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Phaedrus

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PhaedrusIntroduction

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Introduction

Phaedrus: Introduction

p. 4

Introduction

The dialogue

The Phaedrus is a conversation between two persons only, Socrates and Phaedrus, set down in dramatic form without a narrator. Socrates meets Phaedrus as he sets out for a walk outside the wall after a morning with Lysias, the speech-writer, “sitting from early in the morning” (227a–228b), with the book of Lysias’ speech under his cloak (228d–e). They turn off along the Ilissus, wading in the stream, to “that very tall plane tree” (229a–b), where a spring flows under the tree beside “a sanctuary of some Nymphs and of Achelous” (230b–c). There, through the heat of the day and with the cicadas singing over their heads (230c, 258e–259d), they talk until the heat has passed, and they leave with a prayer to Pan and the other gods of the place (279b–c). It is the one dialogue in which Plato takes Socrates out of the town into the country, and Socrates admits that he hardly leaves the town: “the country places and the trees are not willing to teach me anything, but the people in the town are” (230d).

The dialogue runs to fifty-three pages of Stephanus’ edition (227a–279c), seventy-three of Burnet’s. The ancient arrangement of the dialogues by Thrasyllus, which Diogenes Laertius preserves, puts it fourth in the third tetralogy, after the Parmenides, the Philebus and the Symposium, with the subtitle “or On Love”, and classes it as “ethical” (3.58). Diogenes also reports a story that the Phaedrus was the first thing Plato wrote, “for its subject has something youthful about it” (3.38), and Schleiermacher, in the introduction to his German translation (1804), set it at the head of the dialogues for that reason among others. Most scholars now place it after the Republic, on grounds of style and of its relation to the doctrines of that work; the date of composition is not known (interpretation).

The dramatic date cannot be fixed either. Lysias is “the most formidable writer of those now living” (228a); his brother Polemarchus has turned to philosophy (257b); Isocrates is “still young” (278e); and Phaedrus is the Phaedrus of the Symposium, whose dinner falls in 416. But Lysias spent his youth at Thurii in southern Italy and came back to Athens only in 412/11 ([Plutarch], Lives of the Ten Orators 835d–e), Phaedrus was among those denounced in 415 for profaning the Mysteries (Andocides, On the Mysteries 1.15) and went into exile, and Polemarchus was put to death by the Thirty in 404 (Lysias 12.17). No single year fits every detail, and Plato may not have meant one to fit (interpretation).

The question and the answers

The dialogue has two parts, and its readers have long asked what joins them. The first is three speeches on love; the second is an inquiry into speaking and writing, which takes those speeches as its examples.

The first question is Lysias’. Phaedrus has spent the morning on a speech “on love” in which Lysias argues that a beautiful boy “should gratify the one who is not in love rather than the one who is” (227c). Lysias’ case, which Phaedrus reads aloud (230e–234c), is that those in love “regret the good they have done, when they cease from their desire” (231a), that “they themselves agree that they are sick rather than temperate” (231d), and that the one who is not in love, “not overcome by love but mastering myself” (233c), makes the safer friend. Socrates allows it only clear and well-turned words, and faults even its rhetoric for saying “the same things twice and three times” (234e–235a); claims that his breast is full of other things to say, heard he knows not where (235c–d), and, held to it by Phaedrus’ oath by the plane tree (236d–e), speaks against love himself, with his head covered for shame (237a).

His first speech is put in the mouth of a “wily” lover who had persuaded a boy “that he was not in love” (237b). It begins, as Lysias’ did not, with a definition: “one must know what the deliberation is about” (237c). In each of us “there are two figures that rule and lead”: “desire for pleasures”, which is inborn, and opinion, “acquired”, “aiming at the best” (237d); when desire “without reason” has mastered opinion, “has been led towards the pleasure of beauty”, and, “strongly strengthened” by its kindred desires “towards the beauty of bodies”, has conquered, it “has been called love” (238b–c). The harms the lover does to the boy’s mind, body and property follow (239a–240a), and his unpleasantness and faithlessness (240b–241c), down to a line that falls into verse: “as wolves cherish lambs, so lovers love a boy” (241d). Socrates breaks off. He is “already uttering epic verses” (241e), and he will not praise the one not in love.

As he is about to cross the river, “the daimonic and the sign that customarily comes to me” stops him (242b–c). Both speeches were “simple-minded, and somewhat impious”, for Love is “a god or something divine” and “could be nothing bad” (242d–e). Like the poet Stesichorus, who lost his sight for slandering Helen and recovered it with a “Palinode”, Socrates must sing his own speech back, “with my head bare” (243a–b).

