PLATO

Phaedrus

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ

The Greek text of John Burnet
Platonis Opera, tomus II (Oxford, 1901; second edition, 1910;
later impression, printed by John Johnson,
issued not before 1935)

with a new English translation and notes

227a–279c

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INTRODUCTION

The dialogue

The *Phaedrus* is a conversation between two persons only, Socrates and Phaedrus, set down in dramatic form without a narrator. Socrates meets Phaedrus as he sets out for a walk outside the wall after a morning with Lysias, the speech-writer, "sitting from early in the morning" (227a–228b), with the book of Lysias' speech under his cloak (228d–e). They turn off along the Ilissus, wading in the stream, to "that very tall plane tree" (229a–b), where a spring flows under the tree beside "a sanctuary of some Nymphs and of Achelous" (230b–c). There, through the heat of the day and with the cicadas singing over their heads (230c, 258e–259d), they talk until the heat has passed, and they leave with a prayer to Pan and the other gods of the place (279b–c). It is the one dialogue in which Plato takes Socrates out of the town into the country, and Socrates admits that he hardly leaves the town: "the country places and the trees are not willing to teach me anything, but the people in the town are" (230d).

The dialogue runs to fifty-three pages of Stephanus' edition (227a–279c), seventy-three of Burnet's. The ancient arrangement of the dialogues by Thrasyllus, which Diogenes Laertius preserves, puts it fourth in the third tetralogy, after the *Parmenides*, the *Philebus* and the *Symposium*, with the subtitle "or On Love", and classes it as "ethical" (3.58). Diogenes also reports a story that the *Phaedrus* was the first thing Plato wrote, "for its subject has something youthful about it" (3.38), and Schleiermacher, in the introduction to his German translation (1804), set it at the head of the dialogues for that reason among others. Most scholars now place it after the *Republic*, on grounds of style and of its relation to the doctrines of that work; the date of composition is not known (interpretation).

The dramatic date cannot be fixed either. Lysias is "the most formidable writer of those now living" (228a); his brother Polemarchus has turned to philosophy (257b); Isocrates is "still young" (278e); and Phaedrus is the Phaedrus of the *Symposium*, whose dinner falls in 416. But Lysias spent his youth at Thurii in south-

ern Italy and came back to Athens only in 412/11 ([Plutarch], *Lives of the Ten Orators* 835d–e), Phaedrus was among those denounced in 415 for profaning the Mysteries (Andocides, *On the Mysteries* 1.15) and went into exile, and Polemarchus was put to death by the Thirty in 404 (Lysias 12.17). No single year fits every detail, and Plato may not have meant one to fit (interpretation).

The question and the answers

The dialogue has two parts, and its readers have long asked what joins them. The first is three speeches on love; the second is an inquiry into speaking and writing, which takes those speeches as its examples.

The first question is Lysias'. Phaedrus has spent the morning on a speech "on love" in which Lysias argues that a beautiful boy "should gratify the one who is not in love rather than the one who is" (227c). Lysias' case, which Phaedrus reads aloud (230e–234c), is that those in love "regret the good they have done, when they cease from their desire" (231a), that "they themselves agree that they are sick rather than temperate" (231d), and that the one who is not in love, "not overcome by love but mastering myself" (233c), makes the safer friend. Socrates allows it only clear and well-turned words, and faults even its rhetoric for saying "the same things twice and three times" (234e–235a); claims that his breast is full of other things to say, heard he knows not where (235c–d), and, held to it by Phaedrus' oath by the plane tree (236d–e), speaks against love himself, with his head covered for shame (237a).

His first speech is put in the mouth of a "wily" lover who had persuaded a boy "that he was not in love" (237b). It begins, as Lysias' did not, with a definition: "one must know what the deliberation is about" (237c). In each of us "there are two figures that rule and lead": "desire for pleasures", which is inborn, and opinion, "acquired", "aiming at the best" (237d); when desire "without reason" has mastered opinion, "has been led towards the pleasure of beauty", and, "strongly strengthened" by its kindred desires "towards the beauty of bodies", has conquered, it "has been called love" (238b–c). The harms the lover does to the boy's mind, body and property follow (239a–240a), and his unpleasantness and faithlessness (240b–241c), down to a line that falls into verse: "as wolves cherish lambs, so lovers love a boy" (241d). Socrates breaks off. He is "already uttering epic verses" (241e), and he will not praise the one not in love.

As he is about to cross the river, "the daimonic and the sign that customarily comes to me" stops him (242b–c). Both speeches were "simple-minded, and somewhat impious", for Love is "a god or something divine" and "could be nothing bad" (242d–e). Like the poet Stesichorus, who lost his sight for slandering Helen and recovered it with a "Palinode", Socrates must sing his own speech back, "with my head bare" (243a–b).

The palinode (243e–257b) answers both earlier speeches by denying what they shared: that it is better to be with one of sound mind than with one who is mad. Rather, "the greatest of goods come to us through madness—given, however, by divine gift" (244a). Prophecy, rites and poetry are three such madnesses (244a–245a); love is the fourth, and "such madness is given by the gods for the greatest good fortune" (245b–c). To show it, Socrates first proves that "All soul is immortal", since it is "what itself moves itself" (245c–246a). Then, since what sort of thing the soul is would be "a matter for a narration in every way and altogether divine, and long", he tells "what it resembles": "the grown-together power of a winged team and charioteer" (246a). The rest of the speech follows that soul through its procession behind the gods, its fall, and the regrowth of its wings in love, described in the next section, and ends with a prayer to Love that Lysias be turned "towards philosophy" (257a–b).

The second part begins from a word. A politician has called Lysias "a speech-writer", and Phaedrus fears that he will give up writing (257c). Socrates answers that "writing speeches is not in itself shameful", but "not speaking and writing well, but shamefully and badly", and he asks, "What, then, is the way of writing well and not well?" (258d). After the story of the cicadas (259a–d), that question governs the rest of the dialogue.

The growing of the wings

The palinode tells how lovers come about and how a soul regains its wings, and it tells it in an order. What follows sets out the stages as the speech gives them, with what the text shows the lover attending to at each; whether these are meant as things to be done is taken up at the end of this section. The notes mark each stage where it begins in the text, and the Outline at the back follows them. What is Plato's is kept here apart from what readers have made of it, which the essay on later readings at the back takes up.

The winged soul and its fall (246a–248c). Every soul is pictured as a charioteer with two winged horses; the gods' horses are

all good, but in ours "one is beautiful and good", "the other of the opposite stock" (246a–b). "The power of the wing is naturally such as to lead what is heavy upward", and the wing is nourished by "beautiful, wise, good, and everything of that sort" and wastes away by "the ugly and the bad" (246d–e). The gods journey round the heaven behind Zeus and stand on its back to behold what is outside it: "the colourless and shapeless and intangible substance that really is, beheld only by intellect, the soul's pilot" (247c). The other souls follow as they can, "lamed" and with "wings broken", and go away "imperfect in the spectacle of what is" and feed on "nourishment of opinion" (248a–b). A soul that, "unable to follow", "does not see", and is "filled with forgetfulness and vice" and weighed down, "loses its wings and falls to the earth" (248c).

The law of the lives (248c–249b). The fallen soul that "has seen most" is born as one "who will be a lover of wisdom or a lover of the beautiful or someone musical and given to love"; the others take lower lives, in nine ranks down to the tyrant (248d–e). No soul grows its wings in less than ten thousand years, "except the soul of one who has loved wisdom without guile, or been a pederast together with philosophy": these, if they choose that life three times in succession, "so grow wings and go away in the three-thousandth year" (248e–249a).

Recollection and the fourth madness (249b–250e). "A human being must understand what is said according to a form, going from many perceptions into one, gathered together by reasoning", and "this is recollection of those things our soul once saw when it journeyed with a god" (249b–c). "Hence, justly, only the mind of the lover of wisdom grows wings" (249c). The fourth madness is the state of one who, "seeing the beauty here and recollecting the true, grows wings, and with wings raised is eager to fly up, but unable", and is blamed "on the ground that he is madly disposed" (249d). Few remember sufficiently (250a). Justice and temperance give no brightness in their likenesses here, but "beauty alone has got this portion, to be most manifest and most lovely" (250b–e). The contrast the text draws is this: the one "not newly perfected" "does not revere it as he looks at it", "attempts to mount after the law of a quadruped" and keeps company with insolence (250e–251a).

The first sight (251a). The one "freshly perfected", seeing "a godlike face that imitates beauty well", "first shudders", then "reveres it as a god", and "if he did not fear the repute of utter madness, he would sacrifice to his darling as to a statue and a god"

(251a). Reverence is the first thing the text shows in him.

The growth (251b–252c). "Receiving the outflow of beauty through his eyes he is warmed, by which the nature of the wing is watered"; "the parts about its outgrowth", "long closed up by hardness", melt, and "the shaft of the wing swells and starts to grow from the root" (251b). The soul seethes and itches "as the experience of those cutting teeth" (251c); when it receives the particles of beauty, "which is why, indeed, they are called longing", it has respite and is glad; apart from the boy it is "parched" and in anguish (251c–e). The lover's soul forgets "mothers and brothers and companions", despises "all the lawful and seemly things", and finds the beloved "the only doctor of its greatest toils" (252a–b). "This experience", Socrates tells the boy, "human beings name love", and the gods call it *Pterōs* (252b–c).

Following one's god (252c–253c). Each lover loves after the manner of the god in whose train he followed (252c–d). The followers of Zeus look for one who "is by nature a lover of wisdom and fit to lead", and "do everything so that he will be such" (252e); "tracking by themselves, they have resource to find out the nature of their own god" (252e–253a), and "make him as like as possible to their own god" (253a–b); the followers of every god lead the darling into their god's way of life, "not using jealousy or servile ill will towards the darling" (253b). What the text describes the lover doing at this stage is imitating his god and leading the beloved towards him by persuasion.

The charioteer and the two horses (253c–254e). At the sight of the beloved the good horse "holds himself back", the other drags the pair towards him (254a). Then "his memory was carried to the nature of beauty, and saw it again, standing with temperance on a hallowed pedestal", and the memory, in reverence, "fell back on its back" and pulled the reins so violently "as to sit both the horses on their haunches, the one willing, since he did not resist, but the insolent one much against his will" (254b–c). The struggle is repeated "many times", until "the base one leaves off his insolence, humbled", and "then at last the lover's soul follows the darling in modesty and fear" (254e–255a). In the text it is memory of beauty with temperance, again and again, that decides the struggle.

The beloved (255a–256a). The beloved, tended "as a peer of the gods", admits the lover into his company (255a–b). The "stream of beauty", flowing back "to the beautiful one through his eyes", "waters the passages of the wings" and "fills the soul of the beloved in turn with love" (255c–d). "He is in love, then, but with what, he

is at a loss"; "it escapes his notice that he is seeing himself in the one in love as in a mirror"; he has "counter-love, an image of love", and "he calls it, and thinks it, not love but friendship" (255d–e).

The outcomes (256a–257a). "If, then, the better parts of the mind win, leading them into an ordered way of living and philosophy", the pair "pass their life here blessed and in concord" and at death are "winged and light" (256a–b). A pair who live "a more vulgar way of living, unphilosophical but honour-loving" go out "wingless, but having started to grow wings" (256b–d). The "affinity from the one not in love" leaves the friend's soul to "roll about the earth for nine thousand years, and under the earth, senseless" (256e–257a).

Whether this is a process in the strict sense the text leaves open. The order of the stages is plain, and some steps depend on others: the growth begins at the sight of beauty, the sight moves because it recalls what the soul once saw, and the struggle of the horses is decided by that memory. But Socrates presents the whole as a likeness, "what it resembles" (246a), and afterwards calls it "a sort of mythic hymn", in which the speech was "perhaps laying hold of something true, and perhaps too being carried off elsewhere" (265b–c). How far the stages are meant as a path to be followed, and how far as a picture of what love already is, is a matter of interpretation.

The argument's main stretch

The inquiry into speaking well (259e–274b) begins with the claim Phaedrus has heard, that "there is no necessity for one who is going to be an orator to learn what is in reality just, but what would seem so to the multitude who will judge" (259e–260a). Socrates answers with the comedy of the ass praised as a horse (260b–c), and then with an argument. Socrates asks whether rhetoric is not "a kind of leading of souls through speeches", in private gatherings as in the law-courts, though Phaedrus has heard of it chiefly in lawsuits and addresses to the people (261a–b); its master's power is to make the same things "appear to the same people now just and, whenever he wants, unjust" (261c–d); deception comes about most easily among things that differ little, so that "the one who is going to deceive another, but not to be deceived himself, must know distinctly and precisely the similarity and dissimilarity of the things that are" (262a). Without the truth, a craft of speeches is "laughable, it seems, and craftless" (262c).

The three speeches then serve as examples. Lysias' opening,

read again (262e, 263e–264a), is found to have no definition: "he attempts to swim through the speech not even from the beginning but from the end, backwards" (264a), and Socrates asks whether its parts have not been "thrown together pell-mell", like the epitaph of Midas, whose lines stand in any order (264b–e). Socrates' two speeches show two forms of method: "seeing together and leading into one figure the things scattered in many places" (265d), and "being able, again, to cut it up by forms, at the joints, as it is by nature" (265e). "Of these, Phaedrus, I am myself a lover, of the divisions and collections" (266b); those who can do this he calls "dialecticians" (266c).

What the handbooks teach is reviewed next, in a catalogue of their parts and their authors, from the "preamble" to the "recapitulation" (266d–267d), and found to be "the studies necessary before" the craft, not the craft itself, as a man who knows remedies is not yet a doctor (268a–269c). The true craft needs "nature" and "knowledge and practice" (269d), and knowledge of the soul needs "the nature of the whole", as, Phaedrus adds, Hippocrates says knowledge of the body does (270c). The rhetorician must "write and make one see the soul", divide its kinds and the kinds of speeches, and know "what sort of soul, by what sort of speeches, through what cause, is of necessity persuaded" (271a–b); he must then recognize them in practice and know "the right moments" (271d–272a). The defence of "the likely", the wolf's part spoken by Socrates for Tisias, ends this stretch: Tisias is made to own that the likely is nothing other than "what the multitude thinks", and "the one who knows the truth knows best how to find the similarities" (272d–274a).

The ending

The last question is the one the second part opened with, "the becomingness and unbecomingness of writing" (274b). Socrates tells a story of Egypt: the god Theuth, who found "number and calculation and geometry and astronomy", "draughts and dice, and indeed letters too", showed his crafts to Thamus, king of all Egypt (274c–d). Of letters Theuth said that "a drug of memory and of wisdom has been found"; the king answered that letters will provide "forgetfulness in the souls of those who have learned it", "not a drug of memory but of reminding", and the seeming of wisdom instead of wisdom (274e–275b). Writing is "like painting", whose offspring "stand there as though alive, but if you ask them something, they keep silent, with great dignity"; written speeches,

asked, "signify one single thing, always the same", and a written speech "always needs its father as its helper" (275d–e). Its "legitimate brother" is the speech "written with knowledge in the soul of the learner", of which, as Phaedrus puts it and Socrates agrees, "the written one would justly be spoken of as a kind of image" (276a–b). The man who knows will sow his gardens in letters "for the sake of play", as farmers sow the gardens of Adonis, and keep his earnestness for the work of one who, "using the dialectical craft, takes a fitting soul and plants and sows in it, with knowledge, speeches" that have seed (276b–277a).

Socrates then sums up the method of the second part (277b–c) and states what makes writing a reproach: to believe that there is "a certain great firmness and clearness" in a written work, and to be ignorant "about just and unjust things and bad and good" (277d–e). Phaedrus is to carry a message to Lysias, to Homer and to Solon, and to any who write speeches, poems or laws: if they wrote "knowing how the truth stands", and can help their writings by speaking, they deserve not those titles but another; "To call him wise, Phaedrus, is, I think, a great thing, and becoming to a god alone; but either lover of wisdom or some such thing" (278b–d). Phaedrus asks what Socrates will say to Isocrates, "the beautiful", and Socrates prophesies that "there is a certain philosophy in the man's mind" (278e–279b). As the heat breaks, he prays: "My friend Pan, and all you other gods of this place, grant me to become beautiful within" (279b–c). "For the things of friends are common", says Phaedrus, and they go (279c).

What is most exposed

A first reader will find several things hard. **The unity of the dialogue.** The first half is about love and the second about rhetoric and writing, and the turn at 257c can look like a change of subject. The dialogue ties them by using its own speeches as examples, by Socrates' account of collection and division drawn from the two speeches on love (265d–266b), and, on one reading, by the leading of souls, which Socrates makes the power of speech (261a, 271c) and which the lovers practise when they "lead him into that god's way of life" (253b); but readers from antiquity on have asked what the work is about, and the essay on later readings gives some of their answers.

The setting in Athenian love. The speeches assume the Athenian custom of an older lover and a younger beloved, and Lysias' question, whether the boy should gratify one in love or one not, is

put plainly. The palinode does not reject the custom; it ranks the pair led "into an ordered way of living and philosophy" (256a) above the pair who give way to the dark horse, while still granting the second pair a prize (256a–d).

The praise of madness. Socrates, elsewhere the man of reason, says that "the greatest of goods come to us through madness" (244a). The text limits the claim at once to madness "given, however, by divine gift" (244a), and the madness of the lover is a recollection of what the soul once saw (249d); but the claim is meant to startle, and it does.

The myth. The heavenly procession, the horses fed on ambrosia and nectar, the nine lives and the ten thousand years are told as a likeness (246a), and Socrates later calls the speech "a sort of mythic hymn", "perhaps laying hold of something true" (265b–c). How much of it is doctrine is left to the reader.

A written book against writing. Plato wrote the dialogue in which Socrates says that a written speech "always needs its father as its helper" and that the wise man writes "for the sake of play" (275e, 276d). The dialogue does not resolve the tension; Socrates' own condition for writing well, that the writer can "help" what he wrote and show it to be "paltry" when questioned (278c), leaves room for writing of its own kind.

Socrates' own two speeches. The first speech is spoken with the head covered and disowned as "simple-minded, and somewhat impious" (242d), yet Socrates later uses it, with the palinode, as an example of good method (265d–266b). Apart from those two forms, he says, "the rest has in reality been played in play" (265c).

The manner

The *Phaedrus* is one of Plato's most playful works, and the play is in the persons and the place. Socrates, who hardly leaves the town, is led out like "hungry livestock" by a book held in front of him (230d–e). He catches Phaedrus with the speech under his cloak (228d–e), swears by the dog and by Hera (228b, 230b), and calls Phaedrus "the divine head" (234d). He speaks his first speech with his head covered so as not to "be at a loss for shame" (237a), warns that he may become "taken by the nymphs" and is "no longer far from dithyrambs" (238c–d), and breaks off when he finds himself "uttering epic verses" (241e). Phaedrus' oath by the plane tree (236d–e) and Socrates' "Ah! You scoundrel, how well you have found the necessity" (236e) are comedy; so is Socrates' rebuke of "sweet bend" politicians who despise writing

in name and love it in fact (257d–258c), the cicadas who were once men so fond of song that they forgot to eat (259b–c), the ass praised as a horse (260b–c), Lysias swimming through his speech "backwards, on his back" (264a), the epitaph of Midas (264c–e), and the catalogue of the handbooks' "*doubling of speech*" and "*maxim-speech*" (266d–267d). The wolf is given his part (272c), and Tisias, the inventor of the likely, is asked by Socrates "whether he says that the likely is anything other than what the multitude thinks" (273a–b). Phaedrus suspects that Socrates makes up "speeches Egyptian and from whatever country you are willing" (275b), and Socrates replies that the first prophetic speeches came from an oak, and that the people of that time were content "to hear an oak and a rock, if only they spoke true" (275b–c). The end is quiet: a message to Lysias, a prophecy of Isocrates, and a prayer.

On reading this edition

Each left-hand page is one page of Burnet's Greek, line for line, with his margin and apparatus; the right-hand page opposite translates it. The letters in the margins of both pages (a–e) mark the sections of Stephanus' pages, by which Plato is cited; the numbers (228, 229 and so on) mark where each of his pages begins. The small numbers 5 and 10 in the Greek margin count Burnet's lines, by which his apparatus is keyed. The dialogue is a conversation between Socrates and Phaedrus, and the speakers' names stand at the head of each speech (in the English, Soc. and Phaedr.). The speech of Lysias that Phaedrus reads aloud (230e–234c) is set, as Burnet sets it, without quotation marks and without speakers' names; on the Greek page a blank line stands before it and another after it. Within Socrates' first speech (237a–241d), after his invocation of the Muses, the tale and the lover's words to the boy are set in the same way, with Burnet's blank lines before the tale (237b2) and before the lover's words (237b7); Socrates' aside to Phaedrus (238c5–d7), in which the speakers' names return, has a blank line before it and another after it; at the speech's end a blank line stands before Socrates' words to Phaedrus (241d2). His second speech, the palinode, begins after a blank line (243e9), and another blank line stands after it, before Phaedrus' reply (257b7). After Socrates' prayer to Pan at the close (279b–c), his next words begin a paragraph without his name, as on Burnet's page. Burnet sets in quotation marks some words quoted from poets or from earlier in the conversation (227b, 236c–d, 237a), and letterspaces them; he also sets in quotation marks the words of

an Athenian decree (258a), a phrase of Homer (260a), the words Socrates gives to the craft of speaking (260d), whose closing mark his page omits, the opening of Lysias' speech as Phaedrus reads it again, twice broken off with a dash (262e, 263e–264a), a line shaped from Homer (266b), and the words Socrates gives to the would-be doctor, the musician, Adrastus and Pericles, and the writer of a handbook (268a–c, 268e, 269b–c, 272b), and the words of Theuth and Thamus in Socrates' Egyptian tale (274e–275b); the verses Socrates quotes from Ibycus (242d1) and Stesichorus (243a8–b1), the two verses Socrates ascribes to the Homeridae (252b8–9), and the epitaph of Midas (264d3–6), stand without quotation marks on lines of their own, indented, and in the English as displayed verse; where Socrates repeats Stesichorus' words in prose (244a3), Burnet marks them only with a capital. He also letterspaces the four names whose making Socrates explains, and the letter tau (244c–d), the handbooks' names for the parts of a speech and the devices of style (266d–267c), the recapitulation (267d), the "honey-voiced Adrastus" and the brief-speeches and image-speeches (269a), the defendant's words in Tisias' example (273c), and words spaced as a quotation, "the old age of forgetfulness" and "reaches" (276d), all of which the English sets in italics. Letters and words in angle brackets ⟨ ⟩, which the principal manuscripts lack, are added by Burnet, from a later manuscript, an early printed edition, from another scholar's conjecture or on his own judgement (232b7 Hirschig, 234c5 Heindorf, 235a2 Burnet, 235b4 the Aldine edition, 248d6 Badham, 250a7 Hirschig, 258a5 Winckelmann, 260c10 Hirschig, 263c11 Burnet after Heindorf, 266a2 Heindorf, 269c3 Heindorf, 272e2 Heindorf, 276d5 a Paris manuscript), and are translated. Words in square brackets [ ], which Burnet deletes, are not translated (236b3, 236c3, 239a6, 244e3, 246d8, 251c8, 254d3, 258a1, 260c4, 266d7, 268c1, 276d2, 278a4). The notes are numbered afresh on each page. The Key Words of the Dialogue, which follow this Introduction, explain the words on which the dialogue turns and how they are rendered. At the back of the volume are an Outline of the dialogue, an essay on later readings of the growing of the wings, an Editorial Note on Burnet's text, his apparatus and the translation, a Glossary of the key terms with the places where they occur, and a Note on how this edition was made.

What the text itself establishes is this. Phaedrus is "son of Pythocles, a man of Myrrhinus" (244a), a friend of the doctor Acumenus and his son Eryximachus (227a, 268a), and "divine about speeches" (242a); no one of his time, Socrates says, has caused more speeches to be made, "whether by speaking them yourself or by compelling others", except Simmias of Thebes (242a–b). Socrates calls him "young man" (257c) and Lysias' "lover" (257b). Lysias is "the son of Cephalus" (227a, 263d), "the most formidable writer of those now living" (228a), whose speech Phaedrus carries in a book and, Socrates guesses, knows by heart (228b–e); he is in town, with Epicrates, in the house of Morychus near the Olympieion (227b); a politician has called him "a speech-writer" (257c); and his brother Polemarchus "has been turned" towards philosophy (257b). Of Socrates the text tells that he goes barefoot (229a), rarely leaves the town (230c–d), is "the lover of speeches" (228c) and "a lover of learning" (230d) and a lover "of the divisions and collections" (266b), and is turned back by "the sign that customarily comes to me" (242b–c). Isocrates is "still young" and "the beautiful", and Socrates calls him his "darling" (278e–279b).

Outside sources add more, and some of it is disputed. Phaedrus is the Phaedrus of the *Symposium*, whose complaint that no poet had praised Love starts its speeches (177a–d), and of the *Protagoras*, where he sits with Eryximachus around Hippias (315c). He was among those denounced in 415 for profaning the Mysteries (Andocides, *On the Mysteries* 1.15) and went into exile. Lysias was the son of Cephalus of Syracuse, who is present at the opening of the *Republic*, set in the house of his son Polemarchus (328b); he went as a young man to Thurii, returned to Athens in 412/11, lost his brother Polemarchus to the Thirty in 404 and accused one of them in his twelfth speech, and was the most famous writer of speeches for others to deliver in the courts ([Plutarch], *Lives of the Ten Orators* 835c–836b; Lysias 12.4–17). Whether the speech Phaedrus reads is Lysias' own or Plato's imitation of him has been argued since antiquity, and is not settled. Isocrates (436–338 BC) became the most celebrated teacher of rhetoric in Athens, and his school was a rival of Plato's Academy; whether Socrates' praise of him at the end is meant straight or ironically is disputed. The masters of the handbooks named at 266d–267d (Theodorus, Evenus, Tisias, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, Polus, Licymnius, Protagoras and Thrasymachus) were real teachers of speaking, several of whom Plato

brings on stage elsewhere.

Each entry says what the word meant in Athens, what the dialogue does with it, and how it is rendered. The Glossary at the back lists the renderings with the places where they occur.

Love, be in love (erōs, Erōs; eran; ho erōn, ho mē erōn)

Erōs was the passion of desire, above all for a beautiful person, and *Erōs* the god of that passion, called in the poets the son of Aphrodite. The verb *eran* meant "to be in love". In the Athenian custom the speeches assume, the older man in love was the *erastēs*, "lover", and the boy he loved the *erōmenos*, "beloved", or his *paidika*, "darling". Lysias' paradox turns on a participle: a boy should gratify *ho mē erōn*, "the one who is not in love", rather than *ho erōn*, "the one in love" (227c). The English never makes this one word ("non-lover"), so that the reader can hear Lysias' contrast and Socrates' later use of it. Socrates' first speech defines love as a desire that has mastered opinion "without reason" (238b–c); the palinode makes it the fourth divine madness (249d–e) and the beginning of the soul's return. Burnet prints the god's name with a capital, and so does the English: "Love" where the god is named, "love" for the passion. *Erōs* also stands behind *Pterōs*, the gods' name for him in the verses Socrates ascribes to the Homeridae (252b), and behind *anterōs*, "counter-love" (255e). See *Longing, yearning; counter-love*.

Gratify (charizesthai)

Charizesthai meant "to do a favour", and of a beloved it was the polite word for granting his favours to a lover; *charis*, "favour", is the favour itself and the gratitude for it. Lysias' speech is an argument about whom to gratify (227c, 231b–234c), and his "those who are in love" and "those who are not in love" are measured by the favours each will return. Socrates turns the word twice. In the palinode the beloved, at last, "would not refuse to gratify the one in love" (256a), and the pair who live in philosophy hold back. In the last part of the dialogue the one who has sense must practise gratifying "masters who are good and of the good", the gods, and not his fellow slaves (273e–274a), and the question of writing is "how

you will most gratify a god concerning speeches" (274b). The English renders *charizesthai* "gratify" throughout, *charis* "favour", and *charin eidenai* "be grateful".

Madness (mania; mainesthai)

Mania was madness of every kind: disease, frenzy, possession by a god. Lysias and Socrates' first speech treat the lover's madness as the disease the word suggests: the lover is "sick rather than temperate" (231d). The palinode reverses the judgement: "the greatest of goods come to us through madness—given, however, by divine gift" (244a). There are four such madnesses, of prophecy, rites, poetry and love, given by Apollo, Dionysus, the Muses, and Aphrodite with Love (244a–245a, 249d–e, 265b); the madness of love is "the best" (249e, 265b). Socrates' etymology joins *mania* to *mantikē*, "divination", by "throwing in the *tau*" (244c), a joke on a real kinship. In the second part madness is divided again, into the kind that comes "through human diseases" and the kind that comes "through a divine departure from the accustomed lawful things" (265a). The English renders *mania* "madness" and *mainesthai* "be mad" throughout, and *enthousiazein*, its companion, "be filled with the god".

Soul (psychē)

Psychē was the life in a living thing and the self that survives death. The palinode proves that "All soul is immortal", since it alone moves itself (245c–246a), and then gives the picture of soul by which the dialogue is best known: "the grown-together power of a winged team and charioteer" (246a), with one horse beautiful and good and the other its opposite. The soul is the subject of the rest of the speech, its procession, fall and recollection; and in the second part it is the subject of rhetoric, since "the power of speech is in fact a leading of souls" (271c), and the rhetorician must divide the forms of soul and fit speeches to them (271a–d, 277b–c). The written speech has no soul; the speech of the one who knows is "living and ensouled" (276a). The English renders *psychē* "soul" everywhere, *empsychos* "ensouled" and *apsychos* "soulless".

Wing (pteron)

Pteron was a feather or a wing. In the palinode the wing is the soul's power to rise: "The power of the wing is naturally such as to lead what is heavy upward" (246d). The souls of the gods are winged and stay aloft; human souls lose their wings and fall (246c, 248c), and the speech of love is the story of their regrowth. Its vocabulary is precise: *pterousthai*, "grow wings" (249a, 249c); *pterorruein*, "lose its wings" (248c); *pterōma*, "plumage" (246e); *kaulos*, the "shaft" of a feather, which is also the stem of a plant (251b); *pterophyein*, "put forth wings" (251c). The growth of the wings is told in the words of growing things, roots and shoots, watered and warmed (251b–d), and the gods' name for Love, *Pterōs*, is made from the word (252b). The English keeps one word for each, and "wing" for *pteron* throughout. See the Introduction, *The growing of the wings*.

Recollection, memory, reminding (anamnēsis; mnēmē; hypomnēsis)

Anamnēsis, "recollection", is the calling to mind of what the soul once saw before its birth, a doctrine Plato also sets out in the *Meno* (81c–86b) and the *Phaedo* (72e–77a). In the palinode it is the way back: understanding "according to a form, going from many perceptions into one" is "recollection of those things our soul once saw" (249b–c), and the lover's madness begins when one "seeing the beauty here and recollecting the true, grows wings" (249d). The charioteer is saved by memory, *mnēmē*: "his memory was carried to the nature of beauty" (254b). In the story of Theuth the same family returns, with a difference. Letters give "forgetfulness" (*lēthē*), and they are "not a drug of memory but of reminding" (275a): *hypomnēsis*, a reminder from outside, against recollection "from within, themselves by themselves". The English keeps the three apart: *anamimnēskesthai* "recollect", *mnēmē* "memory", *hypomnēsis* "reminding", *hypomnēmata* "reminders".

Longing, yearning; counter-love (himeros; pothos; anterōs)

Himeros, "longing", and *pothos*, "yearning", were the poets' words for desire; the *Cratylus* takes *pothos* to be desire for what is absent and *himeros* for what is present (420a), a distinction the *Phaedrus* does not keep. Socrates gives *himeros* an etymology of his own: the soul receives "particles that come and flow from there—which is why, indeed, they are called longing" (251c), as if from *ienai*,

"come", *merē*, "particles", and *rhein*, "flow"; and he returns to it in the "spring of that stream which Zeus, in love with Ganymede, named longing" (255c). *Pothos* is yearning: for the things seen then (250c), for the beloved in his absence (251e), and at the sight of him, in "the goads of yearning" (253e–254a); and the beloved, in his turn, "yearns and is yearned for" (255d). *Anterōs*, "counter-love", is the beloved's love in return, "an image of love", and "he calls it, and thinks it, not love but friendship" (255d–e). The English renders *himeros* "longing", *pothos* and *pothein* "yearning", "yearn", and *anterōs* "counter-love".

Beautiful, beauty (kalos; kallos)

Kalos was the word for beauty of body, of action and of speech alike, and also for what is fine or noble. The dialogue uses it in all these senses: the boy of Lysias' speech is "one of the beautiful" (227c), Love is "overseer of beautiful boys" (265c), madness has its "beautiful works" (245b), and the question at the end is whether speaking and writing speeches "is beautiful or shameful" (277d). In the palinode beauty, *kallos*, has a place no other Form has: "beauty alone has got this portion, to be most manifest and most lovely" (250d–e), and so it is the sight of beauty that begins the wings' regrowth. The prayer at the end asks Pan to "grant me to become beautiful within" (279b). The English renders *kalos* "beautiful" and *kallos* "beauty" throughout; and the adverb *kalōs* is "well".

Temperance, temperate; sense (sōphrosynē, sōphrōn; nous)

Sōphrosynē was self-control, moderation and sound sense together, the virtue opposed to *hybris*, "insolence". Lysias' lover admits that he is "sick rather than temperate" (231d), and Socrates' first speech defines temperance as the mastery of opinion over desire (237e). The palinode sets "the temperance that comes from human beings" below "the madness from a god" (244d), and calls the affinity from the one not in love "mixed with mortal temperance" (256e); yet in the lover's soul it is beauty "standing with temperance on a hallowed pedestal" that his memory sees (254b), and the good horse is "a lover of honour with temperance and modesty" (253d). At the end Socrates prays for as much gold "as no one but the temperate man could either carry or lead off" (279c). *Nous* is "sense" in ordinary use (241a–c, 276b) and "intellect" where it is the soul's pilot that beholds what really is (247c–d). The English renders

sōphrosynē "temperance" and *sōphrōn* "temperate" throughout.

Craft (technē)

Technē was any skilled practice with rules that can be taught, from carpentry and medicine to speaking. The handbooks of rhetoric were themselves called *technai*, "crafts". The second part of the dialogue asks whether rhetoric is a craft at all, or, as the arguments that come forward protest, "not a craft but a craftless knack" (260e); and "a genuine craft of speaking," says the Laconian, "without laying hold of truth, there neither is nor shall ever come to be hereafter" (260e). What the handbooks teach is "the studies necessary before" the craft (269b); the craft itself, like medicine, divides a nature, and the rhetorician must know the soul (270b–272b). The family is rendered one word to one: *technē* "craft", *technēi* "by craft", *atechnos* "craftless", *entechnos* "with craft", *technikos* "master of the craft" (with "masterly" at 271c, 273b and 274e); *tribē* is "knack" and *empeiria* "routine", as in the *Gorgias* (462c, 463b).

Speech, account, argument, reason (logos)

Logos meant a word, a speech, an account or story, an argument, a reckoning and the power of reason. The dialogue is about *logoi* in all these senses, and the English cannot give them one word. It renders *logos* "speech" where a speech is meant, which is most often (227c, 258d, 271c, 276a); "account" for a story or saying (229d, 270c, 272b–c); "arguments" for the *logoi* that come forward to testify against rhetoric (260e–261a), with a note; "reason" for the faculty by which opinion leads and which desire defies in Socrates' first speech (237e–238c), and again in the palinode (256a); and "talk" for a conversation (230a, 254d, 255b, 272d). *Rhēma* is "expression", *onoma* "name" or "word". The second part plays on the range of the word: a speech must be put together "like an animal" (264c), the written speech is the image of "the speech of the one who knows, living and ensouled" (276a), and the speeches the dialectician sows have seed (277a).

Rhetoric, rhetorician, orator; speech-writer (rhētorikē; rhētorikos; rhētōr; logographos)

Rhētorikē was the art of public speaking; the word itself may be no older than Plato, and the *Gorgias* is the first work to use it at

length. The *Phaedrus* asks what rhetoric would be if it were a craft: "a kind of leading of souls through speeches" (261a), whose practitioner must know the truth and the kinds of soul. *Logographos*, "speech-writer", was one who wrote speeches for others to deliver in the courts, for pay, as Lysias did; a politician meant it as an insult (257c), and Socrates answers that the shame is not in writing but in writing badly (258d). The English renders *rhētorikē* "rhetoric", *rhētorikos* "rhetorician" of a person ("rhetorical" of a thing, 235a, 266c), *rhētōr* "orator", *logographos* "speech-writer" and *logographia* "speech-writing".

Leading of souls (psychagōgia)

Psychagōgia was the calling up of the souls of the dead by a necromancer, and, in Plato's time, the "winning of souls" by speech or poetry. Socrates uses it to define rhetoric: "a kind of leading of souls through speeches, not only in law-courts ... but in private ones too" (261a), and he returns to it when he says that "the power of speech is in fact a leading of souls" (271c). The image, if not the word, ties the two parts of the dialogue, on one reading: the lovers "lead him into that god's way of life and figure" (253b), and the rhetorician, if he is a master of the craft, leads souls by knowing them. The English renders it "leading of souls" in both places, with a note at the first.

Form, figure; collection, division; dialectician (eidos, idea; synagōgē, diairesis; dialektikos)

Eidos and *idea* both meant the look or shape of a thing, and so its kind; Plato used them for the Forms. The dialogue uses both in its account of method. "Seeing together and leading into one figure the things scattered in many places" is collection (265d); "being able, again, to cut it up by forms, at the joints, as it is by nature" is division (265e); "Of these, Phaedrus, I am myself a lover, of the divisions and collections" (266b), and those who can do this are "dialecticians" (266c). The rhetorician must divide the forms of soul and of speeches (271a–d), and the summary at the end recalls the method: one must define each thing and "cut it again by forms down to the uncuttable" (277b). The English renders *eidos* "form" and *idea* "figure" throughout, so that the reader can tell the two words apart, *synagōgē* "collection", *diairesis* "division", *dialektikos* "dialectician" and *hē dialektikē technē* "the dialectical craft" (276e).

The likely (to eikos; ta eikota)

To eikos, "the likely", was the probable, and in the law-courts the argument from probability, which the early teachers of rhetoric made their own. Tisias of Syracuse and Gorgias, Socrates says, "saw that likelihoods are more to be honoured than the truths" (267a). The defence of the likely is the wolf's part that Socrates speaks for them: in the courts "the truth of these things matters to nobody", "but what is persuasive does; and this is the likely" (272d–e); Tisias' example of the weak man and the strong is the likely at work (273b–c). Socrates makes Tisias own that the likely is nothing other than "what the multitude thinks" (273a–b), and answers that it comes about in the many "through similarity to the truth", and that "the one who knows the truth knows best how to find the similarities" (273d). The English renders *to eikos* "the likely", *ta eikota* "likelihoods" and the adverb *eikotōs* "as is likely" ("in a likely way" at 272e).

Write, writing, letters (graphein; graphē; grammata; syngramma)

Graphein meant to scratch, draw or paint, and so to write; *graphē* was writing and also painting, and *grammata* were letters, both the signs and literature. The second part of the dialogue begins by asking whether writing speeches is shameful (257c–258d) and ends with a judgement on writing itself (274b–278b). Letters were found by Theuth (274c–d); written speeches are like painting, *zōgraphia*, literally "drawing of living things" (275d); the written speech is the image of the speech "written with knowledge in the soul of the learner" (276a). A *syngramma*, "written work", was a written composition, and the politicians' "written works" are their decrees and laws (258a–c, 278c). The English renders *graphein* and *syngraphein* "write", *graphē* "writing", *grammata* "letters", *syngramma* "written work" and *syngrapheus* "writer".

Play, earnestness (paidia, paizein; spoudē, spoudazein)

Paidia was child's play and amusement, from *pais*, "child", and *spoudē* earnestness and serious effort. The pair runs through the dialogue. Phaedrus asks whether Socrates means to play, and Socrates asks whether he thinks him "playing and not in earnest" (234d); of Socrates' two speeches, apart from two forms of method, he says afterwards that "the rest has in reality been

played in play" (265c); the man who knows will write his gardens in letters "for the sake of play", and keep his earnestness for the speeches he sows in a soul (276b–e); and at the end "let the matter of speeches now have been played by us moderately" (278b). The English renders *paidia* and *paizein* "play" and *spoudē*, *spoudazein* "earnestness", "be in earnest" throughout, so that the theme can be followed.

Drug (pharmakon)

Pharmakon was any substance that changes the body, a remedy or a poison, and also a charm or spell. Socrates calls the book Phaedrus holds out to him "the drug to get me out" of town (230d), and says the first speech was spoken through his mouth "drugged by you" (242e). The word returns at the end, when Theuth offers letters as "a drug of memory and of wisdom", and the king answers that they are "not a drug of memory but of reminding" (274e–275a). The English renders it "drug" in every place, so that the return can be seen, and *Pharmakeia*, the nymph of 229c whose name is the Greek for the use of drugs or spells, keeps her name.

Lover of wisdom, philosophy (philosophos; philosophia; philosophein)

Philosophos meant "lover of wisdom", and Plato often uses the word with its parts in view. The palinode's first life is that of "a lover of wisdom or a lover of the beautiful" (248d), and its swiftest return is for "one who has loved wisdom without guile, or been a pederast together with philosophy" (249a); "only the mind of the lover of wisdom grows wings" (249c). At the end the title "wise" is "becoming to a god alone", "but either lover of wisdom or some such thing" suits the man who knows (278d), and Socrates finds "a certain philosophy" in Isocrates (279a). The English renders *philosophos* "lover of wisdom", *philosophein* "love wisdom" and *philosophia* "philosophy", as in the *Symposium*.

Daimonic; the sign (daimonios; to daimonion; sēmeion)

A *daimōn* was a divine power, lesser than a god or not distinguished from one, and *daimonios* meant "of a daimon", and so "marvellous", often in irony. Socrates calls Phaedrus "you daimonic man" (235c, 268a) and caps his "prodigiously" with "Daimonically" (234d). *To daimonion*, "the daimonic", is Socrates'

own sign, a voice that only ever holds him back: "the daimonic and the sign that customarily comes to me came" when he was about to cross the river, and kept him until he had made expiation for his speech (242b–c). The English renders *daimōn* "daimon", *daimonios* "daimonic" and *sēmeion* "sign", as in the *Symposium*, where Love is "a great daimon" (202d).

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ

St. III p. 227

ΣΩ. Ὦ *φίλε* Φαῖδρε, *ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν*; a

ΦΑΙ. Παρὰ Λυσίου, *ὦ* Σώκρατες, *τοῦ* Κεφάλου, *πορεύομαι δὲ πρὸς περίπατον ἔξω τείχους· συχνὸν γὰρ ἐκεῖ διέτριψα χρόνον καθήμενος ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ. τῷ δὲ σῷ καὶ ἐμῷ ἑταίρῳ πειθόμενος Ἀκουμενῷ κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ποιοῦμαι* 5 *τοὺς περιπάτους· φησὶ γὰρ ἀκοπωτέρους εἶναι τῶν ἐν τοῖς δρόμοις.* b

ΣΩ. Καλῶς *γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λέγει. ἀτὰρ Λυσίας ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν ἄστει.*

ΦΑΙ. Ναί, *παρ' Ἐπικράτει, ἐν τῇδε τῇ πλησίον τοῦ* Ὀλυμπίου *οἰκίᾳ τῇ* Μορυχίᾳ. 5

ΣΩ. Τίς *οὖν δὴ ἦν ἡ διατριβή; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῶν λόγων ὑμᾶς Λυσίας εἱστία;*

ΦΑΙ. Πεύσῃ, *εἴ σοι σχολὴ προϊόντι ἀκούειν.*

ΣΩ. Τί *δέ; οὐκ ἂν οἴει με κατὰ* Πίνδαρον "*καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον*" *πρᾶγμα ποιήσασθαι τὸ τεήν τε καὶ* 10 *Λυσίου διατριβὴν ἀκοῦσαι;*

ΦΑΙ. Πρόαγε *δή.* c

ΣΩ. Λέγοις *ἄν.*

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ *μήν, ὦ* Σώκρατες, *προσήκουσά γέ σοι ἡ ἀκοή·*

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a 5 *ἀκουμένῳ* B T (cf. Symp. 176 b, 6) **b** 6 *οὖν δὴ* B: *οὖν* T **b** 10 *ποιήσασθαι* Par. 1811: *ποιήσεσθαι* B T *τεήν* G: *σήν* B T

SOC. My friend Phaedrus,[1] where are you going, and where have you come from? 227a

PHAEDR. From Lysias, Socrates, the son of Cephalus;[2] and I am on my way for a walk outside the wall. For I spent a long time there, sitting from early in the morning. And, obeying Acumenus, your companion and mine,[3] I take my walks along the roads; for he says they are less tiring than those on the running-tracks.[4] b

SOC. Yes, my companion, for he speaks well. But Lysias, it seems, was in town.

PHAEDR. Yes, with Epicrates, in this house here near the Olympieion, the house of Morychus.[5]

SOC. So what, then, was the pastime? Or is it plain that Lysias was feasting you on speeches?

PHAEDR. You will learn, if you have the leisure to listen as you walk on.

SOC. What? Don't you think I would make the hearing of your pastime and Lysias', in Pindar's words, a matter "above even business"?[6]

PHAEDR. Lead on, then. c

SOC. Speak, please.

PHAEDR. And indeed, Socrates, the hearing is a fitting one for you;

1. Phaedrus of Myrrhinus, whose complaint that no poet had ever praised Love sets off the speeches of the *Symposium* (177a–d).

2. Lysias, the speech-writer, son of Cephalus of Syracuse; the conversation of the *Republic* takes place in the house of his brother Polemarchus in the Piraeus (328b).

3. Acumenus, a doctor, the father of Eryximachus, who speaks in the *Symposium* (176b).

4. The running-tracks of the gymnasia, also used for walking.

5. Epicrates was an Athenian politician; Morychus a gourmand mocked by the comic poets (Aristophanes, *Wasps* 506, *Peace* 1008). The Olympieion, the temple of Olympian Zeus, stood south-east of the Acropolis, near the Ilissus.

6. Pindar, *Isthmian* 1.1–3: "My mother, Thebe of the golden shield, I shall set your affair above even business" (*ascholia*, "want of leisure"). Socrates also borrows Pindar's poetic word for "your" (*teon* there, *teēn* here): the reading of G, which Burnet prints; B and T have the ordinary *sēn* (apparatus, b10).

ὁ γάρ τοι λόγος ἦν, περὶ ὃν διετρίβομεν, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον ἐρωτικός. γέγραφε γὰρ δὴ ὁ Λυσίας πειρώμενόν τινα τῶν καλῶν, οὐχ ὑπ' ἐραστοῦ δέ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ κεκόμψευται· λέγει γὰρ ὡς χαριστέον μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐρῶντι.

ΣΩ. Ὦ γενναῖος. εἴθε γράψειεν ὡς χρὴ πένητι μᾶλλον ἢ πλουσίῳ, καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ ἢ νεωτέρῳ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐμοί τε πρόσεστι καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡμῶν· ἦ γὰρ ἂν ἀστεῖοι καὶ δημωφελεῖς εἶεν οἱ λόγοι. ἔγωγ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιτεθύμηκα ἀκοῦσαι, ὥστ' ἐὰν βαδίζων ποιῇ τὸν περίπατον Μεγαράδε καὶ κατὰ Ἡρόδικον προσβὰς τῷ τείχει πάλιν ἀπίῃς, οὐ μή σου ἀπολειφθῶ.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ βέλτιστε Σώκρατες; οἴει με, ἃ Λυσίας ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ κατὰ σχολὴν συνέθηκε, δεινότατος ὢν τῶν νῦν γράφειν, ταῦτα ἰδιώτην ὄντα ἀπομνημονεύσειν ἀξίως ἐκείνου; πολλοῦ γε δέω· καίτοι ἐβουλόμην γ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἤ μοι πολὺ χρυσίον γενέσθαι.

ΣΩ. Ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέτερά ἐστι τούτων· εὖ οἶδα ὅτι Λυσίου λόγον ἀκούων ἐκεῖνος οὐ μόνον ἅπαξ ἤκουσεν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἐπαναλαμβάνων ἐκέλευέν οἱ λέγειν, ὁ δὲ ἐπείθετο προθύμως. τῷ δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἦν ἱκανά, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν παραλαβὼν τὸ βιβλίον ἃ μάλιστα ἐπεθύμει ἐπεσκόπει, καὶ τοῦτο δρῶν ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ καθήμενος ἀπειπὼν εἰς περίπατον ᾔει, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἐξεπιστάμενος τὸν λόγον, εἰ μὴ πάνυ τι ἦν μακρός. ἐπορεύετο δ' ἐκτὸς τείχους ἵνα μελετῴη. ἀπαντήσας δὲ τῷ νοσοῦντι περὶ λόγων ἀκοήν, ἰδὼν μέν, ἰδών, ἥσθη ὅτι ἕξοι τὸν συγκορυβαντιῶντα, καὶ προάγειν ἐκέλευε. δεομένου δὲ λέγειν τοῦ τῶν λόγων ἐραστοῦ, ἐθρύπτετο ὡς δὴ οὐκ ἐπιθυμῶν λέγειν· τελευτῶν

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c 9 ὦ W: ὧ T: ὧ B **a** 4 πολὺ B: πολὺν T **a** 6 εὖ B: εὖ δ' T **b** 5 πάνυ τι Schanz: πάνυ τις B T **b** 6 τῷ] τῳ ci. Stephanus **b** 7 ἰδὼν μὲν ἰδὼν B T: ἰδὼν μὲν ἰὼν G: ἰδὼν μὲν ἰόντα vulg.: alterum ἰδὼν del. t Hermann: om. Schanz

for the speech we were spending our time on was, I don't know in what way, a speech on love. For Lysias has written of one of the beautiful being solicited, though not by a lover; but this is just where he has been refined: he says one should gratify the one who is not in love rather than the one who is.[1]

SOC. Oh, the noble fellow! If only he would write that one should gratify a poor man rather than a rich one, and an older man rather than a younger, and all the other things that belong to me and to d
most of us![2] For then the speeches would indeed be urbane and of service to the people. For my part, I have come to desire so much to hear it that if you make your walk on foot to Megara and, as Herodicus would have it, go up to the wall and come back again, I will not be left behind by you.[3]

PHAEDR. What do you mean, most excellent Socrates? Do you think that what Lysias composed at his leisure over a long time, the 228
most formidable writer of those now living, I, a private person,[4] will recount from memory in a manner worthy of him? I am far from it; and yet I would want that more than to come into a great deal of gold.

SOC. Phaedrus, if I am ignorant of Phaedrus, I have forgotten myself as well.[5] But in fact neither is the case. I know well that when he heard a speech of Lysias, that man did not hear it only once, but going back over it many times he kept telling him to say it, and he eagerly obeyed. But for him not even this was sufficient; b
in the end he took the book and looked over the parts he most desired, and doing this, sitting from early in the morning, he grew weary and went for a walk, knowing the speech by heart, as I at least think, by the dog,[6] unless it was very long indeed. And he was on his way outside the wall to practise it. And having met the one who is sick for the hearing of speeches, seeing him, seeing him,[7] he was pleased that he would have a partner in his Corybantic frenzy,[8] and told him to lead on. But when the lover of speeches entreated c
him to speak, he played coy, as though he did not desire to speak; but in the end

1. *Gratify*: *charizesthai*; of a beloved, to grant his favours to a lover.
2. Socrates was poor (*Apology* 23c) and no longer young.
3. Herodicus, trainer and doctor (*Republic* 406a–b); Megara is some 40 km away.
4. *Private person*: *idiōtēs*, a layman as against a professional.
5. Phaedrus turns these words back on Socrates at 236c.
6. Socrates' oath, "by the dog, the god of the Egyptians" (*Gorgias* 482b).
7. The repetition is B's and T's; others alter or delete it (apparatus, b7).
8. Worshippers who danced in a frenzy (*Laws* 790d; *Symposium* 215e).

