

PLATO

CHARMIDES

ΧΑΡΜΙΔΗΣ

The Greek text of John Burnet
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with a new English translation and notes

THE COMPLETE DIALOGUE

153a–176d

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INTRODUCTION

THE DIALOGUE

The *Charmides* is a conversation about *sōphrosynē*, the virtue this edition calls temperance, and Socrates tells it himself. He has just come home from the siege of Potidaea, and on the day after his return he goes back to his old haunt, the wrestling-school of Tau-reas, to ask how philosophy has been doing and whether any of the young men has turned out outstanding in wisdom or in beauty (153a–d). The answer is Charmides, son of Glaucon, the most admired boy of the moment, whose cousin and guardian Critias is there to introduce him (154a–b, 155a). Socrates tells the story to an unnamed friend, whom he addresses now and then (“my friend”, 154b; “my noble friend”, 155d), and no one else has a speaking part except Chaerephon at the start, Critias and Charmides. The dialogue runs from page 153 to page 176 in the pages of Stephanus’ edition, by which Plato is still cited, and fills thirty-seven pages of Burnet’s Oxford text.

The ancient arrangement of Plato’s works by Thrasyllus, which Diogenes Laertius preserves (3.59), gives the dialogue the subtitle “On temperance”, classes it as “peirastic”, a dialogue of testing, and places it in the fifth tetralogy with the *Theages*, the *Laches* and the *Lysis*; Burnet’s third volume prints them in that order. Like the *Laches* on courage and the *Euthyphro* on piety, the *Charmides* asks what a single virtue is, tests a series of answers, and ends without one. When it was written is not known; it is usually counted among the earlier dialogues.

THE QUESTION AND THE FIRST ANSWERS

The question is what temperance is, and Socrates puts it to Charmides in a particular form. If temperance is present in him, it must give rise to some sense from which he would have an opinion about it, and since he can speak Greek he can say what that opinion is (158e–159a). The boy tries three times. First, temperance is “doing everything in an orderly way and quietly”, “a kind of quietness” (159b); Socrates runs through a schoolboy’s

lessons, writing, reading, the lyre, wrestling and learning, to show that quick things are at least as often fine as quiet ones, and temperance is something fine (159c–160d). Second, temperance “makes a person feel shame”, and is the same as modesty (160e); but Homer says that modesty is no good thing for a man in need, and temperance is good (161a–b). Third, Charmides offers something he has heard: temperance is “doing one’s own business” (161b). Socrates takes “doing” literally. A city in which every man wove his own cloak and cobbled his own shoes would not be well run, so the phrase must be a riddle (161d–162b).

The phrase is Critias’, and at this point he can contain himself no longer (162c–d). He takes the argument over, and his defence turns on words. On the authority of Hesiod he separates making from working and doing: only what is made finely and beneficially is a work, and only the making of good things is a doing; temperance is “the doing of good things” (163b–e). Socrates asks whether a man can be temperate without knowing it. A doctor who makes a patient healthy does something beneficial, and so, on Critias’ account, acts temperately, yet he may not know whether his treatment will benefit (164a–c). Rather than grant that a man who does not know himself can be temperate, Critias gives up everything he has said and starts again: temperance is knowing oneself, the “Know thyself” inscribed at Delphi (164d–165b).

KNOWLEDGE OF KNOWLEDGE

Nearly half the dialogue (164d–175b) examines this last definition and what Critias makes of it. Asked what temperance produces, as medicine produces health and house-building houses (165c–e), Critias answers that temperance is unlike the other kinds of knowledge: it alone is knowledge both of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself (166c), and, as he then agrees, also of the lack of knowledge (166e). Only the temperate man, then, will know what he knows and what he does not know, and be able to examine others in the same way (167a).

Socrates asks two questions: whether such a knowledge is possible at all, and whether it would benefit us (167b). On the first he offers a procession of parallels: a sight that sees no color but only itself and the other sights, a hearing that hears no sound, a love that loves nothing beautiful, a fear that fears nothing dreadful (167c–168a), and a greater that is greater than itself and so smaller than itself (168b–c). He leaves the question to “a great man” (169a), and, with Critias too embarrassed to admit that he is at a loss (169c),

grants for the sake of argument that knowledge of knowledge exists (169d). The second question does the damage. A knowledge that knows only knowledge could tell that a man knows something, but not what he knows, and so it could not tell a doctor from a man pretending to be one, since only medicine knows the healthy and the diseased (170a–171c). Socrates describes the life that temperance as first imagined would have given, households and cities run without error because everyone would do only what he knew (171d–172a), then doubts that it would even do that much good (172c–d). In his “dream” he grants it everything (173a–d) and asks whether living knowledgeably would make us happy. It would not, unless one knew the right things; and when Critias names the knowledge that makes men happy, it is the knowledge of good and bad (174b). Without it the other crafts go on working, but nothing is done “well and beneficially” (174c–d). Critias tries to save his definition by putting temperance in charge of this knowledge too (174d–e), but temperance was agreed to be knowledge of knowledge and of nothing else, and so it turns out to be “the craftsman of no benefit” (175a).

THE ENDING

Socrates declares the inquiry a failure: “we are beaten on every side” (175b). He and Critias granted, against what the argument allowed, both that there is knowledge of knowledge and that by it one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge, and even so temperance has come out of no benefit (175b–d). He blames himself, not temperance: he is “a poor inquirer”, and temperance “a great good” (175e). Charmides, who does not know whether he has it, asks to be charmed every day; Critias orders him to it as proof that he is temperate; and Charmides, speaking for both, tells Socrates playfully that they will use force if he resists. “Then I won’t oppose you,” he says, and the dialogue ends (176a–d).

WHAT IS MOST EXPOSED

Three things in the dialogue are likely to trouble a first-time reader, and they are best stated plainly.

First, the dialogue fails on its own terms, and says so. It is not only that no definition survives. Socrates says that he and Critias “conceded many things that did not follow in the argument” (175b), and that the inquiry “has made such a mockery of the truth” (175d). Readers have long looked for a positive teaching

behind the failure, and the likeliest place is the knowledge of good and bad at 174b–d, which temperance, as Critias defines it, cannot contain. That is an interpretation, and the notes mark it as one.

Second, the knowledge of knowledge that the argument takes apart looks very like Socrates' own. In the *Apology* he examines others to find out who thinks he knows and does not, and he does not think he knows what he does not know (21d; compare 21b–23b). Critias' account at 167a describes this activity closely, and the argument concludes that such a knowledge could not tell who knows what (170d). Whether Plato is testing Socrates' wisdom or only Critias' version of it, the text does not say.

Third, the two men who discuss temperance here were remembered for the opposite. A quarter of a century later Critias was the leading figure among the Thirty, the oligarchy that ruled Athens by terror in 404/3, and Charmides served it as one of the Ten set over the Piraeus; both died fighting the democrats in 403. Plato was their kinsman: Critias was his mother's cousin, Charmides her brother, and Pyrilampes, praised at 158a, later married her. The dialogue mentions none of this. But its last lines, in which Charmides and his guardian resolve, in fun, to use force, were written for readers who knew how the story ended.

THE MANNER

The *Charmides* is among the funniest of Plato's dialogues, and much of it is carried by its comedy. The prologue is openly erotic and self-mocking. Socrates, "a white measuring-line on white stone" where the beautiful are concerned (154b), proposes to strip the boy's soul before his body (154e), joins the men on the bench in shoving his neighbor to make room for the boy, until one man at the end is made to stand up and another is tipped off sideways (155c), and, glimpsing inside his cloak, is "on fire" and "no longer in my own possession" (155d). His cure for the boy's headache is a charm that must be applied to the soul first (155e–157c), and the charm, on the dialogue's own hints, is conversation of the right kind (157a).

The comedy of the argument is quieter. Charmides passes his guardian's phrase to Socrates, then, when it is in trouble, laughs slyly and glances across at its author (162b). Critias is proud of his learning and fond of distinctions (163b–d), and when he catches Socrates' perplexity "like people who catch a yawn", he is too vain to admit that he is at a loss (169c–d). Socrates' examples are deliberately homely: cutting leather, working bronze, wool and

wood (173d–e), draughts (174b), cobbling (174c); and his tone runs from the mock-solemn (“the third time, for the Savior”, 167a) to open teasing (“You rascal!”, 161b, 174b). The translation tries to keep all of this and to add nothing; the jokes are Plato’s, and where the English cannot carry one a note says what it was.

ON READING THIS EDITION

Each left-hand page is a page of Burnet’s Oxford text, line for line, with his apparatus at the foot; each right-hand page translates it. The Key Words of the Dialogue, which follow, explain the words on which the argument turns and how they are rendered; the Outline gives the argument’s joints by Stephanus page; and the Editorial Note sets out the conventions of both pages. At the back, the Glossary lists the renderings for reference, and the Note on this Edition says how the volume was made and where a reader should be careful.

A NOTE ON THE PERSONS

The dialogue itself establishes little about its characters. Socrates has just come back from Potidaea after a heavy battle (153b–c). Critias is the son of Callaeschrus (153c, 169b) and the cousin and guardian of Charmides (154b, 155a, 176c); Charmides is the son of Glaucon (154b, 158b) and the nephew of Pyrilampes (158a), and his father’s house descends from Critias son of Dropides, whose family was kin to Solon (155a, 157e). Charmides was not yet grown up when Socrates left for Potidaea (154a–b), and he is already thought a philosopher and a poet (154e–155a). Chaerephon is Socrates’ excitable friend (153b).

The rest comes from other sources, and on some points they disagree. Socrates (469–399 BC) served at Potidaea (Plato, *Symposium* 219e–220e). The city revolted in 432 and surrendered in the winter of 430/29 (Thucydides 1.56–66, 2.70), and scholars differ over whether the homecoming is set in 432 or in 429. Critias (c. 460–403) was a poet and prose writer as well as a politician; some works ascribed to him, among them a speech on the invention of the gods from a play called *Sisyphus*, are also ascribed to Euripides. Charmides appears in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* (3.7), where Socrates urges him, a capable man too diffident to speak in the Assembly, to take part in public life, and in Xenophon’s *Symposium* (4.29–32), where he praises the freedom of being poor. Under the oligarchy of 404/3 Critias was one of the Thirty and among their

leaders, and Charmides was one of the Ten in the Piraeus; both fell at Munychia (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.4.19). Plato (c. 428/7–348/7) was the son of Perictione, Charmides' sister.

KEY WORDS OF THE DIALOGUE

These notes are for orientation, not reference: each explains a word the argument leans on, what it meant in Plato's Athens, and what the dialogue does with it. The Glossary at the back lists the renderings with the places where they matter.

TEMPERANCE (SŌPHROSYNĒ)

The word is formed from *sōs*, "sound", and *phrēn*, "mind", and in ordinary Athenian use it covered a wide range: sound-mindedness and good sense, self-control over appetite, moderation, the modesty and good order expected of a well-brought-up youth, and the grown man's sense of his own limits. The dialogue tries several of these senses in turn. Charmides' first two answers, quietness and modesty (159b, 160e), take the virtue as it shows in a young man's behavior, which is how he knows it; Critias' answers move from conduct (doing one's own business, doing good things) to knowledge (knowing oneself, knowledge of knowledge). No English word covers the whole range. "Temperance" has been kept throughout, one word for one word, because the argument tests definition after definition of the same word, and the reader needs to see the same thing being tried each time. Its narrower modern sense, abstinence from drink, should be set aside: the dialogue never treats temperance in that way. The adjective *sōphrōn* is "temperate", and the verb *sōphronein*, "to be temperate", is also the word of the Delphic greeting as Critias reads it, "Be temperate!" (164e).

KNOWLEDGE (EPISTĒMĒ), AND KNOWLEDGE OF KNOWLEDGE

Epistēmē means both knowing and a body of knowledge, a science or an expertise, and the argument treats crafts such as medicine and house-building as *epistēmai* (165c–d). The English says "knowledge" throughout, and "kinds of knowledge" where the Greek is plural. From 166c–e the phrase that matters is *epistēmē epistēmēs*, "knowledge of knowledge": a knowledge whose object is not health or number but knowledge itself, its own and that of the other kinds. Its partner is *anepistēmosynē*, "lack of knowledge" (166e), which the English keeps visibly tied to its root rather than

calling it ignorance. A reader should notice how much this phrase is made to carry. Critias accepts that it is the same as knowing what one knows and what one does not know (167a, 170a) and as knowing oneself (169e), and the argument shows that it is not the same as the first: knowledge of knowledge would tell only *that* someone knows, not *what* he knows (170c–d). “Knowledgeably” (*epistēmōnōs*), in the dream and after (173d–174b), is the adverb of the same word.

KNOWING ONESELF (GIGNŌSKEIN HEAUTON)

“Know thyself” was one of the maxims inscribed at the temple of Apollo at Delphi, and Critias reads it as the god’s greeting, meaning “Be temperate” (164d–165a). The phrase is prepared a few lines earlier, where the doctor “does not know himself—how he has acted” (164c): the Greek makes the doctor himself the object of “know”, and Critias seizes on the formula. From 166c the argument shifts, without comment, from knowledge *of oneself* (the reflexive of a person, *heautou*) to knowledge *of itself* (the reflexive of a knowledge, *heautēs*). The English follows the shift, so that “of oneself” and “of itself” are both Plato’s; the difference between a man knowing himself and a knowledge knowing itself is one the dialogue never quite resolves.

DOING ONE’S OWN BUSINESS (TO TA HEAUTOU PRATTEIN)

Literally “doing one’s own (things)”, this was an ordinary Greek phrase for minding one’s own affairs, the opposite of meddling, *polypragmosynē*, whose verb Socrates uses at 161d (“were you being busybodies”). In the *Republic* (433a–b) the same formula defines justice. Charmides offers it at 161b, and Socrates makes it absurd by taking “doing” in its widest sense, so that a boy writing his enemy’s name is doing his enemy’s business. The English keeps the verb “do” wherever the argument depends on it.

DOING, MAKING, WORKING (PRATTEIN, POIEIN, ERGAZESTHAI)

Critias answers Socrates with a distinction he claims from Hesiod, whose saying “work is no disgrace” (*Works and Days* 311) he cites: making (*poiein*) is not the same as doing (*prattein*) or working (*ergazesthai*), and only what is made finely and beneficially is a “work” (*ergon*), and only the making of good things a doing (163b–d). For the distinction to be visible the three verbs are kept apart

throughout the argument of 161b–164c: “make” for *poiein*, “do” for *prattein*, “work” for *ergazesthai* and “works” for *erga*. An earlier state of this edition had Socrates speak of “making and doing his own” at 162a, where the Greek is “working and doing”; that left Critias citing a word Socrates had not used, and it has been corrected.

DOING WELL, AND HAPPY (EU PRATTEIN, EUDAIMŌN)

Eu prattein, “to do well”, means both to act well and to fare well, to prosper, as English “do well” also can. The argument about the benefit of temperance rides on the double sense: those who act without error “must necessarily do finely and well in every action, and those who do well must be happy” (172a). *Eudaimōn* is “happy” and *eudaimonein* “to be happy”, in the Greek sense of a life that goes well as a whole rather than a passing feeling. The dream at 173a–d grants that temperance would make us live “knowledgeably”, and asks whether that is the same as doing well and being happy; it is not (173d–174c).

FINE, BEAUTIFUL (KALOS)

Kalos is the ordinary word for a beautiful body and for a fine or noble act, and the dialogue uses both senses, one after the other. In the prologue it is the word for Charmides’ beauty, rendered “beautiful” (154a–155d); in the argument it is the premise that temperance is something *kalon*, rendered “fine” (159c–160d). A reader who hears only one sense will miss that the argument begins with the same word as the flirtation. Its opposite *aischros* means both “ugly” and “shameful”; the argument uses it of ugly, laborious movements (159d). The stock phrase *kalos kagathos*, a gentleman of the proper sort, which Critias uses at 154e in its full form, *kalos kai agathos*, is kept literally as “beautiful and good” so that its joke shows.

MODESTY (AIDŌS)

Charmides’ second answer (160e). *Aidōs* is the sense of shame or respect that holds a person back, and in a boy it shows as blushing; the same word, rendered “bashfulness”, describes his blush at 158c. It is not modesty about one’s achievements, and not prudery. The refutation rests on Homer’s line that modesty is no good thing for a man in need (161a), and on the premise that temperance is always good.

GOOD AND BAD (AGATHOS, KAKOS)

The pair appears at three joints of the argument: in the Thracian doctrine that everything, “bad and good alike”, flows from the soul (156e); in Critias’ definition of temperance as the doing of good things rather than bad (163e); and in the knowledge that Critias finally names as the one that makes us happy, the knowledge “of good and bad” (174b–d). The English keeps “good and bad” all three times, so that the reader can see Critias’ last answer return to his first. An earlier state of this edition had “good and evil” at 174b–d, which brought in a narrowly moral sense and a biblical echo that the Greek does not have; the context there is benefit and harm.

BENEFIT (ŌPHELIMOS, ŌPHELEIN)

Ōphelimos, “beneficial”, and its family (“benefit”, “of no benefit”) carry the second of Socrates’ two questions, whether temperance would benefit us (167b, 169b), and the verdict, that it is “the craftsman of no benefit” (175a). The family is rendered “benefit” throughout so that the verdict answers the question in its own terms: the doctor who acts “beneficially” (164b–c), Critias’ things made “finely and beneficially” (163c), and the final “of no benefit” (175d). “Use” and “useful” are kept for other words, *ophelos*, *chrēstos* and *chrēsimos* (155e, 165a, 165c, 172c, 175a); at 175b Socrates plays on *ophelos* in *anōphelēs*, “of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well”, and the English keeps the play. Earlier states of this edition had “usefully” at 163c and “useless” at 175d.

CHARM AND REMEDY (EPŌIDĒ, PHARMAKON)

The *pharmakon* is a drug or remedy, here a leaf for the head; the *epōidē*, from *epaeidein*, “to sing over”, is an incantation sung over the patient, and is rendered “charm” (155e). Greek healing could pair the two. Socrates improvises on Critias’ ruse, but the charm he describes works on the soul, and consists of “beautiful words” (157a); the dialogue returns to it at its close, when Charmides asks to be charmed every day (175e–176b).

LOOK INTO, AND AT A LOSS (SKOPEIN, APOREIN)

Socrates’ constant word for what he and his partners are doing is *skopein* or *skeptesthai*, “to look into”, and it is rendered with

the same English phrase wherever the repetition can be heard (158d–e, 161b–c, 167b, 169b, 175a). Its failure is *aporia*: *poros* is a way through, and *aporein*, “to be at a loss”, is to have none (167b, 169c–d). Socrates admits to being at a loss (167b); Critias catches it from him like a yawn and will not admit it (169c).

OUTLINE

The divisions follow the argument, not the blocks in which the edition was made. References are to Stephanus pages and sections, which stand in the margins of both pages of the text.

I. PROLOGUE: THE RETURN FROM POTIDAEA (153A–154B)

- 153a–d** Socrates, back from the army, goes to the wrestling-school of Taureas. Chaerephon runs to meet him: “how did you come out of the battle alive?” “Like this, as you see.” He gives the news from the camp, then asks his own questions: how is philosophy doing, and has any young man turned out outstanding “in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both”?
- 154a–b** Critias points to the crowd coming in, the “advance guard and the lovers” of the most beautiful boy of the moment: his cousin Charmides.

II. THE BEAUTIFUL BOY AND THE CHARM (154B–158C)

- 154b–155a** Charmides enters, and the boys all gaze at him “as if he were a statue”. Socrates is “a white measuring-line on white stone” where the beautiful are concerned. If the boy stripped he would seem to have no face; Socrates proposes to strip his soul first.
- 155b–e** Critias’ ruse: Socrates is to pose as a doctor with a remedy for the boy’s morning headache. Everyone on the bench shoves along to make room for him, until one man at the end is made to stand up and another is tipped off sideways; Socrates sees inside his cloak and is “on fire”. The remedy is a leaf, with a charm to go with it.
- 156a–157c** The charm and its doctrine. Good doctors treat the part with the whole; Zalmoxis, the Thracian god-king, teaches that the body cannot be cured without the soul, and that the soul is treated with charms, which are “beautiful words”, from which temperance comes to be. No one is to persuade Socrates to treat anyone’s head with the remedy unless he first hands over his soul to the charm.
- 157c–158c** Critias vouches that Charmides is the most temperate

of his age. Socrates praises the boy's ancestry and asks him directly: has he temperance already, or does he need the charm?

III. THE QUESTION PUT (158C–159A)

158c–e Charmides blushes and cannot answer either way without boasting or calling Critias a liar. Socrates proposes to “look into it together”.

158e–159a The method: if temperance is present in him, it must give rise to some sense, from which he has an opinion about what it is; “since you know how to speak Greek”, he can say it.

IV. CHARMIDES' THREE ANSWERS (159B–162B)

159b–160d Temperance is “a kind of quietness”. But temperance is fine, and in body and soul quick things are at least as often fine as quiet ones.

160d–161b Temperance is modesty. But temperance is good, and Homer says that “modesty is no good thing to be present with a man in need”.

161b–162b Temperance is “doing one's own business”, a phrase Charmides has heard from someone. Taken literally it would mean writing only one's own name and making only one's own shoes; it must be “a riddle”. Charmides laughs slyly and looks at Critias.

V. CRITIAS TAKES OVER (162C–164D)

162c–e Critias, angry “as a poet is with an actor who makes a mess of the poet's own verses”, takes the argument over.

163a–e Hesiod's “work is no disgrace”: making is not doing or working, and only the making of good things is doing. Socrates recalls Prodicus' distinctions and asks for a plain definition: temperance is “the doing of good things”.

164a–d The doctor who benefits a patient acts temperately, yet may not know that he has; so a man could be temperate without knowing himself. Critias would sooner take back some of what he has agreed than grant it.

VI. KNOW THYSELF (164D–167A)

164d–165b Critias' new definition: temperance is knowing oneself, the god's greeting at Delphi in place of “Rejoice!”. Socrates answers that he inquires because he does not himself know.

- 165c–166b** If temperance is knowledge, what is its work, as health is the work of medicine? Critias: it has no product, like calculation and geometry. Socrates: but they have objects distinct from themselves.
- 166b–e** Critias: temperance alone is knowledge of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself, and Socrates is only trying to refute him. Socrates: he refutes others for the same reason he examines himself, “for fear that I might ever, without noticing, think I know something when I don’t”.
- 166e–167a** Knowledge of knowledge is also knowledge of the lack of knowledge: the temperate man alone knows what he knows and what he does not know, and can examine others.

VII. IS KNOWLEDGE OF KNOWLEDGE POSSIBLE? (167A–169D)

- 167a–c** “The third time, for the Savior”: two questions, whether it is possible and whether it would benefit us. Socrates can find “no way through”.
- 167c–168a** The parallels: a sight that sees no color, a hearing that hears no sound, a sense of senses, a desire for no pleasure, a wish for no good, a love of nothing beautiful, a fear of nothing dreadful, an opinion about nothing.
- 168b–169a** Relations: a greater than itself would be smaller than itself, a double of itself half of itself. Hearing that hears itself must have a sound. “It needs a great man” to decide.
- 169b–d** Socrates’ “prophetic hunch” that temperance is beneficial and good. Critias catches his perplexity like a yawn and covers it up. The existence of knowledge of knowledge is granted for now.

VIII. WHAT WOULD IT BE GOOD FOR? (169D–172D)

- 169d–170d** Even granted, knowledge of knowledge would know only *that* one knows, not *what*: the healthy is known by medicine, not by temperance.
- 170d–171c** So the temperate man could not tell a real doctor from a pretender; only another doctor could.
- 171d–172a** What temperance would have given if it were what was first supposed: a life without error, households and cities well run, and those who do well are happy.
- 172b–d** What is left: learning more easily and examining others better. Perhaps the search “has been to no useful purpose”; and they agreed too easily that it would be a great good for each to

do only what he knew.

IX. THE DREAM, AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND BAD (172E–175A)

- 172e–173d** “By the dog”: Socrates tells his “dream”, through horn or ivory. Temperance rules; no impostor deceives us; we are healthier, safer and better shod; the true prophets tell us the future. We would live knowledgeable, but would we do well and be happy?
- 173d–174b** Knowledgeably about what? Not cutting leather or working bronze. The prophet; the man who knows past, present and future. Which knowledge makes him happy: draughts? calculation? health? Critias: the knowledge by which one knows good and bad. “You rascal!”
- 174b–d** Without this knowledge the other crafts still work, but nothing is done “well and beneficially”. It, not temperance, is the knowledge whose work is to benefit us.
- 174d–175a** Critias: temperance, ruling over all knowledge, rules this too. Socrates: temperance was agreed to be knowledge of knowledge only; it will not make us healthy, and it is “the craftsman of no benefit”.

X. THE VERDICT (175A–176A)

- 175a–b** Socrates’ fear was justified; “we are beaten on every side”, and cannot find what the lawgiver gave this name to.
- 175b–d** The recapitulation: they conceded, though the argument did not allow it, that there is knowledge of knowledge and that by it one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge; even so temperance comes out of no benefit. The inquiry “has made such a mockery of the truth”.
- 175d–176a** Socrates is grieved for Charmides and for the Thracian charm. He is “a poor inquirer”; temperance is a great good; if Charmides has it, he is blessed.

XI. EPILOGUE: THE CHARM, AND FORCE (176A–D)

- 176a–b** Charmides does not know whether he has temperance, is “not altogether persuaded” by Socrates, and asks to be charmed every day.
- 176b–d** Critias orders it as proof of his temperance; Charmides obeys his guardian. “What are you plotting to do?” “We’ve finished plotting.” “So you’ll use force ... and won’t even give me a

preliminary hearing?" "Count on force." "Then I won't oppose you."

EDITORIAL NOTE

The Greek text. The Greek is John Burnet's, from the third volume of his Oxford Classical Text of Plato (1903), which remains the standard critical text of the *Charmides*. The copy reproduced is the second impression of January 1909, "corrected in a number of places", printed at Oxford by Horace Hart. It is reproduced page for page and line for line: each left-hand page of this edition is one page of Burnet, with his line-ends, his marginal section letters and line numbers, and his apparatus criticus at the foot. The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library's digital transcription of Burnet, and every line was then checked against the photographs of the 1909 impression; where the two differ, this edition prints what Burnet printed, including a few forms that look like misprints (the grave accent on Θραῖξ at 156d6, for instance). Burnet's paragraphing (a new, indented paragraph at each change of speaker), his capitals at the openings of speeches, his quotation marks (157b, 165c–e), his letterspacing of the quoted verse at 155d and his setting of Homer's line on a line of its own at 161a are all kept. In his text, square brackets [] enclose words he believed spurious, and angle brackets < > words that are not in the principal manuscripts and have been supplied from later ones or by conjecture.

Reading the apparatus. The notes at the foot of each Greek page are Burnet's, unaltered. Entries are keyed by section letter and line as numbered in the margin, so that "a 4" is the fourth line of section a; a further entry on the same line follows after a wider space without repeating the key. Usually the reading printed in the text comes first, followed by the witnesses that have it; a colon separates it from the alternatives, each followed by its witnesses. Where the text's reading is followed by a square bracket, as in "a 4 ἄν που] δῆπου ci. Naber", the witnesses for the text are not listed and only the alternatives are given; three spaced points stand for words left out of a quotation. A scholar's name alone marks a reading, addition or deletion made in that scholar's edition or study; *ci.* marks a conjecture he proposed; *scripsi*, "I have written", marks Burnet's own emendation, and *an ...?*, "perhaps ...?", a suggestion of Burnet's that he did not adopt.

The witnesses. The three principal manuscripts are B, the Bodleian Plato (MS. E. D. Clarke 39, written in 895); T, the Venice manuscript (Marcianus, Append. Class. 4, cod. 1); and W, the Vienna manuscript (Vindobonensis 54, suppl. phil. Gr. 7). The raised numerals and small letters are correcting hands: B² is an early corrector of B (Burnet's Preface suggests Arethas or his scribe), B³ a further hand in B, and b later hands; T², T³ and t are the corresponding hands in T. Letters written together share a reading: "BW" is B and W, "Bt" B and a later hand in T. Burnet also cites, by name, the Coislinianus (Coisl.), Ambrosianus 56 (Ambr. 56), Parisini 1809 and 1812 (Par.), Laurentianus lxxxv. 6 (Laur.) and Venetus 189 (Ven. 189), and a manuscript he calls Θ, which he does not identify in this volume. In the *Protagoras* (329c) Θ shares gaps in B that a later hand filled, which suggests that it was copied from B; it may be the Vaticanus gr. 226 that Bekker and Stallbaum cite as Θ, though this has not been confirmed. The printed editions cited are the Aldine (Aldina, Venice 1513), the second Basel edition (Basileensis altera, Basel 1556) and that of Stephanus (1578), whose pages give the standard references. Burnet cites two ancient authors who quote the dialogue: Stobaeus, the anthologist, whose excerpts cover 156d–157b, 164d–165a and 173a–d, and the grammarian Priscian (Priscianus), whom he cites only at 160c, although Priscian also quotes 155e and 175d–e.

Abbreviations. *add.*, added; *addub.*, doubted; *al.*, other manuscripts; *altera manu*, in another hand; *ante*, before; *bis*, twice; *ci.*, conjectured; *compendio*, in an abbreviated form; *corr.*, corrected (with a manuscript's name, a correction found in that manuscript); *del.*, deleted; *et*, and; *et mox*, and just after; *fuit qui ... mallet*, there was one who preferred; *γρ.*, a variant introduced by *γράφεται*, "it is (also) read"; *in marg.*, in the margin; *in ras.*, written over an erasure; *lacunam indicat*, marks a gap; *om.*, omitted; *post*, after; *posterius*, the second (of two occurrences); *re vera*, in fact; *rec.*, a later hand; *recc.*, later manuscripts; *scr.*, written in (*scr. recc.*, the reading of later manuscripts; with a manuscript's name, the reading of that manuscript); *secl.*, bracketed as spurious; *sed*, but; *sic*, so written; *supra*, above; *suprascr.*, written above the line; *transp.*, transposed; *ut videtur*, as it seems; *vel*, or. "W. Dindorf" is the scholar Wilhelm Dindorf, not the manuscript W.

