Charmides
120 discussion questions for the 2026 Diotimos reading edition of Plato’s Charmides, with Stephanus references from 153a to 176d. Temperance translates sophrosyne.
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Questions for discussion
Return, beauty, and desire12 questions+
How does the return from battle frame the inquiry into temperance?→ Why does Socrates ask about philosophy, wisdom, and beauty together?→ How does the crowd shape our first impression of Charmides?→ What does Socrates admit by calling himself a white measuring-line?→ What does the comparison of Charmides to a statue suggest?→ Why call a good soul the one small thing Charmides still needs?→ What would it mean to strip and examine a soul?→ Does family reputation help us judge a person's character?→ What does the pretence of a headache cure make possible?→ What does the scramble for seats reveal about these men?→ How does Socrates' desire complicate his role as examiner?→ Why might the leaf be powerless without the charm?→
The charm and the care of the soul12 questions+
What role does consent play in the offer of the charm?→ How strong is the analogy between treating a part and a whole?→ Why does Charmides' agreement restore Socrates' confidence?→ What authority does the Thracian physician lend the argument?→ What supports the claim that bodily good and evil begin in the soul?→ How might beautiful words produce temperance?→ Why must wealth, birth, and beauty not alter the terms of treatment?→ Why does Critias welcome an illness as an opportunity?→ How does the praise of Charmides' ancestry affect the inquiry?→ What follows from saying a temperate person needs no charm?→ What makes an honest self-assessment difficult for Charmides?→ How does a joint inquiry change the relation of doctor and patient?→
Quietness and modesty12 questions+
Does possessing a virtue mean one can explain what it is?→ Why might orderly, quiet conduct seem to be temperance?→ Why must temperance count as something fine?→ Do examples of physical speed really refute quietness?→ Is quick learning always better than slow learning?→ Does good deliberation require speed?→ What does the argument establish beyond rejecting quietness?→ What can looking within oneself contribute to a definition?→ How does modesty differ from the earlier idea of quietness?→ Why does the inquiry move from the fine to the good?→ What weight should Homer's words carry in this argument?→ Must a virtue be good in every situation to count as a virtue?→
Doing one's own business12 questions+
What different meanings could doing one's own business have?→ Can we separate the truth of a claim from the person who makes it?→ How does writing other people's names test the definition?→ What does the imagined self-sufficient city reveal?→ Why treat an unclear definition as a riddle rather than an error?→ What does Charmides achieve by teasing the author of the definition?→ How does concern for reputation draw Critias into the discussion?→ What does the poet-and-actor comparison imply about Charmides?→ Does age give Critias a better claim to know what temperance is?→ Can distinguishing making from doing rescue the definition?→ Does Critias' reading of Hesiod clarify work or redefine it?→ What is gained or lost by defining temperance as doing good?→
Good action and self-knowledge12 questions+
Why does Socrates ask whether temperate people know they are so?→ Can a doctor know a treatment without knowing whether it benefits?→ Does an accidentally beneficial action show virtue?→ What makes Critias withdraw an earlier admission?→ How does knowing oneself differ from doing good?→ Why interpret Know thyself as a greeting rather than advice?→ What connects the Delphic sayings in Critias' interpretation?→ Can Socrates examine a definition while claiming not to know?→ What would self-knowledge have as its object?→ Must every kind of knowledge produce something useful?→ What distinguishes a kind of knowledge from its object?→ Why does Critias make temperance an exceptional kind of knowledge?→
Can knowledge know itself?12 questions+
Why does Critias suspect that Socrates wants only to refute him?→ Why fear thinking one knows what one does not know?→ How can refutation benefit everyone present?→ How does knowledge of ignorance alter Critias' definition?→ Why separate the question of possibility from that of benefit?→ Can sight see itself without seeing any colour?→ How well does the analogy with hearing illuminate knowledge?→ Can desire have desire itself as its only object?→ Does opinion about opinion offer a better analogy?→ Why can something not be greater or older than itself?→ Must something that acts upon itself have its object's qualities?→ Do these analogies establish one rule for every kind of self-relation?→
Knowing that and knowing what12 questions+
What does Socrates' admitted uncertainty contribute to the inquiry?→ Why would possibility alone fail to establish temperance?→ What does the image of contagious yawning reveal about perplexity?→ How does Critias' shame affect his response to difficulty?→ What are the risks of granting a disputed premise for discussion?→ Must possessing self-knowing knowledge make its possessor self-knowing?→ Can one recognise knowledge without knowing its subject?→ How does knowing that one knows differ from knowing what one knows?→ What remains of self-knowledge after this distinction?→ Why is the false doctor a crucial test case?→ What makes an examination relevant to a particular craft?→ Must one be an expert to recognise another person's expertise?→
Expertise and the well-governed life12 questions+
What benefit was the stronger account of temperance meant to provide?→ Would knowing our limits prevent us from acting beyond them?→ When should a person entrust a task to someone else?→ Would rule by experts necessarily make a city well governed?→ Does freedom from error guarantee happiness?→ Could awareness of knowledge make learning easier?→ Why might a modest benefit still matter?→ Why restore a stronger definition after finding it doubtful?→ What assumption about expertise does Socrates now question?→ Why present the imagined rule of knowledge as a dream?→ What would a society without false experts gain?→ Does adding reliable prophecy make this society complete?→
Knowledge, goodness, and happiness12 questions+
Why might living with knowledge fail to make us happy?→ What is missing from the claim that knowledge ensures a good life?→ Would knowing every fact be enough for happiness?→ Why ask which kind of knowledge contributes most to happiness?→ Why does knowledge of good and evil emerge as decisive?→ What can the crafts still achieve without knowledge of good and evil?→ How does producing a result differ from making it beneficial?→ Why is knowledge of good and evil not the temperance defined earlier?→ Could supervising knowledge benefit us without producing its results?→ Does Socrates adequately answer Critias' argument about supervision?→ Has temperance proved useless, or has its proposed definition failed?→ How do the granted premises weaken the final argument?→
The ending and the dialogue as a whole12 questions+
Why describe the inquiry as mocking the truth?→ Why does Socrates turn from Critias back to Charmides?→ What warrants Socrates' confidence that temperance is a great good?→ What has Charmides learned if he still cannot define temperance?→ Why does Charmides want the charm after the inquiry has failed?→ Does obedience to Socrates prove temperance, as Critias claims?→ How does the language of force alter the ending's tone?→ What happens to the earlier concern for consent at the end?→ How does Socrates' final submission echo his earlier loss of composure?→ How do Charmides and Critias respond differently to possible ignorance?→ In what sense might the discussion itself have been a charm?→ Does the ending challenge the claim that virtue entails self-knowledge?→