

PLATO

THEAGES ΘΕΑΓΗΣ

The Greek text of John Burnet
Platonis Opera, tomus III (Oxford: Horace Hart, 1903;
second impression, corrected, 1909)
with a new English translation and notes

THE COMPLETE DIALOGUE

121a–131a

Translation by Diotimos Editions

2026

CONTENTS

Introduction	iv
Key Words of the Dialogue	x
The Text, 121a–131a	2
Outline	37
Editorial Note	41
Glossary of Key Terms	46
Note on this Edition	49

INTRODUCTION

THE DIALOGUE

The *Theages* is a conversation of three: Demodocus, an older Athenian of standing, his son Theages, and Socrates. Demodocus asks Socrates for a private word; at his suggestion they withdraw into the stoa of Zeus Eleutherios, on the west side of the Agora (121a). There is no narrator and no frame: the dialogue is spoken from beginning to end, and Burnet names the speakers at the head of each speech. Later Socrates tells three stories in which others speak, and the English sets their words in quotation marks, as Burnet does.

It is short, eleven pages of Stephanus' edition (121a–131a), seventeen of Burnet's. The ancient arrangement of Plato's works by Thrasyllus, which Diogenes Laertius preserves (3.59), puts it first in the fifth tetralogy, before the *Charmides*, the *Laches* and the *Lysis*, with the subtitle "or On Philosophy", and classes it as "maieutic", a dialogue that brings out what is in the respondent; Burnet's third volume opens with it. Whether Plato wrote it has been doubted since the early nineteenth century, when Schleiermacher, Plato's German translator, judged it not to be his, and many scholars since have placed it among the works of his followers; the ancient catalogue gave it to Plato, and this edition translates it as the tradition gives it, without taking a side.

The conversation can be dated only from inside. Archelaus is "this new ruler in Macedonia" (124d), and he came to the throne about 413 BC; the disaster in Sicily, which ended in 413, is past (129c–d); and Sannion has "gone now with Thrasyllus on campaign, straight for Ephesus and Ionia" (129d), an expedition that sailed at the beginning of summer, in 409 by the usual reckoning. Taken strictly, these words set the conversation in that summer, ten years before Socrates' trial.

THE QUESTION AND THE ANSWERS

Demodocus has a son who "desires, Socrates, so he says, to become wise" (121c–d). The desire "is not ignoble, but it is unsafe": some of the boy's own age and deme, his father thinks, unsettle him with

arguments they repeat from memory, and he thinks fit that his father should "pay money to one of the sophists, who will make him wise" (121d). The father has held out, but can hold out no longer, and has come for just this, to introduce him to one of "those who are thought to be sophists"; Socrates has appeared "at just the right time", the man whose advice he would most wish to take (122a).

Socrates turns the request into a question. Before they deliberate, they must agree what they are deliberating about; and before that, they must find out "what it is that he desires" (122c-d). So the question of the dialogue is put to the son: what is the wisdom he desires? Socrates' first examples, piloting, "the wisdom by which men pilot ships", and charioteering (123b-c), are wisdoms with names; the one Theages desires rules men, and it is not medicine, music, gymnastics, farming or carpentry (123d-124b). Theages answers, under questioning, that it is "the one by which we rule those in the city" (124a), and agrees when Socrates puts it more fully: the one by which we rule "all these, and the farmers themselves, and the carpenters, and all the craftsmen, and private persons, and women and men" (124b). Socrates runs through rulers who ruled these same people, Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus and Hippias, and asks what title Hippias and Periander have on account of that rule; Theages answers, "Tyrants, I think; what else?" (124c-e). Then the desire is a tyrant's: "You rascal! So it was in desiring to be our tyrant that you have long been blaming your father" (124e-125a).

THE ARGUMENT'S MAIN STRETCH

The middle of the dialogue asks who could teach such a wisdom. Socrates borrows a line he gives to Euripides, "Wise are tyrants by being with the wise", and asks what the wise must be wise in, on the pattern of farmers, cooks and wrestlers (125b-d); the answer, "the things that Anacreon said Callicrite knew", "tyrannical things", is a joke, and Theages takes it as one at his own expense (125d-e). Theages protests that he is being mocked. He would pray, he admits, to become a tyrant over all men if he could, and if not, over as many as possible, as would Socrates and all other men, and "still more, perhaps, to become a god"; but what he desires is to rule "not by force, at least, nor as the tyrants do, but over those who are willing, as the other men of repute in the city do", like Themistocles, Pericles and Cimon (125e-126a).

Then, Socrates says, he should go to the statesmen, as one who would become a clever horseman goes to those skilled in horse-

manship, and whichever he chooses will be with him for nothing (126b–127a). Theages has heard the argument Socrates is said to make against this: “the sons of these statesmen are no better than the sons of the shoemakers” (126d). He wants Socrates himself: “For if you were willing to be with me, that suffices, and I look for no one else” (127a); and Demodocus, ashamed even to say how much he wishes it, begs them both, Socrates to be willing to be with the boy and the boy to seek no one else (127b–d).

THE ENDING

Socrates answers that he wonders where either of them got the idea that he could benefit the boy more than his own father could (127d–e). The father is older, has “ruled in many offices”, and is honored; the famous sophists, Prodicus, Gorgias and Polus, are better choices; Socrates knows “nothing except a certain small subject, the things of love”, though at that subject he counts himself “clever at beyond anyone” (127e–128b). Theages knows young men who were worth nothing before they were with Socrates and “in a very short time ... appear better than all those they were worse than before” (128c). Socrates tells him what this is: “there is something daimonic that has accompanied me by a divine lot, beginning in my childhood. It is a voice, which, whenever it comes, always signals to me a turning away from whatever I am about to do, but never turns me towards anything” (128d). It turns his friends away too, and he gives instances of the sign at work: Charmides, who trained for the stadion at Nemea against it (128e); Timarchus, who went out to commit a murder against it and was put to death (129a–c); the expedition to Sicily (129c–d); and Sannion, gone with Thrasyllus to Ephesus (129d). The same power governs “being with those who spend time with me” (129e): “it opposes many”, some are with him and gain nothing, and some “make progress quickly, at once”, and of these, some keep it and some lose it, like Aristides son of Lysimachus, who made progress when he sat near Socrates and touched him, and lost it all when he went to sea (130a–e). “If it is dear to the god, you will make very great progress, and quickly; if not, not” (130e). Theages proposes that they make trial of the daimonic thing by being with one another, and, if it does not allow them, deliberate at once whether to be with someone else or to try “to soothe the divine itself that comes to you with prayers and sacrifices” (131a). Demodocus agrees, and Socrates gives way: “Well, if it seems we should do so, let us do so.”

WHAT IS MOST EXPOSED

A reader who knows the *Apology* will find Socrates' sign here doing more than it does there. In the *Apology* it is a voice that turns him away and never turns him towards anything (31c–d), as here (128d); but in the *Theages* it also turns away his friends, foretells what will happen to men on campaign, and decides which of his companions will profit from being with him. In Xenophon the sign does both: Socrates said that the daimonic thing signalled to him beforehand what he should do and what he should not (*Memorabilia* 4.8.1), and he told many of his companions to do some things and not to do others, as it signalled (1.1.4). In the *Theaetetus*, too, the daimonic thing that comes to Socrates prevents him from being with some of those who come back to him and allows others, and these make progress again (151a). The reader should keep these accounts apart, and not read this one into the *Apology*.

Socrates' teaching, as Aristides describes it, is not teaching. "I never learned anything from you, as you yourself know; but I made progress whenever I was with you", most of all "when I sat beside you, keeping hold of you and touching you" (130d–e). The story is comic, and Socrates neither explains it nor qualifies it; he draws from it only this: "Such, then, Theages, is our being with one another" (130e). On this reading, the question the dialogue raised at the start, what a young man gains from being with a wise man, is answered by a power that no one can teach or buy.

The dialogue is also exposed where it leans on others. The line of verse Socrates gives to Euripides is given to Euripides in the *Republic* too (568a–b), but Aulus Gellius found it in a play of Sophocles (*Attic Nights* 13.19.2); the song of Callicrite is known only from this passage (125d); and the persons of the stories at 129a–b are, for the most part, known from nothing else.

THE MANNER

The comedy begins with the father. Demodocus opens with the farmer's view of children: "the planting of this son here—whether one should name it planting or begetting—has proved the easiest thing of all, but his rearing has been troublesome" (121c). Socrates turns everything gravely: the boy's name is "befitting the sacred" (122d–e); advice "is indeed said to be a sacred thing" (122b); the would-be tyrant gets "You rascal!", and the father a mock reproach: "you have somewhere you could have sent him and so made him a craftsman of the wisdom he desires, and then

you begrudge it him" (125a). The line of Euripides is varied on farmers, cooks and wrestlers until it yields Callicrite (125b-e), and Theages, who has seen where it is going, says, "You have long been mocking me, Socrates, and joking with me" (125e). Socrates' refusal at 127e-128b is the familiar self-deprecation turned into a list of better teachers.

Aristides' confession is the dialogue's most comic page. He was once a match for anyone in argument; now "I flee if I so much as perceive that anyone is educated, so ashamed am I of my own poor quality". Did the power leave him suddenly? "Little by little" (130c). It came in degrees: some when he was only in the same house, more in the same room, much more when he looked at Socrates as he spoke, and most when he sat beside him and touched him; "But now," he said, "all that state has drained away" (130e).

ON READING THIS EDITION

Each left-hand page is a page of Burnet's Oxford text, line for line, with his apparatus at the foot; each right-hand page translates it, with the Stephanus section letters in the margin so that any passage can be found on both sides. The speakers are named at the head of each speech, as in Burnet. Words in square brackets [] are ones Burnet thought spurious; they are not translated. The words enclosed by the obeli † † at 129a are ones Burnet thought corrupt; they are translated as printed, between the same signs, with a note. The line of verse at 125b and the lines made on its pattern are set as verse on both pages. The Key Words of the Dialogue, which follow, explain the words on which the argument turns and how they are rendered. At the back, the Outline gives the argument's joints by Stephanus page, the Editorial Note sets out the conventions of both pages and explains the abbreviations of the apparatus, the Glossary lists the renderings for reference, and the Note on this Edition says how the volume was made and where a reader should be careful.

A NOTE ON THE PERSONS

The dialogue establishes this about its persons. Demodocus is older than Socrates, has "ruled in many offices, and the greatest, for the Athenians", and is honored by "the Anagyrasians, your fellow demesmen", above all (127e); he farms, or speaks as one who does (121b). Theages is young, and his father thinks him

unsettled by “those of his own age and his own deme, coming down to the town” (121d); he has been taught letters, the cithara and wrestling (122e), and wants to rule the city as Themistocles and Pericles did (126a). Socrates is at leisure (121a) and holds no office (127e), and calls himself knowing “nothing except a certain small subject, the things of love” (128b).

The rest comes from other sources. In the *Apology* Socrates points to “Paralius here, son of Demodocus, whose brother was Theages” among the men present at his trial (33e); the past tense suggests that Theages had died by then. In the *Republic* Socrates speaks of “the bridle of our companion Theages”: ill health kept him out of politics and so held him to philosophy (496b–c). Thucydides names a Demodocus among the Athenian generals of 424 BC (4.75.1), who may be the same man. Aristides son of Lysimachus and Thucydides son of Melesias, grandsons of the statesmen whose names they bear, are the boys whose education their fathers ask about in the *Laches* (178a–179d); in the *Theaetetus* Socrates names Aristides among those who left him too soon (150e–151a). Charmides, son of Glaucon and Plato’s uncle, is the young man of the *Charmides*.

KEY WORDS OF THE DIALOGUE

These notes are for orientation, not reference: each explains a word the argument leans on, what it meant in the Athens of Socrates, and what the dialogue does with it. The Glossary at the back lists the renderings with the places where they matter.

BEING WITH, COME TO BE WITH (SYNOUSIA, SYNEINAI, SYNGIGNESTHAI)

Synousia, from *syn*, “with”, and *einai*, “to be”, is the ordinary Greek for company of every kind: a gathering, a conversation, the union of man and woman, and the time a pupil spends with a teacher, for which the sophists took fees. The dialogue turns on it. Its question is what a young man gains from being with a wise man, and Socrates gives it a line of verse, “Wise are tyrants by being with the wise” (125b); the son thinks fit that his father should find him “some man to be with” (122e); whichever statesman he chooses “will be with you for nothing” (127a); the sophists persuade the young “to leave their being with those men and to be with them” (128a); and the last pages describe “our being with one another” and the power that governs it (129e–130e). *Synousia* is “being with” and *syneinai* “be with” throughout (at 122e, where the noun cannot stand, “some man to be with”), so that the question can be heard each time it returns; the series’ *Alcibiades I* rendered the noun “company” (119a), and the verbs “keep company with” (118c). *Syngignesthai*, “come to be with” (122a, 126c, 127b, 128c, 130b), is the coming together that begins it; *syndiatribein*, “spend time with” (128b, 129e), is kept apart.

WISE, WISDOM (SOPHOS, SOPHIA)

Sophia was skill of every kind before it was philosophy: the wisdom of a pilot, a charioteer, a poet or a statesman. Theages “desires ... to become wise” (121c–d), and the argument asks which wisdom he means. Socrates first makes Theages agree that the wise are “those who have knowledge” (122e), then sets *sophia* beside the crafts, “the wisdom by which men pilot ships” (123b); the wisdom Theages wants is “the one by which we rule those in the city” (124a), the wisdom of tyrants (124e–125e), and then the wisdom of

Themistocles and Pericles, who are “clever at the affairs of the city” (126a). The sophists “are so wise” that they persuade the young to leave their fellow citizens and pay them besides (128a). *Sophia* is “wisdom” and *sophos* “wise”, as in the series, so that the line “Wise are tyrants by being with the wise” holds the dialogue’s two key words.

DESIRE (EPITHYMEIN, EPITHYMIA)

Epithymia is wanting of any kind, from appetite to ambition. The dialogue begins with a desire: “the desire that has now come upon him frightens me very much” (121c), and asks again and again what the boy desires. The answers move from “to become wise” (121d) to the wisdom “by which we rule those in the city” (124a), which Socrates calls “the wisdom by which you would rule all the citizens” (125e), and then, under pressure, to a prayer “to become a tyrant ... and still more, perhaps, to become a god” (125e–126a), before Theages draws back: he would rule the citizens “not by force, at least, nor as the tyrants do, but over those who are willing” (126a). The word is “desire” throughout, verb and noun; “wish” is kept for *boulesthai*, and “be willing” for *ethelein*, the word of the father’s refusal (123a) and of Theages’ request to Socrates (127a); the “willing” subjects of 126a are *hekontes*, men who consent.

RULE, RULER, TYRANT (ARCHEIN, ARCHĒ, ARCHŌN; TYRANNOS, TYRANNEIN, TYRANNIKOS)

Archein is both “begin” and “rule”, and *archē* both a beginning and an office of rule; in Athens the *archai* were the magistracies, held by lot or election for a year. The argument turns on ruling: pilots “rule ships”, charioteers “a team of horses”, doctors “the sick” (123d–e), and Theages wants the wisdom “by which we rule those in the city” (124a). The rulers Socrates names are kings, a usurper and tyrants, and the title of Hippias and Periander is “tyrants” (124e). *Archein* and *archē* are “rule” wherever they mean ruling (the middle, *archesthai*, is “begin”, 122d, 128d, 128e), even of the father’s magistracies, where he “ruled in many offices” (127e), so that the father is seen to have done what the son wants; *tyrannos* is “tyrant”, *tyrannein* “be a tyrant” (“to be our tyrant”, 124e), and *tyrannikos* “tyrannical” (124e, 125e). A *tyrannos* was a ruler who held power outside the laws, not necessarily a cruel one.

KNOWLEDGE, KNOW HOW (EPISTĒMĒ, EPISTĒMŌN, EPISTASTHAI)

Epistasthai is to know how to do something, or to know a thing well enough to act on it; *epistēmē* is that kind of knowledge, and *epistēmōn* one who has it. Theages agrees that the wise are “those who have knowledge” (122e), and each craft is a wisdom “by which we know how to rule” something (123d–124b). Socrates later says that he knows none of the “blessed and fine subjects” the sophists teach (128b). *Epistēmē* is “knowledge”, *epistēmōn* “one who has knowledge”, and *epistasthai* “know how” with an infinitive and “know” without one.

ADVISE, DELIBERATE (SYMBOULEUEIN, SYMBOULEUESTHAI; BOULEUESTHAI, BOULĒ)

The father comes for advice, and Socrates makes the word work. *Symbouleuein* is to give advice and *symbouleuesthai* to take it; Socrates calls them “I, the one advising, and you, the one taking advice” (122c). Advice, Socrates says, “is indeed said to be a sacred thing” (122b), and there is “nothing more divine about which a man could deliberate than the education of himself and of his own kin”. *Bouleuesthai* is “deliberate” and *boulē* “counsel”: “shall we deliberate together” (125a), “this needs no trivial counsel” (125b), and Theages, at the end, “then at once we will deliberate about what we shall do” (131a).