δὲ ἔμελλε καὶ εἰ μή τις ἑκὼν ἀκούοι βίᾳ ἐρεῖν. σὺ οὖν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, αὐτοῦ δεήθητι ὅπερ τάχα πάντως ποιήσει νῦν ἤδη ποιεῖν.

ΦΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολὺ κράτιστόν ἐστιν οὕτως ὅπως δύναμαι λέγειν, ὥς μοι δοκεῖς σὺ οὐδαμῶς με ἀφήσειν πρὶν ἂν εἴπω ἁμῶς γέ πως.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ γάρ σοι ἀληθῆ δοκῶ.

ΦΑΙ. Οὑτωσὶ τοίνυν ποιήσω. τῷ ὄντι γάρ, ὦ Σώ- d
κρατες, παντὸς μᾶλλον τά γε ῥήματα οὐκ ἐξέμαθον· τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν σχεδὸν ἁπάντων, οἷς ἔφη διαφέρειν τὰ τοῦ ἐρῶντος ἢ τὰ τοῦ μή, ἐν κεφαλαίοις ἕκαστον ἐφεξῆς δίειμι, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου.

ΣΩ. Δείξας γε πρῶτον, ὦ φιλότης, τί ἄρα ἐν τῇ ἀρι- στερᾷ ἔχεις ὑπὸ τῷ ἱματίῳ· τοπάζω γάρ σε ἔχειν τὸν λόγον αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστιν, οὑτωσὶ διανοοῦ περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγώ σε πάνυ μὲν φιλῶ, παρόντος δὲ καὶ Λυσίου, ἐμαυτόν σοι e
ἐμμελετᾶν παρέχειν οὐ πάνυ δέδοκται. ἀλλ' ἴθι, δείκνυε.

ΦΑΙ. Παῦε. ἐκκέκρουκάς με ἐλπίδος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἣν εἶχον ἐν σοὶ ὡς ἐγγυμνασόμενος. ἀλλὰ ποῦ δὴ βούλει καθιζόμενοι ἀναγνῶμεν;

ΣΩ. Δεῦρ' ἐκτραπόμενοι κατὰ τὸν Ἰλισὸν ἴωμεν, εἶτα 229
ὅπου ἂν δόξῃ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καθιζησόμεθα.

ΦΑΙ. Εἰς καιρόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνυπόδητος ὢν ἔτυχον· σὺ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἀεί. ῥᾷστον οὖν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ ὑδάτιον βρέχουσι τοὺς πόδας ἰέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἀηδές, ἄλλως τε καὶ τήνδε τὴν 5
ὥραν τοῦ ἔτους τε καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας.

ΣΩ. Πρόαγε δή, καὶ σκόπει ἅμα ὅπου καθιζησόμεθα.

ΦΑΙ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν ἐκείνην τὴν ὑψηλοτάτην πλάτανον;

ΣΩ. Τί μήν;

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d 4 *ἕκαστον* T W: om. B **d** 6 *ἐν* B: *ὃ ἐν* T **e** 1 δὲ *καὶ λυσίου* B: δὲ *λυσίου* T: δ' *ἐκείνου* Badham **e** 2 *δείκνυ* Hirschig **e** 5 *καθιζόμενοι* B T: *καθεζόμενοι* Vind. 89 Stallbaum **a** 2 *καθιζησόμεθα* B T W Bekk. Anecd. i. 101: *καθιζώμεθα* Stephanus

he was going to speak by force even if no one would listen willingly. So you, Phaedrus, entreat him to do now at once what he will soon do in any case.

PHAEDR. In truth it is much best for me to speak as I am able, since I think you will by no means let me go until I speak somehow or other.

SOC. Yes, for what you think of me is quite true.

PHAEDR. Well then, I will do it like this. For in reality, Socrates, d
I most certainly did not learn the expressions by heart; but the thought of nearly everything in which he said the case of the one in love differs from that of the one who is not, I will go through in summary, each in order, beginning from the first.

SOC. Yes, once you have first shown me, friend of mine, what it is you have in your left hand under your cloak; for I guess you have the speech itself. And if that is so, be minded like this about me: that I love you very much, but when Lysias too is present, I have e
not at all decided to offer myself to you to practise on. Come, show it.

PHAEDR. Stop. You have knocked me out of the hope I had in you, Socrates, of exercising on you. But where do you want us to sit down and read?

SOC. Let us turn off this way and go along the Ilissus;[1] then we 229
shall sit down in quiet wherever we decide.

PHAEDR. Opportunely, it seems, I am in fact barefoot; for you, of course, always are.[2] So it is easiest for us to go along the little stream wetting our feet, and not unpleasant, especially at this season of the year and of the day.

SOC. Lead on, then, and at the same time look into where we shall sit.

PHAEDR. Do you see, then, that very tall plane tree?

SOC. Of course.

1. The Ilissus, a small river that ran outside the walls on the south-east side of Athens.

2. Socrates went barefoot as a rule (*Symposium* 174a, 220b).

ΦΑΙ. Ἐκεῖ σκιά τ' ἐστὶν καὶ πνεῦμα μέτριον, καὶ πόα καθίζεσθαι ἢ ἂν βουλώμεθα κατακλινῆναι. b

ΣΩ. Προάγοις ἄν.

ΦΑΙ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἐνθένδε μέντοι ποθὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰλισοῦ λέγεται ὁ Βορέας τὴν Ὠρείθυιαν ἁρπάσαι; 5

ΣΩ. Λέγεται γάρ.

ΦΑΙ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐνθένδε; χαρίεντα γοῦν καὶ καθαρὰ καὶ διαφανῆ τὰ ὑδάτια φαίνεται, καὶ ἐπιτήδεια κόραις παίζειν παρ' αὐτά.

ΣΩ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ κάτωθεν ὅσον δύ' ἢ τρία στάδια, ᾗ c πρὸς τὸ ἐν Ἄγρας διαβαίνομεν· καὶ πού τίς ἐστι βωμὸς αὐτόθι Βορέου.

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ νενόηκα· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ πρὸς Διός, ὦ Σώκρατες, σὺ τοῦτο τὸ μυθολόγημα πείθῃ ἀληθὲς εἶναι; 5

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἀπιστοίην, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοί, οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἴην, εἶτα σοφιζόμενος φαίην αὐτὴν πνεῦμα Βορέου κατὰ τῶν πλησίον πετρῶν σὺν Φαρμακείᾳ παίζουσαν ὧσαι, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τελευτήσασαν λεχθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Βορέου ἀνάρπαστον γεγονέναι—ἢ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου· λέγεται γὰρ αὖ καὶ οὗτος d ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἐκεῖθεν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνθένδε ἡρπάσθη. ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ἄλλως μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαρίεντα ἡγοῦμαι, λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐτυχοῦς ἀνδρός, κατ' ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, ὅτι δ' αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ τῶν Ἱπποκενταύρων εἶδος ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, καὶ αὖθις τὸ τῆς Χιμαίρας, καὶ ἐπιρρεῖ δὲ ὄχλος τοιούτων Γοργόνων καὶ Πηγάσων καὶ ἄλλων ἀμηχάνων πλήθη τε καὶ ἀτοπίαι τερατολόγων τινῶν e φύσεων· αἷς εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβᾷ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἕκαστον, ἄτε ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ χρώμενος, πολλῆς αὐτῷ σχολῆς δεήσει. ἐμοὶ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ οὐδαμῶς ἐστι σχολή· τὸ δὲ

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b 2 ἢ ἂν] ἢ ἐὰν W: ᾗ ἂν B: ᾗ ἐὰν T *βουλώμεθα* T W: *βουλόμεθα* B *κατακλιθῆναι* B T W **c** 2 *τὸ ἐν Ἄγρας* scripsi (*τὰ ἐν Ἄγρας* Bratuscheck): *τὸ τῆς ἄγρας* B T W: *τὸ τῆς ἀγραίας* rec. b Eustathius *τίς* T: *τί* B **c** 7 ⟨ἂν⟩ *αὐτὴν* Ast **d** 1 ἢ ἐξ . . . *ἡρπάσθη* secl. Bast **e** 1 *πλήθη . . . ἀτοπίαι* B T W: *πλήθει . . . ἀτοπίᾳ* Athenaeus vulg. **e** 4 *αὐτα* B W: *ταῦτα* T

PHAEDR. Shade is there, and a moderate breeze, and grass for b
sitting or, if we want, for lying down.

SOC. Lead on, please.

PHAEDR. Say, Socrates, isn't Boreas said to have carried off Oreithyia from somewhere here on the Ilissus?[1]

SOC. Yes, it is said.

PHAEDR. Was it from here, then? At any rate the little waters appear charming and clean and transparent, and suited for girls to play beside.

SOC. No, but about two or three stades lower down, where we c
cross over to the shrine in Agrae;[2] and there is, I take it, an altar of Boreas there.

PHAEDR. I haven't apprehended it at all. But say, by Zeus, Socrates, are you persuaded that this legend is true?

SOC. Well, if I disbelieved it, as the wise do, I would not be outlandish; then, acting the wise man, I would say that a gust of Boreas pushed her down from the rocks nearby as she was playing with Pharmaceia,[3] and that when she had died in this way she was said to have been snatched away by Boreas—or from the Areopagus; d
for this account too is given, that she was carried off from there and not from here. But I, Phaedrus, believe such things charming in other respects, but the work of an all too formidable and laborious and not very fortunate man, for nothing else but that after this it is a necessity for him to set straight the form of the Hippocentaurs, and then again that of the Chimaera, and there floods in a crowd of such Gorgons and Pegasuses, and multitudes and out- e
landishnesses of other extraordinary natures, monsters of story. If someone disbelieves them and brings each one into line with what is likely, using some boorish wisdom, he will need much leisure. But I have no leisure at all for them; and the

1. Boreas, the North Wind, carried off Oreithyia, daughter of Erechtheus, king of Athens; the Athenians, calling on him as their "son-in-law", founded a shrine of Boreas by the Ilissus (Herodotus 7.189).

2. *The shrine in Agrae*: Burnet's own correction (apparatus, c2); B, T and W have *to tēs agras*. Across the Ilissus lay Agrae, with the temple of Artemis Agrotera, "the Huntress" (Pausanias 1.19.6). The Greek leaves the noun understood.

3. A nymph of the place; her name is the Greek for the use of drugs or spells. The rationalizing of myths by "the wise" is mocked here (interpretation).

αἴτιον, ὦ φίλε, τούτου τόδε. οὐ δύναμαί πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνῶναι ἐμαυτόν· γελοῖον δή μοι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἔτι ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν. ὅθεν δὴ χαίρειν ἐάσας ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἐμαυτόν, εἴτε τι θηρίον ὂν τυγχάνω Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον, εἴτε ἡμερώτερόν τε καὶ ἁπλούστερον ζῷον, θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον. ἀτάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων, ἆρ' οὐ τόδε ἦν τὸ δένδρον ἐφ' ὅπερ ἦγες ἡμᾶς;

ΦΑΙ. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτό.

ΣΩ. Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, καλή γε ἡ καταγωγή. ἥ τε γὰρ πλάτανος αὕτη μάλ' ἀμφιλαφής τε καὶ ὑψηλή, τοῦ τε ἄγνου τὸ ὕψος καὶ τὸ σύσκιον πάγκαλον, καὶ ὡς ἀκμὴν ἔχει τῆς ἄνθης, ὡς ἂν εὐωδέστατον παρέχοι τὸν τόπον· ἥ τε αὖ πηγὴ χαριεστάτη ὑπὸ τῆς πλατάνου ῥεῖ μάλα ψυχροῦ ὕδατος, ὥστε γε τῷ ποδὶ τεκμήρασθαι. Νυμφῶν τέ τινων καὶ Ἀχελῴου ἱερὸν ἀπὸ τῶν κορῶν τε καὶ ἀγαλμάτων ἔοικεν εἶναι. εἰ δ' αὖ βούλει, τὸ εὔπνουν τοῦ τόπου ὡς ἀγαπητὸν καὶ σφόδρα ἡδύ· θερινόν τε καὶ λιγυρὸν ὑπηχεῖ τῷ τῶν τεττίγων χορῷ. πάντων δὲ κομψότατον τὸ τῆς πόας, ὅτι ἐν ἠρέμα προσάντει ἱκανὴ πέφυκε κατακλινέντι τὴν κεφαλὴν παγκάλως ἔχειν. ὥστε ἄριστά σοι ἐξενάγηται, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε.

ΦΑΙ. Σὺ δέ γε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἀτοπώτατός τις φαίνῃ. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ, ὃ λέγεις, ξεναγουμένῳ τινὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχωρίῳ ἔοικας· οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος οὔτ' εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἀποδημεῖς, οὔτ' ἔξω τείχους ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς τὸ παράπαν ἐξιέναι.

ΣΩ. Συγγίγνωσκέ μοι, ὦ ἄριστε. φιλομαθὴς γάρ εἰμι· τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὐδέν μ' ἐθέλει διδάσκειν,

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e 6 δή B T W Proclus (in Alc. p. 289, 5): δέ Vind. 80 **a** 4 ὂν T W: om. B: ὢν vulg. ἐπιτεθυμμένον B T W (sed μ prius in ras. B): ἔτι τεθυμμένον ci. Ruhnken **b** 4 καὶ ὡς B T W: καὶ οὕτως ci. Heindorf: καὶ Schanz **b** 7 ὥστε γε B T W: ὥς γε Aristaenetus vulg. **c** 2 ἡδύ T W: ἤδη B ὑπηχεῖ τῷ T W: ὑπηχεῖτο B **c** 4 προσάντει T W: προσαντε B **c** 6 σὺ W: οὐ B T

cause of it, my friend, is this. I am not yet able, according to the Delphic inscription, to know myself;[1] and so it appears laughable to me, while I am still ignorant of this, to look into what is other 230
people's. That is why I let these things pass, bidding them farewell, and, persuaded by what is held about them, as I said just now, I look into not these things but myself: whether I am in fact some beast more intricately coiled and more fuming than Typhon, or a tamer and simpler animal, sharing by nature in some divine and unfuming portion.[2] But, my companion, in the midst of our talk, wasn't this the tree you were leading us to?

PHAEDR. Yes, this is the very one. b

SOC. By Hera,[3] a beautiful stopping-place indeed. For this plane tree is very wide-spreading and tall, and the height and the shadiness of the chaste-tree are altogether beautiful;[4] and as it is at the prime of its flowering, it would make the place most fragrant. And again the most charming spring flows under the plane tree, with very cold water, to take my foot's evidence. It seems to be a sanctuary of some Nymphs and of Achelous, from the girls and the statues.[5] And again, if you want, how much to be cherished and c
how very pleasant is the breeziness of the place: it echoes back, summery and clear-voiced, to the chorus of the cicadas.[6] But most refined[7] of all is what concerns the grass: that on a gently rising slope it is naturally sufficient for one lying down to keep his head altogether well. So you have been the best of guides to a stranger, my friend Phaedrus.

PHAEDR. And you, you marvellous man, appear a most outlandish person. For, quite simply, as you say, you resemble a d
stranger being guided and not a native. So little do you leave the town, either to cross the border or even, I think, to go outside the wall at all.

SOC. Pardon me, best of men. For I am a lover of learning; and the country places and the trees are not willing to teach me anything,

1. *Know yourself*, inscribed at Apollo's temple at Delphi; examined in the *Charmides* (164d–165b) and the *Alcibiades I* (124a–b, 129a).

2. Typhon (Hesiod's Typhoeus), the hundred-headed serpent monster overcome by Zeus (*Theogony* 820–868). *Fuming* (*epitethymmenon*, from *typhein*, "smoke") and *unfuming* (*atyphos*, also "free of vanity") play on his name.

3. An oath Socrates uses elsewhere (*Apology* 24e, *Gorgias* 449d).

4. *Agnos*, the chaste-tree, a fragrant shrub of riverbanks; its name sounds like *hagnos*, "pure".

5. Achelous, the great river of north-western Greece, worshipped with the Nymphs. *Girls*: *korai*, votive figures of girls; the word of 229b.

6. The cicadas return at 258e–259d, where Socrates tells their story.

7. *Refined*: the word Phaedrus used of Lysias (227c).

οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἄνθρωποι. σὺ μέντοι δοκεῖς μοι τῆς ἐμῆς ἐξόδου τὸ φάρμακον ηὑρηκέναι. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τὰ πεινῶντα θρέμματα θαλλὸν ἤ τινα καρπὸν προσείοντες ἄγουσιν, σὺ ἐμοὶ λόγους οὕτω προτείνων ἐν βιβλίοις τήν τε Ἀττικὴν φαίνῃ περιάξειν ἅπασαν καὶ ὅποι ἂν ἄλλοσε βούλῃ. νῦν δ' οὖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεῦρ' ἀφικόμενος ἐγὼ μέν μοι δοκῶ κατακείσεσθαι, σὺ δ' ἐν ὁποίῳ σχήματι οἴει ῥᾷστα ἀναγνώσεσθαι, τοῦθ' ἑλόμενος ἀναγίγνωσκε.

ΦΑΙ. Ἄκουε δή.

Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὡς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν γενομένων τούτων ἀκήκοας· ἀξιῶ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχῆσαι ὧν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστὴς ὤν σου τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει ὧν ἂν εὖ ποιήσωσιν, ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται· τοῖς δὲ οὐκ ἔστι χρόνος ἐν ᾧ μεταγνῶναι προσήκει. οὐ γὰρ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ἀλλ' ἑκόντες, ὡς ἂν ἄριστα περὶ τῶν οἰκείων βουλεύσαιντο, πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν τὴν αὑτῶν εὖ ποιοῦσιν. ἔτι δὲ οἱ μὲν ἐρῶντες σκοποῦσιν ἅ τε κακῶς διέθεντο τῶν αὑτῶν διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα καὶ ἃ πεποιήκασιν εὖ, καὶ ὃν εἶχον πόνον προστιθέντες ἡγοῦνται πάλαι τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδεδωκέναι χάριν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις· τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶσιν οὔτε τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἀμέλειαν διὰ τοῦτο ἔστιν προφασίζεσθαι, οὔτε τοὺς παρεληλυθότας πόνους ὑπολογίζεσθαι, οὔτε τὰς πρὸς τοὺς προσήκοντας διαφορὰς αἰτιάσασθαι· ὥστε περιῃρημένων τοσούτων κακῶν οὐδὲν ὑπολείπεται ἀλλ' ἢ ποιεῖν προθύμως ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς οἴωνται πράξαντες χαριεῖσθαι. ἔτι δὲ εἰ διὰ τοῦτο ἄξιον τοὺς ἐρῶντας περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, ὅτι τούτους μάλιστά φασιν φιλεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐρῶσιν, καὶ ἕτοιμοί εἰσι καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων

d 5 σὺ recc.: οὐ B: οὖ T δοκεῖς T: δοκεῖ B **d** 6 ἐμῆς T W: om. B **d** 7 προσείοντες t recc.: προσιόντες B T W **e** 2 δ' οὖν T: οὖν B **e** 3 κατακείσεσθαι T: κατακεισθαι (sic) B **e** 7 γενομένων τούτων B: τούτων γενομένων T **a** 2 μεταμέλει ὧν T: μεταμελειῶν B **b** 5 αἰτιάσασθαι] αἰτιᾶσθαι Cobet **c** 1 τοὺς T: τοῦ pr. B **c** 2 ἕτοιμοί εἰσι καὶ T W et in marg. b: om. B

but the people in the town are. You, though, I think, have found the drug to get me out.[1] For just as people lead hungry livestock by shaking a green branch or some fruit in front of them,[2] so you, holding out speeches to me like this in books, appear about to lead me e
around all Attica and anywhere else you want. Now, anyway, for the present, having come here, I mean to recline; and you, choose whatever posture you think you will read in most easily, and read.

PHAEDR. Listen, then.

Of my circumstances you know, and you have heard how I hold it to be to our advantage that this should come about. And I deem it right that I should not fail to obtain what I need on this account, 231
that I am in fact not your lover.[3] For those men then regret the good they have done, when they cease from their desire; but for these there is no time when it is fitting to change their minds. For not by necessity but willingly, as they would best deliberate about their own affairs, they do good to the measure of their own power. Further, those who are in love look into what of their own interests they have managed badly because of their love,[4] and what good they have done; and adding in the toil they had, they believe b
they have long since returned to their beloveds the favour due. But those who are not in love can neither plead the heedlessness of their own affairs on this account, nor reckon up past toils, nor lay the blame for their quarrels with their kin; so that, with so many evils removed, nothing is left but to do eagerly whatever they think they will gratify them by doing. Further, if it is right to value those c
who are in love highly on this account, that they say they love most those they are in love with, and are ready, both by their speech

1. *Drug*: *pharmakon*, remedy, drug or charm; the word returns when writing is offered as a drug for memory (274e).

2. *Shaking in front of them*: the reading of t and the later manuscripts, printed by Burnet; B, T and W have "approaching" (apparatus, d7).

3. The speech is presented as Lysias'. Whether Plato copies a real speech or writes one in his manner has long been disputed; none such survives among Lysias' works.

4. *Love*: *erōs*, "love" throughout, with a capital where the god is meant, as in the *Symposium*; in Lysias' speech it is only the passion.

καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπεχθανόμενοι τοῖς ἐρωμένοις χαρίζεσθαι, ῥᾴδιον γνῶναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν, ὅτι ὅσων ἂν ὕστερον ἐρασθῶσιν, ἐκείνους αὐτῶν περὶ πλείονος ποιήσονται, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι, ἐὰν ἐκείνοις δοκῇ, καὶ τούτους κακῶς ποιήσουσιν. καίτοι πῶς εἰκός ἐστι τοιοῦτον πρᾶγμα προέσθαι τοιαύτην ἔχοντι συμφοράν, ἣν οὐδ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσειεν οὐδεὶς ἔμπειρος ὢν ἀποτρέπειν; καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦσι νοσεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ εἰδέναι ὅτι κακῶς φρονοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ δύνασθαι αὑτῶν κρατεῖν· ὥστε πῶς ἂν εὖ φρονήσαντες ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχειν ἡγήσαιντο περὶ ὧν οὕτω διακείμενοι βουλεύονται; καὶ μὲν δὴ εἰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐρώντων τὸν βέλτιστον αἱροῖο, ἐξ ὀλίγων ἄν σοι ἡ ἔκλεξις εἴη· εἰ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τὸν σαυτῷ ἐπιτηδειότατον, ἐκ πολλῶν· ὥστε πολὺ πλείων ἐλπὶς ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ὄντα τυχεῖν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς σῆς φιλίας.

Εἰ τοίνυν τὸν νόμον τὸν καθεστηκότα δέδοικας, μὴ πυθομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄνειδός σοι γένηται, εἰκὸς ἐστι τοὺς μὲν ἐρῶντας, οὕτως ἂν οἰομένους καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζηλοῦσθαι ὥσπερ αὐτοὺς ὑφ' αὑτῶν, ἐπαρθῆναι τῷ λέγειν καὶ φιλοτιμουμένους ἐπιδείκνυσθαι πρὸς ἅπαντας ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως αὐτοῖς πεπόνηται· τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶντας, κρείττους αὑτῶν ὄντας, τὸ βέλτιστον ἀντὶ τῆς δόξης τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων αἱρεῖσθαι. ἔτι δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐρῶντας πολλοὺς ἀνάγκη πυθέσθαι καὶ ἰδεῖν ἀκολουθοῦντας τοῖς ἐρωμένοις καὶ ἔργον τοῦτο ποιουμένους, ὥστε ὅταν ὀφθῶσι διαλεγόμενοι ἀλλήλοις, τότε αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἢ γεγενημένης ἢ μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας συνεῖναι· τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶντας οὐδ' αἰτιᾶσθαι διὰ τὴν συνουσίαν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἰδότες ὅτι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἢ διὰ φιλίαν τῳ διαλέγεσθαι ἢ δι' ἄλλην

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c 4 *ὅτι ὅσων* T W: *ὁπόσον* B: *οἵ γ' ὅσων* Hermann **c** 5 *ποιήσονται* B: *ποιήσωνται* T **d** 5 *οὕτω* rec. b: *οὗτοι* B T **d** 6 *βουλεύονται* Stephanus: *βούλονται* B T W: *βεβούλευνται* Heindorf **d** 7 *αἱροῖο* T: *αἱροῖτο* B **a** 2 *τῷ λέγειν* B T: *τῳ λέγειν* t: *τὸ λέγειν* D: *τῷ ἔχειν* Badham: alii alia **a** 3 *οὐκ ἄλλως* T W: *οὐ καλῶς* B **a** 5 *ἀντὶ* T: *ἂν* B **b** 4 *τῳ* b t: *τῷ* B T

and by their deeds, to gratify their beloveds while incurring the enmity of the others, it is easy to recognize, if they speak the truth, that whomever they fall in love with later they will value more than these, and it is plain that, if those so decide, they will treat these badly too. And yet how is it likely that anyone should give away such a thing to one who has such a misfortune, which no one d
versed in it would even attempt to turn away? For they themselves agree that they are sick rather than temperate,[1] and know that they are of unsound mind but are not able to master themselves; so how, when they have come to be of sound mind, could they believe that the things they deliberate about while so disposed are well?[2] Moreover, if you were to choose the best of those in love, your selection would be from few; but if from the others the one most suited to yourself, from many; so that there is much more hope, among the e
many, of meeting the one worthy of your friendship.

Now if you fear the established law, that when people find out, reproach may come upon you,[3] it is likely that those who are in 232
love, thinking that they would be envied by the others as much as by themselves, would be carried away into talking and, seeking honour, would display to everyone that they have not toiled for nothing; but that those who are not in love, being stronger than themselves,[4] would choose what is best instead of the repute that comes from people. Further, it is a necessity that many people hear of and see those in love attending their beloveds and making this their work, so that whenever they are seen conversing with one b
another, people think they are together then because their desire has been fulfilled or is about to be; but those who are not in love they do not even attempt to blame for their association, knowing that it is necessary to converse with someone either for friendship or for some other

1. *Temperate*: *sōphronein*, at root "to be of sound mind", like *eu phronein* and *kakōs phronein*, "of sound" and "unsound mind", just after. Socrates' second speech answers this: love is a madness given by the gods (244a, 245b–c), by which the soul grows its wings (249d–e).

2. *Deliberate*: Stephanus' correction, printed by Burnet; B, T and W have "want" (apparatus, d6).

3. *Law*: *nomos*, "law" for written law and custom alike, as in the series.

4. A Greek idiom for self-mastery; at *Republic* 430e–431a Socrates finds it laughable, since the stronger and the weaker would be one person, and explains it as the better part of the soul ruling the worse.

τινὰ ἡδονήν. καὶ μὲν δὴ εἴ σοι δέος παρέστηκεν ἡγουμένῳ χαλεπὸν εἶναι φιλίαν συμμένειν, καὶ ἄλλῳ μὲν τρόπῳ διαφορᾶς γενομένης κοινὴν ⟨ἂν⟩ ἀμφοτέροις καταστῆναι τὴν συμφοράν, προεμένου δέ σου ἃ περὶ πλείστου ποιῇ μεγάλην ἄν σοι βλάβην ἂν γενέσθαι, εἰκότως ἂν τοὺς ἐρῶντας μᾶλλον ἂν φοβοῖο· πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτούς ἐστι τὰ λυποῦντα, καὶ πάντ᾽ ἐπὶ τῇ αὑτῶν βλάβῃ νομίζουσι γίγνεσθαι. διόπερ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους τῶν ἐρωμένων συνουσίας ἀποτρέπουσιν, φοβούμενοι τοὺς μὲν οὐσίαν κεκτημένους μὴ χρήμασιν αὐτοὺς ὑπερβάλωνται, τοὺς δὲ πεπαιδευμένους μὴ συνέσει κρείττους γένωνται· τῶν δὲ ἄλλο τι κεκτημένων ἀγαθὸν τὴν δύναμιν ἑκάστου φυλάττονται. πείσαντες μὲν οὖν ἀπεχθέσθαι σε τούτοις εἰς ἐρημίαν φίλων καθιστᾶσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ σεαυτοῦ σκοπῶν ἄμεινον ἐκείνων φρονῇς, ἥξεις αὐτοῖς εἰς διαφοράν· ὅσοι δὲ μὴ ἐρῶντες ἔτυχον, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἀρετὴν ἔπραξαν ὧν ἐδέοντο, οὐκ ἂν τοῖς συνοῦσι φθονοῖεν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὴ ἐθέλοντας μισοῖεν, ἡγούμενοι ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων μὲν ὑπερορᾶσθαι, ὑπὸ τῶν συνόντων δὲ ὠφελεῖσθαι, ὥστε πολὺ πλείων ἐλπὶς φιλίαν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος ἢ ἔχθραν γενέσθαι.

Καὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν μὲν ἐρώντων πολλοὶ πρότερον τοῦ σώματος ἐπεθύμησαν ἢ τὸν τρόπον ἔγνωσαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων ἔμπειροι ἐγένοντο, ὥστε ἄδηλον αὐτοῖς εἰ ἔτι τότε βουλήσονται φίλοι εἶναι, ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται· τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶσιν, οἳ καὶ πρότερον ἀλλήλοις φίλοι ὄντες ταῦτα ἔπραξαν, οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἂν εὖ πάθωσι ταῦτα εἰκὸς ἐλάττω τὴν φιλίαν αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μνημεῖα καταλει-

b 8 ἂν add. Hirschig **c** 2 ἄν σοι B T: δή σοι Schanz ἂν γενέσθαι B: γενέσθαι T εἰκότως ἂν B T: εἰκότως δὴ Schanz μᾶλλον ἂν B: μᾶλλον T **c** 5 τὰς B T W: τῆς corr. Ven. 184 τῶν ἐρωμένων] τὸν ἐρώμενον Heindorf **d** 2 ἀπεχθέσθαι . . . τούτοις] ἀπέχθεσθαι . . . τούτοις B T W: ἀπέχεσθαι . . . τούτοις vulg.: ἀπέχεσθαι . . . τούτων al. Stallbaum **d** 6 ὑπ᾽] σ᾽ ὑπ᾽ Schanz auctore Heindorf **e** 2 γενέσθαι T: γενήσεσθαι B **e** 5 αὐτοῖς εἰ ἔτι B: εἰ ἔτι αὐτοῖς T: εἰ ἔτι Hermann τότε T: om. B **a** 3 μνημεῖα] σημεῖα ci. Heindorf

pleasure. Moreover, if fear has come to you, as you believe it is difficult for friendship to last, and that if a quarrel arose in some other way the misfortune would be common to both, but if you had c
given away what you value most the harm to you would be great, you would, as is likely, be more afraid of those in love; for many are the things that pain them, and they hold that everything happens to their own harm. That is why they also turn away their beloveds' associations with others, being afraid that those who possess substance may outdo them in money, and that the educated may become stronger than they in understanding; and of those who possess any other good they guard against the power of each. So, per- d
suading you to incur the enmity of these people, they set you down in a solitude of friends; but if, looking into your own interest, you are of sounder mind than they, you will come to a quarrel with them. But those who were in fact not in love, but achieved what they needed through their virtue, would not be jealous of those who are with you, but would hate those who are not willing to be, believing that they are looked down on by those, but benefited by those who are with you; so that there is much more hope that e
friendship rather than enmity will come to them from the thing.

Moreover, many of those in love have desired the body before they knew his ways or became versed in his other affairs, so that it is unclear to them whether they will still want to be friends then, when they cease from their desire. But for those who are not in love, 233
who did this when they were already friends with one another, it is not likely that the good they receive will make their friendship less, but that these things will be left

φθῆναι τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι. καὶ μὲν δὴ βελτίονί σοι προσήκει γενέσθαι ἐμοὶ πειθομένῳ ἢ ἐραστῇ. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ πραττόμενα ἐπαινοῦσιν, τὰ μὲν δεδιότες μὴ ἀπέχθωνται, τὰ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ χεῖρον διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν γιγνώσκοντες. τοιαῦτα γὰρ ὁ ἔρως ἐπιδείκνυται· δυστυχοῦντας μέν, ἃ μὴ λύπην τοῖς ἄλλοις παρέχει, ἀνιαρὰ ποιεῖ νομίζειν· εὐτυχοῦντας δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἡδονῆς ἄξια παρ' ἐκείνων ἐπαίνου ἀναγκάζει τυγχάνειν· ὥστε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐλεεῖν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις ἢ ζηλοῦν αὐτοὺς προσήκει. ἐὰν δέ μοι πείθῃ, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ τὴν παροῦσαν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύων συνέσομαί σοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν ὠφελίαν ἔσεσθαι, οὐχ ὑπ' ἔρωτος ἡττώμενος ἀλλ' ἐμαυτοῦ κρατῶν, οὐδὲ διὰ σμικρὰ ἰσχυρὰν ἔχθραν ἀναιρούμενος ἀλλὰ διὰ μεγάλα βραδέως ὀλίγην ὀργὴν ποιούμενος, τῶν μὲν ἀκουσίων συγγνώμην ἔχων, τὰ δὲ ἑκούσια πειρώμενος ἀποτρέπειν· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι φιλίας πολὺν χρόνον ἐσομένης τεκμήρια. εἰ δ' ἄρα σοι τοῦτο παρέστηκεν, ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἰσχυρὰν φιλίαν γενέσθαι ἐὰν μή τις ἐρῶν τυγχάνῃ, ἐνθυμεῖσθαι χρὴ ὅτι οὔτ' ἂν τοὺς ὑείς περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμεθα οὔτ' ἂν τοὺς πατέρας καὶ τὰς μητέρας, οὔτ' ἂν πιστοὺς φίλους ἐκεκτήμεθα, οἳ οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιθυμίας τοιαύτης γεγόνασιν ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑτέρων ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

Ἔτι δὲ εἰ χρὴ τοῖς δεομένοις μάλιστα χαρίζεσθαι, προσήκει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μὴ τοὺς βελτίστους ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους εὖ ποιεῖν· μεγίστων γὰρ ἀπαλλαγέντες κακῶν πλείστην χάριν αὐτοῖς εἴσονται. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις δαπάναις οὐ τοὺς φίλους ἄξιον παρακαλεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς προσαιτοῦντας καὶ τοὺς δεομένους πλησμονῆς· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ καὶ ἀγαπήσουσιν καὶ ἀκολουθήσουσιν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἥξουσι καὶ μάλιστα ἡσθήσονται καὶ οὐκ ἐλαχίστην χάριν

b 5 *τοῖς ἐρωμένοις* B T Stobaeus: *τοὺς ἐρωμένους* vulg. **b** 6 *αὐτοὺς* B Stobaeus: *αὐτοῖς* T δέ *μοι* B T: δ' *ἐμοὶ* Ven. 184 **d** 6 *καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις* B T: *καὶ τῶν ἄλλων* Aldina: *κἂν τοῖς ἄλλοις* Badham **e** 2 *προσαιτοῦντας* B T: *προσαιροῦντας* G

behind as memorials of what is to come. Moreover, it is fitting that you should become better by obeying me than by obeying a lover. For those men praise what you say and what you do even against what is best, partly fearing that they will incur enmity, partly because they themselves judge worse through their desire. For such are the things love displays: when they are unfortunate, it makes them hold distressing what causes no pain to others; when they are fortunate, it compels even what is not worthy of pleasure to win praise from them. So that it is much more fitting for beloveds to pity them than to envy them.[1] But if you obey me, first I shall be with you not tending present pleasure but also the benefit that is to come, not overcome by love but mastering myself, not taking up strong enmity over small things but slowly forming little anger over great ones, having pardon for the involuntary and trying to turn away the voluntary; for these are pieces of evidence of a friendship that will last a long time. But if, after all, this has come to you, that strong friendship cannot come about unless one is in fact in love, you must reflect that then we would not value our sons highly, nor our fathers and mothers, nor would we have acquired faithful friends, who have come to be not from such desire but from other ways of life.

Further, if one should gratify most of all those in need, it is fitting for others too to do good not to the best but to those most without resource; for, released from the greatest evils, they will be most grateful to them. Moreover, at our private entertainments too it is right to invite not our friends but those who beg and those in need of a surfeit; for they will cherish and attend and come to the doors, and they will be most pleased, and

1. *For beloveds to pity them*: Burnet's text, with B, T and Stobaeus (*tois erōmenois*); the reading of the early printed editions, *tous erōmenous*, gives "to pity beloveds" (apparatus, b5).

εἴσονται καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς εὔξονται. ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως προσήκει οὐ τοῖς σφόδρα δεομένοις χαρίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μάλιστα ἀποδοῦναι χάριν δυναμένοις· οὐδὲ τοῖς προσαιτοῦσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τοῦ πράγματος ἀξίοις· οὐδὲ ὅσοι τῆς σῆς ὥρας ἀπολαύσονται, ἀλλ᾽ οἵτινες πρεσβυτέρῳ γενομένῳ τῶν σφετέρων ἀγαθῶν μεταδώσουσιν· οὐδὲ οἳ διαπραξάμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοτιμήσονται, ἀλλ᾽ οἵτινες αἰσχυνόμενοι πρὸς ἅπαντας σιωπήσονται· οὐδὲ τοῖς ὀλίγον χρόνον σπουδάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὁμοίως διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου φίλοις ἐσομένοις· οὐδὲ οἵτινες παυόμενοι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχθρας πρόφασιν ζητήσουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ οἳ παυσαμένου τῆς ὥρας τότε τὴν αὑτῶν ἀρετὴν ἐπιδείξονται. σὺ οὖν τῶν τε εἰρημένων μέμνησο καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἐνθυμοῦ, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἐρῶντας οἱ φίλοι νουθετοῦσιν ὡς ὄντος κακοῦ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶσιν οὐδεὶς πώποτε τῶν οἰκείων ἐμέμψατο ὡς διὰ τοῦτο κακῶς βουλευομένοις περὶ ἑαυτῶν.

Ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἔροιό με εἰ ἄπασίν σοι παραινῶ τοῖς μὴ ἐρῶσι χαρίζεσθαι. ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι οὐδ᾽ ἂν τὸν ἐρῶντα πρὸς ἅπαντάς σε κελεύειν τοὺς ἐρῶντας ταύτην ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν. οὔτε γὰρ τῷ λαμβάνοντι χάριτος ἴσης ἄξιον, οὔτε σοὶ βουλομένῳ τοὺς ἄλλους λανθάνειν ὁμοίως δυνατόν· δεῖ δὲ βλάβην μὲν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ μηδεμίαν, ὠφελίαν δὲ ἀμφοῖν γίγνεσθαι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἱκανά μοι νομίζω τὰ εἰρημένα· εἰ δ᾽ ἔτι ⟨τι⟩ σὺ ποθεῖς, ἡγούμενος παραλελεῖφθαι, ἐρώτα.

ΦΑΙ. Τί σοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ λόγος; οὐχ ὑπερφυῶς τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εἰρῆσθαι;

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e 8 *προσαιτοῦσι* Ast: *προσερῶσι* B: *ἐρῶσι* T W **a** 2 *γενομένῳ* T: *γενόμενοι* B **a** 6 *σπουδάζουσιν*] *σπουδάσουσιν* ci. Stephanus (*colent* Ficinus) **a** 8 *παυσαμένου* G. Hermann: *παυσάμενοι* B T: *παυομένης* Laur. 2643: *παυσαμένοις* Winckelmann: alii alia **b** 6 *ἂν οὖν* T: *μὲν οὖν* B **b** 7 *μὲν* T: δὲ B **c** 1 *τῷ* T: *τῷ λόγῳ* B W *ἴσης* T: *οισης* (sic) B: *οἴσεις* W **c** 3 δεῖ T: *αἰεὶ* B *ἀπ᾽* B: *ἐπ᾽* T **c** 5 δ᾽ *ἔτι τι* Heindorf: δέ *τι* B T *σὺ ποθεῖς* Ven. 189: *σὺ ὑποθεις* T: *σὺ ὑποθῇς* B *ἐρώτα* T: *ἔρωτα* B

will be not the least grateful, and will pray for many good things for them. But perhaps it is fitting to gratify not those in great need but those most able to return the favour; nor those who merely beg,[1] 234
but those worthy of the thing; nor those who will enjoy your youth, but those who, when you have grown older, will give you a share of their own good things; nor those who, having accomplished it, will seek honour before the others, but those who, being ashamed, will keep silent before everyone; nor those who are in earnest for a short time, but those who will be friends likewise through all of life; nor those who, when they cease from their desire, will look for a pretext for enmity, but those who, when your youth has ceased,[2]
will then display their own virtue. So remember what has been b
said, and reflect on this: that friends admonish those who are in love on the ground that the way of life is bad, but none of their own people has ever yet found fault with those who are not in love on the ground that they deliberate badly about themselves on this account.

Perhaps, then, you might ask me whether I advise you to gratify all who are not in love. I think that not even the one in love would tell you to have this thought towards all who are in love. For it c
would neither be worth an equal favour to the one who receives it, nor would it be likewise possible for you, if you want to escape the notice of the others; and from it no harm should come, but benefit to both. Well, I hold that what has been said is sufficient; but if you still yearn for anything,[3] believing it has been left out, ask.

PHAEDR. How does the speech appear to you, Socrates? Doesn't it appear to have been spoken prodigiously, both in other respects and in its words?

1. *Who merely beg*: Ast's correction, printed by Burnet; T and W have *erōsi*, "who are in love", B *proserōsi* (apparatus, e8).

2. *When your youth has ceased*: G. Hermann's correction, printed by Burnet; B and T have *pausamenoi*, "when they have ceased" (apparatus, a8).

3. *Yearn for*: *potheis*, the reading of a later manuscript (Ven. 189), printed by Burnet; B and T have forms of *hypotithenai*, "propose" (apparatus, c5).

ΣΩ. Δαιμονίως μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὥστε με ἐκπλαγῆναι. d
καὶ τοῦτο ἐγὼ ἔπαθον διὰ σέ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, πρὸς σὲ ἀπο-
βλέπων, ὅτι ἐμοὶ ἐδόκεις γάνυσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου μεταξὺ
ἀναγιγνώσκων· ἡγούμενος γὰρ σὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ἐπαΐειν
περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοὶ εἰπόμην, καὶ ἑπόμενος συνεβάκχευσα 5
μετὰ σοῦ τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς.

ΦΑΙ. Εἶεν· οὕτω δὴ δοκεῖ παίζειν;

ΣΩ. Δοκῶ γάρ σοι παίζειν καὶ οὐχὶ ἐσπουδακέναι;

ΦΑΙ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς εἰπὲ e
πρὸς Διὸς φιλίου, οἴει ἄν τινα ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἄλλον τῶν
Ἑλλήνων ἕτερα τούτων μείζω καὶ πλείω περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
πράγματος;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; καὶ ταύτῃ δεῖ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ τὸν 5
λόγον ἐπαινεθῆναι, ὡς τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος τοῦ ποιητοῦ,
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνῃ μόνον, ὅτι σαφῆ καὶ στρογγύλα, καὶ ἀκρι-
βῶς ἕκαστα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀποτετόρνευται; εἰ γὰρ δεῖ,
συγχωρητέον χάριν σήν, ἐπεὶ ἐμέ γε ἔλαθεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐμῆς
οὐδενίας· τῷ γὰρ ῥητορικῷ αὐτοῦ μόνῳ τὸν νοῦν προσ- 235
εῖχον, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδ' ⟨ἂν⟩ αὐτὸν ᾤμην Λυσίαν οἴεσθαι ἱκανὸν
εἶναι. καὶ οὖν μοι ἔδοξεν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο
λέγεις, δὶς καὶ τρὶς τὰ αὐτὰ εἰρηκέναι, ὡς οὐ πάνυ εὐπορῶν
τοῦ πολλὰ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἴσως οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μέλον 5
τοῦ τοιούτου· καὶ ἐφαίνετο δή μοι νεανιεύεσθαι ἐπιδεικνύ-
μενος ὡς οἷός τε ὢν ταὐτὰ ἑτέρως τε καὶ ἑτέρως λέγων
ἀμφοτέρως εἰπεῖν ἄριστα.

ΦΑΙ. Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ b
μάλιστα ὁ λόγος ἔχει. τῶν γὰρ ἐνόντων ἀξίως ῥηθῆναι

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d 3 ἐδόκεις T: δοκεῖς B **d** 7 δὴ δοκεῖ T W: δὴ B: δεῖ Schanz **e** 3 *τούτων μείζω* B: *μείζω τούτων* T **e** 7 *καὶ ἀκριβῶς* fort. non legerunt Plutarchus Hermias **e** 8 *ἀποτετόρνευται* B: *ἀποτετόρνωται* T **a** 1 *μόνῳ* B T: *μόνον* W **a** 2 *ἂν* ante *αὐτὸν* addidi: ante *ᾤμην* add. Thompson: post *οἴεσθαι* add. Ast **a** 3 *καὶ οὖν* Hermann: *καὶ δὴ οὖν* Stephanus: δικαιοῦν B: δίκαιον οὖν T W **a** 4 λέγεις T: λέγῃς B **a** 7 *ταὐτὰ* Heindorf: *ταῦτα* B T **b** 2 *ἀξίως*] *ἀξίων* Madvig

SOC. Daimonically, rather, my companion, so that I was struck.[1] d
And this I underwent on your account, Phaedrus, as I looked at you, because I thought you were radiant with the speech as you read; for, believing that you are more expert than I in such things, I followed you, and following I joined in the Bacchic revel with you, the divine head.[2]

PHAEDR. Very well: so it is decided to play like this?

SOC. Why, do you think I am playing and not in earnest?

PHAEDR. By no means, Socrates; but say, in truth, by Zeus, god e
of friendship,[3] do you think anyone else of the Greeks would have other things to say, greater and more than these, about the same subject?

SOC. What? Must the speech be praised by me and you in this respect too, on the ground that its poet has said what was needed, but not only in that respect, that each of its words is clear and rounded and precisely turned on the lathe?[4] For if it must, I must concede it as a favour to you, since through my nothingness it es- 235
caped my notice, at least; for it was only to its rhetorical side that I was paying attention, and this I thought not even Lysias himself would think sufficient.[5] And so I thought, Phaedrus, unless you say something else, that he said the same things twice and three times, as though he had not much resource for saying many things about the same thing, or perhaps because such a thing mattered nothing to him; and indeed he appeared to me to be swaggering like a young man, displaying that he was able, saying the same things in one way and in another, to speak best both ways.

PHAEDR. There is nothing in what you say, Socrates; for this very b
thing the speech has, and has most of all. For of the things that are there to be spoken worthily

1. *Daimonically*: *daimoniōs*, capping Phaedrus' "prodigiously" (234c). The daimonic is what stands between gods and mortals (*Symposium* 202d–e).

2. *The divine head*: a solemn way of naming a person, like Homer's "dear head" (*Iliad* 8.281).

3. Zeus Philios, guardian of friendship (*philia*). Socrates swears by him in the same plea not to play at *Gorgias* 500b.

4. *Poet*: *poiētēs*, "maker"; Socrates calls Lysias, a writer of prose, a poet again at 236d.

5. *Would think*: the *an* that makes it so is Burnet's own addition (*addidi*); Thompson and Ast put it elsewhere (apparatus, a2).

ἐν τῷ πράγματι οὐδὲν παραλέλοιπεν, ὥστε παρὰ τὰ ἐκείνῳ εἰρημένα μηδέν' ⟨ἄν⟩ ποτε δύνασθαι εἰπεῖν ἄλλα πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἄξια.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο ἐγώ σοι οὐκέτι οἷός τ' ἔσομαι πιθέσθαι· παλαιοὶ γὰρ καὶ σοφοὶ ἄνδρες τε καὶ γυναῖκες περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρηκότες καὶ γεγραφότες ἐξελέγξουσί με, ἐάν σοι χαριζόμενος συγχωρῶ.

ΦΑΙ. Τίνες οὗτοι; καὶ ποῦ σὺ βελτίω τούτων ἀκήκοας;

ΣΩ. Νῦν μὲν οὕτως οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν· δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τινῶν ἀκήκοα, ἤ που Σαπφοῦς τῆς καλῆς ἢ Ἀνακρέοντος τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ καὶ συγγραφέων τινῶν. πόθεν δὴ τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω; πλῆρές πως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τὸ στῆθος ἔχων αἰσθάνομαι παρὰ ταῦτα ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἕτερα μὴ χείρω. ὅτι μὲν οὖν παρά γε ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἐννενόηκα, εὖ οἶδα, συνειδὼς ἐμαυτῷ ἀμαθίαν· λείπεται δὴ οἶμαι ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων ποθὲν ναμάτων διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς πεπληρῶσθαί με δίκην ἀγγείου. ὑπὸ δὲ νωθείας αὖ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐπιλέλησμαι, ὅπως τε καὶ ὧντινων ἤκουσα.

ΦΑΙ. Ἀλλ', ὦ γενναιότατε, κάλλιστα εἴρηκας. σὺ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ὧντινων μὲν καὶ ὅπως ἤκουσας μηδ' ἂν κελεύω εἴπῃς, τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεις ποίησον· τῶν ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ βελτίω τε καὶ μὴ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ὑπέσχησαι εἰπεῖν τούτων ἀπεχόμενος, καί σοι ἐγώ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες, ὑπισχνοῦμαι χρυσῆν εἰκόνα ἰσομέτρητον εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀναθήσειν, οὐ μόνον ἐμαυτοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ σήν.

ΣΩ. Φίλτατος εἶ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς χρυσοῦς, ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἴ με οἴει λέγειν ὡς Λυσίας τοῦ παντὸς ἡμάρτηκεν, καὶ οἷόν τε δὴ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα ἄλλα εἰπεῖν· τοῦτο δὲ οἶμαι οὐδ' ἂν τὸν φαυλότατον παθεῖν συγγραφέα. αὐτίκα περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, τίνα οἴει λέγοντα ὡς χρὴ μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον ἢ

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b 4 *μηδέν' ἄν* Aldina: *μηδένα* B T (*μηδ' ἄν* marg. t) **b** 6 *τ'* B: *γε* T *πιθέσθαι* B: *πείθεσθαι* T **c** 5 *πως*] *περ* Aldina **d** 7 *ἕτερα ὑπέσχησαι* scripsi: *ἕτερα ὑπόσχες* Badham (secl. *εἰπεῖν*): *ἑτέρᾳ ὑποσχέσει* B T: *ἕτερα ἐπιχείρει* Schanz: alii alia **e** 4 *πάντα ταῦτα* B: *ταῦτα πάντα* T: *ταῦτα* G **e** 6 *τίνα* B T: *τί* vulg.

in the subject he has left out none, so that beside what has been said by him no one could ever say other things, more and of more worth.

SOC. In this I shall no longer be able to be persuaded by you; for old and wise men and women, who have spoken and written about them, will refute me if I concede it to gratify you.

