Philosophy

Can Hearing Decide a Question About Knowing?

Socrates imagines a kind of hearing that can hear hearing but never a sound. The comparison makes Critias’ proposal look strange and leaves open what the mind can do that an ear can’t.

An ear and an eye make a good test of what a capacity is for. Descartes and the Theaetetus help show where the test may stop working.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • An ear without soundSocrates asks Critias to imagine a hearing that hears itself and other hearings while hearing no sound. Critias rejects the example.
  • What a power is forHearing is ordinarily directed at sound, just as sight is directed at color. The Republic helps explain why a power’s usual object matters when we ask what kind of power it is.
  • Where the analogy is testedThe Theaetetus distinguishes what we take in through the senses from what the soul considers directly. That gives a defender of Critias room to ask whether knowledge and hearing have the same limits.
  • The question stays openSocrates finds some self-relations impossible and others doubtful. He grants the possibility of knowledge of knowledge for the time being, so that he can ask what it would do for us.

Charmides 167c–e, 167e–168b, 168d–169a, 169a–d · Republic 477c–d · Theaetetus 184b–d, 185c–e, 185e–186a · Descartes, Meditations Second Meditation

After asking about a sight that sees no color, Socrates asks about “a hearing which hears no sound, but hears itself and the other hearings, and the non-hearings.” Critias says there’s no such thing. A little later Socrates says that “if hearing is to hear itself, it will hear itself as having a sound.” He’s testing a proposal about knowledge with an example that seems much easier to picture. It works as a test only if knowing is like hearing in the respect that matters.

There’s a respectable defense of the analogy. It rests on the idea of a proper object, the sort of thing a capacity is for. Hearing takes in sound, sight takes in color and medicine concerns health. The Republic makes a more general point when it distinguishes a power by what it is directed at and what it accomplishes. On that picture a capacity is like a key cut for a particular sort of lock. The puzzle is what a key would be for if it were cut only to fit itself and other keys.

The strength of the analogy is that the examples make the relation so easy to see. You can hear a bell ring, and you know what would be missing if an imagined power could never pick up anything like the sound of a bell. Knowledge, by comparison, is normally knowledge of some subject that can be learned. When the two men agree to consider a knowledge “of no subject of learning,” the hearing example gives the reader a way to feel what that proviso takes away.

The challenge is that thinking seems able to turn back on itself. A mirror can make your eye visible. It takes no mirror to notice that you’re wondering what to say next. Descartes makes a sharper point in his Second Meditation. Even if he is deceived about everything he is considering, he has to exist for the thought or deception to take place. It is an example of reflection giving him something he can know. It leaves open whether he needed a special power whose only objects are kinds of knowledge.

The Theaetetus draws a distinction that makes room for that objection. There Socrates and Theaetetus agree that we take in color through the eyes and sound through the ears. But they ask what bodily organ could tell us that two things differ, or that they both are. Theaetetus suggests that the soul considers such things directly, and Socrates agrees to pursue the distinction. The limits of any particular sense give us a poor reason by themselves to decide what the soul can do in considering the things all the senses have in common.

There is also a difference between the objects involved. It’s easy to see why a hearing would have to produce or be a sound in order for an ear to hear it. The relation between knowledge and what can be known seems less restrictive. A person can study what an expert knows and how she knows it. That gives us an intelligible sense in which knowledge can itself be a subject, and a reason to look carefully at what happens when Critias takes every other subject away.

Socrates leaves room for just this sort of objection. He treats some cases involving magnitudes and numbers as impossible. Hearing, sight, self-motion and heat, he says, may raise disbelief in some people and leave others untroubled. “It needs a great man, my friend, to determine this adequately for all cases.” Rather than claiming to be that man, he grants for now that there could be knowledge of knowledge. He can then ask how anyone who had it would be better off.

My verdict is that hearing can make Critias’ proposal look strange without settling it. If a capacity has familiar work to do, we have a right to ask how it could do that work after losing its usual objects. We still have to find out whether the mind’s way of knowing permits things an ear can’t do. Socrates has given Critias a harder question to answer, and he leaves the hardest part of it on the table.

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