The English. The translation is new. It aims to be exact, with every clause answering to a clause of the Greek, and to keep what translations of this dialogue often lose: Socrates' humor. That means his deadpan understatement, his mock-heroics, his teasing

of Critias, his comic confession of being thrown into confusion by a beautiful boy, and the quick timing of the short exchanges. Socrates tells the story to an unnamed friend, and his asides to that friend are kept. Where a joke depends on the Greek and cannot be carried into English, a note explains it briefly. Nothing is added to the text to make it funnier, with one declared exception: at 154b Plato quotes half of a proverb his hearers would finish for themselves, and the English finishes it. Words that Burnet brackets as spurious are not translated. Words added in angle brackets are translated, and marked in the English only where the addition changes the sense (167b).

Each right-hand page translates the Greek page opposite. When a sentence runs over the turn of Burnet's page, the English breaks at the nearest point English word order allows and leaves the sentence unfinished at the foot of the page, as the Greek does. The Stephanus section letters in the margin of the English mark where each section begins, so that any passage can be found in the Greek or cited by the standard reference.

Temperance. The dialogue is an inquiry into *sōphrosynē*, a virtue whose Greek range (soundness of mind, self-control, moderation, modesty, decorum) has no single English equivalent. It is rendered "temperance" throughout, one word for one word, because the argument tests definition after definition of that word and the reader needs to see the same thing being tried each time. The note at 157a and the Key Words of the Dialogue say more.

The notes. The translator's notes at the foot of the English page identify people, places and quotations; explain the jokes the English cannot carry; flag the places where Burnet's choice of reading changes the sense; and mark the dramatic irony every ancient reader would have felt, since the two aristocrats who answer Socrates here, Critias and his young cousin Charmides, were a quarter of a century later among the men of the oligarchy of 404/3, Critias as a leader of the Thirty and Charmides as one of the Ten in the Piraeus. Where a note offers an interpretation, it says so. The notes are numbered afresh on each page.

This edition. The volume contains the whole dialogue, 153a–176d, in Burnet's thirty-seven pages. It was made in five blocks, each checked before the next was begun, and then read through and checked again as a whole; the Introduction, the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Outline and the Glossary were written last, from the finished text. The Note on this Edition, at the back, says how the volume was made, what the checks found, and what remains

undone.

ΧΑΡΜΙΔΗΣ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ

St. II
p. 153

Ἦκομεν τῇ προτεραίᾳ ἐσπέρας ἐκ Ποτειδαίας ἀπὸ τοῦ a
στρατοπέδου, οἷον δὲ διὰ χρόνου ἀφιγμένος ἀσμένως ἦα
ἐπὶ τὰς συνήθεις διατριβάς. καὶ δὴ καὶ εἰς τὴν Ταυρέου
παλαίστραν τὴν καταντικρὺ τοῦ τῆς Βασίλης ἱεροῦ εἰσῆλ-
θον, καὶ αὐτόθι κατέλαβον πάνυ πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν καὶ 5
ἀγνώστας ἐμοί, τοὺς δὲ πλείστους γνωρίμους. καί με ὥς
εἶδον εἰσιόντα ἐξ ἀπροσδοκίτου, εὐθὺς πόρρωθεν ἡσπάζοντο b
ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν Χαιρεφῶν δέ, ἅτε καὶ μανικὸς ὢν, ἀνα-
πηδῆσας ἐκ μέσων ἔθει πρὸς με, καί μου λαβόμενος τῆς
χειρός, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἦ δ' ὅς, πῶς ἐσώθης ἐκ τῆς μάχης;
Ὀλίγον δὲ πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀπιέναι μάχῃ ἐγεγόνει ἐν τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ, 5
ἣν ἄρτι ἦσαν οἱ τῇδε πεπυσμένοι.

Καὶ ἐγὼ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποκρινόμενος, Οὕτωςί, ἔφην, ὥς
σὺ ὀρᾷς.

Καὶ μὴν ἡγγελταί γε δεῦρο, ἔφη, ἥ τε μάχῃ πάνυ ἰσχυρὰ
γεγονέναι καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ πολλοὺς τῶν γνωρίμων τεθνάναι. c

Καὶ ἐπιεικῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ ἀπήγγελλται.

Παρεγένου μὲν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τῇ μάχῃ;

Παρεγενόμην.

Δεῦρο δὴ, ἔφη, καθεζόμενος ἡμῖν διήγησαι οὐ γάρ τί 5

a1 ἦκομεν BT: ἦκον μὲν bt a2 ἀσμένως B: ἀσμένως T: ἄσμενος Hirschig a4
Βασίλης] βασιλῆς B (sed suprascr. ικ): βασιλικῆς T b1 εἶδον t: ἴδον BT c5 τι
scr. recc.: τοι BTW

We had got back from the army at Potidaea the evening before,¹ 153a
 and after so long away I was glad to make for my old haunts. In
 particular I went into the wrestling-school of Taureas, the one op-
 posite the shrine of Basile,² and there I found a great crowd, some
 of them strangers to me but most of them people I knew. When b
 they saw me come in so unexpectedly, they started greeting me
 at once from across the room, from every side; and Chaerephon,
 madman that he is,³ jumped up from the middle of them all, came
 running over to me, and seized me by the hand.

“Socrates,” he said, “how did you come out of the battle alive?”
 (Shortly before we left there had been a battle at Potidaea, and the
 people here had only just heard the news.)

And I answered him, “Like this, as you see.”

“Well, the word here,” he said, “is that the fighting was very
 heavy, and that many people we know were killed in it.” c

“The word,” I said, “is reasonably accurate.”

“You were there, then,” said he, “in the battle?”

“I was.”

“Then come over here,” he said, “sit down, and tell us all about
 it. We still haven’t

1. Potidaea, a city in the Chalcidice paying tribute to Athens, revolted in 432 BC and was besieged until it surrendered in the winter of 430/29 (Thucydides 1.56–66, 2.70). Socrates served in the siege: in the *Symposium* (219e–220e) Alcibiades tells how he stood the winter barefoot and saved Alcibiades’ life in battle. Whether the homecoming narrated here belongs to 432 or to 429 is disputed.

2. A *palaestra*, or wrestling-school, was an exercise ground where young men trained and their older admirers idled and talked. Basile was a local Athenian goddess worshipped together with Codrus and Neleus; an inscription of 418/17 BC regulates their precinct (IG I³ 84). The manuscripts waver over her name (apparatus, a4).

3. Chaerephon, Socrates’ devoted friend, is the man who asked the Delphic oracle whether anyone was wiser than Socrates (*Apology* 21a, where Socrates calls him “vehement in whatever he set about”). Aristophanes makes him a pale, “half-dead” inmate of the Thinkery in the *Clouds*. *Manikos*, “crazy”, is an affectionate label for a man who did everything at a run.

πω πάντα σαφῶς πεπύσμεθα. Καὶ ἅμα με καθίζει ἄγων
παρὰ Κριτίαν τὸν Καλλαίσχρου.

Παρακαθεζόμενος οὖν ἡσπαζόμεν τὸν τε Κριτίαν καὶ τοὺς
ἄλλους, καὶ διηγούμεν αὐτοῖς τὰ ἀπὸ στρατοπέδου, ὅτι μὲ
τις ἀνέροιτο ἡρώτων δὲ ἄλλος ἄλλο.

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἄδην εἵχομεν, αὖθις ἐγὼ αὐτοὺς
ἀνηρώτων τὰ τῇδε, περὶ φιλοσοφίας ὅπως ἔχοι τὰ νῦν, περὶ
τε τῶν νέων, εἴ τινες ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφέροντες ἢ σοφία ἢ κάλλει
ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἐγγεγονότες εἶεν. καὶ ὁ Κριτίας ἀποβλέψας
πρὸς τὴν θύραν, ἰδὼν τινας νεανίσκους εἰσιόντας καὶ λοι-
δορουμένους ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἄλλον ὄχλον ὀπισθεν ἐπόμενον,
Περὶ μὲν τῶν καλῶν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτίκα μοι δοκεῖς
εἴσεσθαι οὗτοι γὰρ τυγχάνουσιν οἱ εἰσιόντες πρόδρομοί τε
καὶ ἐρασταὶ ὄντες τοῦ δοκοῦντος καλλίστου εἶναι τὰ γε δὴ
νῦν, φαίνεται δέ μοι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγγὺς ἤδη που εἶναι προσιῶν.

Ἔστιν δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τίς τε καὶ τοῦ;

Οἶσθά που σύ γε, ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐπω ἐν ἡλικία ἦν πρὶν σε
ἀπιέναι, Χαρμίδην τὸν τοῦ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ ἡμετέρου θείου
υἱόν, ἐμὸν δὲ ἀνεψιόν.

Οἶδα μέντοι νῆ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ γάρ τι φαῦλος οὐδὲ
τότε ἦν ἔτι παῖς ὢν, νῦν δ' οἶμαί που εὖ μάλα ἂν ἤδη
μειράκιον εἴη.

Αὐτίκα, ἔφη, εἴση καὶ ἡλίκος καὶ οἶος γέγονεν. Καὶ ἅμα
ταῦτ' αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὁ Χαρμίδης εἰσέρχεται.

Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐδὲν σταθμητόν ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ
λευκὴ στάθμη εἰμὶ πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς—σχεδὸν γάρ τί μοι
πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικία καλοὶ φαίνονται—ἀτὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ
τότε ἐκεῖνος ἐμοὶ θαυμαστὸς ἐφάνη τό τε μέγεθος καὶ τὸ
κάλλος, οἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι πάντες ἐρᾶν ἔμοιγε ἐδόκουν αὐτοῦ—
οὕτως ἐκπεπληγμένοι τε καὶ τεθορυβημένοι ἦσαν, ἥνίκ'

d1 ἀνέροιτο T: ἂν ἔροιτο B (γρ. καὶ ἀνέροιτο⁷⁰ b) b7 εἰσέρχεται T: ἔρχεται B (γρ.
εἰσέρχεται b) b8 σταθμητόν BT: ἀστάθμητον b

got the whole story straight.” And with that he takes me over and sits me down beside Critias, the son of Callaeschrus.¹

So I sat down beside him, greeted Critias and the others, and gave them the news from the camp, whatever anyone asked; and everyone had a different question. d

When we had had our fill of all that, I asked them my own questions in turn about things here at home: how philosophy was doing these days, and about the young men, whether any of them had turned out to be outstanding in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both. Critias glanced toward the door and saw some young men coming in, trading insults with one another, with another crowd following on behind. 154

“As for the beautiful ones, Socrates,” he said, “I think you’ll know in a moment. The fellows coming in are the advance guard and the lovers² of the one who is thought the most beautiful—at the moment, anyway. And I imagine he must be close by himself, on his way in.”

“Who is he?” I said. “And whose son?”

“You know him,” he said, “but he wasn’t yet grown up when you went away: Charmides, our uncle Glaucon’s son. My cousin.” b

“Of course I know him, by Zeus,” I said. “He was nothing to sniff at even then, when he was still a child; by now, I should think, he must be quite the young man.”

“You’ll know in a moment,” he said, “how big he’s grown and how he’s turned out.” And even as he said it, in comes Charmides.

Now I, my friend, am no measure of anything. Where the beautiful are concerned I am simply a white measuring-line on white stone:³ nearly everyone of that age looks beautiful to me. All the same, at that moment he struck me as a marvel of stature and beauty, and all the rest, it seemed to me, were in love with him, so astounded and flustered were they when c

1. Critias (c. 460–403 BC), cousin of Plato’s mother, was a poet; Charmides, who enters shortly, was her brother. A quarter of a century later Critias led the Thirty, the oligarchy that ruled Athens by terror in 404/3, and Charmides was one of their Ten in the Piraeus; both fell fighting the democrats in 403 (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.4.19). Plato’s readers knew this, and the dialogue’s irony draws on it.

2. *Prodromoi*, “forerunners”, was also the military word for scouts riding ahead of an army; if the sense is felt, Critias is teasing Socrates in the language of his campaign. The “lovers” (*erastai*) are young men, older than the boy they court, as Athenian custom allowed.

3. Plato writes only “a white line”. The proverb ran “a white line on white stone”: a builder’s line was rubbed with red ochre (or black), and a white one on white marble marks nothing. The English completes it so that the joke arrives. The chime of “measure” and “measuring-line” is Plato’s: *stathmēton*, “measurable”, and *stathmē*.

εἰσῆι—πολλοὶ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι ἐρασταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὀπισθεν
εἶποντο. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἡμέτερον τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἦττον θαν- 5
μαστὸν ἦν ἄλλ' ἐγὼ καὶ τοῖς παισὶ προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν,
ὥς οὐδείς ἄλλος' ἔβλεπεν αὐτῶν, οὐδ' ὅστις σμικρότατος
ἦν, ἀλλὰ πάντες ὥσπερ ἄγαλμα ἐθεῶντο αὐτόν. καὶ ὁ
Χαιρεφῶν καλέσας με, Τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ νεανίσκος, ἔφη, d
ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐκ εὐπρόσωπος;

Ὑπερφυῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Οὗτος μέντοι, ἔφη, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἀποδῦναι, δόξει σοι ἀπρόσω-
πος εἶναι οὕτως τὸ εἶδος πάγκαλός ἐστιν. 5

Συνέφασαν οὖν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ταῦτα ταῦτα τῷ Χαιρεφῶντι
κάγώ, Ἡράκλεις, ἔφην, ὥς ἅμαχον λέγετε τὸν ἄνδρα, εἰ ἔτι
αὐτῷ ἐν δὴ μόνον τυγχάνει προσὸν σμικρόν τι.

Τί; ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας.

Εἰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τυγχάνει εὖ πεφυκώς. πρέπει e
δέ που, ὦ Κριτία, τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν εἶναι τῆς γε ὑμετέρας ὄντα
οἰκίας.

Ἄλλ', ἔφη, πάννυ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός ἐστιν καὶ ταῦτα.

Τί οὖν, ἔφην, οὐκ ἀπεδύσαμεν αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ 5
ἐθεασάμεθα πρότερον τοῦ εἶδους; πάντως γάρ που τηλικούτος
ὢν ἤδη ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι.

Καὶ πάννυ γε, ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας, ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ ἔστιν φιλό-
σοφός τε καί, ὥς δοκεῖ ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἐαυτῷ, πάννυ ποιητικός. 155

Τοῦτο μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Κριτία, πόρρωθεν ὑμῖν τὸ
καλὸν ὑπάρχει ἀπὸ τῆς Σόλωνος συγγενείας. ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ
ἐπέδειξάς μοι τὸν νεανίαν καλέσας δεῦρο; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν που
εἰ ἔτι ἐτύγχανε νεώτερος ὢν, αἰσχροὺς ἂν ἦν αὐτῷ διαλέ- 5
γεσθαι ἡμῖν ἐναντίον γε σοῦ, ἐπιτρόπου τε ἅμα καὶ ἀνεψιοῦ
ὄντος.

c7 ἄλλος' ἔβλεπεν scr. Coisl.: ἄλλοσέβλεπεν T: ἄλλος ἔβλεπεν B (sed ω supra o b) W d4 ἐθέλοι BW: ἐθέλει T d7 λέγετε scr. recc.: λέγεται BTW d8 δὴ Θ: δέ B: om. TW e8 φιλόσοφος τε BW (sed γ supra τ W): φιλόσοφος γε T a4 ἂν που] δήπου ci. Naber a5 εἰ ἔτι ἐτύγχανε Goldbacher (εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ἔτι Cobet): ἔτι τυγχάνει BW: εἰ ἐτύγχανε T: γρ. εἰ γ' ἐτύγχανεν in marg. W

he came in; and many other lovers were following among the crowd behind. With us grown men that was less surprising. But I watched the boys too, and not one of them was looking anywhere else, not even the littlest: they were all gazing at him as if he were a statue.¹ And Chaerephon called over to me, “Well, Socrates, what do you think of the young man? Hasn’t he a lovely face?”

“Extraordinarily,” I said.

“And yet if he were willing to strip,” he said, “you’d think he had no face at all, his figure is so perfectly beautiful.”

The others all said the same as Chaerephon, and I said, “Heraclides! What an invincible man you are describing, if he has just one little thing more.”

“What?” said Critias.

“If where his soul is concerned,” I said, “he is in fact well made. And he ought to be, Critias, coming from your family.”

“Oh, he’s thoroughly beautiful and good,” he said, “in that respect too.”²

“Then why don’t we strip that very part of him,” I said, “and take a look at it before we look at his figure? At his age he must surely be willing to have a conversation.”³

“Very much so,” said Critias, “seeing that he is a philosopher and, in other people’s opinion as well as his own, quite the poet.”

“That fine gift, my dear Critias,” I said, “has been in your family a long way back, from your kinship with Solon.⁴ But why don’t you call the youngster over and show him off to me? Even if he were younger still, there would be nothing improper in his talking with us in front of you, his guardian and his cousin.”

1. *Agalma*, “a thing that delights”, is above all the statue of a god set up in a sanctuary, so the boys gaze as worshippers gaze. Alcibiades uses the same word in the *Symposium* for the images of gods hidden inside Socrates, “the images within” (215b, 216e–217a).

2. *Kalos kagathos*, literally “beautiful and good”, was the stock phrase for a gentleman of the proper sort. Critias means the social compliment, but the word “beautiful” in it keeps the conversation where it has been all along, and the English keeps the literal words so that the joke shows.

3. Athletes exercised naked, so “if he were willing to strip” is nothing strange in a palaestra. Socrates takes Chaerephon’s verb (*apodyein*) and turns it on the soul.

4. Solon, the early sixth-century lawgiver and Athens’ first great poet, was a kinsman of Critias’ ancestor Dropides (*Timaeus* 20e). Critias has just called his ward a poet “in other people’s opinion and his own”; poetry, Socrates suggests, runs in the family.

Ἄλλὰ καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, καὶ καλοῦμεν αὐτόν. Καὶ
 ἅμα πρὸς τὸν ἀκόλουθον, Παῖ, ἔφη, κάλει Χαρμίδην, εἰπὼν b
 ὅτι βούλομαι αὐτὸν ἱατρῷ συστήσαι περὶ τῆς ἀσθενείας ἧς
 πρώην πρὸς με ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἀσθενοῖ. Πρὸς οὖν ἐμὲ ὁ Κρι-
 τίας, Ἐναγχὸς τοι ἔφη βαρύνεσθαί τι τὴν κεφαλὴν ἔωθεν
 ἀνιστάμενος ἀλλὰ τί σε κωλύει προσποιήσασθαι πρὸς 5
 αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τι κεφαλῆς φάρμακον;

Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ μόνον ἐλθέτω.

Ἄλλ' ἥξει, ἔφη.

Ὁ οὖν καὶ ἐγένετο. ἦκε γάρ, καὶ ἐποίησε γέλωτα
 πολὺν ἕκαστος γὰρ ἡμῶν τῶν καθημένων συγχωρῶν τὸν c
 πλησίον ἐώθει σπουδῇ, ἵνα παρ' αὐτῷ καθέζοιτο, ἕως τῶν
 ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ καθημένων τὸν μὲν ἀνέστήσαμεν, τὸν δὲ πλάγιον
 κατεβάλομεν. ὁ δ' ἐλθὼν μετὰξὺ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ Κριτίου
 ἐκαθέζετο. ἐνταῦθα μέντοι, ὦ φίλε, ἐγὼ ἤδη ἠπόρουν, καὶ 5
 μου ἢ πρόσθεν θρασύτης ἐξεκέκοπτο, ἦν εἶχον ἐγὼ ὡς πάννυ
 ῥαδίως αὐτῷ διαλεξόμενος ἐπειδὴ δέ, φράσαντος τοῦ Κριτίου
 ὅτι ἐγὼ εἶην ὁ τὸ φάρμακον ἐπιστάμενος, ἐνέβλειπέν τέ μοι
 τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμύχανόν τι οἶον καὶ ἀνήγετο ὡς ἐρωτήσων, d
 καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ παλαίστρᾳ ἅπαντες περιέρρεον ἡμᾶς κύκλῳ
 κομιδῇ, τότε δὴ, ὦ γεννάδα, εἰδόν τε τὰ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἱματίου
 καὶ ἐφλεγόμην καὶ οὐκέτ' ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ ἦν καὶ ἐνόμισα σοφώ-
 τατον εἶναι τὸν Κυδῖαν τὰ ἐρωτικά, ὃς εἶπεν ἐπὶ καλοῦ 5
 λέγων παιδός, ἄλλῳ ὑποτιθέμενος, εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ κατέ-
 ναντα λέοντος νεβρὸν ἐλθόντα μοῖραν αἰρεῖσθαι
 κρεῶν αὐτὸς γάρ μοι ἐδόκουν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου θρέμματος e
 ἐαλωκέναι. ὅμως δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐρωτήσαντος εἰ ἐπισταίμην τὸ τῆς
 κεφαλῆς φάρμακον, μόγις πως ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι ἐπισταίμην.

a8 καλοῦμεν BTW: καλῶμεν scr. Ambr. 56 b9 ὁ BW: ὅπερ T ἦκε T: ἦκει BW
 (sed ε supra ei W) c2 ἐώθει W. Dindorf: ὥθει BT καθίζοιτο in marg. T c4
 κατεβάλομεν T: κατελάβομεν B c8 τέ μοι T (sed ε supra οι): δέ με B d3 εἶδον
 W: ἴδον BT d4 ἐν T: ἐπ' BW d6 κατέναντα T: κατ' ἐναντία BW d7 μοῖραν T:
 μοῖραν W: ἀθανατώσῃ θείᾳ μοῖρα B αἰρεῖσθαι] αἰτεῖσθαι ci. Cobet e1 αὐτὸς
 BT: καὶ αὐτὸς rec. b

“You’re right,” he said. “We’ll call him.” And at once he said ^b to his attendant, “Boy, call Charmides. Tell him I want to introduce him to a doctor about the complaint he was telling me about the other day.” Then Critias said to me, “You know, only lately he was saying that his head feels rather heavy when he gets up in the morning. What’s to stop you pretending to him that you know a remedy for the head?”¹

“Nothing,” I said. “Only let him come.”

“Oh, he’ll come,” he said.

And so it turned out. He came, and caused a great deal of ^c laughter. Every one of us who were sitting there squeezed up and shoved his neighbor hard to make room for Charmides to sit beside him, until, of those sitting at the end, we made one stand up and tipped the other off sideways. He came and sat down between me and Critias. And then, my friend, I really was at a loss: the boldness I’d had before, sure as I was that I would talk to him with the greatest of ease, had been knocked clean out of me. And when Critias told him that I was the one who knew the remedy, and he gave me a look with those eyes of his, a look beyond words, and ^d was just getting under way with a question, and everyone in the wrestling-school came swirling round us in a ring—then, my noble friend, I saw inside his cloak, and I was on fire, and was no longer in my own possession.² And I thought Cydias the wisest of men in the ways of love, who, speaking of a beautiful boy and advising someone else, told him to beware

*of coming, a fawn, into the lion’s presence,
to be caught as a portion of meat;* ^e

for I felt I had been caught by just such a creature myself.³ Still, when he asked me whether I knew the remedy for the head, I did somehow manage to answer that I did.

1. Critias’ ruse casts Socrates as a doctor. The remedy and its charm frame the opening of the dialogue; at its close (175e–176b) the charm returns, though the remedy and the headache are never mentioned again.

2. The *himation* was a loose mantle, and Socrates is frank about what he saw and what it did to him; “no longer in my own possession” is Greek for being beside oneself. Many readers have seen a trial passed here: set on fire, Socrates recovers himself and talks philosophy, a wordless display of the virtue about to be discussed. That is an interpretation, but the dialogue invites it.

3. Cydias is otherwise almost unknown; these words are his only secure fragment (PMG 714), letterspaced by Burnet as a quotation and set in italic here. (A scholiast on Aristophanes’ *Clouds* 967 also credits a Cydias of Hermione with a lyric opening.) In the usual image the lover hunts the boy; in Cydias’ the lover is the fawn and the beautiful boy the lion. Socrates’ “caught” just below (*healōkenai*) is its passive. B garbles the line (apparatus, d7).

Τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐστίν;

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι αὐτὸ μὲν εἷη φύλλον τι, ἐπωδὴ δέ τις 5
ἐπὶ τῷ φαρμάκῳ εἷη, ἣν εἰ μὲν τις ἐπάδοι ἅμα καὶ χρῶτο
αὐτῷ, παντάπασιν ὑγιᾶ ποιοῖ τὸ φάρμακον ἄνευ δὲ τῆς
ἐπωδῆς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἷη τοῦ φύλλου.

Καὶ ὅς, Ἀπογράψομαι τοῖνυν, ἔφη, παρὰ σοῦ τὴν 156
ἐπωδὴν.

Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐάν με πείθῃς ἢ κἂν μῆ;

Γελάσας οὖν, Ἐάν σε πείθω, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ καὶ τοῦνομά μου σὺ ἀκριβοῖς; 5

Εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε, ἔφη οὐ γάρ τι σοῦ ὀλίγος λόγος ἐστίν
ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἡλικιώταις, μέμνημαι δὲ ἔγωγε καὶ παῖς
ὦν Κριτία τῷδε συνόντα σε.

Καλῶς γε σύ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιῶν μᾶλλον γάρ σοι παρ-
ρησιάσομαι περὶ τῆς ἐπωδῆς οἷα τυγχάνει οὔσα ἄρτι δ' b
ἠπόρουν τίνι τρόπῳ σοι ἐνδειξαίμην τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς.
ἔστι γάρ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, τοιαύτη οἷα μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν
κεφαλὴν μόνον ὑγιᾶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἴσως ἤδη καὶ σὺ
ἀκήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰατρῶν, ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοῖς προσ- 5
έλθῃ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀλγῶν, λέγουσί που ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν
τε αὐτοὺς μόνους ἐπιχειρεῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἰᾶσθαι, ἀλλ'
ἀναγκαῖον εἷη ἅμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν, εἰ μέλλοι
καὶ τὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων εὖ ἔχειν καὶ αὐτὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν c
οἷσθαι ἂν ποτε θεραπεύσαι αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἄνευ ὅλου
τοῦ σώματος πολλὴν ἄνοιαν εἶναι. ἐκ δὲ τούτου τοῦ λόγου
διαίταις ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα τρεπόμενοι μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ
μέρος ἐπιχειροῦσιν θεραπεύειν τε καὶ ἰᾶσθαι ἢ οὐκ ἦσθησαι 5
ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως λέγουσιν τε καὶ ἔχει;

Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι καὶ ἀποδέχῃ τὸν λόγον;

a 3, 4 πείθῃς . . . πείθω] πείσῃς . . . πείσω ci. H. Richards a 4 ἔφη TW: om. B
a 7 ἔγωγε T: ἐγώ τε B a 9 γε corr. Coisl.: δὲ BT b 8 εἷη] ἂν εἷη ci. Madvig c 2
ποτε TW: ποθεν B

“So what is it?” he said.

And I told him that the thing itself was a leaf, but that there was a charm to go with the remedy; if one sang the charm while using it, the remedy made one perfectly healthy, but without the charm the leaf was no use at all.¹

“Then I’ll copy the charm down from you,” he said.

“If you persuade me,” I said, “or even if you don’t?”

He laughed. “If I persuade you, Socrates,” he said.²

“Very well,” I said. “And you are sure you have my name right?”

“I’d be doing you an injustice if I didn’t,” he said. “You’re talked about a good deal among people my age, and I remember you from when I was a boy, keeping company with Critias here.”

“Good for you,” I said. “Then I can speak to you more frankly about this charm and what it is like. Just now I was at a loss how to show you its power. It is the kind of charm, Charmides, that cannot make the head alone healthy. It is like what you have probably heard good doctors say yourself: when someone comes to them with sore eyes, they tell him, I believe, that they cannot undertake to cure the eyes on their own, but must treat the head at the same time if the eyes too are to be in good condition; and again, that to imagine one could ever treat the head on its own, apart from the whole body, is sheer folly. On this principle they put the entire body on a regimen and try to treat and heal the part along with the whole.³ Haven’t you noticed that this is what they say, and that it is so?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“And you think it well said, and you accept the principle?”

1. Greek healing could pair a herb with an incantation (*epōidē*, a song “sung over” the sufferer): the sons of Autolycus stanch Odysseus’ wound with one (*Odyssey* 19.457–58), and Pindar’s Asclepius heals some patients “with soothing incantations” (*Pythian* 3.51). Socrates is improvising on Critias’ ruse. What the charm really is, he says at 157a.

2. Socrates makes a small point of principle out of the boy’s cheek, and introduces the verb *peithein*, “persuade”, which returns a page later (157b–c). Charmides’ laugh suggests he has understood the game.

3. This is the medicine of the Hippocratic writers, who insisted that the part be treated with the whole. In the *Phaedrus* (270c) it is Phaedrus who cites Hippocrates for the view that not even the body can be understood apart from “the nature of the whole”, and Socrates agrees.

Πάντων μάλιστα, ἔφη.

