Philosophy
Knowing Yourself the Hard Way
Critias starts with a familiar demand to know yourself and ends up with a kind of knowledge that knows itself. The doctor’s example helps Socrates test what this unusual capacity could tell anyone.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesA person can have speed and be fast. Critias thinks a person with self-knowing knowledge becomes self-knowing too, but the leap raises a question about whose self is being known.
Orientation
At a Glance
- What possession confersCritias says someone who has speed is fast and someone who has self-knowing knowledge knows himself. The analogy makes it worth asking which properties are being passed to the person.
- Which self is known?The Delphic command addresses a person. Critias’ account gives a kind of knowledge itself as an object, and the shared reflexive grammar makes the difference easy to miss.
- What the doctor can tell youKnowing that someone has a kind of knowledge falls short of assessing what that person knows. Socrates asks how one could judge a doctor’s claims without knowing what medicine is about.
- Aristotle’s parallel has limitsAristotle imagines divine thought thinking itself. The comparison brings out how unusual Critias’ proposal is, even though his capacity would also have to survey other kinds of knowledge and their absence.
Charmides 164d–165b, 166a–c, 166e–167b, 167e–168a, 168e–169a, 169a–d, 169e–170b, 170b–e, 170e–171c · Apology 21d · Aristotle, Metaphysics Λ.9, 1074b15–35
Critias’ definition starts with something everyone recognizes and ends with something almost no one has met. Temperance, he says, is knowing oneself, and the Delphic maxim gives that answer a familiar ring. It sounds like the sort of achievement a wise grandparent might help you toward. But when Socrates presses him, Critias explains that temperance is the one knowledge that is “knowledge both of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge.” A few pages later he says a person with “knowledge which knows itself” will thereby know himself.
The argument for that last step is neat on its own terms. Critias says a person becomes like what he has. Someone with speed is fast, someone with beauty is beautiful, and someone with knowledge knows. Then someone with a knowledge that knows itself ought to know himself. Socrates says, “That isn’t what I’m disputing,” and asks why it would let a person know what he knows and what he doesn’t. Letting the first move pass keeps the inquiry going. It’s still worth slowing down to see what the analogy asks us to accept.
In the Delphic maxim the self being known is a person, with a character and a history. In Critias’ explanation the self being known is a kind of knowledge, a capacity that somehow takes itself as its object. The two sentences sound much alike because both use a reflexive. In the Greek, the form that points back to the person and the form that points back to the knowledge are grammatically distinct. The speed example shows how a quality can describe its possessor. The self-knowledge example asks us to go a step further, from a relation a capacity has to itself to a relation a person has to himself.
On the face of it, you can learn plenty about yourself without knowing anything about a special capacity. You can discover that you’re impatient, that you take on more than you can finish, or that you can be trusted with money and tend to repeat secrets. You get there by watching what you do, listening to people who know you and noticing what happens over and over. A friend who has watched you for twenty years may be able to say something about you that you’ll recognize as soon as you hear it.
There’s a better case for Critias, though. The kind of self-knowledge that matters in the Apology is knowing the limits of what you know. Socrates says he doesn’t think he knows what he doesn’t know. If you want to tell a sound judgment from a guess you’re attached to, it can help to turn your attention back on the way you reached it. That’s a genuine kind of reflection. Critias might have spotted something important in making it part of what it means to know oneself.
Even granting that, the knowledge Critias describes is very unusual. The two men agree to consider a knowledge that has no ordinary subject of learning. It would survey itself, the other kinds of knowledge and the lack of knowledge. Socrates asks how much it could tell you about a doctor. Perhaps it would let you see that the person knows something. To tell whether a claim about what’s healthy is right, you still need some command of medicine. A capacity that can spot knowledge without knowing any subjects is like an accountant who can tell a company keeps books without being able to read a single figure.
Aristotle gives the reflexive idea a striking setting in the Metaphysics. In his discussion of divine thought he says it thinks itself and describes its thinking as a thinking of thinking. It sounds close to knowledge of knowledge. The resemblance helps you feel how far Critias has gone from the ordinary example. Aristotle is trying to understand the best and unchanging activity of divine thought. Critias wants a capacity that will also tell a person something about other kinds of knowledge and their absence. The teenager in a wrestling school still has to work out what sort of person he is.
My verdict is that learning where your knowledge runs out can be part of knowing yourself. It has something to do with whether you know enough medicine to judge a doctor and whether you know the grounds for a belief you hold. The dialogue leaves open whether knowledge can take itself as its object at all. Socrates says it would take “a great man” to settle such questions adequately. Even if someone did settle them, there’d be work left to do on the person Critias started out trying to know.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What central gap does the author identify in Critias’ argument that possessing self-knowing knowledge means knowing oneself?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If recognizing the limits of your knowledge is only one part of knowing yourself, what other parts seem necessary, and why?→
- When, if ever, can you responsibly judge whether someone is knowledgeable without understanding the subject they claim to know?→
- Does Critias’ analogy between possessing a quality and becoming like that quality justify his conclusion about self-knowledge, or does it conceal a change in what “self” means?→