Immediate intellection and the return to particulars · Lexicon

From the book

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Marsilio Ficino · Diotimos Editions · 2026

Orientation

At a Glance

The wordImmediate apprehension is marked by statim and subito; discursus is the movement through intermediate considerations.
In the Platonic TheologyThe argument about a shared nature and its divine exemplar could suggest that intellect always calculates its way to a universal.
In this editionThe emphatic statim, simul ac, subito, inquam is intentionally repeated.
A place to readNatural intellectual apprehension needs no preliminary discursive argument.

Meaning

Immediate apprehension is marked by statim and subito; discursus is the movement through intermediate considerations. Abstraction frees an intelligible form from singular material conditions. A reflexive act turns intellect back toward the particular image that occasioned its activity.

Use in the book

The argument about a shared nature and its divine exemplar could suggest that intellect always calculates its way to a universal. Ficino explicitly corrects that reading. By its natural power intellect apprehends common nature as soon as the particular image is present in phantasy. The long demonstration explains what this apprehension involves; it need not reproduce its actual temporal course.

A second correction prevents universality from becoming an exclusion of particulars. Intellect must know both universal and particular in order to compare them, and it also knows lower faculties and their operations. The order defended with broad Platonic and Peripatetic agreement is that universal nature is known first, through an abstract intelligible form, while the particular is reached in a second, reflexive movement toward the phantastic image. The image prompts conception; it is not simply identical with the universal form.

The inference to incorporeality rests on what is most natural to mind: its first, direct movement goes toward what is free from material conditions. This is stronger than the earlier claim that nutritive and sensory soul is not spatially divided through the body. Ficino argues that intellect's proper operation leaves matter altogether, supporting a further conclusion about its origin and survival. These are philosophical inferences from the stipulated operations, not observations that ordinary learning never takes time.

Places to read

VIII.1.4Natural intellectual apprehension needs no preliminary discursive argument.
VIII.1.5The particular is known by a second return through act and form to the initiating image.
VIII.3.2, VIII.3.3Lengthy preparation is later reconciled with sudden realization.

Translation in this edition

The emphatic statim, simul ac, subito, inquam is intentionally repeated. “Absolute” translates a condition of release from restrictions here; it should not automatically imply that the human intellect is the unconditioned First Cause.

abstractio / abstrahere

abstractio / abstrahere. Printed forms: abstractione; abstrahit.

Release of intelligible content from singular material restrictions. The abstract form first represents universal nature, and intellect actively abstracts rather than merely undergoing a bodily impression. References: VIII.1.5, VIII.10.2. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

actus reflexus (return to the particular)

actus reflexus (return to the particular). Printed forms: secundo quodam actu atque reflexo; sese reflectens.

A second, reflexive act in which intellect turns back toward a particular object through its image. Ficino says that Platonists and Peripatetics largely hold that intellect first apprehends universal nature and then returns through its act and species to the phantastic image that prompted the conception. This local direct/reflexive contrast differs from VIII.9.1, where the direct act is life and the reflexive act cognition. References: VIII.1.5. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

agnoscere / cognoscere

agnoscere / cognoscere. Printed forms: agnoscat; agnoscit; cognoscere; cognoscet; cognosci; cognoscit.

Recognizing or knowing, whose object and mode determine its philosophical force. The Platonists deny genuine knowledge of substance to phantasy, yet intellect's priority toward universals does not prevent knowledge of particulars. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.1.5, VIII.6.1, VIII.10.1. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

depingere

depingere. Printed forms: depicta; depingit; Picta.

Painting or depicting an inward presentation. Phantasy paints Plato under singular conditions; the painted particular is present when intellect immediately apprehends the common nature. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.4. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

discursus / discurrere

discursus / discurrere. Printed forms: discurrendi; discurrendo; discurrit; discursione; discursu.

Successive intellectual movement or reasoning; in a bodily hypothesis it can describe traversal. Immediate universality does not require discourse, whereas return to particulars involves it; bodily traversal is a separate rejected model. References: VIII.1.4, VIII.1.5, VIII.4.4, VIII.5.1, VIII.10.2. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

immo / tamen / non tamen

immo / tamen / non tamen. Printed forms: Atqui; immo; Immo; Non tamen; non tamen; tamen.

Indeed or rather, nevertheless and corrective transitions. Non tamen at VIII.1.4 limits the necessity of the preceding discursive argument; other corrections sharpen conclusions rather than adding interchangeable connective filler. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.1.4, VIII.2.5, VIII.3.7, VIII.10.2. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

incitare

incitare. Printed forms: incitante.

Prompting an intellectual conception without being identical to its resulting universal form. The phantastic image occasions the form and becomes the destination of the later reflexive return to a particular. References: VIII.1.5. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

intellectus

intellectus. Printed forms: intellectu; intellectum; Intellectus; intellectus.

Intellect, distinguished locally from discursive reason and sensory imagination. Ficino reasons from its objects, its incorporeal constructions and angelic pure exercise; no single use makes every intellectual act uninterrupted. References: VI.2.9, VI.2.10. See Separate forms and intellectual life.

The intellectual faculty or knower able to apprehend universal and incorporeal accounts. It first knows universal nature and then returns to particulars; its unity and nonextended reception drive the later arguments. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.4, VIII.1.5, VIII.3.1, VIII.3.3, VIII.3.6, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.5, VIII.6.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.13.2, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.2, VIII.16.3. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

primum / deinde / prius / secundo

primum / deinde / prius / secundo. Printed forms: deinde; postquam; Primum; primum; Prius; prius; secundo.

First, next and prior, marking explanatory or cognitive order that may differ from chronology. Universal knowledge precedes reflective particular knowledge; life precedes intelligence in the final proof. A sequence of reasons is not automatically a temporal production story. References: VIII.1.5, VIII.10.1, VIII.16.4. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

singularis / particularis

singularis / particularis. Printed forms: particulare; particularem; particulares; singulares; singularis; singulas; singulis.

Individualized or restricted to this instance; neither adjective means intrinsically unknowable. Intellect knows particulars through a reflexive return even though its first mode is universal; bodily recipients would particularize their forms. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.4, VIII.1.5, VIII.8.1. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.