The palinode (243e–257b) answers both earlier speeches by denying what they shared: that it is better to be with one of sound mind than with one who is mad. Rather, “the greatest of goods come to us through madness—given, however, by divine gift” (244a). Prophecy, rites and poetry are three such madnesses (244a–245a); love is the fourth, and “such madness is given by the gods for the greatest good fortune” (245b–c). To show it, Socrates first proves that “All soul is immortal”, since it is “what itself moves itself” (245c–246a). Then, since what sort of thing the soul is would be “a matter for a narration in every way and altogether divine, and long”, he tells “what it resembles”: “the grown-together power of a winged team and charioteer” (246a). The rest of the speech follows that soul through its procession behind the gods, its fall, and the regrowth of its wings in love, described in the next section, and ends with a prayer to Love that Lysias be turned “towards philosophy” (257a–b).

The second part begins from a word. A politician has called Lysias “a speech-writer”, and Phaedrus fears that he will give up writing (257c). Socrates answers that “writing speeches is not in itself shameful”, but “not speaking and writing well, but shamefully and badly”, and he asks, “What, then, is the way of writing well and not well?” (258d). After the story of the cicadas (259a–d), that question governs the rest of the dialogue.

The growing of the wings

The palinode tells how lovers come about and how a soul regains its wings, and it tells it in an order. What follows sets out the stages as the speech gives them, with what the text shows the lover attending to at each; whether these are meant as things to be done is taken up at the end of this section. The notes mark each stage where it begins in the text, and the Outline at the back follows them. What is Plato’s is kept here apart from what readers have made of it, which the essay on later readings at the back takes up.

The winged soul and its fall (246a–248c). Every soul is pictured as a charioteer with two winged horses; the gods’ horses are all good, but in ours “one is beautiful and good”, “the other of the opposite stock” (246a–b). “The power of the wing is naturally such as to lead what is heavy upward”, and the wing is nourished by “beautiful, wise, good, and everything of that sort” and wastes away by “the ugly and the bad” (246d–e). The gods journey round the heaven behind Zeus and stand on its back to behold what is outside it: “the colourless and shapeless and intangible substance that really is, beheld only by intellect, the soul’s pilot” (247c). The other souls follow as they can, “lamed” and with “wings broken”, and go away “imperfect in the spectacle of what is” and feed on “nourishment of opinion” (248a–b). A soul that, “unable to follow”, “does not see”, and is “filled with forgetfulness and vice” and weighed down, “loses its wings and falls to the earth” (248c).

The law of the lives (248c–249b). The fallen soul that “has seen most” is born as one “who will be a lover of wisdom or a lover of the beautiful or someone musical and given to love”; the others take lower lives, in nine ranks down to the tyrant (248d–e). No soul grows its wings in less than ten thousand years, “except the soul of one who has loved wisdom without guile, or been a pederast together with philosophy”: these, if they choose that life three times in succession, “so grow wings and go away in the three-thousandth year” (248e–249a).

Recollection and the fourth madness (249b–250e). “A human being must understand what is said according to a form, going from many perceptions into one, gathered together by reasoning”, and “this is recollection of those things our soul once saw when it journeyed with a god” (249b–c). “Hence, justly, only the mind of the lover of wisdom grows wings” (249c). The fourth madness is the state of one who, “seeing the beauty here and recollecting the true, grows wings, and with wings raised is eager to fly up, but unable”, and is blamed “on the ground that he is madly disposed” (249d). Few remember sufficiently (250a). Justice and temperance give no brightness in their likenesses here, but “beauty alone has got this portion, to be most manifest and most lovely” (250b–e). The contrast the text draws is this: the one “not newly perfected” “does not revere it as he looks at it”, “attempts to mount after the law of a quadruped” and keeps company with insolence (250e–251a).

The first sight (251a). The one “freshly perfected”, seeing “a godlike face that imitates beauty well”, “first shudders”, then “reveres it as a god”, and “if he did not fear the repute of utter madness, he would sacrifice to his darling as to a statue and a god” (251a). Reverence is the first thing the text shows in him.

