From the book
Pensées
Blaise Pascal · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordSentiment ranges from feeling to immediately available awareness; sentir is not confined to emotion.
- In the bookMemory, joy, subtle judgment, first principles, and faith reveal related but distinct uses.
- In this editionThe edition varies ‘feeling,’ ‘sense,’ ‘awareness,’ and ‘direct apprehension’ with the local task.
- A place to readFragment 95 and Fragment 282, checked against Fragment 274's difficulty of distinguishing fancy.
Meaning
The French family sentir, sentiment, sentiments crosses an English division between affective feeling and cognitive apprehension. Fragment 95 deliberately places memory and joy together and adds that even geometrical propositions become sentiments. A blanket replacement by emotion would make the mathematics unintelligible; a blanket replacement by intuition would erase the affective examples. Feeling and apprehension therefore need to be considered together rather than assigned to one separate faculty. The sense must be inferred from what is apprehended or felt, how it is acquired, and what argumentative role the passage gives it.
Use in the book
In Fragment 1 sentir helps describe principles too numerous and delicate to be handled like geometrical definitions. They are sensed rather than fully laid out, and good judgment follows this sentiment. The passage does not make sensitivity sufficient: clear apprehension and correct reasoning remain necessary. Fragment 3 then describes people accustomed to judging by a direct sense of things, contrasted with those proceeding through principles. Fragment 6 adds that both sense and mind can be formed or spoiled by conversation. The directness of a judgment thus does not by itself establish an untouched natural authority.
Fragment 95 complicates any fixed opposition between sentiment and acquired reasoning. The printed English says geometrical propositions “become feelings.” Its note explains the extended cognitive sense: what required inference can become immediately or habitually present. The sentence continues in both directions, saying reason makes feelings natural and natural feelings are erased by reason. It presents a traffic between articulated judgment and settled apprehension, not a permanent partition between one rational organ and one emotional organ.
Fragment 252 develops the practical importance of readiness. Reason acts slowly and needs many principles kept before it; sentiment acts in an instant and is ready to act. The instruction to place faith in direct apprehension responds to the instability of having to reconstruct proofs continually. Yet its surrounding account of custom does not make every ready belief true, and Fragment 245 distinguishes inspiration's saving work from reason and repetition. Fragment 274 presses the unresolved difficulty directly: fancy resembles the apprehension opposed to it, rival speakers rename one another's conviction, and reason itself bends. Fragment 275's mistake of imagination for heart shows why religious confidence also requires scrutiny.
At Fragment 282 the contrast is more precise. First principles are sensed, propositions inferred, and both routes are certain. The heart's knowing space, time, movement, and numbers is not a geometrical proof abbreviated into emotion; it supplies beginnings on which argument rests. The comparison is reciprocal: reason should not demand a proof of every beginning, and the heart should not demand immediate apprehension of every demonstrated proposition. Nature gives little knowledge by the first route and leaves the rest to reasoning. The final paragraph then distinguishes divine giving of religion through the heart's sense from the human persuasion available through argument. It is a transition to faith, not an erasure of the earlier distinctions.
Other contexts make awareness itself the issue. Fragment 164 says the undiverted young feel their nothingness without knowing it: painful exposure and articulated understanding do not coincide. Fragment 399 states that misery requires sentiment, contrasting a ruined house with a human being. There the edition says “awareness.” Fragment 276, finally, distinguishes a reported explanation from Pascal's reply: Roannez attributes his first response to subsequently discovered reasons, while Pascal suspects the response generates the reasons. The passage does not let an interpreter certify a first impression simply by supplying a later argument for it.
Places to read
- Fragment 1FrenchSubtle principles are sensed, yet sound judgment still requires correct reasoning.
- Fragment 3FrenchSentiment names direct apprehension contrasted with successive inference.
- Fragment 6FrenchSense as well as mind can be cultivated or damaged.
- Fragment 95FrenchMemory, joy, and geometrical propositions share the extended vocabulary.
- Fragment 164FrenchFeeling nothingness is distinguished from knowing it.
- Fragment 252FrenchDirect apprehension supplies readiness where discursive attention wavers.
- Fragment 274FrenchFancy and direct apprehension can be confused.
- Fragment 275FrenchImagination is mistaken for heart in supposed conversion.
- Fragment 276FrenchAn immediate reaction may generate its later reasons rather than follow them.
- Fragment 282FrenchSensed principles and inferred propositions have different routes to certainty.
- Fragment 399FrenchSentiment becomes awareness in the distinction between a ruined house and human misery.
Translation in this edition
The listed glosses identify particular contexts rather than universal replacements. In Fragment 282 “Principles are sensed” corresponds to Les principes se sentent; the complete statement about propositions requires its separate verb se concluent. In Fragment 95 the English preserves “feelings,” and the apparatus guards against the modern narrow emotional reading. Cœur remains a distinct printed noun even when the phrase sentiment du cœur joins the two families. Keeping their separate lookup routes prevents an English “feeling” from being silently reassigned to every occurrence of “heart.”
French forms and English renderings
sentiment — direct sense; direct apprehension [printed form]; sentiments — feelings [printed form]; sentent — sense [printed form]; sentiment du cœur — the heart’s direct sense [phrase]; sentir — to sense; to feel [printed form]; se concluent — are inferred [printed form]