From the book
Stobaeus, Volume II
John Stobaeus · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordAn appropriate action is consistent in life and admits a reasonable defense when done; the concept is broader than a fully virtuous correct action.
- In StobaeusThe account moves from preferred things to appropriate activity and extends the concept to nonrational creatures before giving a formulation specific to rational ways of life.
- In this editionAppropriate action preserves the definition’s breadth better than an unqualified duty, especially where the concept extends to creatures without human institutions or rational deliberation.
- A place to readChapter 7 · Excerpt 8 · Passage 1 Read the animal example together with the rational reformulation; this sequence shows why the definition should not become a narrowly human institutional obligation or office.
- English renderings
- appropriate action; what is fitting to do
Meaning
Kathēkon names what is consistent in life and, once done, admits of a reasonable defense. The definition is broader than a fully virtuous correct action.
Use in the book
The Stoic account extends appropriate activity to nonrational animals insofar as they act consistently with their own nature. In rational life it distinguishes complete appropriate actions, also called correct actions, from intermediate ones such as marrying, serving as ambassador or engaging in discussion. The latter descriptions do not themselves establish that the agent acts from virtue. The later Peripatetic exposition employs appropriate actions in a life intermediate between virtue and vice, retaining the vocabulary within a different framework.
The transition from preferred things explains why appropriate action follows evaluative distinctions. The definition concerns something done and the defense it admits, not merely an attractive object. Its extension to animals makes consistency with their nature sufficient for the wider application. The formulation for rational creatures then locates that consistency in a way of life without retracting the broader extension. This prepares the next excerpt’s distinction between complete correct action and intermediate appropriate activities: the general concept must remain wider than its ethically complete form.
“admits of a reasonable defense” (Chapter 7 · Excerpt 8 · Passage 1).
Places to read
- Chapter 7 · Excerpt 8 · Passage 12Definition and extension to nonrational creatures.
- Chapter 7 · Excerpt 8 · Passage 22Complete and intermediate appropriate actions are distinguished.
- Chapter 7 · Excerpt 24 · Passage 102The Peripatetic intermediate life has appropriate actions.
Translation in this edition
“Appropriate action” avoids making every kathēkon a complete moral achievement.
καθῆκον
Attested. Chapter 7 · Excerpt 8 · Passage 1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 85.
προηγμένων ὁ περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος τόπος. Ὁρίζεται δὲ τὸ καθῆκον· ‘τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ, ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἀπολογίαν ἔχει’· παρὰ
Source note
Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 85–86, 145. “Duty” may suggest a narrower universal obligation than the account’s examples and definition warrant.