Καὶ γὰρ ἀκούσας αὐτοῦ ἐπαινέσαντος ἀνεθάρρησά τε, καὶ d
μοι κατὰ σμικρὸν πάλιν ἢ θρασύτης συνηγείρετο, καὶ ἀνεζω-
πυρούμην. καὶ εἶπον Τοιοῦτον τοῖνυν ἐστίν, ὦ Χαρμίδη, καὶ
τὸ ταύτης τῆς ἐπωδῆς. ἔμαθον δ' αὐτὴν ἐγὼ ἐκεῖ ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς
παρά τινος τῶν Θρακῶν τῶν Ζαλμόξιδος ἱατρῶν, οἱ λέγονται 5
καὶ ἀπαθανατίζειν. ἔλεγεν δὲ ὁ Θράξ οὗτος ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν
[ἱατροὶ] οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, καλῶς λέγοιεν
ἀλλὰ Ζάλμοξις, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ ἡμέτερος βασιλεὺς, θεὸς ὢν,
ὅτι ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμοὺς ἄνευ κεφαλῆς οὐ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἰᾶσθαι e
οὐδὲ κεφαλὴν ἄνευ σώματος, οὕτως οὐδὲ σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς,
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον εἴη τοῦ διαφεύγειν τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς
Ἕλλησιν ἱατροὺς τὰ πολλὰ νοσήματα, ὅτι τοῦ ὅλου ἀμελοῖεν
οὐ δέοι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, οὐ μὴ καλῶς ἔχοντος ἀδύ- 5
νατον εἴη τὸ μέρος εὖ ἔχειν. πάντα γὰρ ἔφη ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς
ὠρμῆσθαι καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τῷ σώματι καὶ παντὶ
τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιρρεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐπὶ
τὰ ὅμματα δεῖν οὖν ἐκείνο καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα θερα- 157
πεύειν, εἰ μέλλει καὶ τὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἄλλου
σώματος καλῶς ἔχειν. θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφη, ὦ
μακάριε, ἐπωδαῖς τισιν, τὰς δ' ἐπωδὰς ταύτας τοὺς λόγους
εἶναι τοὺς καλοὺς ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς 5
σωφροσύνην ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἧς ἐγγενομένης καὶ παρούσης
ῥάδιον ἤδη εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ
σώματι πορίζειν. διδάσκων οὖν με τό τε φάρμακον καὶ τὰς b
ἐπωδάς, “Ὅπως,” ἔφη, “τῷ φαρμάκῳ τούτῳ μηδεὶς σε
πέισει τὴν αὐτοῦ κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν, ὅς ἂν μὴ τὴν ψυχὴν

d 2 ξυνηγείρετο Tb: ξυνεγείρετο B d 3 posterius καὶ om. Stobaeus d 4 στρατιᾶς
BT: στρατείας Stobaeus d 5 ζαλμόξιδος B: ζαμόλξιδος Tb ἱατρῶν] πολιτῶν
Stobaeus d 6 μὲν] μὲν δὴ Stobaeus d 7 ἱατροὶ secl. Cobet ἱατροὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες
BT: οἱ Ἕλληνες ἱατροὶ Stobaeus d 8 ζάλμοξις B: ζάμολξις Tb e 4 τοῦ ὅλου
scripsi: τοῦ ἄλλου Stobaeus: τὸ ὅλον BT ἀμελοῖεν γρ. T Stobaeus: ἀγνοοῖεν BT
a 2 μέλλοι Heindorf ἄλλου BW Stobaeus: ὅλου T a 5 ἐν om. Stobaeus b 3
πέισει scr. Par. 1812: πείσῃ BTW

“Absolutely,” he said.

When I heard his approval I took heart again; little by little my boldness began to gather itself together, and I was rekindled.¹ And I said, “Well, Charmides, that is exactly how it is with this charm. I learned it out there on campaign from one of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis,² who are said even to make one immortal. This Thracian said that the Greeks were right to say what I was telling you just now. But Zalmoxis, he said, our king, who is a god, says that just as one must not try to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body, so one must not try to cure the body without the soul either; and that this is the very reason why most diseases elude the Greek doctors: they neglect the whole, which is what they ought to be caring for,³ and when the whole is not in good condition the part cannot possibly be well. For everything, he said, bad and good alike, for the body and for the whole human being, starts from the soul and flows from there, as it flows from the head into the eyes. So it is the soul that must be treated first and foremost, if the head and the rest of the body are to be in good condition. And the soul, my dear fellow, he said, is treated with certain charms, and these charms are beautiful words.⁴ From words like these, temperance comes to be in souls;⁵ and once it has come to be and is present, it is easy then to provide health for the head and for the rest of the body too. So, when he was teaching me the remedy and the charms, he said, ‘Mind that nobody persuades you to treat his head with this remedy unless he first

1. *Anezōpyroumēn*, “I was blown back into flame”, picks up “I was on fire” at 155d: the fire of desire has become the fire of confidence.

2. Zalmoxis was the god of the Getae, a Thracian people of the lower Danube. Herodotus (4.93–96) calls the Getae “the ones who make themselves immortal” (*athanatizantes*), because they believed that at death they went to Zalmoxis; the Greeks of the Hellespont and the Black Sea told him that Zalmoxis had once been a slave of Pythagoras, a story Herodotus doubts. Plato’s verb, *apathanatizein*, is a compound of Herodotus’ word.

3. “Neglect” (*amelein*) is the variant recorded in T and read by Stobaeus, and it chimes with “caring for”; B and T have “they do not know the whole”. “The whole” in this form is Burnet’s own emendation (*apparatus*, e4).

4. *Logoi kaloi*: *logoi* are words, speeches and arguments, and *kaloi* is the word for the beautiful youth. The charm, it seems, is conversation of the right kind, perhaps the very conversation about to begin.

5. *Sōphrosynē*, which this edition renders throughout as “temperance”. The word is formed from “sound” and “mind”, and in Plato’s Athens it covered sound-mindedness, self-control, moderation, modesty, decorum and discretion: the virtue of the well-brought-up youth who blushes, keeps quiet and knows his place, and the virtue of the grown man who knows his limits. The dialogue tries several of these senses in turn; one English word is kept throughout so that the reader can watch each definition trying it on.

πρώτον παράσχη τῇ ἐπωδῇ ὑπὸ σοῦ θεραπευθῆναι. καὶ γὰρ
 νῦν,” ἔφη, “τοῦτ’ ἔστιν τὸ ἀμάρτημα περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, 5
 ὅτι χωρὶς ἐκατέρου, σωφροσύνης τε καὶ ὑγείας, ἰατροί τινες
 ἐπιχειροῦσιν εἶναι ” καὶ μοι πάνν σφόδρα ἐνετέλλετο μήτε
 πλούσιον οὕτω μηδένα εἶναι μήτε γενναῖον μήτε καλόν, ὃς
 ἐμὲ πείσει ἄλλως ποιεῖν. ἐγὼ οὖν—ὁμώμοκα γὰρ αὐτῷ, c
 καὶ μοι ἀνάγκη πείθεσθαι—πέισομαι οὖν, καὶ σοί, ἐάν
 μὲν βούλη κατὰ τὰς τοῦ ξένου ἐντολὰς τὴν ψυχὴν πρώτον
 παρασχεῖν ἐπᾶσαι ταῖς τοῦ Θρακὸς ἐπωδαῖς, προσοίσω τὸ
 φάρμακον τῇ κεφαλῇ εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὅτι ποιούμεν 5
 σοι, ὦ φίλε Χαρμίδη.

Ἀκούσας οὖν μου ὁ Κριτίας ταῦτ’ εἰπόντος, Ἑρμαιον,
 ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη ἡ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἀσθένεια
 τῷ νεανίσκῳ, εἰ ἀναγκασθήσεται καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν διὰ τὴν
 κεφαλὴν βελτίων γενέσθαι. λέγω μέντοι σοι ὅτι Χαρμίδης d
 τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν οὐ μόνον τῇ ἰδέᾳ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 αὐτῷ τούτῳ, οὗ σὺ φῆς τὴν ἐπωδὴν ἔχειν φῆς δὲ σωφρο-
 σύνης ἢ γάρ;

Πάνν γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ.

Εὖ τοῖνυν ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὅτι πάνν πολὺν δοκεῖ σωφρονέστατος
 εἶναι τῶν νυνί, καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα, εἰς ὅσον ἡλικίας ἦκει,
 οὐδενὸς χείρων ὢν.

Καὶ γάρ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ δίκαιον, ὦ Χαρμίδη, διαφέρειν σε
 τῶν ἄλλων πᾶσιν τοιούτοις οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι ἄλλον οὐδένα e
 τῶν ἐνθάδε ῥαδίως ἂν ἔχειν ἐπιδείξαι ποῖαι δύο οἰκίαι
 συνελθοῦσαι εἰς ταῦτόν τῶν Ἀθήνησιν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων

b6 σωφροσύνης τε καὶ ὑγείας om. Laur. lxxv. 6 c1 οὖν BT: γ’ οὖν W
 ὁμώμοκα T et γρ. W: ὥμοσα BW (γρ. καὶ ὁμώμοκα γὰρ b) c4 ἐπᾶσαι B³:
 ἀπάσαις B (ut videtur) T et in marg. γρ. b ταῖς . . . ἐπωδαῖς] τὰς . . . ἐπωδὰς ci. H.
 Richards d2 δοκεῖ W: ἐδόκει BT d6 πάνν πολὺν δοκεῖ σωφρονέστατος T et γρ.
 W: πλείστων δοκεῖ πολυφρονέστατος B: πλείστων δοκεῖ πολὺν σωφρονέστατος
 W: πλείστον δοκεῖ σωφρονέστατος Hermann: πλείστοις δοκεῖ σωφρονέστατος
 ci. Madvig: πλείστων δοκεῖ πολὺν σωφρονέστερος ci. Goldbacher e2 ποῖαι
 δύο οἰκίαι Aldina: ποῖαι δυοῖν οἰκίαι BTW: ποῖαν δυοῖν οἰκίαν corr. Θ e3
 συνελθοῦσαι T: καὶ νῦν ἐλθοῦσαι B: νῦν ἐλθοῦσαι W (sed σ supra ν W): καὶ νῦν
 ἐλθοῦσαι corr. Θ

hands over his soul to be treated by you with the charm. For that,' he said, 'is the mistake made nowadays in treating human beings: some try to be doctors of the two separately, of temperance and of health.' And he charged me very strictly to let no one be so rich, or so wellborn, or so beautiful, as to persuade me to do otherwise. So I—for I have sworn him an oath, and I must obey—I shall obey.¹ And as for you, if you are willing, as the stranger instructed, to hand over your soul first to be charmed with the Thracian's charms, I shall apply the remedy to your head. But if not, there would be nothing we could do for you, my dear Charmides."

When Critias heard me say this, he said, "Why, Socrates, this trouble with his head will turn out to be a godsend for the young man,² if on account of his head he is going to be forced to improve his mind as well. But let me tell you, Charmides is thought to surpass those his age not only in his looks, but in the very thing you say you have the charm for. You say it is for temperance, don't you?"

"Certainly," I said.

"Then rest assured," he said, "that he is thought far and away the most temperate of anyone nowadays,³ and in every other respect, as far as his years allow, second to none."

"And indeed," I said, "it is only right, Charmides, that you should excel all the others in all these things. For I don't suppose anyone else here could easily point to two houses in Athens whose union would be likely to

1. The Greek chimes on *peithein*, "persuade", and *peithesthai*, "obey" (literally "be persuaded"): no one is to persuade Socrates, and Socrates, bound by his oath, will obey. "Rich, or wellborn, or beautiful" happens to describe Charmides exactly.

2. A *hermaion* is a windfall, a lucky find sent by Hermes. Critias' joke is that a headache will drive the boy to improve his mind "on account of his head".

3. Burnet prints T's reading, also a variant in W. B has "thought the most sagacious (*polyphrenestatos*) of very many", and editors have proposed several repairs (*apparatus*, d6).

καλλίῳ ἂν καὶ ἀμείνω γεννήσειαν ἢ ἐξ ὧν σὺ γέγονας. ἢ
 τε γὰρ πατρώα ὑμῖν οἰκία, ἢ Κριτίου τοῦ Δρωπίδου, καὶ ὑπὸ 5
 Ἀνακρέοντος καὶ ὑπὸ Σόλωνος καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πολλῶν ποιητῶν
 ἐγκεκωμιασμένη παραδέδοται ἡμῖν, ὥς διαφέροντα κάλλει τε 158
 καὶ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ λεγομένη εὐδαιμονίᾳ, καὶ αὖ ἢ πρὸς
 μητρὸς ὡσαύτως Πυριλάμπους γὰρ τοῦ σοῦ θεοῦ οὐδεὶς τῶν
 ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ λέγεται καλλίων καὶ μείζων ἀνὴρ δόξαι εἶναι,
 ὁσάκις ἐκεῖνος ἢ παρὰ μέγαν βασιλέα ἢ παρὰ ἄλλον τινὰ
 τῶν ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ πρεσβεύων ἀφίκετο, σύμπασα δὲ αὕτη ἢ 5
 οἰκία οὐδὲν τῆς ἐτέρας ὑποδεεστέρα. ἐκ δὴ τοιούτων γεγονότα
 εἰκός σε εἰς πάντα πρῶτον εἶναι. τὰ μὲν οὖν ὁρώμενα τῆς
 ἰδέας, ὧ φίλε παῖ Γλαύκωνος, δοκεῖς μοι οὐδένα τῶν πρὸ b
 σοῦ ἐν οὐδενὶ ὑποβεβηκέναι εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην
 καὶ πρὸς τᾶλλα κατὰ τὸν τοῦδε λόγον ἱκανῶς πέφυκας,
 μακάριόν σε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὧ φίλε Χαρμίδη, ἢ μήτηρ ἔτικτεν.
 ἔχει δ' οὖν οὕτως. εἰ μὲν σοι ἤδη πάρεστιν, ὥς λέγει 5
 Κριτίας ὅδε, σωφροσύνη καὶ εἰ σώφρων ἱκανῶς, οὐδὲν ἔτι
 σοι ἔδει οὔτε τῶν Ζαλμόξιδος οὔτε τῶν Ἀβάριδος τοῦ
 Ὑπερβορέου ἐπωδῶν, ἀλλ' αὐτό σοι ἂν ἤδη δοτέον εἴη τὸ
 τῆς κεφαλῆς φάρμακον εἰ δ' ἔτι τούτων ἐπιδεῆς εἶναι δοκεῖς, c
 ἐπαστέον πρὸ τῆς τοῦ φαρμάκου δόσεως. αὐτὸς οὖν μοι
 εἰπὲ πότερον ὁμολογεῖς τῷδε καὶ φῆς ἱκανῶς ἤδη σωφροσύνης
 μετέχειν ἢ ἐνδεῆς εἶναι;

Ἀνευθριάσας οὖν ὁ Χαρμίδης πρῶτον μὲν ἔτι καλλίων 5

e 4 καλλίῳ ... ἀμείνω γεννήσειαν T et in marg. γρ. W (sed γενήσειαν W): καλλίων
 ... ἀμείνων γενήσεται BW e 5 οἰκία TW et γρ. b: οὐσία B et suprascr. W a 2 τοῦ
 σοῦ θεοῦ W: τοῦδε σοῦ δὲ θεοῦ T: τοῦδε λέγουσιν B οὐδεὶς T: οὐδὲ BW τῶν TW:
 τὴν B a 3 τῇ ἡπείρῳ TW: τῇ περὶ B: τῇπείρῳ Schanz (et mox) δόξαι T: δόξα
 B a 4 ὁσάκις T: ὁσάκις τε B a 5 τῶν ... ἡπείρῳ secl. Ast b 1 τῶν πρὸ σοῦ
 ἐν οὐδενὶ ὑποβεβηκέναι ci. Madvig: τῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἐν οὐδενὶ ὑπερβεβηκέναι BW:
 τῶν προγόνων κατασχύνειν T et γρ. W b 2 καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην καὶ πρὸς
 TW: καὶ πόρρωθεν σωφροσύνην καὶ B b 3 πέφυκας T: πεφυκυίας B b 5 ὥς
 BW (sed suprascr. ὁ W): ὁ T λέγει T: λέγοι B: εἰ λέγοι W b 7 ἔδει] δεῖ ci. Cobet
 ζαλμόξιδος B: ζαμόλξιδος T b 8 αὐτό σοι] αὐτοσοι T: αὐτός σοι W: αὐτὸς οἶου B
 c 3 ἤδη T: ἤδη καὶ B

produce finer and better offspring than the two you are sprung from. For your family on your father's side, the house of Critias son of Dropides,¹ has come down to us celebrated by Anacreon and by Solon and by many other poets for its outstanding beauty and virtue and everything else that goes by the name of happiness; and your mother's side, again, is no different. For it is said that no man on the continent was ever thought handsomer or bigger than your uncle Pyrilampes, whenever he went as ambassador to the Great King or to anyone else on the continent;² and that whole house is in no way inferior to the other. Born of such people, you are likely to be first in everything. As for what can be seen of your looks, dear son of Glaucón, you seem to me to fall short of none of your forebears in any respect.³ And if, as Critias here says, you are also well enough endowed for temperance and the rest, then blessed is the child, my dear Charmides," I said, "your mother bore.⁴ But here is how things stand. If temperance is already present in you, as Critias here says, and you are temperate enough, then you would have no further need of charms, whether of Zalmoxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean;⁵ the remedy for the head itself should be given you straightaway. But if you seem still to be lacking in these things, the charm must be sung before the remedy is given. So tell me yourself: do you agree with Critias here, and say that you already have a sufficient share of temperance, or that you are lacking in it?"

Charmides blushed. For one thing, he looked even more beautiful

1. Plato names the paternal house after an ancestor, Critias son of Dropides; on the usual modern reconstruction he was the great-great-grandfather of Charmides and Critias. Solon's verses bid someone "tell fair-haired Critias to listen to his father" (fr. 22a West), and Anacreon was said to have celebrated a Critias of the same house.

2. Pyrilampes, brother of Charmides' mother, later married his niece Perictione, Plato's mother: Plato is praising his own family. He was known for his embassies to Persia (and, says Plutarch, for his peacocks: *Pericles* 13). "The continent" is Asia, the Persian empire. *Meizōn*, "bigger", can mean taller or greater, and there may be a smile in an envoy admired for being handsome and big.

3. Burnet prints here a conjecture of Madvig, "fallen short" (*hypobebēkenai*). B and W have "surpassed" (*hyperbeblēkenai*), which would make the compliment say that Charmides has outdone none of his ancestors; T (and a variant in W) has "to disgrace none of your forebears" (apparatus, b1).

4. The phrase is the old formula of blessing, as when Odysseus tells Nausicaa "thrice blessed are your father and your lady mother" (*Odyssey* 6.154–55). Socrates is laying it on.

5. Abaris the Hyperborean was a legendary priest of Apollo from the far north, said to have carried an arrow round the whole world without eating (Herodotus 4.36); later tradition made him a healer and a maker of charms.

ἐφάνη—καὶ γὰρ τὸ αἰσχυνηλὸν αὐτοῦ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ἔπρεψεν—
 ἔπειτα καὶ οὐκ ἀγεννῶς ἀπεκρίνατο εἶπεν γὰρ ὅτι οὐ ῥάδιον
 εἶη ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὐθ' ὁμολογεῖν οὔτε ἐξάρνω εἶναι τὰ
 ἐρωτώμενα. ἐὰν μὲν γάρ, ἡ δ' ὅς, μὴ φῶ εἶναι σώφρων, d
 ἅμα μὲν ἄτοπον αὐτὸν καθ' ἑαυτοῦ τοιαῦτα λέγειν, ἅμα δὲ
 καὶ Κριτίαν τόνδε ψευδῇ ἐπιδείξω καὶ ἄλλους πολλούς, οἷς
 δοκῶ εἶναι σώφρων, ὥς ὁ τούτου λόγος ἐὰν δ' αὖ φῶ καὶ
 ἐμαυτὸν ἐπαινῶ, ἴσως ἐπαχθὲς φανείται. ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι 5
 σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι μοι εἰκότα φαίνη λέγειν, ὦ Χαρμίδη.
 Καί μοι δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κοινῇ ἂν εἶη σκεπτέον εἴτε κέκτησαι
 εἴτε μὴ ὁ πυνθάνομαι, ἵνα μήτε σὺ ἀναγκάζῃ λέγειν ἂ μὴ e
 βούλει, μήτ' αὖ ἐγὼ ἀσκέπτως ἐπὶ τὴν ἱατρικὴν τρέπωμαι.
 εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον, ἐθέλω σκοπεῖν μετὰ σοῦ εἰ δὲ μή, ἔαν.

Ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα, ἔφη, φίλον ὥστε τούτου γε
 ἔνεκα, ὅπῃ αὐτὸς οἶε βέλτιον σκέψασθαι, ταύτῃ σκόπει. 5

Τῇδε τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, δοκεῖ μοι βελτίστη εἶναι ἡ σκέψις
 περὶ αὐτοῦ. δηλὸν γὰρ ὅτι εἴ σοι πάρεστιν σωφροσύνη,
 ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν. ἀνάγκη γάρ που ἐνοῦσαν 159
 αὐτήν, εἴπερ ἔνεστιν, αἰσθησὶν τινα παρέχειν, ἐξ ἧς δόξα ἂν
 τίς σοι περὶ αὐτῆς εἶη ὅτι ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη
 ἢ οὐκ οἶε;

Ἐγώ γε, ἔφη, οἶμαι. 5

Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε, ἔφην, ὁ οἶε, ἐπειδήπερ ἐλληνίζειν
 ἐπίστασαι, κἂν εἴποις δήπου αὐτὸ ὅτι σοι φαίνεται;

Ἴσως, ἔφη.

Ἵνα τοίνυν τοπάσωμεν εἴτε σοι ἔνεστιν εἴτε μή, εἰπέ, ἦν
 δ' ἐγώ, τί φῆς εἶναι σωφροσύνην κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν. 10

Καὶ ὅς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὥκνει τε καὶ οὐ πάννυ ἤθελεν ἀπο- b

c7 οὐ ῥάδιον T et γρ. W: ἄλογον BW d3 ἐπιδείξω] ἀποδείξω ci. Stallbaum d8
 ἂν εἶη Ven. 189: εἶη ἂν εἶναι BT (εἶναι secl. ci. Stephanus: εἶη secl. ci. Salvini) e2
 αὐτ' T: αὐτ' B e4 ἀλλὰ πάντων T: ἀλλ' ἀπάντων B e5 βέλτιον ci. Heindorf:
 βελτίω BT: βέλτιον ἂν ci. Cobet σκέψασθαι Stephanus e6 τῇδε Bt: τί δὲ T: τί
 δαί t (altera manu) a1 αὐτῆς Bt: αὐτήν T

— his bashfulness was becoming at his age—and for another, he gave an answer that did his breeding credit.¹ He said that it was not easy, in the circumstances, either to agree or to deny what he had been asked. “For if I say I’m not temperate,” he said, “not only is it an odd thing to say such things against oneself, but at the same time I shall be showing up Critias here as a liar, and many others too who think I am temperate, by his account. But if I say I am, and praise myself, that will probably seem obnoxious. So I don’t know what answer to give you.” d

And I said, “You seem to me to be talking sense, Charmides. And it seems to me,” I said, “that we ought to look into it together, whether or not you possess what I am asking about, so that you won’t be forced to say what you don’t want to, and I in turn won’t set about my doctoring without looking into things. So if you’d like, I am willing to look into it with you; if not, let’s leave it.” e

“Why, I’d like nothing better,” he said. “So as far as that goes, look into it in whatever way you think best.”

“This, then,” I said, “seems to me the best way of looking into it. For it is clear that if temperance is present in you, you have some opinion about it. For surely, if it really is in you, it must give rise to some sense, from which you would have some opinion about it: what it is, and what sort of thing temperance is. Don’t you think so?” 159

“I do,” he said.

“Well then, this opinion of yours,” I said, “since you know how to speak Greek, you could surely tell us what it seems to you to be?”²

“Perhaps,” he said.

“Then, so that we can make a guess whether it is in you or not, tell me,” I said, “what you say temperance is, in your opinion.”

At first he hung back, and was not at all willing to b

1. “Did his breeding credit” renders *ouk agennōs*, “not ignobly”, a word of the same family as “wellborn” (*gennaios*, 157b) and the pedigree just recited. On a natural reading, the blush and the refusal either to boast or to run himself down are a picture of *sōphrosynē* in its commonest sense, modesty, before anyone has tried to define it.

2. “Since you know how to speak Greek” (*hellēnizein*): the remark is dry, and on one reading it states an assumption the inquiry will lean on, that whatever a person really has in him he can put into words.

κρίνασθαι ἔπειτα μέντοι εἶπεν ὅτι οἱ δοκοῖ σωφροσύνη εἶναι
τὸ κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ, ἔν τε ταῖς ὁδοῖς
βαδίζειν καὶ διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὡσαύτως
ποιεῖν. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, συλλήβδην ἡσυχιότης τις εἶναι 5
ὁ ἔρωτῆς.

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὖ λέγεις; φασὶ γέ τοι, ὦ Χαρμίδη,
τοὺς ἡσυχίους σώφρονας εἶναι ἴδωμεν δὴ εἴ τι λέγουσιν.
εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, οὐ τῶν καλῶν μέντοι ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστίν; c

Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

Πότερον οὖν κάλλιστον ἐν γραμματιστοῦ τὰ ὅμοια γράμ-
ματα γράφειν ταχὺ ἢ ἡσυχῇ;

Ταχύ.

Τί δ' ἀναγινώσκειν; ταχέως ἢ βραδέως;

Ταχέως.

Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τὸ καθαρίζειν ταχέως καὶ τὸ παλαίειν
ὀξέως πολὺ κάλλιον τοῦ ἡσυχῇ τε καὶ βραδέως;

Ναί.

Τί δὲ πυκτεύειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν; οὐχ ὡσαύτως;

Πάνυ γε.

Θεῖν δὲ καὶ ἄλλεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἅπαντα ἔργα,
οὐ τὰ μὲν ὀξέως καὶ ταχὺ γιγνόμενα τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐστίν, τὰ d
δὲ [βραδέα] μόγις τε καὶ ἡσυχῇ τὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ;

Φαίνεται.

Φαίνεται ἄρα ἡμῖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, κατὰ γε τὸ σῶμα οὐ τὸ
ἡσύχιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τάχιστον καὶ ὀξύτατον κάλλιστον ὄν. 5
ἢ γάρ;

Πάνυ γε.

Ἦ δέ γε σωφροσύνη καλὸν τι ἦν;

Ναί.

b 2 οἱ B³T: οὖν W (sed suprascr. οἱ W) δοκοῖ BW (sed εἰ supra οἱ W): δοκεῖ T
b 7 φασὶ γέ τοι TW: φασὶν B c 3 κάλλιστον] κάλλιον Stephanus: κάλλιόν ἐστιν
Schanz c 9 τοῦ T: που B: που ἢ B² d 1 τὰ τοῦ T: τοῦ B d 2 βραδέα secl. ci.
Heindorf d 4 ἄρα T: γ' ἄρα B: τᾶρα Cobet

answer; but then he said that in his view temperance was doing everything in an orderly way and quietly: walking in the streets and talking, and doing everything else, in the same manner. “And in short,” he said, “I think what you are asking about is a kind of quietness.”¹

“Well, are you right?” I said. “People do say, you know, Charmides, that quiet people are temperate. Let us see whether there is anything in it. Tell me: temperance is one of the fine things, isn’t it?”²

“Certainly,” he said.

“Well then, which is finest at the writing-master’s: to copy out the letters quickly, or quietly?”³

“Quickly.”

“And reading? Quickly, or slowly?”

“Quickly.”

“And again, playing the lyre quickly and wrestling nimbly are far finer than doing them quietly and slowly?”

“Yes.”

“And boxing and the pancration? Isn’t it the same?”⁴

“Certainly.”

“And running and jumping, and all the actions of the body: aren’t the ones done nimbly and quickly the fine ones, and the ones done laboriously and quietly the ugly ones?”

“So it appears.”

“So it appears to us,” I said, “that in the body, at any rate, it is not the quiet that is finest, but the quickest and the nimblest. Isn’t that so?”

“Certainly.”

“And temperance was something fine?”

“Yes.”

1. Charmides’ word, *hēsychē*, “quietly”, most naturally means calmly, sedately: the bearing of a well-brought-up boy in the street (compare Aristophanes, *Clouds* 964). Socrates sets it against speed, and in his next question adds “slowly” (*bradeōs*), a word Charmides never used. On one reading the refutation trades on that shift; others reply that the word can cover slowness.

2. *Kalos*, “fine”, is the word used of Charmides’ beauty, and *aischros*, its opposite, means both “ugly” and “shameful”. The refutation that follows rests on the premise, which Charmides grants at once, that temperance is something *kalon*.

3. The *grammatistēs* taught boys their letters, tracing them for beginners to write over (*Protagoras* 326d); with the lyre-master and the wrestling-trainer he made up an Athenian boy’s schooling (*Protagoras* 325e–326c). Socrates’ examples march Charmides back through his own lessons.

4. The pancration (*pankration*, “all-strength”) combined boxing and wrestling, and almost anything was allowed except biting and gouging.

Οὐ τοίνυν κατὰ γε τὸ σῶμα ἡ ἡσυχιότης ἂν ἀλλ' ἡ 10
ταχυτῆς σωφρονέστερον εἴη, ἐπειδὴ καλὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη.

Ἔουκεν, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὐμαθία κάλλιον ἢ δυσμαθία; e

Εὐμαθία.

Ἔστιν δέ γ', ἔφην, ἡ μὲν εὐμαθία ταχέως μανθάνειν, ἡ
δὲ δυσμαθία ἡσυχῇ καὶ βραδέως;

Ναί. 5

Διδάσκειν δὲ ἄλλον οὐ ταχέως [καὶ] κάλλιον καὶ σφόδρα
μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσυχῇ τε καὶ βραδέως;

Ναί.

Τί δέ; ἀναμνησθήσκεισθαι καὶ μεμνήσθαι ἡσυχῇ τε καὶ
βραδέως κάλλιον ἢ σφόδρα καὶ ταχέως; 10

Σφόδρ', ἔφη, καὶ ταχέως.

Ἡ δ' ἀγχίνουα οὐχὶ ὀξύτης τίς ἐστιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλ' οὐχὶ 160
ἡσυχία;

Ἀληθῆ.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ συνιέναι τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ ἐν γραμματιστοῦ
καὶ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ ἄλλοι πανταχοῦ, οὐχ ὥς ἡσυχαιέτατα ἀλλ' 5
ὥς τάχιστα ἐστὶ κάλλιστα;

Ναί.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν γε ταῖς ζητήσεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῷ
βουλευέσθαι οὐχ ὁ ἡσυχιώτατος, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, καὶ μόνος
βουλευόμενός τε καὶ ἀνευρίσκων ἐπαίνου δοκεῖ ἄξιος εἶναι, 10
ἀλλ' ὁ ῥᾶστά τε καὶ τάχιστα τοῦτο δρῶν. b

Ἔστιν ταῦτα, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν πάντα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν
ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, τὰ τοῦ τάχους τε καὶ τῆς ὀξύτητος
καλλίως φαίνεται ἢ τὰ τῆς βραδυτητός τε καὶ ἡσυχιότητος; 5

Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη.

