Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus · Lexicon

From the book

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Marsilio Ficino · Diotimos Editions · 2026

Orientation

At a Glance

The wordNatural desire is presented as directed toward a good appropriate to the being that desires.
In the Platonic TheologyAfter arguing from truth as food, Ficino introduces a confirmation attributed to the Platonist Olympiodorus, woven from Pythagorean and Platonic mysteries associated with the Phaedo and Gorgias.
In this editionThe repeated naturaliter is interpreted in the text itself as “truly.”
A place to readThe argument from immortal nourishment is followed by the explicitly attributed Olympiodoran confirmation.

Meaning

Natural desire is presented as directed toward a good appropriate to the being that desires. Possibile concerns attainability, utile usefulness, and potentia the power associated with good. The argument does not say that every passing wish must be fulfilled.

Use in the book

After arguing from truth as food, Ficino introduces a confirmation attributed to the Platonist Olympiodorus, woven from Pythagorean and Platonic mysteries associated with the Phaedo and Gorgias. Mind naturally separates forms from matter and strives to live apart from the perishable body, even though bodily sensation pulls it in the opposite direction. The life sought is characterized as devoted to truth and goodness.

The inference runs from the goodness of such a life to its possibility. What is impossible is said to be useless; good cannot be useless; and just as impotence is associated with evil, power belongs to good. Consequently, a genuinely natural appetite for good aims at a possible possession. The structure is an account of teleologically ordered desire, not a survey of human preferences.

Ficino's preceding argument adds that what is most natural to mind as mind should intensify rather than diminish its life. Separation is therefore presented as a consummation. The restriction “insofar as it is mind” is important: the passage is not denying the ordinary distress or limitations of embodied persons, nor does it invite practical self-harm. Its subject is the metaphysical adequacy of a natural end.

Places to read

VIII.2.8The argument from immortal nourishment is followed by the explicitly attributed Olympiodoran confirmation.

Translation in this edition

The repeated naturaliter is interpreted in the text itself as “truly.” The apparatus preserves the possible/useful and impotence/power pairs and the concluding vere beneque. The ancient works are named through Ficino's report; this contribution does not claim a separate verification of Olympiodorus's wording.

appetere / cupere / affectare

appetere / cupere / affectare. Printed forms: affectaret; affectat; appetant; appetit; appetunt; cupiat; cupit; cupitque.

Seeking, desiring or aspiring toward an object or end. Natural desire for truth and inward life is distinguished from bodily appetite and from the endlessly repeated willing of one's own act. References: VIII.2.5, VIII.2.6, VIII.2.8, VIII.10.2, VIII.11.1, VIII.15.3. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.

appetitus / appetitio

appetitus / appetitio. Printed forms: appetitio; appetitu; appetitus.

Appetite or directed desire, including rational and nonrational forms. The stable appetite for truth differs from changing sensory appetite, while formed moral appetite is illuminated by intellect. References: VIII.2.6, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.1, VIII.3.2, VIII.16.1. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.

consensio stabilis

consensio stabilis. Printed forms: consensio; convenire; stabilis.

Stable agreement of minds in their shared desire for truth. It is contrasted with appetites varying with bodily constitution and change, not with every difference of opinion between people. References: VIII.2.6. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.

naturalis

naturalis. Printed forms: naturale; naturalem; naturali; naturalis; naturaliter; naturalium.

Natural, belonging to the characteristic constitution or operation of a being. Natural appetite is taken to disclose a possible proper end, while natural intellectual universality precedes deliberate training; these are specific teleological claims. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.1.4, VIII.1.5, VIII.2.3, VIII.2.6, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.1, VIII.3.8, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.4, VIII.7.1, VIII.8.2, VIII.13.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.2. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.

Olympiodorus / Phaedo / Gorgias

Olympiodorus / Phaedo / Gorgias. Printed forms: Gorgiaque; Olympiodori; Phaedone.

The named Platonist and dialogues invoked for a confirmation from natural desire. Ficino attributes the argument's Pythagorean and Platonic materials to this line of reception; no separate ancient-source collation is claimed. References: VIII.2.8. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.

possibile / utile / impotentia

possibile / utile / impotentia. Printed forms: impossibile; impotentia; inutile; possibile; possibilia; possibilis.

Possible and useful, with impotence as the contrary of effective power. The Olympiodoran confirmation argues that a genuinely good natural end must be attainable; it is not a guarantee that every individual wish will occur. References: VIII.2.8. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.

separare / segregare

separare / segregare. Printed forms: segregari; segregat; separat; separata; Separatam; separationem.

Separating or setting apart, intellectually or with respect to mode of life. Mind separates forms from matter and desires a truth-directed life apart from the perishable body; these are metaphysical claims rather than practical instructions. References: VIII.2.8, VIII.5.2. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.

Olympiodorus (authorities and interlocutors)

Olympiodorus. Ficino cites Olympiodorus’s treatment of natural desire in connection with the Phaedo and Gorgias and with Pythagorean and Platonic materials. The argument turns on the possibility and proper object of a natural desire. References: VIII.2.8. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.

Plato, Gorgias and Phaedo (explicitly named works)

Plato, Gorgias and Phaedo. These titles occur in the Olympiodorus reference supporting the treatment of natural desire. The present index follows Ficino’s mediation rather than claiming to verify a verbatim Platonic quotation. References: VIII.2.8. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.