CRAFT AND CRAFTSMAN (TECHNĒ, DĒMIOURGOS)

Technē is any skill that can be taught and has a product: piloting, medicine, carpentry, farming. *Dēmiourgos*, “one who works for the people”, is the craftsman. Socrates proceeds by the crafts, as he often does: each is a “wisdom” with a name and a field it rules (123b–124b), and the wisdom Theages wants rules “all the craftsmen” (124b). The comedy plays on the word: the father should have made his son “a craftsman of the wisdom he desires” (125a), and the man Theages is to be with is “a fellow craftsman of Callicrite” (*homotechnos*, one who shares her craft, 125e); and the painters are “the craftsmen of this very thing” (126e). *Technē* is “craft”, *dēmiourgos* “craftsman” and *homotechnos* “fellow craftsman”, as in the series.

DAIMONIC AND DIVINE (DAIMONION; THEIOS, TO THEION)

A *daimōn* was a divine being or power, less than a named god; *daimonion* is its adjective, “of a daimon”, and as a noun “something daimonic”. Socrates’ own word for his sign was *to daimonion*, and his accusers charged him with believing not in the city’s gods but in “other new daimonic things” (*Apology* 24b–c). Here he calls it “something daimonic that has accompanied me by a divine lot” (128d), “the voice of the daimonic” (128e), “the customary sign, the daimonic one” (129b), and speaks of “this power of this daimonic thing” (129e). *Daimonion* is “daimonic” throughout and is kept apart from *theios*, “divine”, which stands beside it at 128d and which Theages uses at the end, “the divine itself that comes to you” (131a), after calling it “this daimonic thing” (131a). The series’ *Alcibiades I* rendered the same adjective “divine” (103a); this volume does not.

SIGN, VOICE, POWER (SĒMEION, PHŌNĒ, DYNAMIS)

The sign is a voice that “comes” (*gignesthai*) and “signals” (*sēmainein*) a turning away (128d), and the stories show it at work: the voice came while Charmides was speaking (128e) and when Timarchus rose to go (129b). *Sēmeion* is “sign”, *sēmainein* “signal”, *phōnē* “voice”. *Dynamis*, “power”, is the power of the daimonic, which “has all power also over being with those who spend time with me” (129e); Socrates uses the same word when he asks Aristides whether “this power” left him suddenly (130c).

BENEFIT, MAKE PROGRESS (ŌPHELEIN, ŌPHELIA; EPIDIDONAI)

Socrates allows that Demodocus thinks his son “would be benefited most of all” by him (127d), and Theages doubts that a statesman “would not benefit his own son at all” if he could benefit another (126d). *Ōphelein* is “benefit” and *ōphelia* “benefit” throughout, so that Socrates’ last advice, to go to those “who are themselves masters of the benefit with which they benefit men” (130e), recalls Theages’ doubt at 126d. *Epididonai* is to grow, to increase, and of persons to “make progress”; Socrates’ companions “make progress quickly, at once” (129e), and Aristides says, “I made progress whenever I was with you” (130d).

STATESMEN AND THE AFFAIRS OF THE CITY (POLITIKOI, TA POLITIKA)

Ta politika, the things of the *polis*, are “the affairs of the city”, and the men skilled in them, *politikoi* or *politikoi andres*, are “statesmen”. Themistocles, Pericles and Cimon “have become clever at the affairs of the city” (126a), and the statesmen “use on every occasion both their own city and many others” (126c), as those skilled in horsemanship use horses. Socrates’ own argument, that “the sons of these statesmen are no better than the sons of the shoemakers” (126d), is turned against him.

FINE AND GOOD; BEAUTIFUL (KALOS KAGATHOS; KALOS)

Kalos is “fine” of things and acts and “beautiful” of persons; *kalos kagathos*, “fine and good”, named the gentleman of Athens, of good family, means and education. Theages was educated as “the sons of fine and good fathers” are (122e), and Socrates offers to introduce him to whichever he wishes “of the Athenians who are fine and good in the affairs of the city” (127a), to which Theages replies, “Are you not one of the fine and good men too?” The name Theages is “a fine name” (122d); Charmides “has grown up beautiful” (128d–e); and Sannion is “the beautiful one” (129d), whom Ficino took for the son of a man called Calus.

ΘΕΑΓΗΣ

ΔΗΜΟΔΟΚΟΣ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΘΕΑΓΗΣ

St. I
p. 121

ΔΗ. ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐδεόμην ἅττα σοι ἰδιολογήσασθαι, a
εἰ σχολή· κἂν εἰ ἀσχολία δὲ μὴ πάνυ τις μεγάλη, ὅμως
ἐμοῦ ἔνεκα ποιήσαι σχολήν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλως τυγχάνω σχολάζων, καὶ δὴ σοῦ
γε ἔνεκα καὶ πάνυ. ἀλλ' εἴ τι βούλει λέγειν, ἔξεστιν. 5

ΔΗ. Βούλει οὖν δεῦρο εἰς τὴν τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ ἐλευθερίου
στοὰν ἐκποδὼν ἀποχωρήσωμεν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΔΗ. Ἴωμεν δὴ. ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντα τὰ φυτὰ κιν- b
δυνεύει τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχειν, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα
καὶ τὰ ζῶα τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ἄνθρωπος. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς
φυτοῖς ῥᾶστον ἡμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεται, ὅσοι τὴν γῆν γεωργοῦ-
μεν, τὸ παρασκευάσασθαι πάντα τὰ πρὸ τοῦ φυτεύειν καὶ 5
αὐτὸ τὸ φυτεῦσαι· ἐπειδὴν δὲ τὸ φυτευθὲν βιωῇ, μετὰ τοῦτο
θεραπεία τοῦ φύντος καὶ πολλή καὶ χαλεπή καὶ δύσκολος
γίγνεται. οὕτω δὲ ἔχειν ἔοικε καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· c
ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμαντοῦ ἐγὼ πραγμάτων τεκμαίρομαι καὶ ἐς τᾶλλα.
καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ἢ τοῦ ὕεος τουτουῖ, εἴτε φυτεῖαν εἴτε παιδο-
ποιάν δεῖ αὐτὴν ὀνομάζειν, πάντων ῥάστη γέγονεν, ἢ δὲ
τροφή δύσκολός τε καὶ αἰὲ ἐν φόβῳ περὶ αὐτοῦ δεδιότι. 5

a1 ἰδιολογήσασθαι] διαλογίσασθαι ci. Cobet a2 κἂν εἰ] κἂν ἥ vulg.
a3 ἔνεκα T: ἔνεκεν B W b1 post δὴ dist. Cobet: post σώκρατες B T
b3 ἄνθρωπος Schanz: ἄνθρωπος B T c2 τᾶλλα B W: τὰ ἄλλα T c4 ῥάστη
γέγονεν, ἢ δὲ τροφή T: ῥάστη· γέγονε δὲ τροφή B

DEM. Socrates, I have been wanting to talk over some things with you privately, if you have leisure; and even if you are busy, so long as it is with nothing very great, make leisure all the same, for my sake.¹ 121

SOC. Why, I am in fact at leisure anyway, and for your sake very much so. But if you wish to say something, you may.

DEM. Would you like us, then, to withdraw over here, out of the way, into the stoa of Zeus Eleutherios?²

SOC. If it seems good to you.

DEM. Let us go, then. Socrates, it looks as though all things that grow fare in the same way, both the things that grow from the earth and the animals, man as well as the rest. For with plants, for those of us who farm the land, this part comes easiest: getting everything ready before planting, and the planting itself; but when what has been planted lives, after that the tending of what has grown becomes great, and hard, and troublesome. So it seems to fare with men too: from my own affairs I judge of the rest as well. For with me too, the planting of this son here—whether one should name it planting or begetting—has proved the easiest thing of all, but his rearing has been troublesome, and I am always in fear, afraid for him. b c

1. Demodocus is Theages' father. In Plato's *Apology* (33e) Socrates points to "Paralius here, son of Demodocus, whose brother was Theages"; the past tense suggests that Theages had died before the trial; in the *Republic* (496b–c) "the bridle of our companion Theages", the ill health that kept him out of politics, is said to have held him to philosophy.

2. The stoa of Zeus Eleutherios, Zeus "of Freedom", stood on the west side of the Agora, the market and civic square of Athens. Xenophon's Socrates meets Ischomachus sitting there (*Oeconomicus* 7.1).

τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα πολλὰ ἂν εἴη λέγειν, ἡ δὲ νῦν παροῦσα ἐπιθυμία τούτῳ πάννυ με φοβεῖ—ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀγεννής, σφαλερὰ δέ—ἐπιθυμῇ γὰρ δὴ οὗτος ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς φησι, σοφὸς γενέσθαι. δοκῶ γάρ μοι, τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν τινες d αὐτοῦ καὶ δημοτῶν, εἰς τὸ ἄστει καταβαίνοντες, λόγους τινὰς ἀπομνημονεύοντες διαταράττουσιν αὐτόν, οὓς ἐξήλωκεν καὶ πάλαι μοι πράγματα παρέχει, ἀξιῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι με ἑαυτοῦ καὶ χρήματα τελέσαι τινὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν, ὅστις αὐτόν 5 σοφὸν ποιήσει. ἐμοὶ δὲ τῶν μὲν χρημάτων καὶ ἔλαττον μέλει, ἡγοῦμαι δὲ τοῦτον οὐκ εἰς μικρὸν κίνδυνον ἵεναι οἷ σπεύδει. 122 τέως μὲν οὖν αὐτόν κατεῖχον παραμυθούμενος· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκέτι οἷός τέ εἰμι, ἡγοῦμαι κράτιστον εἶναι πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ, ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις ἄνευ ἐμοῦ συγγενόμενός τῳ διαφθαρῇ. νῦν οὖν ἡκῶ ἐπ’ αὐτὰ ταῦτα, ἵνα τῳ τούτων 5 τῶν σοφιστῶν δοκούντων εἶναι συστήσω τουτονί. σὺ οὖν ἡμῖν εἰς καλὸν παρεφάνης, ὦ ἂν ἐγὼ μάλιστα ἐβουλόμην περὶ τῶν τοιούτων μέλλων πράξειν συμβουλευσάσθαι. ἀλλ’ εἴ τι ἔχεις συμβουλεύειν ἐξ ὧν ἐμοῦ ἀκήκοας, ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρή. b

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὲν δὴ, ὦ Δημόδοκε, καὶ λέγεταί γε συμβουλή ἱερὸν χρῆμα εἶναι. εἴπερ οὖν καὶ ἄλλη ἡτισοῦν ἐστὶν ἱερά, καὶ αὕτη ἂν εἴη περὶ ἧς σὺ νῦν συμβουλεύῃ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι περὶ ὅτου θειοτέρου ἂν ἄνθρωπος βουλευσαιο 5 ἢ περὶ παιδείας καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ οἰκείων. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ συνομολογήσωμεν τί ποτε οἰόμεθα τοῦτο εἶναι περὶ οὗ βουλευόμεθα· μὴ γὰρ πολλάκις ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ ὑπολαμβάνω, σὺ δὲ ἄλλο, κάπειτα πόρρω c που τῆς συνουσίας αἰσθώμεθα γελοῖοι ὄντες, ἐγὼ τε ὁ συμ-

c6 πολλὰ ἂν] πολὺ ἂν ἔργον Cobet d1 δοκῶ γάρ μοι] an δοκεῖ γάρ μοι ?
 Stephanus: δοκεῖν γάρ μοι Cobet d5 αὐτόν W: αὐτῶν B T d6 καὶ secl.
 Cobet a1 μέλει B: μέλλει T τοῦτον B: τούτων T μικρὸν B T: μακρὸν W
 a2 σπεύδει (σπεύδοντα) Schanz a7 ἂν] δὴ Cobet a8 (τι) πράξειν Cobet
 c1 ὑπολαμβάνων Cobet c2 συνουσίας B T: συνηθείας W αἰσθώμεθα B T:
 αἰσθόμεθα W

There are many other things one could tell; but the desire that has now come upon him frightens me very much—for it is not ignoble, but it is unsafe—for this boy of ours desires, Socrates, so he says, to become wise. For I think some of those of his own age and his own deme, coming down to the town, unsettle him by repeating certain arguments from memory; he has come to envy them, and has long been making trouble for me, thinking fit that I should care for him and pay money to one of the sophists, who will make him wise.¹ For my part I care less about the money; but I think he is going into no small danger where he is hurrying. So far I have held him back by soothing him; but since I am no longer able to, I think it best to obey him, lest perhaps, coming to be with someone when I am not there, he be corrupted. So I have come now for just this, to introduce this boy here to someone among those who are thought to be sophists. You, then, have appeared to us at just the right time, the man from whom I would most wish to take advice when I am about to act in such matters. But if you can advise anything from what you have heard from me, you may, and you should.

soc. Why, Demodocus, advice is indeed said to be a sacred thing. If, then, any other advice at all is sacred, this too would be, the advice you are now taking; for there is nothing more divine about which a man could deliberate than the education of himself and of his own kin. So first let us agree on it together, you and I, what exactly we think this is about which we are deliberating; for perhaps I take it to be one thing and you another, and then, somewhere far on in our being with one another,² we may perceive that we are ridiculous, I, the one advising,

1. A deme was one of the villages and wards into which Attica was divided; “coming down to the town” suggests a country deme. Demodocus’ deme is later named as Anagyrus (127e). The sophists were teachers who went from city to city and took fees for their instruction; later in the dialogue Socrates names Prodicus, Gorgias and Polus (127e–128a).

2. *Synousia*, from *syn*, “with”, and *einai*, “to be”, is the ordinary word for company and conversation, and for a pupil’s attendance on a teacher. It is “being with” throughout, and the verb *syneinai* “be with”, so that the dialogue’s question, what a young man gains from being with a wise man, can be heard each time it returns; this series’ *Alcibiades I* rendered the noun “company” (119a). *Syngignesthai*, “come to be with” (122a), is kept apart.

βουλευών και σὺ ὁ συμβουλευόμενος, μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ἡγούμενοι.

ΔΗ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ 5 ποιεῖν χρὴ οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Καὶ λέγω γε ὀρθῶς, οὐ μέντοι παντάπασί γε· σμικρὸν γάρ τι μετατίθεται. ἐννοῶ γὰρ μὴ καὶ ὁ μειρακίσκος οὗτος οὐ τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ οὐδ' ἡμεῖς αὐτὸν οἰόμεθα ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀλλ' ἐτέρου, εἴτ' αὖ ἡμεῖς ἔτι ἀτοπώτεροι ὦμεν d περὶ ἄλλου του βουλευόμενοι. ὀρθότατον οὖν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τούτου ἄρχεσθαι, διαπνυθανομένους ὅτι καὶ ἔστιν οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ.

ΔΗ. Κινδυνεύει γοῦν οὕτω βέλτιστον εἶναι ὡς σὺ λέγεις. 5

ΣΩ. Εἰπέ δὴ μοι, τί καλὸν ὄνομα τῷ νεανίσκῳ; τί αὐτὸν προσαγορεύωμεν;

ΔΗ. Θεάγης ὄνομα τούτῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Καλὸν γε, ὦ Δημόδοκε, τῷ υἱεῖ τὸ ὄνομα ἔθου καὶ ἱεροπρεπές. εἰπέ δὴ ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεάγες, ἐπιθυμεῖν φῆς σοφὸς e γενέσθαι, καὶ ἀξιοῖς σου τὸν πατέρα τόνδε ἐξευρεῖν ἀνδρός τινος συνουσίαν τοιούτου ὅστις σε σοφὸν ποιήσει;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Σοφοὺς δὲ καλεῖς πότερον τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας, περὶ 5 ὅτου ἂν ἐπιστήμονες ὦσιν, ἢ τοὺς μῆ;

ΘΕ. Τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἐδιδάξατό σε ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν ἅπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἄλλοι πεπαίδευνται, οἱ τῶν καλῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων υἱεῖς, οἷον γράμματα τε καὶ κιθαρίζειν καὶ παλαίειν 10 καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀγωνίαν;

ΘΕ. Ἐμέ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐτι οὖν οἶε τινὸς ἐπιστήμης ἐλλείπειν, ἧς προσήκει 123 ὑπὲρ σοῦ τὸν πατέρα ἐπιμεληθῆναι;

c9 ἐπιθυμεῖ B T W: ἐπιθυμῇ scr. Ven. 184 d6 καλὸν secl. Baiter: καὶ ci. H. Richards
d7 προσαγορεύω H. Richards e8 καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν secl. Cobet a1 ἐλλείπειν B² T:
ἐλλιπειν B

and you, the one taking advice, since we think nothing the same.

DEM. Why, you seem to me to speak rightly, Socrates, and that is how we should act.

SOC. And I do speak rightly, though not altogether: for I am changing it a little. For I take into account that perhaps this lad here does not desire what we think he desires, but something else, and then again we would be still more absurd, deliberating about some other thing. So the rightest course, I think, is to begin from this very point, finding out thoroughly what it is that he desires.

