Diotimos Library · Plato Collection · Bilingual Edition
Swipe or use the arrow keys.
Facing Pages · Branch 29 of 44
Charmides · 167e–168c
Ancient Greek
p. 48Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
Ἔρωτα δὲ φαίης ἄν τινα εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ὃς τυγχάνει ὢν ἔρως καλοῦ μὲν οὐδενός, αὑτοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων;
Οὔκ, ἔφη, ἔγωγε.
Φόβον δὲ ἤδη τινὰ κατανενόηκας, ὃς ἑαυτὸν μὲν καὶ τοὺς 168a ἄλλους φόβους φοβεῖται, τῶν δεινῶν δ’ οὐδὲ ἓν φοβεῖται;
Οὐ κατανενόηκα, ἔφη.
Δόξαν δὲ δοξῶν δόξαν καὶ αὑτῆς, ὧν δὲ αἱ ἄλλαι δοξάζουσιν μηδὲν δοξάζουσαν;
Οὐδαμῶς.
Ἀλλ’ ἐπιστήμην, ὡς ἔοικεν, φαμέν τινα εἶναι τοιαύτην, ἥτις μαθήματος μὲν οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, αὑτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη;
Φαμὲν γάρ.
Οὐκοῦν ἄτοπον, εἰ ἄρα καὶ ἔστιν; μηδὲν γάρ πω διισχυριζώμεθα ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔστιν ἔτι σκοπῶμεν.
168bὈρθῶς λέγεις.
Φέρε δή· ἔστι μὲν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἔχει τινὰ τοιαύτην δύναμιν ὥστε τινὸς εἶναι· ἦ γάρ;
Πάνυ γε.
Καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεῖζόν φαμεν τοιαύτην τινὰ ἔχειν δύναμιν, ὥστε τινὸς εἶναι μεῖζον;
Ἔχει γάρ.
Οὐκοῦν ἐλάττονός τινος, εἴπερ ἔσται μεῖζον.
Ἀνάγκη.
Εἰ οὖν τι εὕροιμεν μεῖζον, ὃ τῶν μὲν μειζόνων ἐστὶν μεῖζον καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, ὧν δὲ τἆλλα μείζω ἐστὶν μηδενὸς μεῖζον, 168c πάντως ἄν που ἐκεῖνό γ’ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, εἴπερ ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον εἴη, καὶ ἔλαττον ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι· ἢ οὔ;
Charmides
p. 49“Of course not.”
“And would you say there is a love of such a kind that it turns out to be love of nothing beautiful, but of itself and of the other loves?”1
“No,” he said, “I wouldn’t.”
“And have you ever yet come across a fear which fears itself 168a and the other fears, but fears not one of the things that are dreadful?”
“I haven’t come across one,” he said.
“Or an opinion which is an opinion of opinions and of itself, but has no opinion about any of the things the other opinions are opinions about?”
“Not at all.”
“But knowledge, it seems, we are saying there is of this kind: knowledge of no subject of learning, but knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge?”
“We are.”
“Then isn’t it strange, if there really is such a thing? For let’s not yet insist that there isn’t; let us go on looking into whether there is.”
168b“You’re right.”
“Come then: this knowledge is knowledge of something, and has a certain power such that it is of something, doesn’t it?”2
“Certainly.”
“For we say that the greater, too, has a certain power such that it is greater than something?”
“It has.”
“Than something smaller, that is, if it is to be greater.”
“Necessarily.”
“So if we were to find something greater which is greater than the greater things and than itself, but greater than none of the things than which the others are greater, 168c then surely this would certainly be true of it: if it were greater than itself, it would also be smaller than itself. Wouldn’t it?”
Socrates
Reading Charmides · Charmides · 167e–168c
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Socrates, Charmides, and Critias examine temperance, self-knowledge, and the knowledge of knowledge. The complete dialogue appears in Ancient Greek and English, aligned by the supplied edition’s facing pages and Stephanus references.
Historical Text and Translation
Greek: Plato, Charmides, in J. Burnet, ed., Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903), transcribed by the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University. The supplied edition omits words marked for deletion, retains supplied words, lightly normalizes punctuation and paragraphing, and removes a stray digital numeral at 163c. The digital Greek transcription and its modifications are provided under CC BY-SA 4.0, with attribution to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for clear, measured English while preserving Plato’s conversational rhythm, philosophical distinctions, and the unfolding give-and-take of Socratic inquiry.
Rights
Plato's Greek source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.