Philosophy
Does It Matter Who Said It?
Critias is sitting beside Charmides when Socrates asks where the definition came from.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesCharmides asks Socrates to set the speaker’s reputation aside. When the borrowed definition proves hard to explain, he still needs someone to speak for it.
Orientation
At a Glance
- A borrowed definitionCharmides says he heard someone define temperance as doing one’s own business. Socrates suspects Critias, who denies that the saying came from him.
- What matters is whether it’s trueCharmides asks what difference the source makes, and Socrates agrees that they should examine the claim. In the Phaedrus, Socrates makes the same point with an oak and a rock.
- The saying still needs an answerCharmides can’t explain what the definition means and suggests its author may not know either. Looking at a claim on its merits still leaves someone with the job of making it clear.
- A judgment in his own wordsAt the end, Charmides says he doesn’t know whether he’s temperate and asks for the charm to continue. He says what he thinks, even as he agrees to follow his guardian’s instructions.
The exchange takes only a few turns, and it’s one of the liveliest in the dialogue. Charmides offers his third definition, that temperance is doing one’s own business, as “something I once heard someone say,” and Socrates pounces with “You rascal! You’ve heard that from Critias here, or from one of the other wise men.” Critias jumps in at once to deny it. “From someone else, apparently,” he says. “Certainly not from me.” Then the boy asks the question that turns the moment. “But what difference does it make, Socrates,” he says, “whom I heard it from?” It’s the sort of question a student asks when he’s been caught quoting someone, and it’s also, as it turns out, a very good question.
Socrates’ answer comes without hesitation. “None,” he says, because “what we have to look into is not who said it, but whether what is said is true or not.” Then the boy hands Socrates his own compliment back, saying, “Now you are talking sense,” which is almost exactly what Socrates had said to him earlier when he described the trap of being asked whether he was temperate. The pupil has just graded the teacher, and the teacher has cheerfully accepted the grade, which tells you something about the kind of conversation this has become. The boy who’s been answering the questions now asks one of his own.
The principle the boy invokes is one Socrates champions elsewhere, and in strong terms. In the Phaedrus, Phaedrus teases him for making his story Egyptian. Socrates points to Dodona, where the first prophecies were said to come from an oak. He says people back then would hear out an oak or a rock, so long as it spoke truly. On that view, Charmides has put his finger on a rule Socrates also follows there, the idea that an argument stands or falls on its own merits, whether it comes from a famous wise man, a guardian or a talking tree. A résumé is little help when someone asks whether what you say is true.
So does the moment establish the boy’s intellectual independence? The case for yes is strong, and it deserves to be stated first. A young man has just asked a philosopher to set aside the authority behind an idea, and he’s done it in front of the very person whose authority is in question. That takes a certain nerve, and for a moment the boy steps out from behind his guardian and asks to have the saying judged on its merits. Plenty of adults never manage to say that out loud.
The case for no is just as easy to make, because look at what he does next. He goes along with Socrates’ questions but offers no explanation of what the saying means. He had already introduced it by telling Socrates, “So look into whether you think the man who said it was right,” which invites Socrates to test it. When it starts going badly, he says he doesn’t know what it means and suggests, with a sly laugh and a look at Critias, that perhaps its author didn’t either, which puts the likely source back in the middle of the discussion. The turn is clever, and it may also be a way of getting himself out of a tight spot.
There’s a reasonable reading in which the question is partly a shield. With Critias sitting beside him and denying that the idea is his, the boy’s question keeps the source anonymous and spares everyone an awkward moment, including himself. He can be right about judging a claim and still have good reasons to manage the room. Principles come in handy when a conversation gets awkward.
The dialogue also shows where the principle runs out. The source of an idea doesn’t matter to whether it’s true, but it matters a great deal to who is responsible for explaining it, and that’s exactly why Socrates soon turns to Critias and invites him to take the argument over. Truth and responsibility are different questions, and the next scene turns to the second. Critias agrees to take over, and Socrates asks him to say what the words mean. It’s a distinction worth keeping, since we can judge an argument without caring who made it while still asking whoever defends it to explain it.
My verdict is that the moment establishes the right to intellectual independence without yet showing the practice of it. Charmides states the principle perfectly and Socrates endorses it, but the boy still treats the idea as something to hand back to its owner rather than something to examine himself. A different sort of independence comes into view at the end. Charmides says plainly that he doesn’t know whether he has temperance and asks for the charm to continue. He also agrees to follow his guardian’s instructions, so the question of how far he’s thinking for himself stays open. Independence, it turns out, is less about rejecting your sources than about being willing to stand behind what you say.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What limit does the article identify in the principle that a claim should be judged independently of its source?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If the truth of a claim does not depend on who said it, under what circumstances—if any—should a speaker’s identity still affect how we evaluate the claim?→
- What would Charmides have needed to do differently to turn his statement of intellectual independence into the practice of intellectual independence?→
- Can a principle remain intellectually sincere when it also helps someone escape embarrassment or manage a tense conversation? Why or why not?→