DEM. It looks, at any rate, as though that is best, as you say.

SOC. Tell me, then: what is the young man's fine name? What are we to call him?

DEM. Theages is his name, Socrates.

SOC. A fine name, Demodocus, you have given your son, and one befitting the sacred.¹ Tell us, then, Theages: do you say that you desire to become wise, and do you think fit that your father here should find you some man to be with, such a man as will make you wise?

THEAG. Yes.

SOC. And whom do you call wise: those who have knowledge, about whatever they have knowledge of, or those who have not?

THEAG. Those who have knowledge, I do.

SOC. Well then? Did your father not have you taught and educated in what the others here have been educated in, the sons of fine and good fathers: letters, for instance, and playing the cithara, and wrestling, and the other contests?²

THEAG. Yes, me he did.

SOC. Do you think, then, that you still lack some knowledge which it is your father's part to care for on your behalf?

1. *Theagēs* is formed on *theos*, "god"; Socrates calls the name *hieroprepēs*, "befitting the sacred". Baiter would delete "fine" (*kalon*) in Socrates' question (122d); Burnet keeps it.

2. Letters, the cithara and the trainer's exercises are the three parts of a boy's schooling in the *Protagoras* (325d–326c). "The fine and good" (*kaloi kagathoi*) were the gentlemen of Athens.

ΘΕ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τίς ἐστὶν αὕτη; εἰπὲ καὶ ἡμῖν, ἵνα σοι χαρισώμεθα.

ΘΕ. Οἶδεν καὶ οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες—ἐπεὶ πολλάκις ἐγὼ 5
αὐτῷ εἴρηκα—ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἐξεπίτηδες πρὸς σέ λέγει, ὡς δὴ
οὐκ εἰδώς οὐ ἐγὼ ἐπιθυμῶ· τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἕτερα καὶ πρὸς ἐμὲ
μάχεται τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει με οὐδενὶ συστήσαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἐμπροσθέν σοι ἦν πρὸς τοῦτον ῥηθέντα
ὥσπερ ἀνευ μαρτύρων λεγόμενα· νυνὶ δὲ ἐμὲ ποιῆσαι μάρ- b
τυρα, καὶ ἐναντίον ἐμοῦ κάτειπε τίς ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ σοφία ἥς
ἐπιθυμεῖς. φέρε γάρ, εἰ ἐπεθύμεις ταύτης ἢ οἱ ἄνθρωποι
τὰ πλοῖα κυβερνῶσιν, καὶ ἐγὼ σε ἐτύγχανον ἀνερωτῶν·
“ὦ Θεάγες, τίνος ἐνδεής ὢν σοφίας μέμφη τῷ πατρὶ ὅτι 5
οὐκ ἐθέλει σε συνιστάναι παρ’ ὧν ἂν σοφὸς γένοιτο;”
τί ἂν μοι ἀπεκρίνω; τίνα αὐτὴν εἶναι; ἄρα οὐ κυβερνη-
τικὴν;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ ἐπιθυμῶν ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν εἶναι σοφὸς ἦ c
τὰ ἄρματα κυβερνῶσιν εἴτ’ ἐμέμφου τῷ πατρί, ἐμοῦ αὖ
ἐρωτῶντος τίς ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ σοφία, τίνα ἂν ἀπεκρίνω αὐτὴν
εἶναι; ἄρ’ οὐχὶ ἡνιοχικήν;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἦς δὲ δὴ νῦν τυγχάνεις ἐπιθυμῶν, πότερον ἀνώ- 5
νυμός τίς ἐστὶν ἢ ἔχει ὄνομα;

ΘΕ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν αὐτὴν μὲν οἶσθα, οὐ μέντοι τό γε 10
ὄνομα, ἢ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα;

ΘΕ. Καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἔστιν; εἰπέ.

ΘΕ. Τί δὲ ἄλλο, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτῇ ὀνομά τις φαίη ἂν d
εἶναι ἄλλ’ ἢ σοφίαν;

a 5 ἐγὼ αὐτῷ B T: αὐτῷ ἐγὼ W a 7 ἕτερα W et in marg. b: ἔτι B: ἔτι καὶ ἕτερα T
a 8 οὐδενὶ B T: οὐδέν W b 2 ἐναντίον B² T: ἐναντίων B b 3 ἐπεθύμεις corr. Coisl.:
ἐπιθυμεῖς B T b 6 ἐθέλει T: ἐθέλη B

THEAG. I do.

SOC. What is it? Tell us too, so that we may do you a favor.

THEAG. He knows it too, Socrates—for I have often told him—but he says this to you on purpose, as though he did not know what I desire; for he fights with me in other such ways too, and is not willing to introduce me to anyone.

SOC. But the things you said to him before were said as though b
without witnesses; now make me your witness, and speak out before me what this wisdom is that you desire. For come: if you desired¹ the wisdom by which men pilot ships, and I were in fact to ask you, “Theages, lacking what wisdom do you blame your father, because he is not willing to introduce you to those from whom you would become wise?”, what would you answer me? What would you say it is? Would it not be piloting?

THEAG. Yes.

SOC. And if, desiring to be wise in that wisdom by which they c
pilot chariots,² you then blamed your father, and I in turn asked what this wisdom is, what would you answer that it is? Would it not be charioteering?

THEAG. Yes.

SOC. And the wisdom you do in fact now desire: is it nameless, or has it a name?

THEAG. I think it has one.

SOC. Do you know it, then, but not its name, or its name too?

THEAG. Its name too, I do.

SOC. What is it, then? Tell me.

THEAG. What other name, Socrates, would anyone say it has but d
wisdom?

1. *Epethymeis*, “you desired”, is the reading of a corrector in the Coislinianus, a later manuscript; B and T have the present, “you desire”.

2. The verb is the one used of ships, *kybernan*, “pilot”; Socrates uses it of chariots too, so that the two crafts stand side by side.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ ἡνιοχεία σοφία ἐστίν; ἡ ἀμαθία
δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι;

ΘΕ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

5

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ σοφία;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἦ τι χρώμεθα; οὐχ ἡ ἵππων ἐπιστάμεθα ζεύγους
ἄρχειν;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

10

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ κυβερνητικὴ σοφία ἐστίν;

ΘΕ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐχ αὕτη ἡ πλοίων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν;

ΘΕ. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἦς δὲ δὴ σὺ ἐπιθυμεῖς ἡ σοφία τίς ἐστιν; ἡ τίνος
ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν;

e

ΘΕ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

ΣΩ. Μῶν ἡ τῶν καμνόντων;

ΘΕ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἰατρικὴ γὰρ αὕτη ἐστίν· ἡ γάρ;

5

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν ῥδόντων ἐπιστάμεθα ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς
ἄρχειν;

ΘΕ. Οὐ.

ΣΩ. Μουσικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γε;

10

ΘΕ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν γυμναζομένων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν;

ΘΕ. Οὐ.

ΣΩ. Γυμναστικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γε;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

15

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν τί ποιούντων; προθυμοῦ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ
ἐγὼ σοὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν.

d₃ ἡνιοχεία T W: ἡνιοχία B d₆ σοφία B: σοφία T d₁₃ οὐχ αὕτη vet. b: οὐκ
αὕτη B T d₁₅ ἡ B²: ἡ B e₂ ἡ scr. recc.: ἡ B T W (et mox e₃) e₁₀ μουσικὴ corr.
Par. 1812: μουσικῆς B T W

soc. Then is charioteering also wisdom? Or does it seem to you to be stupidity?¹

THEAG. Not to me.

soc. Wisdom, then?

THEAG. Yes.

soc. What do we use it for? Is it not that by which we know how to rule a team of horses?

THEAG. Yes.

soc. Then is piloting also wisdom?

THEAG. I think so.

soc. Is it not that by which we know how to rule ships?

THEAG. That one, yes.

soc. And the wisdom you desire: what is it? The one by which we know how to rule what? e

THEAG. To my mind, the one by which we rule men.

soc. Surely not the one by which we rule the sick?

THEAG. No indeed.

soc. For that is medicine; isn't that so?

THEAG. Yes.

soc. Then the one by which we know how to rule the singers in the choruses?

THEAG. No.

soc. For that, surely, is music?

THEAG. Certainly.

soc. Then the one by which we know how to rule those who exercise?

THEAG. No.

soc. For that, surely, is gymnastics?

THEAG. Yes.

soc. Then the one by which we rule those doing what? Do your best to say it, as I did the earlier ones for you.

1. *Amathia*, the want of learning, is "stupidity" in the series; "ignorance" is kept for *agnoia*.

ΘΕ. Ἦι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

124

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν τῇ πόλει εἰσὶν καὶ οἱ κάμνοντες;

ΘΕ. Ναί, ἀλλ' οὐ τούτων λέγω μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα γε μανθάνω ἣν λέγεις τέχνην; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν οὐχ ἥ τῶν θεριζόντων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν καὶ τρυγών- 5
των καὶ τῶν φυτευόντων καὶ σπειρόντων καὶ ἀλοώντων· αὕτη μὲν γὰρ γεωργική, ἥ τούτων ἄρχομεν. ἥ γάρ;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε οἶμαι ἥ τῶν περιζόντων καὶ τρυπώντων καὶ 6
ξέοντων καὶ τορνευόντων συμπάντων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν, οὐ ταύτην λέγεις· αὕτη μὲν γὰρ οὐ τεκτονική;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἴσως ἥ τούτων τε πάντων καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν 5
γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἀπάντων καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, ταύτην ἴσως λέγεις τὴν σοφίαν.

ΘΕ. Ταύτην πάλαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, βούλομαι λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, Αἴγισθος ὁ Ἀγαμέμνονα ἀπο- 6
κτείνας ἐν Ἀργεὶ ἄρα τούτων ἦρχεν ὧν σὺ λέγεις, τῶν τε δημιουργῶν καὶ ἰδιωτῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν συμπάντων, ἥ ἄλλων τινῶν;

ΘΕ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τούτων.

5

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δῆ; Πηλεὺς ὁ Αἰακοῦ ἐν Φθίᾳ οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἦρχεν;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Περίανδρον δὲ τὸν Κυψέλου ἄρχοντα ἐν Κορίνθῳ 7
ἤδη ἀκήκοας γενέσθαι;

10

ΘΕ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἄρχοντα ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

d

a6 τρυγόντων B T W: τῶν τρυγόντων t b1 πριόντων Cobet b3 γὰρ οὐ] γὰρ Schanz c12 αὐτοῦ B: αὐτοῦ T: αὐτῇ vulg.

THEAG. The one by which we rule those in the city, I think. 124

soc. Then are not the sick in the city too?

THEAG. Yes, but I do not mean these alone; I mean the others in the city as well.

soc. Do I understand which craft you mean? For you seem to me to mean not the one by which we know how to rule those who reap and gather grapes, and those who plant and sow and thresh: for that is farming, by which we rule these. Isn't that so?

THEAG. Yes.

soc. Nor, I think, the one by which we know how to rule those who saw and drill and plane and turn, all together; this is not the one you mean: for that is carpentry, is it not? b

THEAG. Yes.

soc. But perhaps the one by which we rule all these, and the farmers themselves, and the carpenters, and all the craftsmen, and private persons, and women and men—perhaps it is this wisdom you mean.

THEAG. That is the one I have long been meaning, Socrates.

soc. Can you say, then: Aegisthus, who killed Agamemnon— c did he rule in Argos those you mean, the craftsmen and private persons and men and women all together, or some others?¹

THEAG. No, those.

soc. Well then? Peleus son of Aeacus in Phthia: did he not rule these same people?²

THEAG. Yes.

soc. And Periander son of Cypselus, who was ruler in Corinth: you have heard of him before now?³

THEAG. I have.

soc. Not ruling these same people in his own city?

THEAG. Yes. d

1. Aegisthus seduced Clytemnestra, the wife of Agamemnon, king of the Greeks at Troy, and with her killed him on his return; he then ruled Mycenae for seven years (Homer, *Odyssey* 3.303–305). In Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* the murder is at Argos, and Aegisthus means to "rule the citizens" (1638–1639).

2. Peleus, father of Achilles, was king of Phthia in Thessaly.

3. Periander succeeded his father Cypselus as tyrant of Corinth and ruled, by the usual reckoning, from about 627 to 587 BC; Herodotus tells of his cruelty (3.48–53, 5.92).

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Περδίκκου, τὸν νεωστὶ τοῦτον ἄρχοντα ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ; οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν ἡγή τούτων ἄρχειν;

ΘΕ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἰππίαν δὲ τὸν Πεισιστράτου ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει 5 ἄρξαντα τίνων οἶε ἄρξαι; οὐ τούτων;

ΘΕ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Εἴποις ἂν οὖν μοι τίνα ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει Βάκισ τε καὶ Σίβυλλα καὶ ὁ ἡμεδαπὸς Ἀμφίλυτος;

ΘΕ. Τίνα γὰρ ἄλλην, ὦ Σώκρατες, πλὴν γε χρησμοδοί; 10

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως λέγεις. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούσδε μοι οὕτω πειρῶ e ἀποκρίνασθαι, τίνα ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει Ἰππίας καὶ Περιάνδρος διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρχήν;

ΘΕ. Οἶμαι μὲν τύραννοι· τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅστις ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἐν τῇ 5 πόλει συμπάντων ἄρχειν, τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς τούτοις ἐπιθυμεῖ, τυραννικῆς, καὶ τύραννος εἶναι;

ΘΕ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ταύτης ἐπιθυμεῖν σὺ φής;

ΘΕ. Ἐοικέν γε ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ εἶπον. 10

ΣΩ. Ὡς μαρέ, τυραννεῖν ἄρα ἡμῶν ἐπιθυμῶν πάλαι ἐμέμφου τῷ πατρὶ ὅτι σε οὐκ ἔπεμπεν εἰς [διδασκάλου] 125 τυραννοδιδασκάλου τινός; καὶ σύ, ὦ Δημόδοκε, οὐκ αἰσχύνη πάλαι εἰδὼς οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ οὗτος, καὶ ἔχων ὅθι πέμψας αὐτὸν δημιουργὸν ἂν ἐποίησας τῆς σοφίας ἥς ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἔπειτα φθονεῖς τε αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλεις πέμπειν; ἀλλὰ νῦν—ὀρᾷς;— 5 ἐπειδὴ ἐναντίον ἐμοῦ κατέρηκέ σου, κοινῇ βουλευόμεθα ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐς τίνος ἂν αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν καὶ διὰ τὴν τίνος συνουσίαν σοφὸς ἂν γένοιτο τύραννος;

ΔΗ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, βουλευόμεθα δῆτα, ὥς b δοκεῖ γέ μοι βουλῆς δεῖν περὶ τούτου οὐ φαύλης.

d2 τοῦτον corr. Par. 1812: τούτων B T W: secl. ci. Stephanus e3 αὐτὴν] αὐτῶν Baiter e9 ἐπιθυμεῖν T: ἐπιθυμεῖς B (sed suprascr. ν) a1 διδασκάλου secl. Schleiermacher a3 ὅθι] ὅποι Bekker: οἱ Cobet a6 βουλευόμεθα b: βουλευόμεθα B T a7 ἐς τίνος Bekker (ἐς τίνα corr. Coisl.): ἐστω οἱ B: ἔστω οἱ B² T

soc. And Archelaus son of Perdiccas, this new ruler in Macedonia: do you not think he rules these same people?¹

THEAG. I do.

soc. And Hippias son of Pisistratus, who ruled in this city: whom do you think he ruled? Not these?²

THEAG. Of course.

soc. Could you tell me, then, what title Bakis and the Sibyl and our own Amphilytus have?³

THEAG. What other, Socrates, but oracle-singers?

soc. Rightly said. Then try to answer me in the same way about these men too: what title do Hippias and Periander have on account of the same rule?

THEAG. Tyrants, I think; what else?

soc. Then whoever desires to rule all the men in the city together desires the same rule as these, tyrannical rule, and to be a tyrant?

THEAG. It appears so.

soc. Then this is what you say you desire?

THEAG. It seems so, at any rate, from what I said.

soc. You rascal! So it was in desiring to be our tyrant that you have long been blaming your father because he did not send you to the house of some tyrant-teacher?⁴ And you, Demodocus, are you not ashamed? You have long known what he desires, and you have somewhere you could have sent him and so made him a craftsman of the wisdom he desires, and then you begrudge it him and are not willing to send him? But now—do you see?—since he has spoken out against you before me, shall we deliberate together, you and I, to whose house we should send him, and by being with whom he would become a wise tyrant?⁵

DEM. Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, let us deliberate indeed; for it seems to me, at least, that this needs no trivial counsel.

1. Archelaus became king of Macedon about 413 BC; in the *Gorgias* (470d–471d) Polus makes him the example of a happy wrongdoer, and the *Alcibiades II* tells of his murder (141d–e).