PHAEDR. Who are these? And where have you heard better things than these? c

SOC. Just now, offhand, I can't say; but plainly I have heard from some, from Sappho the beautiful, I take it, or Anacreon the wise, or even from some writers.[1] What is the evidence I take for saying so? Having my breast somehow full, you daimonic man, I perceive that I could say other things beside these, no worse. That from myself, at least, I have conceived none of them, I know well, being conscious of my own want of learning; it remains, then, I think, that from other people's streams, from somewhere, I have been filled d through my hearing like a jar. But from sluggishness, again, I have forgotten this very thing too, the way I heard it and from whom.

PHAEDR. Why, you most noble man, you have spoken very well indeed. For from whom and how you heard it, don't say to me, not even if I tell you to; but do this very thing you speak of: you have promised to say other things, better than those in the book and not fewer, keeping away from these;[2] and I, like the nine archons, promise you to dedicate at Delphi a golden likeness, life-size, not only of myself but of you too.[3] e

SOC. You are the best of friends, Phaedrus, and in truth golden, if you think I am saying that Lysias has altogether missed the mark, and that it is indeed possible to say other things beside all these; this, I think, not even the paltriest writer would undergo. For example, as to what the speech is about: who, do you think, saying that one should gratify the one who is not in love rather than

1. Sappho of Lesbos (about 600 BC) and Anacreon of Teos (sixth century BC), lyric poets of love.

2. *You have promised*: Burnet's own correction (*scripsi*); B and T have *heterāi hyposchesei*, "by another promise"; Badham proposed "promise other things", deleting "to say" (apparatus, d7).

3. On taking office the nine archons swore to dedicate a golden statue if they broke the laws (Aristotle, *Constitution of the Athenians* 7.1) or took gifts (55.5); Plutarch (*Solon* 25.3), who gives the oath to the thesmothetae, has the statue "of equal measure" and "at Delphi", as here.

ἐρῶντι χαρίζεσθαι, παρέντα τοῦ μὲν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐγκωμιάζειν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ἄφρον ψέγειν, ἀναγκαῖα γοῦν ὄντα, εἶτ' 236
ἄλλ' ἄττα ἔξειν λέγειν; ἀλλ' οἶμαι τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἐατέα καὶ συγγνωστέα λέγοντι· καὶ τῶν μὲν τοιούτων οὐ τὴν εὕρεσιν ἀλλὰ τὴν διάθεσιν ἐπαινετέον, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίων τε καὶ χαλεπῶν εὑρεῖν πρὸς τῇ διαθέσει καὶ τὴν 5
εὕρεσιν.

ΦΑΙ. Συγχωρῶ ὃ λέγεις· μετρίως γάρ μοι δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ποιήσω οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ οὕτως· τὸ μὲν τὸν ἐρῶντα τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος μᾶλλον νοσεῖν δώσω σοι ὑποτίθεσθαι, τῶν b
δὲ λοιπῶν ἕτερα πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἄξια εἰπὼν τῶνδε [Λυσίου] παρὰ τὸ Κυψελιδῶν ἀνάθημα σφυρήλατος ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ στάθητι.

ΣΩ. Ἐσπούδακας, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὅτι σου τῶν παιδικῶν 5
ἐπελαβόμην ἐρεσχηλῶν σε, καὶ οἴει δή με ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιχειρήσειν εἰπεῖν παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου σοφίαν ἕτερόν τι ποικιλώτερον;

ΦΑΙ. Περὶ μὲν τούτου, ὦ φίλε, εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας λαβὰς ἐλήλυθας. ῥητέον μὲν γάρ σοι παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ὅπως c
οἷός τε εἶ, ἵνα μὴ τὸ τῶν κωμῳδῶν φορτικὸν πρᾶγμα ἀναγκαζώμεθα ποιεῖν ἀνταποδιδόντες ἀλλήλοις [εὐλαβήθητι], καὶ μὴ βούλου με ἀναγκάσαι λέγειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ "εἰ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, Σωκράτην ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλη- 5
σμαι," καὶ ὅτι "ἐπεθύμει μὲν λέγειν, ἐθρύπτετο δέ·" ἀλλὰ διανοήθητι ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν οὐκ ἄπιμεν πρὶν ἂν σὺ εἴπῃς ἃ ἔφησθα ἐν τῷ στήθει ἔχειν. ἐσμὲν δὲ μόνω ἐν ἐρημίᾳ, ἰσχυρότερος δ' ἐγὼ καὶ νεώτερος, ἐκ δὲ ἁπάντων τούτων d
"σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω," καὶ μηδαμῶς πρὸς βίαν βουληθῇς μᾶλλον ἢ ἑκὼν λέγειν.

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b 2 εἰπὼν τῶνδε T W: εἰπόντος B: εἰπὼν τῶν τοῦ fecit t **b** 3 Λυσίου seclusi **b** 4 στάθητι B T: ἑστάθη Photius: ἕσταθι Cobet **c** 1 ἐλήλυθας T: ἐλήλυθα B **c** 2 ἵνα B: ἵνα δὲ T **c** 3 ἀναγκαζώμεθα B: ἀναγκαζόμεθα T εὐλαβήθητι secl. Cobet **c** 7 διανοήθητι T: διανοήθητε B **c** 8 μόνω B W: μόνω μὲν T **d** 2 ὅ τοι] ὅ σοι hoc loco B T (at cf. Menon. 76 d) βίαν T: βίας B W

the one in love, and passing over making an encomium of the former for being intelligent and censuring the latter for being foolish, 236
which are necessary things at any rate, will then have other things to say? But such things, I think, must be let pass and pardoned in the speaker; and in such things it is not the finding but the arrangement that must be praised, while in things that are not necessary and are difficult to find, the finding too, besides the arrangement.

PHAEDR. I concede what you say; for I think you have spoken moderately. So I too will do this: I will grant you to assume that b
the one in love is sicker than the one who is not in love; but as for the rest, if you say other things, more and of more worth than these,[1] be set up at Olympia, beaten out with the hammer, next to the Cypselids' offering.[2]

SOC. Phaedrus, you are in earnest because I laid hold of your darling, teasing you; and do you think that I shall in truth attempt to say, beside his wisdom, something else more subtle?

PHAEDR. On this point, my friend, you have come into the like c
holds.[3] For you must most certainly speak as you are able, so that we are not compelled to do the vulgar thing of the comic actors, paying each other back;[4] and do not want to compel me to say that "Socrates, if I am ignorant of Socrates, I have forgotten myself as well," and that "he desired to speak, but played coy"; but be minded that we shall not go away from here until you say what you claimed to have in your breast. We are alone in solitude, and d
I am mightier and younger; from all this, "understand what I say to you,"[5] and by no means want to speak by force rather than willingly.

1. *Than these*: B and T go on "of Lysias", which Burnet deletes (*seclusi*, apparatus b3).

2. A statue of Zeus in beaten gold, dedicated at Olympia by the Cypselids, tyrants of Corinth in the seventh and sixth centuries BC (Strabo 8.3.30).

3. *Holds*: wrestling holds. Phaedrus turns back on Socrates his own words of 228a–c, quoted below.

4. B and T go on "take care!", which Burnet deletes with Cobet (apparatus, c3).

5. Pindar (fr. 105a Snell–Maehler), quoted also at *Meno* 76d, whence Burnet takes *toi*, "to you" (B and T have *soi* here; apparatus, d2).

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε Φαῖδρε, γελοῖος ἔσομαι παρ' ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν ἰδιώτης αὐτοσχεδιάζων περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΦΑΙ. Οἶσθ' ὡς ἔχει; παῦσαι πρός με καλλωπιζόμενος· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἔχω ὃ εἰπὼν ἀναγκάσω σε λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Μηδαμῶς τοίνυν εἴπῃς.

ΦΑΙ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ δὴ λέγω· ὁ δέ μοι λόγος ὅρκος ἔσται. ὄμνυμι γάρ σοι—τίνα μέντοι, τίνα θεῶν; ἢ βούλει τὴν πλάτανον ταυτηνί;—ἦ μήν, ἐάν μοι μὴ εἴπῃς τὸν λόγον ἐναντίον αὐτῆς ταύτης, μηδέποτέ σοι ἕτερον λόγον μηδένα μηδενὸς μήτε ἐπιδείξειν μήτε ἐξαγγελεῖν.

ΣΩ. Βαβαῖ, ὦ μιαρέ, ὡς εὖ ἀνηῦρες τὴν ἀνάγκην ἀνδρὶ φιλολόγῳ ποιεῖν ὃ ἂν κελεύῃς.

ΦΑΙ. Τί δῆτα ἔχων στρέφῃ;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἔτι, ἐπειδὴ σύ γε ταῦτα ὀμώμοκας. πῶς γὰρ ἂν οἷός τ' εἴην τοιαύτης θοίνης ἀπέχεσθαι;

ΦΑΙ. Λέγε δή.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθ' οὖν ὡς ποιήσω;

ΦΑΙ. Τοῦ πέρι;

ΣΩ. Ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἐρῶ, ἵν' ὅτι τάχιστα διαδράμω τὸν λόγον καὶ μὴ βλέπων πρὸς σὲ ὑπ' αἰσχύνης διαπορῶμαι.

ΦΑΙ. Λέγε μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὅπως βούλει ποίει.

ΣΩ. Ἄγετε δή, ὦ Μοῦσαι, εἴτε δι' ᾠδῆς εἶδος λίγειαι, εἴτε διὰ γένος μουσικὸν τὸ Λιγύων ταύτην ἔσχετ' ἐπωνυμίαν, "ξύμ μοι λάβεσθε" τοῦ μύθου, ὅν με ἀναγκάζει ὁ βέλτιστος οὑτοσὶ λέγειν, ἵν' ὁ ἑταῖρος αὐτοῦ, καὶ πρότερον δοκῶν τούτῳ σοφὸς εἶναι, νῦν ἔτι μᾶλλον δόξῃ.

Ἦν οὕτω δὴ παῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ μειρακίσκος, μάλα καλός· τούτῳ δὲ ἦσαν ἐρασταὶ πάνυ πολλοί. εἷς δέ τις αὐτῶν

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e 3 *μηδενὸς μήτε* T: *μηδενός τ'* B *ἐξαγγελεῖν* G: *ἐξαγγέλλειν* B T **a** 7 *λίγειαι* T: *λιγιαι* B **a** 8 *γένος τὸ Λιγύων μουσικὸν* Dionysius: *γένος τι μουσικὸν* Heraclitus: *γένος μουσικὸν τὸ λιγὺ ὂν* Stobaeus *ἔσχετ' ἐπωνυμίαν* B T Stobaeus: *ἔσχετε τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν* Dionysius, Heraclitus **b** 2 *μειρακίσκος* B T: *μειρακίσκος ἁπαλὸς* vulg.

SOC. But, my blessed Phaedrus, I shall be laughable, a private person improvising beside a good poet on the same things.[1]

PHAEDR. Do you know how it stands? Stop preening yourself before me; for I pretty well have the thing by saying which I shall compel you to speak.

SOC. Then by no means say it.

PHAEDR. No: I am saying it already, and my speech will be an oath. For I swear to you—but by whom? Which of the gods? Or do you want this plane tree here?—that assuredly, if you do not say e
the speech to me before this very tree, I will never again display to you or report another speech of anyone's, not one.

SOC. Ah! You scoundrel, how well you have found the necessity for a speech-loving man to do whatever you tell him!

PHAEDR. Then why do you keep twisting about?

SOC. Not any more, since you, at least, have sworn this. For how could I be able to keep away from such a banquet?

PHAEDR. Speak, then. 237

SOC. Do you know, then, how I shall do it?

PHAEDR. As to what?

SOC. I shall speak with my head covered, so that I may run through the speech as fast as possible and not be at a loss for shame from looking at you.[2]

PHAEDR. Just speak; for the rest, do as you want.

SOC. Come, then, you Muses, whether you are clear-voiced from the form of your song or got this title from the Ligurians' musical race,[3] "take hold with me" of the tale which this most excellent man here compels me to say,[4] so that his companion, who even before was thought wise by him, may now be thought so still more. b

There was, then, a boy, or rather a lad, very beautiful; and he had very many lovers. And one of them

1. *Private person*: *idiōtēs*, as Phaedrus called himself beside Lysias (228a).
2. He uncovers it for his second speech (243b).
3. *Clear-voiced*: *ligeiai*, Homer's epithet of the Muse (*Odyssey* 24.62), derived here either from their song or from the Ligurians (*Ligyes*), a people of the coast round Massalia.
4. Burnet marks the words as a quotation; their source is not known.

αἰμύλος ἦν, ὃς οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἐρῶν ἐπεπείκει τὸν παῖδα ὡς
οὐκ ἐρῴη. καί ποτε αὐτὸν αἰτῶν ἔπειθεν τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὡς μὴ 5
ἐρῶντι πρὸ τοῦ ἐρῶντος δέοι χαρίζεσθαι, ἔλεγέν τε ὧδε—

Περὶ παντός, ὦ παῖ, μία ἀρχὴ τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς
βουλεύσεσθαι· εἰδέναι δεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἡ βουλή, ἣ παντὸς c
ἁμαρτάνειν ἀνάγκη. τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς λέληθεν ὅτι οὐκ
ἴσασι τὴν οὐσίαν ἑκάστου. ὡς οὖν εἰδότες οὐ διομολογοῦνται
ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς σκέψεως, προελθόντες δὲ τὸ εἰκὸς ἀποδιδόασιν·
οὔτε γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογοῦσιν. ἐγὼ οὖν 5
καὶ σὺ μὴ πάθωμεν ὃ ἄλλοις ἐπιτιμῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ σοὶ
καὶ ἐμοὶ ὁ λόγος πρόκειται πότερα ἐρῶντι ἢ μὴ μᾶλλον εἰς
φιλίαν ἰτέον, περὶ ἔρωτος οἷόν τ' ἔστι καὶ ἣν ἔχει δύνα-
μιν, ὁμολογίᾳ θέμενοι ὅρον, εἰς τοῦτο ἀποβλέποντες καὶ d
ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιώμεθα εἴτε ὠφελίαν εἴτε
βλάβην παρέχει. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δὴ ἐπιθυμία τις ὁ ἔρως,
ἅπαντι δῆλον· ὅτι δ' αὖ καὶ μὴ ἐρῶντες ἐπιθυμοῦσι τῶν
καλῶν, ἴσμεν. τῷ δὴ τὸν ἐρῶντά τε καὶ μὴ κρινοῦμεν; 5
δεῖ αὖ νοῆσαι ὅτι ἡμῶν ἐν ἑκάστῳ δύο τινέ ἐστον ἰδέα
ἄρχοντε καὶ ἄγοντε, οἷν ἑπόμεθα ἧ ἂν ἄγητον, ἡ μὲν ἔμ-
φυτος οὖσα ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν, ἄλλη δὲ ἐπίκτητος δόξα,
ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀρίστου. τούτω δὲ ἐν ἡμῖν τοτὲ μὲν ὁμο-
νοεῖτον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε στασιάζετον· καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἡ ἑτέρα, e
ἄλλοτε δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα κρατεῖ. δόξης μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄριστον
λόγῳ ἀγούσης καὶ κρατούσης τῷ κράτει σωφροσύνη ὄνομα·
ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἀλόγως ἑλκούσης ἐπὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀρξάσης ἐν 238
ἡμῖν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὕβρις ἐπωνομάσθη. ὕβρις δὲ δὴ πολυώνυμον
—πολυμελὲς γὰρ καὶ πολυμερές—καὶ τούτων τῶν ἰδεῶν

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b 5 *αἰτῶν* T W Heraclitus: *ἐρῶν* B **c** 1 *βουλεύσεσθαι* T: *βουλεύεσθαι* B δεῖ B: ᾗ δεῖ T *παντὸς* B Simplicius: *ἅπαντος* T **c** 4 *προελθόντες* t: *προσελθόντες* B T **c** 5 *ἀλλήλοις* B: *ἄλλοις* ex *ἀλλήλοις* T **c** 7 *πότερα* T: *πότερον* (sed *α* s. v.) W: om. B **c** 8 *οἷόν τ'*] *οἷόν τι* ci. Heindorf *ἔχει* T: *εἶχε* B **d** 6 *αὖ*] *δὴ* Schanz **d** 8 *ἡδονῶν* T: *δηλον ων* B **a** 3 *πολυμελὲς . . . καὶ πολυμερές* scripsi: *πολυμελὲς . . . καὶ πολυειδές* B Stobaeus: *πολυμερὲς . . . καὶ πολυειδές* T: *πολυειδὲς . . . καὶ πολυμελές* V

was wily, who, though in love no less than anyone, had persuaded the boy that he was not in love. And once, making his request,[1] he was persuading him of just this, that one should gratify the one who is not in love before the one in love; and he spoke like this—

About everything, boy, there is one beginning for those who are going to deliberate well: one must know what the deliberation c
is about, or of necessity one misses the mark altogether. But it escapes the notice of the many that they do not know the substance of each thing. So, as though they knew, they do not come to agreement at the beginning of the inquiry, and having gone on, they pay the likely price; for they agree with neither themselves nor one another. So let me and you not undergo what we reprove in others; but since the speech before you and me is on whether one should rather go into friendship with one in love or with one not, as to love, what sort of thing it is and what power it has, having laid d
down a definition by agreement, let us, looking to it and referring to it, make our inquiry whether it provides benefit or harm. That love, then, is a kind of desire is plain to everyone; and that, again, those too who are not in love desire beautiful things, we know. By what, then, shall we distinguish the one in love and the one not? We must apprehend, again, that in each of us there are two figures that rule and lead, which we follow wherever they lead: the one, which is inborn, desire for pleasures; the other, acquired, opinion, aiming at the best.[2] These two in us are sometimes in concord, and e
there are times when they are at faction; and at one time the one has the mastery, at another the other. When, then, opinion leads by reason towards the best and has the mastery, the name of the mastery is temperance;[3] but when desire drags without reason to- 238
wards pleasures and has ruled in us, the rule has been given the title of insolence.[4] But insolence is many-named—for it is many-limbed and many-parted—and of these figures[5]

1. *Making his request*: *aitōn*, the reading of T, W and Heraclitus, printed by Burnet; B has *erōn*, "being in love" (apparatus, b5).

2. *Figures*: *idea*, a thing's look or shape, or a kind; "figure" throughout (*eidos* "form"). Compare the charioteer's two horses in the second speech (246a–b, 253d–e).

3. *Reason*: *logos*, the word that is "speech" elsewhere.

4. *Insolence*: *hybris*, outrageous excess, the vice opposed to temperance; *hybristēs* is "insolent" in the series. The dark horse of the second speech is "companion of insolence" (253e).

5. *Many-limbed and many-parted*: Burnet's own text (*scripsi*); B and Stobaeus have "many-limbed ... many-formed", T "many-parted ... many-formed" (apparatus, a3).

ἐκπρεπὴς ἢ ἂν τύχῃ γενομένη, τὴν αὐτῆς ἐπωνυμίαν ὀνο-
μαζόμενον τὸν ἔχοντα παρέχεται, οὔτε τινὰ καλὴν οὔτ' 5
ἐπαξίαν κεκτῆσθαι. περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐδωδὴν κρατοῦσα τοῦ
λόγου τε τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπιθυμία
γαστριμαργία τε καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα ταὐτὸν τοῦτο κεκλημένον b
παρέξεται· περὶ δ' αὖ μέθας τυραννεύσασα, τὸν κεκτημένον
ταύτῃ ἄγουσα, δῆλον οὗ τεύξεται προσρήματος· καὶ τἆλλα
δὴ τὰ τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ ἀδελφῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀνόματα τῆς
ἀεὶ δυναστευούσης ᾗ προσήκει καλεῖσθαι πρόδηλον. ἧς δ' 5
ἕνεκα πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν εἴρηται, σχεδὸν μὲν ἤδη φανερόν,
λεχθὲν δὲ ἢ μὴ λεχθὲν πάντως σαφέστερον· ἡ γὰρ ἄνευ
λόγου δόξης ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν ὁρμώσης κρατήσασα ἐπιθυμία
πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀχθεῖσα κάλλους, καὶ ὑπὸ αὖ τῶν ἑαυτῆς συγ- c
γενῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ σωμάτων κάλλος ἐρρωμένως ῥωσθεῖσα
νικήσασα ἀγωγῇ, ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ῥώμης ἐπωνυμίαν λαβοῦσα,
ἔρως ἐκλήθη.

Ἀτάρ, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, δοκῶ τι σοί, ὥσπερ ἐμαυτῷ, 5
θεῖον πάθος πεπονθέναι;

ΦΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς εὔροιά
τίς σε εἴληφεν.

ΣΩ. Σιγῇ τοίνυν μου ἄκουε. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ θεῖος ἔοικεν
ὁ τόπος εἶναι, ὥστε ἐὰν ἄρα πολλάκις νυμφόληπτος προϊόντος d
τοῦ λόγου γένωμαι, μὴ θαυμάσῃς· τὰ νῦν γὰρ οὐκέτι πόρρω
διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι.

ΦΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

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a 4 *ἐπονομαζόμενον* Stobaeus **a** 6 *κεκτῆσθαι* B: *κεκλῆσθαι* T **a** 7 *τε* T Stobaeus: om. B **b** 5 *ᾗ* B T: *ὃ* Stobaeus **b** 7 *πάντως* Stobaeus Ven. 189: *πᾶν πως* B T **b** 8 *τὸ ὀρθὸν* B T Dionysius ad Cn. Pompeium: *τἀγαθὸν* in marg. B² Dionysius de Demosthene **c** 1 *ἀχθεῖσα* B T pr. loc. Dionysius Hermias: *ἄγουσα* in marg. B² alt. loc. Dionysius *ὑπὸ αὖ* om. marg. B² alt. loc. Dionysius *ἑαυτῆς* B² T Dionysius Stobaeus: *ἑαυτῇ* B **c** 2 *ἐρρωμένως* B² T Dionysius Stobaeus: *ἐρώμενος* pr. B *ἐρρωμένως . . . νικήσασα* secl. G. Hermann **c** 3 *ἀγωγῇ* B T: *ἀγωγὴ* Dionysius *ἐπωνυμίαν* B T pr. loc. Dionysius: *ἐπιθυμίαν* marg. b alt. loc. Dionysius

whichever has in fact become conspicuous makes the one who has it be named by its own title, one neither beautiful nor worth possessing. For when desire concerned with food has the mastery over reason, the best, and over the other desires, it is gluttony, and it b
will make the one who has it be called this same thing; and when, again, concerned with drunkenness, it has become tyrant, leading the one who possesses it that way, it is plain what appellation it will get; and as for the other names, brothers of these and belonging to brother desires, it is obvious how it is fitting for one to be called by that of whichever holds sway at the time. The desire for whose sake all that came before has been said is pretty well evident already; but said, rather than not said, it is in every way clearer. For the desire that without reason has mastered opinion striving towards what is right, and has been led towards the pleasure of c
beauty, and has been strongly strengthened in turn by its own kindred desires towards the beauty of bodies, and has conquered in its leading, taking its title from this very strength, has been called love.[1]

But, my friend Phaedrus, do you think, as I do, that I have undergone a divine experience?

PHAEDR. Very much so, Socrates; a kind of fair flow has taken hold of you, beyond what is usual.

SOC. Listen to me in silence, then; for in reality the place seems d
to be divine; so that if, as the speech goes on, I become by chance taken by the nymphs, do not marvel; for what I am uttering now is no longer far from dithyrambs.[2]

PHAEDR. You speak most truly.

1. *Strongly strengthened … strength … love*: *errōmenōs rhōstheisa … rhōmē … erōs*: Socrates derives *erōs* from *rhōmē*, "strength". The *Cratylus* (420a–b) derives it instead from its "flowing in" through the eyes. After the speech Socrates repents of it, since Love is a god (242d–e); in his second speech such madness is given by the gods for the greatest good fortune (245b–c).

2. *Taken by the nymphs*: *nympholēptos*, held by the nymphs, whose shrine is beside them (230b). Dithyrambs were choral songs for Dionysus, a byword for high-flown diction.

ΣΩ. Τούτων μέντοι σὺ αἴτιος. ἀλλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄκουε· ἴσως γὰρ κἂν ἀποτράποιτο τὸ ἐπιόν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸς τὸν παῖδα πάλιν τῷ λόγῳ ἰτέον.

Εἶεν, ὦ φέριστε· ὃ μὲν δὴ τυγχάνει ὂν περὶ οὗ βουλευτέον, εἴρηταί τε καὶ ὥρισται, βλέποντες δὲ δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὰ λοιπὰ λέγωμεν τίς ὠφελία ἢ βλάβη ἀπό τε ἐρῶντος καὶ μὴ τῷ χαριζομένῳ ἐξ εἰκότος συμβήσεται. τῷ δὴ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχομένῳ δουλεύοντί τε ἡδονῇ ἀνάγκη που τὸν ἐρώμενον ὡς ἥδιστον ἑαυτῷ παρασκευάζειν· νοσοῦντι δὲ πᾶν ἡδὺ τὸ μὴ ἀντιτεῖνον, κρεῖττον δὲ καὶ ἴσον ἐχθρόν. οὔτε δὴ κρείττω οὔτε ἰσούμενον ἑκὼν ἐραστὴς παιδικὰ ἀνέξεται, ἥττω δὲ καὶ ὑποδεέστερον ἀεὶ ἀπεργάζεται· ἥττων δὲ ἀμαθὴς σοφοῦ, δειλὸς ἀνδρείου, ἀδύνατος εἰπεῖν ῥητορικοῦ, βραδὺς ἀγχίνου. τοσούτων κακῶν καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐραστὴν ἐρωμένῳ ἀνάγκη γιγνομένων τε καὶ φύσει ἐνόντων [τῶν] μὲν ἥδεσθαι, τὰ δὲ παρασκευάζειν, ἢ στέρεσθαι τοῦ παραυτίκα ἡδέος. φθονερὸν δὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἄλλων συνουσιῶν ἀπείργοντα καὶ ὠφελίμων ὅθεν ἂν μάλιστ' ἀνὴρ γίγνοιτο, μεγάλης αἴτιον εἶναι βλάβης, μεγίστης δὲ τῆς ὅθεν ἂν φρονιμώτατος εἴη. τοῦτο δὲ ἡ θεία φιλοσοφία τυγχάνει ὄν, ἧς ἐραστὴν παιδικὰ ἀνάγκη πόρρωθεν εἴργειν, περίφοβον ὄντα τοῦ καταφρονηθῆναι· τά τε ἄλλα μηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως ἂν ᾖ πάντα ἀγνοῶν καὶ πάντα ἀποβλέπων εἰς τὸν ἐραστήν, οἷος ὢν τῷ μὲν ἥδιστος, ἑαυτῷ δὲ βλαβερώτατος ἂν εἴη. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐπίτροπός τε καὶ κοινωνὸς οὐδαμῇ λυσιτελὴς ἀνὴρ ἔχων ἔρωτα.

Τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν τε καὶ θεραπείαν οἵαν τε καὶ ὡς θεραπεύσει οὗ ἂν γένηται κύριος, ὃς ἡδὺ πρὸ ἀγαθοῦ

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d 6 *καν* B: *ἂν* T **e** 3 *δουλεύοντι* B: *ἢ δουλεύοντι* T **e** 5 *μὴ* T: om. B **a** 2 *ἥττων* B T: *ἧττον* V **a** 6 *ἐνόντων* T Stobaeus: *ἐν ὄντων* B *τῶν* B T Stobaeus: secl. Nutzhorn: *τοῖς* Heindorf **b** 8 *ἑαυτῷ* T Stobaeus: *τῷ ἑαυτῷ* B *ἂν* V: om. B T

soc. You, however, are the cause of this. But listen to the rest; for perhaps what is coming on might even be turned away. That, then, will matter to a god; but we must go back to the boy with the speech.

Very well, my fine fellow: what that in fact is about which we must deliberate has been said and defined; and looking to it, let e
us say the rest: what benefit or harm will in all likelihood come to the one who gratifies, from the one in love and from the one not. Now for the one ruled by desire, who is a slave to pleasure, it is a necessity, I take it, to prepare his beloved to be as pleasant as possible to himself; and to one who is sick, everything that does not resist is pleasant, but what is stronger or equal is an enemy. So a lover will not willingly endure a darling who is stronger or 239
his equal, but always works him into one weaker and inferior; and weaker are the unlearned than the wise, the coward than the brave, one unable to speak than the rhetorician, the slow than the quick-witted. It is a necessity that the lover be pleased with so many evils of mind, and more still, when they come about in the beloved and are in him by nature, and that he prepare the others, or be deprived of what is pleasant for the moment.[1] It is a necessity, then, that he be jealous, and, by shutting him out from many other associations, b
beneficial ones, from which he would most become a man, be the cause of great harm, and of the greatest harm in shutting him out from the one from which he would be most intelligent. And this is in fact divine philosophy, from which it is a necessity that the lover shut his darling out, far away, being terrified of being despised; and that in other respects he contrive that the other be ignorant of everything and look to the lover in everything, being such that he would be most pleasant to the lover and most harmful to himself. In matters of the mind, then, a man who has love is in no way a c
profitable guardian and partner.

The condition of the body, and the tending of it, what kind of tending it will be and how he will tend the body of whomever he becomes lord of—he who

1. *Be pleased … prepare the others*: Burnet deletes *tōn* after Nutzhorn; B, T and Stobaeus have it, "be pleased with some, and prepare others" (apparatus, a6).

ἠνάγκασται διώκειν, δεῖ μετὰ ταῦτα ἰδεῖν. ὀφθήσεται δὴ μαλθακόν τινα καὶ οὐ στερεὸν διώκων, οὐδ' ἐν ἡλίῳ καθαρῷ τεθραμμένον ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ συμμιγεῖ σκιᾷ, πόνων μὲν ἀνδρείων καὶ ἱδρώτων ξηρῶν ἄπειρον, ἔμπειρον δὲ ἁπαλῆς καὶ ἀνάνδρου διαίτης, ἀλλοτρίοις χρώμασι καὶ κόσμοις χήτει οἰκείων κοσμούμενον, ὅσα τε ἄλλα τούτοις ἕπεται πάντα ἐπιτηδεύοντα, ᾗ δῆλα καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον περαιτέρω προβαίνειν, ἀλλὰ ἓν κεφάλαιον ὁρισαμένους ἐπ' ἄλλο ἰέναι· τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον σῶμα ἐν πολέμῳ τε καὶ ἄλλαις χρείαις ὅσαι μεγάλαι οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ θαρροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ φίλοι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ φοβοῦνται.

Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ὡς δῆλον ἐατέον, τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς ῥητέον, τίνα ἡμῖν ὠφελίαν ἢ τίνα βλάβην περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν ἡ τοῦ ἐρῶντος ὁμιλία τε καὶ ἐπιτροπεία παρέξεται. σαφὲς δὴ τοῦτό γε παντὶ μέν, μάλιστα δὲ τῷ ἐραστῇ, ὅτι τῶν φιλτάτων τε καὶ εὐνουστάτων καὶ θειοτάτων κτημάτων ὀρφανὸν πρὸ παντὸς εὔξαιτ' ἂν εἶναι τὸν ἐρώμενον· πατρὸς γὰρ καὶ μητρὸς καὶ συγγενῶν καὶ φίλων στέρεσθαι ἂν αὐτὸν δέξαιτο, διακωλυτὰς καὶ ἐπιτιμητὰς ἡγούμενος τῆς ἡδίστης πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμιλίας. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐσίαν γ' ἔχοντα χρυσοῦ ἤ τινος ἄλλης κτήσεως οὔτε εὐάλωτον ὁμοίως οὔτε ἀλόντα εὐμεταχείριστον ἡγήσεται· ἐξ ὧν πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ἐραστὴν παιδικοῖς φθονεῖν μὲν οὐσίαν κεκτημένοις, ἀπολλυμένης δὲ χαίρειν. ἔτι τοίνυν ἄγαμον, ἄπαιδα, ἄοικον ὅτι πλεῖστον χρόνον παιδικὰ ἐραστὴς εὔξαιτ' ἂν γενέσθαι, τὸ αὑτοῦ γλυκὺ ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον καρποῦσθαι ἐπιθυμῶν.

Ἔστι μὲν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα κακά, ἀλλά τις δαίμων ἔμειξε τοῖς πλείστοις ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα ἡδονήν, οἷον κόλακι, δεινῷ θηρίῳ καὶ βλάβῃ μεγάλῃ, ὅμως ἐπέμειξεν ἡ φύσις ἡδονήν τινα οὐκ

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c 5 *μετὰ* T: *με* B δὴ Hirschig: δὲ B T **d** 1 *κόσμοις* B T: *σχήμασιν* Plutarchus **d** 3 ᾗ δῆλα b t: ἄδηλα B T **d** 4 ἓν *κεφάλαιον*] *ἐν κεφαλαίῳ* Ast **e** 3 δὲ T: γε B **e** 5 *εὔξαιτ'* T: *εὔξετ'* B **e** 6 *μητρὸς καὶ* T Stobaeus: *μητρὸς* B **a** 5 *ἀπολλυμένης* B T: *ἀπολλυμένοις* vulg. **a** 6 *ἄοικον* T Stobaeus: *οἶκον* B

has been compelled to pursue the pleasant before the good—we must see next. He will be seen, then, pursuing someone soft and not firm, reared not in clean sunlight but under mingled shade, unversed in manly toils and dry sweat, versed in tender and unmanly living, adorned with other people's colours and adornments for d
want of his own, and making a way of life of all the other things that follow on these, which are plain;[1] and it is not worth going further, but, having defined one main point, we should go on to another: for such a body, in war and in the other great occasions of need, the enemies are bold against, and the friends, and the lovers themselves, are afraid for.

This, then, must be let pass as plain; what comes next must be said: what benefit or what harm, as regards property, the company e
and guardianship of the one in love will provide for us. This at least is clear to everyone, and most of all to the lover: that he would pray before everything that his beloved be orphaned of the most loved, best-disposed and most divine possessions; for he would accept his being deprived of father and mother and kindred and friends, believing them hinderers and reprovers of his most pleasant com- 240
pany with him. But indeed, one who has substance in gold or some other property he will believe neither likewise easy to catch nor, once caught, easy to handle;[2] from which there is every necessity that a lover be jealous of his darling when he possesses substance, and rejoice when it is lost. Further, then, a lover would pray that his darling be unmarried, childless, homeless for as long a time as possible, desiring to reap the fruit of his own sweet thing for as long a time as possible.

There are, to be sure, other evils too, but some daimon has mixed into most of them a pleasure for the moment: in a flatterer, for ex- b
ample, a dreadful beast and a great harm, nature has nevertheless mixed in a pleasure

1. *Which are plain*: the reading of later hands in B and T (b t), printed by Burnet; B and T themselves have *adēla*, "unclear" (apparatus, d3).

2. *Substance*: *ousia*, the word rendered "substance" at 237c for what each thing is; here, as at 232c, it is wealth.

ἄμουσον, καί τις ἑταίραν ὡς βλαβερὸν ψέξειεν ἄν, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων θρεμμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων, οἷς τό γε καθ' ἡμέραν ἡδίστοισιν εἶναι ὑπάρχει· παιδικοῖς δὲ ἐραστὴς πρὸς τῷ βλαβερῷ καὶ εἰς τὸ συνημερεύειν πάντων ἀηδέστατον. ἥλικα γὰρ δὴ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος τέρπειν τὸν ἥλικα—ἡ γὰρ οἶμαι χρόνου ἰσότης ἐπ' ἴσας ἡδονὰς ἄγουσα δι' ὁμοιότητα φιλίαν παρέχεται—ἀλλ' ὅμως κόρον γε καὶ ἡ τούτων συνουσία ἔχει. καὶ μὴν τό γε ἀναγκαῖον αὖ βαρὺ παντὶ περὶ πᾶν λέγεται· ὃ δὴ πρὸς τῇ ἀνομοιότητι μάλιστα ἐραστὴς πρὸς παιδικὰ ἔχει. νεωτέρῳ γὰρ πρεσβύτερος συνὼν οὔθ' ἡμέρας οὔτε νυκτὸς ἑκὼν ἀπολείπεται, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνάγκης τε καὶ οἴστρου ἐλαύνεται, ὃς ἐκείνῳ μὲν ἡδονὰς ἀεὶ διδοὺς ἄγει, ὁρῶντι, ἀκούοντι, ἁπτομένῳ, καὶ πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν αἰσθανομένῳ τοῦ ἐρωμένου, ὥστε μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀραρότως αὐτῷ ὑπηρετεῖν· τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐρωμένῳ ποῖον παραμύθιον ἢ τίνας ἡδονὰς διδοὺς ποιήσει τὸν ἴσον χρόνον συνόντα μὴ οὐχὶ ἐπ' ἔσχατον ἐλθεῖν ἀηδίας—ὁρῶντι μὲν ὄψιν πρεσβυτέραν καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὥρᾳ, ἑπομένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ταύτῃ, ἃ καὶ λόγῳ ἐστὶν ἀκούειν οὐκ ἐπιτερπές, μὴ ὅτι δὴ ἔργῳ ἀνάγκης ἀεὶ προσκειμένης μεταχειρίζεσθαι, φυλακάς τε δὴ καχυποτόπους φυλαττομένῳ διὰ παντὸς καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας, ἀκαίρους τε ἐπαίνους καὶ ὑπερβάλλοντας ἀκούοντι, ὡς δ' αὖτως ψόγους νήφοντος μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτούς, εἰς δὲ μέθην ἰόντος πρὸς τῷ μὴ ἀνεκτῷ ἐπαισχεῖς, παρρησίᾳ κατακορεῖ καὶ ἀναπεπταμένῃ χρωμένου;

Καὶ ἐρῶν μὲν βλαβερός τε καὶ ἀηδής, λήξας δὲ τοῦ ἔρωτος εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἄπιστος, εἰς ὃν πολλὰ καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν ὅρκων τε καὶ δεήσεων ὑπισχνούμενος μόγις

b 5 *ἡδίστοισιν* B: *ἡδίστοις* T Stobaeus **c** 1 *δὴ* Stobaeus Aristaenetus: om. B T *τέρπειν* B ex emend. T: *τέρπει* T **c** 7 *ἑκὼν ἀπολείπεται* B: *ἀπολείπεται ἑκών* T **d** 5 *διδοὺς* T: *ἀιδοῦς* B: *διαιδοῦς* W **e** 2 *φυλακάς* T: *φύλακας* B *καχυποτόπους* T: *καχυπὸ τόπους* B: *καχυπόπτους* vulg. **e** 3 *ἀκαίρους τε ἐπαίνους* T: *ἀκαίρους τε καὶ ἐπαίνους* B: *ἐπαίνους τε καὶ ἀκαίρους* W **e** 5 *νήφοντος* T: *νήφοντες* B **e** 6 *ἐπαισχεῖς* ci. Heindorf: *ἐπ' αἴσχει* B T

not unmusical; and one might censure a courtesan as harmful, and many other creatures and ways of life of that sort, which have it in them to be most pleasant, for the day at least; but to his darling a lover, besides being harmful, is also for spending the days together the most unpleasant of all. For indeed the old account too c
has it that age delights age[1]—for equality in time, I think, leading to equal pleasures, provides friendship through similarity—but nevertheless even the association of these has its satiety. And indeed what is compulsory, again, is said to be heavy for everyone in everything; and this, besides the dissimilarity, the lover has most of all towards his darling. For the older, being with the younger, is not willingly left behind, by day or by night, but is driven by ne- d
cessity and a gadfly,[2] which leads him, ever giving him pleasures, as he sees, hears, touches and perceives the beloved with every perception, so that he serves him, closely fitted, with pleasure. But to the beloved what consolation or what pleasures will he give, to keep him, being with him for an equal time, from coming to the extreme of unpleasantness—as he sees an appearance that is older and not in its youth, with the other things that follow on it, which it is not delightful even to hear of in speech, let alone to handle in e
deed, with necessity always pressing on him; and as he is guarded with suspicious guarding continually and against everyone, and hears praises untimely and excessive, and in the same way censures, unbearable when the lover is sober, and, when he goes into drunkenness, besides being unbearable, disgraceful, since he uses a frankness that runs to satiety and is spread wide open?[3]

And, while in love, he is harmful and unpleasant, and when he has left off from love he is faithless for the time to come, in regard to which, making many promises with many oaths and entreaties, he barely

1. A proverb (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1371b15, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1161b34).
2. *Gadfly*: *oistros*, the stinging fly that drives cattle wild; so, any maddening goad.
3. *Disgraceful*: Heindorf's conjecture, printed by Burnet; B and T have *ep' aischei*, "to his shame" (apparatus, e6).

κατεῖχε τήν γ' ἐν τῷ τότε συνουσίαν ἐπίπονον οὖσαν φέρειν 241
δι' ἐλπίδα ἀγαθῶν. τότε δὴ δέον ἐκτίνειν, μεταβαλὼν ἄλλον
ἄρχοντα ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ προστάτην, νοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνην ἀντ'
ἔρωτος καὶ μανίας, ἄλλος γεγονὼς λέληθεν τὰ παιδικά. καὶ
ὁ μὲν αὐτὸν χάριν ἀπαιτεῖ τῶν τότε, ὑπομιμνήσκων τὰ 5
πραχθέντα καὶ λεχθέντα, ὡς τῷ αὐτῷ διαλεγόμενος· ὁ δὲ ὑπ'
αἰσχύνης οὔτε εἰπεῖν τολμᾷ ὅτι ἄλλος γέγονεν, οὔθ' ὅπως τὰ
τῆς προτέρας ἀνοήτου ἀρχῆς ὁρκωμόσιά τε καὶ ὑποσχέσεις
ἐμπεδώσῃ ἔχει, νοῦν ἤδη ἐσχηκὼς καὶ σεσωφρονηκώς, ἵνα b
μὴ πράττων ταὐτὰ τῷ πρόσθεν ὅμοιός τε ἐκείνῳ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς
πάλιν γένηται. φυγὰς δὴ γίγνεται ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ἀπε-
στερηκὼς ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ὁ πρὶν ἐραστής, ὀστράκου μετα-
πεσόντος, ἴεται φυγῇ μεταβαλών· ὁ δὲ ἀναγκάζεται διώκειν 5
ἀγανακτῶν καὶ ἐπιθεάζων, ἠγνοηκὼς τὸ ἄπαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὅτι
οὐκ ἄρα ἔδει ποτὲ ἐρῶντι καὶ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ἀνοήτῳ χαρίζεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον μὴ ἐρῶντι καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι· εἰ δὲ μή, c
ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἐνδοῦναι αὐτὸν ἀπίστῳ, δυσκόλῳ, φθονερῷ,
ἀηδεῖ, βλαβερῷ μὲν πρὸς οὐσίαν, βλαβερῷ δὲ πρὸς τὴν
τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν, πολὺ δὲ βλαβερωτάτῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς
ψυχῆς παίδευσιν, ἧς οὔτε ἀνθρώποις οὔτε θεοῖς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ 5
τιμιώτερον οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε ποτὲ ἔσται. ταῦτά τε οὖν χρή,
ὦ παῖ, συννοεῖν, καὶ εἰδέναι τὴν ἐραστοῦ φιλίαν ὅτι οὐ μετ'
εὐνοίας γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ σιτίου τρόπον, χάριν πλησμονῆς,
ὡς λύκοι ἄρνας ἀγαπῶσιν, ὡς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί. d

Τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο, ὦ Φαῖδρε. οὐκέτ' ἂν τὸ πέρα ἀκούσαις ἐμοῦ
λέγοντος, ἀλλ' ἤδη σοι τέλος ἐχέτω ὁ λόγος.

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a 1 γ' T: om. B οὖσαν T: om. B **a** 2 ἐκτίνειν B: ἐκτείνειν pr. T: ἐκτείνει G μεταβαλὼν B T: μεταλαβὼν corr. Coisl. **a** 7 ὅτι T: οὔτ' εἰ B **b** 1 ἐμπεδώσῃ B T W: ἐμπεδώσει vulg. **b** 3 ἀπεστερηκὼς B T: ἀπειρηκὼς corr. Coisl.: ἀπεστυγηκὼς G. Hermann **b** 5 διώκειν T: διώκων B **c** 2 δυσκόλῳ φθονερῷ secl. Spengel **c** 4 τοῦ B T Stobaeus: om. vulg. **d** 1 ἄρνας ἀγαπῶσιν B T: ἄρνα φιλοῦσ' vulg.: αἶγ' ἀγαπῶσιν schol. Hermogenis: ἄρν' ἀγαπῶσ' Bekker **d** 3 ἀλλ' ἤδη B: ἀλλὰ δὴ T τέλος B T: πέρας vulg.

kept him bearing the association of that time, at least, toilsome as 241
it was, through hope of good things. Then, when he ought to discharge his debt, having changed to another ruler and champion within himself, sense and temperance instead of love and madness, he has escaped his darling's notice, having become another. And the boy demands from him the favour owed for those times, reminding him of what was done and said, as though conversing with the same man; but he, for shame, neither dares to say that he has become another, nor has any way to make good the sworn b
pledges and promises of his former, senseless rule, now that he has got sense and become temperate, so as not, by doing the same things as before, to become like that man and the same again. So he becomes a fugitive from these things; and the former lover, having defaulted by necessity, now that the shell has fallen the other way, takes to flight, having changed about;[1] and the boy is compelled to pursue him, in vexation and calling on the gods, having been ignorant of the whole thing from the beginning: that, after all, he should never have gratified one in love and, by necessity, senseless, but much rather one not in love and who has sense; and that c
otherwise it would be necessary to give himself up to one faithless, ill-tempered, jealous, unpleasant, harmful to his substance, harmful to the condition of his body, and by far most harmful to the education of his soul, than which nothing, truly, either is or ever will be more precious to human beings or to gods. These things, then, boy, you should consider, and know that a lover's friendship does not come about with goodwill, but in the way of food, for the sake of surfeit: as wolves cherish lambs, so lovers love a boy.[2] d

This is the very thing, Phaedrus. You will not hear me speak any further; let the speech now have its end for you.

1. A children's game: a shell, black on one side and white on the other, was thrown, and the way it fell decided which side gave chase and which fled (Pollux, *Onomasticon* 9.111).

2. The words fall close to an epic line, a hexameter; hence Socrates' "I am already uttering epic verses" (241e).

ΦΑΙ. Καίτοι ᾤμην γε μεσοῦν αὐτόν, καὶ ἐρεῖν τὰ ἴσα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος, ὡς δεῖ ἐκείνῳ χαρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον, λέγων ὅσα αὖ ἔχει ἀγαθά· νῦν δὲ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἀποπαύῃ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ᾔσθου, ὦ μακάριε, ὅτι ἤδη ἔπη φθέγγομαι ἀλλ' οὐκέτι διθυράμβους, καὶ ταῦτα ψέγων; ἐὰν δ' ἐπαινεῖν τὸν ἕτερον ἄρξωμαι, τί με οἴει ποιήσειν; ἆρ' οἶσθ' ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν, αἷς με σὺ προύβαλες ἐκ προνοίας, σαφῶς ἐνθουσιάσω; λέγω οὖν ἑνὶ λόγῳ ὅτι ὅσα τὸν ἕτερον λελοιδορήκαμεν, τῷ ἑτέρῳ τἀναντία τούτων ἀγαθὰ πρόσεστιν. καὶ τί δεῖ μακροῦ λόγου; περὶ γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. καὶ οὕτω δὴ ὁ μῦθος ὅτι πάσχειν προσήκει αὐτῷ, τοῦτο πείσεται· κἀγὼ τὸν ποταμὸν τοῦτον διαβὰς ἀπέρχομαι πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ τι μεῖζον ἀναγκασθῆναι.

ΦΑΙ. Μήπω γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὶν ἂν τὸ καῦμα παρέλθῃ. ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὡς σχεδὸν ἤδη μεσημβρία ἵσταται ἡ δὴ καλουμένη σταθερά; ἀλλὰ περιμείναντες καὶ ἅμα περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων διαλεχθέντες, τάχα ἐπειδὰν ἀποψυχῇ ἴμεν.

ΣΩ. Θεῖός γ' εἶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς θαυμάσιος. οἶμαι γὰρ ἐγὼ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ σοῦ βίου γεγονότων λόγων μηδένα πλείους ἢ σὲ πεποιηκέναι γεγενῆσθαι ἤτοι αὐτὸν λέγοντα ἢ ἄλλους ἑνί γέ τῳ τρόπῳ προσαναγκάζοντα —Σιμμίαν Θηβαῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πάμπολυ κρατεῖς—καὶ νῦν αὖ δοκεῖς αἴτιός μοι γεγενῆσθαι λόγῳ τινὶ ῥηθῆναι.

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ πόλεμόν γε ἀγγέλλεις. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνι τούτῳ;

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d 4 γε μεσοῦν αὐτόν V: γε μεσοῦν αὐτοῦ B T: σε μεσοῦν αὐτοῦ Hermann **d** 6 λέγων B T: λέγοντα Stephanus: λέγονθ' Schanz **e** 5 ἐνθουσιάσω T: ἐνθυσιάσω B **a** 4 ἡ δὴ t Suidas: ἤδη B T ἡ δὴ . . . σταθερά secl. Ruhnken **a** 6 ἀποψυχημεν (sic) B: ἀποψύξῃ ἴωμεν T: ἀποψύχῃ ἄπιμεν Phrynichus **b** 1 λόγων T: om. B W πεποιηκέναι B t: πεπονηκέναι pr. T γεγενῆσθαι] γενέσθαι H. Richards **b** 2 τῳ B T: om. vulg. **b** 3 ἐξαιρῶ Heindorf: ἐξαίρω B T λόγου B T: τοῦ λόγου W **b** 4 γεγενῆσθαι] γενήσεσθαι Badham

PHAEDR. And yet I thought it was at its middle,[1] and that you would say an equal amount about the one who is not in love, how one should gratify him rather, saying all the good things he has in turn. But now, Socrates, why do you break off?

SOC. Did you not perceive, you blessed man, that I am already e
uttering epic verses, no longer dithyrambs, and that while I censure? And if I begin to praise the other, what do you think I shall do? Do you know that by the Nymphs, to whom you deliberately threw me, I shall plainly be filled with the god? I say, then, in short, that the goods opposite to all the things we have reviled the one for belong to the other. And what need is there of a long speech? For it has been said sufficiently about both. And so the tale will un- 242
dergo whatever it is fitting for it to undergo; and I am crossing this river and going away before I am compelled by you to something greater.

PHAEDR. Not yet, Socrates, not until the heat has passed. Or don't you see that midday is almost already standing—the standing midday, as it is called?[2] But when we have waited, and at the same time conversed about what has been said, we will go soon, when it has cooled.

SOC. You are divine about speeches, Phaedrus, and simply marvellous. For I think that of the speeches that have come about in b
your lifetime no one has caused more to come about than you, whether by speaking them yourself or by compelling others in one way or another—I leave Simmias of Thebes out of the reckoning; but over the rest you have the mastery by far[3]—and now again I think you have become the cause of a speech being spoken by me.

PHAEDR. It's no war you announce, at least![4] But how so, and what speech is this?

1. *It was at its middle*: V's reading, printed by Burnet; B and T have *autou*: "that you were in the middle of it" (apparatus, d4).

2. Noon, when the sun seems to stand still at the height of its course.

3. Simmias of Thebes, a follower of the Pythagorean Philolaus and one of Socrates' two Theban questioners in the *Phaedo* (59c, 61d).

