Philosophy
Hands Off, Stay in Your Lane, Be Yourself
In Plato’s Charmides, a familiar saying can be about what you own, what you do, or what’s fitting for you to do.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesA cobbler can work on someone else’s shoes and still be doing his own work. That distinction makes trouble for a proverb that sounds like a definition of temperance.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The things you ownSocrates tests what happens if you take the saying to mean working only on things that belong to you. A city full of people making their own shoes and cloaks would be badly run.
- The work you doA cobbler works on other people’s shoes and still does his own job. The Republic gives each citizen work suited to his abilities, which raises the question of how you know what work is yours.
- What’s fitting to doCritias counts good and beneficial actions as properly one’s own. That shifts the question from who owns the object to whether the action itself is good.
- Taking care of yourselfIn Alcibiades I, Socrates distinguishes taking care of your possessions, your body and yourself. The distinction helps explain why Critias’ argument turns toward self-knowledge.
Charmides 161b–c, 161d–162a, 162e–163c, 163c–164a, 164a–d · Republic 433a–b · Thucydides 2.40.2 · Hesiod, Works and Days 311 · Alcibiades I 128a–b, 128b–d, 130b–d, 130d–131b, 131b–c
Charmides’ third definition comes with the comfortable sound of a proverb. Temperance, he says, is doing one’s own business. It sounds like the advice we give a busybody to mind his own business. Everybody knows roughly what that means, which is exactly the problem. The word doing the heavy lifting is own, and it can point to at least three different things. Watching the argument over the next few pages is like watching a ball get passed between three players. The definition never stops long enough for anyone to say who has it.
The first sense is ownership, the hands-off-my-stuff meaning. Your cloak is yours because it belongs to you. Your name is yours because it names you. Socrates asks whether boys who write their enemies’ names are doing other people’s business and whether a city could be well run if everyone had to make his own cloak, shoes, oil-flask and strigil. Read that way, the saying makes the ordinary work of a city look like meddling. The doctor heals other people’s bodies, the builder puts up other people’s houses and the weaver makes other people’s cloaks.
The second sense is responsibility for a task, the stay-in-your-lane meaning. Your own business is your job, your role, the part of the work that’s assigned to you. A cobbler who makes shoes for the whole neighborhood is doing his own business perfectly well. In the Republic, Socrates draws on the familiar maxim when he connects justice with each person doing the work for which they’re best suited. That gives the words a defensible meaning, and it raises a question the phrase can’t answer by itself. Who decides what your lane is?
The third sense is appropriateness, the be-yourself meaning, and it’s where Critias takes the argument. The Greek word he leans on, oikeios, can describe something properly yours or fitting for you. Critias reads Hesiod’s saying about work as praise for doing good. He says that Hesiod “regarded only such things as appropriate to one, and everything harmful as belonging to others.” Socrates picks up the wording. Critias calls “what is appropriate to one, and one’s own,” good. In that sense, a beneficial action counts as your business. We’re a long way from your cloak and shoes.
The phrase has a political edge, too. In the funeral speech Thucydides gives to Pericles, the Athenians take pride in paying attention to public affairs alongside their own. Pericles says that a citizen who takes no part is useless, and that even people busy earning a living can know what’s going on in the city. On his view, attending to the city is part of your business as a citizen. The saying leaves open the very question people might be arguing about. Which things are yours to get involved in?
There’s a dialogue that sorts out the senses of own more explicitly, Alcibiades I, traditionally attributed to Plato. Socrates distinguishes the person, what belongs to the person, and what belongs to those things in turn. In his account, you are your soul. Your body is yours, and the shoes belong to your feet. Socrates puts money another step away from the self, too. A doctor can know the body without knowing the person in the sense Socrates has in mind. On that map, tending your things, tending your body and tending yourself are three different kinds of care.
That’s why specifying the sense of own matters more than repeating the maxim, however wise it sounds. If it means property, the definition makes ordinary useful work a problem. If it means a role, somebody has to say what each person’s role is. If it means what’s fitting for you, you still have to know what’s genuinely good to do. That question comes up a few lines later. Socrates asks whether a doctor can benefit a patient without knowing what he’s done. Critias balks at the thought that someone could be temperate without knowing it and proposes that temperance is knowing yourself.
My verdict is that doing one’s own business is three definitions wearing the same coat. The argument in the Charmides shows how easily the coat gets passed around. If the business that’s yours is the good you can do, then the proverb has given you work to do. You still have to tell what’s good and whether you’re doing it. Think of that the next time someone tells you to stay in your lane without telling you where the lanes are painted.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does interpreting “one’s own business” as an assigned role improve on the ownership interpretation without fully settling the maxim’s meaning?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If the meaning of “one’s own business” depends on who assigns social roles, what standards could be used to judge whether those assignments are just?→
- Can someone know what is genuinely fitting for them without first knowing what is good? How would Critias’s interpretation answer that question?→
- When does attending to another person’s affairs become improper meddling, and when might it instead be part of one’s responsibility as a citizen or specialist?→