2. Hippias succeeded his father Pisistratus as tyrant of Athens in 527 BC and was driven out in 510.

3. Bakis was a legendary Boeotian seer whose oracles were collected and quoted (Herodotus 8.20, 8.77; Aristophanes, *Knights* 123–124); the Sibyl, a prophetess, is named already by Heraclitus (fragment B92). Amphilytus foretold Pisistratus' victory; Herodotus calls him an Acarnanian (1.62.4).

4. *Tyrannodidaskalos*, "tyrant-teacher", perhaps made for the joke; it recurs in Cassius Dio (59.24). Burnet brackets "teacher" before it, after Schleiermacher.

5. "To whose house" (*es tinos*) is Bekker's; B and T have *estin hoi*, which does not answer to "by being with whom".

ΣΩ. Ἔασον, ὠγαθέ. διαπυθώμεθα αὐτοῦ πρώτον ἱκανῶς.

ΔΗ. Πυνθάνου δή.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν εἰ Εὐριπίδῃ τι προσχρησαίμεθα, ὦ Θέαγες; 5
Εὐριπίδης γάρ πού φησιν—

σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσία·

εἰ οὖν ἔροιτό τις τὸν Εὐριπίδην· “ὦ Εὐριπίδη, τῶν τί 5
σοφῶν συνουσία φῆς σοφοὺς εἶναι τοὺς τυράννους;” ὥσπερ c
ἂν εἰ εἰπόντα—

σοφοὶ γεωργοὶ τῶν σοφῶν συνουσία,

ἡρόμεθα “Τῶν τί σοφῶν;” τί ἂν ἡμῖν ἀπεκρίνατο; ἄρ’ ἂν 5
ἄλλο τι ἢ τῶν τὰ γεωργικά; 5

ΘΕ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ εἰ εἶπε—

σοφοὶ μάγειροι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσία,

εἰ ἡρόμεθα· “Τῶν τί σοφῶν;” τί ἂν ἡμῖν ἀπεκρίνατο; οὐχ 10
ὅτι τῶν μαγείρων; 10

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δ’ εἰ—

σοφοὶ παλαισταὶ τῶν σοφῶν συνουσία

εἶπεν, εἰ ἡρόμεθα· “Τῶν τί σοφῶν;” ἄρα οὐκ ἂν τῶν 10
παλαίειν ἔφη; d

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἶπε—

σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσία,

ἡμῶν ἐρωτῶντων· “Τῶν τί σοφῶν λέγεις, ὦ Εὐριπίδη;” 5
τί ἂν φαίη; ποῖα ἂν εἶναι ταῦτα; 5

ΘΕ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί’ οὐκ οἶδ’ ἔγωγε.

b 5 προσχρησαίμεθα B T: προσχρησόμεθα W c 4 ἡρόμεθα T b: ἡρώμεθα B τί
ἂν ἡμῖν ἀπεκρίνατο B T W: τί ἂν οἶε αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι in marg. γρ. T W b
c 10 τῶν μαγείρων B T W: τῶν μαγειρικῶν in marg. γρ. W: τῶν τὰ μαγειρικά
Hirschig d 6 φαίη T: φαίην B (sed suprascr. η) ποῖα ἂν T W: ποῖα ἂ B: ποῖα
Hermann: fort. ποῖα δὴ d 7 ἔγωγε T: ἔγε B (sed suprascr. γω)

soc. Let it be, my good friend. Let us first find out from him thoroughly enough.

DEM. Find out, then.

soc. What, then, if we were to make some further use of Euripides, Theages? For Euripides says somewhere—¹

Wise are tyrants by being with the wise.

If someone, then, were to ask Euripides, “Euripides, by being with those wise in what do you say that tyrants are wise?”, just as if he had said—

Wise are farmers by being with the wise,

and we asked, “Those wise in what?”, what would he answer us? Would it be anything other than “those wise in farming”?

THEAG. No, that.

soc. And what if he said—

Wise are cooks by being with the wise,

if we asked, “Those wise in what?”, what would he answer us? Would it not be “the cooks”?

THEAG. Yes.

soc. And what if—

Wise are wrestlers by being with the wise,

he said, if we asked, “Those wise in what?”, would he not say “those wise in wrestling”?

THEAG. Yes.

soc. But since he said—

Wise are tyrants by being with the wise,

when we ask, “Those wise in what do you mean, Euripides?”, what would he say? What sort of things would these be?

THEAG. Why, by Zeus, I do not know.

1. Socrates gives the line to Euripides here and in the *Republic* (568a–b); Aulus Gellius, writing in the second century AD, found it in Sophocles’ *Ajax the Locrian* (*Attic Nights* 13.19.2).

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ βούλει ἐγὼ σοι εἶπω;

ΘΕ. Εἰ σὺ βούλει.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἅπερ ἔφη Ἀνακρέων τὴν Καλλικρίτην 10
ἐπίστασθαι· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα τὸ ᾄσμα;

ΘΕ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; τοιαύτης τινὸς καὶ σὺ συνουσίας ἐπιθυμεῖς
ἀνδρὸς ὅστις τυγχάνει ὁμότεχνος ὢν Καλλικρίτῃ τῇ Κυάνης e
καὶ “ἐπίσταται τυραννικά,” ὥσπερ ἐκείνην ἔφη ὁ ποιητής,
ἵνα καὶ σὺ ἡμῖν τύραννος γένη καὶ τῇ πόλει;

ΘΕ. Πάλαί, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκώπτεις καὶ παίζεις πρὸς με.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; οὐ ταύτης φῆς τῆς σοφίας ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ 5
πάντων ἂν τῶν πολιτῶν ἄρχοις; τοῦτο δὲ ποιῶν ἄλλο τι ἢ
τύραννος ἂν εἴης;

ΘΕ. Εὐξαίμην μὲν ἂν οἶμαι ἔγωγε τύραννος γενέσθαι,
μάλιστα μὲν πάντων ἀνθρώπων, εἰ δὲ μή, ὥς πλείστων· καὶ 126
σύ γ' ἂν οἶμαι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι—ἔτι δέ γε
ἴσως μᾶλλον θεὸς γενέσθαι—ἀλλ' οὐ τούτου ἔλεγον ἐπι-
θυμεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ἐστὶ ποτε οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖς; οὐ τῶν 5
πολιτῶν φῆς ἄρχειν ἐπιθυμεῖν;

ΘΕ. Οὐ βία γε οὐδ' ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι ἀλλ' ἐκόντων,
ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλλόγμοι ἄνδρες.

ΣΩ. Ἄρά γε λέγεις ὥσπερ Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ Περικλῆς
καὶ Κίμων καὶ ὅσοι τὰ πολιτικά δεινοὶ γεγόνασιν; 10

ΘΕ. Νῆ Δία τούτους λέγω.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν εἰ τὰ ἵππικὰ ἐτύγχανες ἐπιθυμῶν σοφὸς
γενέσθαι; παρὰ τίνας ἂν ἀφικόμενος ὠήθης δεινὸς ἔσεσθαι b
ἱππεύς; ἢ παρ' ἄλλους τινὰς ἢ τοὺς ἵππικούς;

ΘΕ. Μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔγωγε.

d10 καλλικρίτην scr. Ang. C. 1. 4: καλλικρήτην B T W d13 σὺ B T: om. W
e1 καλλικρήτῃ B T κυάνης B: κυανῆς T e3 καὶ τῇ B T: ἐν τῇ W et ἐν suprascr. b
a5 δὴ Laur. lxxxv. 6: δὲ T W et fort. B: δαὶ B² b1 τίνας W: τίνος B T et sic legit
schol. B

soc. Well, would you like me to tell you?

THEAG. If you like.

soc. These are just the things that Anacreon said Callicrite knew. Or do you not know the song?¹

THEAG. I do.

soc. Well then? Do you too desire being with some such man as is in fact a fellow craftsman of Callicrite daughter of Cyane, and “knows tyrannical things”, as the poet said of her, so that you too may become a tyrant for us and for the city?

THEAG. You have long been mocking me, Socrates, and joking with me.

soc. Well? Do you not say that you desire the wisdom by which you would rule all the citizens? And doing this, would you be anything other than a tyrant?

THEAG. I would pray, I think, to become a tyrant, over all men best of all, and if not, over as many as possible; and so, I think, would you and all other men—and still more, perhaps, to become a god—but this is not what I said I desired.²

soc. Then what in the world is it that you desire? Do you not say you desire to rule the citizens?

THEAG. Not by force, at least, nor as the tyrants do, but over those who are willing, as the other men of repute in the city do.

soc. Do you mean like Themistocles and Pericles and Cimon, and all who have become clever at the affairs of the city?³

THEAG. By Zeus, those are the ones I mean.

soc. What, then, if you were in fact desiring to become wise in horsemanship? By going to whom would you have thought you would become a clever horseman? Would it be to any others than those skilled in horsemanship?

THEAG. Not I, by Zeus.

1. Anacreon of Teos, the lyric poet of the sixth century BC, lived at the courts of Polycrates of Samos and of Hipparchus at Athens; the *Hipparchus* says that Hipparchus brought him to the city (228c). The song is known only from this passage. Burnet prints the spelling Callicrite from a later manuscript; B, T and W have Callicrete.

2. The wish can be set beside the *Alcibiades I*, where Socrates imagines a god offering Alcibiades power in Europe but forbidding him Asia, and says Alcibiades would not care to live on those terms (105a–c), and the *Alcibiades II*, where Socrates imagines the god offering Alcibiades tyranny (141a–b).

3. Themistocles, who built the Athenian fleet and led it against the Persians at Salamis in 480 BC; Pericles, who led Athens for some thirty years until his death in 429; Cimon, son of Miltiades, general and statesman between them. In the *Gorgias* Callicles offers the same three, with Miltiades, as good men (503c), and Socrates finds that none of them made the citizens better (515c–517a).

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ παρ' αὐτοὺς αὖ τοὺς δεινοὺς ὄντας ταῦτα, καὶ οἷς εἰσὶν τε ἵπποι καὶ χρώνται ἐκάστοτε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ 5 ἀλλοτρίους πολλοῖς.

ΘΕ. Δῆλον ὅτι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ εἰ τὰ ἀκοντιστικὰ σοφὸς ἐβούλου γενέσθαι; οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ἀκοντιστικοὺς ᾧον ἂν ἐλθὼν σοφὸς ἔσσεσθαι τούτους, οἷς ἔστιν τε ἀκόντια καὶ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀλλοτρίους καὶ 10 οἰκείους ἐκάστοτε χρώνται ἀκοντίοις;

ΘΕ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ τὰ πολιτικὰ βούλει σοφὸς γενέσθαι, οἷε παρ' ἄλλους τινὰς ἀφικόμενος σοφὸς ἔσσεσθαι ἢ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς τούτους, τοὺς αὐτοὺς τε δεινοὺς ὄντας τὰ 5 πολιτικὰ καὶ χρωμένους ἐκάστοτε τῇ τε αὐτῶν πόλει καὶ ἄλλαις πολλαῖς, καὶ Ἑλληνίσιν προσομιλοῦντας πόλεσιν καὶ βαρβάροις; ἢ δοκεῖς ἄλλοις τισὶν συγγενόμενος σοφὸς ἔσσεσθαι ταῦτα ἅπερ οὗτοι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοῖς τούτοις;

ΘΕ. Ἀκήκοα γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὓς σέ φασιν λέγειν τοὺς 10 λόγους, ὅτι τούτων τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν οἱ ὑεῖς οὐδὲν βελτίους εἰσὶν ἢ οἱ τῶν σκυτοτόμων· καί μοι δοκεῖς ἀληθέστατα λέγειν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ δύναμαι αἰσθέσθαι. ἀνόητος ἂν οὖν εἶην εἰ οἰοίμην τινὰ τούτων ἐμοὶ μὲν ἂν παραδοῦναι τὴν 5 αὐτοῦ σοφίαν, τὸν δὲ ὑὸν τὸν αὐτοῦ μηδὲν ὠφελῆσαι, εἴ τι οἷός τ' ἦν εἰς ταῦτα ὠφελεῖν ἄλλον ὄντιναοῦν ἀνθρώπων.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν, ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, χρήσαιο σαντῶ, εἴ σοι ἐπειδὴ γένοιτο ὑὸς τοιαῦτα πράγματα παρέχοι, καὶ φαίη μὲν ἂν ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀγαθὸς γενέσθαι ζωγράφος, καὶ μέμφοιτο 10 σοὶ τῷ πατρὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀναλίσκειν εἰς αὐτὸν τούτων αὐτῶν ἔνεκα ἀργύριον, τοὺς δὲ δημιουργοὺς αὐτοῦ τούτου, τοὺς ζωγράφους, ἀτιμάζοι τε καὶ μὴ βούλοιο παρ' αὐτῶν

b5 οἷς ... ἵπποι γρ. t et in marg. W: οἷ ... ἵππικοὶ B T W c1 ἀκοντίοις secl. Hirschig c3 ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ B T: ἐπειδὴ δὲ W d4 ἂν οὖν B: οὖν ἂν T d5 παραδοῦναι B T: προδοῦναι W d8 σαντῶ] αὐτῶ Schleiermacher: secl. Fritzsche d9 τοιαῦτα] τοσαῦτα ci. H. Richards e1 ἂν] δὴ ci. H. Richards e2 fort. ἐθέλοις H. Richards

soc. But to the very men, in turn, who are clever at this, and who have horses¹ and use them on every occasion, both their own and others', many of them.

THEAG. Clearly.

soc. And what if you wished to become wise in javelin-throwing? Would you not think that you would become wise by going to those skilled in javelin-throwing, these men who have javelins, and who use javelins on every occasion, many of them, both others' and their own? c

THEAG. I think so.

soc. Tell me, then: since you wish to become wise in the affairs of the city, do you think that you will become wise by going to any others than these statesmen, who are themselves clever at the affairs of the city, and who use on every occasion both their own city and many others, and have dealings with cities both Greek and barbarian? Or do you think that by coming to be with some others you will become wise in the things these men are wise in, and not with these themselves?

THEAG. For I have heard, Socrates, the arguments they say you make: that the sons of these statesmen are no better than the sons of the shoemakers;² and you seem to me to speak most truly, from what I am able to perceive. So I would be senseless if I thought that any of these would hand over his own wisdom to me, but would not benefit his own son at all, if he were at all able to benefit any other man whatever in these things. d

soc. Then what would you do with yourself, most excellent of men, if, once a son was born to you, he made such trouble for you, and said that he desired to become a good painter, and blamed you, his father, because you are not willing to spend money on him for these very things, while the craftsmen of this very thing, the painters, he slighted and did not wish e

1. "Who have horses" is the reading recorded as a variant by a later hand in T and in the margin of W; B, T and W have "who are skilled in horsemanship".

2. Socrates argues so in the *Protagoras* (319e–320b), with Pericles' sons and his ward Cleinias as examples, and in the *Meno* (93a–94e), with the sons of Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles and Thucydides.

μανθάνειν; ἢ τοὺς αὐλητάς, βουλόμενος αὐλητῆς γενέσθαι, 5
ἢ τοὺς καθαριστάς; ἔχοις ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι χρῶο καὶ ὅποι πέμποις
ἄλλοσε μὴ ἐθέλοντα παρὰ τούτων μανθάνειν;

ΘΕ. Μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Νῦν οὖν ταῦτὰ ταῦτα αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ποιῶν 127
θαυμάζεις, καὶ μέμφη εἰ ἀπορεῖ ὅτι σοι χρήσεται καὶ ὅποι
πέμποι; ἐπεὶ Ἀθηναίων γε τῶν καλῶν κάγαθὼν τὰ πολιτικὰ
ὅτῳ ἂν βούλῃ συστήσομέν σε, ὅς σοι προῖκα συνέσται· καὶ
ἅμα μὲν ἀργύριον οὐκ ἀναλώσεις, ἅμα δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον 5
εὐδοκίμησεις παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ
συνών.

ΘΕ. Τί οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐ καὶ σὺ τῶν καλῶν κάγα-
θῶν εἰ ἀνδρῶν; εἰ γὰρ σύ μοι ἐθέλοις συνεῖναι, ἐξαρκεῖ καὶ
οὐδένα ἄλλον ζητῶ. 10

ΣΩ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις, Θέαγες; b

ΔΗ. ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ μέντοι κακῶς λέγει, καὶ ἅμα μὲν
ἐμοὶ χαριῇ· ὥς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτι τούτου μείζον ἂν ἔρμαιον
ἡγησαίμην, ἢ εἰ οὗτός τε ἀρέσκοιτο τῇ σῇ συνουσίᾳ καὶ σὺ
ἐθέλοις τούτῳ συνεῖναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ αἰσχύνομαι λέγειν 5
ὥς σφόδρα βούλομαι. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἀμφοτέρων ὑμῶν δέομαι, σέ
τ' ἐθέλειν τούτῳ συνεῖναι καὶ σέ μὴ ζητεῖν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ
συγγενέσθαι ἢ Σωκράτει· καί με πολλῶν καὶ φοβερῶν ἀπαλ-
λάξετε φροντιδῶν. ὥς νῦν πάνυ φοβοῦμαι ὑπὲρ τούτου μή c
τινι ἄλλῳ ἐντύχη οἶω τοῦτον διαφθεῖραι.

