Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea

Use in the book

Plato, Antisthenes and Xenophon differ as persons but share humanity; the example likewise presents them as sharing beauty and goodness. Humanity is communicable to people of different places and times and, considered as common, is not restricted to one of those conditions. Ficino distinguishes the one nature in many from a one subsisting in itself above them. The transition requires more than noticing a common word: what exists in another needs a principle existing in itself, and the common nature in material instances cannot supply its own ultimate foundation.

The causal argument excludes several proposed sources in turn. The nature does not arise by chance, because its order is regular. Matter cannot explain it, because matter does not form itself. One particular person cannot act upon all the others and, insofar as that person's act is particular, cannot produce their commonality. Nor do all the persons together explain it: insofar as they differ they produce differences, while insofar as they agree they already presuppose the common nature. The last proposal therefore assumes what it is supposed to explain. Various individualizing properties supervene upon that simpler nature to constitute persons. Its priority is explanatory, not the chronological age of one person relative to another.

Because the common nature is one, Ficino traces it to one superior form rather than a mere aggregate of particular agents. He rejects an endless regress of derivative forms and ascends to a divine Idea capable of acting equally in all. The resulting structure has three distinguishable levels: individual embodiments, their shared immanent nature and the superior exemplar. Calling the common nature universal does not by itself make it separately subsistent; Ficino adds the causal-dependence premises to reach that conclusion.

The movement from part to whole to what stands above the whole supplies another account of the ascent. Persons occupy parts of place and time. Their common nature is as though spread through every place and the whole of time; the Idea stands above those conditions. The spatial image is qualified: humanity is not a vast body containing people as physical fragments. Nor does participation divide the exemplar into diminished portions. The claim is that each individual is human through an account shared with others and derived from a common cause.

Ficino further treats natural species as everlasting. A movable cause alone could fail through its movement and therefore cannot explain their stable character. Yet the species are caused, because they belong to a composite universe derived from another. Their coordination toward one nature, work and end points to one source, with exemplars in the immutable mind moving the world. Those exemplars belong neither to bodily nature nor merely to animate nature, whose operations would still be mobile, but to an intellectual and ultimately intelligible order. This is Ficino's defended argument; a reader evaluating it should examine the assumed stability of species, causal priority of simplicity and inference from coordinated order.

Two qualifications govern how the resulting Idea is known. VIII.1.3 describes intellect apprehending it either within itself or in divine light, without resolving every question about the relation of a human intellectual form to its divine exemplar. VIII.1.4 then says that the preceding discursive proof need not occur whenever intellect apprehends a universal: its natural activity can be immediate. The causal demonstration and the actual temporal course of cognition have different tasks. VIII.13.1's later Platonic account of latent forms awakened by images connects inward cognition to the same larger explanatory scheme, but does not make a human concept numerically identical with God's being.

Places to read

1. VIII.1.2The shared humanity of three pupils leads from singular conditions to common nature and a self-subsisting Idea.
2. VIII.1.3The exclusions of chance, matter and persons lead to a divine exemplar and immutable mind.
3. VIII.1.4Discursive proof is distinguished from immediate intellectual access.

Translation in this edition

Ratio moves between account, principle and rational justification. The English “Idea” should not make natura communis and the separate exemplar interchangeable. Quodammodo, quasi and the alternative sive apud se ipsum sive in divino lumine preserve qualifications in how the ascent and apprehension are described.

Antisthenes / Xenophon

Antisthenes / Xenophon. Printed forms: Antisthenes; Xenophon.

Named comparators whose shared humanity extends the example beyond Plato alone. Ficino's illustrative grouping makes likeness and common predicates available for the ascent to universal humanity; it is not a biographical investigation. References: VIII.1.2. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

communicare / infundere

communicare / infundere. Printed forms: communicat; infundit.

Communicating a nature to many without dividing it into diminished portions. Humanity is shared by persons, places and times; the common nature and its higher exemplar remain distinct explanatory levels. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.4.10. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

communis (additional forms)

communis (additional forms). Printed forms: commune; communi.

Shared or common, in contrast with what belongs exclusively to one instance. The form's power extends to many cases, while the nature's commonness does not by itself identify it with its separate divine exemplar. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.8.1. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

convenire / conciliare

convenire / conciliare. Printed forms: conciliet; congruat; conveniunt.

Agreeing, being suited or bringing into common accord. Persons agree through humanity, and an Idea is said to unite them in that common nature; the source is not a chance assemblage of their differences. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.2.1. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

humanitas

humanitas. Printed forms: humanitas; Humanitas; humanitate; humanitatem; humanitatis.

Humanity, the common defining nature rather than an individual human being. Humanity is not confined to Plato's time or place, and Ariston does not generate humanity itself when begetting Plato. References: V.7.1, V.13.5. See Participation, common and proper.

Humanity, the nature by which human individuals are human. Its communication across persons, times and places supplies the opening example of universality and the ascent to an Idea. References: VIII.1.2. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

idea

idea. Printed forms: idea; ideae; ideam; ideaque; ideas; ideis.

