Philosophy

What Actually Broke?

Socrates ends the inquiry without a definition of temperance. He also finds a problem with Critias’ proposal and admits that they agreed to more than they could show.

The search falls short in three ways. Keeping them apart shows what the speakers learned and which questions they still owe the reader.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The missing definitionSocrates and his companions reach the end without an account of what temperance is. Socrates still expects the virtue to be a great good.
  • The limits of one proposalCritias’ knowledge of knowledge gets a trial run. The speakers assign the work of benefiting us to knowledge of good and bad, and the proposed temperance comes up short on their terms.
  • Concessions the argument hadn’t earnedSocrates says they agreed that knowledge of knowledge exists and that it knows what other kinds of knowledge produce. He reviews those concessions because neither had been established.
  • A lead remainsKnowledge of good and bad gives the inquiry a direction to explore. Socrates separates it from the reflexive knowledge under examination and leaves the definition of temperance open.

Socrates sounds like a man surveying a wreck when he tells Critias, “As it is, we are beaten on every side, and cannot discover to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave this name, temperance,” and a little later he tells Charmides to regard him as “a babbler, unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument.” Read quickly, that sounds like a total defeat. A closer look can distinguish what failed from what remains unsettled, the way someone reviewing a trial can ask whether the treatment failed or whether the trial couldn’t give a clear answer.

The first failure is that they never found a definition. Quietness, modesty, doing one’s own business, doing good things, knowing oneself, and knowledge of knowledge all came up. None became a settled answer. Socrates still entertains the thought that Charmides is “most temperate in soul.” It’s quite possible to recognize a good friend without having an account of friendship that would stand up in a seminar. The speakers’ trouble saying what temperance is leaves room for someone to have it.

The second failure concerns one candidate, knowledge of knowledge. Whether it can exist was never decided. Socrates says a great man would be needed to settle that and grants it provisionally. When they test what it could do, they assign the work of benefiting us to a knowledge of good and bad. If temperance has only knowledge and ignorance for its objects, it comes out as “the craftsman of no benefit,” and Critias agrees, “It seems it can’t be, Socrates, in any way.” The result concerns the version of temperance they have put to the test.

The third failure is in the way the inquiry proceeds. Socrates says, “we have conceded many things that did not follow in the argument.” They had granted both that there is knowledge of knowledge and that it could know the works of other kinds of knowledge. Earlier he had been “afraid we were not looking into it correctly.” His closing review helps a reader separate conclusions from the unearned premises that went into them. We know more about the conditions of the test because he tells us where they took shortcuts.

The closing speech can make a reader wonder whether anything at all survived. Socrates calls himself a poor inquirer and admits that their agreed account brought them to a result he finds incredible. He also says he thinks temperance is a great good. This leaves the speakers with a live question about the virtue and a reason to doubt that their proposed account captures it. The doubt is directed at something they can identify.

A reader can also go looking for a hidden solution. The strongest lead comes when Critias, asked which knowledge makes a person happy, answers, “By which he knows good,” and adds, “and bad.” The Republic offers a different direction, describing temperance as concord about who should rule, in a city and in the soul. In the Charmides itself, Socrates separates the knowledge of good and bad from Critias’ proposed knowledge of knowledge. He gives us a reason to pursue the lead while leaving its relation to temperance to be worked out.

So the conversation achieved more than the closing speech first suggests. It gave the speakers reasons to move beyond quietness as a definition and to ask where knowledge of good and bad enters a life governed by expertise. It showed a cost of treating self-knowledge as knowledge of knowledge alone, on the terms Critias granted. And it recorded which points they conceded to keep going. The person who reviews a trial wants all three things, the result, its scope, and an account of how it was reached.

My verdict is that the three failures have different consequences. The missing definition leaves temperance to be explained. The test of knowledge of knowledge shows what Critias would still need to show about its benefit. The account of their concessions tells us how much weight the result can bear. Socrates sounds defeated, and he gives his listener enough detail to see where the search could begin again.

Test your understanding

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Question 1 of 3

What distinction allows the article to deny that the failed search for a definition proves Charmides lacks temperance?

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