Οὐκ ἄρα ἡσυχιότης τις ἡ σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη, οὐδ' ἡσύχιος

d 10 ἡ ἡσυχιότης T: ἡσυχιότης B e 6 καὶ BTW: del. corr. Coisl. a 6 κάλλιστα]
fuit qui ἐστὶ κάλλιστον mallet Stallbaum a 9 ἡσυχιώτατος Cobet: ἡσυχώτατος
BT

"Then as far as the body goes, at any rate, it would not be quietness but quickness that was the more temperate, since temperance is something fine."

"It seems so," he said.

"And what about this?" I said. "Which is finer, learning easily, ^e or learning with difficulty?"

"Learning easily."

"And learning easily," I said, "is learning quickly, isn't it, and learning with difficulty is learning quietly and slowly?"

"Yes."

"And teaching someone else: isn't it finer to do it quickly and vigorously than quietly and slowly?"

"Yes."

"And what about recollecting and remembering? Is it finer to do them quietly and slowly, or vigorously and quickly?"

"Vigorously," he said, "and quickly."

"And isn't quick-wittedness a kind of sharpness of the soul, and ¹⁶⁰ not a quietness?"

"True."

"And understanding what is said, at the writing-master's and the lyre-master's and everywhere else: isn't that finest when it is done not as quietly as possible, but as quickly as possible?"

"Yes."

"And again, in the soul's inquiries and in deliberation, it is not the quietest person, I imagine, the one who deliberates and finds things out with difficulty, who is thought to deserve praise, but the ^b one who does it most easily and most quickly."

"That is so," he said.

"So in everything, Charmides," I said, "in the soul and in the body alike, what belongs to quickness and sharpness appears finer to us than what belongs to slowness and quietness?"

"It looks that way," he said.

"Then temperance would not be a kind of quietness, nor would

ὁ σώφρων βίος, ἔκ γε τούτου τοῦ λόγου, ἐπειδὴ καλὸν αὐτὸν
 δεῖ εἶναι σώφρονα ὄντα. δυοῖν γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἕτερα ἢ οὐδαμοῦ
 ἡμῖν ἢ πάνυ που ὀλιγαχοῦ αἰ ἡσύχιοι πράξεις ἐν τῷ βίῳ c
 καλλίους ἐφάνησαν ἢ αἰ ταχεαί τε καὶ ἰσχυραί. εἰ δ' οὖν, ὦ
 φίλε, ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ἐλάττους αἰ ἡσύχιοι τῶν σφοδρῶν
 τε καὶ ταχειῶν πράξεων τυγχάνουσιν καλλίους οὔσαι, οὐδὲ
 ταύτῃ σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον τι τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν ἢ τὸ 5
 σφόδρα τε καὶ ταχέως, οὔτε ἐν βαδισμῷ οὔτε ἐν λέξει οὔτε
 ἄλλοθι οὐδαμοῦ, οὐδὲ ὁ ἡσύχιος βίος [κόσμος] τοῦ μὴ ἡσυχίου
 σωφρονέστερος ἂν εἴη, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῶν καλῶν τι ἡμῖν d
 ἢ σωφροσύνη ὑπετέθη, καλὰ δὲ οὐχ ἦττον τὰ ταχέα τῶν
 ἡσυχίων πέφανται.

Ὅρθως μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρηκέναι.

Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, μᾶλλον προσέχων 5
 τὸν νοῦν καὶ εἰς σεαυτὸν ἐμβλέψας, ἐννοήσας ὁποῖόν τινα
 σε ποιεῖ ἢ σωφροσύνη παρούσα καὶ ποία τις οὔσα τοιοῦτον
 ἀπεργάζοιτο ἄν, πάντα ταῦτα συλλογισάμενος εἰπέ εὖ καὶ
 ἀνδρείως τί σοι φαίνεται εἶναι; e

Καὶ ὃς ἐπισχὼν καὶ πάνυ ἀνδρικῶς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν διασκεψά-
 μενος, Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, αἰσχύνεσθαι ποιεῖν ἢ σωφρο-
 σύνη καὶ αἰσχυνητὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ εἶναι ὅπερ αἰδῶς ἢ 5
 σωφροσύνη.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ καλὸν ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις τὴν σωφρο-
 σύνην εἶναι;

Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες οἱ σώφρονες;

Ναί.

Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν εἴη ἀγαθὸν ὁ μὴ ἀγαθοὺς ἀπεργάζεται;

10

c 5 ἢ τὸ Priscianus: ἢ τοῦ BT: τοῦ Schanz c 6 οὔτε . . . οὔτε Priscianus: οὐ τὸ . . . οὐ
 τὸ BTW c 7 οὐδὲ corr. Coisl.: οὐδὲν BTW κόσμος secl. ci. Heindorf: καὶ κόσμος
 corr. Coisl. d 2 καλὰ T: καὶ ἄλλα B τὰ add. corr. Coisl. d 6 ἐμβλέψας scripsi:
 ἀπεμβλέψας B (sed lepsi in ras.): ἀποβλέψας TW e 6 εἶεν T: εἴτα B e 11 post εἴη
 lacunam indicat Schanz ἀγαθοὺς, (καὶ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ὁ ἀγαθοὺς) ci. Goldbacher

the temperate life be quiet, on this argument at any rate, since, being temperate, it has to be fine. For one of two things is true: quiet actions in life have appeared finer to us than quick and strong ones either nowhere or in very few places. But even supposing, my friend, at the very most, that the quiet actions which turn out finer are no fewer than the vigorous and quick ones, even so temperance would not be acting quietly any more than acting vigorously and quickly, whether in walking or in talking or anywhere else, nor would the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet one. For in our argument we laid it down that temperance is one of the fine things, and quick things have turned out to be no less fine than quiet ones.”¹

“I think what you have said is right, Socrates,” he said.

“Then once more, Charmides,” I said, “pay closer attention and look within yourself. Consider what sort of person temperance makes you by being present, and what sort of thing it would be that could produce such a person; then put all this together and tell me, properly and like a man, what it seems to you to be.”

He paused, and after thinking it over to himself very much like a man, said, “Well, I think temperance makes a person feel shame and makes him bashful, and that temperance is the same thing as modesty.”²

“Very well,” I said. “Weren’t you agreeing just now that temperance is fine?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“And temperate men are good men, too?”

“Yes.”

“Now could anything be good that does not make men good?”

1. Socrates covers both flanks: if quiet actions are seldom or never the finer, quietness cannot be temperance; and even if they were as often the finer as quick ones, temperance would still be no more quietness than quickness. Whether the argument is fair to what Charmides meant is another matter, and the dialogue leaves it to the reader.

2. Socrates asks him to answer “like a man” (*andreios*, “bravely”), and Charmides, after thinking it over “very much like a man” (*andrikōs*), answers that temperance is modesty (*aidōs*); both adverbs come from *anēr*, “man”. *Aidōs* is the sense of shame or respect that holds a person back, and in a boy it shows as blushing. His word “bashful” (*aischyntēlos*) is the one used of his blush at 158c, and it is hard not to see a self-portrait in the answer.

- Οὐ δῆτα.
 Οὐ μόνον οὖν ἄρα καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.
 Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. 161
 Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ 'Ομήρῳ οὐ πιστεύεις καλῶς λέγειν,
 λέγοντι ὅτι
 αἰδῶς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρεῖναι;
 Ἔγωγ', ἔφη. 5
 Ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, αἰδῶς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.
 Φαίνεται.
 Σωφροσύνη δέ γε ἀγαθόν, εἶπερ ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ οἷς ἂν
 παρῇ, κακοὺς δὲ μὴ.
 Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω γε δοκεῖ μοι ἔχειν, ὡς σὺ λέγεις. 10
 Οὐκ ἄρα σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη αἰδῶς, εἶπερ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν
 τυγχάνει ὄν, αἰδῶς δὲ [μὴ] οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ b
 κακόν.
 Ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς
 λέγεσθαι τόδε δὲ σκέψαι τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι περὶ σωφρο-
 σύνης. ἄρτι γὰρ ἀνεμνήσθην—ὃ ἤδη του ἤκουσα λέγοντος— 5
 ὅτι σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. σκόπει οὖν
 τοῦτο εἰ ὀρθῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγειν ὁ λέγων.
 Καὶ ἐγώ, ὦ μιανέ, ἔφην, Κριτίου τοῦδε ἀκήκοας αὐτὸ ἢ
 ἄλλου του τῶν σοφῶν. c
 Ἔοικεν, ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας, ἄλλου οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐμοῦ γε.
 Ἀλλὰ τί διαφέρει, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὁ Χαρμίδης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτου
 ἤκουσα;
 Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ πάντως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ὅστις 5
 αὐτὸ εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ πότερον ἀληθὲς λέγεται ἢ οὐ.
 Νῦν ὀρθῶς λέγεις, ἦ δ' ὅς.
 Νῆ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ εὐρήσομεν αὐτὸ ὅπη γε
 ἔχει, θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν αἰνίγματι γάρ τιιν ἔοικεν.
 Ὅτι δὴ τί γε; ἔφη. 10

b1 μὴ secl. Ast καὶ om. Par. 1809: secl. Cobet b6 ἂν secl. Bekker c10 ὅτι δὴ
 T: εἰ δὴ BW (sed suprascr. ὅτι W)

“Certainly not.”

“Then temperance is not only fine, but good as well.”

“I think so.”

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“Well then,” I said, “don’t you believe that Homer is right when he says

Modesty is no good thing to be present with a man in need?”

“I do,” he said.¹

“So it seems modesty is both not good and good.”

“It appears so.”

“But temperance is good, if it makes good those it is present with, and does not make them bad.”

“Why, yes, it seems to me to be just as you say.”

“Then temperance would not be modesty, if the one is in fact good, while modesty is no more good than bad.” b

“Well, I think that is rightly said, Socrates,” he said. “But look into this: what do you think of it, as an account of temperance? I have just remembered something I once heard someone say: that temperance would be doing one’s own business. So look into whether you think the man who said it was right.”²

And I said, “You rascal! You’ve heard that from Critias here, or from one of the other wise men.”³ c

“From someone else, apparently,” said Critias. “Certainly not from me.”

“But what difference does it make, Socrates,” said Charmides, “whom I heard it from?”

“None,” I said. “For in any case what we have to look into is not who said it, but whether what is said is true or not.”

“Now you are talking sense,” said he.

“By Zeus, I am,” I said. “But I’d be surprised if we even find out how it stands: it looks like a kind of riddle.”

“How so?” he said.

1. *Odyssey* 17.347: Telemachus has his disguised father told to go round the suitors begging, since modesty is no good thing for a needy man. Plato’s form of the line (also at *Laches* 201b) ends “to be present” where our Homer has “a beggar”, setting up “those it is present with” below. Hesiod (*Works and Days* 317–18) adds that modesty both harms and helps, which is Socrates’ conclusion. One may feel the argument helps itself to a line about a beggar’s shyness.

2. *To ta heautou pratein*, literally “doing one’s own (things)”: in ordinary Greek, keeping to one’s own affairs, the opposite of *polypragmosynē*, meddling, whose verb Socrates uses at 161d. In the *Republic* (433a–b) the same formula defines justice. The English keeps the verb “do”, on which the argument turns.

3. *Ō miare*, literally “you polluted creature”, is affectionate abuse; Socrates turns it on Critias at 174b. Critias’ denial is answered at 162c.

Ὅτι οὐ δῆπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἥ τὰ ῥήματα ἐφθέγγατο ταύτη d
καὶ ἐνόει, λέγων σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν.
ἥ σὺ οὐδέν ἡγῇ πράττειν τὸν γραμματιστὴν ὅταν γράφῃ ἥ
ἀναγινώσκη;

Ἐγωγε, ἡγοῦμαι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 5

Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι τὸ αὐτοῦ ὄνομα μόνον γράφειν ὁ γραμ-
ματιστὴς καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν ἥ ὑμᾶς τοὺς παῖδας διδάσκειν,
ἥ οὐδέν ἦττον τὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐγράφετε ἥ τὰ ὑμέτερα καὶ τὰ
τῶν φίλων ὀνόματα;

Οὐδέν ἦττον. 10

Ἦ οὖν ἐπολυπραγμονεῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐσωφρονεῖτε τοῦτο e
δρῶντες;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Καὶ μὴν οὐ τὰ ὑμέτερά γε αὐτῶν ἐπράττετε, εἴπερ τὸ
γράφειν πράττειν τί ἐστιν καὶ τὸ ἀναγινώσκειν.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστιν. 5

Καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἰᾶσθαι, ὦ ἐταῖρε, καὶ τὸ οἰκοδομεῖν καὶ τὸ
ὑφαίνειν καὶ τὸ ἡτινιοῦν τέχνη ὅτιοι τῶν τέχνης ἔργων
ἀπεργάζεσθαι πράττειν δῆπου τί ἐστιν.

Πάνυ γε.

Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ ἄν σοι πόλις εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι ὑπὸ 10
τούτου τοῦ νόμου τοῦ κελεύοντος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἰμάτιον ἕκαστον
ὑφαίνειν καὶ πλύνειν, καὶ ὑποδήματα σκυτοτομεῖν, καὶ λή-
κυθον καὶ στλεγγίδα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον,
τῶν μὲν ἀλλοτρίων μὴ ἄπτεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον 162
ἐργάζεσθαι τε καὶ πράττειν;

Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἥ δ' ὅς.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, σωφρόνως γε οἰκοῦσα εὖ ἂν
οἰκοῖτο. 5

Πῶς δ' οὐκ; ἔφη.

d 1 ἥ W: ἡ B: om. T d 2 ὁ ante λέγων add. corr. Coisl. e 10 εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι TW:
ἀρκεῖσθαι B e 12 λήκυθον BT: λίκυθον t e 13 πάντα] ποιοῦντα vel πάντα
ποιοῦντα ci. H. Richards a 4 γε B³: τε BT

"Because the man who said that temperance is doing one's own business," I said, "surely did not mean it the way the words sound. Or do you think the writing-master does nothing when he writes or reads?"^d

"On the contrary, I think he does something," he said.

"And do you think the writing-master writes and reads, or teaches you boys, only his own name? Or did you write your enemies' names just as much as your own and your friends'?"

"Just as much."

"Well, were you being busybodies, and not temperate, when you did that?"^e

"Not at all."

"And yet you were not doing your own business, if writing and reading are doing something."

"But they are."

"Yes, and healing, my friend, and building houses and weaving, and producing, by any craft whatever, any of the works of craft, are surely doing something."

"Certainly."

"Well then," I said, "do you think a city would be well managed under a law that ordered each man to weave and wash his own cloak, cobble his own shoes, and make his own oil-flask and strigil and everything else on the same principle, keeping his hands off what belongs to others and working at and doing his own?"² 162

"I don't think so," he said.

"And yet," I said, "a city that is temperately managed would be well managed."

"Of course," he said.

1. The argument plays on "do". In the formula, "doing one's own business" means keeping to one's own affairs; Socrates takes "doing" to mean making or performing anything at all, so that a boy who writes his enemy's name is doing his enemy's business. *Polypragmonein*, "to be a busybody", is the vice the formula was meant to exclude.

2. The *lēkythos* held the olive oil with which men anointed themselves for exercise, and the strigil (*stlēngis*) was the curved scraper used afterwards to clean off oil and dust: the very kit of the wrestling-school they are sitting in.

Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτά τε καὶ οὕτω τὰ αὐτοῦ
πράττειν σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη.

Οὐ φαίνεται.

Ἦνίττετο ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὁ λέγων 10
τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν σωφροσύνην εἶναι οὐ γάρ που οὕτω
γε ἦν εὐνήθης. ἢ τινος ἡλιθίου ἤκουσας τουτὶ λέγοντος, ὦ b
Χαρμίδη;

Ἦκιστά γε, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ πάννυ ἐδόκει σοφὸς εἶναι.

Παντὸς τοίνυν μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αἰνιγμα αὐτὸ
προύβαλεν, ὡς ὃν χαλεπὸν τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν γινῶναι 5
ὅτι ποτε ἔστιν.

Ἴσως, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν ἂν εἴη ποτὲ τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν; ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;

Οὐκ οἶδα μὰ Δία ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς ἂν ἴσως οὐδὲν κωλύει
μηδὲ τὸν λέγοντα μηδὲν εἰδέναι ὅτι ἐνόει. Καὶ ἅμα ταῦτα 10
λέγων ὑπεγέλα τε καὶ εἰς τὸν Κριτίαν ἀπέβλεπεν.

Καὶ ὁ Κριτίας δηλὸς μὲν ἦν καὶ πάλαι ἀγωνιῶν καὶ c
φιλοτίμως πρὸς τε τὸν Χαρμίδην καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας
ἔχων, μόγις δ' ἐαυτὸν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν κατέχων τότε οὐχ οἷός
τε ἐγένετο δοκεῖ γάρ μοι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ὃ ἐγὼ
ὑπέλαβον, τοῦ Κριτίου ἀκηκοέναι τὸν Χαρμίδην ταύτην τὴν 5
ἀπόκρισιν περὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης. ὁ μὲν οὖν Χαρμίδης βουλό-
μενος μὴ αὐτὸς ὑπέχειν λόγον ἀλλ' ἐκείνον τῆς ἀποκρίσεως,
ὑπεκίνει αὐτὸν ἐκείνον, καὶ ἐνεδείκνυτο ὡς ἐξεληλεγμένος εἴη d
ὁ δ' οὐκ ἠνέσχετο, ἀλλὰ μοι ἔδοξεν ὀργισθῆναι αὐτῷ ὥσπερ
ποιητῆς ὑποκριτῇ κακῶς διατιθέντι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ποιήματα.
ὥστ' ἐμβλέψας αὐτῷ εἶπεν, Οὕτως οἶε, ὦ Χαρμίδη, εἰ σὺ
μὴ οἶσθα ὅτι ποτ' ἐνόει ὃς ἔφη σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ 5
πράττειν, οὐδὲ δὴ ἐκείνον εἰδέναι;

Ἄλλ', ὦ βέλτιστε, ἔφην ἐγώ, Κριτία, τοῦτον μὲν οὐδὲν
θαυμαστὸν ἀγνοεῖν τηλικούτον ὄντα σὲ δέ που εἰκὸς εἰδέναι e

d 4 σὺν T: σοὶ B d 5 ποτ' ἐνόει t: ποτε ἐνόει B: ποτε νοεῖ T e 1 εἰκὸς εἰδέναι T:
εἰδέναι re vera BW

“So doing one’s own business,” I said, “in things of this kind and in this way, would not be temperance.”

“It seems not.”

“Then, as it seems, the man who said that temperance was doing one’s own business was speaking in riddles, as I said just now; for surely he was not such a simpleton. Or was it some fool you heard saying this, Charmides?” b

“Far from it,” he said. “He was thought to be very wise indeed.”¹

“Then I am quite certain he put it forward as a riddle, on the view that it is hard to know what on earth doing one’s own business is.”

“Perhaps,” he said.

“So what could doing one’s own business be? Can you say?”

“By Zeus, I don’t know,” said he. “But perhaps there is nothing to stop even the man who said it from not knowing what he meant.” And as he said this he laughed slyly and looked across at Critias. c

Critias had plainly been on edge for some time, and eager to shine before Charmides and the company; he had held himself back with difficulty until then, but now he could contain himself no longer. For I think it was entirely true, as I had suspected, that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance from Critias. So Charmides, wanting not to answer for the definition himself but to have Critias answer for it, kept prodding him, and made out that he had been refuted. Critias would not put up with it: he seemed to me as angry with Charmides as a poet is with an actor who makes a mess of the poet’s own verses.² So he fixed his eyes on him and said, “Do you really think, Charmides, that if you don’t know what the man meant who said that temperance was doing one’s own business, then he doesn’t know either?” d

“But my good Critias,” I said, “it is no wonder that he doesn’t know, at his age. You, though, may reasonably be expected to know,” e

1. If the phrase is Critias’, as Socrates is sure by 162c, Charmides is paying his guardian a compliment that may already carry the tease that follows.

2. Critias was also a poet, and dramatic verse circulated under his name: Athenaeus hesitates between “Critias the tyrant or Euripides” as author of a *Pirithous*, and Sextus Empiricus quotes as Critias’ a speech on the invention of the gods that others assign to Euripides’ *Sisyphus*. If he wrote plays, the simile fits the man; and “the poet’s own verses” (*ta heautou poiēmata*) echoes the formula under discussion, “one’s own”. Whether “he had been refuted” means Charmides (playing beaten) or Critias is left open by the Greek, and by the English; translators divide.

καὶ ἡλικίας ἔνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ οὖν συγχωρεῖς τοῦτ' εἶναι σωφροσύνην ὅπερ οὐτοσί λέγει καὶ παραδέχῃ τὸν λόγον, ἔγωγε πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον μετὰ σοῦ σκοποίμην εἴτ' ἀληθὲς εἶτε μὴ τὸ λεχθέν.

5

Ἀλλὰ πάνυ συγχωρῶ, ἔφη, καὶ παραδέχομαι.

Καλῶς γε σὺ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιῶν. καί μοι λέγε, ἦ καὶ ἂ νυνδὴ ἡρώτων ἐγὼ συγχωρεῖς, τοὺς δημιουργοὺς πάντας ποιεῖν τι;

Ἐγωγε.

10

Ἡ οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι τὰ ἐαυτῶν μόνον ποιεῖν ἢ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων;

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Καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων.

Σωφρονοῦσιν οὖν οὐ τὰ ἐαυτῶν μόνον ποιοῦντες;

Τί γὰρ κωλύει; ἔφη.

5

Οὐδὲν ἐμέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ ἐκείνον κωλύει, ὃς ὑποθέμενος σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τὰ ἐαυτοῦ πράττειν ἔπειτα οὐδέν φησι κωλύειν καὶ τοὺς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντας σωφρονεῖν.

Ἐγὼ γάρ που, ἦ δ' ὅς, τοῦθ' ὠμολόγηκα, ὥς οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες σωφρονοῦσιν, εἰ τοὺς ποιοῦντας ὠμολόγησα.

10

Εἰπέ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ ταῦτόν καλεῖς τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πράττειν;

b

Οὐ μέντοι, ἔφη οὐδέ γε τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν. ἔμαθον γὰρ παρ' Ἡσιόδου, ὃς ἔφη ἔργον [δ'] οὐδὲν εἶναι ὄνειδος. οἶει οὖν αὐτόν, εἰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα ἐκάλει καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ πράττειν, οἶα νυνδὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, οὐδενὶ ἂν ὄνειδος φάναι εἶναι σκυτοτομοῦντι ἢ ταριχοπωλοῦντι ἢ ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθημένῳ; οὐκ οἶεσθαί γε χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνος οἶμαι ποίησιν πράξεως καὶ ἐργασίας ἄλλο ἐνόμιζεν, καὶ ποίημα μὲν γίγνεσθαι ὄνειδος ἐνίοτε, ὅταν μὴ

5

c

a 4 οὐ B: οἱ T: οἱ μὴ W a 10 γὰρ ποῦ Cobet a 11 εἰ ci. Heindorf: ἦ B: ἦ T: ἦ W
b 4 δ' vel εἶναι secl. ci. Stephanus b 6 ἔλεγες TW: λέγεις B

both because of your age and because of the study you have given it. So if you agree that temperance is what this young man says, and take the argument over, I would much rather look into it with you, to see whether what was said is true or not.”

“I agree entirely,” he said, “and I take it over.”

“Good for you,” I said. “Now tell me: do you also agree with what I was asking just now, that all craftsmen make something?”

“I do.”

“And do you think they make only their own things, or other people’s as well?”

“Other people’s as well.”

“Then are they temperate, even though they don’t make only their own things?”

“What’s to stop them?” he said.

“Nothing stops me,” I said. “But see whether it doesn’t stop the man who laid it down that temperance is doing one’s own business, and then says there is nothing to stop those who do other people’s business from being temperate too.”

“Oh yes,” said he, “I suppose I agreed that those who do other people’s business are temperate, just because I agreed that those who make other people’s things are!”¹

“Tell me,” I said, “don’t you call making and doing the same thing?”

“No indeed,” he said, “nor working and making either. I learned that from Hesiod, who said that work is no disgrace. Do you suppose that, if he had called the sort of things you were mentioning just now ‘works’, and ‘working’ and ‘doing’, he would have said that it was no disgrace to anyone to cobble shoes, or to sell salt fish, or to sit in a brothel?² One must not suppose so, Socrates. He too, I think, held making to be something other than doing and working, and held that a thing made may sometimes become a disgrace, when it does not

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b

c

1. Critias’ answer is sarcastic: he had agreed about *making* (*poiein*), and never about *doing* (*prattein*), and he is about to explain the difference. Burnet punctuates it as a statement, not a question.

2. Hesiod, *Works and Days* 311: “Work is no disgrace; idleness is the disgrace.” Burnet, following Stephanus, brackets a particle that Hesiod’s line has and Plato’s indirect quotation does not need. Xenophon reports that “the accuser” charged Socrates with using this very line to teach that no work, however base, should be refused for gain (*Memorabilia* 1.2.56); his reply gives Socrates Critias’ reading, that only doing good counts as working (1.2.57). Critias’ trades seem chosen to shock, and the choice is an aristocrat’s: the cobbler, the salt-fish seller, and the prostitute who “sits in a room” (*oikēma*, a brothel room).

μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ γίγνηται, ἔργον δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν ὄνειδος
τὰ γὰρ καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως ποιούμενα ἔργα ἐκάλει, καὶ
ἐργασίας τε καὶ πράξεις τὰς τοιαύτας ποιήσεις. φάναι δέ
γε χρὴ καὶ οἰκεῖα μόνα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡγεῖσθαι αὐτόν, τὰ δὲ 5
βλαβερὰ πάντα ἀλλότρια ὥστε καὶ Ἡσίοδον χρὴ οἶεσθαι
καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις φρόνιμος τὸν τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττοντα τοῦτον
σώφρονα καλεῖν.

ὦ Κριτία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου σου σχεδὸν d
ἐμάνθανον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι τὰ οἰκεῖα τε καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ
καλοῖς, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήσεις πράξεις καὶ γὰρ
Προδίκου μυρία τινα ἀκήκοα περὶ ὀνομάτων διαιρουντος.
ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι τίθεσθαι μὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων δίδωμι ὅπη ἂν 5
βούλῃ ἕκαστον δήλου δὲ μόνον ἐφ' ὅτι ἂν φέρῃς τοῦνομα
ὅτι ἂν λέγῃς. νῦν οὖν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς σαφέστερον ὀρिसαι
ἄρα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράξιν ἢ ποιήσιν ἢ ὅπως σὺ βούλει e
ὀνομάξῃ, ταύτην λέγεις σὺ σωφροσύνην εἶναι;

Ἔγωγε, ἔφη.

Οὐκ ἄρα σωφρονεῖ ὁ τὰ κακὰ πράττων, ἀλλ' ὁ τὰγαθὰ;

Σοὶ δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ βέλτιστε, οὐχ οὕτω δοκεῖ; 5

Ἔα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ μὴ γάρ πω τὸ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν σκοπῶμεν,
ἀλλ' ὁ σὺ λέγεις νῦν.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἔγωγε, ἔφη, τὸν μὴ ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ κακὰ
ποιοῦντα οὐ φημι σωφρονεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ μὴ κακὰ
σωφρονεῖν τὴν γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράξιν σωφροσύνην εἶναι 10
σαφῶς σοι διορίζομαι.

Καὶ οὐδέν γέ σε ἴσως κωλύει ἀληθῆ λέγειν τόδε γε 164
μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, θαυμάζω, εἰ σωφρονοῦντας ἀνθρώπους
ἡγῆ σὺ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι σωφρονοῦσιν.

Ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι, ἔφη.

Οὐκ ὀλίγον πρότερον, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ ὅτι τοὺς 5

d 5 ἂν βούλῃ W: ἂν θέλῃ B: βούλει T: ἂν ἔλῃ Hermann d 6 ἂν φέρῃς BT: ἂν
φέρεις al.: δὴ φέρεις ci. H. Richards e 10 τῶν ἀγαθῶν TW: τῶν B a 1 γέ σε BW:
γέ T

come about with what is fine, but that work is never any disgrace. For things made finely and beneficially he called works, and makings of that kind he called workings and doings. And we must say that he regarded only such things as appropriate to one, and everything harmful as belonging to others. So we must suppose that Hesiod, and anyone else of sense, calls the man who does his own business temperate."

"Critias," I said, "almost as soon as you began I understood^d what you meant: that it is what is appropriate to one, and one's own, that you call good, and the makings of good things that you call doings. After all, I have heard Prodicus draw countless distinctions between words.¹ Well, I allow you to assign each word as you please; only make clear what you are applying whatever word you use to. So now go back to the beginning and define it more plainly. Is it the doing, or the making, or whatever you like to call it, of good things that you say temperance is?"^e

"It is," he said.

"Then the man who does bad things is not temperate, but the one who does good things?"

"And don't you think so, my good fellow?" said he.

"Never mind that," I said. "Let's not look yet at what I think, but at what you are saying now."

"Well then," he said, "I say that the man who makes not good things but bad ones is not temperate, and that the one who makes good things and not bad ones is. I give you a plain definition: temperance is the doing of good things."

"And perhaps there is nothing to stop you being right. But this¹⁶⁴ I do wonder at," I said, "whether you think that people who are temperate do not know that they are temperate."

"But I don't think so," he said.

