Philosophy

Too Good to Be Temperance?

Socrates asks whether a doctor who helps a patient without realizing it has shown temperance.

Critias finally gives a plain definition, that temperance is the doing of good things. The same words fit courage and justice, which makes it hard to see what he has defined.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • A plain definitionCritias says temperance is doing good things, and Socrates grants that he might be right.
  • Too many casesDoing good things fits temperance and fits courage, justice, and generosity just as readily.
  • The unity of virtueThe Protagoras raises the possibility that the virtues share a kind of knowledge, which would help explain why their good actions overlap.
  • Where the action comes fromSocrates asks whether someone can act temperately without knowing it, exposing a question that Critias’ formula leaves open.

Charmides 163d–164a, 164a–d, 174b–d, 174d–175b · Laches 194e–195a, 199c–e · Protagoras 329c–e, 360d–361c · Republic 430e–431a

After all the hairsplitting about making, doing and working, Critias at last says something plain. When Socrates asks, “Then the man who does bad things is not temperate, but the one who does good things?” Critias answers, “And don’t you think so, my good fellow?” and then gives his formula, that “temperance is the doing of good things.” Socrates’ first response is generous, since he says, “And perhaps there is nothing to stop you being right.” It’s worth pausing on that generosity, because the definition is so attractive that it’s hard to say what’s wrong with it, and the trouble only shows when you ask what it leaves out.

On the attractive side, the definition seems to cover cases we already agree on. Think of the guy who goes home at a reasonable hour or the official who refuses a bribe. Both do something good, and both can show self-command in doing it. The formula can include the quiet person or the bold one, the modest person or the one who knows when to speak up.

The problem is that it applies just as readily to courage, justice or simply being a good person. The brave do good things, the just do good things, and the generous do good things, so the formula leaves us with something the virtues share, and no way of telling them apart. A definition of “dog” as “an animal” isn’t false, since every dog is an animal, but it’s useless as a definition, because it can’t tell a dog from a cat or a horse. Ask what a temperate man and a brave man have in common, and “they both do good things” is the right answer, which is exactly why it can’t be the answer to what makes one of them temperate.

What’s missing from the formula is anything distinctive about temperance itself, the feature that would let you tell it apart from its sister virtues. The Greek word sōphrosynē can suggest self-control, the virtue of someone who keeps pleasures and desires in check. In the Republic, Socrates describes it partly in those terms, as a kind of order and mastery over certain appetites. Strikingly, none of the definitions in the Charmides makes appetite the test, and Critias’ version is the most extreme case, since it drops the whole idea of restraint and keeps only the result, good deeds, with nothing about what in the person produces them. A man who does good things while struggling every minute against wild appetites and a man who does them with his appetites calmly in order would count as equally temperate under Critias’ formula, as long as they did the same things.

Plato shows the same failure in another dialogue, and there he names it. In the Laches, the general Nicias defines courage as knowledge of what is to be feared and what is to be dared, and under questioning that turns into knowledge of all goods and evils, at which point Socrates points out that they have defined the whole of virtue rather than one part of it, and so haven’t found what courage is after all. Critias’ definition has a similar problem. From the start, it names something that good actions of every kind can have in common.

There’s a serious case on the other side, though, and it comes from Socrates himself. In the Protagoras, he asks whether the virtues are like the parts of a face, each different from the others, or like pieces of gold, which differ only in size, and by the end he is pressing the idea that virtues such as justice, temperance and courage are all knowledge. If that’s right, then a definition of temperance that turns out to describe goodness in general might not be a failure but a discovery, and the Charmides does identify knowledge of good and bad as what benefits us. The dialogue still leaves open how that knowledge is related to temperance. On that reading Critias would have stumbled onto a deep truth without realizing it, which would be a very Platonic kind of joke.

But even on that view, Critias’ definition doesn’t earn the credit. If the virtues are one, the interesting claim is that they’re all one kind of knowledge, and that claim explains why the temperate person does good things, because he knows what’s good. Critias’ formula names the good deeds and leaves their source unexplained. It would count somebody who did something good by accident, under pressure or without knowing it was good. That’s precisely the gap Socrates goes after next, asking whether temperate people can fail to know that they’re temperate. He gives the example of a doctor who benefits a patient without knowing whether the treatment has helped.

My verdict is that “doing good things” covers examples of temperance and leaves the door open to plenty of other cases. It leaves us looking for something distinctive about temperance, perhaps the self-command that keeps appetite in its place. It also leaves the question of where the good deeds come from. Socrates is right to grant that it might not be false, and right to keep pushing, because a definition can fit every case and still tell you nothing about why the cases belong together.

Test your understanding

123

Question 1 of 3

Why does the author compare Critias’ definition of temperance to defining a dog merely as “an animal”?

Choose one answer

Guided Inquiry

Questions for Socrates

Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.