Philosophy
Agreeing Isn’t Finding
Socrates ends the inquiry by listing the claims he and Critias were willing to grant. His inventory shows how far an agreement can get ahead of the reasons for it.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesCritias begins with a report about Charmides’s reputation for temperance. The argument ends with two people who have agreed on a great deal and still can’t say what temperance is.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Socrates reads back the concessionsHe lists two claims they granted along the way, including the existence of knowledge of knowledge and its ability to know what other kinds of knowledge produce.
- The joke about the inquirySocrates pictures the inquiry repaying their generosity by showing that the proposed temperance is of no benefit.
- Charmides’s reputation comes firstCritias reports that Charmides is thought exceptionally temperate. Charmides explains why he would have trouble agreeing or disagreeing in front of the company.
- Where to look nextThe final inventory identifies claims that a new examination would have to support before it could rely on them.
Socrates sounds almost as though he’s reading out the minutes of a meeting. “And yet we have conceded many things that did not follow in the argument,” he says. He begins the list. They conceded that there was such a thing as knowledge of knowledge, then that it could tell its possessor the works of the other kinds of knowledge. He describes how freely they granted what they needed, “with the utmost magnificence.” The grandeur of the phrase is a little ridiculous here. They’ve been generous with things they were hardly in a position to give away.
The sentence that follows makes the inquiry itself sound like an ungrateful guest. Socrates says it found them simple-minded and easy to deal with, then showed the thing they’d agreed to call temperance to be of no benefit, “with the utmost insolence.” They gave their proposal every advantage they could think of, and it still failed to show the benefit they expected. The joke is in their relationship to their own inquiry. They can decide what it’s allowed to start from. What follows can still take them somewhere they didn’t want to go.
A pair of people can agree on the meaning of a word and get something useful done. If they’re using temperance for a kind of knowledge that knows itself and other kinds of knowledge, they have a specific account to investigate. The moment they ask whether that account picks out the good thing they’re looking for, their shared use of the word can only carry them so far. They need to see what the proposed kind of knowledge would enable someone to do. The conversation reaches a point where the name they agreed on begins to sound like the least important thing they’ve settled.
Irving Janis used the term groupthink for a danger in closely knit groups. The desire to keep agreement intact can get in the way of seriously weighing alternatives. He was trying to explain failures of government decision-making, where the pressures are different from those facing two people testing a definition. But his example gives us a way to notice what agreement can conceal. One person may take everyone else’s confidence as a reason to stop asking questions. Socrates makes some of his concessions out loud and later names them as such. That makes them easier to examine than a roomful of nods.
There’s a smaller version of the problem near the start of the dialogue. Critias tells Socrates that Charmides is thought to surpass other people his age in temperance. Socrates asks Charmides whether he agrees. Charmides blushes and explains why either answer would be awkward. To disagree is to make Critias and the people who share his opinion out to be liars. To agree is to praise himself. He may have a very good reason to hesitate before either answer, and that reason tells us little about whether he has the quality they’re discussing.
Socrates offers to look into it with him instead of making him give the room a verdict on his own character. For a time the two can ask what temperance might be, and why any answer fits. By the end, the question is even harder to settle than it was at the beginning. Critias’s report about the young man’s reputation can explain why they began with such high expectations. The difficulty of saying what temperance is makes it harder to know what anyone had seen in him that justified them.
That’s what makes the final inventory worth lingering over. Some agreements let the speakers investigate a possibility. Others reflect claims they think they can defend. Read back a conversation without asking how each agreement was reached and the two can sound much the same. Socrates’s list identifies two specific places where a later inquiry would need more support. It gives readers a clearer sense of what would have to be done next than a quick verdict on whether Critias won or lost ever could.
The dialogue puts two kinds of public speech side by side. Early on, it’s difficult for Charmides to say anything that will sit well with the people watching. At the end, Socrates can say plainly that he and Critias gave away more than their reasoning earned. It’s an odd kind of relief after all that agreement. They still have no account of temperance that they can stand behind, but at least they can name the points where assent was doing the work they wanted reasons to do.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the article consider Socrates’s final review of earlier concessions more useful than declaring a winner in the argument?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- When does provisional agreement help an inquiry move forward, and what signs indicate that it has begun to substitute for justification?→
- If social pressures can explain why someone agrees, disagrees, or remains silent, how should an inquirer evaluate that person’s response?→
- Why might identifying the unsupported steps in an unsuccessful argument be more valuable than deciding who won the exchange?→