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Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΛηρεῖν is to talk nonsense, and λῆρος is nonsense or trash; φαῦλος is ordinary, and so poor, and a ζητητής is one who seeks.
- In the CharmidesAs the argument about temperance fails, Socrates runs himself down. "I think I'm talking nonsense," he says before his dream, and goes on all the same (173a). At the end he blames himself, not temperance (175a–b), calls himself "a poor inquirer" (175e), and, if the young Charmides has temperance, would sooner advise him to count Socrates "a babbler" (176a).
- In this editionΛηρεῖν is "talking nonsense"; λῆρος, said of Socrates himself, becomes "a babbler"; φαῦλος ζητητής is "a poor inquirer".
- A place to read175e–176a, where Socrates takes the failure on himself and keeps temperance "a great good".
Meaning
Ληρεῖν (lērein) is to talk nonsense; λῆρος (lēros) is the nonsense itself, and said of a man, as Socrates says it of himself at 176a, a babbler. A ζητητής (zētētēs), from ζητεῖν (zētein), "to seek", is an inquirer; φαῦλος (phaulos), "ordinary", makes him a poor one. In the Charmides, self-deprecation is less a word than a habit: when the inquiry goes wrong, Socrates puts the fault down to himself.
Use in the book
The habit grows as the argument weakens. At 172c Socrates says, "perhaps our search has been to no useful purpose", and at 172e–173a he doubts that temperance, even as they have defined it, does us any good. Asked by Critias, Charmides' cousin and guardian, to explain, he answers, "I think I'm talking nonsense," and goes straight on: "All the same, one must look into what comes to light and not let it go by at random, if one cares for oneself even a little" (173a). Then he tells his dream, "whether it has come through horn or through ivory", not vouching even for whether it is one of Homer's true dreams or one of the false (173a–d2; see The dream hypothesis).1 Calling his talk nonsense does not let him off the inquiry: the reason to go on is care for oneself, and even a little of it obliges one to look.
At the end the self-blame is explicit. When temperance has proved "the craftsman of no benefit" (175a), Socrates takes up the words of his suspicion at 172c: "So you see, Critias, that my fear long ago was reasonable, and I was right to blame myself for looking into temperance to no useful purpose?" Then he draws the conclusion against himself: "For surely what is agreed to be the finest of all things would not have turned out to be of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well" (175a–b). He will not believe that the charm was learned "for a thing worth nothing" (175d–e; see Anger): "Well, I don't at all think it is so; rather, I am a poor inquirer. For I do think that temperance is a great good, and that if you have it you are blessed" (175e–176a). Between doubting temperance and doubting himself, he doubts himself.
The word "babbler" comes in the advice that follows, on the same condition: "For if you have it, I would sooner advise you to regard me as a babbler, unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument, and yourself to be happier just in proportion as you are more temperate" (176a). Charmides, who cannot say whether he has it, offers to be charmed every day and promises Critias, "I'll follow him and not desert him" (176a–b2; see Advice and greeting). This can be read as the dialogue's verdict on Socrates' verdict on himself: the inquirer who calls himself a babbler is the one the boy will not leave.
Places to read
- 172c–173a2Socrates suspects that their search has been to no useful purpose, says he thinks he is talking nonsense, and goes on, since one must look into what comes to light "if one cares for oneself even a little".
- 175a–bSocrates blames himself: temperance would not have proved useless if he were "of any use at inquiring well".
- 175d–176b2Rather than think temperance worthless, Socrates calls himself "a poor inquirer", and, if Charmides has temperance, would have the boy regard him as a babbler; Charmides offers to be charmed every day.
Translation in this edition
Ληρεῖν is "talking nonsense" (173a). Λῆρος, said of Socrates himself, is "a babbler" (176a): English cannot call a man "a nonsense", so the edition renders the noun by the man who talks it. Φαῦλον … ζητητήν is "a poor inquirer" (175e), and ζητεῖν on either side of it is "inquiring" and "inquire" (175b, 176a).
ληρέω
Attested: ληρεῖν (lērein; 173a). To talk nonsense, to babble. Asked why he doubts that temperance does us any good, Socrates says, "I think I'm talking nonsense," and goes on all the same, to his dream (173a). Lemma: ληρέω.
λῆρος
Attested: λῆρον (lēron; 176a). Nonsense, trash, idle talk; of a person, a babbler. If Charmides has temperance, Socrates would sooner advise him to regard Socrates "as a babbler, unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument" (176a). Lemma: λῆρος.
Elsewhere in Plato
The habit, and the words, return elsewhere. In the Hippias Major, a dialogue whose authorship has been doubted, the sophist Hippias of Elis tells Socrates to give up his hair-splitting, so as not to seem a fool for dealing in "nonsense and drivel" (λήρους καὶ φλυαρίας, lērous kai phlyarias, 304a–b). Socrates answers that Hippias is blessed, for he knows what a man should practise, while Socrates himself is held by some strange fortune: he always wanders and is at a loss, and when he shows his perplexity to the wise, they abuse him for it (304b–c). The pairing is that of Charmides 175e–176a, where Charmides, if he has temperance, is blessed, and Socrates is a poor inquirer. In the Theaetetus Socrates calls himself a babbler in another word, ἀδολέσχης (adoleschēs): vexed at his own slowness to learn, he asks what else to call a man who drags arguments up and down because he is too dull to be persuaded, and cannot let go of any of them (195b–c). In both dialogues, as in the Charmides, Socrates puts the trouble with an argument down to his own failings.
Source note
1. Homer, Odyssey 19.562–567, where Penelope says that dreams that pass through the gate of ivory deceive and those that pass through the gate of horn come true.