Philosophy

Can You Be Temperate by Accident?

A right guess, a skilled judgment, and a lucky break can look alike when things go well.

A guide who’s never been to Larissa can still get you there. Plato’s Meno helps explain what a traveler’s arrival and a patient’s recovery tell us about the people who brought them about.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • A definition under pressureCritias says that temperance consists in doing good things, then recoils when Socrates asks whether someone can do good without recognizing it.
  • A guide with the right ideaIn the Meno, a guide who correctly believes which road leads to Larissa can get a traveler there even if the guide has never been there himself.
  • Statues that run awaySocrates compares true opinions to Daedalus’s statues, which stay put only when tied down. Giving reasons makes an opinion more secure.
  • What the result tells usA patient’s recovery gives us reason to be grateful. To judge the doctor’s temperance, the essay asks how he chose and assessed the treatment.

Socrates tests the new definition with a simple case. A doctor who makes a patient healthy does something beneficial, and so does what he ought, and on Critias’ account the man who does what he ought is temperate. But must a doctor always know when his treatment is beneficial and when it isn’t, Socrates asks, and Critias answers, “Perhaps not.” So sometimes the doctor acts beneficially without knowing how he’s acted. By Critias’ own definition he is then temperate without knowing it, and that’s the conclusion Critias can’t stand.

Critias bails out as soon as Socrates puts the consequence plainly. He says he “would sooner take back some of it, and not be ashamed to say I had spoken wrongly, than ever concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate.” He jumps to a new definition on the spot, that temperance is knowing yourself. There’s something honest about that willingness to take back what he said. But he moves so quickly that the view he was defending barely gets a hearing, and before following him it’s worth asking whether a good result really could be enough.

There’s a serious case that it could, and it starts from how we actually hand out praise. We give a lot of weight to outcomes, to the surgeon whose patients survive, the investor whose fund grows, and the coach whose team wins. We don’t always ask whether they understood exactly why it worked. Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel brought the problem of moral luck into focus in a pair of essays in 1976. Nagel makes it vivid with a driver who has had too much to drink and whose car swerves onto the sidewalk. He counts as morally lucky if the sidewalk happens to be empty. If he had hit someone, we’d judge him far more harshly, though he was just as reckless either way. If outcomes shape our judgments that much, maybe a person who reliably produces good results deserves some credit even without knowing why things turn out well.

Plato himself takes this possibility seriously in the Meno. Socrates points out that a person with a true opinion about the road to Larissa will guide you there just as well as someone who knows the way. The traveler who arrives safely doesn’t care whether his guide could have drawn a map. A true opinion can guide a choice, which is different from a lucky result that nobody guided at all. Socrates even suggests that successful statesmen were like inspired prophets who say many true things without knowing what they’re saying. The possibility that virtue comes by a kind of divine gift is where the dialogue tentatively lands, pending an account of what virtue is.

But the Meno also says why knowledge is worth more. True opinions, Socrates says, are like the statues of Daedalus that were said to run away if you didn’t tie them down. They’re fine while they stay, but they don’t stay, and they become knowledge when they’re tied down by reasoning about why they’re true. That gives you something to fall back on when the situation changes. And it helps explain why the statesmen Socrates names could arrange for their sons to learn riding or wrestling but couldn’t pass on their own excellence.

That points to the distinction the case really turns on, between a fortunate outcome and a responsible way of acting. The doctor whose treatment helps has done the patient some good. He might also have had sound reasons for trying it, even if he can’t tell how much the treatment did. Temperance, whatever it is, is supposed to be a feature of the person, a settled way of governing himself. The result alone tells us very little about that. A student who guesses right on a multiple-choice test gets the points, but you’d want to see what he can explain before concluding he’s learned the material.

Even moral luck, looked at closely, supports this distinction. We judge the reckless driver who hits someone more harshly, but nobody calls the driver who happens to make it home a model of road safety. The harm he causes matters to how we judge the act. The way he drove tells us what to expect when he gets behind the wheel again.

My verdict is that a good result can make an action beneficial, but it can’t by itself make the person who did it temperate. The doctor deserves thanks, and he may deserve more if his judgment and care helped bring about the recovery. To call him temperate we’d want to know something about how he acts, including what he does when he can’t be sure. Critias’ leap to self-knowledge puts that question back inside the person, though the dialogue will soon show that saying temperance is knowledge is much easier than saying what that knowledge is of.

Test your understanding

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Why does Socrates’ doctor example create a problem for Critias’ initial account of temperance?

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