Philosophy

Ashamed of What?

Charmides says temperance makes you feel shame. The blush itself leaves three questions unanswered.

Being ashamed to cheat and being ashamed of your old sneakers can feel much the same. The difference is where Charmides’ definition runs into trouble.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • What the blush is aboutShame at the thought of cheating can feel like shame about old sneakers. Charmides’ account gives us no way to tell those cases apart.
  • Why we hold backAlcibiades says only Socrates makes him feel shame, and that the crowd’s approval wins him over when he leaves. His confession shows how much a person’s reasons can depend on whose opinion matters at the time.
  • When shame helpsHomer’s hungry man needs to overcome his reluctance to ask. The Athenian visitor in the Laws praises the fear of disgrace that can stop someone from saying or doing something shameful.
  • The work of judgmentA feeling can give you pause. To know whether to heed it, you still have to judge what you’re about to do and why you’re tempted to hold back.

Charmides 160d–e, 160e–161b, 164c–d, 164d–165b · Symposium 216a–c · Laws 646e–647b · Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.7 (1108a)

When Charmides looks within himself for temperance, he comes back with a description of what it does. Temperance, he says, “makes a person feel shame and makes him bashful,” so it’s the same thing as modesty. He identifies temperance by its effect on the person who has it, the way you might describe coffee by saying it makes you jittery. It’s a plausible report of how restraint feels to this boy. But the feeling leaves out three things, and each of them is where the moral action is.

The first thing missing is the object, because shame is always shame about something. You can be ashamed to steal or ashamed of your old sneakers, ashamed to lie or ashamed to be seen with a friend the popular kids don’t like. The feeling can seem identical in every case while its moral worth swings wildly. A kid ashamed of cheating and a kid ashamed of his parents’ beat-up car can blush the same shade of red. A definition that names the feeling without its object can’t tell those two kids apart.

The second thing missing is the reason, because the same flush can come from very different places. Someone can hold back from cruelty because it hurts another person, or because people are watching and cruelty would look bad. Those two people can behave identically right up to the moment the audience leaves. In the Symposium, Alcibiades admits that Socrates alone makes him feel shame. Socrates gets him to see that he neglects himself while managing the affairs of Athens. When he leaves, he says, the honor he gets from the crowd overcomes him. Most of us have known someone like that, the friend who’s a model citizen around his grandmother and a different person entirely by midnight.

The third thing missing is whether holding back was the right call in this case. Homer’s hungry man shows that sometimes it isn’t. Aristotle sets out a spectrum. At one end is the shameless person, who takes no account of shame. At the other is the bashful person, whose modesty takes alarm at everything. Aristotle praises the person whose feeling falls between those extremes, while giving modesty a different status from the virtues. It matters both what you’re ashamed of and how readily you feel it.

In the Laws, the Athenian visitor distinguishes fear of coming harm from the fear of getting a bad reputation for doing or saying something shameful. He calls this second fear modesty and says the lawgiver should hold it in the highest honor. The prospect of disgrace might make you stop before you tell a cruel joke or a lie. That fear already has an object. Charmides’ answer leaves it blank. And the example in the Laws still leaves us with a question about whose opinion you trust to tell you that the joke is cruel.

The omissions suggest a sharper account that keeps a place for shame. It would matter what you were ashamed of, why you felt it, and whether the feeling was strong enough to make you stop when stopping was right. That keeps something true in what the boy said. Shame can help you pause. To decide whether you should, you need a judgment about what you’re doing.

Shame can take on the standards of the people around you. Among decent people it may point you the right way, and among a corrupt crowd it can point you the wrong way with the same burning intensity. A boy who grows up in a house where the grown-ups admire ruthless cleverness may feel ashamed of being a sucker long before he feels ashamed of being cruel. Nothing about the heat of the feeling tells him that his targets are off. That’s why a definition built on the feeling alone can’t tell you whether the person who has it is temperate.

My verdict is that Charmides’ definition gives temperance an engine without a steering wheel. Shame can be a fine thing when it’s aimed at the right objects for the right reasons and in the right amount. It takes judgment to tell it where to point. That gives us a way to hear what comes later, when Critias proposes that temperance is knowing yourself. Charmides can already tell us what a blush feels like. The next question is what he needs to know to decide whether to listen to it.

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Why does the author consider Charmides’ account of temperance incomplete?

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