ΘΕ. Μηκέτι νῦν, ὦ πάτερ, ὑπὲρ γ' ἐμοῦ φοβοῦ, εἴπερ
οἰός τ' εἰ πείσαι τοῦτον τὴν ἐμὴν συνουσίαν προσδέξασθαι.

ΔΗ. Πάνυ καλῶς λέγεις. ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σέ δ' ἂν 5
ἤδη εἴη ὁ μετὰ τοῦτο λόγος· ἐγὼ γάρ σοι ἔτοιμός εἰμι, ὥς
διὰ βραχέων εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ὥς οἶόν τε οἰκείο-

e6 χρῶο T: χρῶϊό, τι B ὅποι B T: ὅπη W a3 πέμποι B T W: πέμπη Bekker
b1 λέγεις T W: om. B (sed add. in marg. rec. b) b4 τε B T: om. W ἀρέσκοιτο
B² W et γρ. T: ἀρέσκοιτο B (ut videtur) T c2 διαφθεῖραι B T: διαφθαρήναι W
c6 τοῦτο scr. Ven. 189: τοῦτον B T W ὥς T W: om. B (sed add. in marg. b)

to learn from them? Or the flute-players, wishing to become a flute-player, or the cithara-players? Would you find anything to do with him, or anywhere else to send him, if he were not willing to learn from these?

THEAG. Not I, by Zeus.

SOC. Now, then, when you are doing these very same things yourself towards your father, do you wonder, and blame him, if he is at a loss what to do with you and where to send you? For of the Athenians who are fine and good in the affairs of the city we will introduce you to whichever you wish, and he will be with you for nothing; and at the same time you will not spend money, and at the same time you will be much more highly thought of among the many than if you were with anyone else. 127

THEAG. What then, Socrates? Are you not one of the fine and good men too?¹ For if you were willing to be with me, that suffices, and I look for no one else.

SOC. What do you mean by this, Theages? b

DEM. Socrates, he certainly does not speak badly, and at the same time you will be doing me a favor; for there is nothing I would think a greater godsend² than if this boy were pleased with being with you, and you were willing to be with him. Indeed, I am ashamed even to say how much I wish it. But I beg you both: you, to be willing to be with him, and you, not to seek to come to be with anyone else than Socrates; and you will free me from many fearful worries. For as it is I am very much afraid for him, lest he meet with someone else of a kind to corrupt him. c

THEAG. Do not be afraid any longer now, father, for me at least, if indeed you are able to persuade him to accept being with me.

DEM. You speak very well. Socrates, the talk from here on would now be addressed to you; for I am ready, to put it briefly, both myself and what is mine, as much your own as can be,

1. Burnet's page prints *ei*, "if", where the sense requires *ei* with the circumflex, "you are"; the misprint is kept on the Greek page, and the English translates the sense.

2. *Hermaion*, a lucky find, named after Hermes, the god of luck and of things found on the road.

τατα παρέχειν, ὅτου ἂν δέῃ ἔμβραχυν, ἐὰν Θεάγῃ τουτονὶ ἀσπάζῃ τε καὶ εὐεργετῆς ὅτι ἂν οἶός τε ᾦς.

d

ΣΩ. ὦ Δημόδοκε, τὸ μὲν ἐσπουδακέναι σε οὐ θαυμάζω, εἴπερ οἶει ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ μάλιστ' ἂν σοι τοῦτον ὠφελῇσθαι—οὐ γὰρ οἶδα ὑπὲρ ὅτου ἂν τις νοῦν ἔχων μᾶλλον σπουδάζῃ ἢ ὑπὲρ ἑός αὐτοῦ ὅπως ὥς βέλτιστος ἔσται—ὁπόθεν δὲ ἔδοξέ σοι τοῦτο, ὥς ἐγὼ ἂν μᾶλλον τὸν σὸν υἱὸν οἶός τ' εἶην ὠφελῆσαι πρὸς τὸ πολίτην ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἢ σὺ αὐτός, καὶ ὁπόθεν οὗτος ᾤθηται ἐμὲ μᾶλλον ἢ σὲ αὐτὸν ὠφελήσῃν, τοῦτο πάννυ θαυμάζω. σὺ γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν πρεσβύτερος εἶ ἐμοῦ, ἔπειτα πολλὰς ἤδη ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς μεγίστας Ἀθηναίοις ἤρξας, καὶ τιμᾷ ὑπὸ Ἀναγυρασίων τε τῶν δημοτῶν πολὺ μάλιστα καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδενὸς ἦττον· ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ἐνορᾷ οὐδέτερος ὑμῶν. ἔπειτα εἰ ἄρα τῆς μὲν τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν συνουσίας Θεάγῃς ὅδε καταφρονεῖ, ἄλλους δὲ τινὰς ζητεῖ οἱ παιδεύειν ἐπαγγέλλονται οἰοί τε εἶναι νέους ἀνθρώπους, ἔστιν ἐνταῦθα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος καὶ Πῶλος ὁ Ἀκραγαντίνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, οἳ οὕτω σοφοὶ εἰσιν ὥστε εἰς τὰς πόλεις ἰόντες πείθουσι τῶν νέων τοὺς γενναιοτάτους τε καὶ πλουσιωτάτους—οἷς ἔξεστιν τῶν πολιτῶν ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται προῖκα συνεῖναι—τούτους πείθουσιν ἀπολείποντας τὰς ἐκείνων συνουσίας αὐτοῖς συνεῖναι, προσκατατιθέντας ἀργύριον πάννυ πολὺ μισθόν, καὶ χάριν πρὸς τούτοις εἶδέναι. τούτων τινὰς εἰκὸς ἦν προαιρεῖσθαι καὶ τὸν υἱὸν σου καὶ αὐτὸν σέ, ἐμὲ δ' οὐκ εἰκός· οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτων ἐπίσταμαι τῶν μακαρίων τε καὶ καλῶν μαθημάτων—ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν—ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγω δῆπου αἰεὶ ὅτι ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενος πλὴν γε σμικροῦ τινος μαθήματος, τῶν ἐρωτικῶν. τοῦτο

e

5

128

5

b

d 5 ἔδοξέ σοι B T: σοι ἔδοξε Priscianus d 6 ἂν secl. Cobet: δὴ H. Richards τ' εἶην Priscianus: τέ τ' ἦν B: τε ἦν T e 1 μὲν in ras. B e 8 κείος B: κίος T a 5 τούτους B T: om. W (sed cf. Apol. 19 e, 6) ἀπολείποντας B T W (cf. Prot. 316): ἀπολιπόντας Cobet (cf. Apol. 20 a, 1) a 6 ἀργύριον secl. Schanz (et mox scr. πολὺν) πάννυ πολὺ Beck: πάμπολυ Cobet: πάννυ πολὺν B T

to offer you, in whatever at all may be needed, if you will welcome d
Theages here and do him whatever good you can.

soc. Demodocus, that you are in earnest I do not wonder, if indeed you think that this boy of yours would be benefited most of all by me—for I do not know about what a man of sense would be more in earnest than about his own son, that he may be as good as possible—but where you got this idea, that I would be better able than you yourself to benefit your son towards becoming a good citizen, and where he got the idea that I would benefit him more than you yourself, this I wonder at very much. For, first, you are older e
than I; then you have already ruled in many offices, and the greatest, for the Athenians, and you are honored by the Anagyrasians, your fellow demesmen, by far the most, and by the rest of the city no less than anyone;¹ but none of these things does either of you see in me. Then, if after all Theages here despises being with the statesmen, and is looking for some others who profess to be able to educate young men, there is Prodicus of Ceos here, and Gorgias of Leontini, and Polus of Acragas, and many others, who are 128
so wise that they go into the cities and persuade the most wellborn and richest of the young—who are free to be with whichever of the citizens they wish for nothing—these they persuade to leave their being with those men and to be with them, paying down a great deal of money besides as a fee, and to be grateful to them on top of it.² It would be reasonable for your son and you yourself to choose some of these, but not reasonable to choose me; for I know none b
of these blessed and fine subjects—though I would like to—but, of course, I always say that I in fact know, so to speak, nothing except a certain small subject, the things of love. This

1. Anagyrus was a deme on the coast of Attica south of Athens. Thucydides names a Demodocus among the Athenian generals of 424 BC (4.75.1), perhaps the same man.

2. Prodicus of Ceos was known for his distinctions between words; Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily was the most famous teacher of rhetoric; Polus of Acragas, his pupil, is the second of the three men Socrates argues with in the *Gorgias*. The sentence is close to the *Apology* (19e–20a), where Socrates says that Gorgias, Prodicus and Hippias persuade the young to leave their fellow citizens, pay them and be grateful besides.

μέντοι τὸ μάθημα παρ' ὄντιν' οὖν ποιῶμαι δεινὸς εἶναι καὶ τῶν 5
προγεγονότων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν νῦν.

ΘΕ. Ὁρᾷς, ὦ πάτερ; ὁ Σωκράτης οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ
[τι] ἔτι ἐθέλειν ἐμοὶ συνδιατρίβειν—ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν ἔτοιμον,
ἐὰν οὗτος ἐθέλῃ—ἀλλὰ ταῦτα παίζων πρὸς ἡμᾶς λέγει. c
ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα τῶν ἐμῶν ἡλικιωτῶν καὶ ὀλίγῳ πρεσβυτέρων
οἳ πρὶν μὲν τούτῳ συνεῖναι οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι ἦσαν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ
συνεγένοντο τούτῳ, ἐν πάνυ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πάντων βελτίους
φαίνονται ὧν πρότερον χείρους. 5

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα οὖν οἷον τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ παῖ Δημοδόκου;

ΘΕ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία ἔγωγε, ὅτι, ἐὰν σὺ βούλῃ, καὶ ἐγὼ
οἷός τ' ἔσομαι τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι οἰοίμην καὶ ἐκείνοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, ὠγαθέ, ἀλλὰ σε λέληθεν οἷον τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ἐγὼ d
δέ σοι φράσω. ἔστι γάρ τι θεία μοῖρα παρεπόμενον ἐμοὶ
ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον δαιμόνιον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή, ἥ
ὅταν γένηται αἰεὶ μοι σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, τούτου
ἀποτροπὴν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε· καὶ ἐὰν τίς μοι τῶν 5
φίλων ἀνακουῶται καὶ γένηται ἡ φωνή, ταῦτόν τοῦτο, ἀπο-
τρέπει καὶ οὐκ ἔῃ πράττειν. καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν μάρτυρας
παρέξομαι. Χαρμίδην γὰρ τουτονὶ γιννώσκετε τὸν καλὸν
γενόμενον, τὸν Γλαῦκωνος· οὗτός ποτε ἐτύγχανε ἐμοὶ ἀνα- e
κοινοῦμενος μέλλων ἀσκήσειν στάδιον εἰς Νεμέαν, καὶ εὐθὺς
αὐτοῦ ἀρχομένου λέγειν ὅτι μέλλοι ἀσκεῖν ἐγένετο ἡ φωνή,
καὶ ἐγὼ διεκώλυόν τε αὐτὸν καὶ εἶπον ὅτι “Λέγοντός σου
μεταξὺ γέγονέ μοι ἡ φωνή ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄσκει.” 5
“Ἴσως,” ἔφη, “σημαίνει σοι ὅτι οὐ νικήσω· ἐγὼ δὲ κἂν
μὴ μέλλω νικᾶν, γυμνασάμενός γε τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ὠφελή-
θησομαι.” ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἤσκει· ἄξιον οὖν πυθέσθαι αὐτοῦ

b5 ποιῶμαι] *fuit qui οἶμαι aut προσποιῶμαι legendum putaret* Stallbaum:
ἀντιποιῶμαι Fritzsche: ἡγοῦμαι Cobet b7 ὁ Cobet: ὅτι B T (μοι secl. ci. H.
Richards) b8 τι om. Ven. 189 c1 ἐθέλῃ corr. Coisl.: ἐθέλοι B T ἀλλὰ sqq.
alteri tribuit B c5 φαίνονται] ἐφαίνοντο Schleiermacher d5 δὲ T: om. B (δ' b)
W e1 γενόμενον] λεγόμενον Cobet e2 νεμέαν T: νεμαίαν B e3 ἡ B T: om. W
e7 ὠφελήσομαι Cobet

subject, however, I count myself clever at beyond anyone, both of the men who have gone before and of those now.¹

THEAG. Do you see, father? Socrates hardly seems to me willing any longer to spend time with me—since my part is ready, if he is willing—but he says this joking with us. For I know some of those of my own age and a little older who before they were with him were worth nothing, but once they came to be with him, in a very short time they appear better than all those they were worse than before.

soc. Do you know, then, what this is, son of Demodocus?

THEAG. Yes, by Zeus, I do: that if you wish, I too will be able to become such as those men are.

soc. No, my good friend; it has escaped you what this is, but I will tell you. For there is something daimonic that has accompanied me by a divine lot, beginning in my childhood.² It is a voice, which, whenever it comes, always signals to me a turning away from whatever I am about to do, but never turns me towards anything; and if one of my friends consults me and the voice comes, it is the same: it turns him away and does not allow him to do it. And of these things I will provide you with witnesses. You know Charmides here, who has grown up beautiful, the son of Glaucon.³ He was in fact once consulting me, when he was about to train for the stadion race at Nemea,⁴ and as soon as he began to say that he was going to train, the voice came, and I tried to prevent him, and said, “In the midst of your speaking the voice of the daimonic has come to me; no, do not train.” “Perhaps,” he said, “it signals to you that I will not win; but even if I am not going to win, I will at least be benefited by exercising for this time.” Saying this, he trained; so it is worth finding out from him

1. In the *Symposium* Socrates says that he knows nothing except “the things of love” (177d); in the *Lysis*, that he is quick to recognize a lover and his beloved (204b–c).

2. *Daimonion* is the adjective of *daimōn*, a divine being or power, and is rendered “daimonic” throughout, kept apart from *theios*, “divine”, which stands beside it here. The *Alcibiades I* uses the same adjective of it, *daimonion enantiōma* (103a), rendered there “divine opposition”. In the *Apology* (31c–d) Socrates describes it, as here, as a voice that always turns him away and never turns him towards anything.

3. Charmides, son of Glaucon and Plato’s uncle, is the young man of the *Charmides*.

4. The stadion was the sprint of one length of the stadium, about two hundred yards; the Nemean games were among the four great games of the Greeks.

ἃ αὐτῷ συνέβη ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσκήσεως. εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε, 129
τὸν Τιμάρχου ἀδελφὸν Κλειτόμαχον ἔρεσθε τί εἶπεν αὐτῷ
Τίμαρχος ἡνίκα ἀποθανούμενος ἦι ἐϋθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου†,
ἐκεῖνός τε καὶ Εὐαθλος ὁ σταδιοδρομῶν ὃς Τίμαρχον ὑπ-
εδέξατο φεύγοντα· ἐρεῖ γὰρ ὑμῖν ὅτι εἶπεν αὐτῷ ταυτί. 5

ΘΕ. Τί;

ΣΩ. “ὦ Κλειτόμαχε,” ἔφη, “ἐγὼ μέντοι ἔρχομαι ἀπο-
θανούμενος νυνί, διότι Σωκράτει οὐκ ἤθελον πείθεσθαι.” τί
δὴ οὖν ποτε τοῦτο εἶπεν ὁ Τίμαρχος; ἐγὼ φράσω. ὅτε
ἀνίστατο ἐκ τοῦ συμποσίου ὁ Τίμαρχος καὶ Φιλήμων ὁ b
Φιλημονίδου ἀποκτενοῦντες Νικίαν τὸν Ἡροσκαμάνδρου,
ἡπιστάσθην μὲν αὐτῷ μόνῳ τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν, ὁ δὲ Τίμαρχος
ἀνιστάμενος πρὸς ἐμὲ εἶπεν, “Τί λέγεις,” ἔφη, “ὦ Σώ-
κρατες; ὑμεῖς μὲν πίνετε, ἐμὲ δὲ δεῖ ποι ἐξαναστήναι· ἦξω 5
δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ἐὰν τύχω.” καὶ μοι ἐγένετο ἡ φωνή,
καὶ εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν, “Μηδαμῶς,” ἔφην, “ἀναστής· γέγονε
γὰρ μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον.” καὶ ὃς ἐπέσχε.
καὶ διαλιπὼν χρόνον αὐθις ὥρμᾶτο ἰέναι, καὶ ἔφη· “Εἴμι c
δὴ, Σώκρατες.” αὐθις ἐγένετο ἡ φωνή· αὐθις οὖν αὐτὸν
ἠνάγκασα ἐπισχεῖν. τὸ τρίτον, βουλόμενός με λαθεῖν,
ἀνέστη οὐκέτι εἰπὼν μοι οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ λαθὼν, ἐπιτηρήσας
ἄλλοσε τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα· καὶ οὕτως ᾤχετο ἀπιὼν καὶ διε- 5
πράξατο ἐξ ὧν ἦι ἀποθανούμενος. ὅθεν δὴ τοῦτο εἶπεν
πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν ὅπερ νῦν ὑμῖν ἐγώ, ὅτι ἱοὶ ἀποθανούμενος
διὰ τὸ ἐμοὶ ἀπιστῆσαι. ἔτι τοίνυν περὶ τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ
πολλῶν ἀκούσεσθον ἃ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον περὶ τῆς διαφθορᾶς τοῦ d
στρατοπέδου. καὶ τὰ μὲν παρεληλυθότα τῶν εἰδότεων ἔστιν
ἀκοῦσαι· πείραν δ' ἔξεστι νυνὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ σημείου εἰ ἄρα
τί λέγει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τῇ ἐπὶ στρατείᾳ ἐξορμῇ Σαννίωνος τοῦ

a1 βούλεσθε B² T: βούλεσθαι B a2 ἔρεσθαι B T W (sed ε supra αι W) a3 ἦι B² T:
είη in marg. B δαιμονίου] δημίον vel δημοσίον Baier a5 ταυτί T W: ταῦτα B
b4 ἀνιστάμενος T: ἀνισται**μενος B πρὸς ἐμὲ B W: πρὸς με T c1 διαλιπὼν B:
διαλείπων T c8 τῶν T: τὸν B d1 διαφθορᾶς B T: διαφορᾶς W d4 τοῦ Καλοῦ
Ficinus (Cali filium)

what happened to him as a result of this training. And if you wish, 129
ask Clitomachus, the brother of Timarchus, what Timarchus said
to him when he was going to his death †straight for the daimonic†,¹
he and Euathlus the stadion-runner, who took in Timarchus when
he was in flight; for he will tell you that he said this to him.

