Law's wishing and human achievement

Use in the book

Socrates' conclusion at 315a is not simply “law is discovery.” It is that law wishes to be the discovery of what is. The companion's immediate objection restates the proposal with “is” and asks why people change laws if reality has been discovered. That sharpening of the formula makes the difference between an aim or defining tendency and a successful achievement visible in the conversation itself.

Socrates answers by repeating the wish. Law wishes no less to be discovery, while people who do not always use the same laws are not always able to discover what law wishes, namely what is (315a–b2). The failure is assigned to human ability, not to variation in law's object. This gives Socrates a way to retain a stable orientation toward truth while recognizing unsuccessful human attempts.

It would nevertheless be too simple to turn the sentence into a settled doctrine that every enactment is law provided it merely aspires to truth. The later craft argument is more restrictive: what is not right is lawless, even if ignorant people call it law (317c). In the recapitulation Socrates says that they agreed law is the finding of what is, without boulesthai (317d). The work moves between an account of what law aims to be and a criterion of what successfully deserves the name. Its language leaves a tension a responsible reading should preserve.

Ordinary requests elsewhere show the verb's everyday force. Socrates lets the companion ask or answer if he wishes; the companion is willing to answer whatever Socrates wishes (315e). Socrates later asks whether the companion wants a reminder about old musical lawgivers (318b), and says that if he is willing to consider tragedy he will find it an old Athenian invention (321a). These are acts or dispositions of speakers. The law's “wish” belongs to the explanatory language of the argument, not to another dramatic character.

At the end neither man's willingness suffices to produce the answer about the soul. The companion says he can no longer state it. That limitation does not duplicate the precise law-formula, but it brings the contrast between an acknowledged aim and an achieved understanding back to the investigators.

Places to read

1. 315aβούλεται τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι ἐξεύρεσις — Law wishes to be discovery
2. 315aεἰ ὁ νόμος ἐστὶν τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις — The companion's objection uses “is”
3. 315a–b2Βούλεται μὲν οὐδὲν ἧττον ὁ νόμος — Socrates insists that the wish remains
4. 315bοὐκ ἀεὶ δύνανται ἐξευρίσκειν ὃ βούλεται ὁ νόμος, τὸ ὄν — Human ability fails to attain the object law wishes
5. 315eἐθέλω; ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ — The companion's willingness to answer and Socrates' wish about the question
6. 317dνόμον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος εὕρεσιν — The recapitulation no longer contains the verb of wishing

Translation in this edition

“Wishes to be” deliberately keeps the verb literal. The note acknowledges “means to be” and “tends to be” as possible ways of understanding this use. The choice preserves the wording on which Socrates' reply depends without pretending that one English phrase resolves all of the philosophical difficulty.

Am willing — ἐθέλειν (ethelein)

ἐθέλειν (ethelein)

Am willing. The companion volunteers to answer, choosing the respondent's role. Attested: ἐθέλω (315e). Law's wishing and human achievement.

Be able — δύνασθαι (dynasthai)

δύνασθαι (dynasthai)

Be able. Human capacity to discover is separated from law's stable wish. Attested: δύνανται (315b). Law's wishing and human achievement.

Have been discovered — ἐξευρίσκειν (exeuriskein)

ἐξευρίσκειν (exeuriskein)

Have been discovered. Perfect passive form in the companion's supposition that discovery has already been achieved. Attested: ἐξηύρηται (315a). Law's wishing and human achievement.

Discover — ἐξευρίσκειν (exeuriskein)

ἐξευρίσκειν (exeuriskein)

Discover. What people do not always manage to do: attain what law wishes, what is. Attested: ἐξευρίσκειν (315b). Law's wishing and human achievement.

People — ἄνθρωπος (anthrōpos)

ἄνθρωπος (anthrōpos)

People. The fallible human users of laws, distinguished from what law itself wishes. Attested: ἄνθρωποι (315b). Law's wishing and human achievement.

We think — δοκεῖν (dokein)

δοκεῖν (dokein)

We think. Socrates qualifies the description of people who fail always to use the same laws. Attested: δοκοῦμεν (315b). Law's wishing and human achievement.

Wishes — βούλεσθαι (boulesthai)

βούλεσθαι (boulesthai)

Wishes. Predicated of law in the qualified definition; identifies what law aims or means to be without making it a conscious person. Attested: βούλεται (315a). Law's wishing and human achievement.

You wish — βούλεσθαι (boulesthai)

βούλεσθαι (boulesthai)

You wish. Socrates' human wish concerning what the companion will answer, distinct from law's figurative wish. Attested: βούλῃ (315e). Law's wishing and human achievement.

Wishes none the less (contextual phrase)

315a: Βούλεται μὲν οὐδὲν ἧττον. The phrase insists that law's orientation toward discovery remains despite the objection from divergent practice. The following δέ turns to the human beings who fail to discover. The contrast is between the aim assigned to law and the variable attainment of people, not between two different gods or two grades of legislative force. See What law wishes.