Theages

Key Words of the Dialogue

These notes are for orientation, not reference: each explains a word the argument leans on, what it meant in the Athens of Socrates, and what the dialogue does with it. The Glossary at the back lists the renderings with the places where they matter.

Being with, come to be with (synousia, syneinai, syngignesthai)

Synousia, from syn, “with”, and einai, “to be”, is the ordinary Greek for company of every kind: a gathering, a conversation, the union of man and woman, and the time a pupil spends with a teacher, for which the sophists took fees. The dialogue turns on it. Its question is what a young man gains from being with a wise man, and Socrates gives it a line of verse, “Wise are tyrants by being with the wise” (125b); the son thinks fit that his father should find him “some man to be with” (122e); whichever statesman he chooses “will be with you for nothing” (127a); the sophists persuade the young “to leave their being with those men and to be with them” (128a); and the last pages describe “our being with one another” and the power that governs it (129e–130e). Synousia is “being with” and syneinai “be with” throughout (at 122e, where the noun cannot stand, “some man to be with”), so that the question can be heard each time it returns; the series’ Alcibiades I rendered the noun “company” (119a), and the verbs “keep company with” (118c). Syngignesthai, “come to be with” (122a, 126c, 127b, 128c, 130b), is the coming together that begins it; syndiatribein, “spend time with” (128b, 129e), is kept apart.

Wise, wisdom (sophos, sophia)

Sophia was skill of every kind before it was philosophy: the wisdom of a pilot, a charioteer, a poet or a statesman. Theages “desires … to become wise” (121c–d), and the argument asks which wisdom he means. Socrates first makes Theages agree that the wise are “those who have knowledge” (122e), then sets sophia beside the crafts, “the wisdom by which men pilot ships” (123b); the wisdom Theages wants is “the one by which we rule those in the city” (124a), the wisdom of tyrants (124e–125e), and then the wisdom of Themistocles and Pericles, who are “clever at the affairs of the city” (126a). The sophists “are so wise” that they persuade the young to leave their fellow citizens and pay them besides (128a). Sophia is “wisdom” and sophos “wise”, as in the series, so that the line “Wise are tyrants by being with the wise” holds the dialogue’s two key words.

Desire (epithymein, epithymia)

Epithymia is wanting of any kind, from appetite to ambition. The dialogue begins with a desire: “the desire that has now come upon him frightens me very much” (121c), and asks again and again what the boy desires. The answers move from “to become wise” (121d) to the wisdom “by which we rule those in the city” (124a), which Socrates calls “the wisdom by which you would rule all the citizens” (125e), and then, under pressure, to a prayer “to become a tyrant … and still more, perhaps, to become a god” (125e–126a), before Theages draws back: he would rule the citizens “not by force, at least, nor as the tyrants do, but over those who are willing” (126a). The word is “desire” throughout, verb and noun; “wish” is kept for boulesthai, and “be willing” for ethelein, the word of the father’s refusal (123a) and of Theages’ request to Socrates (127a); the “willing” subjects of 126a are hekontes, men who consent.

Rule, ruler, tyrant (archein, archē, archōn; tyrannos, tyrannein, tyrannikos)

Archein is both “begin” and “rule”, and archē both a beginning and an office of rule; in Athens the archai were the magistracies, held by lot or election for a year. The argument turns on ruling: pilots “rule ships”, charioteers “a team of horses”, doctors “the sick” (123d–e), and Theages wants the wisdom “by which we rule those in the city” (124a). The rulers Socrates names are kings, a usurper and tyrants, and the title of Hippias and Periander is “tyrants” (124e). Archein and archē are “rule” wherever they mean ruling (the middle, archesthai, is “begin”, 122d, 128d, 128e), even of the father’s magistracies, where he “ruled in many offices” (127e), so that the father is seen to have done what the son wants; tyrannos is “tyrant”, tyrannein “be a tyrant” (“to be our tyrant”, 124e), and tyrannikos “tyrannical” (124e, 125e). A tyrannos was a ruler who held power outside the laws, not necessarily a cruel one.

Knowledge, know how (epistēmē, epistēmōn, epistasthai)

Epistasthai is to know how to do something, or to know a thing well enough to act on it; epistēmē is that kind of knowledge, and epistēmōn one who has it. Theages agrees that the wise are “those who have knowledge” (122e), and each craft is a wisdom “by which we know how to rule” something (123d–124b). Socrates later says that he knows none of the “blessed and fine subjects” the sophists teach (128b). Epistēmē is “knowledge”, epistēmōn “one who has knowledge”, and epistasthai “know how” with an infinitive and “know” without one.