4. A proverb: it is good news.

ΣΩ. Ἠνίκ' ἔμελλον, ὠγαθέ, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο —ἀεὶ δέ με ἐπίσχει ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν—καί τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι, ἥ με οὐκ ἐᾷ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἂν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὡς δή τι ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θεῖον. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν μάντις μέν, οὐ πάνυ δὲ σπουδαῖος, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ γράμματα φαῦλοι, ὅσον μὲν ἐμαυτῷ μόνον ἱκανός· σαφῶς οὖν ἤδη μανθάνω τὸ ἁμάρτημα. ὡς δή τοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μαντικόν γέ τι καὶ ἡ ψυχή· ἐμὲ γὰρ ἔθραξε μέν τι καὶ πάλαι λέγοντα τὸν λόγον, καί πως ἐδυσωπούμην κατ' Ἴβυκον, μή τι παρὰ θεοῖς

ἀμβλακὼν τιμὰν πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀμείψω·

νῦν δ' �😊σθημαι τὸ ἁμάρτημα.

ΦΑΙ. Λέγεις δὲ δὴ τί;

ΣΩ. Δεινόν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, δεινὸν λόγον αὐτός τε ἐκόμισας ἐμέ τε ἠνάγκασας εἰπεῖν.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς δή;

ΣΩ. Εὐήθη καὶ ὑπό τι ἀσεβῆ· οὗ τίς ἂν εἴη δεινότερος;

ΦΑΙ. Οὐδείς, εἴ γε σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; τὸν Ἔρωτα οὐκ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ θεόν τινα ἡγῇ;

ΦΑΙ. Λέγεταί γε δή.

ΣΩ. Οὔ τι ὑπό γε Λυσίου, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ὃς διὰ τοῦ ἐμοῦ στόματος καταφαρμακευθέντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐλέχθη. εἰ δ' ἔστιν, ὥσπερ οὖν ἔστι, θεὸς ἤ τι θεῖον ὁ Ἔρως, οὐδὲν ἂν κακὸν εἴη, τὼ δὲ λόγω τὼ νυνδὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπέτην ὡς τοιούτου ὄντος· ταύτῃ τε οὖν ἡμαρτανέτην περὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα, ἔτι τε ἡ εὐήθεια αὐτοῖν πάνυ ἀστεία, τὸ μηδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγοντε

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b 9 *τε καὶ* B T: del. ci. Schanz: *μοι καὶ* V (om. mox *μοι*): *καὶ* Proclus *τὸ* B T Proclus: om. al. **c** 1 *ἀεὶ . . . πράττειν* secl. Heindorf, at legit Proclus *ὃ* B T: *ἃ* Proclus **c** 3 *δή* Proclus: om. B T **c** 5 *μὲν* B: om. T *ἱκανός* T: *ἱκανῶς* B **c** 6 *ὡς δή τοι ὦ* T W: *ὡς δε ποιω* B W² (*ε* et *π* s. v.) **d** 1 *ἀμβλακὼν* B: *ἀμπλακὼν* T *τιμὰν* T: *τιμᾶν* B **d** 7 *οὗ τις* T: *οὔ τις* B: *οὗ τί* (et mox *δεινότερον*) Proclus **d** 11 *οὔ τι* T: *ὅτι* B: *οὕτοι* Heindorf **e** 3 *τὸ δὴ λόγω τὸ* T: *τῷ δὲ λόγῳ τῷ* B **e** 5 *ἔτι τε* T: *εἴτε* B

SOC. When I was about to cross the river, my good friend, the daimonic and the sign that customarily comes to me came—and it always checks me in whatever I am about to do[1]—and I thought I heard a voice from that very spot, which does not let me go away until I have made expiation, as one who has indeed in some way offended against the divine. I am, then, a seer—not a very serious one, but, like those who are paltry at their letters, capable, at least, for myself alone; so I now clearly learn what the offence is. For indeed, my companion, the soul too is something prophetic; for something troubled me even a while ago as I was speaking the speech, and I was somehow abashed, in Ibycus' words, lest in some way before the gods

erring, I win honour from human beings in exchange;[2]

but now I have perceived the offence.

PHAEDR. And what is it you are saying?

SOC. Dreadful, Phaedrus, a dreadful speech you both brought yourself and compelled me to speak.

PHAEDR. How so?

SOC. Simple-minded, and somewhat impious; and what speech could be more dreadful than that?

PHAEDR. None, if indeed you speak the truth.

SOC. What then? Do you not believe Love to be Aphrodite's son, and a god?

PHAEDR. So it is said, at least.

SOC. Not by Lysias, at any rate, nor by your speech, which was spoken through my mouth, drugged by you.[3] But if Love is, as indeed he is, a god or something divine, he could be nothing bad; yet the two speeches just now spoke of him as if he were such. In this, then, they both offended in regard to Love; and further, their simple-mindedness was quite urbane: that, saying nothing healthy

1. Socrates' "sign" (*sēmeion*), a voice that only ever turns him back (*Apology* 31c–d, 40a–c).

2. Ibycus of Rhegium, lyric poet of the sixth century BC (fr. 310 *PMG*).

3. *Drugged*: from *pharmakon*, the "drug" of 230d, Phaedrus' book, which drew Socrates out of town.

μηδὲ ἀληθὲς σεμνύνεσθαι ὡς τὶ ὄντε, εἰ ἄρα ἀνθρωπίσκους 243
τινὰς ἐξαπατήσαντε εὐδοκιμήσετον ἐν αὐτοῖς. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν,
ὦ φίλε, καθήρασθαι ἀνάγκη· ἔστιν δὲ τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσι περὶ
μυθολογίαν καθαρμὸς ἀρχαῖος, ὃν Ὅμηρος μὲν οὐκ ἔσθετο,
Στησίχορος δέ. τῶν γὰρ ὀμμάτων στερηθεὶς διὰ τὴν Ἑλένης 5
κακηγορίαν οὐκ ἠγνόησεν ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος, ἀλλ' ἅτε μουσικὸς
ὢν ἔγνω τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐθὺς—

Οὐκ ἔστ' ἔτυμος λόγος οὗτος,
οὐδ' ἔβας ἐν νηυσὶν εὐσέλμοις,
οὐδ' ἵκεο Πέργαμα Τροίας· b

καὶ ποιήσας δὴ πᾶσαν τὴν καλουμένην Παλινῳδίαν παρα-
χρῆμα ἀνέβλεψεν. ἐγὼ οὖν σοφώτερος ἐκείνων γενήσομαι
κατ' αὐτό γε τοῦτο· πρὶν γάρ τι παθεῖν διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἔρωτος
κακηγορίαν πειράσομαι αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι τὴν παλινῳδίαν, 5
γυμνῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τότε ὑπ' αἰσχύνης
ἐγκεκαλυμμένος.

ΦΑΙ. Τουτωνί, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔστιν ἅττ' ἂν ἐμοὶ εἶπες
ἡδίω.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γάρ, ὠγαθὲ Φαῖδρε, ἐννοεῖς ὡς ἀναιδῶς εἴρησθον c
τὼ λόγω, οὗτός τε καὶ ὁ ἐκ τοῦ βιβλίου ῥηθείς. εἰ γὰρ
ἀκούων τις τύχοι ἡμῶν γεννάδας καὶ πρᾷος τὸ ἦθος, ἑτέρου
δὲ τοιούτου ἐρῶν ἢ καὶ πρότερόν ποτε ἐρασθείς, λεγόντων
ὡς διὰ σμικρὰ μεγάλας ἔχθρας οἱ ἐρασταὶ ἀναιροῦνται καὶ 5
ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ φθονερῶς τε καὶ βλαβερῶς, πῶς οὐκ
ἂν οἴει αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι ἀκούειν ἐν ναύταις που τεθραμμένων
καὶ οὐδένα ἐλεύθερον ἔρωτα ἑωρακότων, πολλοῦ δ' ἂν δεῖν
ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖν ἃ ψέγομεν τὸν Ἔρωτα; d

ΦΑΙ. Ἴσως νὴ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτόν γε τοίνυν ἔγωγε αἰσχυνόμενος, καὶ αὐτὸν
τὸν Ἔρωτα δεδιώς, ἐπιθυμῶ ποτίμῳ λόγῳ οἷον ἁλμυρὰν

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a 1 μηδὲ T: μήτε B **a** 7 ποιεῖ] ἐποίει H. Richards **a** 9 οὐδ' ἔβας T: οὐδὲ βὰς B
b 6 τῇ T: om. B **c** 2 τὼ λόγω T: τῷ λόγῳ B **c** 7 τεθραμμένων corr. Coisl.: τεθραμμένον B T

or true, they dignified themselves as if they were something, on the 243
chance that, by deceiving some mannikins, they would win good repute among them. For me, then, my friend, it is a necessity to purify myself; and there is, for those who offend in legend-telling, an ancient purification, which Homer did not perceive, but Stesichorus did. For when he was deprived of his eyes for his evil-speaking of Helen, he was not ignorant, as Homer was, but, since he was musical, he recognized the cause, and at once he makes—[1]

> *Not true is this account;*
> *you did not go in the well-benched ships,*
> *nor come to the citadel of Troy.*[2] b

And having made, then, the whole of the so-called Palinode, he recovered his sight on the spot.[3] So I shall become wiser than they in this very respect, at least; for before I undergo anything for my evil-speaking of Love, I shall try to pay him the palinode, with my head bare, and not, as at that time, covered for shame.

PHAEDR. Than these, Socrates, there is nothing you could have said to me more pleasant.

SOC. Yes, for you conceive, my good friend Phaedrus, how c
shamelessly the two speeches have been spoken, this one and the one spoken from the book. For if someone were in fact listening to us, a man of noble breed and gentle in character, who was in love with another such, or had even at some time before been in love, while we said that lovers take up great enmities over small things and are jealous and harmful towards their darlings, how do you think he would not believe he was hearing people reared, I take it, among sailors, who had never seen a free man's love, and would be far from agreeing with us in the things we censure Love for? d

PHAEDR. Perhaps, by Zeus, Socrates.

SOC. Well, I, being ashamed before this man, and fearing Love himself, desire with a speech of fresh water to rinse away, as it were, the brine

1. Stesichorus of Himera in Sicily, lyric poet of the late seventh and the sixth centuries BC. Isocrates tells the same story of his blinding and his recantation (*Helen* 64). Homer was by tradition blind.

2. Stesichorus, fr. 192 *PMG*. The *Republic* (586c) recalls his story that those at Troy fought over a phantom of Helen.

3. *Palinode*: *palinōidia*, "a song sung back", a recantation. Socrates gives his second speech the name.

ἀκοὴν ἀποκλύσασθαι· συμβουλεύω δὲ καὶ Λυσίᾳ ὅτι τάχιστα γράψαι ὡς χρὴ ἐραστῇ μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐρῶντι ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων χαρίζεσθαι.

ΦΑΙ. Ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἔξει τοῦθ' οὕτω· σοῦ γὰρ εἰπόντος τὸν τοῦ ἐραστοῦ ἔπαινον, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη Λυσίαν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἀναγκασθῆναι γράψαι αὖ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγον.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν πιστεύω, ἔωσπερ ἂν ᾖς ὃς εἶ.

ΦΑΙ. Λέγε τοίνυν θαρρῶν.

ΣΩ. Ποῦ δή μοι ὁ παῖς πρὸς ὃν ἔλεγον; ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀκούσῃ, καὶ μὴ ἀνήκοος ὢν φθάσῃ χαρισάμενος τῷ μὴ ἐρῶντι.

ΦΑΙ. Οὗτος παρά σοι μάλα πλησίον ἀεὶ πάρεστιν, ὅταν σὺ βούλῃ.

ΣΩ. Οὑτωσὶ τοίνυν, ὦ παῖ καλέ, ἐννόησον, ὡς ὁ μὲν πρότερος ἦν λόγος Φαίδρου τοῦ Πυθοκλέους, Μυρρινουσίου ἀνδρός· ὃν δὲ μέλλω λέγειν, Στησιχόρου τοῦ Εὐφήμου, Ἱμεραίου. λεκτέος δὲ ὧδε, ὅτι Οὐκ ἔστ' ἔτυμος λόγος ὃς ἂν παρόντος ἐραστοῦ τῷ μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον φῇ δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, διότι δὴ ὁ μὲν μαίνεται, ὁ δὲ σωφρονεῖ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἁπλοῦν τὸ μανίαν κακὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγετο· νῦν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν γίγνεται διὰ μανίας, θείᾳ μέντοι δόσει διδομένης. ἥ τε γὰρ δὴ ἐν Δελφοῖς προφῆτις αἵ τ' ἐν Δωδώνῃ ἱέρειαι μανεῖσαι μὲν πολλὰ δὴ καὶ καλὰ ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἠργάσαντο, σωφρονοῦσαι δὲ βραχέα ἢ οὐδέν· καὶ ἐὰν δὴ λέγωμεν Σίβυλλάν τε καὶ ἄλλους, ὅσοι μαντικῇ χρώμενοι ἐνθέῳ πολλὰ δὴ πολλοῖς προλέγοντες εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὤρθωσαν, μηκύνοιμεν ἂν δῆλα παντὶ λέγοντες. τόδε μὴν ἄξιον ἐπιμαρτύρασθαι, ὅτι καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ τὰ

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d 8 *οὕτω· σοῦ* Schanz: *οὕτως σοῦ* t: *οὕτως οὐ* B T **e** 4 *τοῦτο* B: *τούτου* T **e** 7 *πάρα* Cobet (secl. mox *πάρεστιν*) **a** 3 *λεκτέος* T W: om. B *λόγος* B: *ὁ λόγος* T **a** 8 *γὰρ δὴ* T: *γὰρ* * * B: *γὰρ* Aristides **b** 4 *ἐνθέῳ* T: *ἐν θεοῖς* B **b** 5 *ὤρθωσαν* Ven. 189 corr. V Aristides: *ὀρθῶς* B T

of our hearing;[1] and I advise Lysias too to write as soon as possible that, on like terms, one should gratify a lover rather than one who is not in love.

PHAEDR. Why, be sure that this will be so; for once you have spoken the praise of the lover, there is every necessity that Lysias be e
compelled by me to write, in his turn, a speech on the same subject.

SOC. This I trust, so long as you are who you are.

PHAEDR. Speak, then, and be bold.

SOC. Where, then, is my boy, to whom I was speaking? So that he may hear this too, and not, through not having heard, be beforehand in gratifying the one who is not in love.

PHAEDR. He is here beside you, very near, always present whenever you want.

SOC. Conceive it, then, like this, beautiful boy: the former speech 244
was that of Phaedrus, son of Pythocles, a man of Myrrhinus; but the one I am about to speak is that of Stesichorus, son of Euphemus, of Himera.[2] And it must be spoken thus: that Not true is the account which says that, when a lover is present, one should rather gratify the one who is not in love, because the one, supposedly, is mad and the other temperate. For if it were a simple matter that madness is an evil, it would be well said; but in fact the greatest of goods come to us through madness—given, however, by divine gift. For indeed the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona, when mad, have worked many beautiful b
things for Greece, in private and in public, but when temperate, little or nothing; and if we speak of the Sibyl and others, all who, using god-filled divination, have set many people right about the future by foretelling many things, we should be going on at length, saying what is plain to everyone.[3] This, however, is worth calling to witness: that of the people of old, too, those who

1. Fresh water against salt: the earlier speeches are brine in the ears.

2. The *Suda* names Stesichorus' father Euphorbus or Euphemus. *Euphemus* means "of auspicious speech", and Himera recalls *himeros*, "longing"; whether Plato means the play is a matter of interpretation.

3. *Have set ... right*: *ōrthōsan*, from a later manuscript, a corrector of V and Aristides, printed by Burnet; B and T have *orthōs*, "rightly" (apparatus, b5). The Pythia, Apollo's prophetess at Delphi; the priestesses of the oracle of Zeus at Dodona in Epirus; the Sibyl, a prophetess of legend, who speaks "with raving mouth" (Heraclitus, fr. 92 Diels–Kranz).

ὀνόματα τιθέμενοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦντο οὐδὲ ὄνειδος μανίαν·
οὐ γὰρ ἂν τῇ καλλίστῃ τέχνῃ, ᾗ τὸ μέλλον κρίνεται, αὐτὸ c
τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἐμπλέκοντες μανικὴν ἐκάλεσαν. ἀλλ' ὡς
καλοῦ ὄντος, ὅταν θείᾳ μοίρᾳ γίγνηται, οὕτω νομίσαντες
ἔθεντο, οἱ δὲ νῦν ἀπειροκάλως τὸ ταῦ ἐπεμβάλλοντες
μαντικὴν ἐκάλεσαν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τήν γε τῶν ἐμφρόνων, 5
ζήτησιν τοῦ μέλλοντος διά τε ὀρνίθων ποιουμένων καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων σημείων, ἅτ' ἐκ διανοίας ποριζομένων ἀνθρωπίνῃ
οἰήσει νοῦν τε καὶ ἱστορίαν, οἰονοϊστικὴν ἐπωνόμασαν,
ἣν νῦν οἰωνιστικὴν τῷ ω̄ σεμνύνοντες οἱ νέοι καλοῦσιν· d
ὅσῳ δὴ οὖν τελεώτερον καὶ ἐντιμότερον μαντικὴ οἰωνιστικῆς,
τό τε ὄνομα τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔργον τ' ἔργου, τόσῳ κάλλιον
μαρτυροῦσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ μανίαν σωφροσύνης τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ τῆς
παρ' ἀνθρώπων γιγνομένης. ἀλλὰ μὴν νόσων γε καὶ πόνων 5
τῶν μεγίστων, ἃ δὴ παλαιῶν ἐκ μηνιμάτων ποθὲν ἔν τισι
τῶν γενῶν ἡ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα, οἷς ἔδει
ἀπαλλαγὴν ηὕρετο, καταφυγοῦσα πρὸς θεῶν εὐχάς τε καὶ e
λατρείας, ὅθεν δὴ καθαρμῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν τυχοῦσα ἐξάντη
ἐποίησε τὸν [ἑαυτῆς] ἔχοντα πρός τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν
ἔπειτα χρόνον, λύσιν τῷ ὀρθῶς μανέντι τε καὶ κατασχομένῳ
τῶν παρόντων κακῶν εὑρομένη. τρίτη δὲ ἀπὸ Μουσῶν 245
κατοκωχή τε καὶ μανία, λαβοῦσα ἁπαλὴν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχήν,
ἐγείρουσα καὶ ἐκβακχεύουσα κατά τε ᾠδὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν
ἄλλην ποίησιν, μυρία τῶν παλαιῶν ἔργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς
ἐπιγιγνομένους παιδεύει· ὃς δ' ἂν ἄνευ μανίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ 5
ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκηται, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς

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c 4 *ἐπεμβαλόντες* Aristides **c** 6 *ποιουμένων* secl. Schanz: *ποιουμένην* Stephanus **c** 7 *ποριζομένων*] *ποριζομένην* Stephanus *ἀνθρωπίνῃ οἰήσει* pr. B Aristides: *ἀνθρωπίνην οἰήσει* corr. b (*νοήσει* voluit): *ἀνθρωπίνῃ νοήσει* T **c** 8 *οἰονοϊστικὴν* W Aristides: *οἰωνιστικὴν* B: *οἷον νοϊστικὴν* T **d** 5 *γε* B T: *τε* Aristides **d** 7 *γενῶν, ἡ* B T: *γενῶν ἦν* Hermann **e** 2 δὴ T: om. B **e** 3 *ἑαυτῆς ἔχοντα* B T: *αὐτὴν ἔχοντα* Aristides: *ἑαυτῆς* seclusi (glossema *ἔξω ἄτης* fuisse suspicor) **a** 2 *κατοκωχή* W: *κατοικωχή* B: *κατακωχή* T: *κατοχή* vulg. **a** 6 *ποιητικὰς* B T Aristides Stobaeus (*poeticas* Seneca): *ποιητικῆς* Proclus Synesius: secl. Cobet *πεισθεὶς* B T Stobaeus: secl. Cobet *ὡς ἄρα* B T: *ἄρα ὡς* Stobaeus

set the names did not believe madness shameful, nor a reproach;
for they would not have woven this very name into the most beau- c
tiful craft, the one by which the future is discerned, and called it
manikē. But it was because they held it a beautiful thing, when it
comes about by divine portion, that they set the name so; and the
people of today, unversed in the beautiful, throwing in the *tau*,
have called it *mantikē*.[1] For the search for the future, too, made
by people in their wits, through birds and the other signs, since
from the mind they procure sense and information for human sup-
position, they gave the title *oionoïstikē*; which the young now call d
oiōnistikē, dignifying it with the ō.[2] By as much, then, as *mantikē* is
more perfect and more honoured than *oiōnistikē*, name than name
and work than work, by so much do the people of old testify that
madness is more beautiful than temperance, the madness from a
god than the temperance that comes from human beings. But in-
deed, from diseases and toils, the greatest, which from old wraths
come about somehow in some families, madness, arising in them
and prophesying, found deliverance for those who needed it, tak- e
ing refuge in prayers and services to the gods; whence indeed, ob-
taining purifications and rites, it made the one who has it safe for
the present and the time to come,[3] finding for the one rightly mad 245
and seized a release from the present evils. And third, the seizure
and madness from the Muses, taking a tender and untrodden soul,
rousing it and stirring it to Bacchic revel in songs and in the rest of
poetry, by adorning countless works of the people of old educates
those who come after; but whoever comes to the poetic doors with-
out the madness of the Muses, persuaded that he will after all, by
craft, be a capable

1. *Manikē* … *mantikē*: "the craft of madness" and "divination", the second made from the first by adding a t. The added t is Socrates' joke; but *mantis*, "seer", does belong with *mainesthai*, "be mad".

2. *Oionoïstikē*: from *oiēsis*, "supposition", *nous*, "sense", and *historia*, "information" (the form of W and Aristides; B has *oiōnistikē* here too, apparatus c8). The new name comes from *oiōnos*, "bird of omen", and has the long ō, omega, which Burnet marks with a bar.

3. *The one who has it*: B and T add *heautēs*, "its own"; Burnet deletes it, suspecting that it began as a gloss, *exō atēs*, "out of ruin", explaining *exantē*, "safe" (*seclusi*, apparatus e3).

ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελὴς αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ πυίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαινομένων ἢ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος ἠφανίσθη.

Τοσαῦτα μέν σοι καὶ ἔτι πλείω ἔχω μανίας γιγνομένης b
ἀπὸ θεῶν λέγειν καλὰ ἔργα. ὥστε τοῦτό γε αὐτὸ μὴ φοβώ-
μεθα, μηδέ τις ἡμᾶς λόγος θορυβείτω δεδιττόμενος ὡς πρὸ
τοῦ κεκινημένου τὸν σώφρονα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι φίλον· ἀλλὰ
τόδε πρὸς ἐκείνῳ δείξας φερέσθω τὰ νικητήρια, ὡς οὐκ ἐπ' 5
ὠφελίᾳ ὁ ἔρως τῷ ἐρῶντι καὶ τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐκ θεῶν ἐπιπέμπεται.
ἡμῖν δὲ ἀποδεικτέον αὖ τοὐναντίον, ὡς ἐπ' εὐτυχίᾳ τῇ μεγίστῃ
παρὰ θεῶν ἡ τοιαύτη μανία δίδοται· ἡ δὲ δὴ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται c
δεινοῖς μὲν ἄπιστος, σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή. δεῖ οὖν πρῶτον ψυχῆς
φύσεως πέρι θείας τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ἰδόντα πάθη τε καὶ
ἔργα τἀληθὲς νοῆσαι· ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀποδείξεως ἥδε.

Ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος. τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον· τὸ 5
δ' ἄλλο κινοῦν καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου κινούμενον, παῦλαν ἔχον
κινήσεως, παῦλαν ἔχει ζωῆς. μόνον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν, ἅτε
οὐκ ἀπολεῖπον ἑαυτό, οὔποτε λήγει κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα κινεῖται τοῦτο πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως.
ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγένητον. ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον d
γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ μηδ' ἐξ ἑνός· εἰ γὰρ ἔκ του ἀρχὴ
γίγνοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἀρχὴ γίγνοιτο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀγένητόν
ἐστιν, καὶ ἀδιάφθορον αὐτὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ἀρχῆς γὰρ δὴ
ἀπολομένης οὔτε αὐτή ποτε ἔκ του οὔτε ἄλλο ἐξ ἐκείνης 5
γενήσεται, εἴπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεῖ τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι. οὕτω
δὴ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν. τοῦτο δὲ οὔτ'
ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν
πᾶσάν τε γῆν εἰς ἓν συμπεσοῦσαν στῆναι καὶ μήποτε αὖθις e
ἔχειν ὅθεν κινηθέντα γενήσεται. ἀθανάτου δὲ πεφασμένου

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b 1 *μέν σοι* T Aristides: *μέντοι* B **b** 6 *ὁ* om. V Stobaeus **d** 3 *ἔτι ἀρχὴ* Buttmann (et sic ut videtur Iamblichus: cf. Timaeum Locrum ap. Theodoretum *εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἔτι ἀρχά*): *ἀρχὴ* Vind. 89 Cicero (ut videtur): *ἐξ ἀρχῆς* B T Simplicius Stobaeus **d** 4 *ἀδιάφθορον* T Proclus: *ἀδιάφορον* B: *ἄφθορον* Stobaeus **e** 1 *γῆν εἰς ἓν* Philoponus: *γένεσιν* B T Hermias Syrianus Stobaeus: *γῆν* in marg. t **e** 2 *ἔχειν* Stobaeus: *ἔχειν στῆναι* B T δὲ T Alexander Stobaeus: om. B

poet, is himself imperfect, and his poetry, the poetry of the temperate man, is made to vanish by that of the mad.[1]

So many, and still more, are the beautiful works of madness that b
comes from the gods of which I can speak to you. So let us not be afraid of this, at least, and let no speech throw us into confusion, frightening us with the claim that one should prefer the temperate friend to the one who has been moved; but let it show this besides, and then carry off the prizes: that love is not sent from the gods for the benefit of the one in love and the beloved. And we in turn must demonstrate the opposite: that such madness is given by the c
gods for the greatest good fortune. And the demonstration will be incredible to the formidable, but credible to the wise.[2] We must first, then, apprehend the truth about the nature of soul, divine and human, by seeing its experiences and works; and the beginning of the demonstration is this.

All soul is immortal.[3] For what is ever-moving is immortal; but what moves something else and is moved by something else, having a cessation of motion, has a cessation of life. Only what moves itself, then, since it does not leave itself behind, never leaves off being moved; but for the other things too that are moved, this is the spring and beginning of motion. And a beginning is ungener- d
ated. For it is a necessity that everything that comes to be come to be from a beginning, but the beginning itself from nothing at all; for if a beginning came to be from something, it would no longer be a beginning that came to be.[4] And since it is ungenerated, it is a necessity that it be indestructible too. For once a beginning has perished, neither will it ever come to be from anything, nor anything else from it, if indeed all things must come to be from a beginning. Thus, then, the beginning of motion is what itself moves itself. And this can neither perish nor come to be; or else the whole heaven and all the earth would fall together into one and come to e
a stand, and never again have anything from which they will be moved and come to be.[5] And since it has appeared immortal,

1. Prophecy, rites and poetry (244a–245a) are three kinds of divine madness; love is the fourth (249d–e); all four, 265b.

2. *The formidable*: *deinoi*, the clever; Lysias was "the most formidable writer" (228a).

3. *All soul*: *psychē pasa*, "all soul" or "every soul"; the Greek allows both.

4. Buttmann's reading, printed by Burnet; B and T: "it would not come to be from a beginning" (apparatus, d3).

5. *All the earth … into one*: Philoponus' reading; B and T have *genesin*, "all coming to be", and no "into one" (apparatus, e1).

τοῦ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινουμένου, ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον τοῦτον αὐτόν τις λέγων οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖται. πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα, ᾧ μὲν ἔξωθεν τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἄψυχον, ᾧ δὲ ἔνδοθεν αὐτῷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἔμψυχον, ὡς ταύτης οὔσης φύσεως ψυχῆς· εἰ δ' ἔστιν τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, μὴ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν ἢ ψυχήν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγένητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς ἱκανῶς· περὶ δὲ τῆς ἰδέας αὐτῆς ὧδε λεκτέον. οἷον μέν ἐστι, πάντῃ πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρᾶς διηγήσεως, ᾧ δὲ ἔοικεν, ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττονος· ταύτῃ οὖν λέγωμεν. ἐοικέτω δὴ συμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου. θεῶν μὲν οὖν ἵπποι τε καὶ ἡνίοχοι πάντες αὐτοί τε ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων μέμεικται. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῶν ὁ ἄρχων συνωρίδος ἡνιοχεῖ, εἶτα τῶν ἵππων ὁ μὲν αὐτῷ καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων, ὁ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίων τε καὶ ἐναντίος· χαλεπὴ δὴ καὶ δύσκολος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἡνιόχησις. πῇ δὴ οὖν θνητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ζῷον ἐκλήθη πειρατέον εἰπεῖν. ψυχὴ πᾶσα παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου, πάντα δὲ οὐρανὸν περιπολεῖ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλοις εἴδεσι γιγνομένη. τελέα μὲν οὖν οὖσα καὶ ἐπτερωμένη μετεωροπορεῖ τε καὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον διοικεῖ, ἡ δὲ πτεροῤῥυήσασα φέρεται ἕως ἂν στερεοῦ τινος ἀντιλάβηται, οὗ κατοικισθεῖσα, σῶμα γήϊνον λαβοῦσα, αὐτὸ αὑτὸ δοκοῦν κινεῖν διὰ τὴν ἐκείνης δύναμιν, ζῷον τὸ σύμπαν ἐκλήθη, ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα παγέν, θνητόν τ' ἔσχεν ἐπωνυμίαν· ἀθάνατον δὲ οὐδ' ἐξ ἑνὸς λόγου λελογισμένου, ἀλλὰ πλάττομεν οὔτε ἰδόντες οὔτε ἱκανῶς νοήσαντες

a 6 *ἐοικέτω δὴ γρ.* t Hermias Stobaeus: *ἐοικε τῳ δὴ* T: *ἔοικε τῷ δὴ* B: *ἔοικε δή τῳ* V: *ἔοικε δὴ τῇ* vulg. **a** 8 *πάντες αὐτοί τε* T: *καὶ πάντες αὐτοὶ* B **b** 2 *αὐτῷ* B T: *αὐτῶν* al. **b** 5 *τε* T: om. B **b** 6 *ψυχὴ πᾶσα* Simplicius: *πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ* B: *ἡ ψυχὴ πᾶσα* T: *ψυχὴ γὰρ πᾶσα* Eusebius **b** 7 *οὐρανὸν* B T: *ἄνθρωπον* V: *οὖν* Herwerden: secl. Badham **c** 1 *οὖν* T: om. B *μετεωροπολεῖ* Syrianus *πάντα* B: *ἅπαντα* T **c** 7 *πλάττομεν* Proclus corr. V: *πλαττομένου* B T *οὔτε ἰδόντες* T: *οὔτ' εἰδότες* B Proclus

what is moved by itself, one who says that this very thing is the substance and the account of soul will not be ashamed. For every body to which being moved comes from outside is soulless, but one to which it comes from within, from itself, is ensouled, since this is the nature of soul. And if this is so, that what itself moves itself 246
is nothing other than soul, soul would of necessity be ungenerated and immortal.

About its immortality, then, it has been said sufficiently; but about its figure we must speak like this. What sort of thing it is is a matter for a narration in every way and altogether divine, and long; but what it resembles, for a human one, and lesser; let us speak, then, in this way. So let it resemble the grown-together power of a winged team and charioteer.[1] Now the gods' horses and charioteers are all good themselves and of good stock; but that of the b
others is mixed. And first, our ruler is charioteer of a pair; then, of his horses, one is beautiful and good, and of such stock, and the other of the opposite stock, and opposite. Difficult, then, and troublesome, of necessity, is the charioteering in our case. How, then, an animal came to be called mortal, and immortal, we must try to say. All soul takes care of all that is soulless, and goes about the whole heaven, coming to be now in one form, now in another.[2] Be- c
ing perfect, then, and with its wings grown, it journeys on high and governs the whole cosmos; but the soul that has lost its wings is carried along until it lays hold of something solid, where it settles, taking an earthy body, which seems itself to move itself through that soul's power; and the whole, soul and body fixed together, was called an animal, and got the title of mortal. But immortal it is called from no reasoned account at all, but we fashion, having neither seen nor sufficiently apprehended,[3]

1. The growing of the wings, stage 1 (246a–248c): the soul pictured as a charioteer and two winged horses, its procession behind the gods and its fall. *Let it resemble*: *eoiketō*, a variant noted by a later hand in T ($\gamma\rho$. t), and the reading of Hermias and Stobaeus; B has "it resembles the …", T "it resembles a …" (apparatus a6).

2. *All soul*: as at 245c, "all soul" or "every soul"; here Simplicius' reading, without the article; B has "all the soul", T "the soul, all of it" (apparatus b6).

3. *We fashion*: Proclus' reading, and a corrector's in V; B and T have *plattomenou*, agreeing with "account" ("from no reasoned account, but from one fashioned"), which leaves the rest without its verb. *Seen*: T; B and Proclus have "known" (apparatus c7).

θεόν, ἀθάνατόν τι ζῷον, ἔχον μὲν ψυχήν, ἔχον δὲ σῶμα, τὸν d
ἀεὶ δὲ χρόνον ταῦτα συμπεφυκότα. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δή,
ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, ταύτῃ ἐχέτω τε καὶ λεγέσθω· τὴν δὲ
αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν πτερῶν ἀποβολῆς, δι' ἣν ψυχῆς ἀπορρεῖ,
λάβωμεν. ἔστι δέ τις τοιάδε. 5

Πέφυκεν ἡ πτεροῦ δύναμις τὸ ἐμβριθὲς ἄγειν ἄνω μετε-
ωρίζουσα ᾗ τὸ τῶν θεῶν γένος οἰκεῖ, κεκοινώνηκε δέ πῃ
μάλιστα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ θείου [ψυχή], τὸ δὲ θεῖον
καλόν, σοφόν, ἀγαθόν, καὶ πᾶν ὅτι τοιοῦτον· τούτοις δὴ e
τρέφεταί τε καὶ αὔξεται μάλιστά γε τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πτέρωμα,
αἰσχρῷ δὲ καὶ κακῷ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις φθίνει τε καὶ διόλ-
λυται. ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεύς, ἐλαύνων
πτηνὸν ἅρμα, πρῶτος πορεύεται, διακοσμῶν πάντα καὶ ἐπι- 5
μελούμενος· τῷ δ' ἕπεται στρατιὰ θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων,
κατὰ ἕνδεκα μέρη κεκοσμημένη. μένει γὰρ Ἑστία ἐν θεῶν 247
οἴκῳ μόνη· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὅσοι ἐν τῷ τῶν δώδεκα ἀριθμῷ
τεταγμένοι θεοὶ ἄρχοντες ἡγοῦνται κατὰ τάξιν ἣν ἕκαστος
ἐτάχθη. πολλαὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ μακάριαι θέαι τε καὶ διέξοδοι
ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, ᾗς θεῶν γένος εὐδαιμόνων ἐπιστρέφεται 5
πράττων ἕκαστος αὐτῶν τὸ αὑτοῦ, ἕπεται δὲ ὁ ἀεὶ ἐθέλων
τε καὶ δυνάμενος· φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται.
ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρὸς δαῖτα καὶ ἐπὶ θοίνην ἴωσιν, ἄκραν ἐπὶ τὴν
ὑπουράνιον ἀψῖδα πορεύονται πρὸς ἄναντες, ᾗ δὴ τὰ μὲν θεῶν b
ὀχήματα ἰσορρόπως εὐήνια ὄντα ῥᾳδίως πορεύεται, τὰ δὲ
ἄλλα μόγις· βρίθει γὰρ ὁ τῆς κάκης ἵππος μετέχων, ἐπὶ
τὴν γῆν ῥέπων τε καὶ βαρύνων ᾧ μὴ καλῶς ἦν τεθραμμένος
τῶν ἡνιόχων. ἔνθα δὴ πόνος τε καὶ ἀγὼν ἔσχατος ψυχῇ 5

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d 1 *τι* T: *τὸ* B **d** 2 *δή* T: *ἤδη* B **d** 8 *ψυχή* B T: om. Plutarchus **e** 2 *αὔξεται* B T: *ἄρδεται* Proclus *μάλιστά γε* b: *μάλιστά τε* B: *μάλιστα* T **e** 3 *καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις* secl. Schanz **a** 5 *εὐδαιμόνων* B T Syrianus Damascius: *καὶ δαιμόνων* Badham: *εὐδαιμόνως* Schanz **a** 7 *θείου χοροῦ* B Alexander: *χοροῦ θείου* T **a** 8 *καὶ* B: *τε καὶ* T *ἐπὶ* T Proclus: *ὑπὸ* B **b** 1 *ὑπουράνιον* B Proclus: *ὑπουρανίαν* W (sed ϵ supra ύ): *οὐράνιον* T *ᾗ δὴ* Proclus: *ἤδη* B T **b** 3 *κάκης* T: *κακῆς* B **b** 4 *ἦν* recc.: *ᾗ* B T

a god, some immortal animal, having a soul and having a body, d
but these grown together for all time. But let these things be, and
be spoken of, in whatever way is agreeable to the god; let us take
up the cause of the shedding of the wings, through which they fall
away from a soul. It is something of this sort.

The power of the wing is naturally such as to lead what is heavy
upward, raising it aloft where the race of the gods dwells; and of
the things about the body it has in some way been most of all a part-
ner in the divine; and the divine is beautiful, wise, good, and every- e
thing of that sort.[1] By these, then, the plumage of the soul is nour-
ished and increases most of all, indeed, but by the ugly and the bad
and the opposites it wastes away and perishes utterly.[2] Now Zeus,
the great leader in heaven, driving a winged chariot, journeys first,
ordering all things and taking care of them; and there follows him
an army of gods and daimons, marshalled in eleven parts. For Hes- 247
tia stays alone in the gods' house; but of the others, those who are
ranked as ruling gods in the number of the twelve act as leaders,
each in the rank in which he was ranked.[3] Many, then, and blessed
are the spectacles and courses within heaven, which the race of
happy gods ranges over, each of them doing what is his own; and
whoever is always willing and able follows; for jealousy stands out-
side the divine chorus. And when they go to repast and to banquet,
they journey uphill to the topmost vault beneath heaven,[4] where b
the gods' vehicles, being evenly balanced and obedient to the rein,
journey easily, but the others barely; for the horse that shares in
badness is heavy, inclining toward the earth and weighing down
whichever of the charioteers had not reared him well. There, in-
deed, a soul's utmost toil and contest

1. Burnet brackets *psychē*, "soul", which B and T have ("the soul has been ... a partner") and Plutarch omits (*Platonic Questions* 6, 1004c; apparatus d8).

2. The wing's nourishment is the beautiful, the wise and the good; of these, only the beautiful shines clearly to sight here (250b–d), and its sight begins the regrowth (251b).

3. Of the twelve gods, Hestia, goddess of the hearth, stays at home; the other eleven lead the eleven divisions.

4. *To the topmost vault*: *epi*, T and Proclus; B has *hypo*, "under" (a8). *Beneath heaven*: B and Proclus; T has "heavenly". *Where*: Proclus; B and T have "already" (b1).

πρόκειται. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀθάνατοι καλούμεναι, ἡνίκ' ἂν πρὸς ἄκρῳ γένωνται, ἔξω πορευθεῖσαι ἔστησαν ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ νώτῳ, στάσας δὲ αὐτὰς περιάγει ἡ περιφορά, αἱ δὲ θεωροῦσι c τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.

Τὸν δὲ ὑπερουράνιον τόπον οὔτε τις ὕμνησέ πω τῶν τῇδε ποιητὴς οὔτε ποτὲ ὑμνήσει κατ' ἀξίαν. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε—τολμητέον γὰρ οὖν τό γε ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἀλη- 5 θείας λέγοντα—ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεατὴ νῷ, περὶ ἣν τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμης γένος, τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τόπον. ἆρ' οὖν θεοῦ διάνοια νῷ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀκη- d ράτῳ τρεφομένη, καὶ ἁπάσης ψυχῆς ὅση ἂν μέλῃ τὸ προσῆκον δέξασθαι, ἰδοῦσα διὰ χρόνου τὸ ὂν ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ θεωροῦσα τἀληθῆ τρέφεται καὶ εὐπαθεῖ, ἕως ἂν κύκλῳ ἡ περιφορὰ εἰς ταὐτὸν περιενέγκῃ. ἐν δὲ τῇ περιόδῳ καθορᾷ 5 μὲν αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθορᾷ δὲ σωφροσύνην, καθορᾷ δὲ ἐπιστήμην, οὐχ ᾗ γένεσις πρόσεστιν, οὐδ' ᾗ ἐστίν που ἑτέρα ἐν ἑτέρῳ οὖσα ὧν ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν e τῷ ὅ ἐστιν ὂν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν· καὶ τἆλλα ὡσαύτως τὰ ὄντα ὄντως θεασαμένη καὶ ἐστιαθεῖσα, δῦσα πάλιν εἰς τὸ εἴσω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οἴκαδε ἦλθεν. ἐλθούσης δὲ αὐτῆς ὁ ἡνίοχος πρὸς τὴν φάτνην τοὺς ἵππους στήσας παρέβαλεν 5 ἀμβροσίαν τε καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῇ νέκταρ ἐπότισεν.

Καὶ οὗτος μὲν θεῶν βίος· αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυχαί, ἡ μὲν 248 ἄριστα θεῷ ἑπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη ὑπερῆρεν εἰς τὸν ἔξω τόπον τὴν τοῦ ἡνιόχου κεφαλήν, καὶ συμπεριηνέχθη τὴν περιφοράν, θορυβουμένη ὑπὸ τῶν ἵππων καὶ μόγις καθορῶσα

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c 1 *νώτῳ στάσας* Proclus: *νώτωι* στάσας* T: *νώτωι ἱστάσας* B *θεωροῦσι* corr. Ven. 189: *θεωροῦσαι* B T **c** 7 *οὖσα ψυχῆς* T Simplicius: *ψυχῇ οὖσα* B: *ψυχῆς* Stobaeus: *οὖσα* Madvig *θεατὴ νῷ* Clemens Proclus: *θεατῇ νῷ* B: *θεατῇ νῷ χρῆται* T W **d** 1 *τόπον* T Simplicius: *τρόπον* B *ἀκηράτῳ τρεφομένη* W Damascius: *ἀκήρατος στρεφομένη* B et os s. v. W²: *ἀκηράτω* vel *ἀκήρατος στρεφομένη* T **d** 2 *ὅση* B: *ὅσῃ* T *μέλῃ* G: *μέλλῃ* B T **d** 3 *δέξασθαι* T: *δέξεσθαι* B **d** 6 *καθορᾷ μὲν* T: *καθορῶμεν* B **d** 7 *οὐδ' ᾗ* B: *οὐ δὴ* T: *οὐδ' ᾗ* vulg.

lies before it. For the souls called immortal, whenever they come to be at the top, journey outside and stand upon the back of heaven; c
and when they have stood, the revolution leads them round, and they contemplate the things outside heaven.

The place beyond heaven no poet of those here has ever yet hymned, nor will ever hymn worthily. But it is like this—for one must dare to say the truth, at any rate, especially when speaking about truth—for the colourless and shapeless and intangible substance that really is, beheld only by intellect, the soul's pilot, the substance that the kind of true knowledge is about, occupies this place.[1] Since, then, the mind of a god is nourished on intellect and d
untainted knowledge, and so is the mind of every soul to which it matters to receive what is fitting, seeing what is, after a time, it cherishes it, and contemplating the true things it is nourished and fares well, until the revolution brings it round in a circle to the same point.[2] In the circuit it catches sight of justice itself, catches sight of temperance, catches sight of knowledge, not the knowledge to which coming to be belongs, nor the knowledge that is, I take it, different, being in a different one of the things we now call e
beings, but the knowledge that is in that which really is what it is;[3] and having beheld in the same way the other things that really are, and been feasted, it sinks back into the inside of heaven and comes home. And when it has come, the charioteer stands the horses at the manger, sets ambrosia before them, and gives them nectar besides to drink.[4]

And this is the life of gods. Of the other souls, the one that best 248
follows a god and has been likened to him raises the charioteer's head into the place outside, and is carried round with the revolution, thrown into confusion by the horses and barely catching sight of

1. *Intellect*: *nous*, "sense" at 241a–c and 244c. *Beheld only by intellect*: Clement and Proclus; T and W have "uses as its only beholder intellect, the soul's pilot" (apparatus c7).

2. *This place*: T and Simplicius; B has "this way" (d1). *Nourished on … untainted knowledge*: W and Damascius; B has "untainted, turning about". *To which it matters*: G; B and T have "which is about to" (d2).

3. *What it is*: *ho estin*, the phrase by which Plato names a Form (*Phaedo* 75b, 78d).

4. As Iris and Poseidon stable the gods' horses in the *Iliad* (5.368–369, 13.34–35).

τὰ ὄντα· ἡ δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἦρεν, τοτὲ δ' ἔδυ, βιαζομένων δὲ τῶν ἵππων τὰ μὲν εἶδεν, τὰ δ' οὔ. αἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλαι γλιχόμεναι μὲν ἅπασαι τοῦ ἄνω ἕπονται, ἀδυνατοῦσαι δέ, ὑποβρύχιαι συμπεριφέρονται, πατοῦσαι ἀλλήλας καὶ ἐπιβάλλουσαι, ἑτέρα πρὸ τῆς ἑτέρας πειρωμένη γενέσθαι. θόρυβος οὖν καὶ ἅμιλλα καὶ ἱδρὼς ἔσχατος γίγνεται, οὗ δὴ κακίᾳ ἡνιόχων πολλαὶ μὲν χωλεύονται, πολλαὶ δὲ πολλὰ πτερὰ θραύονται· πᾶσαι δὲ πολὺν ἔχουσαι πόνον ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας ἀπέρχονται, καὶ ἀπελθοῦσαι τροφῇ δοξαστῇ χρῶνται. οὗ δ' ἕνεχ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ τὸ ἀληθείας ἰδεῖν πεδίον οὗ ἐστιν, ἥ τε δὴ προσήκουσα ψυχῆς τῷ ἀρίστῳ νομὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖ λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὖσα, ἥ τε τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις, ᾧ ψυχὴ κουφίζεται, τούτῳ τρέφεται. θεσμός τε Ἀδραστείας ὅδε. ἥτις ἂν ψυχὴ θεῷ συνοπαδὸς γενομένη κατίδῃ τι τῶν ἀληθῶν, μέχρι τε τῆς ἑτέρας περιόδου εἶναι ἀπήμονα, κἂν ἀεὶ τοῦτο δύνηται ποιεῖν, ἀεὶ ἀβλαβῆ εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ ἀδυνατήσασα ἐπισπέσθαι μὴ ἴδῃ, καί τινι συντυχίᾳ χρησαμένη λήθης τε καὶ κακίας πλησθεῖσα βαρυνθῇ, βαρυνθεῖσα δὲ πτερορρυήσῃ τε καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πέσῃ, τότε νόμος ταύτην μὴ φυτεῦσαι εἰς μηδεμίαν θήρειον φύσιν ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσει, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν πλεῖστα ἰδοῦσαν εἰς γονὴν ἀνδρὸς γενησομένου φιλοσόφου ἢ φιλοκάλου ἢ μουσικοῦ τινος καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν εἰς βασιλέως ἐννόμου ἢ πολεμικοῦ καὶ ἀρχικοῦ, τρίτην εἰς πολιτικοῦ ἤ τινος οἰκονομικοῦ ἢ χρηματιστικοῦ, τετάρτην εἰς φιλοπόνου ⟨ἢ⟩ γυμναστικοῦ ἢ περὶ σώματος ἴασίν τινος ἐσομένου, πέμπτην μαντικὸν βίον ἤ τινα τελεστικὸν ἔξουσαν· ἕκτῃ ποιητικὸς ἢ τῶν περὶ μίμησίν τις ἄλλος ἁρμόσει, ἑβδόμῃ δημιουργικὸς ἢ γεωργικός, ὀγδόῃ σοφιστικὸς ἢ δημοκοπικός, ἐνάτῃ τυραννικός. ἐν δὴ

b 2 *οὗ δὴ* T: *ουδη* B **b 5** *οὗ δ' ἕνεχ' ἡ* corr. D: *οὐδὲν ἔχει* B: *οὗ δὴ ἕνεχ' ἡ* T **b 6** *οὗ* secl. Madvig **c 3** *ψυχὴ* T: *ψυχῇ* B **c 4–5** *κἀν αἰεὶ τοῦτο . . . αἰεὶ ἀβλαβῆ* T W: *εἰ τοῦτο . . . κἀν αἰεὶ βλάβη* B **c 6** *χρησαμένη* T: *χρησαμένῃ* B **d 1** *θήρειον* T: *θηρείαν* B **d 6** *ἢ* add. Badham **d 7** *τινος* Hermann: *τινα* B T **e 3** *δημοκοπικός* T: *δημοτικός* B *δὴ* B: *δὲ* T

the things that are. Another now raises it, now sinks, and, the horses forcing it, sees some things and not others. And the rest all strain after what is above and follow, but being unable, they are carried round together submerged, trampling on one another and thrusting forward, one trying to get ahead of another. So there b
is confusion and rivalry and the utmost sweat, where through the vice of the charioteers many are lamed, and many have many wings broken; and all, having much toil, go away imperfect in the spectacle of what is, and having gone away they use nourishment of opinion.[1] And the reason for the great earnestness to see the plain of truth, where it is: the pasture fitting for the soul's best part is in fact from the meadow there, and the nature of the c
wing, by which a soul is lightened, is nourished by this. And the ordinance of Adrasteia is this: whatever soul, having been in a god's train, has caught sight of anything of the true things, is to be free of woe until the next circuit, and if it is always able to do this, always unharmed;[2] but whenever, unable to follow, it does not see, and, having met with some mischance and been filled with forgetfulness and vice, is weighed down, and being weighed down loses its wings and falls to the earth, then the law is not to d
plant this soul in any beast's nature in its first birth, but the one that has seen most into the seed of a man who will be a lover of wisdom or a lover of the beautiful or someone musical and given to love; the second into that of a law-abiding king, or one warlike and fit to rule; the third into that of a statesman, or someone who manages a household, or a money-maker; the fourth into that of a lover of toil or a trainer, or of someone who will be concerned with the healing of the body; the fifth will have a prophetic life e
or one given to rites; with the sixth a poetic life, or some other among those concerned with imitation, will be in harmony; with the seventh a craftsman's or a farmer's; with the eighth a sophist's or a demagogue's; with the ninth a tyrant's.[3]

1. *Imperfect*: *atelēs*, also "uninitiated"; the rites and their perfection return at 249c and 250b–c.

2. The growing of the wings, stage 2 (248c–249b): the law of the lives into which a fallen soul is born. Adrasteia, "the Inescapable", is a name of Nemesis.

3. *Or* is Badham's, making two lives of one; *of someone*: Hermann's *tinos* for B and T's *tina* (d6–7). *A demagogue's*: T; B has "a popular man's" (e3). The order presumably follows how much each soul saw (Plato says so of the first, which holds the lover whose wings will grow, 249a, 249c).

