Philosophy
Say It the Same Way Twice
Critias’ objection depends on hearing three ordinary verbs recur.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesEnglish style often rewards a fresh word. In this exchange, repeating “do,” “make,” and “work” lets the reader see exactly where the argument changes.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Three verbs in playCritias distinguishes making from doing and working, and appeals to Hesiod’s praise of work.
- A change you can hearSocrates speaks of making things for others before asking whether that counts as doing their business.
- When variation costs somethingIf a translation keeps changing the words, readers lose the echoes that explain why Critias objects.
- Consistency at the turning pointsThe translation keeps the distinction visible while still supplying a verb where Greek leaves it understood.
Charmides 161b–c, 161d–162a, 162e–163c, 163c–e · Hesiod, Works and Days 311 · H. W. and F. G. Fowler, The King’s English Elegant Variation
Critias’ big move in defense of his definition is a distinction between three verbs. Socrates asks whether making, poiein, is the same as doing, prattein. Critias says no and adds, “nor working and making either.” He claims to have learned this from Hesiod’s line that work is no disgrace. Whatever we think of the move, it helps to hear the words before Critias draws his distinction. He’s answering an argument Socrates has made with them, and the English has to let the reader hear that answer.
Listen to the words as they come up. When Socrates questions the boy, he lists healing, building houses, and weaving and says that each of them is a way of “doing something,” using the verb for doing. A few lines later he imagines a law under which people keep to “working at and doing” their own business. That brings working, ergazesthai, in alongside doing. Then, turning to Critias, Socrates gets him to agree that “all craftsmen make something.” Critias’ complaint is that Socrates treats making something for somebody else as if it already counts as doing somebody else’s business.
Imagine a translator who varies the verbs for the sake of elegant English. Craftsmen might “produce” something in one sentence, “create” it in another, and “manufacture” it in a third. The law could tell them to keep to “making and doing” their own business because that sounds more natural than “working at and doing.” Each choice might be reasonable on its own. But by the time Critias distinguishes making from doing and working, the reader would have to reconstruct which words he was picking up and why.
H. W. and F. G. Fowler called substitutions made for the sake of variety “elegant variation” in The King’s English. They’re mostly concerned with writers who reach for another name when the first name or a pronoun would do. In one example, calling Mrs. Scott “his mother” makes the reader work out all over again that the two names belong to the same person. Something similar happens in an argument. When a word changes, the reader starts looking for a difference in what it means.
A contract gives you a sense of why a little repetition can be worth it. Imagine a contract that defines “the Buyer” and uses that name for several pages before switching to “the customer.” You’d have to stop to work out whether the customer is still the same person. Plato’s reader has a similar job. The question is whether doing, making, and working come to the same thing. Keeping the words visible gives you a chance to make up your own mind.
Once you can follow the terms, you can check how Critias uses the distinction. Socrates calls healing and building “doing” with Charmides, then asks Critias about “making,” before drawing a conclusion about doing. Critias has spotted a real change of words. His own move is more ambitious. He reads Hesiod as treating fine and beneficial making as work and as doing in the proper sense. There’s room to agree that Socrates changed verbs and still ask whether Critias can reserve “doing” for what is good.
There’s room for natural English even on these pages. The imaginary law says each man must “make his own oil-flask and strigil,” for example. The Greek leaves that action understood after naming the things. A translator who supplies it is helping the sentence along. The place to hold the line is where the words are actually being set against each other. That’s when an elegant substitution can hide a step in the reasoning.
My verdict is that the repetition earns its place. When Critias distinguishes working, doing, and making, you can hear him taking up words the others have used. Socrates then recalls Prodicus’ verbal distinctions and tells Critias that he can use words as he likes, provided he makes clear what he applies them to. The native translation lets us hear both parts of the exchange. The words stay steady where we need to see what each man is doing with them.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the author object to varying the translations of the three key verbs merely to produce more elegant English?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If changing a repeated word prompts readers to look for a change in meaning, when might that expectation improve interpretation rather than distort it?→
- What would Critias need to establish before he could justifiably reserve “doing” in the proper sense for actions that are fine and beneficial?→
- How should a translator balance natural English against the need to preserve an argument’s repeated terms, and what principle could guide difficult cases?→