First Cause and kinds of causal dependence

Divine production and the third essence

individuum; incorporeus auctor; agentis virtus; tertia essentia; fomentum

Individuum means an indivisible something here, not primarily a modern individual person.

From the book

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Marsilio Ficino · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordIndividuum means an indivisible something here, not primarily a modern individual person.
  • In the Platonic TheologyThe final position in VI.1 calls the human soul divine, whole in each bodily part, and produced by an incorporeal author.
  • In this editionThe facing English renders Mercurius as Hermes and physicus Aristoteles as “Aristotle the natural philosopher.”
  • A place to readThe final contrast is causal independence from matter, not merely freedom from an organ.

Meaning

Individuum means an indivisible something here, not primarily a modern individual person. Auctor is the originating producer; virtus is effective power. Fomentum names matter’s supposed supporting or generative resource, rendered through the image of tinder. Tertia essentia is the third grade between lower body/quality and higher mind/God.

Use in the book

The final position in VI.1 calls the human soul divine, whole in each bodily part, and produced by an incorporeal author. The decisive contrast is between dependence solely upon the agent’s power and dependence upon matter’s beginning, capacity or tinder. The soul is produced and dependent; its freedom from matter is not self-creation or equality with God. Its substantial indivisibility and whole presence do not by themselves finish the argument, because the fourth rejected position already grants comparable features while retaining material origin.

The ancient theologians named here are Zoroaster, Hermes, Orpheus, Aglaophemus, Pythagoras and Plato. Aristotle the natural philosopher is said to follow their footsteps “for the most part,” a deliberately qualified assimilation. The contemporary circle is then represented as agreeing that the human classification must be demonstrated. VI.3 consequently reserves freedom from material origin for the intellectual stage, while natural power first establishes noncorporeality and partly excludes a divided bodily form. The reader should not use the fifth position’s statement as though Book VI had already proved all its conditions.

Places to read

  1. VI.1.5, VI.1.6The final contrast is causal independence from matter, not merely freedom from an organ.
  2. VI.3.1, VI.3.2The proof’s promised stages culminate in assignment to the immortal third essence.

Translation in this edition

The facing English renders Mercurius as Hermes and physicus Aristoteles as “Aristotle the natural philosopher.” Plurimum must accompany the latter attribution. The lexical contrast between material capacitas and the producing agent’s virtus is retained; neither is simply “strength.”

agentis virtus

agentis virtus. Printed forms: agentis virtute solummodo.

The agent’s or producer’s effective power. In the attested phrase, solummodo adds solely or alone; that exclusivity does not come from agentis virtus by itself. This excludes matter’s contributory beginning, capacity and tinder without excluding dependence on the higher producer. References: VI.1.6. See Divine production and the third essence.

anima

anima. Printed forms: anima; animae; animam; animarum; animas.

Soul as a life-giving principle, whose body, qualities, powers and operations must be distinguished. Book VI tests alternative identifications of soul and asks what human soul must be to occupy the immortal third essence; a conditional soul-body is an opponent’s hypothesis, not Ficino’s conclusion. References: VI.1.1, VI.1.6, VI.3.1, VI.13.1. See Divine production and the third essence.

Soul as the living subject and source of cognitive or ethical powers. It can remain while a virtue is absent and is argued to be more than a body or a form divided through a body. References: VIII.2.1, VIII.3.1, VIII.3.8, VIII.15.2. See Virtue as an indivisible quality.

auctor; producere

auctor; producere. Printed forms: incorporeo auctore; productum.

An incorporeal originating agent; to bring forth or produce. The soul is created or produced through an agent’s power, so freedom from matter does not make it uncaused. References: VI.1.6. See Divine production and the third essence.

capacitas; fomentum

capacitas; fomentum. Printed forms: capacitate; fomento.

Capacity and tinder or supporting generative resource. The fifth account excludes these material prerequisites; their denial distinguishes it from a merely unlocated but materially derived soul. References: VI.1.6. See Divine production and the third essence.

immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus

immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus. Printed forms: immortalis; immortalitate; immortalitatem; perpetua; perpetuaque; perpetuo; perpetuus; sempiterna; Sempiternum.

Immortal, perpetual and everlasting, with the subject and mode of duration specified. The inquiry aims at the soul’s immortality, while perpetual bodily motion or pain may occur only inside a hypothetical reductio; duration words alone do not identify their subjects. References: VI.1.1, VI.1.6, VI.2.3, VI.3.2, VI.9.4, VI.13.6. See Divine production and the third essence.

individuum

individuum. Printed forms: individuum.

An indivisible reality, not an extended atom or merely a named person. The fifth position combines indivisibility with whole presence and an origin independent of matter. References: VI.1.6. See Divine production and the third essence.

materia

materia. Printed forms: materia; materiae; materiam; materiarum.

Matter as recipient, common bodily constituent or alleged latent source of soul. The disputed question is not whether soul animates matter, but whether its nature depends upon or originates from material potentiality. References: VI.1.5, VI.1.6, VI.7.1, VI.7.2. See Divine production and the third essence.