"Weren't you saying a little while ago," I said, "that

1. Prodicus of Ceos, the sophist famous for distinguishing near-synonyms. Socrates teases him for it and claims to have been his pupil (*Protagoras* 337a–c, 341a; *Laches* 197d; *Euthydemus* 277e; *Meno* 96d). The joke seems to be that Critias, aristocrat and poet, is splitting words like a paid sophist; compare the jibe at *Laches* 197d that such distinctions suit a sophist better than a statesman.

δημιουργοὺς οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ αὐτὰ τῶν ἄλλων ποιοῦντας
σωφρονεῖν;

Ἐλέγετο γάρ, ἔφη ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;

Οὐδέν ἀλλὰ λέγε εἰ δοκεῖ τίς σοι ἰατρός, ὑγιᾶ τινα
ποιῶν, ὠφέλιμα καὶ ἑαυτῷ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὃν ἰῶτο;

b

Ἔμοιγε.

Οὐκοῦν τὰ δέοντα πράττει ὃ γε ταῦτα πράττων;

Ναί.

Ὁ τὰ δέοντα πράττων οὐ σωφρονεῖ;

5

Σωφρονεῖ μὲν οὖν.

Ἡ οὖν καὶ γινώσκειν ἀνάγκη τῷ ἰατρῷ ὅταν τε ὠφελίμως
ἰᾶται καὶ ὅταν μὴ; καὶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν δημιουργῶν ὅταν τε μέλλῃ
ὀνήσεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔργου οὐ ἂν πράττῃ καὶ ὅταν μὴ;

Ἴσως οὔ.

10

Ἐνίστε ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὠφελίμως πράξας ἢ βλαβερῶς ὁ
ἰατρὸς οὐ γινώσκει ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἔπραξεν καίτοι ὠφελίμως
πράξας, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, σωφρόνως ἔπραξεν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως
ἔλεγες;

c

Ἐγώ γε.

Οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐνίστε ὠφελίμως πράξας πράττει μὲν
σωφρόνως καὶ σωφρονεῖ, ἀγνοεῖ δ' ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ;

5

Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο,
ἀλλ' εἴ τι σὺ οἶε ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ὡμολογημένων
εἰς τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι συμβαίνειν, ἐκείνων ἂν τι ἔγωγε
μᾶλλον ἀναθείμην, καὶ οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυρθείην μὴ οὐχὶ ὀρθῶς
φάναι εἰρηκέναι, μᾶλλον ἢ ποτε συγχωρήσαιμ' ἂν ἀγνοοῦντα
αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρωπον σωφρονεῖν. σχεδὸν γάρ τι ἔγωγε
αὐτὸ τοῦτό φημι εἶναι σωφροσύνην, τὸ γινώσκειν ἑαυτόν,

d

a6 αὐτ secl. ci. Heindorf a9 ἂν vel post δοκεῖ vel post b1 ὠφέλιμα add. ci. H. Richards b5 τὰ] δὲ τὰ corr. Coisl. b8 ἐκάστῳ TW: ἐκάστῳ τί B: ἐκάστῳ τινὶ Schanz b9 οὐ TW: τοῦ B πράττῃ BW: πράξῃ T sed τ in marg. T c8 σὺ W: σοι BT c9 εἰς secl. Hirschig d1 μὴ Stobaeus: ὅτι μὴ BT: ὅτιδὲ ci. Bekker: τι μὴ ci. Madvig: ὅτιοῦν μὴ ci. Cobet: τότε μὴ Schanz d3 ἀνθρωπον αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν Stobaeus

there was nothing to stop craftsmen from being temperate even when they make other people's things?"

"Yes, I was," he said. "But what of it?"

"Nothing. But tell me whether you think a doctor, in making someone healthy, makes something beneficial both for himself and b for the patient he is treating?"

"I do."

"And the man who does this does what he ought?"

"Yes."

"And isn't the man who does what he ought temperate?"

"Temperate indeed."

"Now must a doctor also know when his treatment is beneficial and when it is not? And must each of the craftsmen know when he is going to profit from the work he is doing, and when he is not?"

"Perhaps not."

"Then sometimes," I said, "the doctor, having acted beneficially or harmfully, does not know himself—how he has acted.¹ And yet, c having acted beneficially, he acted temperately, by your account. Or wasn't that what you said?"

"It was."

"Then it seems that sometimes, having acted beneficially, he acts temperately and is temperate, but does not know himself—that he is temperate?"

"But that, Socrates," he said, "could never happen. If you think that this necessarily follows from anything I agreed to earlier, I would sooner take back some of it, and not be ashamed to say I had spoken wrongly, than ever concede that a man who does not d know himself is temperate. In fact I would almost say that this very thing is temperance, knowing oneself,

1. Literally "does not know himself, how he acted": the Greek makes the doctor himself the object of "know", and so, perhaps by design, prepares the formula Critias is about to seize on, "know thyself". The same construction recurs just below.

καὶ συμφέρομαι τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀναθέντι τὸ τοιοῦτον γράμμα. 5
καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ τὸ γράμμα ἀνακείσθαι, ὥς δὴ
πρόσρησις οὔσα τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν εἰσιόντων ἀντὶ τοῦ Χαίρει, ὥς
τούτου μὲν οὐκ ὀρθοῦ ὄντος τοῦ προσρήματος, τοῦ χαίρειν, e
οὐδὲ δεῖν τοῦτο παρακελεύεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἀλλὰ σωφρονεῖν.
οὕτω μὲν δὴ ὁ θεὸς προσαγορεύει τοὺς εἰσιόντας εἰς τὸ
ἱερὸν διαφέρον τι ἢ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὥς διανοούμενος ἀνέθηκεν
ὁ ἀναθεῖς, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ καὶ λέγει πρὸς τὸν αἰεὶ εἰσιόντα οὐκ 5
ἄλλο τι ἢ Σωφρόνει, φησὶν. αἰνιγματωδέστερον δὲ δὴ, ὥς
μάντις, λέγει τὸ γὰρ Γνώθι σαυτὸν καὶ τὸ Σωφρόνει ἔστιν
μὲν ταυτόν, ὥς τὰ γράμματά φησιν καὶ ἐγώ, τάχα δ' ἂν τις 165
οἰηθείη ἄλλο εἶναι, ὃ δὴ μοι δοκοῦσιν παθεῖν καὶ οἱ τὰ ὕστερον
γράμματα ἀναθέντες, τό τε Μηδὲν ἄγαν καὶ τὸ Ἐγγύη πάρα
δ' ἄτη. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι συμβουλὴν ᾧήθησαν εἶναι τὸ Γνώθι
σαυτὸν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν εἰσιόντων [ἔνεκεν] ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ 5
πρόσρησιν εἶθ' ἵνα δὴ καὶ σφεῖς μηδὲν ἡττον συμβουλὰς
χρησίμους ἀναθεῖεν, ταῦτα γράψαντες ἀνέθεσαν. οὐδ' ἂν οὖν
ἐνεκα λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα πάντα, τόδ' ἐστὶν τὰ μὲν
ἔμπροσθέν σοι πάντα ἀφίημι—ἴσως μὲν γάρ τι σὺ ἔλεγες b
περὶ αὐτῶν ὀρθότερον, ἴσως δ' ἐγώ, σαφὲς δ' οὐδὲν πάννῃ ἦν
ὦν ἐλέγομεν—νῦν δ' ἐθέλω τούτου σοι διδόναι λόγον, εἰ μὴ
ὁμολογεῖς σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ γινώσκειν αὐτὸν ἑαυτόν.
Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, σὺ μὲν ὥς φάσκοντος ἐμοῦ 5
εἰδέναι περὶ ὧν ἐρωτῶ προσφέρῃ πρὸς με, καὶ ἐὰν δὴ βού-
λωμαι, ὁμολογήσοντός σοι τὸ δ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ
ζητῶ γὰρ μετὰ σοῦ αἰεὶ τὸ προτιθέμενον διὰ τὸ μὴ αὐτὸς

e1 τοῦ χαίρειν B² Stobaeus: τὸ χαίρειν BT: secl. Cobet e2 ἀλλήλοις B Stobaeus: ἀλλήλους T e3 οὕτω μὲν δὴ] τούτῳ οὖν δὴ Stobaeus e5 ὁ om. Stobaeus
μοι] ἐμοὶ Stobaeus e6 σωφρονεῖν Stobaeus a3 ἐγγύη T: ἐγγυή B: ἐγγυή b:
ἐγγύα t Stobaeus a4 ἄτη BT: ἄτα t Stobaeus a5 ἔνεκεν BTW Stobaeus: addub.
Heindorf, secl. Cobet a6 εἶθ' om. Stobaeus σφεῖς T: αὐτοὶ Stobaeus: αὐτοὶ σφεῖς
W: αὐτὸς φῆς B συμβουλὰς χρησίμους BW: χρησίμους συμβουλὰς T Stobaeus
b2 αὐτῶν T: αὐτόν B b7 ὁμολογήσοντός σοι ci. Heusde: ὁμολογήσαντός σου
BT

and I agree with the one who dedicated the inscription to that effect at Delphi.¹ For it seems to me that the inscription was set up as the god's greeting to those who enter, in place of 'Rejoice!', on the view that this greeting, 'rejoice', is not the right one, and that we ought not to urge this on one another, but 'Be temperate.'² That is how the god addresses those who enter his temple, differently from men; and that, I think, is what the dedicator had in mind when he dedicated it. To everyone who enters he says nothing other than 'Be temperate!' But he says it, as a prophet would, rather riddlingly.³ For 'Know thyself' and 'Be temperate' are the same, as the inscription says and as I say; but one might think them different. That, I think, is what happened to those who dedicated the later inscriptions, 'Nothing too much' and 'Pledge, and ruin is near.'⁴ For they thought 'Know thyself' was a piece of advice, and not the god's greeting to those who enter; and then, so that they too, if you please, could dedicate useful advice no less, they wrote these up and dedicated them. My reason for saying all this, Socrates, is this. Everything before this I give up to you—perhaps what you said about it was more correct, perhaps what I said, but nothing that we said was really clear—but now I am willing to give you an account of this, if you do not agree that temperance is knowing oneself."

"But Critias," I said, "you are treating me as though I claimed to know the answers to what I ask, and as though I will agree with you if only I want to. That is not how it is. I inquire with you, each time, into whatever is proposed, because I myself do not

1. "Take back" (*anatheimēn*) and "dedicated" (*anathenti*) are the same verb, *anathēmi*: in the middle it can mean taking back a move at draughts, and so retracting (LSJ cites this passage); in the active, setting up an offering in a temple. Critias retracts and dedicates in one breath.

2. *Chaire*, "rejoice" or "be glad", was the everyday Greek greeting, used as we use "hello" or "goodbye". Critias' conceit is that the god, greeting his visitors, corrects our manners. "Know thyself" was one of the maxims inscribed at the temple of Apollo at Delphi; the *Protagoras* (343a–b) ascribes it and "Nothing too much" to the Seven Sages.

3. An echo, whether or not Critias hears it: Socrates three times spoke of the formula "doing one's own business" as a riddle (161c, 162a, 162b), and now Critias makes riddling the god's own style.

4. Usually taken to mean: stand surety for another, and ruin is at hand; ancients also applied it to betrothal and to rash oaths (Diodorus 9.10.4–5). It too was given to one or another of the Seven Sages: to Thales in Demetrius of Phalerum's collection (Stobaeus 3.1.172), to Chilon by Diogenes Laertius (1.73).

εἰδέναι. σκεψάμενος οὖν ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν εἴτε ὁμολογῶ εἴτε c
μή. ἀλλ' ἐπίσχεσ ἕως ἄν σκέψωμαι.

Σκόπει δῆ, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Καὶ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σκοπῶ. εἰ γὰρ δὴ γινώσκειν γέ
τί ἐστίν ἢ σωφροσύνη, δηλὸν ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τις ἄν εἴη καὶ 5
τινός ἢ οὐ;

Ἔστιν, ἔφη, ἑαυτοῦ γε.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἱατρική, ἔφην, ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ;

Πάνυ γε.

Εἰ τοίνυν με, ἔφην, ἔροιο σύ “Ἱατρικὴ ὑγιεινοῦ ἐπι- 10
στήμη οὐσα τί ἡμῖν χρησίμη ἐστὶν καὶ τί ἀπεργάζεται,”
εἵπομι' ἄν ὅτι οὐ σμικρὰν ὠφελίαν τὴν γὰρ ὑγίειαν καλὸν d
ἡμῖν ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται, εἰ ἀποδέχῃ τοῦτο.

Ἀποδέχομαι.

Καὶ εἰ τοίνυν με ἔροιο τὴν οἰκοδομικήν, ἐπιστήμην οὐσαν
τοῦ οἰκοδομεῖν, τί φημι ἔργον ἀπεργάζεσθαι, εἵπομι' ἄν ὅτι 5
οἰκῆσεις ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. χρὴ οὖν καὶ
σὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἐπειδὴ φῆς αὐτὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστή-
μην εἶναι, ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἐρωτηθέντα, “ὦ Κριτία, σωφροσύνη,
ἐπιστήμη οὐσα ἑαυτοῦ, τί καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται καὶ e
ἄξιον τοῦ ὀνόματος;” ἴθι οὖν, εἰπέ.

Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζητεῖς. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοία
αὕτη πέφυκεν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις, οὐδέ γε αἱ ἄλλαι ἀλ-
λήλαις σὺ δ' ὡς ὁμοίων οὐσῶν ποιῇ τὴν ζήτησιν. ἐπεὶ λέγε 5
μοι, ἔφη, τῆς λογιστικῆς τέχνης ἢ τῆς γεωμετρικῆς τί ἐστίν
τοιούτων ἔργον οἷον οἰκία οἰκοδομικῆς ἢ ἱμάτιον ὑφαντικῆς ἢ
ἄλλα τοιαῦτ' ἔργα, ἃ πολλὰ ἂν τις ἔχοι πολλῶν τεχνῶν
δείξαι; ἔχεις οὖν μοι καὶ σὺ τούτων τοιούτόν τι ἔργον δείξαι; 166
ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔξεις.

c4 γινώσκειν Tb: γινώσκει B c8 ἔφην W: ἔφη BT d5 οἰκοδομεῖν TW:
οἰκοδομοῦ B e3 ὁμοία αὕτη T: ὁμοίως αὕτη W: ὁμοίως ταύτη B e4 ἀλλήλαις
ci. Heusde: ἄλλαις BT e5 ποιῇ τὴν ζήτησιν W: ποιεῖ τὴν ζήτησιν B: τὴν ζήτησιν
ποιεῖ T λέγε TW: δέ γε B e6 λογιστικῆς TW: λογικῆς B e7 τοιούτων T: τὸ
τοιούτων B a1 τοιούτόν B³T: τοιούτων B

know. So once I have looked into it I am willing to say whether I agree or not. Just wait until I have.” c

“Look into it, then,” said he.

“I am looking,” I said. “If temperance is knowing something, then clearly it would be a kind of knowledge, and knowledge of something, wouldn’t it?”

“It is,” he said, “knowledge of oneself.”¹

“And medicine,” I said, “is knowledge of the healthy?”

“Certainly.”

“Then if you were to ask me,” I said, “‘Medicine, being knowledge of the healthy, what use is it to us and what does it produce?’ I would say, ‘No small benefit: it produces health, a fine work for us,’ if you accept that.” d

“I do.”

“And if you asked me about house-building, which is knowledge of how to build, what work I say it produces, I would say, ‘Houses’; and the same with the other crafts. So you too, on behalf of temperance, since you say it is knowledge of oneself, ought to be able to answer if you are asked, ‘Critias, temperance, being knowledge of oneself, what fine work does it produce for us, worthy of its name?’ Come on, then, tell me.” e

“But Socrates,” he said, “you are not inquiring correctly. This knowledge is not by nature like the other kinds of knowledge, any more than they are like each other; and yet you are conducting your inquiry as though they were alike. For tell me,” he said, “what work does the art of calculation have, or geometry, in the way that a house is the work of house-building, or a cloak of weaving, or the many other works of the kind that one could point to for many crafts? Can you, for your part, point me to any such work of these? No, you can’t.”² 166

1. *Epistēmē*, rendered “knowledge” throughout. The word covers both knowing and a branch of knowledge, a science or an expertise; the argument treats crafts such as medicine and building as *epistēmai*, and the English speaks of “kinds of knowledge” where the Greek is plural.

2. Critias’ counter-examples are mathematical sciences, which leave nothing behind them that one could point to; the *Gorgias* (450d) likewise counts arithmetic, calculation and geometry among arts that achieve everything through words. For Plato *logistikē*, “calculation”, is not mere practical reckoning: see the note at 166a, and *Republic* 525c–d.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Ἀληθῇ λέγεις ἀλλὰ τόδε σοι ἔχω
 δείξαι, τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἐκάστη τούτων τῶν ἐπιστημῶν,
 ὃ τυγχάνει ὃν ἄλλο αὐτῆς τῆς ἐπιστήμης. οἷον ἢ λογιστική 5
 ἐστὶν που τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ τοῦ περιττοῦ, πλήθους ὅπως ἔχει
 πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα ἢ γάρ;

Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἐτέρου ὄντος τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου αὐτῆς τῆς
 λογιστικῆς; 10

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Καὶ μὴν αὖ ἡ στατική τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου b
 σταθμοῦ ἐστὶν στατική ἕτερον δέ ἐστὶν τὸ βαρὺ τε καὶ
 κούφον τῆς στατικῆς αὐτῆς. συγχωρεῖς;

Ἔγωγε.

Λέγε δὴ, καὶ ἢ σωφροσύνη τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ὃ 5
 τυγχάνει ἕτερον ὃν αὐτῆς τῆς σωφροσύνης;

Τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἥκεις
 ἐρευνῶν τὸ ᾧ διαφέρει πασῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ σωφροσύνη
 σὺν δὲ ὁμοιότητά τινα ζητεῖς αὐτῆς ταῖς ἄλλαις. τὸ δ' οὐκ
 ἐστὶν οὕτως, ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσαι ἄλλου εἰσὶν ἐπιστή- c
 μαι, ἐαυτῶν δ' οὔ, ἢ δὲ μόνῃ τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν
 ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ἐαυτῆς. καὶ ταῦτά σε πολλοῦ δεῖ
 λεληθέναι, ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι ὃ ἄρτι οὐκ ἔφησθα ποιεῖν, τοῦτο
 ποιεῖς ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ἐάσας περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος 5
 ἐστίν.

Οἷον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιεῖς ἡγούμενος, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα σὲ
 ἐλέγχω, ἄλλου τινὸς ἔνεκα ἐλέγχειν ἢ οὐπερ ἔνεκα καὶ
 ἐμαυτὸν διερευνώμην τί λέγω, φοβούμενος μὴ ποτε λάθω d
 οἰόμενος μὲν τι εἰδέναι, εἰδὼς δὲ μὴ. καὶ νῦν δὴ οὖν ἔγωγέ
 φημι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, τὸν λόγον σκοπεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ
 ἔνεκα, ἴσως δὲ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδεῖων ἢ οὐ κοινὸν

b 2 στατική secl. ci. Heindorf τε καὶ T: καὶ τὸ B b 8 τὸ ᾧ ci. H. Richards: ὅτῳ
 B: ἵῳ (sic) T: τῷ W πασῶν T et γρ. W: πλείω BW c 8 ἄλλου τινὸς TW: ἀλλ' οὐ
 τινὸς B d 1 διερευνώμην BW: διερευνώην T d 4 κοινὸν B³T: κοινων B

And I said, “That’s true. But I can point out to you what each of these kinds of knowledge is knowledge of, which is something distinct from the knowledge itself. Calculation, for instance, is surely of the even and the odd, how they stand in quantity to themselves and to each other, isn’t it?”¹

“Certainly,” he said.

“And the odd and the even are something other than calculation itself?”

“Of course.”

“And again, weighing is the weighing of the heavier and the lighter weight; and the heavy and the light are something other than weighing itself. Do you agree?”^b

“I do.”

“Tell me, then: what is temperance knowledge of, that is something other than temperance itself?”

“There it is, Socrates,” he said. “Your search has brought you to the very point in which temperance differs from all the other kinds of knowledge, and yet you are looking for some likeness between it and the others. It isn’t so. All the others are knowledge of something else, not of themselves, but this alone is knowledge both of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself. And this is far from having escaped you: I think you are doing the very thing you said just now you were not doing. You are trying to refute me, and letting go of what the argument is about.”^c

“What a thing to do,” I said, “to suppose that, even if I refute you as hard as I can, I am doing it for any other reason than the one for which I would scrutinize even myself—what I am saying: for fear that I might ever, without noticing, think I know something when I don’t.”² And so now too, I say, this is what I am doing: examining the argument for my own sake above all, but perhaps also for the sake of my other friends. Or is it not a common^d

1. Almost word for word the definition of calculation given in the *Gorgias* (451b–c), where it is distinguished from arithmetic, which asks how many each number is.

2. On one reading this is Socrates’ fullest statement in the dialogue of what his refutations are for: the same examination turned first on himself (compare *Apology* 21b–23b, 38a).

οἷε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι σχεδὸν τι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, γίγνεσθαι 5
καταφανὲς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ὅπῃ ἔχει;

Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Θαρρῶν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ μακάριε, ἀποκρινόμενος τὸ
ἐρωτώμενον ὅπῃ σοι φαίνεται, ἔα χαίρειν εἴτε Κριτίας ἐστίν
εἴτε Σωκράτης ὁ ἐλεγχόμενος ἀλλ' αὐτῷ προσέχων τὸν
νοῦν τῷ λόγῳ σκόπει ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἐκβήσεται ἐλεγχόμενος. e

Ἀλλά, ἔφη, ποιήσω οὕτω δοκεῖς γάρ μοι μέτρια λέγειν.

Λέγε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, περὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης πῶς λέγεις;

Λέγω τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι μόνῃ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν 5
αὕτη τε αὐτῆς ἐστὶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη,
εἴπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμης;

Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

Ὁ ἄρα σώφρων μόνος αὐτός τε ἑαυτὸν γινώσεται καὶ οἷός 167
τε ἔσται ἐξετάσαι τί τε τυγχάνει εἰδὼς καὶ τί μὴ, καὶ τοὺς
ἄλλους ὡσαύτως δυνατὸς ἔσται ἐπισκοπεῖν τί τις οἶδεν καὶ
οἶεται, εἴπερ οἶδεν, καὶ τί αὖ οἶεται μὲν εἰδέναι, οἶδεν δ'
οὐ, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδεὶς καὶ ἔστιν δὴ τοῦτο τὸ σωφρονεῖν 5
τε καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ἑαυτὸν αὐτὸν γινώσκειν, τὸ εἰδέναι
ἃ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν. ἄρα ταῦτά ἐστιν ἃ λέγεις;

Ἐγώ, ἔφη.

Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτήρι, ὥσπερ ἐξ
ἀρχῆς ἐπισκεψώμεθα πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν τοῦτ' εἶναι b
ἢ οὐ—τὸ ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι ὅτι οἶδε καὶ ὅτι οὐκ
οἶδεν—ἔπειτα εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα δυνατόν, τίς ἂν εἴη ἡμῖν ὠφελία
εἰδόσιν αὐτό.

Ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη, σκοπεῖν.

Ἴθι δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, σκέψαι, εἴαν τι περὶ αὐτῶν 5

e2 σκόπει ci. Heindorf: σκόπεῖν T: σκοπεῖν B e6 αὕτη T: αὕτη B a4 αὖ Bekker:
αὐτὸς BT: αὖ τις Buttmann a5 τῶν δὲ T: τῶν B a6 αὐτὸν scr. recc.: αὐτὸ BTW
τὸ εἰδέναι BT: ποῖ εἰδέναι b a7 καὶ ἃ W: καὶ ἄτε BT b1 ἐπισκεψώμεθα T:
ἐπισκοπάμεθα B b2 ἢ οὐ τὸ T: ἢ ου τοι B ὅτι οἶδε καὶ add. recc.

good, do you think, for practically all men, that each of the things that are should become plain, as it really is?"

"Very much so, Socrates," he said.

"Then take heart, my dear fellow," I said, "answer the question as it seems to you, and say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted.¹ Just pay attention to the argument itself, and look to see what will become of it under refutation."

"All right," he said, "I'll do that; you seem to me to be talking sense."

"Tell me, then," I said, "what do you say about temperance?"

"I say," said he, "that alone of all the kinds of knowledge it is knowledge both of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge."

"Then," I said, "if it is knowledge of knowledge, it would also be knowledge of the lack of knowledge?"

"Certainly," he said.

"Then only the temperate man will know himself, and be able to examine what he in fact knows and what he does not; and he will likewise be able to inspect others, to see what a person knows and thinks he knows, if he does know it, and again what he thinks he knows but does not; and no one else will. And this is being temperate, and temperance, and knowing oneself: knowing what one knows and what one does not know. Is that what you are saying?"²

"It is," he said.

"Then once more," I said, "the third time, for the Savior, let us look, as though from the beginning, first whether it is possible or not for this to be, to know what one knows and what one does not know, (that one knows it and) that one does not know it; and second, even if it is entirely possible, what benefit there would be for us in knowing it."³

"Well, we must look into it," he said.

"Come then, Critias," I said, "look into it, and see whether, on these matters,

1. "Say goodbye to" is *ea chairein*, literally "let it rejoice": perhaps a smile at Critias, who has just banished "rejoice" as a greeting.

2. Many readers see in "knowledge of the lack of knowledge" a portrait of Socrates as the *Apology* draws him: the man who examines others to find who thinks he knows and does not, and who does not think he knows what he does not know (21d; compare 21b, 22c–d). Whether knowledge of knowledge could really do this is what the argument goes on to test (170d–171c).

3. At a drinking-party the third cup was poured to Zeus the Savior, and "the third, for the Savior" became a proverb for a third and, one hopes, successful attempt (*Philebus* 66d, *Republic* 583b). The words in angle brackets are supplied from later manuscripts.

εὐπορώτερος φανῆς ἐμοῦ ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀπορώ. ἦ δὲ ἀπορώ,
φράσω σοι;

Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάντα ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη, εἰ ἔστιν 10
ὅπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, μία τις ἐπιστήμη, ἣ οὐκ ἄλλου τινός
ἐστιν ἢ ἐαυτῆς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ c
δὴ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἢ αὐτὴ αὕτη;

Πάνυ γε.

Ἴδὲ δὴ ὡς ἄτοπον ἐπιχειροῦμεν, ὦ ἐταῖρε, λέγειν ἐν
ἄλλοις γάρ που τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐὰν σκοπῆς, δόξει σοι, ὡς 5
ἐγῶμαι, ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῦ;

Ἐν τοῖσδε. ἐννόει γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ὅψις τις εἶναι, ἣ ὦν
μὲν αἱ ἄλλαι ὅψεις εἰσὶν, οὐκ ἔστιν τούτων ὅψις, ἐαυτῆς δὲ 10
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅψεων ὅψις ἐστὶν καὶ μὴ ὅψεων ὡσαύτως,
καὶ χρῶμα μὲν ὁρᾷ οὐδὲν ὅψις οὐσα, αὐτὴν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας d
ὅψεις δοκεῖ τίς σοι εἶναι τοιαύτη;

Μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

Τί δὲ ἀκοήν, ἣ φωνῆς μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἀκούει, αὐτῆς δὲ καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων ἀκοῶν ἀκούει καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀκοῶν; 5

Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

Συλλήβδην δὴ σκοπεῖ περὶ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἴ τίς
σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι αἰσθήσεων μὲν αἰσθησις καὶ ἐαυτῆς, ὦν δὲ
δὴ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις αἰσθάνονται, μηδενὸς αἰσθανομένη;

Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

Ἄλλ' ἐπιθυμία δοκεῖ τίς σοι εἶναι, ἥτις ἡδονῆς μὲν οὐδε- e
μιᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία, αὐτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν;

Οὐ δῆτα.

Οὐδὲ μὴν βούλησις, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἣ ἀγαθὸν μὲν οὐδὲν
βούλεται, αὐτὴν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας βουλήσεις βούλεται. 5

b 10 εἰ ἔστιν ὅπερ σὺ t: εἰ ἔστιν ὅπερ T: εἴη ἔστιν ὁ σὺ B (sed ἦ supra εἴη B²) c 8
ἦ B: ἦ T c 10 μὴ ὅψεων BW: μὴ ὅψεως T d 1 οὐδὲν T: οὐδὲ B d 4 ἦ B: ἦ T e 1
δοκεῖ τίς σοι BW: τίς σοι δοκεῖ T e 4 ἀγαθὸν TW (sed ω supra ο W): ἀγαθῶν B

you turn out to be better provided with a way through than I am: for I can find no way through. Shall I tell you where I find none?"¹

"Please do," he said.

"Well, wouldn't all this amount to the following," I said, "if what you were just saying is right: that there is one single knowledge which is knowledge of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge, and that this same knowledge is also knowledge of the lack of knowledge?"

"Certainly."

"Then see what a strange thing we are trying to say, my friend. For if you look at this same thing in other cases, it will seem to you, I think, to be impossible."

"How so, and where?"

"In these. Consider whether you think there is a kind of sight which is not sight of the things the other sights are of, but is sight of itself and of the other sights, and of non-sights likewise; and which, though it is sight, sees no color, but sees itself and the other sights. Do you think there is such a thing?"²

"By Zeus, I don't."

"And a hearing which hears no sound, but hears itself and the other hearings, and the non-hearings?"

"Not that either."

"Then, taking all the senses together, see whether you think there is any sense which is a sense of senses and of itself, but which senses none of the things the other senses sense."

"I don't think so."

"Well, do you think there is a desire which is desire for no pleasure, but for itself and for the other desires?"

"Certainly not."

"Nor, I imagine, a wish which wishes for no good, but wishes for itself and for the other wishes."

1. The Greek plays on *poros*, "way through": *euporos* is "well provided with ways", and *aporein*, "to be at a loss", is to have none. Plato's Socratic dialogues, this one among them, characteristically end in *aporia*.

