Philosophy
Wanted, One Great Man
Socrates says it would take a great man to decide whether a power can turn on itself. Since he can’t settle that question, he finds a narrower one to ask.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesThe proposed knowledge of knowledge gives Socrates two questions, whether it can exist and whether it could help. The missing expert marks a limit the inquiry can work around.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Different kinds of self-relationSocrates treats some cases, such as a number being double itself, as impossible. Whether motion, sight, or knowledge can turn upon themselves needs further thought.
- The great man’s taskThe figure Socrates calls for would sort the cases and say where knowledge belongs. Socrates says he doesn’t trust himself to make those distinctions.
- A question can stay openSocrates grants the possibility of knowledge of knowledge for the time being. This allows him and Critias to ask whether it would help even if it exists.
- The status of a concessionAt the end, Socrates recalls that the argument never established the existence of the proposed knowledge. The inquiry’s failure leaves that possibility undecided.
Charmides 168b–c, 168c–169a, 169a–d, 175b–c · Phaedrus 245c–e, 245e–246a · Aristotle, On the Soul 3.2
Socrates has been running through test cases, asking whether hearing could hear itself, sight see itself, or a greater thing be greater than itself, and he sums up what they’ve found. With magnitudes and numbers it is “altogether impossible,” while hearing and sight, “and indeed motion moving itself and heat burning itself,” would raise disbelief in some people, “though perhaps not in others.” Then comes the line that gives this article its subject, “It needs a great man, my friend, to determine this adequately for all cases,” whether nothing can have its own power in relation to itself, or some things can and some can’t, and whether knowledge is one of them. He adds, “I, for my part, don’t trust myself to be capable of making these distinctions,” and the great man is never mentioned again.
The great man is a job description. Socrates is describing someone able to survey the different kinds of power, sort the ones that can turn back on themselves from the ones that can’t, and then say where knowledge falls. A handful of test cases can give the inquiry somewhere to start. Deciding “for all cases” would take a much wider account. Socrates is frank about what he can manage in the conversation they’re having.
The figure scales back the inquiry’s ambition. Critias’ latest definition has tied the question of what temperance is to a broader question about what kinds of thing can act on themselves. A theory that would cover sight, hearing, heat, motion, and knowledge could swallow the afternoon. Socrates makes it possible to keep the narrower question in view. He can ask how such knowledge would benefit us while setting aside, for now, how it could exist.
What the great man marks is the difference between suspending judgment and giving a proof. Socrates says he can neither say with confidence whether knowledge of knowledge is possible “nor, even if it most certainly exists, accept that it is temperance” before looking into its benefit. A proposed design offers an everyday comparison. An engineer can see that the tests so far give her too little reason to trust it. Proving that the design cannot work under any conditions would take a different argument.
The ending confirms that Socrates remembers the difference. In listing what went wrong, he says, “we conceded that there is knowledge of knowledge, though the argument did not allow it or say that there was.” The concession was a loan. The speakers accepted the premise long enough to see what work it could do. At the end, they still lack an account of which powers can turn on themselves, and the lack of such an account leaves the possibility of the proposed knowledge open.
There’s a quiet irony in the way Socrates handles the moment. The definition on the table promises the ability to tell what you know and what you don’t. When Socrates says he doesn’t trust himself to make the distinctions, he offers an ordinary example of noticing a limit in his own judgment. He has no general account of that ability. Here it gives him something he needs, a way to name where his confidence runs out.
The great man never appears in the dialogue, and Critias can’t supply a clear answer. The questions turn up in other ancient works. In the Phaedrus, Socrates takes what moves itself to be a source of motion and identifies self-motion with the nature of soul. Aristotle asks in On the Soul how we perceive that we see. If another faculty always has to perceive the first, he argues, the explanation risks going on without end. These are different problems, and their variety helps explain why Socrates calls for someone who could sort the cases one by one.
My verdict is that the great man gives the speakers a way to recognize the size of the job. Socrates can leave the larger question open and still ask whether the proposed knowledge would do what Critias wants it to do. At the end, he can say exactly where the attempt fell short. There’s room for a better account because he has taken care to say which question still needs one.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
According to the article, what is the main function of Socrates’ appeal to a “great man” in the inquiry?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- How does distinguishing suspended judgment from proof change the way we should interpret Socrates’ failure to settle whether knowledge can know itself?→
- When is it philosophically legitimate to grant a disputed premise temporarily in order to investigate what follows from it?→
- Does Socrates’ recognition of his own limits provide any support for Critias’ proposed account of temperance, or does it merely illustrate a weaker, everyday form of self-awareness?→