τούτοις ἅπασιν ὃς μὲν ἂν δικαίως διαγάγῃ ἀμείνονος μοίρας μεταλαμβάνει, ὃς δ' ἂν ἀδίκως, χείρονος· εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅθεν ἥκει ἡ ψυχὴ ἑκάστη οὐκ ἀφικνεῖται ἐτῶν μυρίων— οὐ γὰρ πτεροῦται πρὸ τοσούτου χρόνου—πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοσοφήσαντος ἀδόλως ἢ παιδεραστήσαντος μετὰ φιλοσοφίας, αὗται δὲ τρίτῃ περιόδῳ τῇ χιλιετεῖ, ἐὰν ἕλωνται τρὶς ἐφεξῆς τὸν βίον τοῦτον, οὕτω πτερωθεῖσαι τρισχιλιοστῷ ἔτει ἀπέρχονται. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι, ὅταν τὸν πρῶτον βίον τελευτήσωσιν, κρίσεως ἔτυχον, κριθεῖσαι δὲ αἱ μὲν εἰς τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς δικαιωτήρια ἐλθοῦσαι δίκην ἐκτίνουσιν, αἱ δ' εἰς τοὐρανοῦ τινα τόπον ὑπὸ τῆς Δίκης κουφισθεῖσαι διάγουσιν ἀξίως οὗ ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει ἐβίωσαν βίου. τῷ δὲ χιλιοστῷ ἀμφότεραι ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπὶ κλήρωσίν τε καὶ αἵρεσιν τοῦ δευτέρου βίου αἱροῦνται ὃν ἂν θέλῃ ἑκάστη· ἔνθα καὶ εἰς θηρίου βίον ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ ἀφικνεῖται, καὶ ἐκ θηρίου ὅς ποτε ἄνθρωπος ἦν πάλιν εἰς ἄνθρωπον. οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε μήποτε ἰδοῦσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰς τόδε ἥξει τὸ σχῆμα. δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων ἅ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναί φαμεν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὂν ὄντως. διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια· πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἀεί ἐστιν μνήμῃ κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς οἷσπερ θεὸς ὢν θεῖός ἐστιν. τοῖς δὲ δὴ τοιούτοις ἀνὴρ ὑπομνήμασιν ὀρθῶς χρώμενος, τελέους ἀεὶ τελετὰς τελούμενος, τέλεος ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται· ἐξιστάμενος δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων καὶ πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γιγνόμενος, νουθετεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθεν τοὺς πολλούς.

b 3 *θέλῃ* B T: *ἐθέλῃ* Eusebius **b** 4 *βίον* T: *βίου* B **b** 7 ⟨*τὸ*⟩ *κατ' εἶδος* Heindorf *ἰὸν* B T: *οἷον* rec. b: *ἰόντ'* Badham **c** 1 *ξυναιρούμενον* B T: *ξυναιρουμένων* Heindorf **c** 6 *θεὸς* B: *ὁ θεὸς* T (utrumque traditum fuisse testatur Hermias) *θεῖός* B T: *θεός* quoque traditum fuisse testatur Hermias

In all these, then, whoever passes his life justly gets a share of a better portion, and whoever unjustly, of a worse. For to the same place from which each soul came it does not arrive for ten thousand years—for it does not grow wings before so much time—except 249
the soul of one who has loved wisdom without guile, or been a pederast together with philosophy; these, in the third circuit of a thousand years, if they choose this life three times in succession, so grow wings and go away in the three-thousandth year. The others, when they end their first life, meet with judgement, and, having been judged, some go to the houses of justice beneath the earth and discharge their penalty, while others, lightened by Justice into some place of heaven, pass their time worthily of the life they lived b
in a human being's form. And in the thousandth year both, arriving at the allotment and choice of their second life, choose whichever each is willing to have; and there a human soul also arrives at the life of a beast, and from a beast one who was once a human being back into a human being.[1] For a soul that has never seen the truth, at any rate, will not come into this shape. For a human being must understand what is said according to a form, going from many perceptions into one, gathered together by reasoning;[2] and this is rec- c
ollection of those things our soul once saw when it journeyed with a god, overlooking the things we now say are, and lifting its head up into what really is.[3] Hence, justly, only the mind of the lover of wisdom grows wings; for it is always, by memory, as far as it can, near those things by being near which a god is divine.[4] And a man who uses such reminders rightly, being always perfected in perfect rites, alone becomes really perfect; and standing aside from what human beings are in earnest about, and coming to be d
near the divine, he is admonished by the many on the ground that he is deranged, but that he is filled with the god escapes the notice of the many.[5]

1. Compare the choice of lives in the myth of Er (*Republic* 617d–620d).

2. *What is said … going … gathered*: three neuter participles, without a noun; Heindorf proposed adding *to*, "the thing said according to a form", which Burnet does not print (apparatus b7).

3. The growing of the wings, stage 3 (249b–250e): recollection, and the fourth madness that comes of it (249d).

4. *A god*: B; T has "the god". Hermias says both were handed down, and that "is a god" was also handed down for "is divine" (apparatus c6).

5. *Perfected in perfect rites … perfect*: *teleous teletas teloumenos, teleos*, the language of the mysteries, all from *telos*, "fulfilment". *Standing aside*: *existamenos*, also "out of one's mind"; *deranged*: *parakinōn*, literally "moving aside", said of one out of his senses.

Ἔστι δὴ οὖν δεῦρο ὁ πᾶς ἥκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης
μανίας—ἣν ὅταν τὸ τῇδέ τις ὁρῶν κάλλος, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς 5
ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος, πτερῶταί τε καὶ ἀναπτερούμενος προ-
θυμούμενος ἀναπτέσθαι, ἀδυνατῶν δέ, ὄρνιθος δίκην βλέπων
ἄνω, τῶν κάτω δὲ ἀμελῶν, αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς διακεί-
μενος—ὡς ἄρα αὕτη πασῶν τῶν ἐνθουσιάσεων ἀρίστη τε e
καὶ ἐξ ἀρίστων τῷ τε ἔχοντι καὶ τῷ κοινωνοῦντι αὐτῆς
γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι ταύτης μετέχων τῆς μανίας ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν
καλῶν ἐραστὴς καλεῖται. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται, πᾶσα μὲν
ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ φύσει τεθέαται τὰ ὄντα, ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦλθεν 5
εἰς τόδε τὸ ζῷον· ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε ἐκεῖνα οὐ 250
ῥᾴδιον ἁπάσῃ, οὔτε ὅσαι βραχέως εἶδον τότε τἀκεῖ, οὔθ' αἳ
δεῦρο πεσοῦσαι ἐδυστύχησαν, ὥστε ὑπό τινων ὁμιλιῶν ἐπὶ
τὸ ἄδικον τραπόμεναι λήθην ὧν τότε εἶδον ἱερῶν ἔχειν.
ὀλίγαι δὴ λείπονται αἷς τὸ τῆς μνήμης ἱκανῶς πάρεστιν· 5
αὗται δέ, ὅταν τι τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμοίωμα ἴδωσιν, ἐκπλήττονται
καὶ οὐκέτ' ⟨ἐν⟩ αὑτῶν γίγνονται, ὃ δ' ἔστι τὸ πάθος ἀγνο-
οῦσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεσθαι. δικαιοσύνης μὲν οὖν b
καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τίμια ψυχαῖς οὐκ ἔνεστι
φέγγος οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ὁμοιώμασιν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀμυδρῶν
ὀργάνων μόγις αὐτῶν καὶ ὀλίγοι ἐπὶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἰόντες
θεῶνται τὸ τοῦ εἰκασθέντος γένος· κάλλος δὲ τότ' ἦν ἰδεῖν 5
λαμπρόν, ὅτε σὺν εὐδαίμονι χορῷ μακαρίαν ὄψιν τε καὶ
θέαν, ἑπόμενοι μετὰ μὲν Διὸς ἡμεῖς, ἄλλοι δὲ μετ' ἄλλου
θεῶν, εἶδόν τε καὶ ἐτελοῦντο τῶν τελετῶν ἣν θέμις λέγειν
μακαριωτάτην, ἣν ὠργιάζομεν ὁλόκληροι μὲν αὐτοὶ ὄντες καὶ c
ἀπαθεῖς κακῶν ὅσα ἡμᾶς ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὑπέμενεν, ὁλό-
κληρα δὲ καὶ ἁπλᾶ καὶ ἀτρεμῆ καὶ εὐδαίμονα φάσματα
μυούμενοί τε καὶ ἐποπτεύοντες ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ, καθαροὶ

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d 5 *ἣν* B T Stobaeus: *ᾗ* al.: *ἵν'* vulg. **d** 6 *τε καὶ* B T Stobaeus: secl. Schanz **d** 9 *μανικῶς* T: *μανικὸς* B **e** 4 *καλεῖται* B T: *γίγνεται* Stobaeus **a** 3 *ὥστε* B *γρ.* t: *οὔτε* T **a** 7 *οὐκέτ' ἐν αὑτῶν* Hirschig: *οὐκέτ' αὐτῶν* B T: *οὐκέθ' αὑτῶν* vulg. **b** 4 *ὀλίγοι* B t: *ὀλίγοις* T **b** 8 *τῶν* B: om. T *ἣν* recc.: *ἡ* B: *ᾗ* T **c** 1 *ὠργιάζομεν* W: *ὀργιάζομεν* B T **c** 4 *αὐγῇ* T: *αυτῃ* B

So here the whole speech has arrived, about the fourth madness—which, when someone, seeing the beauty here and recollecting the true, grows wings, and with wings raised is eager to fly up, but unable, looking upward like a bird and heedless of what is below, gets the blame on the ground that he is madly disposed—[1] that this, after all, of all the ways of being filled with e
the god, proves the best and from the best, both for the one who has it and for the one who is a partner in it, and that, sharing in this madness, the one in love with beautiful ones is called a lover. For, as was said, every human soul has by nature beheld the things that are, or it would not have come into this animal; but to 250
recollect those things from these is not easy for every soul, neither for those that saw the things there briefly then, nor for those that, having fallen here, had ill fortune, so that, turned to injustice by some company, they have forgetfulness of the holy things they saw then. Few are left, then, in whom the memory is sufficiently present; and these, whenever they see some similitude of the things there, are struck, and are no longer within themselves; and they are ignorant of what the experience is, through not perceiving b
it sufficiently.[2] Now of justice and temperance and whatever else is precious to souls there is no brightness at all in the similitudes here, but through dim organs, barely, and few of them, going to the likenesses, behold the kind of the thing likened; but beauty was then there to see, shining, when with a happy chorus, we following with Zeus, others with another of the gods, they saw a blessed sight and spectacle, and were perfected in that one of the rites which it is right to call most blessed, which we celebrated,[3] c
being whole ourselves and untouched by the evils that awaited us in later time, being initiated into, and admitted to the beholding of,[4] apparitions whole and simple and unmoving and happy, in clean light, clean

1. *Which*: *hēn* (B, T, Stobaeus), left without a verb; others have *hēi*, "in which" (apparatus d5).
2. *Within*: Hirschig's *en*, which Burnet adds; B and T have *ouket' autōn*, without *en* (apparatus a7).
3. *Celebrated*: W; B and T have "celebrate" (apparatus c1).
4. *Admitted to the beholding*: *epopteuontes*; the *epoptai*, "beholders", were the highest grade of initiates at Eleusis.

ὄντες καὶ ἀσήμαντοι τούτου ὃ νῦν δὴ σῶμα περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν, ὀστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μνήμῃ κεχαρίσθω, δι' ἣν πόθῳ τῶν τότε νῦν μακρότερα εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ κάλλους, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, μετ' ἐκείνων τε ἔλαμπεν ὄν, δεῦρό τ' ἐλθόντες κατειλήφαμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν ἡμετέρων στίλβον ἐναργέστατα. ὄψις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ᾗ φρόνησις οὐχ ὁρᾶται—δεινοὺς γὰρ ἂν παρεῖχεν ἔρωτας, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἑαυτῆς ἐναργὲς εἴδωλον παρείχετο εἰς ὄψιν ἰόν—καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἐραστά· νῦν δὲ κάλλος μόνον ταύτην ἔσχε μοῖραν, ὥστ' ἐκφανέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον. ὁ μὲν οὖν μὴ νεοτελὴς ἢ διεφθαρμένος οὐκ ὀξέως ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φέρεται πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος, θεώμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν τῇδε ἐπωνυμίαν, ὥστ' οὐ σέβεται προσορῶν, ἀλλ' ἡδονῇ παραδοὺς τετράποδος νόμον βαίνειν ἐπιχειρεῖ καὶ παιδοσπορεῖν, καὶ ὕβρει προσομιλῶν οὐ δέδοικεν οὐδ' αἰσχύνεται παρὰ φύσιν ἡδονὴν διώκων· ὁ δὲ ἀρτιτελής, ὁ τῶν τότε πολυθεάμων, ὅταν θεοειδὲς πρόσωπον ἴδῃ κάλλος εὖ μεμιμημένον ἤ τινα σώματος ἰδέαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἔφριξε καί τι τῶν τότε ὑπῆλθεν αὐτὸν δειμάτων, εἶτα προσορῶν ὡς θεὸν σέβεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐδεδίει τὴν τῆς σφόδρα μανίας δόξαν, θύοι ἂν ὡς ἀγάλματι καὶ θεῷ τοῖς παιδικοῖς. ἰδόντα δ' αὐτὸν οἷον ἐκ τῆς φρίκης μεταβολή τε καὶ ἱδρὼς καὶ θερμότης ἀήθης λαμβάνει· δεξάμενος γὰρ τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορροὴν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ἐθερμάνθη ᾗ ἡ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις ἄρδεται, θερμανθέντος δὲ ἐτάκη τὰ περὶ τὴν ἔκφυσιν, ἃ πάλαι ὑπὸ σκληρότητος συμμεμυκότα εἶργε μὴ βλαστάνειν, ἐπιρρυείσης δὲ τῆς τροφῆς ᾠδησέ τε καὶ ὥρμησε φύεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς ῥίζης ὁ τοῦ πτεροῦ καυλὸς ὑπὸ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος· πᾶσα γὰρ ἦν τὸ πάλαι πτερωτή.

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c 5 *ἀσήμαντοι*] fort. *ἀπήμαντοι* H. Richards *νῦν δὴ* T: *νῦν* B **c** 6 δεδεσμευμένοι T: δεδεσμευμένον B **a** 5 *μὴ ἐδεδίει* Cobet: *μὴ* 'δεδίει Schanz: *μὴ* δεδιείη B (sed *είη* punctis notatum): *μὴ* δεδίει T **b** 2 *ᾗ . . . ἄρδεται* ante *ἐθερμάνθη* transp. ci. Ast *ᾗ ἡ* T: *ᾗ* B

ourselves, and unmarked by this which we now indeed carry about and name the body, bound in it like an oyster.[1]

Let these things, then, gratify memory, through which, in yearning for the things of then, things have now been said at greater length; but about beauty, as we said, it shone, being among those d
things; and having come here we have grasped it through the clearest of our perceptions, glittering most clearly. For sight comes to us as the keenest of the perceptions through the body, by which intelligence is not seen—for it would provide dreadful loves, if it provided some such clear image of itself coming into sight—and so with the other lovable things; but as it is, beauty alone has got this portion, to be most manifest and most lovely.[2] Now the one e
who is not newly perfected, or has been corrupted, is not carried swiftly from here to there, to beauty itself, when he beholds its namesake here; so that he does not revere it as he looks at it, but, giving himself over to pleasure, he attempts to mount after the law of a quadruped and to sow children, and, keeping company with insolence, he does not fear nor is he ashamed to pursue a pleasure 251
against nature; but the freshly perfected one, who beheld much of the things then, when he sees a godlike face that imitates beauty well, or some figure of a body, first shudders, and something of the terrors of then steals over him; then, looking at it, he reveres it as a god, and if he did not fear the repute of utter madness, he would sacrifice to his darling as to a statue and a god.[3] And when he has seen it, a change, as from the shuddering, and sweat and unaccus- b
tomed heat take hold of him; for receiving the outflow of beauty through his eyes he is warmed, by which the nature of the wing is watered; and as he is warmed, the parts about its outgrowth melt, which, long closed up by hardness, shut it out from shooting; and as the nourishment flows in, the shaft of the wing swells and starts to grow from the root under the whole form of the soul; for all of it was winged long ago.[4]

1. *Unmarked*: *asēmantoi*, perhaps playing on *sēma*, "tomb", and *sōma*, "body" (*Gorgias* 493a, *Cratylus* 400c); H. Richards suggested *apēmantoi*, "free of woe" (cf. *apēmona*, 248c). *Bound*: T; B has the neuter, which would make the body, not we, the thing bound (c6).

2. Why love, and not intelligence or justice, begins the return: beauty alone shines clearly to sight here, while justice and the rest are seen in their likenesses only dimly, by few (250b, 250d).

3. The growing of the wings, stage 4 (251a): the first sight, shuddering, awe and reverence as to a god.

4. The growing of the wings, stage 5 (251b–252c): the growth, told in words for plants (root, shoot, stem) and for feathers (wing); *kaulos*, the "shaft", is both a plant's stem and a feather's quill.

ζεῖ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ὅλη καὶ ἀνακηκίει, καὶ ὅπερ τὸ τῶν ὀδον- c
τοφυούντων πάθος περὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας γίγνεται ὅταν ἄρτι
φύωσιν, κνῆσίς τε καὶ ἀγανάκτησις περὶ τὰ οὖλα, ταὐτὸν
δὴ πέπονθεν ἡ τοῦ πτεροφυεῖν ἀρχομένου ψυχή· ζεῖ τε καὶ
ἀγανακτεῖ καὶ γαργαλίζεται φύουσα τὰ πτερά. ὅταν μὲν 5
οὖν βλέπουσα πρὸς τὸ τοῦ παιδὸς κάλλος, ἐκεῖθεν μέρη ἐπι-
όντα καὶ ῥέοντ'—ἃ δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ἵμερος καλεῖται—δεχομένη
[τὸν ἵμερον] ἄρδηταί τε καὶ θερμαίνηται, λωφᾷ τε τῆς ὀδύνης
καὶ γέγηθεν· ὅταν δὲ χωρὶς γένηται καὶ αὐχμήσῃ, τὰ τῶν d
διεξόδων στόματα ἧ τὸ πτερὸν ὁρμᾷ, συναυαινόμενα μύσαντα
ἀποκλῄει τὴν βλάστην τοῦ πτεροῦ, ἡ δ' ἐντὸς μετὰ τοῦ
ἱμέρου ἀποκεκλῃμένη, πηδῶσα οἷον τὰ σφύζοντα, τῇ διεξόδῳ
ἐγχρίει ἑκάστη τῇ καθ' αὑτήν, ὥστε πᾶσα κεντουμένη κύκλῳ 5
ἡ ψυχὴ οἰστρᾷ καὶ ὀδυνᾶται, μνήμην δ' αὖ ἔχουσα τοῦ
καλοῦ γέγηθεν. ἐκ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων μεμειγμένων ἀδημονεῖ τε
τῇ ἀτοπίᾳ τοῦ πάθους καὶ ἀποροῦσα λυττᾷ, καὶ ἐμμανὴς
οὖσα οὔτε νυκτὸς δύναται καθεύδειν οὔτε μεθ' ἡμέραν οὗ ἂν e
ᾖ μένειν, θεῖ δὲ ποθοῦσα ὅπου ἂν οἴηται ὄψεσθαι τὸν ἔχοντα
τὸ κάλλος· ἰδοῦσα δὲ καὶ ἐποχετευσαμένη ἵμερον ἔλυσε μὲν
τὰ τότε συμπεφραγμένα, ἀναπνοὴν δὲ λαβοῦσα κέντρων τε
καὶ ὠδίνων ἔληξεν, ἡδονὴν δ' αὖ ταύτην γλυκυτάτην ἐν τῷ 5
παρόντι καρποῦται. ὅθεν δὴ ἑκοῦσα εἶναι οὐκ ἀπολείπεται, 252
οὐδέ τινα τοῦ καλοῦ περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖται, ἀλλὰ μητέρων
τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν καὶ ἑταίρων πάντων λέλησται, καὶ οὐσίας
δι' ἀμέλειαν ἀπολλυμένης παρ' οὐδὲν τίθεται, νομίμων δὲ
καὶ εὐσχημόνων, οἷς πρὸ τοῦ ἐκαλλωπίζετο, πάντων κατα- 5
φρονήσασα δουλεύειν ἑτοίμη καὶ κοιμᾶσθαι ὅπου ἂν ἐᾷ τις
ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ πόθου· πρὸς γὰρ τῷ σέβεσθαι τὸν τὸ κάλλος
ἔχοντα ἰατρὸν ηὕρηκε μόνον τῶν μεγίστων πόνων. τοῦτο b

c 1 ζεῖ t: ζῇ B: ζῇ T ὀδοντοφυούντων B t: ὀδόντων φυόντων T **c** 3 φυωσιν B: φύωσι T: φυῶσι Bekker κνῆσίς T: κίνησίς B W **c** 4 ζεῖ T: ζῇ B **c** 8 τὸν ἵμερον secl. olim Stallbaum **d** 5 ἑκάστη Ruhnken: ἑκάστῃ B T **e** 4 συμπεφραγμένα T: συμπεπραγμένα B **e** 5 ὠδίνων] ὀδυνῶν Badham **a** 6 ἂν T: ἐὰν B

So in this state the whole of it seethes and bubbles up; and as the experience of those cutting teeth comes about around the teeth when they have just grown, an itching and vexation about the gums, the very same is undergone by the soul of one beginning to put forth wings: it seethes and is vexed and is tickled as it grows its wings. So whenever, looking at the boy's beauty, it receives particles that come and flow from there—which is why, indeed, they are called longing—and is watered and warmed, it has respite from its anguish and is glad;[1] but whenever it is apart from him and parched, the mouths of the outlets by which the wing starts out dry up together and close, and shut off the shoot of the wing; and each shoot within, shut off together with the longing, leaping like throbbing pulses, pricks the outlet that is its own, so that the whole soul, goaded all round, is gadfly-stung and is in anguish, but again, having the memory of the beautiful one, is glad.[2] And from both of these, mingled, it is sorely troubled at the outlandishness of its experience, and at a loss it raves, and in its madness it can neither sleep at night nor stay where it is by day, but runs, yearning, wherever it thinks it will see the one who has the beauty; and having seen him and channelled in longing, it releases what was then blocked up, and gaining a breathing space it leaves off from goads and birth-pangs, and again reaps this, the sweetest pleasure, for the present. Whence, so far as it rests with it, it is not left behind, nor does it value anyone above the beautiful one, but has forgotten mothers and brothers and companions, all of them, and sets at nothing its substance perishing through heedlessness, and, despising all the lawful and seemly things on which it formerly preened itself, it stands ready to be a slave and to sleep wherever anyone lets it, as near as possible to its yearning; for besides revering the one who has the beauty, it has found him the only doctor of its greatest toils.

1. *Longing*: *himeros*, as if from *ienai*, "come", *merē*, "particles", and *rhein*, "flow" (compare *Cratylus* 419e–420a); the play returns at 255c. After "receives" the manuscripts have *ton himeron*, "the longing", which Burnet brackets, as Stallbaum once did (apparatus c8).

2. The growing of the wings, stage 5, continued (251b–252c): the wings grow while the beloved is present and his beauty flows in, and their outlets close while he is away; pain and joy together are the lover's madness.

δὲ τὸ πάθος, ὦ παῖ καλέ, πρὸς ὃν δή μοι ὁ λόγος, ἄνθρωποι μὲν ἔρωτα ὀνομάζουσιν, θεοὶ δὲ ὃ καλοῦσιν ἀκούσας εἰκότως διὰ νεότητα γελάσῃ. λέγουσι δὲ οἱμαί τινες Ὁμηριδῶν ἐκ τῶν ἀποθέτων ἐπῶν δύο ἔπη εἰς τὸν Ἔρωτα, ὧν τὸ ἕτερον ὑβριστικὸν πάνυ καὶ οὐ σφόδρα τι ἔμμετρον· ὑμνοῦσι δὲ ὧδε—

τὸν δ' ἤτοι θνητοὶ μὲν Ἔρωτα καλοῦσι ποτηνόν,
ἀθάνατοι δὲ Πτέρωτα, διὰ πτεροφύτορ' ἀνάγκην.

τούτοις δὴ ἔξεστι μὲν πείθεσθαι, ἔξεστιν δὲ μή· ὅμως δὲ ἥ γε αἰτία καὶ τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐρώντων τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο τυγχάνει ὄν.

Τῶν μὲν οὖν Διὸς ὀπαδῶν ὁ ληφθεὶς ἐμβριθέστερον δύναται φέρειν τὸ τοῦ πτερωνύμου ἄχθος· ὅσοι δὲ Ἄρεώς τε θεραπευταὶ καὶ μετ' ἐκείνου περιεπόλουν, ὅταν ὑπ' Ἔρωτος ἁλῶσι καί τι οἰηθῶσιν ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐρωμένου, φονικοὶ καὶ ἕτοιμοι καθιερεύειν αὑτούς τε καὶ τὰ παιδικά. καὶ οὕτω καθ' ἕκαστον θεόν, οὗ ἕκαστος ἦν χορευτής, ἐκεῖνον τιμῶν τε καὶ μιμούμενος εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ζῇ, ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἀδιάφθορος καὶ τὴν τῇδε πρώτην γένεσιν βιοτεύῃ, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ πρός τε τοὺς ἐρωμένους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὁμιλεῖ τε καὶ προσφέρεται. τόν τε οὖν Ἔρωτα τῶν καλῶν πρὸς τρόπου ἐκλέγεται ἕκαστος, καὶ ὡς θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ὄντα ἑαυτῷ οἷον ἄγαλμα τεκταίνεταί τε καὶ κατακοσμεῖ, ὡς τιμήσων τε καὶ ὀργιάσων. οἱ μὲν δὴ οὖν Διὸς δῖόν τινα εἶναι ζητοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸν ὑφ' αὑτῶν ἐρώμενον· σκοποῦσιν οὖν εἰ φιλόσοφός τε καὶ ἡγεμονικὸς τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ὅταν αὐτὸν εὑρόντες ἐρασθῶσι, πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὅπως τοιοῦτος ἔσται. ἐὰν οὖν μὴ πρότερον ἐμβεβῶσι τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι, τότε ἐπιχειρήσαντες μανθάνουσί τε ὅθεν ἄν τι δύνωνται καὶ αὐτοὶ μετέρχονται, ἰχνεύοντες δὲ παρ' ἑαυτῶν ἀνευρίσκειν

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b 4 *οἱμαί* T: *οἱ μέν* B **b** 6 *ὑβριστικὸν πάνυ* B: *πάνυ ὑβριστικὸν* T Stobaeus **b** 8 *δ' ἤτοι* T: *δή τοι* B Stobaeus **b** 9 *πτεροφύτορ'* Stobaeus: *πτερόφυτον* B: *πτερόφοιτον* T **d** 2 *ζῇ* recc.: *ζῆν* B T **d** 3 *βιοτεύῃ* corr. Coisl.: *βιοτεύει* B T **d** 4 *καὶ τοὺς* B: *καὶ πρὸς τοὺς* T **d** 5 prius *τε* B: *γε* T **e** 1 *δῖόν* D: *δι' ὅν* B: *διόν* T

This experience, beautiful boy, to whom indeed my speech is addressed, human beings name love; but when you hear what gods call it, you will, as is likely, laugh, because you are young. Some of the Homeridae, I think, say from the stored-away epic verses two verses to Love, one of which is quite insolent and not very metrical; and they hymn him like this—

> *Him mortals indeed call winged Love,*
> *but immortals Pterōs, through wing-growing necessity.*

These, then, one may be persuaded by, or not; but all the same the c
cause, at least, and the experience of those in love is in fact this very thing.[1]

Now of those in Zeus' train, the one taken hold of is able to bear the burden of the wing-named one more weightily; but those who were worshippers of Ares and went about with him, when they are caught by Love and think they are being wronged in some respect by the beloved, are murderous and ready to offer up both themselves and their darlings. And so, after each god whose chorus he d
was a member of, each lives honouring and imitating that god as far as he can, while he is uncorrupted and is living out his first birth here; and in this way he keeps company and conducts himself towards his beloveds and the rest. So each picks out his Love from among the beautiful after his own way, and, as if the beloved himself were that god, he frames him for himself like a statue and adorns him, to honour and celebrate him.[2] Those of Zeus, then, e
seek that the one beloved by them be someone Zeus-like in soul;[3] so they look into whether he is by nature a lover of wisdom and fit to lead, and when they find him and fall in love, they do everything so that he will be such. So if they have not set foot in this way of life before, they then attempt it, and learn something from wherever they can, and go in quest of it themselves; and, tracking by themselves,

1. *Homeridae*: reciters of Homer who claimed descent from him. The verses are not otherwise known, and may be of Plato's own making (an interpretation). *Pterōs* is formed from *pteron*, "wing", on the pattern of *Erōs*. *Wing-growing*: Stobaeus; B has *pterophyton*, T *pterophoiton* (apparatus b9).

2. The growing of the wings, stage 6 (252c–253c): each lover loves after the manner of the god he followed (247a), seeks a beloved of that god's nature, and makes him like the god.

3. *Zeus-like*: *dion*, "divine", also "of Zeus" (*Dios*); the reading of D, where B and T have corrupt forms (e1).

τὴν τοῦ σφετέρου θεοῦ φύσιν εὐποροῦσι διὰ τὸ συντόνως 253
ἠναγκάσθαι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφαπτόμενοι αὐτοῦ
τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνθουσιῶντες ἐξ ἐκείνου λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἤθη καὶ
τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετα-
σχεῖν· καὶ τούτων δὴ τὸν ἐρώμενον αἰτιώμενοι ἔτι τε μᾶλλον 5
ἀγαπῶσι, κἂν ἐκ Διὸς ἁρύτωσιν ὥσπερ αἱ βάκχαι, ἐπὶ τὴν
τοῦ ἐρωμένου ψυχὴν ἐπαντλοῦντες ποιοῦσιν ὡς δυνατὸν
ὁμοιότατον τῷ σφετέρῳ θεῷ. ὅσοι δ' αὖ μεθ' Ἥρας εἵποντο, b
βασιλικὸν ζητοῦσι, καὶ εὑρόντες περὶ τοῦτον πάντα δρῶσιν
τὰ αὐτά. οἱ δὲ Ἀπόλλωνός τε καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν θεῶν οὕτω
κατὰ τὸν θεὸν ἰόντες ζητοῦσι τὸν σφέτερον παῖδα πεφυκέναι,
καὶ ὅταν κτήσωνται, μιμούμενοι αὐτοί τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ 5
πείθοντες καὶ ῥυθμίζοντες εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ
ἰδέαν ἄγουσιν, ὅση ἑκάστῳ δύναμις, οὐ φθόνῳ οὐδ' ἀνελευ-
θέρῳ δυσμενείᾳ χρώμενοι πρὸς τὰ παιδικά, ἀλλ' εἰς ὁμοιότητα
αὑτοῖς καὶ τῷ θεῷ ὧν ἂν τιμῶσι πᾶσαν πάντως ὅτι μάλιστα c
πειρώμενοι ἄγειν οὕτω ποιοῦσι. προθυμία μὲν οὖν τῶν ὡς
ἀληθῶς ἐρώντων καὶ τελετή, ἐάν γε διαπράξωνται ὧ προθυ-
μοῦνται ᾗ λέγω, οὕτω καλή τε καὶ εὐδαιμονικὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ
δι' ἔρωτα μανέντος φίλου τῷ φιληθέντι γίγνεται, ἐὰν 5
αἱρεθῇ· ἁλίσκεται δὲ δὴ ὁ αἱρεθεὶς τοιῷδε τρόπῳ.

Καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦδε τοῦ μύθου τριχῇ διείλομεν ψυχὴν
ἑκάστην, ἱππομόρφω μὲν δύο τινὲ εἴδη, ἡνιοχικὸν δὲ εἶδος
τρίτον, καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἡμῖν ταῦτα μενέτω. τῶν δὲ δὴ ἵππων d
ὁ μέν, φαμέν, ἀγαθός, ὁ δ' οὔ· ἀρετὴ δὲ τίς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
ἢ κακοῦ κακία, οὐ διείπομεν, νῦν δὲ λεκτέον. ὁ μὲν τοίνυν
αὐτοῖν ἐν τῇ καλλίονι στάσει ὢν τό τε εἶδος ὀρθὸς καὶ
διηρθρωμένος, ὑψαύχην, ἐπίγρυπος, λευκὸς ἰδεῖν, μελανόμ- 5

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a 5 *τούτων* recc.: *τοῦτον* B T **a** 6 *κἂν*] *χᾶν* Madvig **b** 1 *ἥρας* t: *ἡμέρας* B T **c** 3 *τελετή* corr. Par. 1808: *τελευτή* B T *ἐάν γε διαπράξωνται* Hermias: *ἐάν τ' ἐνδιαπράξωνται* B T: *ἐάν γ' εὖ διαπράξωνται* G. Hermann **c** 4 *ᾗ λέγω* Heindorf: *ἣν λέγω* T: *ην δ' ἐγὼ* B **c** 5 *γίγνεται* T: *γίγνηται* B **c** 6 *ὁ αἱρεθεὶς* secl. Badham **c** 7 *διείλομεν* Heindorf: *διειλόμην* B T **d** 1 *ἵππων* T: *ἵππω* B **d** 4 *αὐτοῖν* T: *αὐτῶν* B

they have resource to find out the nature of their own god, through 253
being compelled to look intently at the god; and reaching him by
memory, filled with the god, they take from him his habits and
ways of life, as far as it is possible for a human being to share in
a god; and indeed, holding the beloved responsible for these, they
cherish him still more, and if they draw from Zeus, as the bacchants do, they pour it over the beloved's soul and make him as like b
as possible to their own god.[1] And those again who followed with
Hera seek one who is kingly, and when they have found him do
all the same things about him.[2] And those of Apollo and of each of
the gods, going in this way after their god, seek for their own boy
to be naturally so; and when they acquire him, imitating the god
themselves and persuading and bringing the darling into rhythm,
they lead him into that god's way of life and figure, as far as each
has the power, not using jealousy or servile ill will towards the darling, but trying in every way, as much as possible, to lead him into c
complete similarity to themselves and to the god whom they honour, they act thus. The eagerness, then, of those who are in truth
in love, and their rite—if, that is, they accomplish what they are eager for in the way I say—becomes so beautiful and happy-making,
from the friend maddened through love, for the one he loves, if he
is taken; and the one taken is caught in this way.[3]

As at the beginning of this tale we divided each soul in three,
two horse-shaped forms and a charioteer's form as third, so let d
these still stand for us now too.[4] Of the horses, one, we say, is good,
the other not; but what the virtue of the good one is, or the vice of
the bad, we did not describe in full, and now we must say. The one
of them, then, in the more beautiful position is upright in form and
well jointed, high-necked, somewhat hook-nosed, white to look at,

1. *For these*: later manuscripts; B and T have *touton*, "him" (a5). The bacchants were thought to draw milk and honey from rivers (*Ion* 534a).

2. *Hera*: the later hand t; B and T have *hēmeras*, "the day" (b1).

3. *Rite*: a correction in Par. 1808; B and T have *teleutē*, "end". *If, that is*: Hermias; B and T have *ean t' endiapraxōntai*, with *te* for *ge* and a compound of the verb. *In the way I say*: Heindorf's *hēi legō* (c3–4).

4. *We divided*: Heindorf; B and T have "I divided" (c7). The growing of the wings, stage 7 (253c–254e): the charioteer and the two horses at the sight of the beloved; what checks the bad horse is the charioteer's memory of the nature of beauty (254b).

ματος, τιμῆς ἐραστὴς μετὰ σωφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰδοῦς, καὶ
ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἑταῖρος, ἄπληκτος, κελεύσματι μόνον καὶ
λόγῳ ἡνιοχεῖται· ὁ δ' αὖ σκολιός, πολύς, εἰκῇ συμπεφορη- e
μένος, κρατεραύχην, βραχυτράχηλος, σιμοπρόσωπος, μελάγ-
χρως, γλαυκόμματος, ὕφαιμος, ὕβρεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἑταῖρος,
περὶ ὦτα λάσιος, κωφός, μάστιγι μετὰ κέντρων μόγις ὑπεί-
κων. ὅταν δ' οὖν ὁ ἡνίοχος ἰδὼν τὸ ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα, πᾶσαν 5
αἰσθήσει διαθερμήνας τὴν ψυχήν, γαργαλισμοῦ τε καὶ πόθου
κέντρων ὑποπλησθῇ, ὁ μὲν εὐπειθὴς τῷ ἡνιόχῳ τῶν ἵππων, 254
ἀεί τε καὶ τότε αἰδοῖ βιαζόμενος, ἑαυτὸν κατέχει μὴ ἐπι-
πηδᾶν τῷ ἐρωμένῳ· ὁ δὲ οὔτε κέντρων ἡνιοχικῶν οὔτε
μάστιγος ἔτι ἐντρέπεται, σκιρτῶν δὲ βίᾳ φέρεται, καὶ πάντα
πράγματα παρέχων τῷ σύζυγί τε καὶ ἡνιόχῳ ἀναγκάζει 5
ἰέναι τε πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ μνείαν ποιεῖσθαι τῆς τῶν
ἀφροδισίων χάριτος. τὼ δὲ κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν ἀντιτείνετον
ἀγανακτοῦντε, ὡς δεινὰ καὶ παράνομα ἀναγκαζομένω· τελευ- b
τῶντε δέ, ὅταν μηδὲν ᾖ πέρας κακοῦ, πορεύεσθον ἀγομένω,
εἴξαντε καὶ ὁμολογήσαντε ποιήσειν τὸ κελευόμενον. καὶ
πρὸς αὐτῷ τ' ἐγένοντο καὶ εἶδον τὴν ὄψιν τὴν τῶν παιδικῶν
ἀστράπτουσαν. ἰδόντος δὲ τοῦ ἡνιόχου ἡ μνήμη πρὸς τὴν 5
τοῦ κάλλους φύσιν ἠνέχθη, καὶ πάλιν εἶδεν αὐτὴν μετὰ
σωφροσύνης ἐν ἁγνῷ βάθρῳ βεβῶσαν· ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἔδεισέ
τε καὶ σεφθεῖσα ἀνέπεσεν ὑπτία, καὶ ἅμα ἠναγκάσθη εἰς
τοὐπίσω ἑλκύσαι τὰς ἡνίας οὕτω σφόδρα, ὥστ' ἐπὶ τὰ c
ἰσχία ἄμφω καθίσαι τὼ ἵππω, τὸν μὲν ἑκόντα διὰ τὸ μὴ
ἀντιτείνειν, τὸν δὲ ὑβριστὴν μάλ' ἄκοντα. ἀπελθόντε δὲ
ἀπωτέρω, ὁ μὲν ὑπ' αἰσχύνης τε καὶ θάμβους ἱδρῶτι πᾶσαν
ἔβρεξε τὴν ψυχήν, ὁ δὲ λήξας τῆς ὀδύνης, ἣν ὑπὸ τοῦ 5

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d 6 *καὶ* secl. Badham **d** 7 *ἀληθινῆς* om. Heraclitus *κελεύσματι* t Heraclitus: *κελεύματι* B T **e** 2 *βραχυτράχηλος* B T: *βαρυτράχηλος* V **e** 4 *περὶ ὦτα λάσιος κωφὸς* T: *περὶ ὦτα λασιοκωφος* B Photius Synesius: *περιωτάλσιος ὑπόκωφος* Heraclitus **e** 6 *αἰσθήσει* dub. Heindorf: secl. Herwerden **a** 1 *κέντρων*] *πτερῶν* Herwerden **a** 5 ⟨*τῷ*⟩ *ἡνιόχῳ* Herwerden **b** 1 *τελευτῶντε* T: *τελευτῶντες* B

black-eyed, a lover of honour with temperance and modesty, and
a companion of true opinion, needing no blow, charioteered by e
command and speech alone; the other, in turn, is crooked, massive, thrown together at random, strong-necked, short-necked, snub-faced, dark-skinned, grey-eyed, bloodshot, a companion of insolence and boastfulness, shaggy about the ears, deaf, barely yielding to whip and goads. So when the charioteer, seeing the eye of love, having warmed the whole soul through with perception,
is filled with the tickling and the goads of yearning, the horse obe- 254
dient to the charioteer, forced by modesty, then as always, holds himself back from leaping upon the beloved; but the other no longer pays heed to the charioteer's goads or whip, but bounding, is carried along by force, and, giving all kinds of trouble to his yokemate and the charioteer, compels them to go to the darling and make mention of the favour of Aphrodite's pleasures. The two
at first resist, vexed, on the ground that they are being compelled b
to dreadful and lawless things; but in the end, when there is no limit to the evil, they journey on, led, having yielded and agreed to do what they are told. And they came close to him and saw the darling's appearance, flashing like lightning. And when the charioteer saw it, his memory was carried to the nature of beauty, and saw it again, standing with temperance on a hallowed pedestal; and seeing it, the memory feared, and in reverence fell back on its
back, and at the same time was compelled to pull the reins back c
so violently as to sit both the horses on their haunches, the one willing, since he did not resist, but the insolent one much against his will. When the two had gone off further, the one, from shame and amazement, drenched the whole soul with sweat, while the other, having left off the anguish which he had

χαλινοῦ τε ἔσχεν καὶ τοῦ πτώματος, μόγις ἐξαναπνεύσας ἐλοιδόρησεν ὀργῇ, πολλὰ κακίζων τόν τε ἡνίοχον καὶ τὸν ὁμόζυγα ὡς δειλίᾳ τε καὶ ἀνανδρίᾳ λιπόντε τὴν τάξιν καὶ ὁμολογίαν· καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἐθέλοντας προσιέναι ἀναγκάζων d
μόγις συνεχώρησεν δεομένων εἰς αὖθις ὑπερβαλέσθαι. ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ συντεθέντος χρόνου [οὗ] ἀμνημονεῖν προσποιουμένω ἀναμιμνῄσκων, βιαζόμενος, χρεμετίζων, ἕλκων ἠνάγκασεν αὖ προσελθεῖν τοῖς παιδικοῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς 5
λόγους, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ἦσαν, ἐγκύψας καὶ ἐκτείνας τὴν κέρκον, ἐνδακὼν τὸν χαλινόν, μετ᾽ ἀναιδείας ἕλκει· ὁ δ᾽ ἡνίοχος ἔτι μᾶλλον ταὐτὸν πάθος παθών, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ ὕσ- e
πληγος ἀναπεσών, ἔτι μᾶλλον τοῦ ὑβριστοῦ ἵππου ἐκ τῶν ὀδόντων βίᾳ ὀπίσω σπάσας τὸν χαλινόν, τήν τε κακηγόρον γλῶτταν καὶ τὰς γνάθους καθῄμαξεν καὶ τὰ σκέλη τε καὶ τὰ ἰσχία πρὸς τὴν γῆν ἐρείσας ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν. ὅταν δὲ 5
ταὐτὸν πολλάκις πάσχων ὁ πονηρὸς τῆς ὕβρεως λήξῃ, ταπεινωθεὶς ἕπεται ἤδη τῇ τοῦ ἡνιόχου προνοίᾳ, καὶ ὅταν ἴδῃ τὸν καλόν, φόβῳ διόλλυται· ὥστε συμβαίνει τότ᾽ ἤδη τὴν τοῦ ἐραστοῦ ψυχὴν τοῖς παιδικοῖς αἰδουμένην τε καὶ δεδιυῖαν ἕπεσθαι. ἄτε οὖν πᾶσαν θεραπείαν ὡς ἰσόθεος θεραπευό- 255
μενος οὐχ ὑπὸ σχηματιζομένου τοῦ ἐρῶντος ἀλλ᾽ ἀληθῶς τοῦτο πεπονθότος, καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν φύσει φίλος τῷ θεραπεύοντι, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ὑπὸ συμφοιτητῶν ἤ τινων ἄλλων διαβεβλημένος ᾖ, λεγόντων ὡς αἰσχρὸν ἐρῶντι 5
πλησιάζειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπωθῇ τὸν ἐρῶντα, προϊόντος δὲ ἤδη τοῦ χρόνου ἥ τε ἡλικία καὶ τὸ χρεὼν ἤγαγεν εἰς τὸ προσέσθαι αὐτὸν εἰς ὁμιλίαν· οὐ γὰρ δήποτε εἴμαρται b

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c 8 λιπόντε T: λιπόντα B **d** 2 δεομένων B T: δεομένοιν Heindorf **d** 3 οὗ secl. Heindorf **d** 6 ἐπειδὴ T: ἐπεὶ δὲ B ἐκτείνας T: ἐντείνας B **e** 8 φόβῳ T: φόβον B τότ᾽ B: ποτ᾽ T **e** 9 δεδιυῖαν Bekker: δεδυῖαν B (sed κῦι supra versum): δεδοικυῖαν T **a** 2 ὑποσχηματιζομένου T: ὑποσχημένου B (σχηματιζο in marg. b) **a** 3 φίλος B T: φίλος εἰς ταὐτὸν ἄγει τὴν φιλίαν vulg. **a** 6 ἀπωθῇ corr. Coisl.: ἀπωθεῖ B T ἐρῶντα t: ἔρωτα B T **b** 1 προσέσθαι corr. Coisl.: προέσθαι B T

from the bit and the fall, barely recovering his breath, reviled them in anger, abusing the charioteer and his yoke-fellow much, on the ground that they had deserted the ranks and the agreement d through cowardice and unmanliness; and again compelling them, unwilling, to approach, he barely conceded when they entreated to put it off to another time. And when the agreed time came, as they pretended not to remember, making them recollect, forcing them, neighing, pulling, he compelled them again to approach the darling for the same talk; and when they were near, stooping down and stretching out his tail, biting on the bit, he pulls with shamelessness; but the charioteer, undergoing the same experi- e ence still more, as if falling back from the starting-rope, wrenched the bit back by force still more from the insolent horse's teeth, bloodied his evil-speaking tongue and jaws, and, pressing his legs and haunches to the ground, gave him over to anguish. And when, undergoing the same thing many times, the base one leaves off his insolence, humbled, he now follows the forethought of the charioteer, and whenever he sees the beautiful one, he perishes utterly with fright; so that it comes about that then at last the lover's soul follows the darling in modesty and fear. Since, then, 255 he is tended with every tending as a peer of the gods, by the one in love, who is not feigning but has in truth undergone this, and is himself by nature a friend to the one tending him, even if, it may be, he has earlier been misled by schoolfellows or some others, who say that it is shameful to come near one in love, and for this reason pushes the one in love away, yet, as time now goes on, his age and what must be have led him to admit him into his b company;[1] for it is never fated

1. *Pushes the one in love away*: the later hand t; B and T have "pushes love away" (a6). The growing of the wings, stage 8 (255a–256a): the beloved's side: the stream of beauty returns to him through his eyes and he loves in turn, seeing himself in the lover as in a mirror; he calls it friendship.

κακὸν κακῷ φίλον οὐδ' ἀγαθὸν μὴ φίλον ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. προσεμένου δὲ καὶ λόγον καὶ ὁμιλίαν δεξαμένου, ἐγγύθεν ἡ εὔνοια γιγνομένη τοῦ ἐρῶντος ἐκπλήττει τὸν ἐρώμενον διαισθανόμενον ὅτι οὐδ' οἱ σύμπαντες ἄλλοι φίλοι τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι μοῖραν φιλίας οὐδεμίαν παρέχονται πρὸς τὸν ἔνθεον φίλον. ὅταν δὲ χρονίζῃ τοῦτο δρῶν καὶ πλησιάζῃ μετὰ τοῦ ἅπτεσθαι ἔν τε γυμνασίοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ὁμιλίαις, τότ' ἤδη ἡ τοῦ ῥεύματος ἐκείνου πηγή, ὃν ἵμερον Ζεὺς Γανυμήδους ἐρῶν ὠνόμασε, πολλὴ φερομένη πρὸς τὸν ἐραστήν, ἡ μὲν εἰς αὐτὸν ἔδυ, ἡ δ' ἀπομεστουμένου ἔξω ἀπορρεῖ· καὶ οἷον πνεῦμα ἢ τις ἠχὼ ἀπὸ λείων τε καὶ στερεῶν ἀλλομένη πάλιν ὅθεν ὡρμήθη φέρεται, οὕτω τὸ τοῦ κάλλους ῥεῦμα πάλιν εἰς τὸν καλὸν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ἰόν, ᾗ πέφυκεν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἰέναι ἀφικόμενον καὶ ἀναπτερώσαν, τὰς διόδους τῶν πτερῶν ἄρδει τε καὶ ὥρμησε πτεροφυεῖν τε καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐρωμένου αὖ ψυχὴν ἔρωτος ἐνέπλησεν. ἐρᾷ μὲν οὖν, ὅτου δὲ ἀπορεῖ· καὶ οὔθ' ὅτι πέπονθεν οἶδεν οὐδ' ἔχει φράσαι, ἀλλ' οἷον ἀπ' ἄλλου ὀφθαλμίας ἀπολελαυκὼς πρόφασιν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔχει, ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθεν. καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἐκεῖνος παρῇ, λήγει κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ τῆς ὀδύνης, ὅταν δὲ ἀπῇ, κατὰ ταὐτὰ αὖ ποθεῖ καὶ ποθεῖται, εἴδωλον ἔρωτος ἀντέρωτα ἔχων· καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ οἴεται οὐκ ἔρωτα ἀλλὰ φιλίαν εἶναι. ἐπιθυμεῖ δὲ ἐκείνῳ παραπλησίως μέν, ἀσθενεστέρως δέ, ὁρᾶν, ἅπτεσθαι, φιλεῖν, συγκατακεῖσθαι· καὶ δή, οἷον εἰκός, ποιεῖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ταχὺ ταῦτα. ἐν οὖν τῇ συγκοιμήσει τοῦ μὲν ἐραστοῦ ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἵππος ἔχει ὅτι λέγῃ πρὸς τὸν ἡνίοχον, καὶ ἀξιοῖ ἀντὶ πολλῶν πόνων σμικρὰ ἀπολαῦσαι· ὁ δὲ τῶν παιδικῶν ἔχει μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν,

b 3 *προσεμένου* T: *πρὸς ἐμε νου* B *λόγον καὶ* B: *λόγον τε καὶ* T **b** 8 *τοῦ* Eusebius: *τούτου* B T **c** 1 *τότ' ἤδη* B T: *τότε δὴ* Eusebius **c** 4 *ἀπορρεῖ* T: *ἀπορεῖ* B *λείων*] *σκληρῶν* Herwerden **d** 3 *οὔθ'* B T: *οὐδ'* Buttmann **d** 5 *ὀφθαλμίαν* Ast **d** 6 alterum *ἐν* secl. Cobet **e** 6 *λέγῃ* Bekker: *λέγει* B T: *λέγοι* Eusebius: *λέξει* Herwerden

that bad be friend to bad, nor that good not be friend to good.[1] And when he has admitted him and accepted his talk and company, the goodwill of the one in love, coming close, strikes the beloved, as he perceives that all his other friends and his own people together provide no portion of friendship compared with the god-filled friend. And when he continues doing this for some time, and comes near him, with touching, in the gymnasia and in their other company, then at last the spring of that stream which Zeus, in c
love with Ganymede, named longing, carried in abundance to the lover, part sinks into him, and part, as he is filled to the brim, flows off outside;[2] and as a breath or an echo, rebounding from smooth and solid things, is carried back to where it started from, so the stream of beauty, going back to the beautiful one through his eyes, by which it is natural for it to go to the soul, arriving and raising its wings, waters the passages of the wings and starts them putting d
forth wings, and fills the soul of the beloved in turn with love. He is in love, then, but with what, he is at a loss; and he neither knows what he has undergone nor can he declare it, but, like one who has caught an eye-disease from another, he has no explanation to give, and it escapes his notice that he is seeing himself in the one in love as in a mirror. And when that one is present, he leaves off his anguish alike with him, and when he is absent, alike again he yearns and is yearned for, having counter-love, an image of love; e
and he calls it, and thinks it, not love but friendship. He desires, much as the other does, but more weakly, to see, to touch, to kiss, to lie beside him; and indeed, as is likely, he soon does these things next.[3] So in their sleeping together the lover's licentious horse has something to say to the charioteer, and deems it right to enjoy a 256
little in return for many toils; but the darling's horse has nothing to say,

1. Compare the *Lysis* (214c–d), where the good alone is friend to the good, and the bad never comes into true friendship with good or bad.

