Good, fine, and shameful

Use in the book

Socrates' decisive instruction at 314d is that law must be thought of as something fine and sought as a good. The speakers first agree that lawful people are just and lawless people unjust; justice and law are then called most fine, their opposites most shameful. Preservation and destruction of cities provide a practical contrast. On this basis the class of actual resolutions is filtered: a base one cannot be law.

The direction of reasoning matters. Socrates does not survey legislation and discover empirically that every enactment benefits its city. He asks the companion to adopt a favorable normative conception of law and uses it to reject an overinclusive account. The question “what is law?” thereby becomes inseparable from what law should successfully be. The companion's later objections arise because his customary and civic senses continue to include rules Socrates' evaluative conception can exclude.

At 316a–b fine things are said to be accepted as fine everywhere, as shameful things are as shameful. The formula gives a common standard or correct predication; it does not identify a list of practices universally agreed to be fine. The earlier sacrifices make the distinction vivid: knowing that “fine things are fine” is different from determining whether an actual community's ritual is fine. The weight analogy supports correct judgment without itself settling that moral classification.

The later argument puts goodness in an agent and a benefit. Kings and good men write laws; the farmer and trainer are good distributors because they allocate appropriately; the king's laws are said to be best for souls. Socrates also predicates goodness of Minos and links it to divine education. Yet the final question asks what distributions actually make the soul better. The dialogue's favorable account of law has not supplied that content.

Its last use of shame is therefore self-directed. Socrates calls it shameful that their souls appear not to know what is within them while having examined bodily matters (321d). This is not a denial that law should be good. It exposes the difference between agreeing upon goodness as the standard and being able to explain how the standard is achieved.

Places to read

1. 314dκάλλιστον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ ὁ νόμος — Justice and law are most fine
2. 314dΑἴσχιστον δὲ ἡ ἀδικία τε καὶ ἡ ἀνομία — Their opposites receive the contrary evaluation
3. 314dὡς ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ ζητεῖν — Law is to be sought as a good
4. 316a–bΤὰ μὲν καλά, ὡς ἔοικε, πανταχοῦ νομίζεται καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχρά — The universal form of correct valuation
5. 320aἃ ἐνόμιζεν καλὰ εἶναι — What Minos accepted as fine is connected with his legislation
6. 321dαἰσχρόν γε τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἑκατέρου — Shame finally attaches to the soul of each inquirer

Translation in this edition

“Good,” “fine,” and “shameful” remain distinct. “Decent” translates chrēstos, a further favorable adjective needed for the transition from resolutions to opinion. Treating all favorable terms as the same English “good” would conceal how the inference moves.

A good — ἀγαθός (agathos)

ἀγαθός (agathos)

A good. The character under which Socrates says law must be sought, rather than a report that every enactment is beneficial. Attested: ἀγαθὸν (314d). Good, fine, and shameful.

Destroys — ἀπολλύναι (apollynai)

ἀπολλύναι (apollynai)

Destroys. The harmful effect attributed to injustice and lawlessness. Attested: ἀπόλλυσι (314d). Good, fine, and shameful.

Everywhere — πανταχοῦ (pantachou)

πανταχοῦ (pantachou)

Everywhere. The geographical universality claimed for accepting fine things as fine. Attested: πανταχοῦ (316a). Good, fine, and shameful.

Think about — διανοεῖσθαι (dianoeisthai)

διανοεῖσθαι (dianoeisthai)

Think about. How law is to be considered: as something fine. Attested: διανοεῖσθαι (314d). Good, fine, and shameful.

Most fine — καλός (kalos)

καλός (kalos)

Most fine. The superlative appraisal of justice and law that makes goodness a condition of the definition. Attested: κάλλιστον (314d). Good, fine, and shameful.

Fine things — καλός (kalos)

καλός (kalos)

Fine things. The objects said to be accepted as fine everywhere; the formula does not specify every disputed practice that belongs to the class. Attested: καλά (316a). Good, fine, and shameful.

Most shameful — αἰσχρός (aischros)

αἰσχρός (aischros)

Most shameful. The contrary superlative applied to injustice and lawlessness. Attested: Αἴσχιστον (314d). Good, fine, and shameful.

Shameful things — αἰσχρός (aischros)

αἰσχρός (aischros)

Shameful things. The contrary objects, to be accepted as shameful rather than fine. Attested: αἰσχρὰ (316b). Good, fine, and shameful.

Overturns — ἀνατρέπειν (anatrepein)

ἀνατρέπειν (anatrepein)

Overturns. A second destructive verb for what injustice and lawlessness do to cities and other things. Attested: ἀνατρέπει (314d). Good, fine, and shameful.

Preserves — σῴζειν (sōizein)

σῴζειν (sōizein)

Preserves. The beneficial effect attributed to justice and law upon cities and everything else. Attested: σῴζει (314d). Good, fine, and shameful.

Seek — ζητεῖν (zētein)

ζητεῖν (zētein)

Seek. The inquiry into law is instructed to seek it as a good. Attested: ζητεῖν (314d). Good, fine, and shameful.