Philosophy
A Love That Loves Nothing Beautiful
Desire, wish and love carry the argument beyond the senses. Socrates asks what becomes of each longing if it turns back on itself and leaves its usual object out.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesThe man who catches fire at a look imagines love without beauty. Augustine and Harry Frankfurt help separate the familiar experience of wanting to want from the puzzle Socrates poses.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The list changes directionSocrates moves from senses that perceive to desire, wish and love. Each new example brings along a question about what the longing is for.
- An empty love in a crowded roomThe dialogue opens with everyone attending to a beautiful boy and Socrates losing his composure. A love of nothing beautiful makes a pointed contrast with that scene.
- The pairing needs a defenseThe Republic carefully distinguishes thirst for drink from a wish for good or pleasant drink. That comparison makes it worth asking how much the examples assume about the objects of desire.
- Wanting to wantAugustine’s love of loving and Frankfurt’s unwilling addict give familiar forms of reflection on desire. Both examples leave room for ordinary things a person already longs for or might come to want.
Charmides 154b–c, 155c–d, 167d–e, 167e–168b · Gorgias 467b–d, 467d–468c · Symposium 199d–200b, 200e–201c, 206a–c, 206c–e · Republic 437d–e, 438e–439b · Augustine, Confessions 3.1 · Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person The unwilling addict, p. 12
The list changes direction halfway through. After sight and hearing, Socrates asks about “a desire which is desire for no pleasure, but for itself and for the other desires,” then about “a wish which wishes for no good, but wishes for itself and for the other wishes.” Next comes “a love of such a kind that it turns out to be love of nothing beautiful, but of itself and of the other loves.” Critias rejects all three. The argument has moved from things that perceive to things that strive.
The last of the three makes a pointed joke after the opening of the dialogue. Socrates has told us that nearly every boy of Charmides’ age looks beautiful to him. He has described himself catching fire at a glimpse inside the boy’s cloak. His picture of love stripped of anything beautiful could scarcely be further from the room we’ve just been in. If you want to see what’s missing from the example, think of what made it so hard for Socrates to keep his composure.
The examples pair each longing with an ordinary object. Desire has pleasure, wish has the good, and love has the beautiful. Other dialogues give those pairings work to do. In the Gorgias, a person drinks a painful remedy for the sake of health, the good he wants to get from it. In the Symposium, Socrates and Agathon agree that love is of something. Beauty enters their exchange, and Diotima later speaks of giving birth in beauty. The examples have some force because the longing points you toward what might satisfy it.
That gives the argument a wider reach. If the only examples were ears and eyes, Critias might say that knowledge belongs with powers that go out looking for something. Desire, wish and love all reach for something, and Socrates finds the same difficulty in imagining them with their usual objects removed. The list makes it harder to dismiss the first cases as quirks of the senses. It also gives us a reason to look more closely at what each example takes for granted.
The Republic is careful about those assumptions. Thirst considered by itself is for drink. If someone wants good or pleasant drink, there is more to say about what that person wants beyond what we learn by calling it thirst. In the Charmides, Socrates has already given desire pleasure as its object. A reader could question that pairing and still accept that desire is directed at something. The distinction matters because an analogy can tell us as much about its starting assumptions as about the claim it was brought in to test.
There are also familiar ways in which longings turn back on themselves. Harry Frankfurt asks us to imagine an unwilling addict, drawn to the drug and also wanting to refrain, who wants that latter desire to govern what he does. Augustine recalls coming to Carthage, loving the experience of loving while looking for someone to love. Both are recognizable forms of reflection on longing. You can also wish you didn’t crave dessert without having to invent a special faculty for the purpose.
The condition Socrates adds makes the puzzle narrower. Frankfurt’s unwilling addict is still drawn to a drug. Augustine’s love of loving still has a possible beloved in view. The person who wants to want to exercise has an activity in mind even if she doesn’t yet feel any desire to do it. Socrates asks about desire that takes itself and other desires as objects and rules out its ordinary object altogether. That is the feature he is looking for in Critias’ proposal about knowledge.
My verdict is that the new examples give Critias more to answer. Longings about longings are easy to imagine. The interesting question is what remains if the longing can never reach past itself and the other longings. Augustine was looking for somebody to love. Think of a love that, by its very definition, could never find anybody beautiful. It’s hard to see what it would be asking of the person who felt it.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does Socrates move from examples involving sight and hearing to examples involving desire, wish, and love?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If a love could take only itself and other loves as its objects, what could count as its fulfillment or failure?→
- How does the contrast between Socrates’ attraction to Charmides and his imagined love of nothing beautiful affect the force of the argument?→
- When testing an analogy, how should we distinguish what the analogy reveals about the target claim from what it merely assumes at the outset?→