Philosophy

From Doing Good to Knowing Good

Critias first says temperance consists in doing good things. A doctor who helps a patient without knowing it shows why the dialogue comes back to the good in a different way.

Between the doing of good things and the knowledge of good and bad, Socrates asks what it takes to understand the benefit of an action.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The first definition is about actionCritias calls temperance the doing of good things. Socrates asks whether that includes a doctor whose treatment helps without the doctor realizing it.
  • Critias wants awarenessCritias won’t accept that someone could be temperate without knowing himself. That objection turns the inquiry toward self-knowledge.
  • Knowing that and knowing whyKnowing that a person has a skill leaves open what the skill does for the person affected. Socrates eventually asks about the knowledge that could explain the benefit.
  • Good and bad return with a different roleCritias’ final answer names knowledge of good and bad as the kind of knowledge that matters for happiness. The essay reads it alongside his earlier definition without equating the two.

Charmides 163d–164a, 164a–d, 166d–167a, 171c–d, 174b–d · James Lind, A Treatise of the Scurvy pp. 191–196 · Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.4 (1105a–b)

At 163e, after Socrates cleared away his distinctions between making and doing, Critias gave his plainest definition yet, that “temperance is the doing of good things.” Eleven Stephanus pages later, pressed to name the knowledge that makes a person happy, he answers that it’s the knowledge by which he knows good and bad. The two answers are so close in wording that a careless reader might think the dialogue has gone in a circle, and in a way it has. But a circle that brings you back to the same place with something new in hand is a different thing from going nowhere, and the question is what the trip added. Critias doesn’t remark on the echo. A reader can hear the old question in his new answer.

The first answer failed at a very specific point. Socrates asked whether a doctor who makes someone healthy does something beneficial, and when Critias agreed, Socrates asked, “Now must a doctor also know when his treatment is beneficial and when it is not?” and Critias answered, “Perhaps not.” The consequence was that a doctor might act beneficially, and so temperately by Critias’ definition, while not knowing how he had acted, which would make him temperate without knowing it, and Critias found that unbearable.

His reaction is the turning point of the whole dialogue. Critias said he would “sooner take back some of it, and not be ashamed to say I had spoken wrongly, than ever concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate,” and he moved to the definition by self-knowledge. What he rejected was the idea that a good result, arrived at without understanding, could count as virtue. That instinct was right, even if the definitions he tried next didn’t satisfy it, since a temperance you could have by accident, without any grasp of what you were doing, would be more like luck than character.

The middle definitions try to supply the understanding Critias wanted. Knowing oneself comes to mean knowing what one knows and doesn’t know. It becomes a knowledge of knowledge, but that kind of awareness won’t by itself tell a person who has the skill to treat a patient. The doctor in the first argument needed to know whether the treatment helped. The middle of the dialogue gives him a mirror when he needs a window.

The final answer puts benefit back in view. A doctor can know that a treatment restores health. The later argument asks what would make this particular recovery good for the patient. That’s the sort of question for which the speakers propose knowledge of good and bad. The discussion has moved from getting a good result to asking what makes the result beneficial in someone’s life.

James Lind’s eighteenth-century comparison of treatments for scurvy illustrates one part of the distinction. He reported that sailors who received oranges and lemons improved markedly. That observation was useful before anyone understood vitamin C. Finding a treatment that works and discovering why it works are two achievements. In the dialogue, Socrates goes on to ask a further question about how a successful treatment fits into a good life.

A person can do something good by habit, imitation, or luck. Understanding the good involved can help when the case changes and the usual action stops helping. Aristotle makes a related distinction. To act virtuously, a person needs to know what she is doing, choose the action for its own sake, and act from a settled character. A lucky result can leave all three questions open.

My verdict is that Critias’ last answer brings the good back into the argument with a new question attached. The doctor’s success had made the first definition look too easy. The speakers can now distinguish getting a favorable result from understanding what makes it a benefit. They still have to ask whether that understanding belongs to temperance and how anyone could learn it.

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Why does Critias reject his first definition of temperance as “the doing of good things”?

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