Philosophy
Who Has to Explain It?
Critias denies teaching Charmides the saying, then steps in when the boy can’t explain it. Socrates gives him room to choose his own words and asks him to say what they mean.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesA good saying is easy to pass along. The trouble starts when the next person asks what it means. This exchange follows the work of explanation from the person who repeats a definition to the one who agrees to defend it.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The saying comes without an explanationCharmides remembers hearing that temperance is doing one’s own business. When Socrates names Critias as the likely source, Critias denies that it came from him.
- Critias takes the questionSocrates compares Critias’ irritation to a poet’s anger at an actor who mangles his lines. When Socrates invites Critias to take over, Critias agrees.
- Hesiod supplies a new distinctionCritias cites Hesiod’s line that work is no disgrace and distinguishes making, doing and working. Socrates lets him use those words his own way if he can explain what they refer to.
- A claim they can examineCritias finally says that temperance is the doing of good things. Socrates can now test what the claim says instead of guessing what the phrase means.
Ideas travel the way packages do, passing from hand to hand, and the Charmides lets us follow one package along its route. Charmides offers the saying that temperance is doing one’s own business, admits that he heard it from someone, and can’t say what it means. Socrates guesses at once that it came from Critias, and the scene that follows is really about the chain of custody, about who is answerable for a formula once it has been handed down to someone who can repeat it but not explain it. The man Socrates suspects of passing it on is sitting on the same bench. Most of what any of us believes arrived this way, handed over by someone we trusted, and we rarely check the label.
The first link in the chain tries to cut itself loose. “Certainly not from me,” Critias says when Socrates names him, which is the intellectual equivalent of a man denying that the package on the doorstep has his return address on it. We have only Socrates’ suspicion that Critias passed it on. Still, the speed of the denial is worth remembering once Critias hears how the boy handles it. It’s easier to disown the saying while no one needs him to defend it.
Then Critias’ irritation gets the better of him. Socrates says Critias has been holding himself back and finally loses patience. He seems as angry with Charmides as a poet would be with an actor who mangles his verses. The man who wouldn’t claim the saying now objects to how it’s being handled. His anger is the closest thing to a signature he provides. It’s a familiar pattern, the person who shrugs off an idea in public and then bristles when somebody else gets it wrong.
Socrates now asks Critias to take responsibility for the answer. The boy can be excused for not knowing what the saying means, he tells Critias, but Critias can be expected to know, “both because of your age and because of the study you have given it.” If Critias agrees with the definition and will take it over, Socrates says, “I would much rather look into it with you, to see whether what was said is true or not.” The burden of explanation has moved back up the chain to the person willing to defend the idea. Critias says he’ll take it over. Socrates even offers to be a partner rather than a prosecutor, which makes the transfer of responsibility feel less like an accusation.
What happens next is the real test, and it’s a little deflating. Critias defends the saying by leaning on a line of Hesiod and on careful distinctions between making, doing and working, the kind of verbal distinction Socrates associates with Prodicus. A borrowed formula is now being defended with help from a poet. Socrates lets him, but with a pointed condition, saying, “I allow you to assign each word as you please; only make clear what you are applying whatever word you use to.” In the Protagoras, Prodicus distinguishes disputing with friends from wrangling with enemies. There can be a point to making such distinctions, and Socrates wants Critias to make his point plain.
That condition is the heart of the matter, and it’s a principle every teacher could hang on the wall. You can use whatever words you like, but you have to be able to point to what they mean, and a saying that can only be defended by relabeling its terms hasn’t been explained at all. It’s the difference between somebody who forwards a clever quote and, when asked what it means, says “well, it depends on how you define things,” and somebody who can actually tell you what the quote is getting at. A definition that changes every time you press on it becomes a moving target.
The chain of custody, then, ends with a demand rather than a person. The pupil repeated the formula, Critias defended it with a poet’s line, and Socrates keeps asking for the one thing nobody in the chain has supplied, a plain statement of what the words are about. When Critias finally gives one, that temperance is the doing of good things, the inquiry has something definite to examine. Socrates can ask what would follow if doing good things makes a person temperate. Plain statement is the price of admission to real inquiry, and it’s a price the chain of custody had been avoiding all along.
My verdict is that the borrowed answer becomes a test of the person who agrees to defend it, and Critias passes it only partly. Critias first denies passing on the idea, then defends it in anger. He reaches for Hesiod, and only under pressure says plainly what he means. Once someone takes responsibility for an idea, there’s a simple test. When someone asks, can they stop quoting and explain? That’s a standard worth holding any teacher to, including the ones who never meant to teach anything at all.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does Socrates shift the burden of explaining the definition of temperance from Charmides to Critias?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- When someone repeats an idea learned from another person, what responsibility does the repeater have to understand or defend it?→
- Why might Socrates’ offer to examine the definition as Critias’ partner be more effective than treating him as an accused person?→
- How can we distinguish a useful clarification of terms from a redefinition that merely shields a claim from criticism?→