Philosophy
Call It What You Like, but Say What It Is
Socrates tells Critias he can choose his own words. He asks for one thing in return. Say what the words apply to.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesCritias distinguishes making, doing, and working. Once Socrates asks him to state the claim plainly, the two can test it against the case of a doctor.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Critias sorts the wordsCritias distinguishes making, doing, and working so he can explain which activities count as temperance.
- Socrates sets one conditionSocrates lets Critias choose the terms and asks him to say what he applies them to. The two can then examine the same claim.
- Alice asks for an explanationHumpty Dumpty takes liberties with the word glory. Alice’s question makes him explain what he meant, which gives her something she can actually respond to.
- The doctor tests the definitionCritias says temperance is doing good things. Socrates asks whether a doctor can help a patient without knowing that he has helped, a case that puts pressure on Critias’ account.
Charmides 163a–c, 163c–164a, 164a–d · Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass chapter 6 · David Chalmers, Verbal Disputes §4, free will example
The rule comes right after Critias’ elaborate distinction between making, doing and working. Socrates says he has heard the sophist Prodicus “draw countless distinctions between words,” so he’s used to this kind of thing, and then he lays down his condition, telling Critias, “I allow you to assign each word as you please; only make clear what you are applying whatever word you use to.” He asks Critias to go back to the beginning and say plainly whether temperance is the doing or the making “or whatever you like to call it” of good things, and after a little sparring Critias, stripped of his vocabulary, gives his plainest definition yet, “temperance is the doing of good things.” It’s a small moment, easy to read past, but it’s one of the clearest statements anywhere in Plato of how a conversation about big ideas can stay honest when the people in it don’t share a vocabulary.
The rule separates two things that arguments often blur. One is freedom over vocabulary. Critias can choose whether to call the activity doing or making or working. The other is accountability for meaning. He needs to say what his words pick out, so that Socrates can tell whether they’re talking about the same action. Two people can defend different labels for a single thing. They can also use the very same label and never notice that they’re talking about different things.
Lewis Carroll turned that freedom into a joke. In Through the Looking-Glass, Humpty Dumpty uses the word glory and tells Alice he meant there was “a nice knock-down argument” for her. When she objects, he tells her that a word means just what he chooses it to mean and that the question is which is to be master. Later he says impenetrability and gives Alice an elaborate explanation when she asks. It turns out he means he’s had enough of the subject and would like her to say what she plans to do next.
Humpty Dumpty wants to be master of his words. Socrates wants to know what his partner in the argument is talking about. There’s still a family resemblance. Alice can answer once Humpty tells her what he meant, and until then his decree about who is master doesn’t help her much. He says he pays his words extra when he makes them work hard. If the words have put in overtime, the explanation is how Alice gets to see what they’ve been doing.
The philosopher David Chalmers calls one way of testing a verbal dispute the method of elimination. If people disagree about free will, he suggests setting that expression aside for a moment and asking what disagreement remains. They might still disagree about whether people can be held responsible for actions that were determined. Or they might agree about the cases they actually care about. Socrates lets Critias keep his vocabulary. His demand for a plain statement has a related advantage. The speakers can see what there is to argue about.
Once Critias says that temperance is doing good things, Socrates has a case ready to try. A doctor may treat a patient and do him good without knowing whether the treatment did good. On Critias’ account that would make the action temperate, yet Critias balks at calling someone temperate who doesn’t know himself. The two speakers have found a disagreement they can work with. Whether they call the treatment a doing or a making will do little to settle it.
The rule also shows that an argument doesn’t need an approved terminology to make progress. Socrates is willing to say “or whatever you like to call it” right in the middle of the question. He mentions Prodicus’ distinctions with a light touch, and lets Critias keep his distinctions too. The practical test is whether the words help both people follow the claim to the point where it can meet a case like the doctor.
My verdict is that Socrates gives his partner considerable freedom and asks for something he can put to the test. Critias can use his own words while making it clear what they apply to. Alice has to ask for the same courtesy before she can tell why she and Humpty disagree. The odd word is often where a good question begins, provided the person who uses it stays long enough to explain.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What two commitments does the article say Socrates’ rule holds together?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If speakers may define their own terms, what kind of clarification is sufficient to make a disagreement genuinely testable?→
- When might setting aside a disputed word reveal a real disagreement, and when might it remove something essential from the debate?→
- Does the doctor example show that Critias’ definition is mistaken, incomplete, or merely ambiguous? What further question would help decide among those possibilities?→