2. The comedy of the examples looks deliberate and deadpan. The problem underneath is serious and long-lived: Aristotle asks whether it is by sight that we perceive that we see (*De Anima* 3.2, 425b12–25).

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ἔρωτα δὲ φαίης ἄν τινα εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ὃς τυγχάνει ὦν ἔρως καλοῦ μὲν οὐδενός, αὐτοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων;

Οὐκ, ἔφη, ἔγωγε.

Φόβον δὲ ἤδη τινὰ κατανεόηκας, ὃς ἑαυτὸν μὲν καὶ τοὺς 10 ἄλλους φόβους φοβεῖται, τῶν δεινῶν δ' οὐδὲ ἓν φοβεῖται; 168

Οὐ κατανεόηκα, ἔφη.

Δόξαν δὲ δοξῶν δόξαν καὶ αὐτῆς, ὦν δὲ αἱ ἄλλαι δοξάζουσιν μηδὲν δοξάζουσιν;

Οὐδαμῶς.

5

Ἄλλ' ἐπιστήμην, ὥς ἔοικεν, φαμέν τινα εἶναι τοιαύτην, ἣτις μαθήματος μὲν οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, αὐτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη;

Φαμέν γάρ.

Οὐκοῦν ἄτοπον, εἰ ἄρα καὶ ἔστιν; μηδὲν γάρ πω δισχυρίζώμεθα ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἔστιν ἔτι σκοπῶμεν. 10

Ὅρθῶς λέγεις.

b

Φέρε δὴ ἔστι μὲν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἔχει τινὰ τοιαύτην δύναμιν ὥστε τινὸς εἶναι ἡ γάρ;

Πάνυ γε.

Καὶ γὰρ τὸ μείζον φαμεν τοιαύτην τινὰ ἔχειν δύναμιν, 5 ὥστε τινὸς εἶναι μείζον;

Ἐχει γάρ.

Οὐκοῦν ἐλάττωνός τινος, εἴπερ ἔσται μείζον.

Ἀνάγκη.

Εἰ οὖν τι εὔροισιν μείζον, ὃ τῶν μὲν μειζόνων ἐστὶν 10 μείζον καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, ὦν δὲ τὰλλα μείζω ἐστὶν μηδενὸς μείζον, πάντως ἄν που ἐκείνῳ γ' αὐτῷ ὑπάρχῃ, εἴπερ ἑαυτοῦ μείζον c εἶη, καὶ ἐλάττων ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι ἡ οὐ;

e 8 καλοῦ μὲν TW: καλοῦμεν B e 9 ἔφη scr. recc.: ἔφην BTW a 4 μηδὲν Bt: μηδὲ T a 11 ἔτι σκοπῶμεν BTW: ἐπισκοπῶμεν t b 1 ὁρθῶς TW: εἰ ὁρθῶς B (sed in marg. η (sic) B) b 10 εὔροισιν B²T: εὔροι μὲν B b 11 μείζω T: μείζων B c 1 ἄν που Schanz: δὴ ἄν που BT

"Of course not."

"And would you say there is a love of such a kind that it turns out to be love of nothing beautiful, but of itself and of the other loves?"¹

"No," he said, "I wouldn't."

"And have you ever yet come across a fear which fears itself and the other fears, but fears not one of the things that are dreadful?" 168

"I haven't come across one," he said.

"Or an opinion which is an opinion of opinions and of itself, but has no opinion about any of the things the other opinions are opinions about?"

"Not at all."

"But knowledge, it seems, we are saying there is of this kind: knowledge of no subject of learning, but knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge?"

"We are."

"Then isn't it strange, if there really is such a thing? For let's not yet insist that there isn't; let us go on looking into whether there is."

"You're right." b

"Come then: this knowledge is knowledge of something, and has a certain power such that it is of something, doesn't it?"²

"Certainly."

"For we say that the greater, too, has a certain power such that it is greater than something?"

"It has."

"Than something smaller, that is, if it is to be greater."

"Necessarily."

"So if we were to find something greater which is greater than the greater things and than itself, but greater than none of the things than which the others are greater, then surely this would certainly be true of it: if it were greater than itself, it would also be smaller than itself. Wouldn't it?" c

1. Love (*erōs*) is assumed to be of the beautiful, as desire is of pleasure and wish of the good in the lines just before. The *Symposium* starts from the same assumption (201a, 204d), though Diotima refines it: love is of begetting in the beautiful (206e). A love of no beautiful thing is a contradiction as well as a joke; after the prologue, perhaps a pointed one.

2. *Dynamis*, "power" or "capacity": what a thing is able to do or undergo in relation to something else. The argument assumes that each capacity is defined by its proper object, as the *Republic* later makes explicit: a power is defined by what it is set over and what it achieves (477c–d).

Πολλή ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴ τι διπλάσιόν ἐστιν τῶν τε ἄλλων διπλα-
σίων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, ἡμίσεος δὴπου ὄντος ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν 5
ἄλλων διπλάσιον ἂν εἴη οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν που ἄλλου διπλάσιον
ἢ ἡμίσεος.

Ἀληθῆ.

Πλέον δὲ αὐτοῦ ὃν οὐ καὶ ἔλαττον ἔσται, καὶ βαρύτερον
ὃν κουφότερον, καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὃν νεώτερον, καὶ τᾶλλα 10
πάντα ὡσαύτως, ὅτιπερ ἂν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ
ἔχῃ, οὐ καὶ ἐκείνην ἔξει τὴν οὐσίαν, πρὸς ἣν ἡ δύναμις
αὐτοῦ ἦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε οἶον ἢ ἀκοή, φαμέν, οὐκ
ἄλλου τινὸς ἦν ἀκοή ἢ φωνῆς ἢ γάρ;

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αὐτὴ αὐτῆς ἀκούσεται, φωνὴν ἐχούσης
ἐαυτῆς ἀκούσεται οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἀκούσειεν. 5

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

Καὶ ἡ ὄψις γέ που, ὦ ἄριστε, εἴπερ ὄψεται αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν,
χρῶμά τι αὐτὴν ἀνάγκη ἔχειν ἄχρων γὰρ ὄψις οὐδὲν [ἂν] 10
μή ποτε ἴδῃ. e

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ὅρᾳς οὖν, ὦ Κριτία, ὅτι ὅσα διεληλύθαμεν, τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν
ἀδύνατα παντάπασι φαίνεται ἡμῖν, τὰ δ' ἀπιστεῖται σφόδρα
μή ποτ' ἂν τὴν ἑαυτῶν δύναμιν πρὸς ἑαυτὰ σχεῖν; μεγέθη 5
μὲν γὰρ καὶ πλήθη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον ἢ
οὐχί;

Πάνυ γε.

Ἀκοὴ δ' αὖ καὶ ὄψις καὶ ἔτι γε κίνησις αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν
κινεῖν, καὶ θερμότης κάειν, καὶ πάντα αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς 10
μὲν ἀπιστίαν ἂν παράσχοι, ἴσως δέ τισιν οὐ. μεγάλου δὲ 169
τινος, ὦ φίλε, ἀνδρὸς δεῖ, ὅστις τοῦτο κατὰ πάντων ἰκανῶς

c6 ἂν T: ὦν ἂν B c9 ἔσται B: ἐστι compendio T d10 ἀνάγκη T: ἀνάγκην B ἂν
secl. Stallbaum e1 ἴδῃ B: εἴδῃ T e9 γε T³: τε BT e10 αὖ BT: δὴ Schanz a1
ἂν add. Heindorf

“Absolutely necessary, Socrates,” he said.

“And again, if something is double both of the other doubles and of itself, then it would presumably be double of itself and of the others as of halves; for there is no double of anything but a half.”

“True.”

“And what is more than itself will also be less, will it not, and what is heavier lighter, and what is older younger, and so with everything else? Whatever has its own power in relation to itself, will it not also have the character toward which its power was directed?¹ I mean something like this: hearing, we say, was the hearing of nothing but sound, wasn’t it?”

“Yes.”

“Then if hearing is to hear itself, it will hear itself as having a sound; for it could not hear otherwise.”

“Absolutely necessary.”

“And sight too, my excellent friend, if it is to see itself, must have some color; for sight will never see anything that has no color.”

“No, it won’t.”

“So you see, Critias, that of the cases we have gone through, some appear to us to be altogether impossible, while others are very strongly doubted ever to have their own power in relation to themselves? For with magnitudes and numbers and such things it is altogether impossible, isn’t it?”

“Certainly.”

“Again, hearing and sight, and indeed motion moving itself and heat burning itself, and all such things, would raise disbelief in some people, though perhaps not in others.² It needs a great man, my friend, to determine this adequately for all cases: 169

1. “Character” renders *ousia*, being or nature. The principle: if a thing’s power is to be exercised on itself, the thing must itself have the property that power is directed at. So hearing that hears itself must have a sound, and sight that sees itself must have a color.

2. Socrates leaves self-motion open; in later dialogues Plato defines the soul precisely as the motion that moves itself (*Phaedrus* 245c–e; *Laws* 895e–896a).

διαιρήσεται, πότερον οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν
αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ πέφυκεν ἔχειν [πλὴν ἐπιστήμης], ἀλλὰ πρὸς
ἄλλο, ἢ τὰ μὲν, τὰ δ' οὐ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐ ἅτινα αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ 5
ἔχει, ἄρ' ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ἣν δὴ ἡμεῖς σωφρο-
σύνην φαμέν εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ πιστεύω ἑμαυτῷ ἰκανὸς εἶναι
ταῦτα διελέσθαι διὸ καὶ οὐτ' εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι τοῦτο γενέσθαι,
ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, ἔχω δισχυρίσασθαι, οὐτ' εἰ ὅτι b
μάλιστα ἔστι, σωφροσύνην ἀποδέχομαι αὐτὸ εἶναι, πρὶν ἂν
ἐπισκέψωμαι εἴτε τι ἂν ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῖ τοιοῦτον ὃν εἴτε μή.
τὴν γὰρ οὖν δὴ σωφροσύνην ὠφέλιμόν τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν μαν-
τεύομαι εἶναι σὺν οὖν, ὦ παῖ Καλλαίσχρου—τίθεσαι γὰρ 5
σωφροσύνην τοῦτ' εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης καὶ δὴ καὶ
ἀνεπιστημοσύνης—πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ἔνδειξαι, ὅτι δυνατόν
[ἀποδείξαι σε] ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ἔπειτα πρὸς τῷ δυνατῷ ὅτι
καὶ ὠφέλιμον καμὲ τάχ' ἂν ἀποπληρώσῃς ὡς ὀρθῶς λέγεις c
περὶ σωφροσύνης ὃ ἔστιν.

Καὶ ὁ Κριτίας ἀκούσας ταῦτα καὶ ἰδὼν με ἀποροῦντα,
ὥσπερ οἱ τοὺς χασμωμένους καταντικρὺ ὀρώντες ταῦτον
τοῦτο συμπάσχουσιν, κάκείνος ἔδοξέ μοι ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἀποροῦντος 5
ἀναγκασθῆναι καὶ αὐτὸς ἀλῶναι ὑπὸ ἀπορίας. ἄτε οὖν εὐ-
δοκιμῶν ἐκάστοτε, ἡσχύνετο τοὺς παρόντας, καὶ οὔτε συγχω-
ρῆσαί μοι ἤθελεν ἀδύνατος εἶναι διελέσθαι ἃ προυκαλούμην
αὐτόν, ἔλεγεν τε οὐδὲν σαφές, ἐπικαλύπτων τὴν ἀπορίαν. d
κἀγὼ ἡμῖν ἵνα ὁ λόγος προῖοι, εἶπον Ἄλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, ὦ
Κριτία, νῦν μὲν τοῦτο συγχωρήσωμεν, δυνατόν εἶναι γενέ-
σθαι ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης αὐθις δὲ ἐπισκεψόμεθα εἴτε
οὕτως ἔχει εἴτε μή. ἴθι δὴ οὖν, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα δυνατόν 5
τοῦτο, τί μᾶλλον οἶόν τέ ἐστιν εἰδέναι ἅ τέ τις οἶδε καὶ ἃ
μή; τοῦτο γὰρ δήπου ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸ γιγνώσκειν αὐτόν καὶ
σωφρονεῖν ἢ γάρ;

Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς, καὶ συμβαίνει γέ που, ὦ Σώκρατες. εἰ

α3 αὐτοῦ BT: αὐτὴν T² α4 πλὴν ἐπιστήμης secl. Schleiermacher b8 ἀποδείξαι
σε secl. Heindorf c6 ἀναγκασθῆναι secl. ci. Badham: an ἀναπλησθῆναι? d6
καὶ ἃ Bt: καὶ T

whether none of the things that are is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself, but only in relation to something else;¹ or whether some are and some are not; and again, if there are things that relate to themselves, whether among them is the knowledge that we say temperance is. I, for my part, don't trust myself to be capable of making these distinctions. That is why I can neither say with confidence whether it is possible for this to come about, for there to be knowledge of knowledge, nor, even if it most certainly exists, accept that it is temperance, until I have looked into whether a thing of that kind would benefit us or not. For I have a prophetic hunch that temperance is something beneficial and good.² So you, son of Callaeschrus, since you lay it down that temperance is this, knowledge of knowledge and indeed of the lack of knowledge, first show this: that what I just mentioned is possible; and then, besides its being possible, that it is beneficial too. And then perhaps you will satisfy me as well that you are right about what temperance is."

When Critias heard this and saw me at a loss, it was like people who catch a yawn from those they see yawning opposite them: he too seemed to me to be forced by my perplexity to be caught by perplexity himself.³ Since he was used to being admired on every occasion, he was ashamed in front of the company; he was not willing to concede to me that he could not make the distinctions I was challenging him to make, and he said nothing clear, but kept covering up his perplexity. So I, to keep our argument moving, said, "Well, if you like, Critias, let us grant for now that it is possible for there to be knowledge of knowledge; we shall look into it again another time, whether it is so or not. Come then: even if this is entirely possible, how does it make one any more able to know what one knows and what one does not? For this, surely, is what we said knowing oneself and being temperate is, isn't it?"

"Certainly," he said, "and it does follow, Socrates. For if

1. Burnet, after Schleiermacher, deletes "except knowledge" after "in relation to itself": the words would assume the answer to the question Socrates goes on to ask.

2. *Manteuomai*, "I divine", is Plato's usual word for a hunch (*Republic* 506a, *Phaedrus* 278e). After Critias' god who speaks "as a prophet would" (164e), it may be heard as an echo; that is an interpretation.

3. Yawning is catching, as the Aristotelian *Problems* observe (7.1). "Caught" (*halōnai*) is the verb Socrates used of himself at 155e, caught by the beautiful boy; now Critias is the one caught. Badham would delete "forced"; Burnet, who keeps it, asks whether Plato wrote "infected" (*anaplēsthēnai*), the verb Thucydides uses of catching the plague (2.51).

γάρ τις ἔχει ἐπιστήμην ἢ αὐτὴ αὐτὴν γινώσκει, τοιοῦτος
 ἂν αὐτὸς εἴη οἰόνπερ ἐστὶν ὃ ἔχει ὥσπερ ὅταν τάχος τις
 ἔχῃ, ταχύς, καὶ ὅταν κάλλος, καλός, καὶ ὅταν γνώσῃ, γι-
 γνώσκων, ὅταν δὲ δὴ γνώσῃ αὐτὴν αὐτῆς τις ἔχῃ, γινώ-
 σκων που αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τότε ἔσται.

Οὐ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀμφισβητῶ, ὥς οὐχ ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ
 γινώσκόν τις ἔχῃ, αὐτὸς αὐτὸν γινώσεται, ἀλλ' ἔχοντι τοῦτο
 τίς ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν;

Ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτόν ἐστιν τοῦτο ἐκεῖνω.

Ἴσως, ἔφην, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ κινδυνεύω αἰεὶ ὁμοῖος εἶναι οὐ
 γὰρ αὖθις μανθάνω ὥς ἔστιν τὸ αὐτό, ἃ οἶδεν εἰδέναι καὶ ἅ τις
 μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι.

Πῶς λέγεις, ἔφη;

Ὡδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἐπιστήμη που ἐπιστήμης οὐσα ἄρα
 πλεον τι οἷα τ' ἔσται διαιρεῖν, ἢ ὅτι τούτων τόδε μὲν
 ἐπιστήμη, τόδε δ' οὐκ ἐπιστήμη;

Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον.

Ταῦτόν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη ὑγιει-
 νοῦ, καὶ ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη δικαίου;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν οἶμαι ἰατρική, τὸ δὲ πολιτική, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν
 ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμη.

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὴ προσεπίσθηται τις τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ
 δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμην μόνον γινώσκη ἅτε τούτου μόνον
 ἔχων ἐπιστήμην, ὅτι μὲν τι ἐπίσταται καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστήμην
 τινὰ ἔχει, εἰκότως ἂν γινώσκῃ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων ἢ γάρ;

Ναί.

e8 καὶ ἃ scr. Ambr. 56: καὶ ἅτε BTW a1 τοῦτο Cornarius: τὸ αὐτὸ BT a3
 τὸ αὐτό] τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ ci. Heindorf ἃ οἶδεν . . . a4 οἶδεν εἰδέναι secl. Hoenebeek
 Hissink a7 διαιρεῖν T2: διευρεῖν BTW a10 ταῦτόν οὖν TW: ταῦτ' οὖν οὖν B
 ἐπιστήμη et mox ἀνεπιστημοσύνη (bis) ci. Bonitz: ἐπιστήμη . . . ἀνεπιστημοσύνη
 (bis) BT b7 γινώσκη scr. recc.: γινώσκει BTW

someone has knowledge which knows itself, he himself would be of the same kind as what he has. Just as when someone has speed he is fast, and when he has beauty, beautiful, and when he has knowledge, knowing, so when he has knowledge that is knowledge of itself, then surely he will be knowing himself.”¹ e

“That isn’t what I’m disputing,” I said, “that when someone has what knows itself, he will know himself. But what necessity is there that someone who has it should know what he knows and what he does not know?”

“Because, Socrates, this is the same as that.” 170

“Perhaps,” I said, “but I’m afraid I’m my same old self: again I don’t understand how it is the same thing, to know what one knows and to know what one does not know.”

“What do you mean?” he said.

“This,” I said. “Knowledge that is knowledge of knowledge: will it be able to distinguish anything more than that, of these things, this one is knowledge and that one is not knowledge?”

“No, only that much.”

“Then is it the same as knowledge and lack of knowledge of the healthy, and as knowledge and lack of knowledge of the just?” b

“Not at all.”

“No: the one, I think, is medicine, the other statesmanship, and this one nothing but knowledge.”

“Of course.”

“So if someone does not also know what is healthy and what is just, but knows only knowledge, since that is all he has knowledge of, it stands to reason that he would know that he knows something and that he has some knowledge, both about himself and about others, wouldn’t he?”

“Yes.”

1. Critias’ principle is that whoever has a thing becomes such as the thing he has. His examples are pairs that share a root: speed (*tachos*) makes one fast (*tachys*), beauty (*kallos*) beautiful (*kalos*), knowledge (*gnōsis*) knowing (*gignōskōn*). Socrates grants the step and questions the next one.

“Ὅτι δὲ γινώσκει, ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ πῶς εἴσεται;
γινώσκει γὰρ δὴ τὸ μὲν ὑγιεινὸν τῇ ἰατρικῇ ἀλλ’ οὐ σωφρο- c
σύνη, τὸ δ’ ἀρμονικὸν μουσικῇ ἀλλ’ οὐ σωφροσύνη, τὸ δ’
οἰκοδομικὸν οἰκοδομικῇ ἀλλ’ οὐ σωφροσύνη, καὶ οὕτω πάντα
ἢ οὐ;

Φαίνεται.

5

Σωφροσύνη δέ, εἴπερ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη,
πῶς εἴσεται ὅτι τὸ ὑγιεινὸν γινώσκει ἢ ὅτι τὸ οἰκοδομικόν;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Οὐκ ἄρα εἴσεται ὁ οἶδεν ὁ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οἶδεν
μόνον.

10

Ἐοικεν.

Οὐκ ἄρα σωφρονεῖν τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴῃ οὐδὲ σωφροσύνη, εἰδέναι d
ἃ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἀλλ’, ὥς ἔοικεν, ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι
οὐκ οἶδεν μόνον.

Κινδυνεύει.

Οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἄρα οἶός τε ἔσται οὗτος ἐξετάσαι φάσκοντά 5
τι ἐπίστασθαι, πότερον ἐπίσταται ὃ φησιν ἐπίστασθαι ἢ οὐκ
ἐπίσταται ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὥς ἔοικεν, γινώσεται, ὅτι
ἔχει τινὰ ἐπιστήμην, ὅτου δέ γε, ἢ σωφροσύνη οὐ ποιήσει
αὐτὸν γινώσκειν.

Οὐ φαίνεται.

10

Οὔτε ἄρα τὸν προσποιούμενον ἰατρὸν εἶναι, ὄντα δὲ μή, e
καὶ τὸν ὥς ἀληθῶς ὄντα οἶός τε ἔσται διακρίνειν, οὔτε ἄλλον
οὐδένα τῶν ἐπιστημόνων καὶ μή. σκεψάμεθα δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε
εἰ μέλλει ὁ σώφρων ἢ ὅστισιν ἄλλος τὸν ὥς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν
διαγνώσεσθαι καὶ τὸν μή, ἂρ’ οὐχ ᾧδε ποιήσει περὶ μὲν 5
ἰατρικῆς δήπου αὐτῷ οὐ διαλέξεται—οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπαίει, ὥς
ἔφαμεν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ νοσῶδες—ἢ οὐ;

Ναί, οὕτως.

Περὶ δέ γε ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ τῇ
σωφροσύνῃ μόνῃ ἀπέδομεν.

10

"But how will he know, by this knowledge, what it is he knows? For he knows the healthy by medicine and not by temperance, the harmonious by music and not by temperance, what belongs to house-building by house-building and not by temperance, and so on for everything. Isn't that so?" c

"So it appears."

"But by temperance, if it is only knowledge of kinds of knowledge, how will he know that he knows the healthy, or what belongs to house-building?"

"In no way."

"Then the man who is ignorant of these will not know what he knows, but only that he knows."

"It seems so."

"Then being temperate, and temperance, would not be this, knowing what one knows and what one does not know, but, it seems, only that one knows and that one does not know." d

"It looks that way."

"Nor, then, will this man be able to examine someone else who claims to know something, to see whether he knows what he says he knows or does not know it. He will know only this much, it seems, that the man has some knowledge; but of what, temperance will not make him know."¹

"Apparently not."

"Then he will be able to distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the one who truly is, nor anyone else who has knowledge from anyone who does not. Let us look into it from this angle. If the temperate man, or anyone else, is to tell the true doctor from the one who is not, won't he proceed like this? He will surely not discuss medicine with him—for the doctor, as we said, understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased. Isn't that so?" e

"Yes, that's so."

"But about knowledge the doctor knows nothing; that, we assigned to temperance alone."

1. This is perhaps the result that tells most against Critias' definition. One of the powers credited to temperance at 167a, examining others to find who knows and who thinks he knows but does not, is exactly what Socrates does in the *Apology* (21b–22e); on this account temperance could not do it. That the resemblance is deliberate is an interpretation, though a common one.

Ναί.

Οὐδὲ περὶ ἰατρικῆς ἄρα οἶδεν ὁ ἰατρικός, ἐπειδήπερ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη οὔσα τυγχάνει.

171

Ἀληθῆ.

Ὅτι μὲν δὴ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχει, γινώσεται ὁ σώφρων τὸν ἰατρὸν δέον δὲ πείραν λαβεῖν ἥτις ἐστίν, ἄλλο τι σκέψεται ὠντινων; ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ὥρισταί ἐκάστη ἐπιστήμη μὴ μόνον ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τίς, τῷ τινῶν εἶναι;

5

Τούτῳ μὲν οὖν.

Καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ δὴ ἑτέρα εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ὠρίσθη τῷ τοῦ ὑγεινοῦ εἶναι καὶ νοσώδους ἐπιστήμη.

Ναί.

10

Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον σκοπεῖν τὸν βουλόμενον ἰατρικὴν σκοπεῖν, ἐν οἷς ποτ' ἔστιν οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς ἔξω, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστιν;

b

Οὐ δῆτα.

Ἐν τοῖς ὑγεινοῖς ἄρα καὶ νοσώδεσιν ἐπισκέπεται τὸν ἰατρὸν, ἢ ἰατρικός ἐστιν, ὁ ὀρθῶς σκοπούμενος.

5

Ἔοικεν.

Οὐκοῦν ἐν τοῖς οὕτως ἢ λεγομένοις ἢ πραττομένοις τὰ μὲν λεγόμενα, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεται, σκοπούμενος, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα, εἰ ὀρθῶς πράττεται;

Ἀνάγκη.

10

Ἢ οὖν ἄνευ ἰατρικῆς δύναται ἂν τις τούτων ποτέροις ἐπακολουθήσῃ;

Οὐ δῆτα.

Οὐδέ γε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς, ὥς ἔοικεν, πλὴν ἰατρός, οὔτε δὴ ὁ σώφρων ἰατρὸς γὰρ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

c

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

e 12 ἰατρικός BT: ἰατρὸς t a 4 δέον δὲ Goldbacher (δεῖν δὲ Hermann): δεῖ δὴ B: δὲ δὴ T: ἐπιχειρῶν δὲ δὴ corr. Coisl.: εἰ δὲ δεῖ ci. Heindorf a 5 ὠντινων t: ὠντινν B: ὠντινυν T a 9 τῷ τοῦ B: τῷ τὸ T b 11 ἢ T: εἰ B ποτέροις T: προτέροις B c 1 οὐδέ γε] οὔτε γε Naegelsbach

"Yes."

"Then the medical man doesn't know about medicine either, since medicine is in fact a knowledge."¹

171

"True."

"That the doctor has some knowledge, then, the temperate man will know; but when he has to test what knowledge it is, won't he look into what it is of? Or isn't each kind of knowledge defined, not just as being knowledge, but as being a particular knowledge, by its being of particular things?"

"By that, yes."

"And medicine was defined as different from the other kinds of knowledge by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased."

"Yes."

"Then whoever wants to look into medicine must look into it in the things in which it is found, and surely not in the things outside it, in which it is not?" ^b

"Certainly not."

"Then the man who looks into it correctly will examine the doctor, in so far as he is a doctor, in what is healthy and diseased."

"It seems so."

"Examining, in what is said or done in this way, whether the things said are said truly and whether the things done are done rightly?"

"Necessarily."

"Could anyone, then, follow either of these without medicine?"

"Certainly not."

"Nor could anyone else, it seems, except a doctor, and so not the temperate man either; for then he would be a doctor in addition to being temperate." ^c

"That is so."

1. The deadpan conclusion, that the doctor does not know medicine, follows because medicine has just been classed as a knowledge, and knowledge of knowledge was given to temperance alone.

Παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον, εἰ ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη μόνον ἐστὶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης, οὔτε ἰατρὸν διακρίναι οἷα 5
τε ἔσται ἐπιστάμενον τὰ τῆς τέχνης ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον, προσποιοῦμενον δὲ ἢ οἰόμενον, οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐπισταμένων καὶ ὁτιοῦν, πλήν γε τὸν αὐτοῦ ὁμότεχνον, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί.

Φαίνεται, ἔφη.

Τίς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, ὠφελία ἡμῖν ἔτι ἂν εἴη d
ἀπὸ τῆς σωφροσύνης τοιαύτης οὔσης; εἰ μὲν γάρ, ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπετιθέμεθα, ἦιδε ὁ σώφρων ἅ τε ἦιδε καὶ ἂ μὴ ἦδει, τὰ μὲν ὅτι οἶδεν, τὰ δ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, καὶ ἄλλον ταυτόν 5
τοῦτο πεπονητότα ἐπισκεῖσθαι οἷός τ' ἦν, μεγαλωστί ἂν ἡμῖν, φαμέν, ὠφέλιμον ἦν σώφροσιν εἶναι ἀναμάρτητοι γὰρ ἂν τὸν βίον διεζώμεν αὐτοί τε [καὶ] οἱ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἦρχοντο. οὔτε 5
γὰρ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἐπεχειροῦμεν πράττειν ἂ μὴ ἡπιστάμεθα, ἀλλ' e
ἐξευρίσκοντες τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἐκείνοις ἂν παρεδίδομεν, οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπετρέπομεν, ὧν ἦρχομεν, ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἢ ὅτι πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἔμελλον πράξειν—τοῦτο δ' ἦν 5
ἂν, οὐ ἐπιστήμην εἶχον—καὶ οὕτω δὴ ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης οἰκία 5
τε οἰκουμένη ἔμελλεν καλῶς οἰκεῖσθαι, πόλις τε πολιτευομένη, καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν οὗ σωφροσύνη ἄρχοι ἀμαρτίας γὰρ ἐξηρημένης, ὀρθότητος δὲ ἡγουμένης, ἐν πάσῃ πράξει καλῶς 172
καὶ εὖ πράττειν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς οὕτω διακειμένους, τοὺς δὲ εὖ πράττοντας εὐδαίμονας εἶναι. ἂρ' οὐχ οὕτως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, ἐλέγομεν περὶ σωφροσύνης, λέγοντες ὅσον ἀγαθὸν εἴη τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἰδέν τις καὶ ἂ μὴ οἶδεν; 5

Πάννυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτως.

c4 εἰ B²T: εἴη B c5 ἀνεπιστημοσύνης BW: ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη T c8 ὥσπερ BW: ὥσπερ ἂν T d5 μεγαλωστί ci. Stephanus: μεγάλως τι BT d7 διεζώμεν T: ἐζώμεν BWt καὶ del. Heindorf e3 οὔτε T: ὃ οὔτε B e6 οἰκουμένη BW: οἰκονομουμένη T ἔμελλεν καλῶς BW: καλῶς ἔμελλεν T e8 πᾶν T: τι πᾶν B a1 ἐξηρημένης TW: διηρημένης B καλῶς πράττειν ἀναγκαῖον καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν B: ἀναγκαῖον καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν TW

"Most certainly, then, if temperance is only knowledge of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, it will be able to tell neither a doctor who knows the things of his craft from one who does not know them but pretends or thinks he does, nor anyone else who knows anything at all, except the temperate man's own fellow craftsman, as the other craftsmen can."