An exemplary intelligible principle through which God produces a determinate nature. Ideas supply the stable patterns of soul and angel; the soul's cognition of Ideas supports its aptitude for eternal life. References: V.11.6, V.12.14, V.12.15, V.13.16, V.13.18. See Creation and generation.

An intelligible exemplar or principle; context distinguishes the divine source from an exemplar possessed by mind. The divine Idea grounds shared humanity, while artistic ideas within mind guide distinct acts of making. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.3, VIII.3.6, VIII.13.1. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

in se / in alio / in multis

in se / in alio / in multis. Printed forms: in alio; in multis; in se ipso.

In itself, in another and in many, different modes of dependence and unity. The passage from an immanent common nature to an independent exemplar depends on these distinctions, not merely on counting individuals. References: VIII.1.2. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

movere / immobilis

movere / immobilis. Printed forms: immobili; mobilem; mobiles; mobili; motionem; motrice.

Motion and its absence as conditions relevant to causal stability. Everlasting natural species are traced to an immutable world-moving mind rather than a moving bodily or merely animate cause. References: VIII.1.3. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

natura

natura. Printed forms: natura; Natura; naturae; naturam; Naturam.

Nature, either a thing's proper constitution or the productive order of natural agents. Nature as artisan forms a substrate; a form's own nature also means the determinate mode assigned by its maker. References: V.4.1, V.9.2, V.13.5. See Art and elemental transformation.

A thing's defining nature or characteristic way of being and acting. The book distinguishes common nature, particular embodiment and the natural mode of an intellectual power; naturalness concerns explanatory fitness, not merely frequency. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.3, VIII.1.4, VIII.1.5, VIII.2.1, VIII.2.5, VIII.2.6, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.6, VIII.3.8, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.6, VIII.4.10, VIII.4.11, VIII.4.12, VIII.4.13, VIII.5.2, VIII.6.1, VIII.7.1, VIII.8.1, VIII.9.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.11.1, VIII.13.1, VIII.13.2, VIII.15.2, VIII.15.3, VIII.16.2, VIII.16.3. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

natura communis

natura communis. Printed forms: communem; communes; communia; communis.

A nature or intelligible content shared across many individuals without restriction to one instance. Humanity is common to Plato and others; the common nature in instances is then distinguished from its self-subsisting divine exemplar. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.3, VIII.4.6. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

ordinare / ordo

ordinare / ordo. Printed forms: ordinatae; ordinatur; ordine; ordinem.

Ordering and ordered relation among principles, parts or operations. The regular coordination of natural species supports a common cause; ordered reasoning differs from chance assembly of spatial mental fragments. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.10, VIII.5.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.16.2. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

participatio

participatio. Printed forms: participatione; participes.

Participation in a common perfection or principle without numerical identity with it. Humans derive humanity through participation or likeness, and mind judges things participating in equality by reference to equality itself. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.6.1. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

persona

persona. Printed forms: personae; personarum; personis.

An individual person as the bearer of a common nature under distinguishing conditions. The opening argument distinguishes humanity shared across persons from any one person's private properties or productive action. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.3. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

pulchritudo / bonitas

pulchritudo / bonitas. Printed forms: bonitas; bonitatem; bonitatis; pulchritudinem; pulchritudinis; Pulchritudo; pulchritudo.

Beauty and goodness as recognized perfections, then as common intelligible natures. Phantasy judges this beautiful or good Plato; intellect reaches the common account beyond this person's circumstances. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.1.4. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

subsistere / consistere

subsistere / consistere. Printed forms: consistat; consistunt; subsistentem; subsistere; subsistit.

Standing in being or persisting as a determinate subject. The common nature in material individuals requires a foundation, while the higher Idea is said to stand in itself. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.3, VIII.1.4. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

supervenire

supervenire. Printed forms: superveniunt.

Coming upon something already explanatory prior. Individualizing properties supervene upon the simpler shared nature to constitute distinct persons; the priority need not be temporal. References: VIII.1.3. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

Plato (authorities and interlocutors)

Plato. Plato is both an authority and an illustrative individual in this volume. His name in examples of particular human beings must be distinguished from claims attributed to his works. The cave, the mixing-bowl account and the hierarchy of intelligible forms have different local uses. References: V.5.9, VI.2.14, VI.2.17, VII.1.1, VIII.1.1. See Plato’s cave and gradual education; Four causes and graded dependence; Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors; Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

Socrates and named pupils or companions (authorities and interlocutors)

Socrates and named pupils or companions. Socrates and Plato frequently function as concrete individuals in arguments about reception, generation and universals. Xenophon, Alcibiades and Phaedrus in VII.1.1 are remembered persons; Phaedrus there is not a citation of the dialogue. Antisthenes and Xenophon in VIII.1.2 likewise help distinguish individuals from common nature. References: V.7.1, V.8.1, VII.1.1, VIII.1.2. See Reception and the receiver; Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors; Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.