2. Ganymede, the Trojan prince taken up by the gods for his beauty to be Zeus' cupbearer (*Iliad* 20.232–235); Zeus' love for him is in Theognis (1345–1348) and later poets. *Longing*: as at 251c.

3. *Kiss*: *philein*, elsewhere "love", the verb of *philia*, "friendship", which is what the beloved calls his love.

σπαργῶν δὲ καὶ ἀπορῶν περιβάλλει τὸν ἐραστὴν καὶ φιλεῖ,
ὡς σφόδρ᾽ εὔνουν ἀσπαζόμενος, ὅταν τε συγκατακέωνται,
οἷός ἐστι μὴ ἂν ἀπαρνηθῆναι τὸ αὑτοῦ μέρος χαρίσασθαι
τῷ ἐρῶντι, εἰ δεηθείη τυχεῖν· ὁ δὲ ὁμόζυξ αὖ μετὰ τοῦ
ἡνιόχου πρὸς ταῦτα μετ᾽ αἰδοῦς καὶ λόγου ἀντιτείνει.
ἐὰν μὲν δὴ οὖν εἰς τεταγμένην τε δίαιταν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν
νικήσῃ τὰ βελτίω τῆς διανοίας ἀγαγόντα, μακάριον μὲν
καὶ ὁμονοητικὸν τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον διάγουσιν, ἐγκρατεῖς αὑτῶν
καὶ κόσμιοι ὄντες, δουλωσάμενοι μὲν ᾧ κακία ψυχῆς ἐνε-
γίγνετο, ἐλευθερώσαντες δὲ ᾧ ἀρετή· τελευτήσαντες δὲ δὴ
ὑπόπτεροι καὶ ἐλαφροὶ γεγονότες τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων
τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν ἓν νενικήκασιν, οὗ μεῖζον
ἀγαθὸν οὔτε σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη οὔτε θεία μανία δυνατὴ
πορίσαι ἀνθρώπῳ. ἐὰν δὲ δὴ διαίτῃ φορτικωτέρᾳ τε καὶ
ἀφιλοσόφῳ, φιλοτίμῳ δὲ χρήσωνται, τάχ᾽ ἄν που ἐν μέθαις
ἤ τινι ἄλλῃ ἀμελείᾳ τὸ ἀκολάστω αὐτοῖν ὑποζυγίω λαβόντε
τὰς ψυχὰς ἀφρούρους, συναγαγόντε εἰς ταὐτόν, τὴν ὑπὸ
τῶν πολλῶν μακαριστὴν αἵρεσιν εἱλέσθην τε καὶ διεπρα-
ξάσθην· καὶ διαπραξαμένω τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη χρῶνται μὲν
αὐτῇ, σπανίᾳ δέ, ἅτε οὐ πάσῃ δεδογμένα τῇ διανοίᾳ πράτ-
τοντες. φίλω μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτω, ἧττον δὲ ἐκείνων, ἀλλήλοιν
διά τε τοῦ ἔρωτος καὶ ἔξω γενομένω διάγουσι, πίστεις
τὰς μεγίστας ἡγουμένω ἀλλήλοιν δεδωκέναι τε καὶ δεδέχθαι,
ἃς οὐ θεμιτὸν εἶναι λύσαντας εἰς ἔχθραν ποτὲ ἐλθεῖν. ἐν
δὲ τῇ τελευτῇ ἄπτεροι μέν, ὡρμηκότες δὲ πτεροῦσθαι ἐκβαί-
νουσι τοῦ σώματος, ὥστε οὐ σμικρὸν ἆθλον τῆς ἐρωτικῆς
μανίας φέρονται· εἰς γὰρ σκότον καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ γῆς πορείαν
οὐ νόμος ἐστὶν ἔτι ἐλθεῖν τοῖς κατηργμένοις ἤδη τῆς ὑπου-

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a 4 ἄν T: om. B Eusebius **a** 6 *λόγου* corr. Coisl.: *λόγους* B T **a** 7 *ἐὰν* T: *ἃ* B **a** 8 *νικήσῃ* T: *νικήσει* B **b** 2 *μὲν ᾧ* T: *μὲν ὡς* B **b** 3 δὲ ᾧ T: δὲ *ω* B δὲ δὴ T: δὲ B **c** 1 *τάχ᾽ ἄν* B T: *τάχα* W **c** 3 *ξυναγαγόντε* B: *συναγαγόντες* T *τὴν ὑπὸ* B: *τὴν ὑπὸ τὴν* T **c** 4 *εἱλέσθην* Eusebius: *εἱλέτην* B T διεπραξάσθην Eusebius: διεπράξαντο B T **c** 7 *φίλω μὲν* T: *φιλῶμεν* B **d** 2 *ἡγουμένω* recc.: *ἡγουμένων* B T δεδέχθαι T: δέχθαι B **d** 7 *ὑπουρανίου* B T Eusebius: *ἐπουρανίου* Ven. 184: *ὑπερουρανίου* Buttmann

but, swelling and at a loss, he embraces the lover and kisses him, welcoming him as one full of goodwill, and when they lie together he is such that he would not refuse to gratify the one in love, for his part, if he should entreat to obtain it; but his yoke-fellow, in turn, with the charioteer, resists this with modesty and reason. If, then, the better parts of the mind win, leading them into an ordered way of living and philosophy, they pass their life here blessed and in b
concord, masters of themselves and orderly, having enslaved that by which vice came to be in the soul and freed that by which virtue did; and when, indeed, they have ended, having become winged and light, they have won one of the three bouts that are in truth Olympian, than which neither human temperance nor divine madness can procure a greater good for a human being.[1] But if they use c
a more vulgar way of living, unphilosophical but honour-loving, perhaps, I take it, in their drinking or in some other heedlessness their two licentious yoke-beasts, catching their souls unguarded, bring them together and choose the choice the many count blessed and accomplish it; and having accomplished it, they make use of it thereafter, but rarely, since they are doing what has not been decided by the whole mind. These two, then, live as friends to d
each other too, though less than those, both through their love and when they have gone beyond it, believing that they have given each other the greatest pledges and received them, which, they believe, it is not right ever to break and come to enmity. And at the end they go out of the body wingless, but having started to grow wings, so that they carry off no small prize for the madness of love; for into darkness and the journey under the earth it is no longer the law for those to go who have already begun

1. *Reason*: a correction in Coisl. 155; B and T have "words" (a6). The growing of the wings, stage 9 (256a–257a): the outcomes: the pair who live in philosophy regain their wings; the honour-loving pair go out wingless but having started to grow them (256d); the friend of the one not in love rolls about the earth and under it for nine thousand years, senseless (257a). A wrestler won by throwing his opponent three times (compare *Republic* 583b); the three bouts are perhaps the three lives of 249a (an interpretation).

ρανίου πορείας, ἀλλὰ φανὸν βίον διάγοντας εὐδαιμονεῖν
μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων πορευομένους, καὶ ὁμοπτέρους ἔρωτος χάριν, e
ὅταν γένωνται, γενέσθαι.

Ταῦτα τοσαῦτα, ὦ παῖ, καὶ θεῖα οὕτω σοι δωρήσεται ἡ
παρ᾽ ἐραστοῦ φιλία· ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος οἰκειότης,
σωφροσύνῃ θνητῇ κεκραμένη, θνητά τε καὶ φειδωλὰ οἰκονο- 5
μοῦσα, ἀνελευθερίαν ὑπὸ πλήθους ἐπαινουμένην ὡς ἀρετὴν
τῇ φίλῃ ψυχῇ ἐντεκοῦσα, ἐννέα χιλιάδας ἐτῶν περὶ γῆν 257
κυλινδουμένην αὐτὴν καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς ἄνουν παρέξει.

Αὕτη σοι, ὦ φίλε Ἔρως, εἰς ἡμετέραν δύναμιν ὅτι καλ-
λίστη καὶ ἀρίστη δέδοταί τε καὶ ἐκτέτεισται παλινῳδία, τά
τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἠναγκασμένη ποιητικοῖς τισιν διὰ 5
Φαίδρον εἰρῆσθαι. ἀλλὰ τῶν προτέρων τε συγγνώμην καὶ
τῶνδε χάριν ἔχων, εὐμενὴς καὶ ἵλεως τὴν ἐρωτικήν μοι
τέχνην ἣν ἔδωκας μήτε ἀφέλῃ μήτε πηρώσῃς δι᾽ ὀργήν,
δίδου τ᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν παρὰ τοῖς καλοῖς τίμιον εἶναι.
ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν δ᾽ εἴ τι λόγῳ σοι ἀπηχὲς εἴπομεν Φαίδρός b
τε καὶ ἐγώ, Λυσίαν τὸν τοῦ λόγου πατέρα αἰτιώμενος παῦε
τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν δέ, ὥσπερ ἀδελφὸς
αὐτοῦ Πολέμαρχος τέτραπται, τρέψον, ἵνα καὶ ὁ ἐραστὴς
ὅδε αὐτοῦ μηκέτι ἐπαμφοτερίζῃ καθάπερ νῦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς 5
πρὸς Ἔρωτα μετὰ φιλοσόφων λόγων τὸν βίον ποιῆται.

ΦΑΙ. Συνεύχομαί σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ ἄμεινον ταῦθ᾽
ἡμῖν εἶναι, ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι. τὸν λόγον δέ σου πάλαι c
θαυμάσας ἔχω, ὅσῳ καλλίω τοῦ προτέρου ἀπηργάσω· ὥστε
ὀκνῶ μή μοι ὁ Λυσίας ταπεινὸς φανῇ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ ἐθελήσῃ

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d 8 διαγαγόντας Eusebius **e** 2 *γίγνωνται* H. Richards **e** 3 *θεῖα οὕτω* B: *οὕτω θεῖα* T **a** 1 *χιλιάδας* T: *χιλιάδες* B *γῆν* corr. Coisl.: *την* B: *τὴν* T **a** 2 *καλινδουμένην* Herwerden *γῆς* T: *της* B **a** 4 *δέδοταί* T: *δέδοκταί* B **a** 7 *τὴν ἐρωτικήν μοι* B: *τήν μοι ἐρωτικὴν* T **a** 8 *ἔδωκας* B: *δέδωκας* T **a** 9 *τ᾽* T: *δ᾽* B **b** 1 *ἐν* T: om. B **b** 3 *ἀπηχὲς* Hermias: *ἀπηνὲς* B T **b** 4 *τέτραπται* T W: *γέγραπταί τε τέτραπται* B

the journey beneath heaven, but that, living a bright life, they should be happy journeying with each other, and, when they come e
to have wings, should come to have them alike, for love's sake.

These things, so many and so divine, boy, the friendship from a lover will bestow on you; but the affinity from the one not in love, mixed with mortal temperance, managing mortal and thrifty things, engendering in the friend's soul a servility praised by the 257
multitude as virtue, will cause it to roll about the earth for nine thousand years, and under the earth, senseless.[1]

This palinode, my friend Love, as beautiful and as good as was in our power, has been given and discharged to you, compelled to be spoken, in other respects and above all in certain poetic words, because of Phaedrus.[2] But having pardon for the former speech and favour for this one, kindly and gracious, do not take away or maim through anger the craft of love you gave me, and grant that I be still more precious than now among the beautiful. And if in b
the earlier speech Phaedrus and I said anything discordant to you, blaming Lysias, the father of the speech, stop him from speeches of this kind, and turn him towards philosophy, as his brother Polemarchus has been turned, so that this lover of his here too may no longer waver between both, as now, but simply make his life for Love with wisdom-loving speeches.[3]

PHAEDR. I join you in prayer, Socrates, if indeed it is better for c
us that these things should be, that they should come about. Your speech I have long been marvelling at, how much more beautiful than the former you made it; so that I am wary that Lysias may appear humble to me, if after all he should even be willing

1. *Nine thousand years*: the rest of the ten thousand of 248e, the first being spent in a life (an interpretation).

2. Socrates has twice before blamed his high style on Phaedrus (238d, 241e). *Given*: T; B has "decided" (a4).

3. *Discordant*: Hermias; B and T have *apēnes*, "harsh" (b1). Polemarchus, Lysias' brother, in whose house the *Republic* is set (327b–328b). *This lover of his*: Phaedrus.

πρὸς αὐτὸν ἄλλον ἀντιπαρατεῖναι. καὶ γάρ τις αὐτόν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἔναγχος τῶν πολιτικῶν τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ λοιδορῶν ὠνείδιζε, καὶ διὰ πάσης τῆς λοιδορίας ἐκάλει λογογράφον· τάχ᾽ οὖν ἂν ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας ἐπίσχοι ἡμῖν ἂν τοῦ γράφειν.

ΣΩ. Γελοῖόν γ᾽, ὦ νεανία, τὸ δόγμα λέγεις, καὶ τοῦ ἑταίρου συχνὸν διαμαρτάνεις, εἰ αὐτὸν οὕτως ἡγῇ τινα ψοφοδεᾶ. ἴσως δὲ καὶ τὸν λοιδορούμενον αὐτῷ οἴει ὀνειδίζοντα λέγειν ἃ ἔλεγεν.

ΦΑΙ. Ἐφαίνετο γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ σύνοισθά που καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι οἱ μέγιστον δυνάμενοί τε καὶ σεμνότατοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν αἰσχύνονται λόγους τε γράφειν καὶ καταλείπειν συγγράμματα ἑαυτῶν, δόξαν φοβούμενοι τοῦ ἔπειτα χρόνου, μὴ σοφισταὶ καλῶνται.

ΣΩ. Γλυκὺς ἀγκών, ὦ Φαῖδρε, λέληθέν σε ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ μακροῦ ἀγκῶνος τοῦ κατὰ Νεῖλον ἐκλήθη· καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἀγκῶνι λανθάνει σε ὅτι οἱ μέγιστον φρονοῦντες τῶν πολιτικῶν μάλιστα ἐρῶσι λογογραφίας τε καὶ καταλείψεως συγγραμμάτων, οἵ γε καὶ ἐπειδάν τινα γράφωσι λόγον, οὕτως ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς ἐπαινέτας, ὥστε προσπαραγράφουσι πρώτους οἳ ἂν ἑκασταχοῦ ἐπαινῶσιν αὐτούς.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀνδρὸς πολιτικοῦ [συγγράμματι] πρῶτος ὁ ἐπαινέτης γέγραπται.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. "Ἔδοξέ" πού φησιν "τῇ βουλῇ" ἢ "τῷ δήμῳ" ἢ ἀμφοτέροις, καὶ "ὃς ⟨καὶ ὃς⟩ εἶπεν"—τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λέγων μάλα σεμνῶς καὶ ἐγκωμιάζων ὁ συγγραφεύς—ἔπειτα λέγει

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c 4 *αὐτὸν* B T: *αὐτῶν* vulg.: *αὐτῷ* Heindorf **d** 1 *ἡγεῖ τινα* B: *τινὰ ἡγεῖ* T **d** 2 *ὀνειδίζοντα* Postgate: *ὀνειδίζοντα νομίζοντα* B: *νομίζοντα* T W **d** 9 *ὅτι . . .* **e** 1 *ἐκλήθη* secl. Heindorf **e** 5 *ἐπαινέτας* B T: *ἐπαινοῦντας* V **e** 7 *λέγεις τοῦτο* B: *τοῦτο λέγεις* T **a** 1 *ἀρχῇ* secl. Madvig: *ἀνδρὸς* secl. Herwerden (et mox *συγγράμματος*) *συγγράμματι* seclusi: *συγγράμματος* vulg. **a** 4 *φησι* B: *φησὶν αὐτῶν τὸ σύγγραμμα* T W: *φησιν αὐτὸ τὸ σύγγραμμα* vulg. **a** 5 *καὶ ὃς* add. Winckelmann

to set another against it. For indeed, you marvellous man, one of the politicians was lately reviling him and reproaching him with this very thing, and all through his reviling he called him a speech-writer; so perhaps, out of love of honour, he might hold back from writing, as far as we are concerned.[1]

SOC. A laughable view you state, young man, and you are far d
wrong about your companion if you believe him someone so frightened of noise. Perhaps, too, you think the man who reviled him said what he said as a reproach.[2]

PHAEDR. Yes, for so it appeared, Socrates; and you yourself are aware, I take it, that those who have the greatest power and are most dignified in the cities are ashamed to write speeches and to leave behind written works of their own, fearing the repute of later time, that they may be called sophists.

SOC. "Sweet bend," Phaedrus: it escapes your notice that it was e
named from the long bend along the Nile; and, besides the bend, it escapes your notice that those of the politicians who are proudest are most in love with speech-writing and with leaving written works behind; men who, indeed, whenever they write a speech, so cherish their praisers that they write in besides, first, those who praise them on each occasion.[3]

PHAEDR. How do you mean this? For I do not understand.

SOC. You do not understand that at the beginning, with a politi- 258
cian, the praiser is written first.[4]

PHAEDR. How?

SOC. "Resolved," he says, I take it, "by the Council" or "by the People" or both, and "So-and-so said"—meaning himself, of course, with great dignity, and making an encomium of himself, the writer—then he says[5]

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1. *Speech-writer*: *logographos*, one who wrote speeches for others to deliver in the courts, for pay, as Lysias did.

2. *As a reproach*: Postgate's reading; B has "as a reproach, believing it", T and W "believing it" (d2).

3. *Sweet bend*: a proverb that gives a hard thing a sweet name (so the ancient explanations), which Socrates traces to a long bend of the Nile; the politicians who despise writing in name love it in fact. Heindorf would delete the clause on the Nile (d9–e1); Burnet keeps it.

4. Burnet brackets the manuscripts' word for "written work" after "politician" (a1).

5. The opening formula of an Athenian decree: "Resolved by the Council and the People ... So-and-so said", that is, moved; the approving body, the "praiser", stands first. *He says*: B; T and W have "their written work says" (a4). *So-and-so*: Winckelmann's supplement; the manuscripts have only "who said" (a5).

δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐπιδεικνύμενος τοῖς ἐπαινέταις τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σοφίαν, ἐνίοτε πάνυ μακρὸν ποιησάμενος σύγγραμμα· ἢ σοι ἄλλο τι φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ λόγος συγγεγραμμένος;

ΦΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. b

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὲν οὗτος ἐμμένῃ, γεγηθὼς ἀπέρχεται ἐκ τοῦ θεάτρου ὁ ποιητής· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξαλειφθῇ καὶ ἄμοιρος γένηται λογογραφίας τε καὶ τοῦ ἄξιος εἶναι συγγράφειν, πενθεῖ αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἑταῖροι. 5

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Δῆλόν γε ὅτι οὐχ ὡς ὑπερφρονοῦντες τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, ἀλλ' ὡς τεθαυμακότες.

ΦΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ὅταν ἱκανὸς γένηται ῥήτωρ ἢ βασιλεύς, ὥστε 10
λαβὼν τὴν Λυκούργου ἢ Σόλωνος ἢ Δαρείου δύναμιν ἀθά- c
νατος γενέσθαι λογογράφος ἐν πόλει, ἆρ' οὐκ ἰσόθεον ἡγεῖται αὐτός τε αὑτὸν ἔτι ζῶν, καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα γιγνόμενοι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ νομίζουσι, θεώμενοι αὐτοῦ τὰ συγ- 5
γράμματα;

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Οἴει τινὰ οὖν τῶν τοιούτων, ὅστις καὶ ὁπωστιοῦν δύσνους Λυσίᾳ, ὀνειδίζειν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι συγγράφει;

ΦΑΙ. Οὔκουν εἰκός γε ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὀνειδίζοι. 10

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν αὐτό d
γε τὸ γράφειν λόγους.

ΦΑΙ. Τί γάρ;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οἶμαι αἰσχρὸν ἤδη, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν ἀλλ' αἰσχρῶς τε καὶ κακῶς. 5

ΦΑΙ. Δῆλον δή.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος τοῦ καλῶς τε καὶ μὴ γράφειν; δεόμεθά τι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, Λυσίαν τε περὶ τούτων ἐξετάσαι καὶ

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a 7 ⟨τὸ⟩ *μετὰ* Krische **b** 3 *ἐξαλειφθῇ* T: *ἐξαλιφῇ* B **c** 7 *τινα οὖν* B: *οὖν τινα* T **c** 8 *αὐτὸ*] *αὐτῷ* Ast **d** 4 *οἶμαι* B: *οἶμαί σε* T: *οἶμαί γε* vulg. **d** 8 *τι* B T: *τοι* vulg.

after this, you see, displaying his own wisdom to his praisers, sometimes making a very long written work; or does such a thing appear to you to be anything other than a written speech?

PHAEDR. Not to me. b

SOC. Then if this stands, the poet goes away from the theatre rejoicing; but if it is struck out, and he comes to have no portion of speech-writing and of being worthy to write, he mourns, himself and his companions too.

PHAEDR. Quite so.

SOC. It is plain, at least, that they do so not as despising this way of life, but as having come to marvel at it.

PHAEDR. Very much so.

SOC. What? When an orator or king becomes capable enough, taking up the power of Lycurgus or Solon or Darius, to become c an immortal speech-writer in a city, does he not himself believe himself a peer of the gods while still alive, and do not those who come after hold these same views about him, as they behold his written works?[1]

PHAEDR. Quite so.

SOC. Do you think, then, that any man of this sort, who is even in any way ill-disposed to Lysias, reproaches him with this very thing, that he writes?

PHAEDR. Not likely, from what you say; for he would be reproaching his own desire, it seems.

SOC. This much, then, is plain to everyone, that writing speeches d is not in itself shameful.

PHAEDR. Why should it be?

SOC. But that, I think, is already shameful: not speaking and writing well, but shamefully and badly.

PHAEDR. Plainly.

SOC. What, then, is the way of writing well and not well? Do we need at all, Phaedrus, to examine Lysias on these things, and

1. Lycurgus, the lawgiver of Sparta; Solon, the lawgiver of Athens; Darius I of Persia, whom Plato elsewhere counts a lawgiver (*Laws* 695c).

ἄλλον ὅστις πώποτέ τι γέγραφεν ἢ γράψει, εἴτε πολιτικὸν σύγγραμμα εἴτε ἰδιωτικόν, ἐν μέτρῳ ὡς ποιητὴς ἢ ἄνευ μέτρου ὡς ἰδιώτης;

ΦΑΙ. Ἐρωτᾷς εἰ δεόμεθα; τίνος μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα κἄν τις ὡς εἰπεῖν ζῴη, ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν ἕνεκα; οὐ γάρ που ἐκείνων γε ὧν προλυπηθῆναι δεῖ ἢ μηδὲ ἡσθῆναι, ὧ δὴ ὀλίγου πᾶσαι αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναὶ ἔχουσι· διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἀνδραποδώδεις κέκληνται.

ΣΩ. Σχολὴ μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε· καὶ ἅμα μοι δοκοῦσιν ὡς ἐν τῷ πνίγει ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἡμῶν οἱ τέττιγες ᾄδοντες καὶ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμενοι καθορᾶν καὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰ οὖν ἴδοιεν καὶ νὼ καθάπερ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ μὴ διαλεγομένους ἀλλὰ νυστάζοντας καὶ κηλουμένους ὑφ' αὑτῶν δι' ἀργίαν τῆς διανοίας, δικαίως ἂν καταγελῷεν, ἡγούμενοι ἀνδράποδ' ἄττα σφίσιν ἐλθόντα εἰς τὸ καταγώγιον ὥσπερ προβάτια μεσημβριάζοντα περὶ τὴν κρήνην εὕδειν· ἐὰν δὲ ὁρῶσι διαλεγομένους καὶ παραπλέοντάς σφας ὥσπερ Σειρῆνας ἀκηλήτους, ὧ γέρας παρὰ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ἀνθρώποις διδόναι, τάχ' ἂν δοῖεν ἀγασθέντες.

ΦΑΙ. Ἔχουσι δὲ δὴ τί τοῦτο; ἀνήκοος γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τυγχάνω ὤν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μὲν δὴ πρέπει γε φιλόμουσον ἄνδρα τῶν τοιούτων ἀνήκοον εἶναι. λέγεται δ' ὥς ποτ' ἦσαν οὗτοι ἄνθρωποι τῶν πρὶν Μούσας γεγονέναι, γενομένων δὲ Μουσῶν καὶ φανείσης ᾠδῆς οὕτως ἄρα τινὲς τῶν τότε ἐξεπλάγησαν ὑφ' ἡδονῆς, ὥστε ᾄδοντες ἠμέλησαν σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν, καὶ ἔλαθον τελευτήσαντες αὐτούς· ἐξ ὧν τὸ τεττίγων γένος μετ' ἐκεῖνο φύεται, γέρας τοῦτο παρὰ Μουσῶν λαβόν, μηδὲν τροφῆς δεῖσθαι γενόμενον, ἀλλ' ἄσιτόν τε καὶ ἄποτον εὐθὺς ᾄδειν,

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d 10 *ὡς ποιητὴς* et mox *ὡς ἰδιώτης* secl. Badham **e** 1 *ἕνεκα κάν* B: *ἕνεκ' ἄν* T: *ἕνεκα* Stobaeus **e** 3 *μηδὲ* B T: *μὴ* V Stobaeus **a** 1 *καὶ ἡμᾶς* T Stobaeus: om. B *καὶ νὼ* Stobaeus: *καινῶ* B T **b** 5 *γε* T Stobaeus: om. B **b** 6 δ'] δὴ malit Heindorf **c** 4 *γενόμενον* post *δεῖσθαι* B T Stobaeus: post *εὐθὺς* transp. Badham

anyone else who has ever written anything or will write, whether a political written work or a private one, in metre as a poet or without metre as a private person?

PHAEDR. You ask if we need to? Why, for the sake of what, so to e
speak, would one even live, if not for pleasures of this kind? For not, I take it, for those where one must first be pained or else not be pleased at all, which nearly all the pleasures of the body have; which is why they have justly been called slavish.

SOC. We have leisure, it seems; and at the same time I think the cicadas, singing over our heads, as they do in the stifling heat, and conversing with one another, are catching sight of us too. So if they 259
should see the two of us as well, like the many at midday, not conversing but nodding and enchanted by them through idleness of mind, they would laugh at us justly, believing that slaves of a sort, having come to their lodging, are sleeping like little sheep taking their midday rest round the spring; but if they see us conversing and sailing past them as past Sirens, unenchanted, the privilege b
they have from the gods to give to human beings they would perhaps give, in admiration.[1]

PHAEDR. And what is this that they have? For I am in fact, it seems, one who has never heard of it.

SOC. It is not becoming, indeed, for a man who loves the Muses to have never heard of such things. It is said that these were once human beings, of those before the Muses came to be, and when the Muses had come to be and song had appeared, some of the people of that time were so struck with pleasure that in singing c
they were heedless of food and drink, and escaped their own notice as they died; from them the race of cicadas grows after that, having received this privilege from the Muses: to need no nourishment from birth, but to sing at once without food or drink

1. *Sirens*: as Odysseus, bound to the mast, sailed past the Sirens' song (*Odyssey* 12.39–54, 165–200). *The two of us*: Stobaeus' reading; B and T run the two words together (a1).

ἕως ἂν τελευτήσῃ, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐλθὸν παρὰ Μούσας ἀπαγγέλλειν τίς τίνα αὐτῶν τιμᾷ τῶν ἐνθάδε. Τερψιχόρᾳ μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς τετιμηκότας αὐτὴν ἀπαγγέλλοντες ποιοῦσι προσφιλεστέρους, τῇ δὲ Ἐρατοῖ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις οὕτως, κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἑκάστης τιμῆς· τῇ δὲ πρεσβυτάτῃ Καλλιόπῃ καὶ τῇ μετ' αὐτὴν Οὐρανίᾳ τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγοντάς τε καὶ τιμῶντας τὴν ἐκείνων μουσικὴν ἀγγέλλουσιν, αἳ δὴ μάλιστα τῶν Μουσῶν περί τε οὐρανὸν καὶ λόγους οὖσαι θείους τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους ἱᾶσιν καλλίστην φωνήν. πολλῶν δὴ οὖν ἕνεκα λεκτέον τι καὶ οὐ καθευδητέον ἐν τῇ μεσημβρίᾳ.

ΦΑΙ. Λεκτέον γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ νῦν προυθέμεθα σκέψασθαι, τὸν λόγον ὅπῃ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν καὶ ὅπῃ μή, σκεπτέον.

ΦΑΙ. Δῆλον.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τοῖς εὖ γε καὶ καλῶς ῥηθησομένοις τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος διάνοιαν εἰδυῖαν τὸ ἀληθὲς ὧν ἂν ἐρεῖν πέρι μέλλῃ;

ΦΑΙ. Οὑτωσὶ περὶ τούτου ἀκήκοα, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, οὐκ εἶναι ἀνάγκην τῷ μέλλοντι ῥήτορι ἔσεσθαι τὰ τῷ ὄντι δίκαια μανθάνειν ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαντ' ἂν πλήθει οἵπερ δικάσουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντως ἀγαθὰ ἢ καλὰ ἀλλ' ὅσα δόξει· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων εἶναι τὸ πείθειν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας.

ΣΩ. "Οὕτοι ἀπόβλητον ἔπος" εἶναι δεῖ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὃ ἂν εἴπωσι σοφοί, ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν μή τι λέγωσι· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν οὐκ ἀφετέον.

ΦΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὧδε δὴ σποπῶμεν αὐτό.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς;

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c 6 *τερψιχόρᾳ* B T Stobaeus: *τερψιχόρῃ* vulg. **d** 3 *μετ' αὐτὴν* B Stobaeus: *μετὰ ταύτην* T **d** 7 *ἴασιν* B: *ἴασιν* T (corr. t: *πέμπουσι* suprascr. b) *δὴ οὖν ἕνεκα* W: *δὴ συνεκεν* B: *δὴ οὖν ἕνεκεν* T **e** 4 *γε* B: *τε* T **a** 5 *ὦ* T: *ὃ* B **a** 6 *λέγωσι* B T: *λέγουσι* Schaefer

until it dies, and after that to go to the Muses and report which of those here honours which of them. To Terpsichore, then, by reporting those who have honoured her in the dances, they make d
them more her friends; to Erato, those in matters of love; and so to the others, according to the form of honour of each; but to the eldest, Calliope, and to Urania who comes after her, they announce those who pass their lives in philosophy and honour the music that is theirs; they who, most of all the Muses, being concerned with heaven and with speeches both divine and human, send forth the most beautiful voice. So for many reasons we must say something, and not sleep at midday.[1]

PHAEDR. Yes, we must say something.

SOC. Then what we proposed just now to look into, in what way e
it is well to speak and write a speech and in what way not, must be looked into.

PHAEDR. Plainly.

SOC. Then for what is going to be spoken rightly indeed, and well, must not the speaker's mind be there, knowing the truth about whatever he is going to speak of?

PHAEDR. On this, my friend Socrates, I have heard it said like this: that there is no necessity for one who is going to be an ora- 260
tor to learn what is in reality just, but what would seem so to the multitude who will judge, nor what is really good or beautiful, but whatever will seem so; for persuading comes from these, and not from the truth.

SOC. Whatever wise men say, Phaedrus, must be "no word to be cast aside", but we must look into whether there is something in what they say; and in particular what has just been said must not be let go.[2]

PHAEDR. You speak rightly.

SOC. Let us look into it like this, then.

PHAEDR. How?

1. Terpsichore's name means "delighting in the dance", and Erato's recalls *erōs*; Calliope is "the most excellent of all" in Hesiod (*Theogony* 79), and Urania's name means "heavenly". *Send forth*: T as a later hand corrects it; T first had "they go", and B has the same letters without accent or breathing, with "send" written above by a later hand (d7).

2. *No word to be cast aside*: Nestor's words to Agamemnon (*Iliad* 2.361).

ΣΩ. Εἴ σε πείθοιμι ἐγὼ πολεμίους ἀμύνειν κτησάμενον ἵππον, ἄμφω δὲ ἵππον ἀγνοοῖμεν, τοσόνδε μέντοι τυγχάνοιμι εἰδὼς περὶ σοῦ, ὅτι Φαῖδρος ἵππον ἡγεῖται τὸ τῶν ἡμέρων ζῴων μέγιστα ἔχον ὦτα— b

ΦΑΙ. Γελοῖόν γ' ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴη. 5

ΣΩ. Οὔπω γε· ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ σπουδῇ σε πείθοιμι, συντιθεὶς λόγον ἔπαινον κατὰ τοῦ ὄνου, ἵππον ἐπονομάζων καὶ λέγων ὡς παντὸς ἄξιον τὸ θρέμμα οἴκοι τε κεκτῆσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς, ἀποπολεμεῖν τε χρήσιμον καὶ πρός γ' ἐνεγκεῖν δυνατὸν σκεύη καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ὠφέλιμον. c

ΦΑΙ. Παγγέλοιόν γ' ἂν ἤδη εἴη.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ κρεῖττον γελοῖον καὶ φίλον ἢ δεινόν τε καὶ ἐχθρὸν [εἶναι ἢ φίλον];

ΦΑΙ. Φαίνεται. 5

ΣΩ. Ὅταν οὖν ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀγνοῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, λαβὼν πόλιν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν πείθῃ, μὴ περὶ ὄνου σκιᾶς ὡς ἵππου τὸν ἔπαινον ποιούμενος, ἀλλὰ περὶ κακοῦ ὡς ἀγαθοῦ, δόξας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκὼς πείσῃ κακὰ πράττειν ἀντ' ἀγαθῶν, ποῖόν τιν' ἂ⟨ν⟩ οἴει μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ῥητορικὴν 10 καρπὸν ὧν ἔσπειρε θερίζειν; d

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ γε ἐπιεικῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ ἀγαθέ, ἀγροικότερον τοῦ δέοντος λελοιδορήκαμεν τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην; ἡ δ' ἴσως ἂν εἴποι· "Τί ποτ', ὦ θαυμάσιοι, ληρεῖτε; ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐδέν' ἀγνοοῦντα 5 τἀληθὲς ἀναγκάζω μανθάνειν λέγειν, ἀλλ', εἴ τι ἐμὴ συμβουλή, κτησάμενον ἐκεῖνο οὕτως ἐμὲ λαμβάνειν· τόδε δ' οὖν μέγα λέγω, ὡς ἄνευ ἐμοῦ τῷ τὰ ὄντα εἰδότι οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἔσται πείθειν τέχνῃ.

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b 5 εἴη T W: om. B **b** 6 οὔπω γε T: οὔποτε B δὴ T: om. B **b** 9 πρός γ' ἐνεγκεῖν Thompson: προσενεγκεῖν B T **c** 3 γελοῖον καὶ φίλον legit Hermias: γελοῖον B T **c** 4 εἶναι ἢ φίλον B T: non legit Hermias **c** 10 τιν' ἄν Hirschig: τινα B T **d** 1 ὧν T W: ὅν B **d** 2 γε B: om. T **d** 5 οὐδένα T: οὐδὲν B **d** 6 εἴ τι B: εἴ τις T ἐμὴ ξυμβουλή B: ἐμῇ ξυμβουλῇ T: ἐμῇ ξυμβουλῇ χρῆται Stephanus **d** 7 κτησάμενον Vahlen: κτησάμενος B T λαμβάνειν B T: λαμβάνει al.

SOC. If I were to persuade you to acquire a horse and ward off b
foes, and both of us were ignorant of horses, but I did in fact know this much about you, that Phaedrus believes a horse is the tame animal that has the largest ears—

PHAEDR. That would be laughable, Socrates.

SOC. Not yet; but when I should indeed persuade you in earnest, composing a speech of praise on the ass, giving it the title of horse and saying that the creature is worth everything to possess at home and on campaign, useful to fight from and able, besides, to carry baggage, and beneficial for many other things.[1] c

PHAEDR. That would be altogether laughable by then.

SOC. Then is not one laughable and a friend better than one formidable and an enemy?[2]

PHAEDR. It appears so.

SOC. When, then, the rhetorician, ignorant of good and bad, takes a city in the same condition and persuades it, making his praise not about an ass's shadow as if it were a horse's, but about bad as if it were good, and, having practised the opinions of the multitude, persuades it to do bad things instead of good, what sort of fruit, do you think, would rhetoric reap after this from what it d
sowed?[3]

PHAEDR. Not a very fine one, at least.

SOC. Have we, then, my good friend, reviled the craft of speeches more boorishly than we should? Perhaps it might say: "What is this nonsense you talk, you marvellous men? For I compel no one who is ignorant of the truth to learn to speak; but, if my advice counts for anything, let him acquire that, and so take me up. This much, though, I do say, and it is a great claim: that without me the one who knows the things that are will be no more able at all to persuade by craft."[4]

1. *Not yet*: T; B has "never" (b6).

2. *Laughable and a friend*: "and a friend" is Hermias' reading, which B and T lack; after "enemy" they add "to be, or a friend", which Burnet brackets (c3–4).

3. *An ass's shadow*: proverbial for a thing of no account (Aristophanes, *Wasps* 191).

4. *If my advice counts for anything*: B; T has "if anyone ... by my advice" (d6). *Let him acquire*: Vahlen's accusative; B and T have a nominative (d7). Burnet's page does not close the quotation.

ΦΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν δίκαια ἐρεῖ, λέγουσα ταῦτα; e

ΣΩ. Φημί, ἐὰν οἵ γ' ἐπιόντες αὐτῇ λόγοι μαρτυρῶσιν εἶναι τέχνῃ. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀκούειν δοκῶ τινων προσιόντων καὶ διαμαρτυρομένων λόγων, ὅτι ψεύδεται καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη ἀλλ' ἄτεχνος τριβή· τοῦ δὲ λέγειν, φησὶν ὁ Λάκων, ἔτυμος 5 τέχνη ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθείας ἧφθαι οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε μή ποτε ὕστερον γένηται.

ΦΑΙ. Τούτων δεῖ τῶν λόγων, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ δεῦρο 261 αὐτοὺς παράγων ἐξέταζε τί καὶ πῶς λέγουσιν.

ΣΩ. Πάριτε δή, θρέμματα γενναῖα, καλλίπαιδά τε Φαῖδρον πείθετε ὡς ἐὰν μὴ ἱκανῶς φιλοσοφήσῃ, οὐδὲ ἱκανός ποτε λέγειν ἔσται περὶ οὐδενός. ἀποκρινέσθω δὴ ὁ Φαῖδρος. 5

ΦΑΙ. Ἐρωτᾶτε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, οὐ μόνον ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις, ἡ αὐτὴ σμικρῶν τε καὶ μεγάλων πέρι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐντιμότερον τό γε ὀρθὸν περὶ b σπουδαῖα ἢ περὶ φαῦλα γιγνόμενον; ἢ πῶς σὺ ταῦτ' ἀκήκοας;

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί' οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μέν πως περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεταί τε καὶ γράφεται τέχνῃ, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίας· ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα. 5

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἢ τὰς Νέστορος καὶ Ὀδυσσέως τέχνας μόνον περὶ λόγων ἀκήκοας, ἃς ἐν Ἰλίῳ σχολάζοντες συνεγραψάτην, τῶν δὲ Παλαμήδους ἀνήκοος γέγονας;

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε τῶν Νέστορος, εἰ μὴ c Γοργίαν Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις, ἤ τινα Θρασύμαχόν τε καὶ Θεόδωρον Ὀδυσσέα.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τούτους ἐῶμεν· σὺ δ' εἰπέ, ἐν

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e 5 *τοῦ δὲ . . .* **e** 7 *γένηται* secl. Schleiermacher **e** 5 *φησὶν ὁ Λάκων* secl. Voegelin *ἔτυμος τέχνη* T W: *ἕτοιμος* B **a** 1 δεῖ T: δὴ B *λόγων ⟨ἀκροᾶσθαι⟩* H. Richards **a** 4 *πείθετε* T: *πείθεται* B *ὡς ἐὰν* B: *ἕως ἂν* T **b** 4 *τέχνῃ* T: *τέχνη* B **b** 6 *καὶ* B: *τε καὶ* T **b** 7 *περὶ* secl. Thompson *σχολάζοντες* B T W: *σχολάζοντε* corr. Coisl. **c** 1 *Νέστορος ⟨καὶ Ὀδυσσέως⟩* Herwerden **c** 2 *κατασκευάζεις* T: *κατασκευάζῃς* B **c** 3 *τε* T: δε B

PHAEDR. Then will it not be saying what is just, in saying this? e

SOC. I say so, if the arguments that come against it testify that it is a craft. For I think I hear, as it were, certain arguments approaching and solemnly protesting that it lies and is not a craft but a craftless knack; and a genuine craft of speaking, says the Laconian, without laying hold of truth, there neither is nor shall ever come to be hereafter.[1]

PHAEDR. These arguments are needed, Socrates; come, bring 261 them forward here and examine what they say and how.

SOC. Come forward, then, noble creatures, and persuade Phaedrus of the beautiful children that unless he loves wisdom sufficiently, he will never be capable of speaking about anything either. Let Phaedrus answer.[2]

PHAEDR. Ask.

SOC. Would not rhetoric, then, taken as a whole, be a craft, a kind of leading of souls through speeches, not only in law-courts and all the other public gatherings but in private ones too, the same about small things and great, and what is right, at least, no more b honoured when it concerns serious things than paltry ones? Or how have you heard these things?[3]

PHAEDR. No, by Zeus, not entirely so; but it is chiefly, somehow, about lawsuits that there is speaking and writing by craft, and speaking also about addressing the people; further than this I have not heard.

SOC. But can it be that you have heard only of the crafts of speeches of Nestor and Odysseus, which the two of them wrote at their leisure at Ilium, and have never heard of those of Palamedes?

PHAEDR. Yes, by Zeus, and of Nestor's I have never heard either, c unless you are making Gorgias out to be some Nestor, or Thrasymachus and Theodorus some Odysseus.[4]

SOC. Perhaps. But let us let these men pass; and you, say: in

1. *That it is a craft*: Burnet prints the dative, "by craft", with no variant (e3); the nominative is translated. *Arguments*: *logoi*, the word for "speeches". *A craftless knack*: compare the *Gorgias*, where rhetoric is a "routine" (462c), set beside cookery, "not a craft but routine and knack" (463b). *The Laconian*: an unnamed Spartan; Plutarch gives the saying as a Spartan's answer to a man proud of his rhetoric (*Sayings of Spartans* 233b). *Genuine*: T and W; B has "ready" (e5).

2. *Of the beautiful children*: the speeches he has caused to be made (242a–b; Lysias is "the father of the speech", 257b) (an interpretation).

3. *Leading of souls*: *psychagōgia*, also used of calling up the dead (Aeschylus' play *Psychagōgoi*).

4. Nestor and Odysseus are Homer's great speakers (*Iliad* 1.247–249, 3.221–223); Palamedes, the inventive hero at Troy, is the subject of Gorgias' *Defence of Palamedes*. Thrasymachus and Theodorus taught rhetoric.

δικαστηρίοις οἱ ἀντίδικοι τί δρῶσιν; οὐκ ἀντιλέγουσιν μέντοι; ἢ τί φήσομεν;

ΦΑΙ. Τοῦτ' αὐτό.

ΣΩ. Περὶ τοῦ δικαίου τε καὶ ἀδίκου;

ΦΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνῃ τοῦτο δρῶν ποιήσει φανῆναι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δίκαιον, ὅταν δὲ βούληται, ἄδικον; d

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐν δημηγορίᾳ δὴ τῇ πόλει δοκεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθά, τοτὲ δ' αὖ τἀναντία;

ΦΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τὸν οὖν Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην λέγοντα οὐκ ἴσμεν τέχνῃ, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι τὰ αὐτὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἓν καὶ πολλά, μένοντά τε αὖ καὶ φερόμενα;

ΦΑΙ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον περὶ δικαστήριά τέ ἐστιν ἡ ἀντιλογικὴ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίαν, ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικε, περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα e μία τις τέχνη, εἴπερ ἔστιν, αὕτη ἂν εἴη, ᾗ τις οἷός τ' ἔσται πᾶν παντὶ ὁμοιοῦν τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ οἷς δυνατόν, καὶ ἄλλου ὁμοιοῦντος καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένου εἰς φῶς ἄγειν.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τῇδε δοκῶ ζητοῦσιν φανεῖσθαι. ἀπάτη πότερον ἐν πολὺ διαφέρουσι γίγνεται μᾶλλον ἢ ὀλίγον;

ΦΑΙ. Ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγον. 262

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά γε δὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν μεταβαίνων μᾶλλον λήσεις ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ κατὰ μέγα.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Δεῖ ἄρα τὸν μέλλοντα ἀπατήσειν μὲν ἄλλον, αὐτὸν δὲ μὴ ἀπατήσεσθαι, τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ἀκριβῶς διειδέναι.

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c 10 *τέχνῃ* T: *τέχνη* B (et mox) **d** 1 *βούληται ἄδικον* B: *ἄδικον βούληται* pr. T **d** 7 *φαίνεσθαι* B T: δοκεῖν *φαίνεσθαι* vulg. **d** 8 *μένοντα* T: *μὲν ὄντα* B **e** 2 *ᾗ τις* corr. Coisl.: *ἥ τις* T: *ἡ τις* B **e** 3 *πᾶν παντὶ* T: *πάμπαν τί* B **a** 2 *γε δὴ* B: δὴ T: *μὴν* Galenus

the law-courts, what do the opposing parties do? Do they not contradict each other, surely? Or what shall we say?

PHAEDR. Just that.

SOC. About the just and the unjust?

PHAEDR. Yes.

SOC. Then the one who does this by craft will make the same d
thing appear to the same people now just and, whenever he wants, unjust?

PHAEDR. Of course.

SOC. And in addressing the people he will make the same things seem to the city now good, and now again the opposite?

PHAEDR. So he will.

SOC. And the Eleatic Palamedes, do we not know that he speaks by craft, so that the same things appear to those who hear him like and unlike, one and many, and again staying and being carried along?[1]

PHAEDR. Very much indeed.

SOC. The craft of contradiction, then, is not concerned only with law-courts and addressing the people, but, it seems, with every- e
thing that is said, this would be one craft, if indeed it exists, by which one will be able to liken everything to everything, of the things that can be likened and to which they can be, and, when another likens and conceals it, to bring it to light.[2]

PHAEDR. How, then, do you mean such a thing?

SOC. In this way, I think, it will appear to us as we seek. Does deception come about more among things that differ much, or little?

PHAEDR. Among those that differ little. 262

SOC. But, at any rate, passing over little by little, you will escape notice more in arriving at the opposite than passing over much at a time.

PHAEDR. How not?

SOC. Then the one who is going to deceive another, but not to be deceived himself, must know distinctly and precisely the similarity and dissimilarity of the things that are.

1. *The Eleatic Palamedes*: usually taken to be Zeno of Elea, whose argument made the same things both like and unlike (*Parmenides* 127e) (an interpretation). *Staying*: T; B has "being" (d8).

2. *Everything to everything*: T; B has "altogether something" (e3).

ΦΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν οἷός τε ἔσται, ἀλήθειαν ἀγνοῶν ἑκάστου, τὴν τοῦ ἀγνοουμένου ὁμοιότητα σμικράν τε καὶ μεγάλην ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις διαγιγνώσκειν;

ΦΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς παρὰ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζουσι καὶ ἀπατωμένοις δῆλον ὡς τὸ πάθος τοῦτο δι' ὁμοιοτήτων τινῶν εἰσερρύη.

ΦΑΙ. Γίγνεται γοῦν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως τεχνικὸς ἔσται μεταβιβάζειν κατὰ σμικρὸν διὰ τῶν ὁμοιοτήτων ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστοτε ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἀπάγων, ἢ αὐτὸς τοῦτο διαφεύγειν, ὁ μὴ ἐγνωρικὼς ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων;

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ μή ποτε.

ΣΩ. Λόγων ἄρα τέχνην, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ εἰδώς, δόξας δὲ τεθηρευκώς, γελοίαν τινά, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἄτεχνον παρέξεται.

ΦΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν ἐν τῷ Λυσίου λόγῳ ὧν φέρεις, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν ἰδεῖν τι ὧν φαμεν ἀτέχνων τε καὶ ἐντέχνων εἶναι;

ΦΑΙ. Πάντων γέ που μάλιστα, ὡς νῦν γε ψιλῶς πως λέγομεν, οὐκ ἔχοντες ἱκανὰ παραδείγματα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν κατὰ τύχην γέ τινα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐρρηθήτην τὼ λόγω ἔχοντέ τι παράδειγμα, ὡς ἂν ὁ εἰδὼς τὸ ἀληθὲς προσπαίζων ἐν λόγοις παράγοι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. καὶ ἔγωγε, ὦ Φαῖδρε, αἰτιῶμαι τοὺς ἐντοπίους θεούς· ἴσως δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Μουσῶν προφῆται οἱ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ᾠδοὶ ἐπιπεπνευκότες ἂν ἡμῖν εἶεν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας· οὐ γάρ που ἔγωγε τέχνης τινὸς τοῦ λέγειν μέτοχος.

ΦΑΙ. Ἔστω ὡς λέγεις· μόνον δήλωσον ὃ φῂς.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή μοι ἀνάγνωθι τὴν τοῦ Λυσίου λόγου ἀρχήν.

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b 5 *μεταβιβάζειν* T Galenus: *μεταβιβάζει* B **c** 6 *ἀτέχνων . . . ἐντέχνων* Heindorf: *ἄτεχνόν . . . ἔντεχνον* B T **d** 1 *τὼ λόγω* T: *τῷ λόγῳ* B

PHAEDR. It is a necessity, indeed.

SOC. Will he then be able, being ignorant of the truth of each thing, to discern in the other things the similarity, small or great, of the thing he is ignorant of?

PHAEDR. Impossible. b

SOC. Then in those who hold opinions contrary to the things that are, and are deceived, it is plain that this experience has flowed in through certain similarities.

PHAEDR. That, at any rate, is how it comes about.

SOC. Is there any way, then, that one who has not come to know what each of the things that are is will be a master of the craft of leading over little by little through the similarities, leading away each time from what is to the opposite, or of escaping this himself?

PHAEDR. Never.

SOC. A craft of speeches, then, my companion, that is laughable, c it seems, and craftless, is what the one who does not know the truth but has hunted opinions will provide.

PHAEDR. It looks like it.

SOC. Do you want us, then, in the speech of Lysias which you carry, and in those we spoke, to see something of the things we say are craftless and with craft?

PHAEDR. Most of all, I take it, since as it is we are speaking somehow in bare terms, not having sufficient examples.

SOC. And indeed, by some chance, as it seems, the two speeches d were spoken holding a certain example of how one who knows the truth might, playing in speeches, lead his hearers astray. And I, Phaedrus, hold the gods of the place responsible; and perhaps the prophets of the Muses too, the singers over our heads, may have breathed this privilege upon us; for I, at least, have no share, I take it, in any craft of speaking.[1]

PHAEDR. Let it be as you say; only make plain what you mean.

