Philosophy

Good for Whom?

The patient gets well. What the doctor gets is a different question.

Socrates says a cure benefits both the doctor and the patient. Put a bill between them, and Critias’ definition of temperance has to answer a question it could previously leave open.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • Two benefits in one cureSocrates and Critias agree that a cure can benefit both the doctor and the patient. The example leaves open what the doctor gains.
  • A fee and a recoveryIn the Republic, Socrates treats the fee as the product of earning wages and the recovery as the proper aim of medicine.
  • Care without payThe Hippocratic Precepts advises physicians to consider what a patient can afford and sometimes to give their services for free.
  • Whose good mattersA patient’s welfare and a doctor’s financial gain can come apart. The essay asks what Critias’ definition can tell a doctor in that situation.

Charmides 163c–164a, 164a–d · Republic 341c–342e, 345e–346e · Hippocratic Epidemics 1.11 · Hippocratic Precepts 6

Socrates’ example looks innocent enough, the kind of thing anyone would agree to without a second thought. He asks whether a doctor who makes someone healthy produces something “beneficial both for himself and for the patient he is treating.” Critias agrees. A few lines later, Socrates asks whether each craftsman must know “when he is going to profit from the work he is doing, and when he is not.” Profit here can mean any benefit that comes back to the worker, and it needn’t mean money. But there’s already a change in the question. The first takes in both people. The second puts the craftsman’s own gain in view.

Critias has just defined temperance as the doing of good things. He reads Hesiod as saying that fine and beneficial work is properly one’s own, while harmful work is alien to oneself. That raises the question of whose good is meant, since an action can be good for the person doing it, good for the person it’s done to, or both. In Socrates’ example the two line up, with the healing good for the patient and good for the doctor too. The moment they diverge, the definition needs a way to say which benefit matters.

They can diverge in medicine, as anyone who has been on either side of a medical bill knows. A doctor could earn a fee for a test that gives the patient nothing useful, or spend time helping someone who can’t afford to pay. One of the Hippocratic handbooks advises physicians sometimes to treat for nothing and urges them to help a stranger in financial straits. The older maxim in the Epidemics tells the doctor to help the patient, or at least to avoid doing harm. A doctor who looks after patients no one else will see can do good even when it costs him something.

Plato saw the split clearly in the Republic, in an argument where everything turns on it. When Thrasymachus argues that rulers look after their own advantage, Socrates replies that the practice of medicine looks after the patient’s advantage, and that the doctor’s pay comes from a separate skill, the art of earning wages, which goes along with medicine. On that analysis the doctor benefits the patient by practicing medicine and benefits himself by charging a fee. Two activities that often travel together can produce two different goods.

That makes Socrates’ example in the Charmides look loose in an interesting way. His question about what a craftsman gains could make it sound as though the doctor’s own return is part of what makes the action good. If that’s what makes an action temperate, a doctor could earn the title by profiting from a useless treatment. But Critias’ talk of one’s own leaves room for another reading. Healing a patient can be a doctor’s own business even if the patient is the one who benefits. The definition has yet to say what makes the work good when the interests of the two people pull apart.

The later question about profit sharpens this in another way. Socrates asks whether craftsmen know when they’ll gain from their work, and Critias concedes that they may not. You could imagine a builder who can’t be sure his house will sell, or a doctor who doesn’t know whether his patient will pay. If that kind of benefit is the measure of the act, then whether it’s good depends on how things turn out for the person doing it, which makes his temperance hostage to the market and the weather. Two doctors who do exactly the same thing for their patients could differ in temperance depending on which of them got paid.

The example becomes clearer if we ask what the work itself is for. Healing is good because health is good for the patient, and the doctor does well, in the sense that matters for virtue, when he acts with that end in view, whatever it does for his income. That’s close to what Socrates says in the Republic. A fee might make it possible for a doctor to go on seeing patients. The work still has to be judged by what it does for them.

My verdict is that Socrates’ “both” quietly exposes the weakness of defining temperance as doing good things without saying good for whom. Critias could make something of the idea that caring for a patient is properly the doctor’s work. He’d still need to explain why the patient’s good should guide the doctor when there’s more money in doing something else. Instead he leaps to self-knowledge. The question this example raises, whose good a virtue aims at, follows him there and never quite goes away.

Test your understanding

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Question 1 of 3

What unresolved problem does the author find in Critias’ definition of temperance as “doing good things”?

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