The receptive material principle and source of bodily particularization in these arguments. Common nature needs a material foundation in its instances; intellect considers forms apart from it; infinite potency remains subject to God. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.8.1, VIII.16.2. See Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency.

physicus Aristoteles; plurimum

physicus Aristoteles; plurimum. Printed forms: physicus Aristoteles; plurimum.

Aristotle as natural philosopher; for the most part or to a great extent. The qualifier restricts the statement that Aristotle follows the ancient theologians’ footsteps. References: VI.1.6. See Divine production and the third essence.

prisci theologi

prisci theologi. Printed forms: Aglaophemus; Mercurius; Orpheus; Plato; prisci theologi; Pythagoras; Zoroaster.

The ancient theologians Ficino names as teaching the fifth position. The list supplies an attributed tradition of incorporeal soul; Mercurius is translated Hermes. References: VI.1.6. See Divine production and the third essence.

tertia essentia

tertia essentia. Printed forms: tertiae essentiae; tertiam illam essentiam.

The third grade of the fivefold hierarchy, understood as free from matter and everlasting. The task is to demonstrate that our human soul belongs here, rather than assume it from the immortality of rational souls generally. References: VI.1.1, VI.1.6. See Divine production and the third essence.

Aristotle (authorities and interlocutors)

Aristotle. Ficino places Aristotle largely, rather than without qualification, with the ancient theologians. Elsewhere the owl-eye comparison and arguments concerning cognitive activity and bodily restriction enter particular proofs. These uses do not by themselves establish complete agreement between Aristotle and Ficino. References: VI.1.6, VI.2.9, VII.12.1, VIII.10.2. See Divine production and the third essence; Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye; Proportion, health, strength and beauty; Kind, generation, and operation’s dependence on substance.

Augustine (authorities and interlocutors)

Augustine. Augustine supports direct divine creation, the stable mind directing bodily movement, whole presence and active sensation in different passages. These local appeals have distinct argumentative functions and should not be collapsed into a single quotation. References: V.13.1, V.15.5, VII.5.2, VII.6.3. See Divine production and the third essence; Time, memory and expectation; Whole presence and vital intensity; Sensation as attentive activity.

Dionysius the Areopagite and Origen (authorities and interlocutors)

Dionysius the Areopagite and Origen. With Augustine, these Christian authorities support Ficino’s preference for direct divine production of soul over the angelic production attributed to Plotinus and Proclus. Origen also appears in a separately reserved report about descent; the two contexts require separate treatment. References: V.13.1, V.14.9. See Divine production and the third essence; Platonist disagreement and descent.

Nonlocal but materially dependent authorities (authorities and interlocutors)

Nonlocal but materially dependent authorities. Xenophanes of Colophon, Asclepiades, Aristoxenus and Critolaus occur under a principle present throughout the body without spatial confinement, yet still dependent on material constitution or extracted from matter by an external producer. Whole presence alone therefore does not reach the fifth, divine account. References: VI.1.5. See Constitution, localized point and harmony; Divine production and the third essence.

Plotinus (authorities and interlocutors)

Plotinus. The volume reports angelic production, lower-soul immortality and descent in passages where Ficino’s own endorsement varies. Other passages use Plotinus on vegetative power, active perception or a tentative analysis of being. Attribution and assent are not interchangeable. References: V.13.1, V.14.8, V.14.9, VI.10.1, VII.6.3, VIII.4.12. See Divine production and the third essence; Platonist disagreement and descent; Seminal power, fish eggs and the tree; Sensation as attentive activity; Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction.

Proclus (authorities and interlocutors)

Proclus. Ficino reports Proclus in several settings, including angelic soul-production, the dispute over irrational immortality and a tentative analysis of being. VIII.15.2 explicitly leaves the stronger thesis of essential self-production to Proclus; VIII.15.3 retains formal self-causation rather than efficient self-creation. References: V.13.1, V.14.8, VIII.4.12, VIII.15.2, VIII.15.3. See Divine production and the third essence; Platonist disagreement and descent; Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction; Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

Pythagoras and the ancient theologians (authorities and interlocutors)

Pythagoras and the ancient theologians. The sphere argument attributed to Pythagoras is mentioned while being passed over in Book V. Book VI places Zoroaster, Hermes, Orpheus, Aglaophemus, Pythagoras and Plato in the ancient theological line. These two contexts do different argumentative work. References: V.1.4, VI.1.6. See Circularity and spiritual spheres; Divine production and the third essence.

Zoroaster (authorities and interlocutors)

Zoroaster. The Greek expression describing soul as immortal and mistress of life supports the local discussion of life and death through Ficino’s own gloss. The attribution remains the supplied text’s attribution. Zoroaster also appears in the ancient theological sequence. References: V.14.6, VI.1.6. See Zoroaster and the mistress of life; Divine production and the third essence.