Voluntary rule force and unlimited ambition

Use in the book

Socrates initially identifies a desire to rule everyone in the city with tyrannical rule (124e). Theages later concedes that he would pray to become a tyrant over all people, or as many as possible, and perhaps still more to become a god. He attributes the same wish to Socrates and everyone else (125e–126a). That universal psychological claim is his assertion, not a thesis the dialogue independently establishes or Socrates expressly endorses.

Theages then makes the crucial distinction: this is not what he said he desired. He wants to rule citizens who are willing, neither by force nor as tyrants do. The distinction is not between having power and renouncing all power; it concerns the kind of political relationship he intends. Naming Themistocles, Pericles and Cimon gives the clarification recognizable models.

The exchange reveals the incompleteness of defining a political skill solely by its subjects. A ruler of the whole civic population might be described through the extent of rule, but consent and mode of exercise are further questions. The earlier inference from “all” to “tyrannical” does not incorporate those qualifications. Theages' correction therefore has argumentative substance even if his unlimited prayer makes his ambition comic or troubling.

Neither “democracy” nor a constitutional theory of consent is expounded. The genitive “of willing people” identifies the desired relation without specifying elections, laws or institutions. The final agreement to try association likewise concerns the willingness of Socrates and Theages under divine conditions, but that parallel does not turn the dialogue into a systematic theory of voluntary authority.

Places to read

1. 125e–126aΕὐξαίμην … τύραννος γενέσθαι — Theages states a hypothetical prayer for tyranny
2. 126aἔτι δέ γε ἴσως μᾶλλον θεὸς γενέσθαι — Becoming a god extends the aspiration, with “perhaps” retained
3. 126aἀλλ’ οὐ τούτου ἔλεγον ἐπιθυμεῖν — He distinguishes this from the desire he meant to express
4. 126aΟὐ βίᾳ γε … ἀλλ’ ἑκόντων — Force is excluded and willing subjects specified

Translation in this edition

The translation keeps “pray”, “desire” and “willing” distinct. Recasting the whole speech as “I want to be a tyrant” would erase its explicit correction; treating it as a clean repudiation of every tyrannical aspiration would erase the preceding admission. Both belong in the interpretation.

Force — βία (bia)

βία (bia)

Force. The manner of ruling Theages expressly excludes when clarifying his intended civic ambition. Attested: βίᾳ (126a). Voluntary rule force and unlimited ambition.

God — θεός (theos) · θεὸς (126a).

θεός (theos)

God. The further object of Theages' expansive hypothetical prayer; distinct from the divine power later governing association. Attested: θεὸς (126a). Voluntary rule force and unlimited ambition.

Willing — ἑκών (hekōn)

ἑκών (hekōn)

Willing. The consenting people over whom Theages wishes to rule, a qualification absent from the earlier tyranny inference. Attested: ἑκόντων (126a). Voluntary rule force and unlimited ambition.

Would pray — εὔχεσθαι (euchesthai)

εὔχεσθαι (euchesthai)

Would pray. Theages' potential wish for tyranny, distinguished by him from his stated practical desire for civic education. Attested: Εὐξαίμην (125e). Voluntary rule force and unlimited ambition.

Would pray but did not mean that desire (contextual phrase)

126a: ἀλλ’ οὐ τούτου ἔλεγον ἐπιθυμεῖν. Theages distinguishes what he had meant to say he desired from the expansive prayer he has just admitted. The imperfect elegon concerns his earlier statement, not an assertion that limitless ambition never attracts him. A translation or paraphrase should retain both the admission and the clarification. See Voluntary rule and Desire.

Over willing people (contextual phrase)

126a: Οὐ βίᾳ γε οὐδ’ ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι ἀλλ’ ἑκόντων. The genitive hekontōn depends on the governing idea of ruling. It supplies the subjects' willingness, whereas biai identifies the rejected mode. This is distinct from a teacher's or pupil's willingness to join the association. The statement does not by itself prescribe a particular constitutional institution. See Voluntary rule.