Philosophy
The Self-Mover Socrates Leaves Alone
A thing greater than itself is one sort of puzzle. A thing that moves itself is another, and Socrates’ decision to leave it open matters for the inquiry into knowledge.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesA cart needs a pull, but a dog can get up and walk. The Phaedrus, Laws and Aristotle’s Physics give that ordinary difference unusually large consequences.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Socrates sorts the casesHe treats a magnitude greater than itself as impossible. Motion that moves itself belongs with the examples that may give people pause without forcing everyone to reject them.
- Plato uses self-motion elsewhereThe Phaedrus makes self-motion central to an argument for the soul’s immortality. The Laws gives motion able to move itself as the soul’s definition.
- Aristotle divides the workIn the Physics, Aristotle asks how a thing can move itself and distinguishes what moves from what is moved within it. He also asks what would bring the series of movers to an end.
- Possibility and benefit come apartSocrates suspends the question of whether knowledge can relate to itself. This lets him ask what use such a power would be, even if it were possible.
Charmides 168b–c, 168c–169a, 169a–d, 170b–d · Phaedrus 245c–e, 245e–246a · Laws 895e–896a · Aristotle, Physics 8.5, the self-mover, 8.5, the first mover
In the middle of his list, Socrates asks Critias to imagine “motion moving itself and heat burning itself.” It’s easy to hear those examples as further items in a catalogue of impossibilities. But Socrates has stopped to sort the cases. Some, he says, are impossible, and others “would raise disbelief in some people, though perhaps not in others.” Self-motion belongs to the second group. The little qualification is worth keeping in mind when a much harder case comes back into view.
The difference between the groups matters. If a thing were greater than itself, it would have to be smaller than itself in the same comparison. If it were double itself, it would have to be half itself. Socrates can say what goes wrong in those cases. With motion, he hasn’t found a contradiction just by stating the example. It’s one thing to hear an expression that sounds odd and another to show why the thing it describes couldn’t happen.
A cart is pulled by an ox, a stone thrown by a hand, a leaf blown along by the wind. Put a dog in that list and the puzzle changes. A dog can get up and walk out of the room, and you don’t need to see anybody push it. In one perfectly ordinary sense it moves itself. That still leaves a question about what starts the motion, and what it would mean to say that the mover and what it moves are one and the same.
The Phaedrus gives self-motion a much larger role. In Socrates’ argument for the soul’s immortality, what moves itself never parts from the source of its motion and is a beginning of motion for other things. He goes on to connect that capacity with the nature of soul. In the Laws, the Athenian Stranger makes the connection explicit by giving motion able to move itself as the definition of soul. The case that raises doubts in the Charmides does a great deal of work in those two arguments.
Aristotle asks in his Physics how a thing can move itself. He separates the part that imparts motion from the part that is moved. A living thing can move itself in the sense that the source is within it, while the parts involved do different work. Aristotle also argues that the series of movers ultimately requires something unmoved. His treatment lets us keep the dog in view while asking a more exact question than whether things ever move on their own.
That changes how I hear Socrates’ return to knowledge. He says it would take “a great man” to decide which powers can relate to themselves and whether knowledge is among them. Then he adds, “I, for my part, don’t trust myself to be capable of making these distinctions.” He has made Critias’ proposal look strange. He leaves it to a further inquiry to find out whether the strangeness can be explained.
Then Socrates grants for now that knowledge of knowledge is possible and asks what anyone would gain by having it. That’s a different test. A power might be possible and still be unable to tell someone which field he understands or what he’s missing. Socrates can bring out the problem with the proposed knowledge without having to decide, along the way, how every apparent case of self-relation works.
My verdict is that the self-mover is worth keeping beside the cases Socrates finds impossible. It shows how much more there is to ask after the first surprise. Think of the dog walking out of the room. Calling it a self-mover gets the inquiry started, and you may come back with a more exact account of what moved what. Socrates gives the strange knowledge Critias proposes the same chance, before asking what work it would actually do.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the author resist placing self-motion in the same category as being greater than oneself?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- When should the absence of an obvious contradiction give a strange proposal further consideration, and when might that standard be too permissive?→
- Does Aristotle’s division between the part that moves and the part that is moved preserve genuine self-motion, or does it replace self-motion with motion between parts? Why?→
- Why might Socrates gain more by provisionally granting Critias’ proposal and testing its usefulness than by trying to settle its possibility first?→