From the book
Stobaeus, Volume II
John Stobaeus · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordIndignation is counted among admirable passions in the Peripatetic account and later placed between enviousness and malicious joy, preserving a different assessment from the neighboring base responses to others’ fortunes.
- In StobaeusThe classification distinguishes admirable, base and intermediate passions and impulses; indignation’s positive place cannot be inferred merely from the presence of distress or from a generic disapproval of emotion.
- In this editionKeep indignation distinct from envy, and preserve the supplied transition in the later mean-definition rather than presenting the entire sequence as equally secure transmitted wording.
- A place to readChapter 7 · Excerpt 21 · Passage 1 Read indignation within the complete threefold classification, comparing its admirable companions with the named base and intermediate feelings before turning to its later definition as a mean.
- English renderings
- indignation
Meaning
Nemesis here is indignation, not the name of a goddess or a general law of retribution. It is distinguished from envy and malicious joy.
Use in the book
The Peripatetic list counts indignation among admirable passions. A later definition places it between enviousness and malicious joy, with part of the transition supplied. The edition’s accompanying note relates its object to undeserved good fortune. Translating it merely as envy would erase the different objects and moral assessment. The mean also does not require mixing a little envy with malicious pleasure: the chapter makes the ethical standard a quality determined by reason, not an arithmetic blend.
The classification does not divide all feelings into a simple opposition between virtue and vice. It allows admirable, base and intermediate passions and impulses. Indignation appears with friendship, gratitude, modesty, confidence and pity, whereas envy and malicious joy are explicitly base. Anger, pleasure and desire belong to a third group. This structure helps explain why a favorable assessment of indignation cannot simply be transferred to every strongly felt response to another person’s circumstances. The later mean-definition provides a further contrast, while its supplied transition must remain visible.
“Admirable are friendship, gratitude, indignation, modesty, confidence, and pity.” (Chapter 7 · Excerpt 21 · Passage 1).
Places to read
- Chapter 7 · Excerpt 21 · Passage 123Indignation is an admirable passion.
- Chapter 7 · Excerpt 25 · Passage 62Its mean contrasts with envy and malicious joy.
Translation in this edition
“Indignation” retains the feeling without importing an independent theory of righteous anger.
νέμεσιν
Attested. Chapter 7 · Excerpt 21 · Passage 1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 142.
φαῦλα, τὰ δὲ μέσα. Ἀστεῖα μὲν φιλίαν, χάριν, νέμεσιν, αἰδῶ, θάρσος, ἔλεον· φαῦλα δὲ φθόνον, ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν, ὕβριν·
Source note
Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 142, 146. The lemma is transmitted in the list despite its supplied introduction in the later definition.