Advise, deliberate (symbouleuein, symbouleuesthai; bouleuesthai, boulē)

The father comes for advice, and Socrates makes the word work. Symbouleuein is to give advice and symbouleuesthai to take it; Socrates calls them “I, the one advising, and you, the one taking advice” (122c). Advice, Socrates says, “is indeed said to be a sacred thing” (122b), and there is “nothing more divine about which a man could deliberate than the education of himself and of his own kin”. Bouleuesthai is “deliberate” and boulē “counsel”: “shall we deliberate together” (125a), “this needs no trivial counsel” (125b), and Theages, at the end, “then at once we will deliberate about what we shall do” (131a).

Craft and craftsman (technē, dēmiourgos)

Technē is any skill that can be taught and has a product: piloting, medicine, carpentry, farming. Dēmiourgos, “one who works for the people”, is the craftsman. Socrates proceeds by the crafts, as he often does: each is a “wisdom” with a name and a field it rules (123b–124b), and the wisdom Theages wants rules “all the craftsmen” (124b). The comedy plays on the word: the father should have made his son “a craftsman of the wisdom he desires” (125a), and the man Theages is to be with is “a fellow craftsman of Callicrite” (homotechnos, one who shares her craft, 125e); and the painters are “the craftsmen of this very thing” (126e). Technē is “craft”, dēmiourgos “craftsman” and homotechnos “fellow craftsman”, as in the series.

Daimonic and divine (daimonion; theios, to theion)

A daimōn was a divine being or power, less than a named god; daimonion is its adjective, “of a daimon”, and as a noun “something daimonic”. Socrates’ own word for his sign was to daimonion, and his accusers charged him with believing not in the city’s gods but in “other new daimonic things” (Apology 24b–c). Here he calls it “something daimonic that has accompanied me by a divine lot” (128d), “the voice of the daimonic” (128e), “the customary sign, the daimonic one” (129b), and speaks of “this power of this daimonic thing” (129e). Daimonion is “daimonic” throughout and is kept apart from theios, “divine”, which stands beside it at 128d and which Theages uses at the end, “the divine itself that comes to you” (131a), after calling it “this daimonic thing” (131a). The series’ Alcibiades I rendered the same adjective “divine” (103a); this volume does not.

Sign, voice, power (sēmeion, phōnē, dynamis)

The sign is a voice that “comes” (gignesthai) and “signals” (sēmainein) a turning away (128d), and the stories show it at work: the voice came while Charmides was speaking (128e) and when Timarchus rose to go (129b). Sēmeion is “sign”, sēmainein “signal”, phōnē “voice”. Dynamis, “power”, is the power of the daimonic, which “has all power also over being with those who spend time with me” (129e); Socrates uses the same word when he asks Aristides whether “this power” left him suddenly (130c).

Benefit, make progress (ōphelein, ōphelia; epididonai)

Socrates allows that Demodocus thinks his son “would be benefited most of all” by him (127d), and Theages doubts that a statesman “would not benefit his own son at all” if he could benefit another (126d). Ōphelein is “benefit” and ōphelia “benefit” throughout, so that Socrates’ last advice, to go to those “who are themselves masters of the benefit with which they benefit men” (130e), recalls Theages’ doubt at 126d. Epididonai is to grow, to increase, and of persons to “make progress”; Socrates’ companions “make progress quickly, at once” (129e), and Aristides says, “I made progress whenever I was with you” (130d).

Statesmen and the affairs of the city (politikoi, ta politika)

Ta politika, the things of the polis, are “the affairs of the city”, and the men skilled in them, politikoi or politikoi andres, are “statesmen”. Themistocles, Pericles and Cimon “have become clever at the affairs of the city” (126a), and the statesmen “use on every occasion both their own city and many others” (126c), as those skilled in horsemanship use horses. Socrates’ own argument, that “the sons of these statesmen are no better than the sons of the shoemakers” (126d), is turned against him.

Fine and good; beautiful (kalos kagathos; kalos)

Kalos is “fine” of things and acts and “beautiful” of persons; kalos kagathos, “fine and good”, named the gentleman of Athens, of good family, means and education. Theages was educated as “the sons of fine and good fathers” are (122e), and Socrates offers to introduce him to whichever he wishes “of the Athenians who are fine and good in the affairs of the city” (127a), to which Theages replies, “Are you not one of the fine and good men too?” The name Theages is “a fine name” (122d); Charmides “has grown up beautiful” (128d–e); and Sannion is “the beautiful one” (129d), whom Ficino took for the son of a man called Calus.