THEAG. What?

soc. “Clitomachus,” he said, “I am indeed going to my death
now, because I was not willing to obey Socrates.” Now why in the
world did Timarchus say this? I will tell you. When Timarchus b
was getting up from the drinking party, and Philemon son of
Philemonides, to kill Nicias son of Heroscamandrus,² the two of
them alone knew of the plot; and Timarchus, getting up, said to
me, “What do you say,” he said, “Socrates? You go on drinking;
I must get up and be off somewhere; I will come back a little
later, if I have the luck.” And the voice came to me, and I said
to him, “On no account,” I said, “get up; for the customary sign,
the daimonic one, has come to me.” And he held back. And after c
letting some time pass he made to go again, and said, “I am
going now, Socrates.” Again the voice came; so again I made him
hold back. The third time, wishing to escape my notice, he got
up without saying anything more to me, but escaping my notice,
having watched for when I had my mind elsewhere; and so he
went off and did the deeds for which he was going to his death.
That is why he said to his brother what I am now telling you, that
he was going to his death because he had disobeyed me. Further,
about the affairs in Sicily you will both hear from many what I d
said about the destruction of the army.³ And the things that are
past one may hear from those who know; but you can make trial
of the sign now, whether there is after all anything in what it says.
For at the setting out on campaign of Sannion,

1. Burnet marks these words as corrupt; as printed they would mean “straight for the daimonic”. Baiter proposed “the executioner” or “the public prison” (*dēmiou* or *dēmosiōu*) in place of “the daimonic”.

2. Timarchus, Clitomachus and Nicias son of Heroscamandrus are not otherwise known. A Euathlus, a speaker in the courts, appears in Aristophanes (*Acharnians* 710, *Wasps* 592) and as Protagoras’ pupil (Diogenes Laertius 9.56), and a Philemon is mocked as a Phrygian in the *Birds* (763); nothing shows that either is the man named here.

3. The Athenian expedition to Sicily sailed in 415 BC and ended in 413 with the destruction of the army in its retreat from Syracuse (Thucydides 7.84–87). Plutarch says that Socrates’ sign showed him the expedition would ruin the city, and that the story spread from his friends to many (*Nicias* 13.6).

καλοῦ ἐγένετό μοι τὸ σημεῖον, οἷχεται δὲ νῦν μετὰ Θρασύλ- 5
λου στρατευσόμενος εὐθὺς Ἐφέσου καὶ Ἰωνίας. ἐγὼ οὖν
οἶομαι ἐκείνον ἢ ἀποθανεῖσθαι ἢ ὁμοῦ τι τούτῳ γ' ἐλάν, καὶ
περί γε τῆς στρατιᾶς τῆς ἄλλης πάνυ φοβοῦμαι.

Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα εἵρηκά σοι, ὅτι ἡ δύναμις αὕτη τοῦ e
δαιμονίου τούτου καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας τῶν μετ' ἐμοῦ συν-
διατριβόντων τὸ ἅπαν δύναται. πολλοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐναν-
τιοῦται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ὠφεληθῆναι μετ' ἐμοῦ διατρί-
βουσιν, ὥστε οὐχ οἶόν τέ μοι τούτοις συνδιατρίβειν· 5
πολλοῖς δὲ συνεῖναι μὲν οὐ διακωλύει, ὠφελοῦνται δὲ οὐδὲν
συνόντες. οἷς δ' ἂν συλλάβηται τῆς συνουσίας ἡ τοῦ
δαιμονίου δύναμις, οὗτοί εἰσιν ὧν καὶ σὺ ἥσθησαι· ταχὺ
γὰρ παραχρήμα ἐπιδιδόασιν. καὶ τούτων αὖ τῶν ἐπιδι-
δόντων οἱ μὲν καὶ βέβαιον ἔχουσι καὶ παραμόνιμον τὴν 130
ὠφελίαν· πολλοὶ δέ, ὅσον ἂν μετ' ἐμοῦ χρόνον ὦσιν, θαν-
μάσιον ἐπιδιδόασιν, ἐπειδὴν δέ μου ἀπόσχονται, πάλιν οὐδὲν
διαφέρουσιν ὅτουσιν. τοῦτό ποτε ἔπαθεν Ἀριστείδης ὁ
Λυσιμάχου υἱὸς τοῦ Ἀριστείδου. διατρίβων γὰρ μετ' ἐμοῦ 5
πάμπλου ἐπεδεδώκει ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ· ἔπειτα αὐτῷ στρατεία
τις ἐγένετο καὶ ὥχετο ἐκπλέων, ἥκων δὲ κατελάμβανε μετ'
ἐμοῦ διατρίβοντα Θουκυδίην τὸν Μελησίου υἱὸν τοῦ Θου-
κυδίδου. ὁ δὲ Θουκυδίδης τῇ προτεραίᾳ μοι δι' ἀπεχθείας b
ἐν λόγοις τισὶν ἐγεγονεί· ἰδὼν οὖν με ὁ Ἀριστείδης, ἐπειδὴ
ἡσπάσατό τε καὶ τᾶλλα διελέχθη, “Θουκυδίην δέ,” ἔφη,
“ἀκούω, ὦ Σώκρατες, σεμνύνεσθαι ἅττα πρὸς σε καὶ χαλε-
παίνειν ὥς τι ὄντα.” “Ἔστι γάρ,” ἔφην ἐγώ, “οὕτως.” 5
“Τί δέ, οὐκ οἶδεν,” ἔφη, “πρὶν σοὶ συγγενέσθαι οἶον ἦν
τὸ ἀνδράποδον;” “Οὐκ ἔοικέν γε,” ἔφην ἐγώ, “νὴ τοὺς
θεούς.” “Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ αὐτός γε,” ἔφη, “καταγελάστως

d5 τὸ suprascr. B²: om. B T θρασύλλου B T: θρασύλου W d7 γ' ἐλάν Her-
mann: γελάν B: ἐλάν T W d8 στρατιᾶς Cobet: στρατείας B W: πραγματείας T
e3 ἅπαν] πᾶν Cobet e9 αὐ τῶν] αὐτῶν BT a4 ἔπαθεν T W: ἔμαθεν B a5 υἱὸς
τοῦ] τοῦ Ast a8 μελησίου B: μελισίου T υἱὸν τοῦ] τοῦ Ast b7 τὸ secl. Cobet
νὴ] μὰ Cobet

the beautiful one,¹ the sign came to me; and he is gone now with Thrasyllus on campaign, straight for Ephesus and Ionia.² So I think that he will either die or at least come to something close to it, and for the rest of the army too I am very much afraid.

I have told you all this because this power of this daimonic thing e has all power also over being with those who spend time with me. For it opposes many, and these cannot be benefited by spending time with me, so that it is not possible for me to spend time with them; many it does not prevent from being with me, but they are not benefited at all by being with me. But those in whose being with me the power of the daimonic takes a hand, these are the ones you too have perceived; for they make progress quickly, at once. And of these, in turn, who make progress, some have the benefit both firm and lasting; but many, for as long as they stay with me, make wonderful progress, but when they keep away from me, they are once more no different from anyone at all. This once happened to Aristides, son of Lysimachus, son of Aristides. For while spending time with me he had made a great deal of progress in a short time; then some campaign came up for him and he went off sailing, and on his return he found Thucydides, son of Melesias, son of Thucydides, spending time with me.³ Now Thucydides, the day before, had fallen out with me in certain arguments. So Aristides, seeing me, after he had greeted me and talked of other things, said, “But I hear, Socrates, that Thucydides is giving himself airs towards you about something, and is angry, as if he amounted to something.” “It is so,” I said. “What, does he not know,” he said, “what sort of slave he was before he came to be with you?” “It seems not,” I said, “by the gods.” “And yet I myself too,” he said, b

1. Ficinus took “the beautiful” (*kalou*) as a name, “son of Calus”.

2. Thrasyllus sailed at the beginning of summer, in 409 BC by the usual reckoning, and was beaten at Ephesus (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.2.1–10); taken strictly, Socrates’ words set the conversation in that summer, before the news came.

3. Both young men are grandsons of famous statesmen: Aristides “the Just”, and Thucydides son of Melesias, Pericles’ opponent. In the *Laches* their fathers, Lysimachus and Melesias, ask how the boys should be educated (178a–179d), and are advised to look for no one but Socrates (200c–d); in the *Theaetetus* (150e–151a) Socrates names Aristides son of Lysimachus among those who left him too soon.

ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες.” “Τί μάλιστα;” ἔφην ἐγώ. “Ὅτι,” c
 ἔφη, “πρὶν μὲν ἐκπλεῖν, ὁτῶσιν ἀνθρώπων οἶός τ’ ἢ διαλέ-
 γεσθαι καὶ μηδενὸς χείρων φαίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ὥστε
 καὶ ἐδίωκον τὰς συνουσίας τῶν χαριεστάτων ἀνθρώπων,
 νυνὶ δὲ τοῦναντίον φεύγω ἂν τινα καὶ αἰσθάνωμαι πεπαι- 5
 δευμένον· οὕτως αἰσχύνομαι ἐπὶ τῇ ἑμαυτοῦ φαυλότητι.”
 “Πότερον δέ,” ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, “ἐξαίφνης σε προούλιπεν αὕτη
 ἢ δύναμις ἢ κατὰ σμικρόν;” “Κατὰ σμικρόν,” ἦ δ’ ὅς.
 “Ἦνίκα δέ σοι παρεγένετο,” ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, “πότερον μαθόντι d
 παρ’ ἐμοῦ τι παρεγένετο ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ;” “Ἐγώ σοι
 ἐρῶ,” ἔφη, “ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄπιστον μὲν νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀληθὲς
 δέ. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔμαθον μὲν παρά σου οὐδὲν πώποτε, ὥς αὐτὸς
 οἶσθα· ἐπεδίδουν δὲ ὅποτε σοι συνείην, κἂν εἰ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ 5
 μόνον οἰκία εἶην, μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ οἰκήματι, μᾶλλον δὲ
 ὅποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰκήματι, καὶ ἔμοιγε ἐδόκουν πολὺ μᾶλλον
 ὅποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰκήματι ὦν λέγοντός σου βλέπομι πρὸς
 σέ, μᾶλλον ἢ ὅποτε ἄλλοσε ὁρώην, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ e
 πλείστον ἐπεδίδουν ὅποτε παρ’ αὐτόν σε καθοίμην ἐχόμενός
 σου καὶ ἀπτόμενος· νῦν δέ,” ἦ δ’ ὅς, “πᾶσα ἐκείνη ἢ ἕξις
 ἐξερρήκε.”

Ἔστιν οὖν, ὦ Θεάγες, τοιαύτη ἡ ἡμετέρα συνουσία· ἐὰν 5
 μὲν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ἦ, πάνυ πολὺ ἐπιδώσεις καὶ ταχύ, εἰ δὲ
 μή, οὐ. ὅρα οὖν μή σοι ἀσφαλέστερον ἢ παρ’ ἐκείνων τινὶ
 παιδεύεσθαι οἷ ἐγκρατεῖς αὐτοὶ εἰσιν τῆς ὠφελείας ἢν
 ὠφελοῦσιν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους μᾶλλον ἢ παρ’ ἐμοῦ ὅτι ἂν
 τύχη τοῦτο πρᾶξαι. 10

ΘΕ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν τοῖνυν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡμᾶς οὕτως 131
 ποιῆσαι, ἀποπειραθῆναι τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου συνόντας

c2 ἀνθρώπων B: ἀνθρώπων T: ἂν ἀνθρώπων B² ἦ scr. Coisl.: ἦν B: ἦ T
 c5 αἰσθάνωμαι W: αἰσθάνομαι B T: αἰσθῶμαι scr. Coisl. c7 προούλιπεν W:
 προούλιπεν B T d4 μὲν B W: om. T d7 οἰκήματι T: δὲ οἰκήματι B
 e1 ὁρώην B T: ὁρώμην W δὲ W b: δὴ B T e2 καθοίμην] καθήμην Cobet
 e8 οἷ T: ὅτ B: οἷ τ W e9 ἐμοῦ] ἐμοὶ Hermann e10 τύχη] τύχης ci. Bekker

“am in a laughable state, Socrates.” “Why, exactly?” I said. “Because,” he said, “before I sailed I was able to talk with anyone at all and to appear worse than no one in arguments, so that I even pursued being with the most cultivated men; but now, on the contrary, I flee if I so much as perceive that anyone is educated, so ashamed am I of my own poor quality.” “And did this power,” I said, “leave you suddenly, or little by little?” “Little by little,” he said. “And when it came to you,” I said, “did it come to you by learning something from me, or in some other way?” “I will tell you, Socrates,” he said, “a thing past belief, by the gods, but true. For I never learned anything from you, as you yourself know; but I made progress whenever I was with you, even if I was only in the same house, not in the same room, but more when I was in the same room, and, as I seemed to myself, much more when, being in the same room while you were speaking, I looked at you, than when I looked elsewhere; and by far the most and the greatest progress I made when I sat beside you, keeping hold of you and touching you. But now,” he said, “all that state has drained away.”

Such, then, Theages, is our being with one another: if it is dear to the god, you will make very great progress, and quickly; if not, not.¹ So see whether it may not be safer for you to be educated by one of those who are themselves masters of the benefit with which they benefit men, rather than to come away from me with whatever chance may bring.

THEAG. Well, Socrates, it seems to me that we should do this: 131
make trial of this daimonic thing by being with

1. In the *Theaetetus* (150d–151a) Socrates says the same of those who come to be with him: those whom the god allows make wonderful progress, and the daimonic thing that comes to him prevents him from being with some who come back.

ἀλλήλοις. καὶ ἐὰν μὲν παρείκη ἡμῖν, ταῦτα βέλτιστα·
 εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἤδη παραχρήμα βουλευσόμεθα ὅτι δράσομεν, 5
 εἴτε ἄλλω συνεσόμεθα, εἴτε καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον τὸ σοὶ γιγνό-
 μενον πειρασόμεθα παραμυθεῖσθαι εὐχαῖσί τε καὶ θυσίαις
 καὶ ἄλλω ὅτῳ ἂν οἱ μάντις ἐξηγῶνται.

ΔΗ. Μηκέτι πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντείπης, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῷ
 μειρακίῳ· εὖ γὰρ λέγει Θεάγης.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι οὕτω ποιεῖν, οὕτω ποιῶμεν. 10

a 3 ταῦτα βέλτιστα secl. ci. Hirschig

one another. And if it allows us, that is best; but if not, then at once we will deliberate about what we shall do, whether we shall be with someone else, or whether we shall try to soothe the divine itself that comes to you with prayers and sacrifices and in any other way the prophets prescribe.¹

DEM. Do not argue against this any longer, Socrates, with the lad; for Theages speaks well.

SOC. Well, if it seems we should do so, let us do so.

1. Theages, who called the sign “this daimonic thing” a few lines above (*to daimonion touto*, 131a2), now calls it “the divine” (*to theion*).

OUTLINE

The divisions follow the argument. References are to Stephanus pages and sections, which stand in the margins of both pages of the text.

