Philosophy
Two Kinds of Turning Back
In the Charmides, motion that moves itself is a doubtful case. In the Phaedrus, it grounds an argument for the soul’s immortality. What does that tell us about knowledge knowing itself?
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesThe Phaedrus makes self-motion a principle of soul. The Charmides asks what self-directed knowledge would have to do, a problem that the argument about motion leaves open.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Socrates leaves a case openIn the Charmides, Socrates says self-motion may strike some people as incredible. He leaves the question unsettled.
- The argument for soulIn the Phaedrus, a self-mover is the source of other motion. Socrates uses that idea to argue that soul is immortal.
- Two relations to oneselfA self-mover acts on itself. A knowledge of knowledge would have to take knowledge as the object it understands.
- What the doctor test addsCritias’ proposed knowledge needs to tell real expertise from pretense. That takes knowledge of medicine in the case of a doctor.
In the Charmides, self-motion appears in a list of doubtful cases. Socrates has been testing whether anything can have its own power in relation to itself, and he sorts the examples. With magnitudes and numbers it is “altogether impossible,” while hearing and sight, “and indeed motion moving itself and heat burning itself,” would raise disbelief in some people, “though perhaps not in others.” He leaves the matter to a great man and turns to the question of benefit. Self-motion, in other words, is not ruled out, only left open. Heat burning itself sounds like a joke, and perhaps it is, but motion moving itself was a serious idea in Greek thought, and it carries a whole argument elsewhere in Plato.
In the Phaedrus the same possibility becomes a foundation. Every soul is immortal, Socrates argues, because what is always in motion is immortal, and only what moves itself never stops moving, since it never abandons itself. What moves itself is the source and beginning of motion for everything else that is moved, and a source can’t come into being or be destroyed, or everything would come to a standstill. So the self-mover is the essence and definition of soul, and the soul is immortal. What the Charmides left as a puzzle, the Phaedrus makes a principle. The Athenian Stranger in the Laws also defines soul as the motion able to move itself.
It’s tempting to conclude that the Phaedrus answers the Charmides, and that once self-motion is established, the possibility of a knowledge that knows itself follows. But the two texts are dealing with different kinds of reflexivity. Self-motion is a matter of an agent acting on itself, the mover and the moved being the same thing, so that the soul both moves and is moved. A knowledge of knowledge is a matter of a knowledge taking itself as its object, the knower and the known being the same, and the relation of knowing to its object is not obviously the same kind of relation as the relation of moving to what is moved. A runner moves himself without anyone supposing he must also be a runner of running, while a knowledge of knowledge sounds odd from the start, because knowing seems to need something outside itself to be about.
The Charmides offers a test. If a power acts on itself, Socrates asks, would it have the very character it is directed at? Hearing would have to have a sound and sight a color. A self-mover would have to be something that can be moved, which gives the Phaedrus a coherent place to start. Likewise, a piece of knowledge can be the subject of an inquiry. What remains to be shown is whether a knowledge with no objects except knowledge could do the work Critias gives it.
Where it lay was in what the knowledge of knowledge was supposed to do. Critias’ knowledge had to know itself and other knowledges, and also the lack of knowledge, while knowing nothing else at all, and the doctor argument showed that such a knowledge couldn’t tell what anyone knows. The Phaedrus self-mover, by contrast, isn’t asked to do anything like that. It moves itself and is the source of other motions, but it isn’t required to know the contents of those motions, and its reflexivity isn’t burdened with an exclusion clause that strips it of every other object.
There’s a striking structural parallel all the same, since Critias’ knowledge was a knowledge of itself and of other knowledges, and the Phaedrus soul is a motion of itself and a source of other motions, so both are reflexive powers that also stand at the head of others of their kind. But the arguments for them run in opposite directions. The Phaedrus argues for self-motion because without a first mover there would be an endless chain of movers, so the reflexive principle stops a regress. A knowledge of knowledge, if every knowledge needed another to know it, would start one, and nothing in the Charmides shows that knowledge needs a further knowledge to be knowledge.
That is why the comparison can’t simply settle the Charmides’ question. The Phaedrus shows, at most, that one kind of reflexive power is not only possible but necessary, given its argument about the source of motion. It doesn’t show that every reflexive power is possible, and it says nothing about whether a knowledge of knowledge could have the content Critias wanted or the benefit he promised. The question Socrates left to the great man was whether anything can relate to itself in general, and the Phaedrus answers for one case, by an argument that doesn’t transfer. Socrates was right, in other words, to treat the cases one at a time.
The Phaedrus gives a reason to take self-motion seriously, just where the Charmides leaves room to doubt it. Put a doctor in front of Critias’ expert and the difference comes into view. The self-mover’s job is to begin motion. The would-be examiner has to decide whether this person knows what makes a patient well. An argument about how motion begins cannot supply the medical judgment that decision requires.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the article reject the inference that the Phaedrus establishes the possibility of Critias’ knowledge of knowledge?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- What criteria would justify transferring an argument from one kind of reflexive relation, such as self-motion, to another, such as self-knowledge?→
- Why might Socrates’ practice of considering reflexive powers one at a time be philosophically preferable to deciding whether all self-relations are possible or impossible together?→
- If Critias’ knowledge could recognize who knows and who does not without knowing the content of their expertise, what practical benefit, if any, could it still provide?→