Philosophy

No True Craftsman

Critias catches Socrates treating making and doing as the same thing. The distinction helps until Critias gives one of the verbs a new meaning.

A craftsman can make something for somebody else and still be temperate. Critias has an answer, but it changes the definition he set out to defend.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The craftsman causes troubleCritias agrees that craftsmen make things for other people and can still be temperate. Socrates asks how that fits a definition about doing one’s own business.
  • Making and doing come apartCritias notices that Socrates has been treating making something and doing something as interchangeable. Aristotle later distinguishes producing a result from acting well.
  • Good work by definitionCritias calls a making a work or a doing when it is fine and beneficial. His choice of words makes harmful activity disappear from the category he is defending.
  • Put the new claim to a testSocrates lets Critias use the words as he likes and asks what they refer to. The definition becomes doing good things, which raises the question of whether a doctor can act well without knowing it.

Charmides 161e, 162e–163c, 163c–164a, 164a–c · Hesiod, Works and Days 311 · Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.4 (1140a), 6.5 (1140b)

The trap Socrates sets for Critias closes in two quick moves, and both look harmless at the time. Critias agrees that “all craftsmen make something” and that they make other people’s things as well as their own. When he says there’s nothing to stop them from being temperate anyway, Socrates points out that this is awkward for a man who has taken over a definition about doing one’s own business. Critias replies with heavy sarcasm and then a counterpunch. For him, making, doing and working can come apart. He claims to have learned the distinction from Hesiod. The defense of a definition has turned into an argument about verbs.

It’s worth seeing first that Critias has caught something real. When Socrates was questioning the boy, he moved freely between the verbs. He counted healing, building houses, weaving and producing anything by a craft as “doing something.” If making and doing can come apart in the sense that matters to the definition, then showing that craftsmen make other people’s things doesn’t settle whether they do other people’s business. Critias has spotted the hinge the earlier objection turned on.

Aristotle takes a version of that distinction seriously in the Nicomachean Ethics. Making, poiēsis, aims at something beyond the making, such as a house or a pair of shoes. In action, praxis, doing well is itself the end. The difference lets you say why an excellent pair of shoes tells you one thing about the person who made them and leaves plenty still to learn. The shoemaker’s skill shows in the shoes. What it means for the shoemaker to act well takes a different kind of judgment.

But look at how Critias actually draws the line. He says that Hesiod called “things made finely and beneficially” works and counted such makings as workings and doings. That puts a moral filter into the vocabulary. A harmful product can be something you made. Under Critias’ special use of the words, it has already lost its claim to count as a work or a doing. Aristotle distinguishes activities by what they aim at. Critias sorts makings by whether he approves of what they accomplish.

It’s a little like the no-true-Scotsman move. Someone says no Scotsman puts sugar on his porridge. You point to a Scotsman who does, and the answer comes back that no true Scotsman would. Suddenly the example has been kept out by changing who counts. Critias gives his verbs a similar protection. If only good makings count as doings and good things count as properly one’s own, a craftsman can make something for a neighbor without ever being caught doing the neighbor’s business in the sense Critias has just invented.

The rescue comes at a price. Socrates tells Critias that “almost as soon as you began I understood what you meant.” He lets Critias use the words however he likes as long as he says plainly what they refer to. Once doing means producing good things and only such things count as one’s own, the old saying boils down to a short sentence. Temperance is the doing of good things. The new wording can be tested, but the work once done by the phrase one’s own business has gone missing.

That leaves the distinction with two different achievements. It exposes a genuine shortcut in Socrates’ argument with the boy. It also makes a bad outcome impossible to bring forward as an example of doing, because Critias has reserved the word for good outcomes. You can set up a vocabulary like that if you find it helpful. The harder work begins when somebody asks why a given making is good and what the maker has to understand about it.

My verdict is that Critias’ distinction starts as a good catch and ends as a no-true-Scotsman move. Socrates has blurred making and doing, and Critias is right to ask about the difference. But by giving the words his own rules, he has only postponed the test. Once he says plainly that temperance is doing good things, Socrates can ask whether a doctor who benefits a patient without knowing it has acted temperately. The real example is back on the table, and it has a sharper edge than a quarrel over verbs.

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What most clearly distinguishes Aristotle’s account from Critias’ use of the making–doing distinction?

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