SOC. Come, then, read me the beginning of Lysias' speech.

1. *The two speeches*: T's dual; B has "in the speech" (d1). Probably Socrates' two speeches, the first against love and the second for it (an interpretation; some take the pair to be Lysias' and Socrates' first). *The gods of the place*: the Nymphs and Achelous of the shrine by the plane tree (230b–c), with Pan (263d, 279b); the prophets of the Muses are the cicadas.

ΦΑΙ. "Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὡς e
νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν τούτων γενομένων, ἀκήκοας. ἀξιῶ
δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχῆσαι ὧν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστὴς ὢν σοῦ
τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει"—

ΣΩ. Παῦσαι. τί δὴ οὖν οὗτος ἁμαρτάνει καὶ ἄτεχνον 5
ποιεῖ λεκτέον· ἦ γάρ;

ΦΑΙ. Ναί. 263

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ παντὶ δῆλον τό γε τοιόνδε, ὡς περὶ
μὲν ἕνια τῶν τοιούτων ὁμονοητικῶς ἔχομεν, περὶ δ' ἕνια
στασιωτικῶς;

ΦΑΙ. Δοκῶ μὲν ὃ λέγεις μανθάνειν, ἔτι δ' εἰπὲ σαφέστερον. 5

ΣΩ. Ὅταν τις ὄνομα εἴπῃ σιδήρου ἢ ἀργύρου, ἆρ' οὐ τὸ
αὐτὸ πάντες διενοήθημεν;

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὅταν δικαίου ἢ ἀγαθοῦ; οὐκ ἄλλος ἄλλῃ
φέρεται, καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς; 10

ΦΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς συμφωνοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὔ. b

ΦΑΙ. Οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Ποτέρωθι οὖν εὐαπατητότεροί ἐσμεν, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ
ἐν ποτέροις μεῖζον δύναται;

ΦΑΙ. Δῆλον ὅτι ἐν οἷς πλανώμεθα. 5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνην ῥητορικὴν μετιέναι
πρῶτον μὲν δεῖ ταῦτα ὁδῷ διῃρῆσθαι, καὶ εἰληφέναι τινὰ
χαρακτῆρα ἑκατέρου τοῦ εἴδους, ἐν ᾧ τε ἀνάγκη τὸ πλῆθος
πλανᾶσθαι καὶ ἐν ᾧ μή.

ΦΑΙ. Καλὸν γοῦν ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶδος εἴη κατανενοηκὼς c
ὁ τοῦτο λαβών.

ΣΩ. Ἔπειτά γε οἶμαι πρὸς ἑκάστῳ γιγνόμενον μὴ
λανθάνειν ἀλλ' ὀξέως αἰσθάνεσθαι περὶ οὗ ἂν μέλλῃ ἐρεῖν
ποτέρου ὂν τυγχάνει τοῦ γένους. 5

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e 2 ἡμῖν T: ὑμῖν B **a** 3 τοιούτων B T: ὄντων corr. Coisl.: fort. ὀνομάτων H. Richards ὁμονοητικῶς T Galenus: οὐ μόνον ποιητικῶς B **b** 7 δεῖ B: δὴ T **b** 8 πλῆθος T: εἶδος B **c** 1 εἶδος addubitat H. Richards

PHAEDR. "Of my circumstances you know, and you have heard e
how I hold it to be to our advantage that this should come about. And I deem it right that I should not fail to obtain what I need on this account, that I am in fact not your lover. For those men then regret"—

SOC. Stop. In what, then, this man misses the mark, and does something craftless, must be said; is that not so?

PHAEDR. Yes. 263

SOC. Is not this much, at any rate, plain to everyone, that about some things of this sort we are in concord, and about some at faction?[1]

PHAEDR. I think I understand what you mean; but say it still more clearly.

SOC. When someone says the name of iron or of silver, do we not all have the same thing in mind?

PHAEDR. Quite so.

SOC. What, when he says that of just or good? Is not one carried one way and another another, and do we not dispute with one another and with ourselves?

PHAEDR. Very much so.

SOC. In some, then, we are in consonance, and in others not. b

PHAEDR. So it is.

SOC. In which of the two, then, are we more easily deceived, and in which can rhetoric do more?

PHAEDR. Plainly in those in which we wander.

SOC. Then the one who is going to go in quest of the craft of rhetoric must first have divided these things methodically, and have grasped some distinguishing mark of each of the two forms, the one in which it is a necessity that the multitude wander, and the one in which it is not.

PHAEDR. It would be a beautiful form, at any rate, Socrates, that c
the one who had grasped this would have apprehended.

SOC. Next, I think, when he comes to each thing, it must not escape his notice, but he must perceive keenly to which of the two kinds the thing he is going to speak about in fact belongs.

1. *In concord*: T and Galen; B has *ou monon poiētikōs*, "not only poetically" (apparatus a3).

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; τὸν ἔρωτα πότερον φῶμεν εἶναι τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων ἢ τῶν μή;

ΦΑΙ. Τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων δήπου· ἢ οἴει ἄν σοι ἐγχωρῆσαι εἰπεῖν ἃ νυνδὴ εἶπες περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς βλάβη τέ ἐστι τῷ ἐρωμένῳ καὶ ἐρῶντι, καὶ αὖθις ὡς μέγιστον ⟨ὂν⟩ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τυγχάνει;

ΣΩ. Ἄριστα λέγεις· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ καὶ τόδε—ἐγὼ γάρ τοι διὰ τὸ ἐνθουσιαστικὸν οὐ πάνυ μέμνημαι—εἰ ὡρισάμην ἔρωτα ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου.

ΦΑΙ. Νὴ Δία ἀμηχάνως γε ὡς σφόδρα.

ΣΩ. Φεῦ, ὅσῳ λέγεις τεχνικωτέρας Νύμφας τὰς Ἀχελῴου καὶ Πᾶνα τὸν Ἑρμοῦ Λυσίου τοῦ Κεφάλου πρὸς λόγους εἶναι. ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Λυσίας ἀρχόμενος τοῦ ἐρωτικοῦ ἠνάγκασεν ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν Ἔρωτα ἔν τι τῶν ὄντων ὃ αὐτὸς ἐβουλήθη, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἤδη συνταξάμενος πάντα τὸν ὕστερον λόγον διεπεράνατο; βούλει πάλιν ἀναγνῶμεν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ;

ΦΑΙ. Εἰ σοί γε δοκεῖ· ὃ μέντοι ζητεῖς οὐκ ἔστ' αὐτόθι.

ΣΩ. Λέγε, ἵνα ἀκούσω αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου.

ΦΑΙ. "Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὡς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν τούτων γενομένων, ἀκήκοας. ἀξιῶ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχῆσαι ὧν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστὴς ὢν σοῦ τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει ὧν ἂν εὖ ποιήσωσιν, ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται·"—

ΣΩ. Ἦ πολλοῦ δεῖν ἔοικε ποιεῖν ὅδε γε ὃ ζητοῦμεν, ὃς οὐδὲ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐξ ὑπτίας ἀνάπαλιν διανεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἄρχεται ἀφ' ὧν πεπαυμένος ἂν ἤδη

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c 9 *ἐγχωρῆσαι* codex Marcianus Galeni: *συγχωρῆσαι* B T **c** 11 *ὂν* addidi auctore Heindorfio (*ἀγαθῶν ὧν* infra Hirschig) **d** 4 *ὡς* T: om. B **d** 6 Πᾶνα] *πάντα* B T: del. *τ* b t *λόγους* T: *λόγου* B: *λόγον* al. **e** 6 *ἐπίστασαι* B: *ἐπίσταμαι* T **a** 2 *τότε* T: *τὸ τότε* B **a** 4 *ζητοῦμεν ὃς* T: *ζητούμενος* B **a** 5 *διανεῖν* B T: *διανύειν* rec. b

PHAEDR. Of course.

SOC. What then? Shall we say that love is among the disputable things, or not?

PHAEDR. Among the disputable, surely. Or do you think it would have been open to you to say the things you said about it just now, that it is a harm to the beloved and the one in love, and again that it is in fact the greatest of goods?[1]

SOC. You speak best. But say this too—for I, you know, because d
of my being filled with the god, do not quite remember—whether I defined love when beginning the speech.[2]

PHAEDR. Yes, by Zeus, and quite extraordinarily so.

SOC. Ah! How much more masters of the craft, where speeches are concerned, you say the Nymphs of Achelous are, and Pan the son of Hermes, than Lysias the son of Cephalus! Or is there nothing in what I say, and did Lysias too, beginning his speech on love, compel us to take Love as some one of the things that are, the one he e
himself wanted, and then, having ordered the whole later speech towards this, carry it through to the end? Do you want us to read its beginning again?[3]

PHAEDR. If you, at any rate, so decide; but what you are seeking is not there.

SOC. Say it, so that I may hear the man himself.

PHAEDR. "Of my circumstances you know, and you have heard how I hold it to be to our advantage that this should come about. And I deem it right that I should not fail to obtain what I need 264
on this account, that I am in fact not your lover. For those men then regret the good they have done, when they cease from their desire;"—

SOC. Indeed this man, at any rate, seems to be far from doing what we are seeking: he attempts to swim through the speech not even from the beginning but from the end, backwards, on his back, and begins from what, when he had already ceased,[4]

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1. *Open to you*: *enchōrēsai*, from a Venice manuscript of Galen; B and T have *synchōrēsai*, "conceded to you" (apparatus c9). *Is in fact*: *on*, "being", added by Burnet on Heindorf's suggestion (c11). The harm: 238e–241c; the greatest of goods: 244a, and of love 245b–c.

2. *Filled with the god*: as he foretold at 241e. The first speech defined love (237c–238c).

3. *Pan*: B and T have *panta*, "all", corrected in b and t by deleting the *t* (apparatus d6). The Nymphs and Achelous are the gods of the shrine (230b); Pan is Hermes' son in the *Homeric Hymn to Pan* (19).

4. *Swim through*: *dianein*, B and T; a recent hand in B (*rec. b*) has *dianyein*, "accomplish" (apparatus a5).

ὁ ἐραστὴς λέγοι πρὸς τὰ παιδικά. ἢ οὐδὲν εἶπον, Φαῖδρε, φίλη κεφαλή;

ΦΑΙ. Ἔστιν γέ τοι δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τελευτή, περὶ οὗ τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται. b

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τἆλλα; οὐ χύδην δοκεῖ βεβλῆσθαι τὰ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ φαίνεται τὸ δεύτερον εἰρημένον ἔκ τινος ἀνάγκης δεύτερον δεῖν τεθῆναι, ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν ῥηθέντων; ἐμοὶ μὲν 5
γὰρ ἔδοξεν, ὡς μηδὲν εἰδότι, οὐκ ἀγεννῶς τὸ ἐπιὸν εἰρῆσθαι τῷ γράφοντι· σὺ δ' ἔχεις τινὰ ἀνάγκην λογογραφικὴν ᾗ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνος οὕτως ἐφεξῆς παρ' ἄλληλα ἔθηκεν;

ΦΑΙ. Χρηστὸς εἶ, ὅτι με ἡγῇ ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ ἐκείνου οὕτως ἀκριβῶς διιδεῖν. c

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τόδε γε οἶμαί σε φάναι ἄν, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῷον συνεστάναι σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν, ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα. 5

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Σκέψαι τοίνυν τὸν τοῦ ἑταίρου σου λόγον εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει, καὶ εὑρήσεις τοῦ ἐπιγράμματος οὐδὲν διαφέροντα, ὃ Μίδᾳ τῷ Φρυγί φασίν τινες ἐπιγεγράφθαι.

ΦΑΙ. Ποῖον τοῦτο, καὶ τί πεπονθός; d

ΣΩ. Ἔστι μὲν τοῦτο τόδε—

Χαλκῆ παρθένος εἰμί, Μίδα δ' ἐπὶ σήματι κεῖμαι.
ὄφρ' ἂν ὕδωρ τε νάῃ καὶ δένδρεα μακρὰ τεθήλῃ,
αὐτοῦ τῇδε μένουσα πολυκλαύτου ἐπὶ τύμβου, 5
ἀγγελέω παριοῦσι Μίδας ὅτι τῇδε τέθαπται.

ὅτι δ' οὐδὲν διαφέρει αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ ὕστατόν τι λέγεσθαι, e ἐννοεῖς που, ὡς ἐγῷμαι.

ΦΑΙ. Σκώπτεις τὸν λόγον ἡμῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἵνα μὴ σὺ ἄχθῃ, ἐάσωμεν—

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a 7 *ἐραστὴς* recc.: *ἐρασθεὶς* B T **b** 5 *δεῖν* secl. Madvig: *δὴ* Schanz **b** 9 *με* T: *μὴ* B **c** 3 *σῶμά τι* t: *σώματι* B T **c** 4 *μήτε ἀκέφαλον* T: *μὴ το ἀκέφαλον* B **d** 3 *μίδα* T: *μίδᾳ* B **e** 3 *ἡμῶν* B: om. T

the lover would say to his darling. Or was there nothing in what I said, Phaedrus, dear head?[1]

PHAEDR. It is an end, at any rate, Socrates, indeed, the thing he b
makes his speech about.

SOC. And what of the rest? Do not the contents of the speech seem to have been thrown together pell-mell? Or does what was said second appear to have had, from some necessity, to be placed second, or any other of the things said? For I thought, as one who knows nothing, that whatever came was said by the writer not ignobly; but have you some speech-writer's necessity by which he placed these things beside one another in this order?[2]

PHAEDR. You are decent, in that you believe me capable of dis- c
cerning so precisely what is that man's.

SOC. But this, at least, I think you would say: that every speech must be put together like an animal, having a body of its own, so as to be neither headless nor footless, but to have middle parts and extremities, written so as to be becoming to one another and to the whole.[3]

PHAEDR. How could it not?

SOC. Look into, then, your companion's speech, whether it is so or otherwise; and you will find it no different from the epigram which some say has been inscribed for Midas the Phrygian.

PHAEDR. What sort is that, and what has it undergone? d

SOC. It is this—

> *A maiden of bronze am I, and I lie upon the grave of Midas.*
> *As long as water flows and tall trees flourish,*
> *staying here upon the much-wept tomb,*
> *I shall announce to those who pass that Midas has been buried here.*[4]

And that it is no different whether anything of it is said first or last, e
you conceive, I take it, as I think.

PHAEDR. You are mocking our speech, Socrates.

SOC. This one, then, so that you may not be grieved, let us let pass—

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1. *The lover*: *erastēs*, in later manuscripts; B and T have *erastheis*, "the one who has fallen in love" (a7). *Dear head*: Homer's *philē kephalē* (*Iliad* 8.281; compare "the divine head", 234d); "dear" for the stock phrase only (*philos* is "friend").

2. *Speech-writer's necessity*: *anankē logographikē*, a rule that fixes each part in its place; the speech-writer as at 257c.

3. *A body*: *sōma ti*, from a later hand (t); B and T have *sōmati*, "with a body" (c3). Aristotle asks a plot to be one whole like an animal (*Poetics* 23, 1459a20).

4. Diogenes Laertius gives the epitaph with two more lines, says some ascribe it to Cleobulus of Lindos, and quotes Simonides' poem mocking it (1.89–90; Simonides fr. 581 *PMG*). Its lines will stand in any order.

καίτοι συχνά γε ἔχειν μοι δοκεῖ παραδείγματα πρὸς ἅ τις βλέπων ὀνίναιτ' ἄν, μιμεῖσθαι αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρῶν μὴ πάνυ τι— εἰς δὲ τοὺς ἑτέρους λόγους ἴωμεν. ἦν γάρ τι ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὡς δοκῶ, προσῆκον ἰδεῖν τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ λόγων σκοπεῖν.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐναντίω που ἦστην· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὡς τῷ ἐρῶντι, ὁ δ' ὡς τῷ μὴ δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐλεγέτην.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλ' ἀνδρικῶς.

ΣΩ. Ὤιμην σε τἀληθὲς ἐρεῖν, ὅτι μανικῶς· ὦ μέντοι ἐζήτουν ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τοῦτο. μανίαν γάρ τινα ἐφήσαμεν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα. ἦ γάρ;

ΦΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Μανίας δέ γε εἴδη δύο, τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ νοσημάτων ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων γιγνομένην.

ΦΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τῆς δὲ θείας τεττάρων θεῶν τέτταρα μέρη διελόμενοι, μαντικὴν μὲν ἐπίπνοιαν Ἀπόλλωνος θέντες, Διονύσου δὲ τελεστικήν, Μουσῶν δ' αὖ ποιητικήν, τετάρτην δὲ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ Ἔρωτος, ἐρωτικὴν μανίαν ἐφήσαμέν τε ἀρίστην εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος ἀπεικάζοντες, ἴσως μὲν ἀληθοῦς τινος ἐφαπτόμενοι, τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλοσε παραφερόμενοι, κεράσαντες οὐ παντάπασιν ἀπίθανον λόγον, μυθικόν τινα ὕμνον προσεπαίσαμεν μετρίως τε καὶ εὐφήμως τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σὸν δεσπότην Ἔρωτα, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καλῶν παίδων ἔφορον.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα ἔμοιγε οὐκ ἀηδῶς ἀκοῦσαι.

ΣΩ. Τόδε τοίνυν αὐτόθεν λάβωμεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ψέγειν πρὸς τὸ ἐπαινεῖν ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος μεταβῆναι.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ οὖν αὐτὸ λέγεις;

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e 6 *βλέπων ⟨μὲν⟩ . . . μιμεῖσθαι ⟨δ'⟩* Herwerden **e** 7 *ἑτέρους* T: *ἑταίρους* B **b** 2 *τεττάρων θεῶν* secl. Schanz **b** 5 *τε* B T: om. Stobaeus **b** 8 *λόγον* corr. Par. 1808: *λόγου* B T **c** 4 *ἔμοιγε* B: *ἐμοὶ μὲν* T

and yet I think it has many examples, looking to which one would profit, not attempting in the least to imitate them—and let us go to the other speeches. For there was something in them, I think, fitting for those who want to look into speeches to see.

PHAEDR. What sort of thing, then, do you mean? 265

SOC. The two were opposites, I take it; for the one said that one should gratify the one in love, the other the one not.

PHAEDR. And very manfully.

SOC. I thought you would speak the truth: madly. Yet what I was seeking is just this. For we said that love is a kind of madness; is that not so?[1]

PHAEDR. Yes.

SOC. And of madness there are two forms: the one coming about through human diseases, the other through a divine departure from the accustomed lawful things.

PHAEDR. Certainly. b

SOC. And of the divine, dividing it into four parts belonging to four gods, setting down the prophetic inspiration as Apollo's, that of rites as Dionysus', the poetic, again, as the Muses', and the fourth as Aphrodite's and Love's, we said that the madness of love was the best; and, making a likeness of the experience of love I know not how, perhaps laying hold of something true, and perhaps too being carried off elsewhere, mixing together a speech not altogether unpersuasive, we played a sort of mythic hymn, moderately and c with words of good omen, to my master and yours, Phaedrus, Love, overseer of beautiful boys.[2]

PHAEDR. And for me, at least, very far from unpleasant to hear.

SOC. Then let us take this from right there: how the speech was able to pass over from censuring to praising.

PHAEDR. How, then, do you mean it?

1. *Manfully … madly*: *andrikōs*, *manikōs*, a jingle.

2. *Four gods*: in its account of the madnesses (244a–245c) the speech named only the Muses; prophecy was the prophetess's at Delphi, the priestesses' at Dodona and the Sibyl's (244a–b); Love was called Aphrodite's son before it (242d). *Played*: *prosepaisamen*, from *paizein*, "play" (so 265c).

ΣΩ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεται τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῷ ὄντι παιδιᾷ πεπαῖσθαι· τούτων δέ τινων ἐκ τύχης ῥηθέντων δυοῖν εἰδοῖν, εἰ αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν τέχνῃ λαβεῖν δύναιτό τις, οὐκ ἄχαρι. d

ΦΑΙ. Τίνων δή;

ΣΩ. Εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, ἵνα ἕκαστον ὁριζόμενος δῆλον ποιῇ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἀεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ. ὥσπερ τὰ νυνδὴ περὶ Ἔρωτος—ὃ ἔστιν 5 ὁρισθέν—εἴτ' εὖ εἴτε κακῶς ἐλέχθη, τὸ γοῦν σαφὲς καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ὁμολογούμενον διὰ ταῦτα ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν ὁ λόγος.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ δ' ἕτερον δὴ εἶδος τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἴδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν κατ' ἄρθρα e ἃ πέφυκεν, καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνύναι μέρος μηδέν, κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπῳ χρώμενον· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄρτι τὼ λόγω τὸ μὲν ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας ἕν τι κοινῇ εἶδος ἐλαβέτην, ὥσπερ δὲ σώματος ἐξ ἑνὸς διπλᾶ καὶ ὁμώνυμα πέφυκε, σκαιά, τὰ δὲ 266 δεξιὰ κληθέντα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τῆς παρανοίας ὡς ⟨ἓν⟩ ἐν ἡμῖν πεφυκὸς εἶδος ἡγησαμένω τὼ λόγω, ὁ μὲν τὸ ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τεμνόμενος μέρος, πάλιν τοῦτο τέμνων οὐκ ἐπανῆκεν πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐφευρὼν ὀνομαζόμενον σκαιόν τινα ἔρωτα ἐλοιδόρησεν 5 μάλ' ἐν δίκῃ, ὁ δ' εἰς τὰ ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆς μανίας ἀγαγὼν ἡμᾶς, ὁμώνυμον μὲν ἐκείνῳ, θεῖον δ' αὖ τινα ἔρωτα ἐφευρὼν καὶ προτεινάμενος ἐπῄνεσεν ὡς μεγίστων αἴτιον ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν. b

ΦΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστής, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, ἵνα οἷός τε ὦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν· ἐάν τέ τιν' ἄλλον ἡγήσωμαι δυνατὸν εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐπὶ 5

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c 8 *παιδιᾷ* T: *παιδία* B **c** 9 *πεπαῖσθαι* T: *πεπέσθαι* B *τινῶν . . . ῥηθέντων*] *τι νῷν . . . ῥηθὲν τὸ τοῖν* Badham *εἰδοῖν*] *εἰδῶν* Galenus **d** 1 *αὐτοῖν* B T: *αὐτὴν* vulg. **d** 5 *τὰ* B T: *τὸ* Schanz **d** 8 *δὴ* T: *μὴ* B **e** 1 *κατ'* B T: *καὶ τὰ* Madvig *διατέμνειν* T Stobaeus Galenus: *τέμνειν* B **a** 1 *σώματος* B T: *σώματι* Stobaeus *πέφυκε σκαιά* T Stobaeus: *πέφυκες· καὶ ἃ* B *τὰ δὲ* Stobaeus: *τάδε ἡ* B T **a** 2 *παρανοίας* B T: *παροινίας* Stobaeus *ἓν ἐν* Heindorf: *ἐν* B T: *ἓν* al.: om. Stobaeus *ἡμῖν* T Stobaeus: *ὑμῖν* B **a** 3 *τὸ* B T: om. Stobaeus **a** 4 *ἐπανῆκεν* B T: *ἀνῆκεν* Stobaeus *ἐν αὐτοῖς* B T: *ἑαυτοῖς* Stobaeus **a** 7 *καὶ* secl. Badham

SOC. It appears to me that the rest has in reality been played in play; but of certain of these things, spoken by chance, two forms—if one could grasp their power by craft, it would not be without grace. d

PHAEDR. Of which, then?

SOC. That of seeing together and leading into one figure the things scattered in many places, so that by defining each thing one makes plain whatever one is willing to teach about at any time; just as the things said just now about Love—what it is, once defined—whether well or badly, at any rate it was through these that the speech was able to say what was clear and in agreement with itself.[1]

PHAEDR. And the other form, then, what do you say it is, Socrates?

SOC. That of being able, again, to cut it up by forms, at the joints, e as it is by nature, and not to attempt to break any part, using the way of a bad butcher; but as just now the two speeches took what is foolish in the mind as some one form in common, and as from 266 a single body there are by nature things double and of the same name, called left, and the others right, so too the two speeches, believing the form of aberration to be by nature one in us, the one, cutting the part on the left, did not slacken in cutting this again until, finding among them a certain love named left, it reviled it, with full justice; the other, leading us to the parts of madness on the right, finding a love of the same name as that one, but divine, and holding it out, praised it as the cause for us of the greatest b goods.[2]

PHAEDR. You speak most truly.

SOC. Of these, Phaedrus, I am myself a lover, of the divisions and collections, so that I may be able to speak and to be intelligent; and if I believe someone else able to see into one and over

1. The first form, collection: the first speech defined love (237c–238c); compare understanding "according to a form, going from many perceptions into one" (249b–c). *Figure*: *idea*, as at 237d.

2. *Butcher*: *mageiros*, the cook who cut up the sacrificial animal; the *Statesman* divides "limb by limb, like a victim" (287c). *Left*: *skaios*, the left, and so the clumsy and ill-omened; "left" as T and Stobaeus (B *pephykes; kai ha*), "and the others" as Stobaeus alone (B and T *tade hē*) (a1). *One*: added by Heindorf (a2).

πολλὰ πεφυκόθ' ὁρᾶν, τοῦτον διώκω "κατόπισθε μετ' ἴχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο." καὶ μέντοι καὶ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτὸ δρᾶν εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ προσαγορεύω, θεὸς οἶδε, καλῶ δὲ οὖν μέχρι τοῦδε διαλεκτικούς. τὰ δὲ νῦν παρὰ σοῦ τε καὶ c
Λυσίου μαθόντας εἰπὲ τί χρὴ καλεῖν· ἢ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν ἡ λόγων τέχνη, ἣ Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι χρώμενοι σοφοὶ μὲν αὐτοὶ λέγειν γεγόνασιν, ἄλλους τε ποιοῦσιν, οἳ ἂν δωροφορεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς βασιλεῦσιν ἐθέλωσιν; 5

ΦΑΙ. Βασιλικοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες, οὐ μὲν δὴ ἐπιστήμονές γε ὧν ἐρωτᾷς. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ εἶδος ὀρθῶς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς καλεῖν, διαλεκτικὸν καλῶν· τὸ δὲ ῥητορικὸν δοκεῖ μοι διαφεύγειν ἔθ' ἡμᾶς.

ΣΩ. Πῶς φῄς; καλόν πού τι ἂν εἴη, ὃ τούτων ἀπο- d
λειφθὲν ὅμως τέχνῃ λαμβάνεται; πάντως δ' οὐκ ἀτιμαστέον αὐτὸ σοί τε καὶ ἐμοί, λεκτέον δὲ τί μέντοι καὶ ἔστι τὸ λειπόμενον τῆς ῥητορικῆς.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα που συχνά, ὦ Σώκρατες, τά γ' ἐν τοῖς 5
βιβλίοις τοῖς περὶ λόγων τέχνης γεγραμμένοις.

ΣΩ. [Καὶ] καλῶς γε ὑπέμνησας. προοίμιον μὲν οἶμαι πρῶτον ὡς δεῖ τοῦ λόγου λέγεσθαι ἐν ἀρχῇ· ταῦτα λέγεις —ἦ γάρ;—τὰ κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης;

ΦΑΙ. Ναί. e

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δὲ δὴ διήγησίν τινα μαρτυρίας τ' ἐπ' αὐτῇ, τρίτον τεκμήρια, τέταρτον εἰκότα· καὶ πίστωσιν οἶμαι καὶ ἐπιπίστωσιν λέγειν τόν γε βέλτιστον λογοδαί- δαλον Βυζάντιον ἄνδρα. 5

ΦΑΙ. Τὸν χρηστὸν λέγεις Θεόδωρον;

ΣΩ. Τί μήν; καὶ ἔλεγχόν γε καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχον ὡς 267
ποιητέον ἐν κατηγορίᾳ τε καὶ ἀπολογίᾳ. τὸν δὲ κάλλιστον

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b 7 *πεφυκόθ'*] *πεφυκὸς* B T Stobaeus: *πεφυκότα* vulg. **b** 9 *ἢ μὴ* T: *εἰ μὴ* B **c** 1 *δὲ νῦν* B: *νῦν δὲ* T **c** 2 *μαθόντας* B: *μαθόντες* T: *μαθόντα* H. Richards **c** 6 *ἄνδρες* Bekker: *ἄνδρες* B T **c** 7 *τὸ* T: om. B **d** 7 *καὶ* secl. Hirschig **d** 8 *ἐν ἀρχῇ* T: *ἐπ' ἀρχῇ* B: secl. ci. Schanz **e** 4 *λογοδαίδαλον* T (et legit Cicero): *λόγον δαίδαλον* B: *λόγων Δαίδαλον* Winckelmann

many by his nature, him I pursue "behind, after his track, as a god's." And what is more, those able to do this—whether I address them rightly or not, a god knows—but I call them, at any rate, up c
to now, dialecticians. But now, those who have learned from you and Lysias—say what one must call them. Or is this the very thing, the craft of speeches, by using which Thrasymachus and the others have themselves become wise at speaking, and make others so, any who are willing to bring them gifts as to kings?[1]

PHAEDR. Kingly the men are, but not, indeed, knowledgeable, at any rate, in the things you ask about. But this form, I at least think, you call rightly, calling it dialectical; but the rhetorical, I think, still escapes us.

SOC. What do you say? Could there be, I take it, some beautiful d
thing which, though left out of these, is nevertheless grasped by craft? In any case it must not be dishonoured by you and me, but it must be said what, then, it is, the part of rhetoric that is left.

PHAEDR. Quite a lot, I take it, Socrates: the things, at any rate, written in the books on the craft of speeches.

SOC. You have reminded me well. First, I think, a *preamble*, how it must be spoken at the beginning of the speech; these are what you mean—is that not so?—the refinements of the craft?

PHAEDR. Yes. e

SOC. And second, then, a sort of *narration*, and *testimonies* upon it; third, *pieces of evidence*; fourth, *likelihoods*; and *confirmation*, I think, and *further confirmation*, the most excellent speech-Daedalus, the Byzantine man, speaks of.[2]

PHAEDR. You mean the decent Theodorus?

SOC. Of course. And *refutation*, too, and *further refutation*, how 267
they must be done in accusation and in defence. And the most beautiful

1. *By his nature*: *pephykoth'*, Burnet's elision of the early editions' *pephykota*, agreeing with "someone"; B, T and Stobaeus have *pephykos*, making the one and many what is so by nature (b7). *Behind* …: shaped from Homer's "he went in the tracks of the god" (*Odyssey* 2.406, 3.30, 5.193, 7.38). *Dialecticians*: akin to *dialegesthai*, "converse"; the dialectician knows how to ask and answer (*Cratylus* 390c) and gives an account of each thing's being (*Republic* 534b). Thrasymachus of Chalcedon (267c), the sophist of *Republic* I.

2. The parts of a speech in the handbooks; Aristotle mocks their multiplication (*Rhetoric* 3.13, 1414b). Theodorus of Byzantium wrote such a handbook. *Speech-Daedalus*: *logodaidalos* (T, and Cicero read it, *Orator* 39), after the legendary craftsman; B has *logon daidalon* (e4).

Πάριον Εὐηνὸν ἐς μέσον οὐκ ἄγομεν, ὃς ὑποδήλωσίν τε πρῶτος ηὗρεν καὶ παρεπαίνους—οἱ δ' αὐτὸν καὶ παραψόγους φασὶν ἐν μέτρῳ λέγειν μνήμης χάριν—σοφὸς γὰρ ἀνήρ. Τεισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε ἐάσομεν εὖδειν, οἳ πρὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἶδον ὡς τιμητέα μᾶλλον, τά τε αὖ σμικρὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσιν διὰ ῥώμην λόγου, καινά τε ἀρχαίως τά τ' ἐναντία καινῶς, συντομίαν τε λόγων καὶ ἄπειρα μήκη περὶ πάντων ἀνηῦρον; ταῦτα δὲ ἀκούων ποτέ μου Πρόδικος ἐγέλασεν, καὶ μόνος αὐτὸς ηὑρηκέναι ἔφη ὧν δεῖ λόγων τέχνην· δεῖν δὲ οὔτε μακρῶν οὔτε βραχέων ἀλλὰ μετρίων.

ΦΑΙ. Σοφώτατά γε, ὦ Πρόδικε.

ΣΩ. Ἱππίαν δὲ οὐ λέγομεν; οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν σύμψηφον αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν Ἠλεῖον ξένον γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙ. Τί δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ Πώλου πῶς φράσωμεν αὖ μουσεῖα λόγων—ὡς διπλασιολογίαν καὶ γνωμολογίαν καὶ εἰκονολογίαν —ὀνομάτων τε Λικυμνίων ἃ ἐκείνῳ ἐδωρήσατο πρὸς ποίησιν εὐεπείας;

ΦΑΙ. Πρωταγόρεια δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαῦτ' ἄττα;

ΣΩ. Ὀρθοέπειά γέ τις, ὦ παῖ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ καλά. τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἑλκομένων λόγων κεκρατηκέναι τέχνῃ μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος, ὀργίσαι τε αὖ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονεν, καὶ πάλιν ὠργισμένοις ἐπᾴδων κηλεῖν, ὡς ἔφη· διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὁθενδὴ κράτιστος.

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a 3 ἐς B: εἰς T **a** 5 ἀνήρ Bekker: ἀνὴρ B T **a** 6 δὲ in ras. T **b** 4 τέχνην B T: τέχνῃ Stephanus δεῖν corr. Par. 1808: δεινὰ B T **b** 7–8 ἱππίαν . . . τὸν ἠλεῖον T: ἱππείαν . . . τὸν ἥλιον B **b** 10 φράσωμεν B: φράσομεν T: ⟨οὐ⟩ φράσομεν Schanz ὡς B: ὃς T **c** 2 Λικυμνιείων Ast ἃ ἐκείνῳ ἐδωρήσατο secl. Ast πρὸς ποίησιν B T: προσεποίησεν Cornarius **c** 3 εὐεπείας B T: εὐέπειαν Schanz **c** 9 Καλχηδονίου Herwerden ὀργίσαι τε T: ὀργίσαιτο B ἀνὴρ Bekker: ἀνὴρ B T **d** 2 ὅθεν δὴ Par. 1808: ὅθεν δεῖ B T

Evenus of Paros we do not bring into the middle, who first found *insinuation* and *incidental praises*—some say, too, that he speaks *incidental censures* in metre, for the sake of memory—for the man is wise. And Tisias and Gorgias, shall we let them sleep, who saw that likelihoods are more to be honoured than the truths, and who make small things appear great and great things small through the strength of speech, and new things in an ancient way and the opposite in a new way, and found out concision of speeches and lengths without limit about everything? But Prodicus, hearing these things from me once, laughed, and he said that he alone had found the craft of the speeches that are needed: that there is need of speeches neither long nor short, but moderate.[1] b

PHAEDR. Most wisely, Prodicus!

SOC. And Hippias, do we not mention him? For I think the stranger from Elis too would vote with him.[2]

PHAEDR. Why not?

SOC. And how, again, shall we declare Polus' Muse-shrines of speeches—such as *doubling of speech* and *maxim-speech* and *image-speech*—and of the words of Licymnius, which he presented to him for the making of fine diction?[3] c

PHAEDR. But were there not, Socrates, Protagorean things of that sort?

SOC. A sort of *correctness of diction*, boy, and many other beautiful things. But the speeches of piteous wailing, dragged out over old age and poverty, the might of the Chalcedonian appears to me to have mastered by craft; and, again, at angering many at once the man has become formidable, and, in turn, at enchanting them with d charms sung over them when they are angered, as he said; and at slandering and dispelling slanders, from whatever source, he is the strongest.[4]

1. Evenus of Paros, sophist and poet (*Apology* 20b, *Phaedo* 60d). Tisias of Syracuse, whose argument from likelihood is examined at 273a–c; Gorgias of Leontini claims to speak at length or briefly (*Gorgias* 449b–c). Prodicus of Ceos (*Protagoras* 337a–c). *There is need*: *dein*, corrected in a Paris manuscript (1808); B and T have *deina* (b4).

2. Hippias of Elis urges a middle course between long speeches and short in the *Protagoras* (337e–338a).

3. Polus appears with Gorgias in the *Gorgias*, which parodies his jingles (448c) and mentions his treatise (462b). Licymnius, a dithyrambic poet who wrote on style (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.12, 1413b14; 3.13, 1414b17).

4. *Correctness of diction*: *orthoepeia*, Protagoras' study of right usage (*Cratylus* 391c; Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.5, 1407b6). *The might of the Chalcedonian*: Thrasymachus, named in Homer's manner ("the might of Orion", *Iliad* 18.486); Aristotle cites his *Appeals to Pity* (*Rhetoric* 3.1, 1404a14). *From whatever source*: *hothendē*, Burnet's spelling of a Paris manuscript's *hothen dē* (Par. 1808); B and T have *hothen dei* (d2).

τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος τῶν λόγων κοινῇ πᾶσιν ἔοικε συνδεδογμένον εἶναι, ᾧ τινες μὲν ἐπάνοδον, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο τίθενται ὄνομα.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἕκαστα λέγεις ὑπομνῆσαι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοὺς ἀκούοντας περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα λέγω, καὶ εἴ τι σὺ ἄλλο ἔχεις εἰπεῖν λόγων τέχνης πέρι.

ΦΑΙ. Σμικρά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἐῶμεν δὴ τά γε σμικρά· ταῦτα δὲ ὑπ' αὐγὰς μᾶλλον ἴδωμεν, τίνα καὶ πότ' ἔχει τὴν τῆς τέχνης δύναμιν.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα ἐρρωμένην, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔν γε δὴ πλήθους συνόδοις.

ΣΩ. Ἔχει γάρ. ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἰδὲ καὶ σὺ εἰ ἄρα καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται διεστηκὸς αὐτῶν τὸ ἤτριον ὥσπερ ἐμοί.

ΦΑΙ. Δείκνυε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δή μοι· εἴ τις προσελθὼν τῷ ἑταίρῳ σου Ἐρυξιμάχῳ ἢ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ Ἀκουμενῷ εἶποι ὅτι "Ἐγὼ ἐπίσταμαι τοιαῦτ' ἄττα σώμασι προσφέρειν, ὥστε θερμαίνειν τ' ἐὰν βούλωμαι καὶ ψύχειν, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δόξῃ μοι, ἐμεῖν ποιεῖν, ἐὰν δ' αὖ, κάτω διαχωρεῖν, καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα τοιαῦτα· καὶ ἐπιστάμενος αὐτὰ ἀξιῶ ἰατρικὸς εἶναι καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖν ᾧ ἂν τὴν τούτων ἐπιστήμην παραδῶ," τί ἂν οἴει ἀκούσαντας εἰπεῖν;

ΦΑΙ. Τί δ' ἄλλο γε ἢ ἐρέσθαι εἰ προσεπίσταται καὶ οὕστινας δεῖ καὶ ὁπότε ἕκαστα τούτων ποιεῖν, καὶ μέχρι ὁπόσου;

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν εἴποι ὅτι "Οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλ' ἀξιῶ τὸν ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθόντα αὐτὸν οἷόν τ' εἶναι [ποιεῖν] ἃ ἐρωτᾷς;"

ΦΑΙ. Εἰπεῖν ἂν οἶμαι ὅτι μαίνεται ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐκ

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d 4 *τίθενται* T: *τιθέντες* B **a** 1 *ὑπ' αὐγὰς μᾶλλον* T W: *ὑπαύγασμα καλὸν* B **a** 2 *πότ'* B T: *ποτ'* vulg. **a** 8 *εἰπὲ* T b: *εἴπερ* pr. B **a** 9 *Ἀκουμενῷ*] *ἀκουμένῳ* B T **a** 10 *σώμασι* B T: *σώματι* V **b** 1 *μὲν* T: *μὴ* B (in ras.) **b** 3 *ἐπιστάμενος* b: *ἐπισταμένους* B T *ἰατρικὸς* B: *ἰατρὸς* T **b** 6 *δ' ἄλλο γε* T: *γε ἄλλο* B **c** 1 *ποιεῖν* secl. Buttmann: *ἐπαΐειν* Schleiermacher **c** 2 *εἰπεῖν* scripsi: *εἴποιεν* Stephanus: *εἴποι* B T *ἄνθρωπος* Bekker: *ἄνθρωπος* B T

And the end of speeches, then, seems to have been decided in common by them all; to it some give the name *recapitulation*, others another.[1]

PHAEDR. Do you mean reminding the hearers at the end, in summary, of each of the things said?

SOC. These are what I mean, and if you can say anything else about the craft of speeches.

PHAEDR. Small things, at any rate, and not worth saying.

SOC. Let us let the small things pass, then; but let us see these 268
more in the light: what power of the craft they have, and when.

PHAEDR. A very strong one, Socrates, in the meetings of the multitude at any rate.

SOC. So it has. But, you daimonic man, do you too see whether their warp appears to you too to stand apart, as it does to me.[2]

PHAEDR. Only show me.

SOC. Say, then: if someone went up to Eryximachus, your companion, or to Acumenus, his father, and said, "I know how to apply such things to bodies as to warm them, if I want, and cool them, b
and, if I decide, to make them vomit, and again, if I decide, to make them pass below, and a great many other things of the sort; and knowing these things I deem that I am a medical man, and that I make another one so, whoever I hand on the knowledge of these things to," on hearing it, what would they say, do you think?[3]

PHAEDR. What else, at any rate, than ask whether he knows besides to whom he must do each of these things, and when, and up to what point?

SOC. Then if he said, "Not at all; but I deem that whoever has c
learned these from me will himself be capable of what you ask"?[4]

PHAEDR. They would say, I think, that the person is mad, and that[5]

1. *Recapitulation*: *epanodos*, a "going back" over what has been said, as Phaedrus explains.

2. *In the light … warp*: cloth held up to the light shows where the threads of its warp (*ētrion*) stand apart.

3. Acumenus, the doctor of 227a, and his son Eryximachus, a doctor who speaks in the *Symposium*.

4. Burnet brackets *poiein*, "to do", before "what you ask", after Buttmann (c1).

5. *They would say*: Burnet's own correction (*scripsi*), *eipein*; B and T have *eipoi*, "he would say", Stephanus *eipoien* (c2).

βιβλίου ποθὲν ἀκούσας ἢ περιτυχὼν φαρμακίοις ἰατρὸς οἴεται γεγονέναι, οὐδὲν ἐπαΐων τῆς τέχνης.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ Σοφοκλεῖ αὖ προσελθὼν καὶ Εὐριπίδῃ τις λέγοι ὡς ἐπίσταται περὶ σμικροῦ πράγματος ῥήσεις παμμήκεις ποιεῖν καὶ περὶ μεγάλου πάνυ σμικράς, ὅταν τε βούληται οἰκτράς, καὶ τοὐναντίον αὖ φοβερὰς καὶ ἀπειλητικὰς ὅσα τ' ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ διδάσκων αὐτὰ τραγῳδίας ποίησιν οἴεται παραδιδόναι;

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ οὗτοι ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι καταγελῷεν εἴ τις οἴεται τραγῳδίαν ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὴν τούτων σύστασιν πρέπουσαν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ συνισταμένην.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἀγροίκως γε οἶμαι λοιδορήσειαν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν μουσικὸς ἐντυχὼν ἀνδρὶ οἰομένῳ ἁρμονικῷ εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ τυγχάνει ἐπιστάμενος ὡς οἷόν τε ὀξυτάτην καὶ βαρυτάτην χορδὴν ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἀγρίως εἴποι ἄν· "Ὦ μοχθηρέ, μελαγχολᾷς," ἀλλ' ἅτε μουσικὸς ὢν πρᾳότερον ὅτι "Ὦ ἄριστε, ἀνάγκη μὲν καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπίστασθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ἁρμονικὸν ἔσεσθαι, οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἁρμονίας ἐπαΐειν τὸν τὴν σὴν ἕξιν ἔχοντα· τὰ γὰρ πρὸ ἁρμονίας ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα ἐπίστασαι ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἁρμονικά."

ΦΑΙ. Ὀρθότατά γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς τόν σφισιν ἐπιδεικνύμενον τὰ πρὸ τραγῳδίας ἂν φαίη ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ τραγικά, καὶ ὁ Ἀκουμενὸς τὰ πρὸ ἰατρικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἰατρικά.

ΦΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τὸν μελίγηρυν Ἄδραστον οἰόμεθα ἢ καὶ Περικλέα, εἰ ἀκούσειαν ὧν νυνδὴ ἡμεῖς διῆμεν τῶν παγκάλων τεχνημάτων—βραχυλογιῶν τε καὶ εἰκονολογιῶν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα διελθόντες ὑπ' αὐγὰς ἔφαμεν εἶναι σκεπτέα—πότερον χαλεπῶς ἂν αὐτούς, ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ὑπ' ἀγροικίας

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c 8 *αὖ* W: *καὶ αὖ* B T *ὅσα τἆλλα* (sic) *τοιαῦτα καὶ* διδάσκων T: *καὶ ὅσα ταλλα* (sic) *τοιαῦτα* διδάσκων B **d** 5 *πρέπουσαν* T: *τρέπουσαν* B **d** 6 *γε* B: *τε* T **e** 1 *ἀγροίκως* Osann **e** 5 *πρὸ* t: *πρὸς* B T **a** 5 *οἰόμεθ' ⟨ἂν⟩* Hirschig **a** 8 *αὐγὰς* T: *αὐτὰς* B

having heard from a book somewhere, or having chanced on some little drugs, he thinks he has become a doctor, though he is not expert in the craft at all.

SOC. And what if someone went up, in turn, to Sophocles and Euripides and said that he knows how to make set speeches of immense length about a small matter, and quite small ones about a great matter, and, when he wants, piteous ones, and again the opposite, fearsome and threatening ones, and whatever other things d there are of the sort, and that by teaching these he thinks he is handing on the making of tragedy?

PHAEDR. These too, Socrates, would laugh at it, I think, if anyone thinks tragedy is anything other than the putting together of these things, put together so as to be becoming to one another and to the whole.[1]

SOC. But not boorishly, at any rate, would they revile him, I think; but as a musician, meeting a man who thinks he is a harmonist because, you see, he in fact knows how to make a string as high and e as low as possible, would not say savagely, "You wretch, you are mad with black bile," but, being a musician, more gently: "Best of men, it is a necessity that one who is going to be a harmonist know these things too; but nothing prevents one who has your condition from not being expert in harmony even a little; for you know the studies necessary before harmony, but not the things of harmony."[2]

PHAEDR. Most rightly, at any rate.

SOC. Then Sophocles too would say that the one who displays 269 himself to them knows the things before tragedy, but not the things of tragedy; and Acumenus, the things before medicine, but not the things of medicine.

PHAEDR. Altogether so.

SOC. And what do we think of the *honey-voiced Adrastus*, or of Pericles too, if they heard of the altogether beautiful artifices we went through just now—*brief-speeches* and *image-speeches*, and all the others we went through and said must be looked into in the light—whether they would harshly, as I and you did, out of boor- b ishness,[3]

1. As a speech must be (264c).

2. *Harmonist*: one who knows harmony, the ordering of notes into scales. *Mad with black bile*: *melancholan*, from the black bile thought to cause madness.

3. *Honey-voiced Adrastus*: the Argive king of the Theban legend, whose "soft-voiced tongue" (*meilichogērys*) Tyrtaeus names (fr. 12.8 West); Socrates' *meligērys*, "honey-voiced", is a poet's word; perhaps a living orator is meant (an interpretation). Pericles, the Athenian statesman and orator. *Image-speeches*: as 267c.

ῥῆμά τι εἰπεῖν ἀπαίδευτον εἰς τοὺς ταῦτα γεγραφότας τε καὶ διδάσκοντας ὡς ῥητορικὴν τέχνην, ἢ ἅτε ἡμῶν ὄντας σοφωτέρους κἂν νῷν ἐπιπλῆξαι εἰπόντας· "Ὦ Φαῖδρέ τε καὶ Σώκρατες, οὐ χρὴ χαλεπαίνειν ἀλλὰ συγγιγνώσκειν, εἴ τινες μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι διαλέγεσθαι ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο ὁρίσασθαι τί ποτ' ἔστιν ῥητορική, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τοῦ πάθους τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα ἔχοντες ῥητορικὴν ᾠήθησαν ηὑρηκέναι, καὶ ταῦτα δὴ διδάσκοντες ἄλλους ἡγοῦνταί σφισιν τελέως ῥητορικὴν δεδιδάχθαι, τὸ δὲ ἕκαστα τούτων πιθανῶς λέγειν τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον συνίστασθαι, οὐδὲν ἔργον ⟨ὄν⟩, αὐτοὺς δεῖν παρ' ἑαυτῶν τοὺς μαθητάς σφων πορίζεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις".

ΦΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, κινδυνεύει γε τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι τὸ τῆς τέχνης ἣν οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες ὡς ῥητορικὴν διδάσκουσίν τε καὶ γράφουσιν, καὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ εἰρηκέναι· ἀλλὰ δὴ τὴν τοῦ τῷ ὄντι ῥητορικοῦ τε καὶ πιθανοῦ τέχνην πῶς καὶ πόθεν ἄν τις δύναιτο πορίσασθαι;

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὥστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι, εἰκός—ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον—ἔχειν ὥσπερ τἆλλα· εἰ μέν σοι ὑπάρχει φύσει ῥητορικῷ εἶναι, ἔσῃ ῥήτωρ ἐλλόγιμος, προσλαβὼν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ μελέτην, ὅτου δ' ἂν ἐλλείπῃς τούτων, ταύτῃ ἀτελὴς ἔσῃ. ὅσον δὲ αὐτοῦ τέχνη, οὐχ ᾗ Λυσίας τε καὶ Θρασύμαχος πορεύεται δοκεῖ μοι φαίνεσθαι ἡ μέθοδος.

ΦΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ πῇ δή;

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰκότως ὁ Περικλῆς πάντων τελεώτατος εἰς τὴν ῥητορικὴν γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Πᾶσαι ὅσαι μεγάλαι τῶν τεχνῶν προσδέονται

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b 2 *ῥῆμά τι* T: *ῥήματι* B **b** 7 *ῥητορική* B: *ἡ ῥητορική* T **c** 3 *οὐδὲν ἔργον ὄν* Heindorf: *οὐδὲν ἔργον* B T: *ὡς οὐδὲν ἔργον ὄν* Hermias **c** 4 *σφων*] *ἐφῶν* B: *σφῶιν* T **c** 6 *γε* T: om. B **c** 8 *δοκεῖς* T: *δοκεῖ* B **d** 4 *ῥητορικῷ* T: *ῥητορικὸς* B **d** 5 *ὅτου* B T: *ὅπου* Aldina **d** 6 *ἐλλείπῃς* T Aristides: *ἐλλίπῃς* B *ἀτελὴς* T: *ἀτελὲς* B **d** 7 *Λυσίας*] *Gorgias* Ficinus: *Τισίας* Schaefer

say some unschooled expression against those who have written these things and teach them as the craft of rhetoric; or whether, being wiser than we, they would even rebuke the two of us, saying, "Phaedrus and Socrates, one must not be harsh, but pardon them, if some, not knowing how to converse, proved unable to define what rhetoric is, and from this experience, having the studies necessary before the craft, thought they had found rhetoric; and so, teaching c
these things to others, they believe that rhetoric has been perfectly taught by them, but that saying each of these things persuasively, and putting the whole together, being no work at all, their pupils must themselves procure by themselves in their speeches."[1]

PHAEDR. But indeed, Socrates, it looks, at any rate, as though the craft these men teach and write as rhetoric is something of that sort; and I at least think you have spoken the truth. But the craft of the d
one who is in reality a rhetorician and persuasive, how and from where could one procure it?

