Philosophy
Three Ways to Say “Know”
English keeps saying know while the Greek changes verbs. The strongest distinction in the argument comes into focus when Socrates changes what he asks a person to know.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesThe doctor’s example is a good test of a translator’s instincts. Three Greek verbs turn up close together, but the difference that matters can be heard in the English words what and that.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Three Greek verbsThe Diotimos glossary tracks three verbs the edition often renders as know. Their ranges include recognition, knowing that something is so and knowing how to do something, with plenty of overlap.
- The doctor is a test caseSocrates uses a form of gignōskein for knowing the subject of medicine. A few lines later a form of epistasthai describes what a supposed expert claims to know.
- Self and subjectAt 167a Socrates puts knowing oneself and knowing what one knows side by side. The verbs change, and the objects in the sentence make the change of question visible.
- What and thatSocrates later asks whether you could know that someone knows without knowing what they know. The Greek keeps the same verb across the contrast, as the English does.
Charmides 159a, 162d–e, 164b–d, 166d–167b, 170b–d, 172b–d, Glossary of Key Terms · Russell, The Problems of Philosophy Chapter V
At 170b, Socrates asks how a person could know what it is he knows. It sounds almost as if he’s trying to get an extra use out of one English verb. In the Greek the two appearances of know come from different verbs, eidenai and gignōskein. A third, epistasthai, comes up a few lines later. If each Greek verb stood for its own kind of knowing, a translator could help you by giving each its own English word. The doctor Socrates goes on to discuss makes that tempting solution hard to carry out.
The Greek verbs do have different associations. Gignōskein can mean coming to know or recognizing, and it’s the verb behind the Delphic instruction to know yourself. Eidenai, the infinitive of oida, belongs to a family of words for seeing. Epistasthai can mean knowing how, and its family gives the dialogue epistēmē, the term for a kind of knowledge or expertise. It’s easy to start sorting them into the kind of knowledge you have of a person, the kind you have of a fact, and the kind a doctor has of medicine.
A modern distinction can make that sorting feel natural. Bertrand Russell distinguishes knowledge by acquaintance from knowledge by description. His acquaintance is direct awareness, and his examples include the color and hardness you encounter when you look at and touch a table. He contrasts that with knowing something as the thing that answers to a description. This is a distinction about how you know, and it gives us a way to ask whether the Greek verbs carry something similar. You still have to go back to see how Plato actually uses them.
Take the doctor. At 164b, Socrates uses gignōskein to ask whether a doctor knows when his treatment helps. At 170c, he uses the same verb for knowing the subject of a whole craft, as when medicine knows what is healthy. At 170d, someone claims to know a subject, and here the verb for the claim is epistasthai. You can see what goes wrong if you reserve one Greek word for acquaintance and give expertise to the other. Both can be used about knowing a subject. Earlier still, a form of epistasthai does the ordinary work of saying someone knows how to speak Greek.
The verbs also come into play when one person knows something another doesn’t. At 162e, Socrates excuses Charmides for failing to know what was meant by a definition and says Critias might be expected to know. He pairs the negative verb agnoein, to be ignorant of, with eidenai. The English lets you hear that it’s the same question about what the speaker meant, asked first of the boy and then of the older man. A rule that gave every Greek verb a separate English equivalent would make even that simple contrast sound like a difference in the sort of knowledge expected of them.
Then there’s the shift that matters. At 164d Critias proposes “knowing oneself.” At 167a Socrates explicitly sets knowing oneself beside “knowing what one knows and what one does not know,” and Critias agrees. The Greek puts gignōskein and eidenai right beside each other. You can see the movement even if you read only English. A claim about knowing yourself is getting a more specific account in terms of what you can say about the knowledge you have or lack.
At 170c–d, the inquiry puts that account under pressure. Could you know that someone knows something and still have no idea what they know? You might be convinced that a doctor knows her subject without being able to decide whether her account of a patient is right. Socrates brings out the difference with forms of the same Greek verb, oida. The contrast is there in English too, in the distance from what to that. Giving each Greek verb its own territory would do very little to help with this part of the argument.
My verdict is that the Diotimos glossary makes a good case for keeping know as the refrain. It lets you recognize “knowing what one knows and what one does not know” when Socrates raises it again and asks what good it would do. By then, you’ve had plenty of chances to hear the Greek verbs change. The question to listen for is whether what the people in the dialogue need to know has changed with them.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the article reject assigning acquaintance to one Greek verb and expertise to another?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- When does translating several Greek verbs with the single English refrain “know” clarify Socrates's argument, and when might it conceal a meaningful difference?→
- Does defining self-knowledge as knowing what one knows and does not know adequately capture what it means to know oneself? Why or why not?→
- If you know that someone is an expert but cannot judge whether the expert's particular claim is correct, what—if anything—do you genuinely know?→