Philosophy
The Formula That Changed Jobs
In the Charmides, doing one’s own business sounds like a riddle about making your own shoes. In the Republic, the same phrase comes to describe what makes a city and a person just.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesThe Republic gives an old formula a new job. The change starts with what counts as one’s own and ends with how the parts of a person work together.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Charmides brings in a sayingSocrates asks what doing one’s own business could mean for a teacher or shoemaker. A city where everybody made their own things would lose the benefits of specialization.
- The city changes the meaningIn the Republic, your own work means the part you are fitted to play in a shared city. The formula now makes room for people to produce things for one another.
- Socrates takes it inwardThe Republic also uses the formula to explain how reason, spirit, and appetite can do their own work within one person. The focus moves from goods to parts of the soul.
- Inner order raises a further questionDavid Sachs asks whether a well-ordered soul is enough to ensure justice toward other people. The Charmides keeps the problem of what people actually do in view.
Charmides 161b–c, 161d–162a, 162c–e, 162e–163c, 163d–e · Republic 431e–432a, 433a–b, 434a–c, 443c–d · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy The objection from David Sachs
Charmides offers the formula almost in passing, as something he once heard someone say, “that temperance would be doing one’s own business.” Socrates teases him that he must have heard it from Critias or one of the other wise men, and Critias’ quick denial is the first crack in his composure. Socrates calls the saying a riddle and proceeds to make it look ridiculous, asking whether a city would be well managed if each person had to weave and wash his own cloak, cobble his own shoes, and make his own oil flask and scraper Critias steps in to defend the formula with distinctions between making and doing, but by 163e it has been transformed into “the doing of good things,” and the original phrase drops out of the conversation.
In Book IV of the Republic, the formula returns in a very different role. Socrates says they have heard many people say, and have often said themselves, that justice is doing one’s own business and not meddling in other people’s, and he proposes that this, understood in a certain way, is what justice is. In the city they have built, each class does the work it is suited for, the rulers ruling, the guardians guarding and the producers producing, and justice is that arrangement, with injustice the meddling of one class in another’s work. That language recalls the Charmides, where Socrates asks if the schoolboys were being busybodies when they learned to write their enemies’ names as well as their own.
So did the Republic repair what the Charmides broke? That would be the tidiest story, and it isn’t quite right, because the two dialogues give the formula different objects. In the Charmides, Socrates reads “one’s own business” at its most literal, as one’s own cloak and shoes and oil-flask, and the absurdity comes from treating every craft product as somebody’s private business. In the Republic, “one’s own” means the work one is suited for by nature, a function in a whole, and that change of object is what makes the formula plausible.
The dialogues also rest on different assumptions, since the Republic’s version only works because it has already built a city on the principle that people differ by nature and that each should do the one job he is best suited for. The Charmides has no such city, only an ordinary Athenian phrase about minding your own affairs, with no theory of natural roles behind it, and without that theory the phrase really is a riddle, since nothing tells you what counts as one’s own. Socrates exploits that gap with obvious enjoyment, and the boy has no theory to fall back on.
Perhaps the biggest difference is that the Republic moves the formula inside the soul. Justice, Socrates says later in Book IV, is not really about a person’s outward actions but about his inner condition, the parts of his soul each doing their own work, reason ruling, spirit supporting and appetite obeying. On that account doing one’s own business isn’t chiefly about cloaks and shoes at all, and the objections of the Charmides, which were all about outward actions, simply don’t reach it.
That inward move has its own critics, and they deserve a hearing. The philosopher David Sachs argued in a famous paper of 1963 that Plato’s inner justice, a harmony of the soul’s parts, is never shown to guarantee ordinary justice, not stealing, not lying, not betraying friends, so that the Republic may have changed the subject rather than answering the question. If Sachs is right, the formula’s new job is purchased at a price, since it becomes plausible as a description of inner order at the cost of losing its obvious link to outward conduct, which is what the Charmides was examining. Defenders of Plato reply that a soul ruled by reason would have no motive for the greed and fear behind most injustice, and the argument is still going.
There’s also the puzzle of why the formula moves from temperance to justice. In the Republic, temperance gets its own account as an agreement about who should rule that runs through the whole city, while justice gets the doing of one’s own work. The two are closely related, since a city where everyone agrees who should rule and a city where everyone does his own work are nearly the same city, and Plato may simply have found that the formula fit his new scheme better under a different name. The Charmides wasn’t wrong to connect it with temperance, it just lacked the structure that would let the connection be stated precisely. In both works the formula is bound up with order, and order is the idea that links temperance and justice throughout Plato.
My verdict is that the formula “doing one’s own business” does different work in the two dialogues because it has different objects, rests on different assumptions and belongs to different accounts of the city, and that neither dialogue simply cancels or repairs the other. The Charmides shows what goes wrong with the formula when it is taken literally and has no theory behind it, and the Republic shows what it can do once it is given a theory of natural roles and moved inside the soul. How that inner order shows up in conduct remains a live question, and the Charmides remains the best reminder of what the formula has to answer for.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What change most directly makes “doing one’s own business” plausible in the Republic, according to the article?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If “one’s own work” depends on a theory of natural roles, how could Socrates determine those roles without merely assuming the social arrangement he wants to defend?→
- Does moving justice from outward conduct to the soul’s inner order deepen the meaning of justice, or evade the original problem? Why?→
- If temperance and justice are both forms of order in the article’s account, what meaningful distinction between them can still be maintained?→