I. DEMODOCUS' REQUEST (121A–122B)

- 121a** Demodocus asks Socrates for a private word, “if you have leisure”; Socrates is “in fact at leisure anyway”, and they withdraw “into the stoa of Zeus Eleutherios”.
- 121b–c** The farmer’s image: “all things that grow fare in the same way”; planting is easy and tending hard, and “the planting of this son here—whether one should name it planting or begetting—has proved the easiest thing of all, but his rearing has been troublesome”.
- 121c–d** The boy “desires, Socrates, so he says, to become wise”. Boys of his own age and deme have unsettled him, and he thinks fit that his father should “pay money to one of the sophists, who will make him wise”.
- 122a** The father thinks it best to obey him, “lest perhaps, coming to be with someone when I am not there, he be corrupted”, and asks Socrates’ advice.

II. WHAT DOES THE BOY DESIRE? (122B–123B)

- 122b–c** Advice, Socrates says, “is indeed said to be a sacred thing”; they must first agree “what exactly we think this is about which we are deliberating”.
- 122c–d** Socrates changes it a little: they must begin by “finding out thoroughly what it is that he desires”.
- 122d–e** The boy’s name is Theages, “befitting the sacred”. He desires to become wise, and calls wise “those who have knowledge”.
- 122e–123b** He was taught letters, the cithara and wrestling, and thinks he still lacks some knowledge; his father, he says, “is not willing to introduce me to anyone”.

III. THE WISDOM BY WHICH ONE RULES (123B–124B)

- 123b–d** If he desired the wisdom of piloting or of charioteering, he could name it; the wisdom he desires has a name: "What other name, Socrates, would anyone say it has but wisdom?"
- 123d–e** Charioteering is the wisdom by which "we know how to rule a team of horses", piloting that by which we rule ships. Theages' wisdom is "the one by which we rule men", but not medicine, music or gymnastics.
- 124a–b** It is "the one by which we rule those in the city", not farming or carpentry, but "the one by which we rule all these, and the farmers themselves, and the carpenters, and all the craftsmen, and private persons, and women and men".

IV. TYRANTS (124C–125B)

- 124c–d** Aegisthus in Argos, Peleus in Phthia, Periander in Corinth, Archelaus in Macedonia and Hippias in Athens ruled "these same people".
- 124d–e** Bakis, the Sibyl and Amphilytus have the title "oracle-singers"; Hippias and Periander the title "Tyrants". "Then this is what you say you desire?" "It seems so, at any rate, from what I said."
- 124e–125b** "You rascal!" The boy has been blaming his father for not sending him to "some tyrant-teacher", and the father is reproached; "shall we deliberate together, you and I, to whose house we should send him, and by being with whom he would become a wise tyrant?"

V. "WISE ARE TYRANTS BY BEING WITH THE WISE" (125B–126A)

- 125b–d** Socrates quotes the line he gives to Euripides and varies it on farmers, cooks and wrestlers: "Those wise in what do you mean, Euripides?" "Why, by Zeus, I do not know."
- 125d–e** "These are just the things that Anacreon said Callicrite knew"; she "knows tyrannical things". "You have long been mocking me, Socrates, and joking with me."
- 125e–126a** Theages would pray to be a tyrant over all men, "and still more, perhaps, to become a god", but desires to rule "not by force, at least, nor as the tyrants do, but over those who are willing", like Themistocles, Pericles and Cimon.

VI. THE STATESMEN AS TEACHERS (126A–127A)

- 126a–c** As one who would become a clever horseman goes to those skilled in horsemanship, and one who would become wise in javelin-throwing to those skilled in javelin-throwing, a would-be statesman should go to “these statesmen, who are themselves clever at the affairs of the city”.
- 126d** Theages has heard Socrates’ own argument: “the sons of these statesmen are no better than the sons of the shoemakers”.
- 126d–127a** A son who desired to become a painter and slighted the painters would leave his father at a loss; Socrates and the father will introduce Theages to whichever statesman he wishes, “and he will be with you for nothing”.

VII. THEAGES CHOOSES SOCRATES (127A–128C)

- 127a** “Are you not one of the fine and good men too? For if you were willing to be with me, that suffices, and I look for no one else.”
- 127b–d** Demodocus begs: “there is nothing I would think a greater godsend than if this boy were pleased with being with you”; he will offer “both myself and what is mine, as much your own as can be”.
- 127d–128b** Socrates wonders at the request: Demodocus is older and has “ruled in many offices”; Prodicus, Gorgias and Polus teach for fees; and Socrates knows “nothing except a certain small subject, the things of love”.
- 128b–c** Theages: “Socrates hardly seems to me willing any longer to spend time with me”; those who were with him “appear better than all those they were worse than before”.

VIII. THE DAIMONIC SIGN (128C–129E)

- 128c–d** “Do you know, then, what this is, son of Demodocus?” Theages answers that, if Socrates wishes, he too will become such as those men are; Socrates: “there is something daimonic that has accompanied me by a divine lot, beginning in my childhood. It is a voice”.
- 128d–129a** Charmides and the stadion race at Nemea: “In the midst of your speaking the voice of the daimonic has come to me; no, do not train.”
- 129a–c** Timarchus, who said he was going to his death “because I was not willing to obey Socrates”: at the drinking party the

voice twice held him back, and the third time he slipped away unnoticed.

129c–d The army in Sicily; Sannion, “gone now with Thrasyllus on campaign, straight for Ephesus and Ionia”.

IX. BEING WITH SOCRATES (129E–130E)

129e–130a The power of the daimonic “has all power also over being with those who spend time with me”: it opposes many; many are with him and are not benefited; some “make progress quickly, at once”, and of these some keep the benefit and many lose it when they keep away.

130a–c Aristides son of Lysimachus made progress, went on campaign, and came back to find Thucydides son of Melesias with Socrates: “And yet I myself too,” he said, “am in a laughable state, Socrates.”

130c–e He lost his power “little by little”; “I never learned anything from you, as you yourself know; but I made progress whenever I was with you”, most “when I sat beside you, keeping hold of you and touching you”. “But now,” he said, “all that state has drained away.”

130e “Such, then, Theages, is our being with one another: if it is dear to the god, you will make very great progress, and quickly; if not, not.”

X. THE TRIAL AGREED (131A)

131a Theages proposes to “make trial of this daimonic thing by being with one another”, and, if it does not allow them, to deliberate at once whether to be with someone else or to “try to soothe the divine itself that comes to you with prayers and sacrifices”. Demodocus: “Theages speaks well.” Socrates: “Well, if it seems we should do so, let us do so.”

EDITORIAL NOTE

The Greek text. The Greek is John Burnet's, from the third volume of his Oxford Classical Text of Plato (1903), which the *Theages* opens, as the first dialogue of the fifth of Thrasyllus' tetralogies. The copy reproduced is the one used for the *Charmides* of this series: the second impression of January 1909, "corrected in a number of places", printed at Oxford by Horace Hart. The text is reproduced page for page and line for line: each left-hand page of this edition is one page of Burnet, with his line-ends, his marginal section letters and line numbers, and his apparatus criticus at the foot. In the margin, "St. I p. 121" at the head of the dialogue gives the volume and page of Stephanus' edition at which it begins; where each later page of Stephanus begins, its number stands in place of the letter a; and within each section every fifth line is numbered. Burnet sets these in the outer margin of his page, this edition in the right-hand margin; his running heads are not reproduced. The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library's digital transcription of Burnet, and every line was then checked against the photographs of this copy; where the two differ, this edition prints what Burnet printed. Burnet's title, ΘΕΑΓΗΣ, and his list of the persons beneath it (ΔΗΜΟΔΟΚΟΣ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΘΕΑΓΗΣ, Demodocus, Socrates and Theages) are kept, with his paragraphing (a new, indented paragraph at each change of speaker), his abbreviations of the speakers' names (ΔΗ., ΣΩ., ΘΕ.), his capitals at the openings of speeches and of quoted speech, and his quotation marks (123b, 125b–e, and the stories Socrates tells at 128e–130e). Where Socrates turns from his stories to what they show, Burnet begins a new paragraph within the speech (129e1, 130e5), and so does this edition. The line of verse that Socrates quotes, and the lines he makes on its pattern, are set as verse (125b–d). Square brackets [] enclose words Burnet believed spurious: διδασκάλου at 125a1, which Schleiermacher deletes, and τι at 128b8, which Ven. 189 (the manuscript Burnet's list of sigla calls S) leaves out. The obeli † † at 129a3 enclose words Burnet believed corrupt and did not mend. His misprints are kept: at 127a9 his page has εἰ, "if", for εἶ, "you are" (a reader of this copy has struck it through and written εἶ in the margin), and the English translates the sense, with a

note.

Reading the apparatus. The notes at the foot of each Greek page are Burnet's, unaltered. Entries are keyed by section letter and line as numbered in the margin, so that "a 4" is the fourth line of section a. The section letters begin again with each Stephanus page, so that on a page that runs from one Stephanus page into the next, "a 1" after "d 6" belongs to the new page. A further entry on the same line follows after a wider space without repeating the key. Usually the reading printed in the text comes first, followed by the witnesses that have it; a colon separates it from the alternatives, each followed by its witnesses. Where the text's reading is followed by a square bracket, no witnesses are listed for the text, and only other readings follow (121a1, 121a2, 125a3). Entries with no colon either report a scholar's proposal without listing the witnesses for the text, whether a deletion (121d6, 122e8, 125a1), an addition (122a2, 122a8) or a change (122c1, 122d7, 124b1), or record only what a witness has where it differs from the text: an omission (128b8), an erasure (127e1), a change of speaker (128c1) or a spelling (125e1). Inside an entry, angle brackets < > mark the words a scholar would add (122a2, 122a8); spaced points . . . stand for words of the text left unchanged between the two ends of a lemma (126b5); a vertical stroke marks the end of a line in the manuscript (χρῶ|ό, τι B, 126e6); asterisks stand for letters erased in the manuscript, one for each letter (129b4); round brackets enclose a remark on the entry (124e9, 125a7, 128b7). Burnet's references to other dialogues give the Stephanus page, section and line: "Apol. 19 e, 6" is *Apology* 19e6, and "Prot. 316" is *Protagoras* page 316 (128a5).

Names and abbreviations. Stephanus is Henri Estienne, whose edition of 1578 supplies the page numbers by which Plato is cited; the *Theages* fills pages 121–131 of his first volume. A scholar's name standing alone after a reading marks that scholar's reading, from his edition or a study. The names are of editors and critics: Stephanus; the editors Ast, Beck, Bekker, Baiter, Hermann, Schanz and Stallbaum, and Fritzsche, who revised Stallbaum's edition of the *Theages*; Schleiermacher, Plato's German translator; Cobet, Hirschig and H. Richards. Ficinus is Marsilio Ficino, whose Latin translation of Plato was printed at Florence in 1484; Burnet cites his words *Cali filium*, "son of Calus", which show that he took τοῦ καλοῦ at 129d4 as a father's name. Priscianus is Priscian, the Latin grammarian of about AD 500, who quotes the words of 127d5–6. *ci.* (*coniecit*), "conjectured", marks a scholar's conjecture; *secl.*, "set apart", a scholar's deletion; *dist.*, "punctuated", a scholar's

punctuation (121b1); *an ... ?*, “or perhaps ...?”, a scholar’s query (Stephanus at 121d1); *fort.*, “perhaps”, Burnet’s own suggestion (125d6), or, before a siglum, that the manuscript perhaps has the reading (126a5), or, before a reading followed by a scholar’s name, that scholar’s tentative proposal (126e2); *post*, “after” (121b1); *fuit qui ... legendum putaret*, “there was one who thought ... should be read”, an unnamed scholar’s view reported by the scholar named (128b5). *om.* means that a witness leaves the words out; *add.*, that they are added; *in marg.*, that a reading is written in the margin; *in ras.*, that it is written over an erasure (127e1); *suprascr.* and *supra*, that letters or a word are written above the line (124e9, 129d5; 129a2); *ut videtur*, “as it seems”, that the reading is not certain (127b4); *alteri tribuit*, that a manuscript gives the words to the other speaker, and *sqq.*, “and what follows”, that the entry covers the words after the lemma (128c1); *γρ.* (*graphetai*, “it is written”), that a manuscript records a variant beside its own reading; *et mox*, “and soon after”, that the same reading recurs a little later (123e2), or that the scholar named makes a further change just after (128a6); *scr.*, “written”, that a reading is found in the manuscript or manuscripts named (122c9, 123e2, 125d10, 127c6), or, after a scholar’s name, that he writes it (128a6); *corr.*, “corrected”, that the reading is a correction found in the manuscript named (123b3, 123e10, 124d2, 125a7, 128c1); *sed*, “but” (124e9, 125d6, 125d7); *et*, “and”; *aut* and *vel*, “or” (128b5, 129a3); *cf.*, “compare” (128a5). *schol.* is the scholiast, the author of the explanatory notes (scholia) written in the margins of B; *et sic legit schol. B*, “and so the scholiast in B read” (126b1).

The witnesses. Burnet’s apparatus to this dialogue rests chiefly on three manuscripts: B, the Bodleian Plato (MS. E. D. Clarke 39, written in 895); T, the Venice manuscript (Marcianus, Append. Class. 4, cod. 1); and W, the Vienna manuscript (Vindobonensis 54, suppl. phil. Gr. 7). Where W is not named, the apparatus does not report its reading. Later hands are marked by the small letter: b for the later correctors of B (123a7, 125a6, 125c4) and t for T (124a6), *vet. b* (*vetus*, “old”) being an older hand among them (123d13). *rec. b* is a recent hand of B (127b1). B² is B’s own early corrector; Burnet’s Preface takes him to be Arethas, the scholar for whom B was copied, or Arethas’ scribe, and keeps him apart from b (123a1, 123b2, 123d15, 125a7, 126a5, 127b4, 129a1, 129a3, 129d5, 130c2). Letters written together share a reading, so that “BT” is B and T. *recc.* (*recentiores*) are later manuscripts in general, and *vulg.* (*vulgata*) the text of the early printed editions (121a2,

124c12). Some later manuscripts are named: Ven. 184 and Ven. 189 (Burnet's S), manuscripts in the Marcian Library at Venice (122c9; 127c6, 128b8); Par. 1812, a manuscript at Paris, cited for its corrections (123e10, 124d2); Laur. lxxxv. 6, in the Laurentian Library at Florence (126a5); Ang. C. 1. 4, in the Angelica Library at Rome (125d10); and Coisl., the Coislinianus 155 at Paris, whose own readings (130c2, 130c5) and corrections (123b3, 125a7, 128c1) are cited.

The English. The translation is new. It aims to be exact, with every clause answering to a clause of the Greek, and to keep Socrates' manner: his irony with the father and the son, his teasing, and the timing of the short exchanges. Nothing is added to make it livelier; where a joke depends on the Greek, a note explains it. The speakers are named in small capitals at the head of each speech, as Burnet names them. Words that Burnet prints in square brackets are not translated. The reading Burnet prints is translated, including the conjectures he adopts; where his choice makes a real difference to the sense or the words, a note gives the other reading (as at 123b, 125a, 125d and 126b).

Each right-hand page translates the Greek page opposite. When a sentence runs over the turn of Burnet's page, the English breaks at the nearest point English word order allows. The Stephanus section letters in the margin of the English mark where each section begins.

Key terms. The words on which the argument turns have one rendering each throughout. *Sophia* is "wisdom" and *sophos* "wise", as in the series. *Synousia* is "being with" and *syneinai* "be with" in this dialogue (at 122e, where the noun cannot stand, "some man to be with"), where this series' *Alcibiades I* had "company" (119a); *syngignesthai* is "come to be with". *Epithymein* and *epithymia* are "desire"; *archein* and *archē* "rule"; *tyrannos* "tyrant", and *tyrannein* "be a tyrant". *Epistēmē* is "knowledge", *epistēmōn* "one who has knowledge", and *epistasthai* "know how" or "know". *Symbouleuein* is "advise", its middle *symbouleuesthai* "take advice", and *symboulē* "advice"; *bouleuesthai* is "deliberate" and *boulē* "counsel". *Technē* is "craft" and *dēmiourgos* "craftsman"; *kybernan* is "pilot", also of chariots (123c); *amathia* is "stupidity". *Daimonion*, the word for Socrates' sign, is "daimonic" ("something daimonic", "the daimonic"), and is kept apart from *theios*, "divine", which stands beside it at 128d and which Theages uses of the sign at 131a. *Ōphelein* and *ōphelia* are "benefit"; *epididonai* is "make progress"; *diatribein* and *syndiatribein* are "spend time" and "spend time with"; *politikoi* are "statesmen"

and *ta politika* “the affairs of the city”.

The notes. The notes identify persons, places and quotations, explain what the English cannot carry, and mark the places where Burnet’s choice of reading makes a real difference to the sense or the words. Interpretations are labelled as such. They are numbered afresh on each page.

GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

The English words on which the argument depends, in alphabetical order, with the Greek they render and the places where they matter, by Stephanus page. Where a word has a longer entry in the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Glossary says so.

advise, συμβουλεύειν (*sympouleuein*); **take advice**, συμβουλεύεσθαι (*sympouleuesthai*); **advice**, συμβουλὴ (*sympoulē*). 122a–c; “the one advising” and “the one taking advice”, ὁ συμβουλεύων and ὁ συμβουλευόμενος, 122c. See **deliberate** and Key Words, *Advise, deliberate*.

argument, λόγος (*logos*). “certain arguments” repeated from memory, 121d; the arguments Socrates is said to make about the statesmen’s sons, 126d; Thucydides’ and Aristides’ arguments, 130b–c; “the talk from here on”, 127c.

be with, συνεῖναι (*syneînai*); **being with**, συνουσία (*synousia*); **come to be with**, συγγίγνεσθαι (*syngignesthai*). “Be with”: 127a, 127b, 128a, 128c, 129e, 130d, 131a; “some man to be with”, for the noun, 122e. “Being with”: 122c, 125a, the line of verse at 125b–d, 125d, 127b, 127c, 127e, 128a, 129e, 130c, 130e. “Come to be with”: 122a, 126c, 127b, 128c, 130b. See Key Words, *Being with, come to be with*.

beautiful: see **fine**.

benefit, ὠφελεῖν (*ōphelain*), ὠφελία (*ōphelia*). 126d, 127d, 128e, 129e, 130a, 130e (“the benefit with which they benefit men”). See Key Words, *Benefit, make progress*.

blame, μέμφεσθαι (*memphesthai*). 123b, 123c, 125a, 126e, 127a, always of a son and his father.

clever, δεινός (*deinos*). “clever at the affairs of the city”, 126a, 126c; “a clever horseman”, 126b; “clever at” the things of love, 128b.

craft, τέχνη (*technē*); **craftsman**, δημιουργός (*dēmiourgos*); **fellow craftsman**, ὁμότεχνος (*homotechnos*). “Craft”, 124a; “craftsmen”, 124b, 124c, 126e; “a craftsman of the wisdom he desires”, 125a; “a fellow craftsman of Callicrite”, 125e. See Key Words, *Craft and craftsman*.

daimonic, δαιμόνιον (*daimonion*). “something daimonic”, 128d; “the voice of the daimonic”, 128e; “†straight for the daimonic†”, 129a; “the customary sign, the daimonic one”, 129b;

“this daimonic thing”, “the power of the daimonic”, 129e; “this daimonic thing”, 131a. Kept apart from **divine**. See Key Words, *Daimonic and divine*.

deliberate, βουλευέσθαι (*bouleuesthai*); **counsel**, βουλή (*boulē*). 122b, 122d, 125a (“shall we deliberate together”), 125b (“let us deliberate indeed”, “no trivial counsel”), 131a. See Key Words, *Advise, deliberate*.

desire, ἐπιθυμεῖν (*epithymein*), ἐπιθυμία (*epithymia*). 121c, 122c–e, 123a–d, 124e, 125a, 125d–e, 126a, 126e. See Key Words, *Desire*.

divine, θεῖος (*theios*); **the divine**, τὸ θεῖον (*to theion*). “nothing more divine”, 122b; “by a divine lot”, θεία μοίρα, 128d; “the divine itself that comes to you”, 131a. See **daimonic** and Key Words, *Daimonic and divine*.

educate, παιδεύειν (*paideuein*); **education**, παιδεία (*paideia*). 122b, 122e, 127e, 130c, 130e.

fine, καλός (*kalos*); **fine and good**, καλοὶ καγαθοί (*kaloi kagathoi*); **beautiful**, καλός of persons. “A fine name”, 122d; “fine and good”, 122e, 127a; “these blessed and fine subjects”, 128b; “beautiful”, of Charmides, 128d–e, and of Sannion, 129d. See Key Words, *Fine and good; beautiful*.

god, θεός (*theos*). “to become a god”, 126a; “dear to the god”, 130e; the name Theages, 122d–e (note at 122e).

in fact, τυγχάνειν (*tynchanein*) with a participle. 121a, 123b, 123c, 125e, 126a, 128b, 128e.

introduce, συνιστάναι (*synistanai*). 122a, 123a, 123b, 127a.

knowledge, ἐπιστήμη (*epistēmē*); **those who have knowledge**, ἐπιστήμονες (*epistēmones*); **know how**, ἐπίστασθαι (*epistasthai*) with an infinitive. 122e, 123a; “know how to rule”, 123d–124b; “know”, 125d (“the things that Anacreon said Callicrite knew”), 125e (“knows tyrannical things”), 128b, 129b. See Key Words, *Knowledge, know how*.

make progress, ἐπιδιδόναι (*epididonai*). 129e, 130a, 130d, 130e. See Key Words, *Benefit, make progress*.

make trial, πείραν λαβεῖν (*peiran labein*), ἀποπειραθῆναι (*apopeirathēnai*). Of the sign, 129d; “of this daimonic thing”, 131a.

obey, πείθεσθαι (*peithesthai*); **disobey**, ἀπιστεῖν (*apistein*). 122a; “I was not willing to obey Socrates”, 129a; “because he had disobeyed me”, 129c.

oracle-singers, χρησμοῦδοί (*chrēsmōidoi*), 124d; **prophets**, μάντις (*manteis*), 131a.

perceive, αἰσθάνεσθαι (*aisthanesthai*). 122c, 126d, 129e, 130c.

pilot, κυβερνᾶν (*kybernān*); **piloting**, κυβερνητική (*kybernētikē*). Of ships and of chariots, 123b–d (note at 123c). **Charioteering**, ἡνιοχική (*hēniochikē*), 123c, and ἡνιοχεία (*hēniocheia*), 123d.

power, δύναμις (*dynamis*). The power of the daimonic, 129e; “this power”, 130c. See Key Words, *Sign, voice, power*.

private persons, ἰδιῶται (*idiōtai*). 124b, 124c.

rule, ἄρχειν (*archein*), ἀρχή (*archē*); **ruler**, ἄρχων (*archōn*). 123d–124e, 125e, 126a; “ruled in many offices”, 127e. See **tyrant** and Key Words, *Rule, ruler, tyrant*.

sign, σημεῖον (*sēmeion*); **signal**, σημαίνειν (*sēmainein*); **voice**, φωνή (*phōnē*). “Signal”, 128d, 128e; “the sign”, 129b, 129d; “the voice”, 128d, 128e, 129b, 129c. See Key Words, *Sign, voice, power*.

sophist, σοφιστής (*sophistēs*). 121d, 122a (note at 121d); the teachers Socrates names at 127e–128a, Prodicus, Gorgias and Polus, are not called sophists in the text.

spend time, διατρίβειν (*diatribein*); **spend time with**, συνδιατρίβειν (*syndiatribein*). 128b, 129e, 130a.

statesmen, πολιτικοί, πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες (*politikoi, politikoi andres*); **the affairs of the city**, τὰ πολιτικά (*ta politika*). “Statesmen”, 126c, 126d, 127e; “the affairs of the city”, 126a, 126c, 127a. See Key Words, *Statesmen and the affairs of the city*.

stupidity, ἀμαθία (*amathia*). 123d (note); “ignorance” is kept for ἄγνοια.

tyrant, τύραννος (*tyrannos*); **be a tyrant**, τυραννεῖν (*tyrannēin*); **tyrannical**, τυραννικός (*tyrannikos*); **tyrant-teacher**, τυραννοδιδάσκαλος (*tyrannodidaskalos*). “Tyrants”, 124e, 125b–d, 126a; “a tyrant”, 124e, 125e (“to become a tyrant”); “a wise tyrant”, 125a; “to be our tyrant”, “tyrannical rule”, 124e; “tyrant-teacher”, 125a (note); “knows tyrannical things”, 125e. See **rule** and Key Words, *Rule, ruler, tyrant*.

use, χρῆσθαι (*chrēsthai*); **do with**, the same verb of persons. “What do we use it for?”, 123d; “make some further use of Euripides”, προσχρῆσθαι (*proschrēsthai*), 125b; “use” of horses, javelins and cities, 126b–c; “what would you do with yourself”, “anything to do with him”, “what to do with you”, 126d–127a.

wisdom, σοφία (*sophia*); **wise**, σοφός (*sophos*). 121d, 122e, 123b–d, 124b, 125a–e, 126b–d, 128a; “Wise are tyrants by being with the wise”, 125b. See Key Words, *Wise, wisdom*.

wonder, θαυμάζειν (*thaumazein*). 127a, 127d, 127e; “wonderful progress”, θαυμάσιον, 130a.

NOTE ON THIS EDITION

HOW THE VOLUME WAS MADE

The Greek was taken from the Perseus Digital Library's digital transcription of Burnet and cut into Burnet's lines by reading every line-end from the photographs of his page, in the impression described in the Editorial Note. Accents, breathings and iota subscripts were read on the sharpest photograph of each page, and a doubtful mark was settled by setting it beside sure examples of each form on the same page. The section letters and line numbers in the margin were worked out from the Stephanus divisions rather than copied, and were then compared with Burnet's margin, page by page, across the 464 lines of the dialogue.

The dialogue was made in two blocks of Burnet's pages, 1–9 and 10–17. Each block was checked by four independent reviewers: two, dividing its pages between them, compared the Greek and the apparatus with the page images letter by letter, one compared the English with the Greek clause by clause, and one checked every fact and reference in the notes and the Editorial Note. Each finding was examined again against the evidence before it was adopted, and not all were adopted. The first block was approved by the publisher for its voice before the second was begun. What the checks of the blocks caught is recorded at the end of this Note.

The volume was then read through again as one text, since a check made clause by clause cannot see some kinds of error: a word rendered one way here and another way there, a recapitulation that states a step in other words than the step itself, a rendering that departs from the earlier volumes of the series. The translator read the whole, and four further reviewers read it independently: one for the consistency of terms across the whole book and with the earlier volumes, two for sense, omissions and continuity in its two halves, and one for the Editorial Note against the scan of Burnet's volume. The Introduction, the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Outline and the Glossary were then written from the finished English, and three more reviewers checked them, claim by claim and citation by citation, together with the corrections made in the final reading.

It found some sixty points that the block checks had passed, most of them small. They fall into a few classes.

The largest class was renderings that had not been checked against the earlier volumes of the series. Words the series had already settled were brought into line: *kalos* of persons is "beautiful", of Charmides and of Sannion (128d–e, 129d), as in the *Charmides*; *manteis* are "prophets" (131a); *epimeleisthai* is "care for" (121d, 123a), as in the *Alcibiades I*; *dialegesthai* is "talk" ("talked of other things", 130b; "talk with anyone at all", 130c); *mathēma* is "subject" (128b); *anoētos* is "senseless" (126d), answering "a man of sense" at 127d; *hexis* is "state" (130e), so that Aristides' "all that state has drained away" answers his "am in a laughable state" (130c); *hoi polloi* are "the many" (127a); *gennaios* is "wellborn" (128a); *homotechnos* is "fellow craftsman" (125e); and the set answer *Εοικεν* is "It seems so" (124e), no longer sharing its English with *kindyneuei*.

Some renderings changed the sense or the voice. The boy's desire at 121c is now "unsafe", so that Demodocus' first fear is heard again in Socrates' last advice, "safer" (130e). Socrates' *poioumai* at 128b is "I count myself", not "I claim", which is the sense of two of the conjectures in the apparatus (*prospoiousmai*, *antipoiousmai*) rather than of the word Burnet prints. At 127c Demodocus' "the talk from here on would now be addressed to you" keeps the word *logos* and his turn from his son to Socrates. At 124c the question is whether Aegisthus ruled in Argos, as the other rulers in the list rule "in Phthia", "in Corinth" and "in Macedonia". At 129d Socrates fears for the rest of the army "too", not "at least". *Embrachy* at 127c is "at all", its sense with a relative, not "in short". At 122c Socrates' "adviser" became "the one advising", beside "the one taking advice", keeping the one verb of the Greek.

Five Stephanus letters stood after an English pronoun whose Greek is the ending of a verb in the new section, and were moved before it (121d, 123e, 125a, 125d, 127d). A few phrases still followed a published translation more closely than the Greek requires, and were reworded.

In the Editorial Note, the place of one example was wrong (124e9, not 125e9); *fort.* was placed on the wrong side of the siglum; the account of entries with no colon now includes those that record only what a witness has; *et mox* and *ci.* are described as Burnet uses them; the scholia in B are no longer called ancient; and the description of the notes on Burnet's readings now promises

only what the notes do. In the notes to the text, three notes were moved to the words they explain (123c, 126b, 129b); the note at 128d now says, as the English does, that the voice never turns Socrates “towards anything”; the note at 130e speaks of those who “come to be with” him; and Pericles’ ward is spelled Cleinias (126d).

WHAT REMAINS UNDONE

The place of Priscian’s quotation of 127d has not been found; the Editorial Note reports it as Burnet does. Burnet’s own conventions for the vertical stroke and the asterisks in the apparatus were confirmed from his practice elsewhere in the volume, not from a statement of his.

The apparatus is Burnet’s alone. It has not been collated against the manuscripts, and readings proposed since 1909 are not reported. The translation follows Burnet’s text even where later scholars would print something else.

The notes are a reader’s aid, not a commentary. They were chosen to explain what the English cannot carry, and they label the more doubtful interpretations as such. The question of who wrote the dialogue is set out in the Introduction but not argued, and the date of its writing is not discussed; a reader who wants the scholarly debate will need a commentary.

The checks described above were made by independent reviewers working from the same page images. The volume has not been read by a specialist outside the project, and a reader who finds an error is asked to report it.

THE RECORD OF THE BLOCKS

The notes that follow were written when each block was finished, and are kept as a record of what its check found. Where the final reading changed something they report, the text above says so.

BLOCK I: 121A–126B (BURNET PAGES 1–9)

How it was made. Burnet pages 1–9 (scan pp. 19–27), 255 lines, from Demodocus’ request for a private word to the question by going to whom a man would become a clever horseman. The Greek was set line for line from the photographs of Burnet’s page, with his apparatus, and the English written and annotated; independent reviewers then checked the Greek and the apparatus

against the photographs letter by letter, the English against the Greek clause by clause, and every note and the Editorial Note against their sources.

What the reviewers caught. The Greek text was confirmed line for line, but five words of the apparatus had been brought into line with the text or with each other when Burnet prints them otherwise: *τᾶλλα* at 121c2, without the coronis; B's unaccented *ἐλλιπειν* at 123a1 and *ἐστιν* at 125a7; Baiter's *αὐτῶν*, with the rough breathing, at 124e3; and B's *ἐγέ* at 125d7. The verse lines of 125b–d were measured again on the page and their indent reduced. In the English, ten Stephanus letters stood a word or two after the place where the Greek of the new section begins, and were moved. A question at 125a (“shall we deliberate together ...?”) had been made a statement; a negation was missing at 124c12, and Burnet's *τοῦτον* at 124d2 was untranslated; at 124a the English had followed a later hand's article. An unreal wish at 122a, a fear at 122c and a past unreal condition at 125a had been flattened, and were restored. The verb of 123b, where Socrates asks Theages to “speak out” before him, now returns at 125a, where Theages has “spoken out against” his father. The lists of workmen at 124a–b, the name of the stoa at 121a and a few phrases elsewhere were reworded where they followed a published translation too closely. In the notes, the *Apology* names Paralios, not Paralus, and says only that Theages “was” his brother; it is Socrates, not Theages, who names the sophists at 127e–128a, and Callicles, not Socrates, who offers Themistocles, Pericles and Cimon as good men at *Gorgias* 503c; and the god of the *Alcibiades I* offers Alcibiades Europe but forbids him Asia. The Editorial Note now explains *corr.*, *post*, *sed* and *et sic legit*, and distinguishes Burnet's early corrector of B from the later hands.

BLOCK II: 126B–131A (BURNET PAGES 10–17)

How it was made. Burnet pages 10–17 (scan pp. 28–35), 209 lines, from horsemen and javelin-throwers to the end of the dialogue, made as Block I was.

What the reviewers caught. The Greek text was confirmed line for line, including Burnet's misprint *εἰ* for *εἶ* at 127a9, which a reader of this copy has struck through, writing *εἶ* in the margin; in the apparatus an iota subscript was missing from Cobet's *καθ' ἡμην* (130e2). In the English, Timarchus' disobedience at 129c had been rendered as disbelief, although Socrates is repeating Timarchus' own words, “I was not willing to obey Socrates”; Demodocus'

offices at 127e now keep the word “rule”, so that the father is seen to have done what the son wants to do; a reason, a comparison and an address lost at 127a, 127c and 127e were restored; one Stephanus letter was moved; and the phrases that followed a published translation too closely were reworded. In the notes, the *Alcibiades I* uses the same word, *daimonion*, of the sign, and Theages himself calls it “daimonic” before he calls it “divine”; Polus is the second of the three men Socrates argues with in the *Gorgias*; a Euathlus and a Philemon are known from comedy, though nothing shows they are the men named here; the fathers in the *Laches* ask how their sons should be educated; and the date of the conversation, 409, is marked as an inference from Socrates’ words.