"So it appears," he said.

"Then what benefit, Critias," I said, "would we still get from temperance, if it is like this? For if, as we supposed at the start, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know, of some things that he knows them, of others that he does not, and were able to examine another man in the same situation, then, we say, it would be of enormous benefit to us to be temperate.¹ For we would live our lives without error, both we ourselves who had temperance and all the others who were ruled by us. For neither would we ourselves try to do what we did not know; we would find those who did know and hand things over to them. Nor would we allow the others we ruled to do anything except what they would do correctly, and that would be whatever they had knowledge of. And so a household run by temperance would be bound to be run well, and a city governed by it too, and everything else that temperance ruled. For with error removed and rightness leading, those so disposed must necessarily do finely and well in every action, and those who do well must be happy.² Wasn't this what we were saying about temperance, Critias," I said, "when we said what a great good it would be to know what one knows and what one does not know?"

"Certainly," he said, "that is what we said."

1. "Enormous" renders *megalōsti*, a rare epic and Ionic adverb: Homer uses it of a great warrior lying "at his full length" in the dust (*Iliad* 16.776, 18.26), Herodotus simply for "greatly" (6.70). It is Stephanus' conjecture for the manuscripts' "greatly, in a way"; if it is right, the Homeric ring may be Socrates waxing mock-heroic, which is an interpretation.

2. *Eu prattein*, "to do well", means both to act well and to fare well, prosper; Plato often exploits the double sense (compare *Gorgias* 507c, also of the temperate man). The step from doing well to being happy (*eudaimōn*) rides on it. Spoken to Critias, the picture of "us" ruling a city without error invites an irony many readers have felt.

Νῦν δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁρᾷς ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ ἐπιστήμη οὐδεμία τοιαύτη οὔσα πέφανται.

Ὅρῳ, ἔφη.

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτ' ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἦν νῦν εὐρίσκομεν σωφροσύνην οὔσαν, τὸ ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ὅτι ὁ ταύτην ἔχων, ὅτι ἂν ἄλλο μανθάνη, ῥᾷόν τε μαθήσεται καὶ ἐναργέστερα πάντα αὐτῷ φανέται, ἅτε πρὸς ἐκάστω ᾧ ἂν μανθάνη προσκαθορῶντι τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δὴ κάλλιον ἐξετάσει περὶ ὧν ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς μάθῃ, οἱ δὲ ἄνευ τούτου ἐξετάζοντες ἀσθενέστερον καὶ φαυλότερον τοῦτο δράσουσιν; ἄρ', ὦ φίλε, τοιαῦτα ἅττα ἐστὶν ἃ ἀπολαυσόμεθα τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἡμεῖς δὲ μείζον τι βλέπομεν καὶ ζητοῦμεν αὐτὸ μείζον τι εἶναι ἢ ὅσον ἐστίν;

Τάχα δ' ἂν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχοι.

Ἵσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ Ἵσως δέ γε ἡμεῖς οὐδὲν χρηστὸν ἐζητήσαμεν. τεκμαίρομαι δέ, ὅτι μοι ἄτοπ' ἅττα καταφαίνεται περὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ἴδωμεν γάρ, εἰ βούλει, συγχωρήσαντες καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμην δυνατὸν εἶναι [εἰδέναι], καὶ ὃ γε ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐτιθέμεθα σωφροσύνην εἶναι, τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, μὴ ἀποστερήσωμεν, ἀλλὰ δώμεν καὶ πάντα ταῦτα δόντες ἔτι βέλτιον σκεψώμεθα εἰ ἄρα τι καὶ ἡμᾶς ὀνήσει τοιοῦτον ὄν. ἃ γὰρ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὥς μέγα ἂν εἴη ἀγαθὸν ἢ σωφροσύνη εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη, ἡγουμένη διοικήσεως καὶ οἰκίας καὶ πόλεως, οὗ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ὦ Κριτία, καλῶς ὁμολογηκέναι.

Πῶς δὴ; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ῥαδίως ὁμολογήσαμεν μέγα τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰ ἕκαστοι ἡμῶν, ἃ μὲν ἴσασιν, πράττοιεν ταῦτα, ἃ δὲ μὴ ἐπίσταντο, ἄλλοις παραδιδόειν τοῖς ἐπίσταμένοις.

c5 τεκμαίρομαι δὲ T: τεκμαιρόμενοι BW (sed ai δε suprascr. W) c8 εἰδέναι secl. ci. Heusde d1 ἀλλὰ δώμεν T et γρ. W: ἀλλ' ἴδωμεν BW πάντα ταῦτα B: ταῦτα ἅπαντα T: ταῦτα πάντα W d2 ἄρα τι B²: ἄρτι BT ὀνήσει T: ὀνήσειν B

“But now,” I said, “you see that no knowledge of this kind has turned up anywhere.”

“I see,” he said.

“Well then,” I said, “is this the good that temperance has, as we are now finding it to be, knowing knowledge and the lack of knowledge: that whoever has it will learn more easily whatever else he learns, and everything will appear more clearly to him, since in addition to each thing he learns he has a view of the knowledge as well; and that he will examine others better about the things he himself has learned, while those who examine without it will do so more feebly and poorly? Is it some such things as these, my friend, that we shall get out of temperance, while we have been looking at something greater, and seeking for it to be greater than it is?” ^b ^c

“Perhaps that is how it is,” he said.

“Perhaps,” I said. “And perhaps our search has been to no useful purpose. I infer this because some strange things come to light about temperance, if it is of this kind. For let us see, if you like, granting both that it is possible to know knowledge, and, as for what we laid down at the start that temperance is, knowing what one knows and what one does not know, let us not take that away from it, but grant it. And having granted all this, let us look still better at whether, if it is of that kind, it will benefit us at all. For what we were saying just now, that temperance would be a great good if it were of that kind, as the guide of the management of household and of city, I don’t think, Critias, we were right to agree to.” ^d

“How so?” said he.

“Because,” I said, “we too easily agreed that it would be a great good for men if each of us did what we knew, and handed over what we did not know to others who did know it.”¹

1. The principle that each should do what he knows and leave the rest to those who know recalls the founding principle of the city in *Republic II*, that each should do the one work for which he is suited by nature (369e–370c); *Republic IV* restates it as “doing one’s own business” (433a–b), the formula Charmides offered at 161b.

Οὐκ οὖν, ἔφη, καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν;

Οὐ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Ἄτοπα λέγεις ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκратες.

Νῆ τὸν κύνα, ἔφην, καὶ ἐμοί τοι δοκεῖ οὕτω, κἀνταῦθα καὶ ἄρτι ἀποβλέψας ἄτοπ' ἄττ' ἔφην μοι προφαίνεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι φοβοίμην μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς σκοποῖμεν. ὡς ἀληθῶς γάρ, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἢ σωφροσύνη, οὐδέν μοι δῆλον εἶναι δοκεῖ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάζεται.

Πῶς δῆ; ἦ δ' ὅς. λέγε, ἵνα καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰδῶμεν ὅτι λέγεις.

Οἶμαι μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ληρεῖν με ὅμως τό γε προφανόμενον ἀναγκαῖον σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ εἰκῇ παριέναι, εἴ τίς γε αὐτοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν κήδεται.

Καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Ἄκουε δῆ, ἔφην, τὸ ἐμὸν ὄναρ, εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι' ἐλέφαντος ἐλήλυθεν. εἰ γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα ἡμῶν ἄρχοι ἢ σωφροσύνη, οὐσα οἶαν νῦν ὀριζόμεθα, ἄλλο τι κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας πάντ' ἂν πράττειτο, καὶ οὔτε τις κυβερνήτης φάσκων εἶναι, ὦν δὲ οὐ, ἐξαπατῶ ἂν ἡμᾶς, οὔτε ἰατρὸς οὔτε στρατηγὸς οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς, προσποιούμενός τι εἰδέναι ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, λανθάνοι ἂν ἐκ δὴ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἄλλο ἂν ἡμῖν τι συμβαίνοι ἢ ὑγίεσιν τε τὰ σώματα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν, καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ κινδυνεύοντας καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ σώζεσθαι, καὶ τὰ σκεύη καὶ τὴν ἀμπεχόνην καὶ ὑπόδεσιν πάσαν καὶ τὰ χρήματα πάντα τεχνικῶς ἡμῖν εἰργασμένα εἶναι καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀληθινοῖς δημιουργοῖς χρῆσθαι; εἰ δὲ βούλοιό γε, καὶ τὴν μαντικὴν εἶναι συγχωρήσωμεν

e 4 δοκεῖ T: δοκεῖν B οὕτω κἀνταῦθα Hermann: οὕτως εἰ ἐνταῦθα B: οὕτως ἐνταῦθα T: οὕτωσι ἐνταῦθα W e 5 ἄτοπ' ἄττ' ci. Badham: ἄτοπα γ' BT: ἄτοπά τ' Bekker ἔφην T: ἔφη B a 4 παριέναι T: παρῆναι B a 9 νῦν] δῆ νῦν Stobaeus b 1 πάντ' ἂν scripsi: πάντα Stobaeus: ἂν BT b 2 ἐξαπατῶ ἂν T: ἐξαπατᾶν B (ὦν δὲ . . . ἡμᾶς om. Stobaeus) b 3 οὐδεὶς] τις οὐδεὶς Stobaeus b 4 δῆ BT Stobaeus: δὲ Hermann b 5 τι post ἄλλο transp. Stobaeus ἢ add. ci. Heindorf: μὴ Stobaeus: om. BT b 6 τῇ om. Stobaeus b 7 τὰ] τά τε Stobaeus c 2 ἀληθινοῖς δημιουργοῖς TW Stobaeus: ἀληθινὸν δημιουργὸν B c 3 βούλοιό] βούλει ci. H. Richards

“Then weren’t we right to agree to that?” he said. e

“I don’t think we were,” I said.

“You’re saying some truly strange things, Socrates,” he said.

“By the dog,” I said, “I think so too;¹ and it was with my eye on this very point that I said just now that some strange things were coming to light for me, and that I was afraid we were not looking into it correctly. For truly, even if temperance is entirely of this kind, it does not seem at all clear to me that it does us any good.” 173

“How so?” said he. “Tell us, so that we too may know what you mean.”

“I think I’m talking nonsense,” I said. “All the same, one must look into what comes to light and not let it go by at random, if one cares for oneself even a little.”

“Yes, you’re right,” he said.

“Hear my dream, then,” I said, “whether it has come through horn or through ivory.² If temperance ruled us as fully as could be, being such as we are now defining it, wouldn’t everything be done according to the kinds of knowledge? No one who claimed to be a pilot, but was not, would deceive us, nor would any doctor or general or anyone else escape our notice who pretended to know what he did not know. With things so, what else would happen to us than that we would be healthier in body than we are now, and come through safe when in danger at sea and in war, and that our equipment and clothing and our footwear, all of it, and all our possessions would be expertly made for us, and much else besides, because we would be using genuine craftsmen? And if you like, let us grant that prophecy too is b
c

1. “By the dog” was Socrates’ favorite oath: he swears it at *Gorgias* 482b, calling the dog “the god of the Egyptians”, and before his jury (*Apology* 22a). Ancient scholars called it the “oath of Rhadamanthys”, who had men swear by dog, goose or ram rather than by the gods (*Suda* p 13); Porphyry insists that Socrates was not joking (*On Abstinence* 3.16). Whether he swore it with a smile is a matter of reading.

2. In the *Odyssey* (19.560–67) Penelope says that dreams come through two gates: those through the gate of horn come true, those through the gate of ivory deceive. Socrates does not know which kind his is.

ἐπιστήμην τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι, καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην, αὐτῆς ἐπιστατοῦσαν, τοὺς μὲν ἀλαζόνας ἀποτρέπειν, τοὺς 5
δὲ ὡς ἀληθῶς μάντις καθιστάναι ἡμῖν προφήτας τῶν μελ-
λόντων. κατεσκευασμένον δὴ οὕτω τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος
ὅτι μὲν ἐπιστημόνως ἂν πράττοι καὶ ζῶη, ἔπομαι—ἡ γὰρ d
σωφροσύνη φυλάττουσα οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ παρεμπίπτουσιν τὴν
ἀνεπιστημοσύνην συνεργὸν ἡμῖν εἶναι—ὅτι δ' ἐπιστημόνως
ἂν πράττοντες εἰ ἂν πράττοιμεν καὶ εὐδαιμονοῖμεν, τοῦτο
δὲ οὐπω δυνάμεθα μαθεῖν, ὦ φίλε Κριτία. 5

Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ἡ δ' ὅς, οὐ ραδίως εὐρήσεις ἄλλο τι τέλος
τοῦ εἰ πράττειν, ἐὰν τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἀτιμᾷσης.

Σμικρὸν τοίνυν με, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι προσδίδαξον. τίνος
ἐπιστημόνως λέγεις; ἡ σκυτῶν τομῆς;

Μὰ Δῖ οὐκ ἔγωγε. e

Ἄλλὰ χαλκοῦ ἐργασίας;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἄλλὰ ἐρίων ἢ ξύλων ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν τοιούτων;

Οὐ δῆτα. 5

Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι ἐμμένομεν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ εὐδαί-
μονα εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα. οὗτοι γὰρ ἐπιστημόνως
ζῶντες οὐχ ὁμολογοῦνται παρὰ σοῦ εὐδαίμονες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
περί τινων ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα σὺ δοκεῖς μοι ἀφορίζεσθαι
τὸν εὐδαίμονα. καὶ ἴσως λέγεις ὃν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸν 10
εἰδότα τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι πάντα, τὸν μάντιν. τοῦτον 174
ἢ ἄλλον τινα λέγεις;

Καὶ τοῦτον ἔγωγε, ἔφη, καὶ ἄλλον.

Τίνα; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἄρα μὴ τὸν τοιόνδε, εἴ τις πρὸς τοῖς
μέλλουσιν καὶ τὰ γεγονότα πάντα εἰδεῖ καὶ τὰ νῦν ὄντα, 5
καὶ μηδὲν ἀγνοοῖ; θῶμεν γάρ τινα εἶναι αὐτόν. οὐ γὰρ

d4 ἂν πράττοντες T: τὰ πράττοντες B d5 δυνάμεθα BTW: δυναίμεθα (sic)
T² d9 σκυτῶν τομῆς TW: σκυτοτομῆς B: σκυτοτομικῆς b e6 εὐδαίμονα Tb:
εὐδαιμονία B e8 ὁμολογοῦνται BT: ὁμολογοῦσι t e9 ζῶντα ci. Schleiermacher:
ζώντων BT σὺ Bekker: εἰ BT δοκεῖς Basileensis altera: δοκεῖ BT a6 θῶμεν]
φῶμεν Schanz αὐτόν] τοιούτον ci. H. Richards

knowledge of what is going to be, and that temperance, presiding over it, turns away the impostors and sets up the true prophets for us as foretellers of the future.¹ Equipped in this way, the human race would act and live knowledgeably, I grant, since temperance, standing guard, would not allow the lack of knowledge to slip in and work alongside us. But that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, this, my dear Critias, we cannot yet learn."

"And yet," he said, "you won't easily find anything else that crowns doing well, if you slight 'knowledgeably'."

"Then teach me one small thing more," I said. "Knowledgeably about what? About cutting leather?"²

"By Zeus, not I."

"Working bronze, then?"

"Not at all."

"Or wool, or wood, or anything else of that sort?"

"Certainly not."

"Then we are no longer holding to the argument," I said, "that the man who lives knowledgeably is happy. For these people live knowledgeably, and you do not admit that they are happy; rather, I think, you are marking off the happy man as one who lives knowledgeably about certain things. And perhaps you mean the one I was speaking of just now, the one who knows all that is going to be, the prophet. Do you mean him, or someone else?"

"Him," he said, "and another as well."

"Which?" I said. "Can it be the sort of man who, besides the future, knew everything that has happened and everything that is now, and was ignorant of nothing? Let us suppose there is such a man. For I don't

1. *Alazones*, "impostors", were the stock pretenders of comedy, men who claimed knowledge or powers they lacked (Aristophanes, *Birds* 983, 1016); Aristotle's examples are the prophet, the sage and the doctor (*Nicomachean Ethics* 4.7, 1127b17-20). The word names, in effect, the man Socrates' questioning exposes, though the *Clouds* (102) pinned it on Socrates himself.

2. Socrates' lowly examples are his trademark, and Callicles complains of them in the *Gorgias* (491a): "shoemakers and fullers and cooks and doctors, you never stop". Critias, who at 163b put cobblers beside prostitutes, is not amused.

οἶμαι τούτου γε ἔτι ἂν εἴποις οὐδένα ἐπιστημονέστερον ζῶντα εἶναι.

Οὐ δῆτα.

Τόδε δὴ ἔτι προσποθῶ, τίς αὐτὸν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ποιεῖ 10
εὐδαίμονα; ἢ ἅπασαι ὁμοίως;

Οὐδαμῶς ὁμοίως, ἔφη.

Ἀλλὰ ποία μάλιστα; ἢ τί οἶδεν καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν b
γεγονότων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι; ἄρά γε ἢ τὸ πετ-
τευτικόν;

Ποῖον, ἢ δ' ὅς, πεττευτικόν;

Ἄλλ' ἢ τὸ λογιστικόν; 5

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἄλλ' ἢ τὸ ὑγιεινόν;

Μᾶλλον, ἔφη.

Ἐκεῖνη δ' ἦν λέγω μάλιστα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ τί;

Ἦι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸ κακόν. 10

ᾧ μισαρέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, πάσαι με περιέλκεις κύκλω, ἀπο-
κρυπτόμενος ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἦν ζῆν τὸ εὖ πράττειν
τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦν, οὐδὲ συμπασῶν τῶν ἄλλων c
ἐπιστημῶν, ἀλλὰ μιᾶς οὔσης ταύτης μόνον τῆς περὶ τὸ
ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν. ἐπεὶ ᾧ Κριτία, εἰ ἔθελεις ἐξελεῖν
ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἡττόν τι
ἢ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγιαίνειν ποιήσει, ἢ δὲ σκυτικὴ ὑποδεδέσθαι, 5
ἢ δὲ ὑφαντικὴ ἡμφιέσθαι, ἢ δὲ κυβερνητικὴ κωλύσει ἐν τῇ
θαλάττῃ ἀποθνήσκειν καὶ ἢ στρατηγικὴ ἐν πολέμῳ;

Οὐδὲν ἡττον, ἔφη.

Ἄλλ', ᾧ φίλε Κριτία, τὸ εὖ γε τούτων ἕκαστα γίνεσθαι
καὶ ὠφελίμως ἀπολελοιπὸς ἡμᾶς ἔσται ταύτης ἀπούσης. d

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Οὐχ αὕτη δέ γε, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἀλλ' ἡς

b₁ ἢ τί B: ἢ τι T b₅ ἀλλ' ἢ B: ἀλλ' ἢ T b₉ ἢ τι B: ἢ τί T b₁₀ ἢ τὸ T: τὸ B
c₆ ἡμφιέσθαι T: ἀμφιέσθαι B d₁ ἀπολελοιπὸς B²T: ἀπολελοιπὼς B d₃ ἀλλ'
secl. ci. Madvig

think you would say that anyone lived still more knowledgeably than he."

"Certainly not."

"Then this is what I still long to know: which of the kinds of knowledge makes him happy? Or do they all, alike?"

"Not alike at all," he said.

"Then which, most of all? The one by which he knows what, of the things that are and have been and are going to be? Is it perhaps the one by which he knows draughts?"^b

"Draughts?" said he. "What draughts?"¹

"The one, then, by which he knows calculation?"

"Not at all."

"The one by which he knows what is healthy?"

"More so," he said.

"And the one I mean, the one that does it most of all," I said, "is the one by which he knows what?"

"By which he knows good," he said, "and bad."

"You rascal!" I said. "All this time you've been dragging me round in a circle, hiding from me that it was not living knowledgeably that made us do well and be happy, not even with all the other kinds of knowledge together, but only this one, the knowledge of good and bad.² For, Critias, if you choose to take this knowledge away from the other kinds of knowledge, will medicine make us any less healthy, or cobbling any less well shod, or weaving any less well clothed, or will the pilot's art any less prevent us from dying at sea, and generalship in war?"^c

"No less," he said.

"But, my dear Critias, each of these things being done well and beneficially: that will be gone from us, if this is absent."^d

"You're right."

"But this, it seems, is not temperance, but the knowledge whose

1. *Petteia*, draughts, was a board game played with pebbles. Plato treats it as a real skill that needs long practice (*Republic* 374c; *Statesman* 292e), and in the *Republic* Adeimantus likens Socrates' own questioning to it, the weaker player hemmed in "in words, not pebbles" (487b–c). Critias bristles at being offered a game.

2. On one widely held reading this is the dialogue's positive hint: the knowledge that benefits is knowledge of good and bad, the pair on which Critias built his own definition at 163e. The same knowledge surfaces at the end of the *Laches* (199c–e), where it likewise wrecks the definition under examination; the *Euthydemus* hunts for the knowledge that makes us happy and goes round in a circle (291b–292e). Critias names it, and at once tries to bring it under temperance (174d–e).

ἔργον ἐστὶν τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἡμᾶς. οὐ γὰρ ἐπιστημῶν γε καὶ
ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ 5
κακοῦ ὥστε εἰ αὕτη ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος, ἢ σωφροσύνη ἄλλο
τι ἂν εἴη [ἢ ὠφελίμη] ἡμῖν.

Τί δ', ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἂν αὕτη ὠφελοῖ; εἰ γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα
τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἢ σωφροσύνη, ἐπιστατεῖ
δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις, καὶ ταύτης δήπου ἂν ἄρχουσα e
τῆς περὶ τὰγαθὸν ἐπιστήμης ὠφελοῖ ἂν ἡμᾶς.

Ἦ καὶν ὑγιαίνειν ποιοῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὕτη, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ
ιατρικῇ; καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν αὕτη ἂν ποιοῖ, καὶ οὐχ
αἱ ἄλλαι τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον ἐκάστη; ἢ οὐ πάλαι διεμαρτυρό- 5
μεθα ὅτι ἐπιστήμης μόνον ἐστὶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης
ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός οὐχ οὕτω;

Φαίνεται γε.

Οὐκ ἄρα ὑγείας ἔσται δημιουργός;

Οὐ δηῖτα.

10

Ἄλλης γὰρ ἦν τέχνης ὑγεία ἢ οὐ;

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Ἄλλης.

Οὐδ' ἄρα ὠφελίας, ὦ ἐταῖρε ἄλλη γὰρ αὖ ἀπέδομεν
τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον τέχνῃ νυνδὴ ἢ γάρ;

Πάνυ γε.

5

Πῶς οὖν ὠφέλιμος ἔσται ἢ σωφροσύνη, οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφε-
λίας οὔσα δημιουργός;

Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικέν γε.

Ὅρᾳς οὖν, ὦ Κριτία, ὡς ἐγὼ πάλαι εἰκότως ἐδεδοίκη
καὶ δικαίως ἐμαυτὸν ἡτιώμην ὅτι οὐδὲν χρηστὸν περὶ σω- 10
φροσύνης σκοπῶ; οὐ γὰρ ἂν που ὅ γε κάλλιστον πάντων
ὁμολογεῖται εἶναι, τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἀνωφελὲς ἐφάνη, εἴ τι ἐμοῦ b
ὄφελος ἦν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζητεῖν. νῦν δὲ πανταχῇ γὰρ
ἡττώμεθα, καὶ οὐ δυνάμεθα εὐρεῖν ἐφ' ὅτῳ ποτὲ τῶν ὄντων

d 4 γε] τε Heindorf d 7 ἢ ὠφελίμη B: ὠφελίμη T: ἢ ὠφελίμη Schleiermacher:
secl. Madvig e 3 καὶν Schanz: καὶ BT e 4 οὐχ αἱ Hermann: οὐχὶ BT b 2
ὄφελος T: ὠφελος B b 3 γρ. εὐρεῖν T: ἔχων BT

work is to benefit us. For it is knowledge not of kinds of knowledge and lacks of knowledge, but of good and bad. So if this is what benefits us, temperance would be something else for us."

"Why couldn't it benefit us?" said he. "For if temperance really is, in the fullest sense, knowledge of kinds of knowledge, and presides over the other kinds of knowledge too, then surely, since it would rule over this knowledge of the good as well, it would benefit us." e

"Would it also make us healthy," I said, "and not medicine? And would it do the other things belonging to the crafts, and not each of those crafts its own work? Or didn't we solemnly declare long ago that it is knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else? Isn't that so?"

"It seems so."

"Then it will not be the craftsman of health?"

"Certainly not."

"For health belonged to another craft, didn't it?" 175

"To another."

"Nor of benefit either, then, my friend; for we just now assigned this work in turn to another craft, didn't we?"

"Certainly."

"How then will temperance be beneficial, when it is the craftsman of no benefit?"

"It seems it can't be, Socrates, in any way."

"So you see, Critias, that my fear long ago was reasonable, and I was right to blame myself for looking into temperance to no useful purpose? For surely what is agreed to be the finest of all things would not have turned out to be of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well. As it is, we are beaten on every side, and cannot discover to which of the things that are b

ὁ νομοθέτης τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔθετο, τὴν σωφροσύνην. καίτοι
 πολλά γε συγκεχωρήκαμεν οὐ συμβαίνονθ' ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. 5
 καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης εἶναι συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐκ
 ἑῶντος τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲ φάσκοντος εἶναι καὶ ταύτῃ αὖ τῇ
 ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἔργα γιγνώσκειν
 συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἑῶντος τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν c
 γένοιτο ὁ σώφρων ἐπιστήμων ὦν τε οἶδεν ὅτι οἶδεν, καὶ
 ὦν μὴ οἶδεν ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν. τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ παντάπασι
 μεγαλοπρεπῶς συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδ' ἐπισκεψάμενοι τὸ ἀδύ-
 νατον εἶναι ἅ τις μὴ οἶδεν μηδαμῶς, ταῦτα εἰδέναι ἀμῶς 5
 γέ πως ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν, φησὶν αὐτὰ εἰδέναι ἢ ἡμετέρα
 ὁμολογία. καίτοι, ὥς ἐγῶμαι, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχὶ ἀλογώ-
 τερον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτως ἡμῶν εὐηθικῶν
 τυχοῦσα ἢ ζήτησις καὶ οὐ σκληρῶν, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον εὐρεῖν d
 δύναται τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον κατεγέλασεν αὐτῆς,
 ὥστε ὁ ἡμεῖς πάλοι συνομολογοῦντες καὶ συμπλάττοντες
 ἐτιθέμεθα σωφροσύνην εἶναι, τοῦτο ἡμῖν πάνν ὑβριστικῶς
 ἀνωφελὲς ὄν ἀπέφαινε. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐμὸν καὶ ἥττον ἀγα- 5
 νακτῶ ὑπὲρ δὲ σοῦ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, πάνν ἀγανακτῶ,
 εἰ σὺ τοιοῦτος ὦν τὴν ιδέαν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτω τὴν ψυχὴν
 σωφρονέστατος, μηδὲν ὀνήσῃ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σωφροσύνης e
 μηδέ τί σ' ὠφελήσει ἐν τῷ βίῳ παρούσα. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον
 ἀγανακτῶ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐπωδῆς ἦν παρὰ τοῦ Θρακὸς ἔμαθον,
 εἰ μηδενὸς ἀξίου πράγματος οὐσαν αὐτὴν μετὰ πολλῆς
 σπουδῆς ἐμάνθανον. ταῦτ' οὖν πάνν μὲν [οὖν] οὐκ οἶομαι 5
 οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐμὲ φαῦλον εἶναι ζητητὴν ἐπεὶ τὴν γε
 σωφροσύνην μέγα τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καὶ εἴπερ γε ἔχεις αὐτό,
 μακάριον εἶναί σε. ἀλλ' ὅρα εἰ ἔχεις τε καὶ μηδὲν δέη 176
 τῆς ἐπωδῆς εἰ γὰρ ἔχεις, μᾶλλον ἂν ἔγωγέ σοι συμβου-

b 4 νομοθέτης BTW: ὀνοματοθέτης scr. rec. b 5 ἐν om. Schanz b 8 καὶ τὰ T:
 καὶ B c 2 γένοιτο T: γε οἶτο B: γε οἶοιτο W c 5 ἀμῶς γέ πως TW: ἄλλως γέ
 πως B c 8 εὐηθικῶν BT: εὐηθικῶς t: ἀν εὐνοϊκῶν? d 1 εὐρεῖν T: ἐρεῖν B: αἰρεῖν B²
 e 3 ἐπωδῆς TW: ἐπωδίας B et γρ. W e 5 οὖν secl. Winckelmann e 7 γε T: τε B

the lawgiver gave this name, temperance.¹ And yet we have conceded many things that did not follow in the argument. For we conceded that there is knowledge of knowledge, though the argument did not allow it or say that there was; and we conceded, again, that by this knowledge one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge too, though the argument did not allow this either, so that, if you please, our temperate man might turn out to know, of what he knows, that he knows it, and of what he does not know, that he does not know it. This we conceded with the utmost magnificence, without even considering that it is impossible to know, in some way or other, what one does not know at all; for our agreement says that he knows them, knows that he does not know them. And yet, I think, nothing could appear more absurd than this. Still, though it found us so simple-minded and so easy to deal with, our inquiry is no more able to find the truth. It has made such a mockery of the truth that what we long ago agreed on, and made up between us, and laid down as temperance, it has shown, with the utmost insolence, to be of no benefit.² For my own part I am less aggrieved. But on your account, Charmides," I said, "I am very aggrieved, if you, being such as you are in your looks and, besides, most temperate in soul, are to get no profit from this temperance, and it is to be of no benefit to you in life by being present in you. And I am still more aggrieved on account of the charm I learned from the Thracian, if I took great pains to learn a charm for a thing worth nothing. Well, I don't at all think it is so; rather, I am a poor inquirer. For I do think that temperance is a great good, and that if you have it you are blessed. So see whether you have it and have no need of the charm. For if you have it, I would sooner

1. The "lawgiver" (*nomothetēs*) is the imagined first giver of names, a figure the *Cratylus* develops at length (388e–390a); later manuscripts read "name-giver" here.

