Philosophy

Knowing Yourself and Ruling Yourself

Critias says temperance is a kind of self-knowledge. The Republic asks how one person can be both ruler and ruled, and answers by looking at the parts of the soul.

Both dialogues ask how a person can stand in a relation to himself. Their answers emphasize different things about what it takes to be temperate.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • Critias starts with knowledgeCritias connects knowing oneself to temperance. His proposal develops into a kind of knowledge that would know itself and recognize other knowledge.
  • Socrates tests what can turn on itselfA thing greater than itself would also be smaller than itself. Examples like this lead Socrates to ask which powers can take themselves as their objects.
  • The Republic divides the workA better part can rule other parts of the same person. The dialogue makes temperance the agreement that this part should rule.
  • The questions fit togetherAgreement helps explain how self-rule works. The Charmides adds a further question about how much people understand about the way they are governed.

The two accounts could hardly look more different, since in the Charmides Critias’ most developed definition makes temperance a kind of knowledge, a knowledge of itself and of other knowledges, which would let the temperate man know what he knows and what he doesn’t. In the Republic, temperance is a kind of order, a mastery of certain pleasures and appetites, and in a city it is an agreement between rulers and ruled about who should rule, spreading through the whole community like a harmony that makes the weakest, the strongest and those in between sing the same song together. One looks like a theory of the mind and the other like a theory of a community, and yet both are offered as accounts of the same Greek word.

What makes the comparison interesting is that both accounts start from the same kind of puzzle, a puzzle about a thing relating to itself. In the Charmides the puzzle is epistemic, since Socrates asks whether a knowledge could be knowledge of itself, and he runs through cases, seeing that sees itself, hearing that hears itself, a greater that is greater than itself, until he concludes that it would take a great man to decide whether anything can have its own power in relation to itself. The puzzle is never resolved, and the dialogue moves on to the question of benefit. Critias’ move from knowing oneself to a knowledge of knowledge generates the puzzle, since knowing oneself sounded harmless until it became knowledge knowing itself.

In the Republic the puzzle is about rule, since people call the temperate man “master of himself,” as Socrates notes, and that phrase is absurd on its face, because the master of himself would also be subject to himself, the stronger and the weaker the same person. His solution is to divide the soul into parts. There is a better part and a worse part in each of us, and being master of oneself means that the better part rules the worse, so the self-relation that looked impossible turns out to be a relation between two parts of one person. It’s an elegant solution, and Socrates offers it without any of the hesitation he showed in the Charmides.

The Republic offers a way around a similar puzzle. Its account makes mastery a relation between distinct parts of one person, and temperance an agreement about which part should rule. The city offers another example. Rulers and ruled can agree on who ought to lead even though they have different jobs. The comparison helps explain how we can speak of governing ourselves without asking one undivided thing to be both ruler and ruled in the same respect.

What can the Republic’s account explain that the Charmides’ account leaves difficult? First, it explains the role of desire, which figures less directly in Critias’ account, since temperance in the Republic is centrally about the appetites and who controls them. Second, it explains why temperance belongs to everyone in a city and not just to an elite, since it is an agreement shared by rulers and ruled alike. And third, it explains self-mastery without needing anything to know itself, which is exactly where the Charmides got stuck.

The Charmides keeps another question open. Critias starts with the Delphic command to know oneself. That suggests we should ask how well a person understands the arrangement that governs him. The agreement described in the Republic might grow out of good training, and it is still worth asking what the person who has been trained can explain for himself.

Read together, the dialogues give the two questions room. The Republic can describe what happens when desire and judgment pull in different directions and then come into agreement. The Charmides asks what a person can actually know about his own judgment. A person whose judgment keeps desire in order may still have to ask what makes that judgment worth trusting.

The Republic gives self-mastery a shape we can recognize, with parts that have different roles and agree on which should lead. The Charmides makes us ask what a person in that condition understands about himself. That question matters whenever we want to know whether an orderly life is also one its owner knows how to direct.

Test your understanding

123

Question 1 of 3

Why does the phrase “master of himself” initially create a puzzle in the Republic?

Choose one answer

Guided Inquiry

Questions for Socrates

Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.