Philosophy

One Swallow Doesn’t Make a Spring

Socrates moves from a doctor who acts temperately to a doctor who is temperate. Critias has already given him a reason to make that move.

The doctor helps one patient. The argument treats that success as a verdict about his character, and Aristotle’s swallow gives us a way to ask what has changed.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • A deed becomes a descriptionSocrates starts with a doctor who benefits one patient. A few lines later, he says that the doctor both acts temperately and is temperate.
  • The weight of a single dayAristotle’s swallow proverb comes in a discussion of happiness over a whole life. The same image helps us ask how much one good act tells us about a person’s character.
  • Restraint can look the same from outsideIn the Phaedo, Socrates describes people who give up one pleasure because another has a stronger hold on them. Their behavior can resemble self-restraint even when their reasons differ.
  • Critias lets the argument proceedCritias agrees that the person who does what he ought is temperate. Socrates follows that agreement until Critias objects to someone being temperate without knowing himself.

Charmides 160d–e, 163e–164a, 164a–d · Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.7 (1098a), 2.4 (1105a–b) · Phaedo 68e, 69a–c

Watch what happens to the doctor in the space of one sentence. He’s made a patient healthy and done something beneficial. Critias agrees that he’s done what he ought and that doing so makes him temperate. Socrates first says that the doctor “acted temperately, by your account.” Then he says that the doctor “acts temperately and is temperate,” even though he doesn’t know he’s temperate. The second expression sounds like a verdict on the man. How did one treatment come to carry that much weight?

The two descriptions sit side by side in the Greek. First comes a phrase for acting temperately, then a verb, sōphronei, for being temperate or showing sound judgment. The words have the same root. It’s easy to hear the second as repeating the first in a slightly different form. English has something like the same temptation. If you tell me someone is being careful, I can hear you describing what she’s doing now. If you say she is careful, I might expect the same care tomorrow.

Aristotle gives us a good picture of what would be missing. One swallow doesn’t make a spring, and one fine day falls short of making a happy life. He’s talking there about happiness, which needs time to show itself. He makes a related point about virtue when he says that a person acts virtuously by choosing the act knowingly for its own sake and from a settled disposition. A habitual liar can tell the truth one morning. To learn how much that tells you about his character, you’d have to know more about the choice and the man who made it.

In the Phaedo, Socrates asks us to look at someone who abstains from a pleasure because another pleasure has a stronger hold on him. From the seats it might look like a fine display of restraint. Get up close and the scenery is flat. Socrates calls the exchange of one pleasure for another, in the absence of wisdom, a painted imitation of virtue. Whatever we think a settled virtue requires, this is one reason to be careful about reading it straight off the behavior.

So is Socrates cheating when he moves from the deed to the character? Critias has already accepted the move. His definition is “the doing of good things,” and he agrees when Socrates calls the person who does what he ought temperate. There’s still a distinction to draw. You can call a man temperate on this occasion, or you can give him that description outright. If Critias means the first, Socrates can ask whether this captures what they were looking for when they asked what sort of person temperance makes you.

Take the description outright and see what it does. The doctor is temperate at ten when a treatment benefits one patient. At eleven another treatment harms a second patient, and the label switches off. We could imagine the doctor bringing the same degree of skill and care to both. If the verdict has changed, it tells us what happened in the two cases. It tells us less about the sort of person we should expect at twelve.

Critias objects to a different part of the result. He would sooner withdraw what he said than “ever concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate.” That tells us how much awareness matters to him. It leaves the question about a lasting disposition open. A doctor might know just what he’s done for a patient today and still leave us asking how he is likely to act tomorrow.

My verdict is that Socrates has let Critias’ own agreement do its work. A successful deed can tell us something about a person, and how much it tells us depends on what it took to do it and whether we have reason to expect more of the same. Socrates makes the change from the deed to the person sound almost effortless. It’s the sort of change you can miss while you’re watching the swallow.

Test your understanding

123

Question 1 of 3

According to the article’s use of Aristotle, what is missing when a single good act is treated as sufficient proof of virtue?

Choose one answer

Guided Inquiry

Questions for Socrates

Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.