Worth possessing · Lexicon

From the book

Hipparchus

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

Orientation

At a Glance

The wordἌξιος means worth or worthy of something; κεκτῆσθαι is the perfect infinitive of acquiring, here “to possess.”
In HipparchusAt 231d the gold-and-silver exchange establishes that physical amount is insufficient for judging gain.
In this editionThe edition preserves “worth possessing,” “of no benefit” and “beneficial” as separate steps.
A place to readἄξιον εἶναι ἄλλο τι ἢ κεκτῆσθαι — The question completes worth with possessing.

Meaning

Ἄξιος means worth or worthy of something; κεκτῆσθαι is the perfect infinitive of acquiring, here “to possess.” The phrase ἄξιος κεκτῆσθαι is given as a lexical construction: the passage itself uses the neuter τὸ ἄξιον and asks whether it is worth possessing. Ὠφέλιμος means beneficial or useful, and ἀνωφελής means of no benefit. The negative word denies benefit without necessarily asserting active harm.

The complement “possessing” supplies what worth is worth for. That is more specific than saying a thing has a high price. It directs attention to whether having the thing is advantageous to its possessor. The subsequent question makes benefit the proposed answer to that practical assessment.

Use in the book

At 231d the gold-and-silver exchange establishes that physical amount is insufficient for judging gain. Worth must be considered as well. The next move treats what is of worth as gainful irrespective of size, and what is of no worth as without gain. Socrates then asks whether “of worth” means anything other than worth possessing (231e). The companion accepts the completion.

This short question is a major bridge. The metal example initially concerns relative exchange value: a smaller weight of gold can be worth more than a larger weight of silver. Worth possessing asks instead whether holding an acquisition is desirable. These assessments can be related, but they are not identical merely because English and Greek both use the same worth-family. A costly object might not benefit a particular possessor; a useful thing might have little sale value.

The next alternative, of no benefit or beneficial, guides the companion toward usefulness. What is beneficial is then agreed good at 232a, and Socrates announces that the goodness of the gainful has returned. Read charitably, the passage clarifies that genuine gain is an improvement in what it is good for one to have. Read critically, it shifts from financial value to a comprehensive benefit without defending every link. The reader should be able to see both possibilities.

The earlier disease case supports the need for some qualification: an acquisition at zero cost can still be bad to possess. It does not establish that every possession with positive exchange value must be beneficial in all respects. The distinction between a market measure and an assessment of one’s good remains the central interpretive issue.

The question’s syntax is also important. It expects agreement, and the companion’s “Yes: possessing” accepts the intended complement. That is not a separate assertion that people in fact desire to own every priced object; it is assent to Socrates’ proposed explanation of worth in the current argument.

Places to read

231eἄξιον εἶναι ἄλλο τι ἢ κεκτῆσθαι — The question completes worth with possessing.
231eΝαί, κεκτῆσθαι — The companion expressly accepts the complement.
231eτὸ ἀνωφελὲς ἢ τὸ ὠφέλιμον — The next question asks whether what is worth having is without benefit or beneficial.
232aτὸ ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν — Benefit is connected with goodness.

Translation in this edition

The edition preserves “worth possessing,” “of no benefit” and “beneficial” as separate steps. A paraphrase such as “valuable things are obviously good” would obscure both the grammatical completion and the shift in evaluative perspective. The source’s explanatory materials invite attention to that shift rather than silently harmonizing the senses of worth.