Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye

Use in the book

Ficino asks why one should accept the objects of animal sensation while dismissing what distinctively human reason sees. The claim of human dignity carries the rhetoric, but a two-branch argument does the further work. If intellectual objects move mind, they require a reality of their own to exercise that role. If intellect is not moved by its objects, its production of incorporeal structures at least demonstrates its own incorporeality. The second branch does not prove exactly the same thing as the first.

A child blind from birth illustrates difficulty believing a reality outside one’s habitual experience; the point concerns limited access rather than a moral defect in blindness. Ficino then invokes Plato’s Republic VII and Aristotle’s second book of Divine Philosophy. The owl’s eye facing sunlight represents a proportion between a weak knower and what is intrinsically manifest. Obscurity to us does not establish unreality in the object. These reports support the account of habituation and education; they should not be treated as independently checked word-for-word ancient citations.

Places to read

1. VI.2.9The two branches distinguish the reality of intellectual objects from the minimum conclusion about intellect itself.
2. VI.2.23Owls reappear in a different light argument: unseen sunlight still exists.

Translation in this edition

The translation keeps the descriptive title “Divine Philosophy” rather than importing a modern book title and apparatus. “In themselves most manifest” concerns the order of reality, not ease of human recognition. No modern physiological claim about owl vision is being certified.

caecus; noctua

caecus; noctua. Printed forms: caecus; noctuae oculum.

Blindness and the owl’s eye as images of limited access to an object. They explain why what is clear in itself may be difficult for a particular knower; these are comparisons, not diagnoses. References: VI.2.9. See Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.

De republica; Divinorum

De republica; Divinorum. Printed forms: secundo Divinorum; septimo De republica.

The work and book references by which Ficino invokes Plato and Aristotle. The edition preserves his references descriptively without independently importing an ancient-source apparatus. References: VI.2.9. See Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.

fabricare; aedificium

fabricare; aedificium. Printed forms: aedificia; fabricat.

To fashion; constructed works or structures. The intellectual works in the second branch are incorporeal, so the building metaphor does not make intellect a bodily craftsman. References: VI.2.9. See Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.

manifestissimus

manifestissimus. Printed forms: manifestissima.

Most evident in itself in the order of reality. The Aristotelian comparison contrasts intrinsic clarity with the weakness of our intellectual sight. References: VI.2.9. See Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.

mens

mens. Printed forms: mens; Mens; mente; mentem; mentes; menti; mentibus; mentis; mentium.

Mind, especially the cognitive power directed to intelligible reality. Mind can inspect a soul obscured by bodily habit, or attend inwardly to its substance; its operations need not be constantly actual. References: VI.2.2, VI.2.12, VI.2.16, VI.12.12. See Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.

Mind considered as an intellectual subject, power or nature. Its reception, comparison, inward operation and divinely enlarged range are distinguished from bodily extension; it is not identified with the First Cause. References: VIII.6.1, VIII.7.1, VIII.9.1, VIII.15.3, VIII.16.4. See Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

obiectum

obiectum. Printed forms: mentis obiectum; obiecta; obiecta mentis; obiecto; obiectum; sensus obiecto.

Object, what an operation is directed toward and from which it takes its species. Truth and good allow inward operations to range beyond the single species in which the creature itself exists. References: V.13.11, V.13.12. See Creature, power and operation.

The object toward which mind or sense is directed. Ficino tests whether intellectual objects move mind, or whether intellect independently fashions incorporeal structures. References: VI.2.9. See Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.

An object of a sensory power, distinguished from that power’s operation. The inward comparing power judges both the external senses’ objects and their activities. References: VII.2.1. See Comparison and common sense.

praestans; excellens; nobilis

praestans; excellens; nobilis. Printed forms: excellentiore; excellentius; nobilius; praestantior; praestantiores; praestantissima; praestantius.

Superior, more excellent or nobler in the relevant hierarchy. These comparative judgements support priority of correcting reason, ruling soul and indivisibility; they do not simply mean larger physical size. References: VI.2.9, VI.2.22, VI.6.4, VI.6.5, VI.7.3. See Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.

rationis oculus

rationis oculus. Printed forms: rationis oculo.

The eye of reason, a metaphor for rational apprehension of intelligible reality. Ficino contrasts what reason beholds with what the senses perceive and argues against treating reason’s objects as nonexistent. This metaphorical eye differs from the actual owl’s eye used later in the unit to compare difficulty of seeing with difficulty of understanding. References: VI.2.9. See Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.

videre; cernere; intueri

videre; cernere; intueri. Printed forms: cernebat; cernit; cernitis; cernuntur; intueatur; intuemur; intuentur; intueri; videamus; videat; videatur; videbitur; videmus; vident; videramus; videre; videretur; videt; videtur.

To see, discern or contemplate; passive videri can also mean to seem. Bodily seeing and intellectual vision coexist as different modes; “seems” may qualify attribution or appearance rather than certify a doctrine. References: VI.2.2, VI.2.9, VI.2.15, VI.2.16, VI.2.22, VI.2.23, VI.2.24, VI.2.26, VI.4.6, VI.6.2, VI.12.18, VI.13.6. See Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.

Aristotle (authorities and interlocutors)

Aristotle. Ficino places Aristotle largely, rather than without qualification, with the ancient theologians. Elsewhere the owl-eye comparison and arguments concerning cognitive activity and bodily restriction enter particular proofs. These uses do not by themselves establish complete agreement between Aristotle and Ficino. References: VI.1.6, VI.2.9, VII.12.1, VIII.10.2. See Divine production and the third essence; Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye; Proportion, health, strength and beauty; Kind, generation, and operation’s dependence on substance.

Aristotle, “Divine Philosophy,” book II (explicitly named works)

Aristotle, “Divine Philosophy,” book II. The source’s own title and book designation accompany the owl-eye analogy. Modern chapter or Bekker references have not been silently supplied. References: VI.2.9. See Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.

Plato, Republic, book VII (explicitly named works)

Plato, Republic, book VII. The cave narrative and its subsequent mapping organize gradual intellectual education and the difficulty of return. Ficino’s retelling and applications are the immediate object of the articles. References: VI.2.9, VI.2.14, VI.2.15, VI.2.16, VI.2.17. See Plato’s cave and gradual education; Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.