Philosophy
Can Temperance Claim to Be the Exception?
Critias says the ordinary rules of knowledge can’t settle what temperance is.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesSocrates tests an unfamiliar kind of knowledge against familiar examples. The Phaedrus shows what it would take to make a case for an exception.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Critias’s exceptionCritias says temperance is the only kind of knowledge with both itself and other kinds of knowledge as its objects.
- What examples can establishOrdinary crafts give Socrates ways to test Critias’s claim, and Socrates leaves its possibility open.
- Two questions to answerSocrates asks whether such a knowledge can exist and whether it would benefit anyone who had it.
- A case in the PhaedrusSocrates gives a reason why motion needs a source that moves itself and then identifies self-motion with the nature of soul.
Critias’s defense of his definition is that Socrates is asking the wrong question. Calculation has the odd and the even as its objects. If temperance is a kind of knowledge, what is its object? “There it is, Socrates,” Critias replies. Socrates has found the point where temperance differs from other kinds of knowledge, and he’s still looking for a likeness. Critias goes on to accuse him of trying to refute him and losing sight of the argument.
It’s worth taking that reply as a real proposal. Critias is saying that temperance alone knows both itself and other kinds of knowledge. Medicine and calculation are about things other than themselves. An argument that takes it for granted that temperance must work that way would assume the very point at issue. The difference is what Critias is asking Socrates to consider, and for the moment it’s a fair request.
Seeing any number of white swans can tell you what swans usually look like where you live. It leaves room for a black one somewhere else. The same limit applies to familiar examples of knowledge. Socrates does more than list them. He asks what happens when a power is turned on itself, and some cases look impossible to him. But he says the more general question would take “a great man” to settle, and he can’t say with confidence where knowledge belongs.
The difficulty goes both ways. Saying there could be a black swan won’t tell you whether there is one. It just leaves you somewhere to look. A claim that things are different in this case is strongest when it tells us what to look for and why we might expect to find it. Critias has bought himself room to argue that temperance is exceptional. He still needs an argument for the exception.
What would count in Critias’s favor? He could give a reason to believe knowledge can take itself as its object. He could tell us how that would work, or show what someone who had it could do. He does make a start on the last question. The temperate person, on his account, can see what they and other people know. Later he suggests that temperance could benefit us by overseeing knowledge of good and bad. Socrates tests those claims separately from the question of whether the proposed kind of knowledge is even possible.
In the Phaedrus, Socrates makes a case for a different kind of exception. He says that what moves itself can keep moving without a source of motion outside it. He then argues that motion needs a source that didn’t get its movement from somewhere else, and identifies this power of self-motion with the nature of soul. You can disagree with his reasoning and still see what it contributes. He gives the exceptional case a job and tells us why he thinks nothing else can do it.
There’s a moment when it becomes clear how much Critias has taken on. Socrates says he can’t settle which powers can turn on themselves. As he tells the story, Critias catches his perplexity like a yawn. He’s “used to being admired on every occasion,” Socrates says, and gives an unclear answer in front of the company. That’s Socrates’s impression of him. It’s also a moment when Critias can’t supply the explanation that would make his claim stand on its own.
My verdict is that Critias is right to ask whether temperance might be an exception. Ordinary crafts give Socrates a good way to test what it would mean, and the dialogue leaves open whether there could be a knowledge that knows itself. Critias’s defense tells us why he wants temperance to be different. The account of soul in the Phaedrus shows what his defense still needs, a reason to believe the exception exists and can do the work he asks of it.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the author initially regard Critias’s objection to Socrates as fair?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- When is it reasonable to infer a general rule from familiar examples, and what would justify treating one case as an exception?→
- If temperance could know both itself and other kinds of knowledge, what observable abilities or limitations should a temperate person display?→
- Does assigning an exceptional power a necessary function make its existence more credible, or does it merely shift the burden of proof?→