The growth (251b–252c). “Receiving the outflow of beauty through his eyes he is warmed, by which the nature of the wing is watered”; “the parts about its outgrowth”, “long closed up by hardness”, melt, and “the shaft of the wing swells and starts to grow from the root” (251b). The soul seethes and itches “as the experience of those cutting teeth” (251c); when it receives the particles of beauty, “which is why, indeed, they are called longing”, it has respite and is glad; apart from the boy it is “parched” and in anguish (251c–e). The lover’s soul forgets “mothers and brothers and companions”, despises “all the lawful and seemly things”, and finds the beloved “the only doctor of its greatest toils” (252a–b). “This experience”, Socrates tells the boy, “human beings name love”, and the gods call it Pterōs (252b–c).

Following one’s god (252c–253c). Each lover loves after the manner of the god in whose train he followed (252c–d). The followers of Zeus look for one who “is by nature a lover of wisdom and fit to lead”, and “do everything so that he will be such” (252e); “tracking by themselves, they have resource to find out the nature of their own god” (252e–253a), and “make him as like as possible to their own god” (253a–b); the followers of every god lead the darling into their god’s way of life, “not using jealousy or servile ill will towards the darling” (253b). What the text describes the lover doing at this stage is imitating his god and leading the beloved towards him by persuasion.

The charioteer and the two horses (253c–254e). At the sight of the beloved the good horse “holds himself back”, the other drags the pair towards him (254a). Then “his memory was carried to the nature of beauty, and saw it again, standing with temperance on a hallowed pedestal”, and the memory, in reverence, “fell back on its back” and pulled the reins so violently “as to sit both the horses on their haunches, the one willing, since he did not resist, but the insolent one much against his will” (254b–c). The struggle is repeated “many times”, until “the base one leaves off his insolence, humbled”, and “then at last the lover’s soul follows the darling in modesty and fear” (254e–255a). In the text it is memory of beauty with temperance, again and again, that decides the struggle.

The beloved (255a–256a). The beloved, tended “as a peer of the gods”, admits the lover into his company (255a–b). The “stream of beauty”, flowing back “to the beautiful one through his eyes”, “waters the passages of the wings” and “fills the soul of the beloved in turn with love” (255c–d). “He is in love, then, but with what, he is at a loss”; “it escapes his notice that he is seeing himself in the one in love as in a mirror”; he has “counter-love, an image of love”, and “he calls it, and thinks it, not love but friendship” (255d–e).

The outcomes (256a–257a). “If, then, the better parts of the mind win, leading them into an ordered way of living and philosophy”, the pair “pass their life here blessed and in concord” and at death are “winged and light” (256a–b). A pair who live “a more vulgar way of living, unphilosophical but honour-loving” go out “wingless, but having started to grow wings” (256b–d). The “affinity from the one not in love” leaves the friend’s soul to “roll about the earth for nine thousand years, and under the earth, senseless” (256e–257a).

Whether this is a process in the strict sense the text leaves open. The order of the stages is plain, and some steps depend on others: the growth begins at the sight of beauty, the sight moves because it recalls what the soul once saw, and the struggle of the horses is decided by that memory. But Socrates presents the whole as a likeness, “what it resembles” (246a), and afterwards calls it “a sort of mythic hymn”, in which the speech was “perhaps laying hold of something true, and perhaps too being carried off elsewhere” (265b–c). How far the stages are meant as a path to be followed, and how far as a picture of what love already is, is a matter of interpretation.

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About This Reading Edition

The complete Phaedrus, 227a–279c: outside the walls of Athens, Socrates and Phaedrus discuss love, the soul, rhetoric, and writing. Burnet’s Greek faces a new Diotimos Editions English translation, with an introduction, key words, outline, later readings of the winged soul, glossary, critical apparatus, and linked translator notes.

Historical Text and Translation

Greek: Plato, Phaedrus, in John Burnet, Platonis Opera, volume II (Oxford, 1901; second edition, 1910), in the later Johnson/Milford impression issued no earlier than January 1935 described by the supplied edition. Its Greek was taken from the Perseus Digital Library transcription and checked against photographs of that impression; Burnet’s readings and critical apparatus are retained. The digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, under CC BY-SA 4.0. English translation and editorial matter: Diotimos Editions, 2026.

About Diotimos Editions

This historical edition credits Diotimos Editions as its English translator.

Rights

The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are reused under CC BY-SA 4.0, as verified from the official Perseus repository license. The supplied edition reports checking its transcription against Burnet’s printed pages. The new English translation and editorial matter are credited to Diotimos Editions, 2026; no open license for those new contributions is stated in the supplied files.