2. Socrates personifies the inquiry as an insolent mocker: finding its partners simple-minded (*euēthikoi*) and not hard to handle, it laughed at the truth and showed their definition to be of no benefit "with the utmost insolence" (*hybristikōs*). The "magnificence" of their concessions reads as irony: they gave away lavishly what the argument did not allow.

λεύσασαι ἐμὲ μὲν λήρον ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι καὶ ἀδύνατον λόγῳ
ὅτιοῦν ζητεῖν, σεαυτὸν δέ, ὅσωπερ σωφρονέστερος εἶ,
τοσοῦτῳ εἶναι καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερον.

5

Καὶ ὁ Χαρμίδης, Ἄλλὰ μὰ Δι', ἥ δ' ὅς, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες, οὐκ οἶδα οὐτ' εἰ ἔχω οὐτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω πῶς γὰρ ἂν
εἰδείην ὃ γε μῆδ' ὑμεῖς οἰοί τέ ἐστε ἐξευρεῖν ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν,
ὥς φῆς σύ; ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι, καὶ ἐμαντόν,
ὦ Σώκρατες, πάνυ οἶμαι δεῖσθαι τῆς ἐπωδῆς, καὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν
οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐπάδεσθαι ὑπὸ σοῦ ὅσαι ἡμέραι, ἕως ἂν φῆς
σὺ ἱκανῶς ἔχειν.

b

Εἶεν ἀλλ', ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας, ὦ Χαρμίδη, ἦν δρᾶς τοῦτο
ἔμοιγ' ἔσται τοῦτο τεκμήριον ὅτι σωφρονεῖς, ἦν ἐπάδειν
παρέχῃς Σωκράτει καὶ μὴ ἀπολείπη τοῦτου μήτε μέγα μήτε
σμικρόν.

5

Ὡς ἀκολουθήσοντος, ἔφη, καὶ μὴ ἀπολειψομένου δεινὰ
γὰρ ἂν ποιοίην, εἰ μὴ πειθοίμην σοὶ τῷ ἐπιτρόπῳ καὶ μὴ
ποιοίην ἃ κελεύεις.

c

Ἄλλὰ μὲν, ἔφη, κελεύω ἔγωγε.

Ποιήσω τοῖνυν, ἔφη, ἀπὸ ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἀρξάμενος.

Οὔτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί βουλευέσθον ποιεῖν;

5

Οὐδέν, ἔφη ὁ Χαρμίδης, ἀλλὰ βεβουλευμέθα.

Βιάσῃ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ οὐδ' ἀνάκρισίν μοι δώσεις;

Ὡς βιασόμενου, ἔφη, ἐπειδήπερ ὁδε γε ἐπιτάττει πρὸς
ταῦτα σὺ αὖ βουλευόου ὅτι ποιήσεις.

Ἄλλ' οὐδεμία, ἔφην ἐγώ, λείπεται βουλή σοὶ γὰρ
ἐπιχειροῦντι πράττειν ὅτιοῦν καὶ βιαζομένῳ οὐδεὶς οἶός τ'
ἔσται ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἀνθρώπων.

d

Μὴ τοῖνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, μῆδὲ σὺ ἐναντιοῦ.

Οὐ τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐναντιώσομαι.

5

a 4 ὅσωπερ TW: ὅς ὥσπερ B a 7 οὐτ' εἰ ἔχω t: εἴτι ἔχω B: εἴτ' εἰ ἔχω T b 3 ἕως
W: ἵσως BT b 5 ἦν add. Goldbacher (εἰ add. recc.) δρᾶς τοῦτο secl. Hermann:
δρᾶ τοῦτο ci. Madvig b 6 ἦν BW: ἴν' T b 7 ἀπολείπη (suprascr. ι) W: ἀπολίπη
BT c 5 οὔτοι Bt: οὔτοι T c 7 βιάσει BT: βιάσεις t d 4 ἐναντιοῦ Bt: ἐναντίου T

advise you to regard me as a babbler, unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument, and yourself to be happier just in proportion as you are more temperate.”

And Charmides said, “But by Zeus, Socrates, I don’t know whether I have it or whether I don’t. For how could I know, when not even you two are able to discover what it is, as you say? I’m not altogether persuaded by you, though, Socrates,¹ and I think I very much need the charm. As far as I’m concerned, nothing stops me from being charmed by you every day, until you say it’s enough.”

“Very well,” said Critias. “But Charmides, if you do this, it will be proof to me that you are temperate: if you let Socrates charm you and don’t desert him, great or small.”

“Count on it,” he said: “I’ll follow him and not desert him. I’d be doing something terrible if I didn’t obey you, my guardian, and didn’t do what you order.”

“Well, I do order it,” he said.

“Then I’ll do it,” he said, “starting from this very day.”

“You two,” I said, “what are you plotting to do?”

“Nothing,” said Charmides. “We’ve finished plotting.”²

“So you’ll use force,” I said, “and won’t even give me a preliminary hearing?”³

“Count on force,” he said, “since this man here gives the orders. You, for your part, take counsel what you’ll do about it.”

“There’s no counsel left,” I said. “When you set about doing anything, and use force, no man alive will be able to oppose you.”

“Then don’t you oppose me either,” said he.

“Then I won’t oppose you,” I said.

1. *Peithomai*, “I am persuaded”: Charmides is not persuaded by Socrates, and a moment later will obey (*peithesthai*, the same verb) his guardian. The play on persuading and obeying begun at 156a and 157b–c closes here, just as persuasion gives way to force.

2. The verb (*bouleuesthai*) means to deliberate, to take counsel, and so to plot; Socrates asks in the present, Charmides answers in the perfect: the plotting is done. Some twenty-five years later these two ruled Athens by force in the oligarchy of 404–403 BC, Critias among the Thirty and Charmides among the Ten set over the Piraeus; both died fighting the democrats at Munychia (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.4.19). Many readers hear the exchange as the dialogue’s last and darkest irony.

3. *Anakrisis*, the preliminary hearing held by a magistrate before a case went to court: Socrates protests, in the language of the courts, that force is to be used on him without even this first step of due process.

GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

The English words on which the argument depends, in alphabetical order, with the Greek they render and the places where they matter, by Stephanus page. Where a word has a longer entry in the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Glossary says so.

agree, ὁμολογεῖν (*homologeîn*); **agreement**, ὁμολογία. The partners' steps in the argument: 158c, 160e, 163a, 164c, 165b–c, 172d–e, 175a–d. At 162e and 166b “agree” renders συγχωρεῖν (see **concede**).

appropriate to one, οἰκεῖος (*oikeios*). Critias' word, paired with “one's own” and opposed to “belonging to others”: 163c–d.

argument, λόγος (*logos*), where it means the discussion itself: 160b–d, 162e, 166c–e, 169d, 173e, 175b–c, 176a. Elsewhere “account” (158d, 164c, 165b), “principle” (156c, 161e) and “words” (157a, “beautiful words”).

at a loss, ἀπορεῖν (*aporeîn*); **perplexity**, ἀπορία; **no way through** (167b). 155c, 156b, 167b, 169c–d. See Key Words, “Look into, and at a loss”.

bad, κακός (*kakos*). Never “evil”: 156e, 161a–b, 163e, 174b–d. See Key Words, “Good and bad”.

bashful, αἰσχυντηλός (*aischyntēlos*): 160e; “bashfulness” at 158c.

beautiful, καλός (*kalos*), of persons, of the object of love, and of the charm's words: 154a–155d, 157a, 158c, 167e. See **fine**, and Key Words, “Fine, beautiful”.

beautiful and good, καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός (*kalos kai agathos*), the stock phrase καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός for a gentleman, in its full form: 154e.

belonging to others, ἀλλότριος (*allotrios*): 162a, 163c.

beneficial, ὠφέλιμος (*ōphelimos*); **benefit**, ὠφελεῖν, ὠφελία; **of no benefit**, ἀνωφελής. 163c, 164b–c, 165d, 167b, 169b–c, 171d, 174d–175a, 175d–e; ἀνωφελής is “of no use” at 175b, where it plays on **use**. (“Benefit” at 172d renders ὀνίνημι.) See Key Words, “Benefit”.

charm, ἐπωδή (*epōidē*); **to charm**, **to sing a charm**, ἐπάδειν. 155e–158c, 175e–176b. See Key Words, “Charm and remedy”.

concede, **grant**, συγχωρεῖν (*synchōrein*), of steps allowed for the sake of argument: 164d, 169c–d, 172c, 173c, 175b–c; “agree” at 162e and 166b.

craft, τέχνη (*technē*): 161e, 165d, 171c, 174e–175a; “art” at 165e (“the art of calculation”).

craftsman, δημιουργός (*dēmiourgos*): 162e, 164a–b, 171c, 173c; “the craftsman of health”, “of no benefit”, 174e–175a.

do, πράττειν (*prattein*); **doing**, πράξις. Kept apart from **make** and **work**: 161b–163e, 171d–172a. See Key Words, “Doing, making, working”.

do well, εὖ πράττειν (*eu prattein*), both acting well and faring well: 172a, 173d, 174b. See Key Words, “Doing well, and happy”.

doctor, ἰατρός (*iatros*): 156b–157b, 164a–c, 170e–171c, 173b. **Medicine**, ἰατρική (*iatrikē*): 165c, 170b–171b, 174c–e; “doctoring” once, of Socrates’ pretence, 158e.

doing one’s own business, τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν (*to ta heautou prattein*): 161b–163c. See Key Words.

examine, ἐξετάζειν (*exetazein*): 167a, 170d, 172b; also for compounds of σκοπεῖν where a person is examined, 171b, 171d.

fine, καλός (*kalos*), of acts, works and things: 159c–160d, 163c, 165d–e, 172a, 175a. See **beautiful**.

force, βιάζεσθαι (*biazesthai*): 176c–d.

good, ἀγαθός (*agathos*): 160e–161b, 163e, 169b, 172a–d, 174b–e, 175e.

guardian, ἐπίτροπος (*epitropos*): 155a, 176c.

happy, εὐδαιμόν (*eudaimōn*); **be happy**, εὐδαιμονεῖν: 172a, 173d–174c. **Happiness**, εὐδαιμονία: 158a.

health, ὑγίεια (*hygieia*), the product of medicine: 157a–b, 165d, 174e–175a. **The healthy, what is healthy**, τὸ ὑγιεινόν (*to hygieinon*), the object of medicine: 165c, 170a–171b, 174b. The two are kept apart: medicine is knowledge of the healthy and produces health.

impostor, ἀλαζών (*alazōn*): 173c.

inquire, inquiry, ζητεῖν, ζήτησις (*zētein*): 160a, 165b, 165e, 175b, 175d–176a; “search”, “seeking”, 172c; “looking for”, 166b.

know, εἰδέναι, γινώσκειν, ἐπίστασθαι: all “know”, so that the formula “knowing what one knows and what one does not know” keeps the same verb wherever it recurs (167a–b, 169d–170a, 170d, 171d, 172a, 172c).

knowing oneself, γινώσκειν ἑαυτόν (*gignōskein heauton*): 164c–165b, 167a, 169d–e. See Key Words.

knowledge, ἐπιστήμη (*epistēmē*); **kinds of knowledge** for the plural: 165c–175b. **Knowledge of knowledge**, ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης: 166e, 169b–d, 170a, 170c, 171c, 175b. “Knowledge” also renders γνώσις twice, 169e. See Key Words.

knowledgeably, ἐπιστημόνως (*epistēmonōs*): 173d–174b.
lack of knowledge, ἀνεπιστημοσύνη (*anepistēmosynē*): 166e, 167c, 169b, 170a–b, 171c, 172b, 173d, 174d–e.
look into, σκοπεῖν, σκέπτεσθαι (*skopein, skeptesthai*); **way of looking into it**, σκέψις: 158d–e, 161b–c, 162e, 165c, 167b, 168a, 169b, 169d, 171a–b, 172e, 173a, 175a. See Key Words.
make, ποιεῖν (*poiein*); **making**, ποιήσις: 162e–164b. See **do**, **work**.
modesty, αἰδώς (*aidōs*): 160e–161b. See Key Words.
persuade, πείθειν (*peithein*); **obey, be persuaded**, πείθεσθαι: 156a, 157b–c, 176b–c.
pilot, κυβερνήτης (*kybernētēs*); **the pilot’s art**, κυβερνητική: 173b, 174c.
power, δύναμις (*dynamis*): 156b, 168b–169a.
prophet, μάντις (*mantis*); **prophecy**, μαντική: 164e, 173c, 174a.
Prophetic hunch, μαντεύομαι: 169b.
quietness, ἡσυχιότης (*hēsychiōtēs*); **quietly**, ἡσυχῇ: 159b–160d.
rascal, you rascal!, ὦ μιᾶρέ (*ō miare*): 161b, 174b.
refute, ἐλέγχειν (*elenchein*): 162d, 166c–e.
remedy, φάρμακον (*pharmakon*): 155b–158c.
riddle, αἶνιγμα (*ainigma*); **speak in riddles**, αἰνίττεσθαι: 161c, 162a–b, 164e.
temperance, σωφροσύνη (*sōphrosynē*); **temperate**, σώφρων; **be temperate**, σωφρονεῖν. Throughout, one English word for one Greek word. See Key Words.
use, ὄφελος (*ophelos*): 155e, 175b (with “of no use”, ἀνωφελής).
Useful, χρηστός, χρήσιμος: 165a, 165c (“what use is it”), 172c, 175a. Kept apart from **beneficial**.
work (noun), ἔργον (*ergon*): 161e, 163b–c, 165d–166a, 174d–e, 175a–b. **Work** (verb), ἐργάζεσθαι: 162a, 163b–c. See **do**, **make**.

NOTE ON THIS EDITION

HOW THE VOLUME WAS MADE

The Greek was taken from the Perseus Digital Library's digital transcription of Burnet and cut into Burnet's lines by reading every line-end from the photographs of his page, in the 1909 impression described in the Editorial Note. The section letters and line numbers in the margin were computed from the Stephanus divisions rather than copied, and were then compared with Burnet's: all of them, across the 1,067 lines of the dialogue, fall where he prints them. From the second block on, doubtful accents, breathings and superscript numerals were read on the sharper 400-dot text layer that lies beneath each photograph in the scan; in the first block they were read on the photographs at up to fourteen times' magnification. Burnet's apparatus was transcribed from the same images.

The work was done in five blocks of six to nine pages, each finished and checked before the next was begun. Each block was checked by four independent reviewers: two compared the Greek and the apparatus with the page images letter by letter, one compared the English with the Greek clause by clause, and one checked every fact and reference in the notes. Each finding was examined again against the evidence before it was adopted, and not all were adopted. What each block's check caught is recorded at the end of this Note.

When the last block was done the volume was read through as one text, since a check made page by page cannot see some kinds of error: a word rendered one way in one block and another way in the next, a sentence broken badly at a page turn, a step of the argument stated in terms different from those of the step it relies on. The translator read the whole volume, and four further reviewers read it independently: one for the consistency of terms across the whole book, two for sense, omissions and continuity in its two halves, and one for the front matter and the abbreviations of the apparatus. The Introduction, the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Outline and the Glossary were then written from the finished text, and their claims and references were checked against it.

It found some fifty faults that the five block checks had passed, most of them small and several substantive. They fall into a few classes, and the classes are worth a reader's knowing, because they are the kinds of error that an edition checked page by page is likely to contain.

The most serious was words that Burnet deletes surviving in the English. At 169a4 he brackets *πλὴν ἐπιστήμης*, "except knowledge", as spurious, but the English still translated them, in square brackets and without a note, so that Socrates' question named knowledge as the one exception before asking whether knowledge is one. The words are now left untranslated, as the edition promises, and a note records the deletion.

The largest class was terms rendered two ways, with the change falling between blocks. At 162a Socrates was made to speak of "making and doing" one's own, where the Greek has "working and doing", so that at 163b Critias attacked a word Socrates had not used. Medicine was "knowledge of health" at 165c but "of the healthy" from 170a, although 171a refers back to the definition at 165c. The knowledge that makes us happy was "of good and evil" at 174b–d, while the same Greek pair was "good and bad" at 156e and in Critias' definition at 163e. Critias' "usefully" at 163c hid that Socrates' "beneficially" on the next page was the same word, and "useless" at 175d hid that the verdict answered the question of benefit. Socrates' "You rascal!" at 161b had become "You villain!" at 174b; the verb "examine" of 167a and 170d had become "test" at 172b; the ship's "captain" at 173b was a "pilot" at 174c; and at 176b Charmides "believed" Socrates where the Greek resumes the play on persuading and obeying from 156a and 157b–c. At 161b "consider" hid that Charmides was turning Socrates' own "look into" back on him. All are now rendered one way, and the Glossary and Key Words record the rulings.

The next class was sense errors in hard constructions, sentences that read plausibly on their own. At 164e the English had Critias tell people to urge one another not to rejoice; he says we should not bid one another "Rejoice!" but "Be temperate". At 161d "or teaches you boys only yours" added words not in the Greek. At 172c "we have been searching for nothing useful" made temperance the useless thing, where the Greek says the search was to no purpose, as Socrates repeats at 175a. At 175b–c the recapitulation now says "by this knowledge one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge", in the terms of the step it recalls (170b–c). The tentative

question at 174a, the plural formula at 171d and an overstatement at 167c were also corrected, and three times (154a, 154e, 171a) a Greek idiom meaning “is in fact” had been rendered “happens to be”, against the edition’s own ruling.

At two page turns (174a and 174d) the English page carried words that belong to the Greek page following; the breaks now match. Nested quotation marks on the page of Critias’ Delphic speech (164d–165b) were set as double instead of single, and at 165c an opening quotation mark was turned the wrong way by the typesetting program, which has been fixed. Small additions (“of itself” at 159a, “for hire” at 163b) and an omission at 175e (“a charm for a thing worth nothing”) were set right.

In the notes, three cross-references were wrong or loose (161c–162b, where Socrates speaks of a riddle three times, not twice; the reference at 166a; the return of the charm, but not the remedy, at the close); two textual notes that the edition’s working record said had been written, at 156e and 157d, had never been written, and have now been supplied; and a note on the play on persuading and obeying has been added at 176b.

In the front matter, the Editorial Note had said that the Greek was checked against “the 1903 printing”; the copy is in fact the second impression of 1909, corrected in places, and the Note now says so. It named two passages that Stobaeus quotes where he excerpts three, left Priscian and many of Burnet’s abbreviations unexplained, and called Burnet’s text the one in which most readers meet the dialogue, a claim it could not support and has withdrawn.

WHAT REMAINS UNDONE

The identity of Burnet’s witness Θ is not settled; he does not list it among his sigla or discuss it in his preface. Its agreement with B’s gaps in the *Protagoras* suggests that it was copied from B, and it may be the Vaticanus gr. 226 that Bekker and Stallbaum cite as Θ, which contains this tetralogy, but that has not been confirmed.

A few diacritics and superscripts in Burnet’s small apparatus type lie at the limit of what the scan can show, and are printed as read: the breathings under a circumflex at 163a11, 167b10, 167c8 and 167d4; the damaged superscript at 168e9, read as T³, and the heavily inked one at 169a3, read as T²; and the two breathings at 174b1. They should be checked against a better copy of the 1909 impression, or of the first impression of 1903, which may differ from it in places.

The apparatus is Burnet’s alone. It has not been collated against

the manuscripts, and readings proposed since 1903 are not reported. The translation follows Burnet's text even where later scholars would print something else.

The notes are a reader's aid, not a commentary. They were chosen to explain what the English cannot carry and to mark the dramatic irony, and they label interpretations as such; a reader who wants the scholarly debate on the argument of 165–175 will need a commentary.

The checks described above were made by independent reviewers working from the same files and page images. The volume has not been read by a specialist outside the project, and a reader who finds an error is asked to report it.

THE RECORD OF THE BLOCKS

The notes that follow were written as each block was finished, and are kept as a record of what each check found. Where the final reading changed something they report, the text above says so.

BLOCK I (153A–159B)

How it was made. The Greek was taken from the Perseus digital transcription of Burnet and cut into Burnet's lines by reading every line-end from the photographs of his page (in the 1909 impression, as the final reading established). The section letters and line numbers in the margin were then computed from the Stephanus divisions rather than copied, and all of them, across the 243 lines of these nine pages, fell exactly where Burnet prints them. The paragraph breaks read from the photographs agreed with the digital text at every change of speaker. Burnet's apparatus was transcribed from the photographs at magnifications of up to fourteen times.

What verification caught. The block was then checked by four independent reviewers. Two compared the Greek and the apparatus with the page photographs letter by letter, one compared the English with the Greek clause by clause, and one checked every fact and reference in the notes and in the Editorial Note. Each finding was examined again against the evidence before it was adopted.

In the Greek there were three corrections. At 156d6 the digital text's $\Theta\rho\grave{\alpha}\xi$, with a grave accent, is what Burnet actually prints, although the expected form is $\Theta\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi$; the draft had "corrected" it, wrongly, and Burnet's reading is restored. In the apparatus at

155b9, B and W read ἥκει, not ἦκει, and at 157c4 the correcting hand is B³, not B². Two doubtful breathings, at 155c2 αὐτῶ and 157b3 αὐτοῦ, were confirmed as rough.

In the English, six errors of sense were corrected. At 155c, Socrates' boldness rested on his expectation of an easy conversation, not the other way round. At 157b, the mistake is one made "in treating human beings" by some doctors, not by people at large. At 157c, "this weakness in the head" would have had Critias call his cousin simple; it is now "this trouble with his head". At 158a, the comparison with "your uncle Pyrilampes" had been lost. At 158b, the remedy "should" be given, an obligation, not a possibility. At 158c, Charmides looked more beautiful "for one thing", not "at first". Smaller omissions and additions were set right at 153a, 153b, 154c and 155b. At 154b the pun on "measure" and "measuring-line" is now carried in the English, and at 154e Critias' phrase is rendered "beautiful and good" so that its joke shows.

In the notes, a speaker was corrected: at *Phaedrus* 270c it is Phaedrus, not Socrates, who cites Hippocrates. T's reading at 158b1 was restated as "to disgrace none of your forebears", not "disgraced". Critias' genealogy was brought into line with the modern reconstruction, the *Symposium* reference narrowed to 219e–220e, and the lovers of 154a identified as young men rather than grown men. Cydias' fragment is now called his only secure one, and several interpretive remarks are labelled as interpretation.

What remains open. The manuscript Burnet calls Θ is not on his Sigla page and has still to be identified; the Editorial Note names it only as he does.

BLOCK II (159B–162E)

How it was made. As for Block I: the line-ends of Burnet's pages 10–15 were read from the photographs, the margin numbers computed and found to agree with Burnet's at every one of the 180 lines, and the paragraphing read from the photographs agreed with the digital text throughout. Block II adds Burnet's first displayed verse (Homer at 161a) and his first italic Latin in the apparatus (160a).

What verification caught. The same four checks were run. In the Greek text itself nothing was wrong. In the apparatus three readings were corrected: at 159b2 the reading written above the line in W is οἱ, with a breathing only; at 159d4 Cobet's conjecture is τᾶρα, with a circumflex; and at 162e1 Burnet prints *re vera* in roman,

not italic. A reviewer found that the scan carries a sharper 400-dot text layer beneath the photograph, and every doubtful accent and superscript in this block was settled on it; two superscripts were confirmed as B³ and one as B².

In the English, the idiom *pantos mallon* at 162b had been taken as “more than ever”; it means “most certainly”. The simile at 162d now keeps “the poet’s own verses”, which matters because the definition being mangled is Critias’ own. The play between “like a man” and “very much like a man” at 160d–e is now audible, and Homer’s line at 161a keeps “present”, which the argument picks up two lines later. Smaller corrections were made at 160d, 161b, 161c and 162b, and a section letter was moved at 162e.

In the notes, the account of the second half of the argument at 160b–d was corrected; the claims about Critias as a dramatist were reduced to what the ancient evidence supports; the note on Homer’s line now says that Plato adapts it; and the notes on *hēsychē* and on Charmides’ second answer now label their interpretations as such.

BLOCK III (162E–167E)

How it was made. Burnet’s pages 16–23. From this block on, every doubtful accent, breathing and superscript is read on the 400-dot text layer of the scan rather than on the photograph. All 233 lines, margin numbers and paragraph breaks agree with Burnet’s page. One defect in the digital text was removed: a stray numeral keyed into it at 163c.

What verification caught. The Greek text itself was again free of error. In the apparatus ten readings were corrected, all single accents, breathings or superscripts in Burnet’s small type: at 163a11 ἦ B; at 165a6 φῆς B; at 165b2 αὐτὸν B; at 165e3 ταύτη B, where a correction made in drafting had wrongly removed the iota subscript; at 166a1 B³; at 166d4 κοινων B, printed without accent; at 167b2 ἦ B, with no breathing; and at 167b10, c8 and d4 the smooth breathing under a circumflex. These last four are read at the limit of what the scan shows and are recorded as open questions in the register.

In the English, the doctor who “does not know, of himself” (164c) could have been read as “does not know unaided”; it is now “does not know himself—how he has acted”, which keeps the Greek and prepares “know thyself”. At 163d the construction of Socrates’ summary of Critias was made unambiguous, and Critias’ two words “appropriate” and “one’s own” now echo each other as in the Greek. Smaller omissions were restored at 163a,

163d, 165a, 165c, 166a, 166b and 166c–d, a missing section letter was added at 166d, and three page-turns were brought into line with Burnet's.

In the notes, the account of *logistikē* was wrong: the contrast between practical reckoning and the theory of number is later than Plato. The maxim "Pledge, and ruin is near" is now given its ancient interpretations and ascriptions, the notes on Hesiod and Xenophon were made exact, and four interpretive remarks are labelled as such. The Editorial Note now defines every abbreviation used in the apparatus so far.

BLOCK IV (167E–172D)

How it was made. Burnet's pages 24–31, read on the 400-dot text layer. All 238 lines, margin numbers and paragraph breaks agree with Burnet's page. The builder now also checks every line's length against the rest, which caught one line-end matched too early before the proofs were made.

What verification caught. In the Greek, a space had crept between a bracket and a comma at 169a4 (and would have at 172c8); the fault was in the handling of the digital text and is fixed throughout. In the apparatus, three readings were corrected: at 169a3 T² reads ἀντήν, with a smooth breathing; at 171b11 T reads ῆ, with a circumflex; and at 168e9 the damaged superscript is read as T³, not T². Burnet's apparatus gives "e8" for πᾶν at 171e, which stands on line e7; the slip is his and is kept. A stray accent printed above ἀναγκαῖον at 172a2 is a displaced sort, not a reading, and is not reproduced.

In the English, the question at 170a10 now follows Burnet's text, which asks whether knowledge of knowledge is the same as knowledge of the healthy and of the just; the draft had followed the manuscripts. At 170e the question-tag had reversed the doctor's answer, and at 172c the draft had added a clause ("is what it is") that Plato does not write. At 171c "his own fellow craftsman" is now the temperate man's, and "do well" is kept both times at 172a, so that the reader can see the phrase slide from acting well to faring well. Smaller corrections were made at 168a, 168e, 169a, 170b, 171e and 172b.

In the notes, the suspicion of "forced" at 169c is Badham's, not Burnet's; the claims about love of the beautiful, about Homer's *megālōsti*, and about the *Republic's* division of labour were made exact; and three interpretations are now labelled as such.

How it was made. Burnet's pages 32–37, the end of the dialogue, read on the 400-dot text layer. All 173 lines, margin numbers and paragraph breaks agree with Burnet's page, and the build runs to the last word of the text. Three new cases were taught to the builder: a line made only of the end of a divided word (τευτικόν; at 174b), the end of the text itself, and a raised point set against the following word at 175e6.

What verification caught. The Greek text itself was free of error. In the apparatus five readings were corrected. At 174b1, b5, b9 and b10 Burnet reports the manuscripts' own forms, which the draft had normalised to ἦ: he prints ἦ τί B, ἦ τι T; ἀλλ' ἦ B; ἦ τι B, ἦ τί T; and ἦ τὸ T, with no iota subscript anywhere. At 176b5 Madvig's conjecture is $\delta\rho\hat{\alpha}$, without the subscript that Hermann's $\delta\rho\hat{\alpha}s$ has beside it.

In the English, the draft had translated at 174d7 the words [ἦ ὠφελίμῃ], which Burnet deletes, and in the form of Schleiermacher's conjecture, which he rejects; they are now left untranslated. At 175c6 the draft had made Socrates' point a flat contradiction ("he knows the very things he doesn't know"); the Greek says that our agreement has him know, of what he does not know, *that* he does not know it. At 172e Socrates no longer gives a reason the Greek does not give, and at 174d8 "if it really is, in the fullest sense" now matches the same idiom at 172e and 173a. Two small jokes were restored at 175c: the ironic "if you please" and "simple-minded" for the self-mocking *euēthikoi*. Smaller corrections were made at 174c9 and 176b4, and the section letter was added at the head of page 32.

In the notes, two statements were wrong. Plato does not treat draughts as a trivial pursuit; he counts it a real skill, and at *Republic* 487b–c Adeimantus compares Socrates' own questioning to it. And Critias and Charmides did not take Athens by force: the Thirty were voted in, under Spartan pressure, and then ruled by force, and Charmides was not one of the Thirty but one of the Ten set over the Piraeus; both died at Munychia. The note on the oath "by the dog" now gives the ancient explanation, the "oath of Rhadamanthys", with Porphyry's denial that it was a joke. The parallels in the *Laches* and *Euthydemus* are now stated exactly, and the notes on *alazones* and on the insolent inquiry label their interpretations as such.