Philosophy
Demoted, Not Fired
In Plato’s chariot, even the well-bred horse needs a driver.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesSocrates rejects modesty as a definition of temperance. The argument leaves room for modesty to help us, if we can tell when to follow it.
Orientation
At a Glance
- A limit on modestySocrates argues that modesty can be good in some situations and harmful in others, so it falls short of the account of temperance he is testing.
- The hungry manHomer’s line gives Socrates a case where holding back can prevent a person in need from asking for food.
- Modesty in civic lifeIn Protagoras’ myth, Zeus gives humans modesty and justice so they can live together in cities.
- The good horseIn the Phaedrus, modesty restrains one horse in the soul’s team, while the charioteer holds the reins.
Charmides 158c–e, 160e–161b, 174b–d, 174d–175b · Odyssey 17.347 · Euthydemus 279b–c, 281b–e · Protagoras 322c–d · Phaedrus 253d–254c, 254c–255a
It pays to look carefully at what Socrates actually concludes, because the wording is more cautious than it first sounds. After Homer’s hungry man has done his work, Socrates says, “Then temperance would not be modesty, if the one is in fact good, while modesty is no more good than bad.” Just before that, he says modesty “is both not good and good.” The argument grants that modesty can be good, and Homer gives it a case where holding back can hurt. What the argument shows is that modesty isn’t reliably good, which disqualifies it from being temperance, since temperance has to be good every time, but that leaves a lot of room for modesty to be good some of the time.
So there are two claims here that are easy to blur together. The weak claim is that modesty sometimes does harm and therefore can’t be the virtue itself, and the strong claim is that modesty has no ethical value at all. The argument establishes the weak claim. The strong claim would be pretty absurd if you thought about it for a minute, since it would mean that a person who blushes at the thought of humiliating a waiter, or who holds back from boasting at a funeral, has nothing worth having. Socrates needs only the weak claim to reject the definition.
There is a tougher reading, though, and it deserves its due. Modesty could be like a knife that can cut bread or cut a throat. Its value would depend on the hand that uses it. Socrates says something close to this in the Euthydemus, where he and Cleinias consider supposed goods such as wealth, health, beauty, courage and temperance. In that argument these things can do more harm in the service of ignorance or more good under the guidance of wisdom, which is the one good they end up singling out. On that reading modesty is demoted all the way down to raw material.
Even that tough reading leaves modesty with a job, though, because raw material guided by wisdom does real good, and Plato’s other dialogues give modesty an honored role. In the Protagoras, Protagoras tells a myth in which Zeus, seeing that humans can’t live together without destroying each other, sends Hermes to give all of them modesty and justice, and decrees that anyone who can’t share in these two should be put to death as a disease of the city. In Protagoras’ telling, modesty is part of the respect and restraint that let strangers share a city without tearing each other apart.
The picture that answers the question best comes from the Phaedrus. There Socrates describes the soul as a charioteer driving two horses, a good one and a bad one, and the good horse is a lover of honor joined with temperance and modesty, a horse that needs no whip and is guided by the driver’s word alone. When the lover catches sight of the beautiful beloved, the bad horse lunges forward, while the good horse, held back by modesty, refuses to jump, and the charioteer remembers beauty and pulls both horses back. The good horse yields willingly, and the other takes repeated efforts to master. Modesty there is a superb horse, but it’s still a horse, and it’s at its best when it answers to the driver.
That image fits Homer’s hungry man perfectly, and it shows why modesty’s value depends on who is driving. In the hungry man’s case, good judgment would help him get past the hesitation that keeps him from asking for food. In the chariot scene, the good horse’s hesitation helps keep the lover from rushing the boy. The feeling can be much the same, and what a person should do can be different. What Charmides tried to do was make the good horse the driver, and the refutation puts the horse back in harness.
Modesty can therefore have a place in an account of temperance, as part of something larger. A good life plausibly includes a well-trained sense of modesty, the kind that holds back from cruelty, boasting and shamelessness, and you can see the dialogue appreciating it in Charmides himself, whose refusal to brag about his own temperance is presented as a credit to him. What the good life can’t do is put modesty in charge, because modesty in charge keeps the beggar from his bread and the ignorant man from his teacher, and it has no way of telling those cases from the ones where it helps. Most parents would recognize the picture, since what they want for their kids isn’t shamelessness or crippling shyness but a sense of shame that serves good judgment instead of replacing it.
My verdict is that the argument demotes modesty without firing it. It strips modesty of the top job, the claim to be temperance itself, and leaves it a respectable post as a good horse under a driver who knows when to rein it in and when to let it go, which is the possibility the Phaedrus helps us picture. What kind of knowledge should hold the reins is one of the questions the rest of the Charmides goes on to ask.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What distinction is central to the article’s reading of Socrates’ refutation?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If modesty can produce either good or harmful results, what qualities must good judgment possess to decide when modesty should restrain us and when it should be overcome?→
- Does showing that modesty sometimes causes harm successfully prove that it cannot be temperance, or might a virtue sometimes lead to a harmful outcome? Why?→
- How does the charioteer metaphor change our understanding of virtue: should good character consist mainly of well-trained feelings, wise direction, or a combination of both?→