Philosophy
Philosophy Begins With a Headache
A morning complaint turns the young man who came for a remedy into a partner in the inquiry.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesIn the Theaetetus, Socrates says philosophy begins in wonder. In the Charmides it begins with a teenager who wakes up with a heavy head, and that small, ordinary complaint turns out to be a perfect way in.
Orientation
At a Glance
- An ordinary complaintCritias uses Charmides’ heavy head in the mornings as a reason to bring him over to Socrates.
- Two beginningsSocrates names wonder as the beginning of philosophy in the Theaetetus, while the inquiry in the Charmides starts with a headache.
- A lucky turnCritias calls the headache a godsend because treating it might lead Charmides to cultivate temperance.
- A patient takes partCharmides comes for a remedy and ends up helping Socrates investigate what temperance means.
The whole dialogue hangs on a minor ailment, the kind nobody would normally bother a doctor about. Critias tells Socrates that his ward “was saying that his head feels rather heavy when he gets up in the morning.” That complaint gives him an excuse to call the boy over to meet a supposed doctor. Plato never tells us why the boy’s head is heavy, whether it’s late nights or long hours at his poetry or nothing at all, and the vagueness is part of the point, since this is the kind of everyday nuisance anybody might mention in passing and forget by lunchtime. In a dialogue about the whole person, it’s fitting that the door opens on something as ordinary as a sore head.
In the Theaetetus, Socrates gives philosophy a grand birth certificate, saying that wonder is the feeling of a philosopher and that philosophy has no other beginning. The Charmides offers a much earthier origin story, since here philosophy begins with a teenager who’d like his head to stop hurting in the mornings. It’s a funnier and more honest picture of how most people actually wander into big questions, which is rarely through wonder at the cosmos and usually through some small, specific problem they want fixed. Wonder is a fine beginning for a philosopher, but a headache is a more common beginning for everybody else.
Then the scale of the conversation changes, and it changes fast, since within a few exchanges the conversation has moved from a heavy head to the whole body, from the body to the soul, and from the soul to temperance, and Critias, delighted, announces that “this trouble with his head will turn out to be a godsend for the young man, if on account of his head he is going to be forced to improve his mind as well.” The Greek word for “godsend” means a lucky find sent by Hermes, the kind of windfall you stumble on by the road, and that’s exactly what the headache becomes, a small annoyance that opens onto something much larger. Critias’ joke works on another level too, since the boy is being forced to improve his mind “on account of his head,” which turns the aching body part into the very reason for treating the soul.
Anyone who has been to a good doctor knows this pattern. You go in for a stubborn cough and come out talking about your sleep, your stress and the job that’s causing both, or a kid signs up for karate because he wants to learn to fight and ends up learning discipline and respect instead. The immediate need gets you through the door, and a wise practitioner takes the need seriously while gently widening the frame until the real subject comes into view. In both cases the original need is real, and it gives the practitioner somewhere to start.
What’s striking is how much respect Socrates shows the small need along the way. He takes the headache seriously enough to use it as the starting point. He explains the principle that the eyes are treated with the head and the head with the body, and builds from the boy’s own complaint toward the larger question. Critias has used the complaint to get the boy over to the bench, but Socrates still connects the inquiry to the question the boy came to ask. Respecting the small need is what earns the right to raise the big one.
The change of scale also changes who is doing the work. A headache is something that happens to you and that a doctor fixes with a remedy, while temperance is something you have to examine in yourself, so the moment the conversation shifts, the patient becomes a participant. Socrates asks whether the boy thinks he has temperance and then invites him to look into it together. From then on, the inquiry starts with the boy’s own answers, which is a very different relationship from the one he signed up for when he came over to see a doctor about his head. That shift, from receiving a cure to taking part in it, is the real change of scale in the scene.
The headache itself, meanwhile, quietly disappears from the dialogue, since nobody mentions it again after the opening, and we never learn whether the boy’s head felt any lighter the next morning, which tells you something about where the dialogue’s priorities lie. The small need did its job by making room for the larger inquiry, and once the larger inquiry was underway, the small need could fade into the background, the way the cough you went to the doctor about often matters least by the time you leave. Plato is confident enough in the bigger question that he never needs to report back on the smaller one.
My verdict is that the headache is the most realistic thing in the Charmides. Most people don’t come to philosophy, or to faith, or to any serious change in their lives, because they set out looking for it. They come because something small is bothering them and somebody wise takes the bother seriously. Plato lets the dialogue begin where real lives begin, with an ordinary complaint, and shows how a good questioner can turn it into an opening while taking the patient’s headache seriously, which is a rarer skill than it sounds.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
According to the article, what most clearly marks the boy’s transition from patient to participant?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- When does widening a conversation beyond someone’s immediate concern show wisdom, and when might it fail to respect that concern?→
- Why might an ordinary problem provide a more realistic beginning for philosophy than wonder does?→
- How does the shift from receiving a remedy to examining oneself change what it means to be helped?→