SOC. To be able, Phaedrus, to become a perfect competitor is likely—and perhaps necessary—to be as with everything else: if it belongs to you by nature to be a rhetorician, you will be an orator of note, once you add knowledge and practice; and whichever of these you fall short in, in that respect you will be imperfect. But as much of it as is craft, the method, I think, does not appear where Lysias and Thrasymachus journey.[2]

PHAEDR. But where, then?

SOC. It looks, best of men, as though Pericles, as is likely, became e
the most perfect of all in rhetoric.

PHAEDR. Why so?

SOC. All the crafts that are great have need besides

1. *Being*: added by Heindorf; Hermias has "as being" (c3). *Their pupils*: Burnet prints the enclitic *sphōn*, "their", without an accent (c4).

2. *Nature* ... *knowledge* ... *practice*: a triad of the teachers of the time; Protagoras is quoted as saying that teaching needs nature and practice (DK 80 B 3).

ἀδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας φύσεως πέρι· τὸ γὰρ ὑψηλόνουν τοῦτο καὶ πάντῃ τελεσιουργὸν ἔοικεν ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν εἰσιέναι. ὃ καὶ Περικλῆς πρὸς τῷ εὐφυὴς εἶναι ἐκτήσατο· προσπεσὼν γὰρ οἶμαι τοιούτῳ ὄντι Ἀναξαγόρᾳ, μετεωρολογίας ἐμπλησθεὶς καὶ ἐπὶ φύσιν νοῦ τε καὶ διανοίας ἀφικόμενος, ὧν δὴ πέρι τὸν πολὺν λόγον ἐποιεῖτο Ἀναξαγόρας, ἐντεῦθεν εἴλκυσεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην τὸ πρόσφορον αὐτῇ.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὁ αὐτός που τρόπος τέχνης ἰατρικῆς ὅσπερ καὶ ῥητορικῆς.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς δή;

ΣΩ. Ἐν ἀμφοτέραις δεῖ διελέσθαι φύσιν, σώματος μὲν ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, ψυχῆς δὲ ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, εἰ μέλλεις, μὴ τριβῇ μόνον καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ ἀλλὰ τέχνῃ, τῷ μὲν φάρμακα καὶ τροφὴν προσφέρων ὑγίειαν καὶ ῥώμην ἐμποιήσειν, τῇ δὲ λόγους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσεις νομίμους πειθὼ ἣν ἂν βούλῃ καὶ ἀρετὴν παραδώσειν.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ γοῦν εἰκός, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι οἴει δυνατὸν εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως;

ΦΑΙ. Εἰ μὲν Ἱπποκράτει γε τῷ τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν δεῖ τι πιθέσθαι, οὐδὲ περὶ σώματος ἄνευ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λέγει· χρὴ μέντοι πρὸς τῷ Ἱπποκράτει τὸν λόγον ἐξετάζοντα σκοπεῖν εἰ συμφωνεῖ.

ΦΑΙ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν περὶ φύσεως σκόπει τί ποτε λέγει Ἱπποκράτης τε καὶ ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος. ἆρ' οὐχ ὧδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι

a 2 καὶ B: καὶ τὸ T τελεσιουργὸν B Plutarchus: τελεσιουργικὸν T: τελεσίεργον Badham **a** 4 τοιούτῳ T: τῷ B **a** 5 διανοίας V Aristides: ἀνοίας B T: ἐννοίας al. **a** 6 ὧν T b: ὃν pr. B **b** 4 ἐν T: om. B **b** 7 τῇ δὲ T: τῷ δὲ B **c** 2 ὅλου T W: λόγου B **c** 3 γε Heindorf: τε B T: om. Galenus τῶν B T: om. pr. T **c** 4 πιθέσθαι T: πείθεσθαι B

of idle talk and lofty talk about nature; for this high-mindedness 270
and effectiveness in every way seems to come in from there somewhere. And this Pericles acquired besides being of a good nature; for, falling in, I think, with Anaxagoras, who was such a man, and having his fill of lofty talk, and arriving at the nature of intellect and of mind, about which, indeed, Anaxagoras made the greater part of his account, from there he drew into the craft of speeches what was serviceable to it.[1]

PHAEDR. How do you mean this?

SOC. The way of the craft of medicine is, I take it, the same as b
rhetoric's too.

PHAEDR. How so?

SOC. In both one must divide a nature: of the body in the one, of the soul in the other, if you are going, not by knack only and routine but by craft, applying drugs and nourishment to the one, to produce health and strength, and to the other speeches and lawful ways of life, to hand on whatever persuasion you want, and virtue.[2]

PHAEDR. So it is likely, Socrates, at any rate.

SOC. Do you think, then, that it is possible to apprehend the na- c
ture of the soul in a way worth speaking of without the nature of the whole?[3]

PHAEDR. If, at any rate, one must obey Hippocrates the Asclepiad at all, not even about the body without this method.[4]

SOC. Yes, my companion, for he speaks well; but one must, besides Hippocrates, examine the account and look into whether it is in consonance.

PHAEDR. I say so.

SOC. Then look into what Hippocrates and the true account say about nature. Must one not think it through in this way

1. *Idle talk and lofty talk*: the words of those who mocked such inquirers, Socrates among them (*Statesman* 299b; Aristophanes, *Clouds* 1480). Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, who taught that intellect orders all things (*Phaedo* 97b–c), was Pericles' teacher (*Alcibiades I* 118c; Plutarch, *Pericles* 4–6, 8.1). *Mind*: V and Aristides; B and T have "lack of intellect" (a5).

2. *Knack* ... *routine*: in the *Gorgias* rhetoric is a routine, not a craft (462c, 465a), part of the same pursuit as cookery, "not a craft but routine and knack" (463b); compare 260e here.

3. *The whole*: T and W; B has "the account" (c2). Whether the whole is the universe or the whole body and soul is disputed (an interpretation).

4. Hippocrates of Cos, the physician, of the Asclepiads, the guild that traced its descent from Asclepius (*Protagoras* 311b). Which Hippocratic writing, if any, is meant is disputed; Galen took it to be *On the Nature of Man* (Kühn XV 12).

περὶ ὁτουοῦν φύσεως· πρῶτον μέν, ἁπλοῦν ἢ πολυειδές d
ἐστιν οὗ πέρι βουλησόμεθα εἶναι αὐτοὶ τεχνικοὶ καὶ ἄλλον
δυνατοὶ ποιεῖν, ἔπειτα δέ, ἂν μὲν ἁπλοῦν ᾖ, σκοπεῖν τὴν
δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, τίνα πρὸς τί πέφυκεν εἰς τὸ δρᾶν ἔχον ἢ
τίνα εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ, ἐὰν δὲ πλείω εἴδη ἔχῃ, ταῦτα 5
ἀριθμησάμενον, ὅπερ ἐφ' ἑνός, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἐφ' ἑκάστου, τῷ τί
ποιεῖν αὐτὸ πέφυκεν ἢ τῷ τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ;

ΦΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἡ γοῦν ἄνευ τούτων μέθοδος ἐοίκοι ἂν ὥσπερ
τυφλοῦ πορείᾳ. ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν ἀπεικαστέον τόν γε τέχνῃ e
μετιόντα ὁτιοῦν τυφλῷ οὐδὲ κωφῷ, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς, ἄν
τῳ τις τέχνῃ λόγους διδῷ, τὴν οὐσίαν δείξει ἀκριβῶς τῆς
φύσεως τούτου πρὸς ὃ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει· ἔσται δέ που
ψυχὴ τοῦτο. 5

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἅμιλλα αὐτῷ τέταται πρὸς τοῦτο πᾶσα· 271
πειθὼ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ. ἦ γάρ;

ΦΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ὁ Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ ὃς ἂν ἄλλος
σπουδῇ τέχνην ῥητορικὴν διδῷ, πρῶτον πάσῃ ἀκριβείᾳ γράψει 5
τε καὶ ποιήσει ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν, πότερον ἓν καὶ ὅμοιον πέφυκεν
ἢ κατὰ σώματος μορφὴν πολυειδές· τοῦτο γάρ φαμεν φύσιν
εἶναι δεικνύναι.

ΦΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δέ γε, ὅτῳ τί ποιεῖν ἢ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ 10
πέφυκεν.

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τρίτον δὲ δὴ διαταξάμενος τὰ λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς b
γένη καὶ τὰ τούτων παθήματα δίεισι πάσας αἰτίας, προσαρ-
μόττων ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ καὶ διδάσκων οἷα οὖσα ὑφ' οἵων

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d 5 *του* T: *τοῦδε* B **d** 6 *ἀριθμησάμενον* Galenus: *ἀριθμησάμενος* B T: *ἀριθμησαμένους* Stephanus **d** 7 *αὐτὸ* recc.: *αὐτῷ* B T: *οὕτω* V **e** 1 *γε* B: om. T **e** 3 *τῳ* T: om. B **e** 4 *ὃ* T: om. B **a** 10 *τι* T: om. B **b** 2 *πάσας* T W: *τὰς* B

about the nature of anything whatever: first, whether that about d
which we shall want to be masters of the craft ourselves, and able
to make another so, is simple or of many forms; next, if it is simple,
look into its power: what power it naturally has for acting, and on
what, or what for undergoing, and from what; and if it has more
forms, count them up, and see for each what one sees for one: by
what it naturally does what, or by what it undergoes what from
what?

PHAEDR. It looks like it, Socrates.

SOC. A method without these, at any rate, would resemble, as
it were, the journey of a blind man. But indeed the one who goes e
in quest of anything whatever by craft, at any rate, must not be
likened to a blind man or a deaf one; but it is plain that, if any-
one gives speeches to someone by craft, he will show precisely the
substance of the nature of the thing to which he will apply his
speeches; and this, I take it, will be the soul.

PHAEDR. Of course.

SOC. Then his whole rivalry is directed to this; for it is in this that 271
he attempts to produce persuasion. Is that not so?

PHAEDR. Yes.

SOC. It is plain, then, that Thrasymachus, and whoever else gives
a craft of rhetoric in earnest, will first, with all precision, write and
make one see the soul: whether it is naturally one and alike, or of
many forms, after the shape of a body; for this, we say, is showing
a nature.

PHAEDR. Altogether so.

SOC. And second, at any rate, by what it naturally does what, or
undergoes what from what.

PHAEDR. Of course.

SOC. And third, having set in order the kinds of speeches and b
of soul, and the things these undergo, he will go through all the
causes, suiting each to each, and teaching what sort of soul, by
what sort of

λόγων δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ μὲν πείθεται, ἡ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ.

ΦΑΙ. Κάλλιστα γοῦν ἄν, ὡς ἔοικ', ἔχοι οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὕτοι μὲν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ἄλλως ἐνδεικνύμενον ἢ λεγόμενον τέχνῃ ποτὲ λεχθήσεται ἢ γραφήσεται οὔτε τι ἄλλο οὔτε τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οἱ νῦν γράφοντες, ὧν σὺ ἀκήκοας, c τέχνας λόγων πανοῦργοί εἰσιν καὶ ἀποκρύπτονται, εἰδότες ψυχῆς πέρι παγκάλως· πρὶν ἂν οὖν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον λέγωσί τε καὶ γράφωσι, μὴ πειθώμεθα αὐτοῖς τέχνῃ γράφειν.

ΦΑΙ. Τίνα τοῦτον;

ΣΩ. Αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ ῥήματα εἰπεῖν οὐκ εὐπετές· ὡς δὲ δεῖ γράφειν, εἰ μέλλει τεχνικῶς ἔχειν καθ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, λέγειν ἐθέλω.

ΦΑΙ. Λέγε δή.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὖσα, τὸν μέλλοντα ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ψυχὴ ὅσα d εἴδη ἔχει. ἔστιν οὖν τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα, ὅθεν οἱ μὲν τοιοίδε, οἱ δὲ τοιοίδε γίγνονται· τούτων δὲ δὴ οὕτω διῃρημένων, λόγων αὖ τόσα καὶ τόσα ἔστιν εἴδη, τοιόνδε ἕκαστον. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοίδε ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε λόγων διὰ τήνδε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐς τὰ τοιάδε εὐπειθεῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοίδε διὰ τάδε δυσπειθεῖς· δεῖ δὴ ταῦτα ἱκανῶς νοήσαντα, μετὰ ταῦτα θεώμενον αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ὄντα τε καὶ πραττόμενα, ὀξέως τῇ αἰσθήσει δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἢ μηδὲν e εἶναί πω πλέον αὐτῷ ὧν τότε ἤκουεν λόγων συνών. ὅταν δὲ εἰπεῖν τε ἱκανῶς ἔχῃ οἷος ὑφ' οἵων πείθεται, παραγιγνόμενόν τε δυνατὸς ᾖ διαισθανόμενος ἑαυτῷ ἐνδείκνυσθαι ὅτι οὗτός ἐστι καὶ αὕτη ἡ φύσις περὶ ἧς τότε ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι, 272

b 7 *οὕτοι*] *οὕτω* B: *οὗτοι* T **d 3** *τοιοίδε . . . τοιοίδε* T Galenus: *τοῖοι . . . τοιοίδε* B: *τοῖοι . . . τοῖοι* Hermann δὲ δὴ B: δὲ T Galenus **d 4** *οὕτω* T Galenus: om. B *αὖ τόσα* T: *αὐτὸς ᾶ* B *τοιόνδε* B T: *τοιόνδε* δὲ Galenus **d 5** *μὲν οὖν* T Galenus: *μὲν* B **d 6** *ἐς* B: *εἰς* T **d 8** *αὐτὰ* recc.: *αὐτὸν* B T: *αὐτὸ* Galeni cod. Marc. **e 1** *ἢ μηδὲν εἶναι* Galenus: *εἰ μὴ εἰδέναι* B: *ἢ μηδὲ εἰδέναι* T **e 2** *αὐτῷ* B T: *αὐτῶν* vulg. **e 4** *τε* T Galenus: δὲ B

speeches, through what cause, is of necessity persuaded, while another is unpersuaded.

PHAEDR. It would be best so, at any rate, it seems.

SOC. Never, then, you know, my friend, will anything that is pointed out or spoken otherwise be spoken or written by craft, neither anything else nor this. But those who now write crafts of c
speeches, whom you have heard, are knaves and conceal it, though they know about the soul altogether well; so, until they speak and write in this way, let us not be persuaded by them that they write by craft.[1]

PHAEDR. What is this way?

SOC. To say the expressions themselves is not easy; but how one must write, if it is to be masterly so far as is possible, I am willing to say.

PHAEDR. Say it, then.

SOC. Since the power of speech is in fact a leading of souls, it is d
a necessity that the one who is going to be a rhetorician know how many forms soul has. Now they are so many and so many, and of this kind and that, whence some people become of this kind and others of that. And these, then, having been divided in this way, of speeches in turn there are so many and so many forms, each of some kind. Now people of this kind are, by speeches of this kind, for this cause, easily persuaded to things of this kind, and people of that kind, for these reasons, hard to persuade. So one must, having apprehended these things sufficiently, then, beholding them in actions as they are and are done, be able to keep e
pace with them keenly with one's perception; or else one has as yet nothing more than the speeches one heard then, when one was with one's teacher. But when he can say sufficiently what sort of man is persuaded by what sort, and is able, perceiving the man who comes before him, to point out to himself that this is he, and 272
this the nature, about which the speeches then were,[2]

1. *Crafts of speeches*: the handbooks, called *technai*. *Never … you know*: Burnet's *outoi*; B has *houtō*, "so", T *houtoi*, "these" (b7).

2. *A leading of souls*: as at 261a. *Or else … nothing more*: Galen's reading; B has "unless he knows", T "or not even to know" (e1).

νῦν ἔργῳ παροῦσά οἱ, ᾗ προσοιστέον τούσδε ὧδε τοὺς λόγους ἐπὶ τὴν τῶνδε πειθώ, ταῦτα δ' ἤδη πάντα ἔχοντι, προσλαβόντι καιροὺς τοῦ πότε λεκτέον καὶ ἐπισχετέον, βραχυλογίας τε αὖ καὶ ἐλεινολογίας καὶ δεινώσεως ἑκάστων τε ὅσα ἂν εἴδη μάθῃ λόγων, τούτων τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τε καὶ ἀκαιρίαν διαγνόντι, καλῶς τε καὶ τελέως ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη ἀπειργασμένη, πρότερον δ' οὔ· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἂν αὐτῶν τις ἐλλείπῃ λέγων ἢ διδάσκων ἢ γράφων, φῇ δὲ τέχνῃ λέγειν, ὁ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ. "Τί δὴ οὖν; φήσει ἴσως ὁ συγγραφεύς, ὦ Φαῖδρέ τε καὶ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖ οὕτως; μὴ ἄλλως πως ἀποδεκτέον λεγομένης λόγων τέχνης;"

ΦΑΙ. Ἀδύνατόν που, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως· καίτοι οὐ σμικρόν γε φαίνεται ἔργον.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. τούτου τοι ἕνεκα χρὴ πάντας τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταστρέφοντα ἐπισκοπεῖν εἴ τίς πῃ ῥᾴων καὶ βραχυτέρα φαίνεται ἐπ' αὐτὴν ὁδός, ἵνα μὴ μάτην πολλὴν ἀπίῃ καὶ τραχεῖαν, ἐξὸν ὀλίγην τε καὶ λείαν. ἀλλ' εἴ τινά πῃ βοήθειαν ἔχεις ἐπακηκοὼς Λυσίου ἢ τινος ἄλλου, πειρῶ λέγειν ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος.

ΦΑΙ. Ἕνεκα μὲν πείρας ἔχοιμ' ἄν, ἀλλ' οὔτι νῦν γ' οὕτως ἔχω.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν ἐγώ τιν' εἶπω λόγον ὃν τῶν περὶ ταὐτά τινων ἀκήκοα;

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Λέγεται γοῦν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοῦ λύκου εἰπεῖν.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ σύ γε οὕτω ποίει.

ΣΩ. Φασὶ τοίνυν οὐδὲν οὕτω ταῦτα δεῖν σεμνύνειν οὐδ' ἀνάγειν ἄνω μακρὰν περιβαλλομένους· παντάπασι γάρ, ὃ

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a 2 οἱ D: σοι Galenus: om. B T **a** 3 ταῦτα δ' ἤδη πάντα B T: πάντα δὴ ταῦτ' Galenus **a** 6 ὅσα B Galenus: ὃς T τε καὶ ἀκαιρίαν T W Galenus: om. B **b** 2 φήσει T: φύσει B **b** 3 μὴ scripsi: ἢ B T **c** 2 ἀπίῃ B T: ἀνίῃ Stallbaum: περιΐῃ Badham: ἴῃ Schanz **c** 3 ἤ τινος T: εἴ τινος B **c** 5 ἔχοιμ' ἄν T: ἔχοιμαν B: λέγοιμ' ἄν Schanz **c** 7 λόγον T: λόγων pr. B **c** 8 τινων B T: δεινῶν corr. Ven. 184

now present to him in deed, to which these speeches must be applied in this way for persuasion to these things—by one who by now has all this, and has added to it the right moments for when to speak and when to hold back, and has discerned the timeliness and untimeliness of brief-speech, again, and of pity-speech and exaggeration, and of each of the forms of speeches he may learn, by him the craft has been well and perfectly worked out, and not before; but whatever of these anyone falls short in when speaking or b
teaching or writing, while claiming to speak by craft, the one who is not persuaded has the mastery. "What then?" the writer will say, perhaps; "Phaedrus and Socrates, is it decided so? Surely a craft of speeches stated in some other way is not to be accepted?"[1]

PHAEDR. Impossible, I take it, Socrates, otherwise; and yet it appears no small work.

SOC. You speak the truth. For this reason, you know, one must turn all the accounts up and down and look over whether some easier and shorter road to it appears anywhere, so as not to go off c
in vain on a long and rough one when one may take a short and smooth one. But if you have any help anywhere, from having heard Lysias or anyone else, try to say it, recollecting.

PHAEDR. As regards trying, I could; but just now, at any rate, I am not so placed.

SOC. Do you want me, then, to say over an account I have heard from some of those concerned with these things?

PHAEDR. Of course.

SOC. It is said, at any rate, Phaedrus, that it is just to speak the wolf's part too.[2]

PHAEDR. Then you too, at any rate, do so. d

SOC. Well, they say there is no need to dignify these things so, nor to take them up high, going a long way round; for altogether, as

1. *By one who by now has all this*: the sentence begun at 271e is left unfinished, and Socrates begins again. *Pity-speech*: the piteous speeches of Thrasymachus (267c). *Surely … not to be accepted?*: Burnet's own correction (*scripsi*), *mē*, which asks expecting the answer "no"; B and T have *ē*, "or" (b3).

2. *The wolf's part*: proverbial, of hearing even the wolf's side of a case.

καὶ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς εἴπομεν τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀληθείας μετέχειν δέοι δικαίων ἢ ἀγαθῶν πέρι πραγμάτων, ἢ καὶ ἀνθρώπων γε τοιούτων φύσει ὄντων ἢ τροφῇ, τὸν μέλλοντα ἱκανῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι. τὸ παράπαν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις τούτων ἀληθείας μέλειν οὐδενί, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πιθανοῦ· τοῦτο δ᾽ εἶναι τὸ εἰκός, ᾧ δεῖν προσέχειν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνῃ ἐρεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὰ ⟨τὰ⟩ πραχθέντα δεῖν λέγειν ἐνίοτε, ἐὰν μὴ εἰκότως ᾖ πεπραγμένα, ἀλλὰ τὰ εἰκότα, ἔν τε κατηγορίᾳ καὶ ἀπολογίᾳ, καὶ πάντως λέγοντα τὸ δὴ εἰκὸς διωκτέον εἶναι, πολλὰ εἰπόντα χαίρειν τῷ ἀληθεῖ· τοῦτο γὰρ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ λόγου γιγνόμενον τὴν ἅπασαν τέχνην πορίζειν.

ΦΑΙ. Αὐτά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, διελήλυθας ἃ λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τεχνικοὶ προσποιούμενοι εἶναι· ἀνεμνήσθην γὰρ ὅτι ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βραχέως τοῦ τοιούτου ἐφηψάμεθα, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦτο πάμμεγα εἶναι τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τόν γε Τεισίαν αὐτὸν πεπάτηκας ἀκριβῶς· εἰπέτω τοίνυν καὶ τόδε ἡμῖν ὁ Τεισίας, μή τι ἄλλο λέγει τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ τῷ πλήθει δοκοῦν.

ΦΑΙ. Τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δή, ὡς ἔοικε, σοφὸν εὑρὼν ἅμα καὶ τεχνικὸν ἔγραψεν ὡς ἐάν τις ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀνδρικὸς ἰσχυρὸν καὶ δειλὸν συγκόψας, ἱμάτιον ἤ τι ἄλλο ἀφελόμενος, εἰς δικαστήριον ἄγηται, δεῖ δὴ τἀληθὲς μηδέτερον λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν δειλὸν μὴ ὑπὸ μόνου φάναι τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ συγκεκόφθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἐλέγχειν ὡς μόνω ἦστην, ἐκείνῳ δὲ καταχρήσασθαι τῷ Πῶς δ᾽ ἂν ἐγὼ τοιόσδε τοιῷδε ἐπεχείρησα; ὁ δ᾽ οὐκ ἐρεῖ δὴ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κάκην, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο ψεύδεσθαι ἐπιχειρῶν τάχ᾽ ἂν ἔλεγχόν πῃ παραδοίη τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ. καὶ περὶ τἆλλα δὴ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα ἐστὶ τὰ τέχνῃ λεγόμενα. οὐ γάρ, ὦ Φαῖδρε;

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d 8 *μέλειν* Stephanus e Ficino: *μέλει* B T **e** 2 *αὐτὰ τὰ* Heindorf: *αυτὰ* B: *αὖ τὰ* T **a** 4 *ἐφηψάμεθα* T: *ἐψηφισάμεθα* B **a** 6 *τισίαν* T b: *τισιν* pr. B **a** 7 *λέγειν* Par. 1826: *λέγει* B T **b** 5 *ἤ τι* T (ex emend.): *εἴ τι* B

we said too at the beginning of this talk, the one who is going to be sufficiently a rhetorician need have no share at all in the truth about just or good matters, or indeed about people who are such by nature or by nurture. For in the law-courts, they say, the truth of these things matters to nobody at all in any way, but what is persuasive does; and this is the likely, to which the one who is going to speak e
by craft must pay attention. For one must sometimes not even say the very things that were done, if they were not done in a likely way, but the likelihoods, both in accusation and in defence; and in every way, when speaking, one must pursue the likely, indeed, bidding the truth a long farewell; for this, coming about through 273
the whole speech, procures the entire craft.[1]

PHAEDR. You have gone through the very things, Socrates, that those who pretend to be masters of the craft concerning speeches say; for I recollected that earlier we laid hold of this sort of thing briefly; but those concerned with these things think it a very great matter.

SOC. But indeed, you have trodden through Tisias himself precisely; so let Tisias say this too to us: whether he says that the likely b
is anything other than what the multitude thinks.[2]

PHAEDR. What else would it be?

SOC. This, then, having found it, as it seems, wise and at the same time masterly, he wrote: that if someone weak and manly beats up someone mighty and cowardly, and takes his cloak or something else, and is brought to court, then neither must say the truth; but the coward must say that he was not beaten up by the manly one alone, while the other must refute this on the ground that the two of them were alone, and make full use of that famous *How* c
could I, such as I am, have made an attempt on such a man?; and the coward will not, of course, speak of his own badness, but, attempting some other lie, would perhaps hand his opponent a refutation somewhere. And in the other cases too, then, the things spoken by craft are of some such sort. Is it not so, Phaedrus?[3]

1. *At the beginning*: 259e–260a. *The very things*: *auta ta*, Heindorf's reading; B has *auta* alone, T *au ta*, "again the things" (e2).

2. *Trodden through*: *pepatēkas*, as one wears a path by walking it; Phaedrus knows the book well (an interpretation). Tisias of Syracuse, an early writer of a handbook (267a).

3. Aristotle gives the same argument as the "craft of Corax", Tisias' teacher by tradition (*Rhetoric* 2.24, 1402a17–23).

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Φεῦ, δεινῶς γ' ἔοικεν ἀποκεκρυμμένην τέχνην ἀνευρεῖν ὁ Τεισίας ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δή ποτ' ὢν τυγχάνει καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος. ἀτάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τούτῳ ἡμεῖς πότερον λέγωμεν ἢ μὴ —

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι, ὦ Τεισία, πάλαι ἡμεῖς, πρὶν καὶ σὲ παρελθεῖν, τυγχάνομεν λέγοντες ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο τὸ εἰκὸς τοῖς πολλοῖς δι' ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τυγχάνει ἐγγιγνόμενον· τὰς δὲ ὁμοιότητας ἄρτι διήλθομεν ὅτι πανταχοῦ ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰδὼς κάλλιστα ἐπίσταται εὑρίσκειν. ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἄλλο τι περὶ τέχνης λόγων λέγεις, ἀκούοιμεν ἄν· εἰ δὲ μή, οἷς νυνδὴ διήλθομεν πεισόμεθα, ὡς ἐὰν μή τις τῶν τε ἀκουσομένων τὰς φύσεις διαριθμήσηται, καὶ κατ' εἴδη τε διαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα καὶ μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ δυνατὸς ᾖ καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον περιλαμβάνειν, οὔ ποτ' ἔσται τεχνικὸς λόγων πέρι καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ. ταῦτα δὲ οὐ μή ποτε κτήσηται ἄνευ πολλῆς πραγματείας· ἣν οὐχ ἕνεκα τοῦ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι τὸν σώφρονα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῖς κεχαρισμένα μὲν λέγειν δύνασθαι, κεχαρισμένως δὲ πράττειν τὸ πᾶν εἰς δύναμιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄρα, ὦ Τεισία, φασὶν οἱ σοφώτεροι ἡμῶν, ὁμοδούλοις δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι μελετᾶν τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα, ὅτι μὴ πάρεργον, ἀλλὰ δεσπόταις ἀγαθοῖς τε καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν. ὥστ' εἰ μακρὰ ἡ περίοδος, μὴ θαυμάσῃς· μεγάλων γὰρ ἕνεκα περιτέον, οὐχ ὡς σὺ δοκεῖς. ἔσται μήν, ὡς ὁ λόγος φησίν, ἐάν τις ἐθέλῃ, καὶ ταῦτα κάλλιστα ἐξ ἐκείνων γιγνόμενα.

ΦΑΙ. Παγκάλως ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ οἷός τέ τις εἴη.

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c 7 γ' T: τ' B **c** 9 *τούτῳ* B T: *τοῦτο* corr. Coisl.: fort. *τοῦτ' αὐτῷ* Thompson **d** 3 *τὸ* T: om. B **d** 7 *εἰ* δὲ T: *εἴδη* B **d** 8 *νῦν* δὴ T W: *νῦν* B **e** 9 *ἡμῶν* Heindorf: *ἡ* B: *ἡμῶν ἢ* T: *ἡμῶν μὴ* vulg. **a** 2 *ἡ* T: *ᾗ* B **a** 3 *οὐχ ὡς* B T: *οὐχ ὧν* ci. Heindorf **a** 7 *οἷός τε* Heindorf: *οἷος* B: *οἷός γε* T

PHAEDR. Of course.

SOC. Ah! Tisias seems to have found out a craft dreadfully well hidden indeed, or whoever else it in fact is, and from wherever he rejoices to be named. But, my companion, shall we say to him or not—[1]

PHAEDR. What sort of thing? d

SOC. That, Tisias, we have in fact been saying for a long time, before you even came forward, that this, the likely, in fact comes about in the many through similarity to the truth; and we went through just now that everywhere the one who knows the truth knows best how to find the similarities. So if you say anything else about a craft of speeches, we would listen; but if not, we shall be persuaded by what we went through just now: that unless someone counts through the natures of those who will hear, and is able e to divide the things that are by forms and to embrace each single one by one figure, he will never be a master of the craft concerning speeches, as far as is possible for a human being. And he will never acquire these things without much labour; and the temperate man must toil through this labour not for the sake of speaking and acting before human beings, but for the sake of being able to say what is gratifying to gods, and to act gratifyingly in everything, as far as he can. For, as those wiser than we say, Tisias, it is not, then, fellow slaves that the one who has sense must practise gratifying, except 274 as a side-work, but masters who are good and of the good. So if the circuit is long, do not marvel; for one must go round for the sake of great things, not as you think. Yet these things too, as the account says, if one is willing, will come about best from those.[2]

PHAEDR. Altogether well said, I think, Socrates, if only one were able.

1. *From wherever he rejoices to be named*: the formula of prayer to a god whose name is uncertain (Plato, *Cratylus* 400e, in the same words; Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 160–162); many readers hear a hint at Corax, "Crow", Tisias' teacher by tradition (an interpretation).

2. *The similarities*: 261e–262c; *the natures … one figure*: 265d–266b, 271a–272b. *Gratifying*: Lysias' word for the boy's favours (227c, 234b), turned here to the gods. *Those wiser than we*: perhaps those whose teaching the *Phaedo* gives, that human beings are among the possessions of the gods (62b–d; an interpretation). *The circuit*: the long way round that the advocates of likelihood refused (272d).

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντί τοι τοῖς καλοῖς καλὸν καὶ πάσχειν ὅτι ἄν τῳ συμβῇ παθεῖν. b

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν τέχνης τε καὶ ἀτεχνίας λόγων πέρι ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω.

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν; 5

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' εὐπρεπείας δὴ γραφῆς πέρι καὶ ἀπρεπείας, πῇ γιγνόμενον καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ὅπῃ ἀπρεπῶς, λοιπόν. ἦ γάρ;

ΦΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθ' οὖν ὅπῃ μάλιστα θεῷ χαριῇ λόγων πέρι πράττων ἢ λέγων; 10

ΦΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς· σὺ δέ;

ΣΩ. Ἀκοήν γ' ἔχω λέγειν τῶν προτέρων, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς c αὐτοὶ ἴσασιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο εὕροιμεν αὐτοί, ἆρά γ' ἂν ἔθ' ἡμῖν μέλοι τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δοξασμάτων;

ΦΑΙ. Γελοῖον ἤρου· ἀλλ' ἃ φῂς ἀκηκοέναι λέγε.

ΣΩ. Ἤκουσα τοίνυν περὶ Ναύκρατιν τῆς Αἰγύπτου γε- 5 νέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ παλαιῶν τινα θεῶν, οὗ καὶ τὸ ὄρνεον ἱερὸν ὃ δὴ καλοῦσιν Ἶβιν· αὐτῷ δὲ ὄνομα τῷ δαίμονι εἶναι Θεύθ. τοῦτον δὴ πρῶτον ἀριθμόν τε καὶ λογισμὸν εὑρεῖν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ἔτι δὲ πεττείας τε καὶ κυβείας, d καὶ δὴ καὶ γράμματα. βασιλέως δ' αὖ τότε ὄντος Αἰγύπτου ὅλης Θαμοῦ περὶ τὴν μεγάλην πόλιν τοῦ ἄνω τόπου ἣν οἱ Ἕλληνες Αἰγυπτίας Θήβας καλοῦσι, καὶ τὸν θεὸν Ἄμμωνα, παρὰ τοῦτον ἐλθὼν ὁ Θεὺθ τὰς τέχνας ἐπέδειξεν, καὶ ἔφη 5 δεῖν διαδοθῆναι τοῖς ἄλλοις Αἰγυπτίοις· ὁ δὲ ἤρετο ἥντινα ἑκάστη ἔχοι ὠφελίαν, διεξιόντος δέ, ὅτι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς δοκοῖ λέγειν, τὸ μὲν ἔψεγεν, τὸ δ' ἐπῄνει. πολλὰ e

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b 1 *ὅτι* T: *ὅτῳ* B **b** 6 *δὴ . . . ἀπρεπείας* om. Stobaeus **b** 9 *θεῷ* Stobaeus: *θεῶν* B T **c** 3 *μέλοι* B: *μέλλοι* T **c** 6 *ἱερόν* Stobaeus Hermias: *τὸ ἱερόν* B T **c** 7 *δὴ* Stobaeus: *δὲ* B T **d** 3 *ἣν* V: *ὃν* B T Stobaeus **d** 4 *θεὸν*] *Θαμοῦν* Postgate **d** 5 *τοῦτον* T: *τούτων* B *ἐπέδειξεν* T: *ἐπέδειξε* Stobaeus: *ἀπέδειξε* B **d** 6 *ἥντινα* B T: *ἣν δὴ* Stobaeus **d** 7 *ἔχοι* B T: *ἔχει* Stobaeus **e** 1 *δοκοῖ* B T: *δοκοίη* Stobaeus

SOC. But for one who attempts beautiful things, you know, it is beautiful also to undergo whatever it befalls him to undergo. b

PHAEDR. Quite so.

SOC. Then let the matter of craft and craftlessness concerning speeches be sufficiently dealt with.

PHAEDR. Of course.

SOC. But the matter, now, of the becomingness and unbecomingness of writing, in what way it would be well done and in what way unbecomingly, remains. Is that not so?[1]

PHAEDR. Yes.

SOC. Do you know, then, how you will most gratify a god concerning speeches, in acting or in speaking?[2]

PHAEDR. Not at all; do you?

SOC. I can say, at any rate, something heard from those before c us; but the truth they themselves know. But if we were to find this ourselves, would any of the opinions of human beings still matter to us?

PHAEDR. You asked a laughable thing; but say what you say you have heard.

SOC. Well, I heard that round Naucratis in Egypt there was one of the old gods there, to whom the bird too is sacred which they indeed call the Ibis; and the daimon's own name is Theuth. He, then, first found number and calculation and geometry and astron- d omy, and further draughts and dice, and indeed letters too. And Thamus being then king of all Egypt, round the great city of the upper country, which the Greeks call Egyptian Thebes, and the god Ammon, Theuth came to him and displayed his crafts, and said they must be distributed to the other Egyptians; and the other asked what benefit each had, and as Theuth went through them, whatever he seemed to say well or not well, he censured this and e praised that. Many[3]

1. The question set at 258d: what is the way of writing well and not well.

2. *A god*: Stobaeus' reading; B and T have the plural (b9).

3. Naucratis, the Greek trading town in the western Delta of the Nile (Herodotus 2.178–179). Theuth is the Egyptian Thoth, the god of writing and reckoning, to whom the ibis was sacred; the tale itself is known only from Plato. *Thamus*: the king; *Ammon*: the Greeks' name for the Egyptian Amun, whom they took for Zeus (Herodotus 2.42); Socrates seems to make the king himself the god, and Postgate wrote "Thamus" for "the god" (d4).

μὲν δὴ περὶ ἑκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα Θαμοῦν τῷ Θεὺθ λέγεται ἀποφήνασθαι, ἃ λόγος πολὺς ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς γράμμασιν ἦν, "Τοῦτο δέ, ὦ βασιλεῦ, τὸ μάθημα," ἔφη ὁ Θεύθ, "σοφωτέρους Αἰγυπτίους καὶ μνημονικωτέρους παρέξει· μνήμης τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον ηὑρέθη." ὁ δ᾽ εἶπεν· "Ὦ τεχνικώτατε Θεύθ, ἄλλος μὲν τεκεῖν δυνατὸς τὰ τέχνης, ἄλλος δὲ κρῖναι τίν᾽ ἔχει μοῖραν βλάβης τε καὶ ὠφελίας τοῖς μέλλουσι χρῆσθαι· καὶ νῦν σύ, πατὴρ ὢν γραμμάτων, δι᾽ εὔνοιαν τοὐναντίον εἶπες ἢ δύναται. τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν μαθόντων λήθην μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει μνήμης ἀμελετησίᾳ, ἅτε διὰ πίστιν γραφῆς ἔξωθεν ὑπ᾽ ἀλλοτρίων τύπων, οὐκ ἔνδοθεν αὐτοὺς ὑφ᾽ αὑτῶν ἀναμιμνῃσκομένους· οὔκουν μνήμης ἀλλὰ ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον ηὗρες. σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν, οὐκ ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις· πολυήκοοι γάρ σοι γενόμενοι ἄνευ διδαχῆς πολυγνώμονες εἶναι δόξουσιν, ἀγνώμονες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες, καὶ χαλεποὶ συνεῖναι, δοξόσοφοι γεγονότες ἀντὶ σοφῶν."

ΦΑΙ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥᾳδίως σὺ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ ὁποδαποὺς ἂν ἐθέλῃς λόγους ποιεῖς.

ΣΩ. Οἱ δέ γ᾽, ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Δωδωναίου ἱερῷ δρυὸς λόγους ἔφησαν μαντικοὺς πρώτους γενέσθαι. τοῖς μὲν οὖν τότε, ἅτε οὐκ οὖσι σοφοῖς ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς οἱ νέοι, ἀπέχρη δρυὸς καὶ πέτρας ἀκούειν ὑπ᾽ εὐηθείας, εἰ μόνον ἀληθῆ λέγοιεν· σοὶ δ᾽ ἴσως διαφέρει τίς ὁ λέγων καὶ ποδαπός. οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖς, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει;

ΦΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς ἐπέπληξας, καί μοι δοκεῖ περὶ γραμμάτων ἔχειν ᾗπερ ὁ Θηβαῖος λέγει.

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e 3 ἃ λόγος . . . διελθεῖν B W Stobaeus: om. T **e** 6 παρέξει Stobaeus: παρέξοι B: παρέξειν T **e** 8 τέχνης T Stobaeus: τῆς τέχνης B **a** 2 μὲν om. Schanz **a** 4 ἔνδοθεν T Stobaeus: ἔνδον B αὐτοῖς . . . ἀναμιμνῃσκομένοις H. Richards **a** 6 εὗρες T: εὗρε B **b** 1 τὸ B T: om. Stobaeus **b** 3 καὶ B: τε καὶ T **b** 5 οἱ δέ γ᾽ ὦ T: οἶδ᾽ ἐγὼ B: οὐδέ γ᾽ ὦ V: σοὶ δ᾽ ἐγὼ Stobaeus **b** 6 ἔφησαν B Stobaeus: ἔφασαν T **b** 8 δρυὸς T b: διὸς pr. B **c** 1 δ᾽ ἴσως T W Stobaeus: om. B

things, then, concerning each craft, on both sides, Thamus is said to have pronounced to Theuth, which it would be a long account to go through; but when it came to letters, "But this study, King," said Theuth, "will render the Egyptians wiser and better at remembering; for a drug of memory and of wisdom has been found." And the other said: "Most masterly Theuth, one man is able to give birth to the things of craft, another to judge what portion of harm and of benefit they have for those who are going to use them; and now you, being father of letters, have through goodwill said the opposite of what they can do. For this will provide forgetfulness in the souls of those who have learned it, through want of practice of memory, since through trust in writing they recollect from outside, by marks that are other people's, not from within, themselves by themselves. So it is not a drug of memory but of reminding that you have found. And of wisdom you procure for the pupils the seeming, not the truth; for, having become through you hearers of much without teaching, they will seem to be men of much judgement, b
though for the most part they are without judgement, and difficult to be with, having become wise in seeming instead of wise."[1]

PHAEDR. Socrates, you easily make speeches Egyptian and from whatever country you are willing.

SOC. But those, at any rate, in the sanctuary of Zeus of Dodona, my friend, said that the first prophetic speeches came from an oak. Now for the people of that time, since they were not wise like you young people, it was enough, in their simple-mindedness, to hear an oak and a rock, if only they spoke true; but for you, perhaps, c
there is a difference in who is speaking and from what country. For you do not look into that alone, whether it is so or otherwise?[2]

PHAEDR. You rebuked me rightly; and I think it is with letters as the Theban says.[3]

1. *Drug*: *pharmakon*, remedy or poison, the word for the book that drew Socrates out of town (230d). *Give birth*: *tekein*, a play of sound on *technē*, "craft". *Recollect*: the palinode's word for recollection (249c). *Wise in seeming*: *doxosophoi*, from *doxa*, "seeming".

2. At the oracle of Zeus at Dodona in Epirus the god's will was heard from a sacred oak (*Odyssey* 14.327–328, Herodotus 2.55). *An oak and a rock*: a proverbial Homeric pair, used of a man's origins (*Odyssey* 19.163) and of idle chatter (*Iliad* 22.126–127). *But those*: T's reading; B has "I know" (b5).

3. *The Theban*: Thamus, the king at Egyptian Thebes (274d).

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνην οἰόμενος ἐν γράμμασι καταλιπεῖν, καὶ αὖ ὁ παραδεχόμενος ὡς τι σαφὲς καὶ βέβαιον ἐκ γραμμάτων ἐσόμενον, πολλῆς ἂν εὐηθείας γέμοι καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὴν Ἄμμωνος μαντείαν ἀγνοοῖ, πλέον τι οἰόμενος εἶναι λόγους γεγραμμένους τοῦ τὸν εἰδότα ὑπομνῆσαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ᾖ τὰ γεγραμμένα.

ΦΑΙ. Ὀρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τοῦτ' ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅμοιον ζωγραφίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἕστηκε μὲν ὡς ζῶντα, ἐὰν δ' ἀνέρῃ τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾷ. ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι· δόξαις μὲν ἂν ὥς τι φρονοῦντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, ἐὰν δέ τι ἔρῃ τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἕν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταὐτὸν ἀεί. ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ γραφῇ, κυλινδεῖται μὲν πανταχοῦ πᾶς λόγος ὁμοίως παρὰ τοῖς ἐπαΐουσιν, ὡς δ' αὕτως παρ' οἷς οὐδὲν προσήκει, καὶ οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγειν οἷς δεῖ γε καὶ μή. πλημμελούμενος δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ λοιδορηθεὶς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ· αὐτὸς γὰρ οὔτ' ἀμύνασθαι οὔτε βοηθῆσαι δυνατὸς αὑτῷ.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ ταῦτά σοι ὀρθότατα εἴρηται.

ΣΩ. Τί δ'; ἄλλον ὁρῶμεν λόγον τούτου ἀδελφὸν γνήσιον, τῷ τρόπῳ τε γίγνεται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἀμείνων καὶ δυνατώτερος τούτου φύεται;

ΦΑΙ. Τίνα τοῦτον καὶ πῶς λέγεις γιγνόμενον;

ΣΩ. Ὃς μετ' ἐπιστήμης γράφεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ μανθάνοντος ψυχῇ, δυνατὸς μὲν ἀμῦναι ἑαυτῷ, ἐπιστήμων δὲ λέγειν τε καὶ σιγᾶν πρὸς οὓς δεῖ.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον λέγεις ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυχον, οὗ ὁ γεγραμμένος εἴδωλον ἄν τι λέγοιτο δικαίως.

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c 5 *καταλιπεῖν* B T: *καταλείπειν* Stobaeus **c** 7 *ἂν* T Stobaeus: om. B **c** 8 *εἶναι*] *ἔχειν* Heindorf: *ποιεῖν* Stallbaum **d** 1 *τοῦ τὸν* B T: *καὶ τοῦτον* Stobaeus: *ἢ τὸ τὸν* fuisse susp. Wachsmuth **d** 4 *γραφή* b: *γραφήν* pr. B T **d** 6 *δ' ἀνέρῃ* T: *δ' ἂν ἐρῃ* B: *δὲ ἔρῃ* Stobaeus **e** 1 *κυλινδεῖται* B T: *καλινδεῖται* V **e** 3 *γε*] *τε* Hirschig *πλημμελούμενος* T: *πλημμενος* B **a** 1 *ὁρῶμεν* B T: *ἐροῦμεν* V *γνήσιον* corr. Coisl.: *γνήσιος* B T

SOC. Then the one who thinks he has left behind a craft in letters, and again the one who receives it as though something clear and firm will come of letters, would be full of much simple-mindedness, and would in reality be ignorant of Ammon's prophecy, thinking that written speeches are something more than d
reminding the one who knows about whatever the written things concern.[1]

PHAEDR. Most rightly.

SOC. For writing, I take it, Phaedrus, has this dreadful property, and is in truth like painting. For the offspring of painting too stand there as though alive, but if you ask them something, they keep silent, with great dignity. And speeches too are the same: you would think they spoke as though they were in some way intelligent, but if you ask something about what they say, wanting to learn, they signify one single thing, always the same. And once it e
is written, every speech rolls about everywhere, likewise among those who are expert and in the same way among those to whom it is in no way fitting, and it does not know to whom it ought to speak and to whom not. And when it is ill-treated and reviled unjustly, it always needs its father as its helper; for by itself it is able neither to defend itself nor to help itself.[2]

PHAEDR. This too you have said most rightly.

SOC. What? Shall we see another speech, this one's legitimate 276
brother, both the way it comes about and by how much better and more able than this one it grows up?[3]

PHAEDR. Which is this, and how do you say it comes about?

SOC. The one that is written with knowledge in the soul of the learner, able to defend itself, and knowledgeable in speaking and keeping silent before those it should.

PHAEDR. You mean the speech of the one who knows, living and ensouled, of which the written one would justly be spoken of as a kind of image.

1. *Ammon's prophecy*: the king's verdict, if the king is the god (274d; an interpretation).

2. *Painting*: *zōgraphia*, literally the drawing of living things, from the same root as *graphē*, "writing". *Ill-treated*: *plēmmeloumenos*, from a verb meaning first to strike a false note; compare "more in tune" (278d).

3. *Legitimate*: *gnēsios*, of a child born in wedlock.

ΣΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. τόδε δή μοι εἰπέ· ὁ νοῦν b
ἔχων γεωργός, ὧν σπερμάτων κήδοιτο καὶ ἔγκαρπα βούλοιτο
γενέσθαι, πότερα σπουδῇ ἂν θέρους εἰς Ἀδώνιδος κήπους
ἀρῶν χαίροι θεωρῶν καλοὺς ἐν ἡμέραισιν ὀκτὼ γιγνομένους,
ἢ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ ἑορτῆς χάριν δρῴη ἄν, ὅτε 5
καὶ ποιοῖ· ἐφ' οἷς δὲ ἐσπούδακεν, τῇ γεωργικῇ χρώμενος ἂν
τέχνῃ, σπείρας εἰς τὸ προσῆκον, ἀγαπῴη ἂν ἐν ὀγδόῳ μηνὶ
ὅσα ἔσπειρεν τέλος λαβόντα;

ΦΑΙ. Οὕτω που, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν σπουδῇ, τὰ δὲ ὡς c
ἑτέρως ἂν ᾖ λέγεις ποιοῖ.

ΣΩ. Τὸν δὲ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμας
ἔχοντα τοῦ γεωργοῦ φῶμεν ἧττον νοῦν ἔχειν εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ
σπέρματα; 5

ΦΑΙ. Ἥκιστά γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα σπουδῇ αὐτὰ ἐν ὕδατι γράψει μέλανι
σπείρων διὰ καλάμου μετὰ λόγων ἀδυνάτων μὲν αὐτοῖς
λόγῳ βοηθεῖν, ἀδυνάτων δὲ ἱκανῶς τἀληθῆ διδάξαι.

ΦΑΙ. Οὔκουν δὴ τό γ' εἰκός. 10

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ· ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἐν γράμμασι κήπους, ὡς d
ἔοικε, παιδιᾶς χάριν σπερεῖ τε καὶ γράψει, ὅταν [δὲ] γράφῃ,
ἑαυτῷ τε ὑπομνήματα θησαυριζόμενος, εἰς τὸ λήθης γῆρας
ἐὰν ἵκηται, καὶ παντὶ τῷ ταὐτὸν ἴχνος μετιόντι, ἡσθή-
σεταί τε αὐτοὺς θεωρῶν φυομένους ἁπαλούς· ὅταν ⟨δὲ⟩ 5
ἄλλοι παιδιαῖς ἄλλαις χρῶνται, συμποσίοις τε ἅρδοντες αὐ-
τοὺς ἑτέροις τε ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, τότ' ἐκεῖνος, ὡς ἔοικεν,
ἀντὶ τούτων οἷς λέγω παίζων διάξει.

ΦΑΙ. Παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην παιδιάν, ὦ Σώ- e

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b 1 *νοῦν* T: *νυν* B **b** 2 *ὧν* T: *ω* B: *ἂν* V **b** 4 *ἀρῶν* B T: *ὁρῶν* V: *σπείρας* Herwerden **b** 6 *χρώμενος ἂν τέχνῃ* T: *ἂν χρώμενος τέχνῃ ἂν* B **c** 7 *γράψει ⟨ἐν⟩* Badham **c** 8 *μετὰ*] *σπέρματα* Badham *ἀδυνάτων* (bis) B: *ἀδυνατῶν* (bis) T (et sic Heindorf omissis *μετὰ λόγων*) **c** 9 *ταληθῆ* B: *τ' ἀληθὲς* T **d** 2 δὲ om. Bekker: *τε* Heindorf: *γε* Schanz **d** 5 δὲ add. Par. 1811: *τε* Stephanus: om. B T **d** 8 *οἷς λέγω γρ.* Par. 1812: *οἷς λέγων* B T: *ἐν οἷς λέγω* Heindorf: *οὗ λέγω* Schanz *διάξει* T: *διέξει* B

SOC. Altogether so. Now say this to me: the farmer who has b
sense, with the seeds he cared for and wanted to bear fruit, would he in earnest plough them into gardens of Adonis in summer and rejoice, contemplating them as they became beautiful in eight days; or would he do these things for the sake of play and of a festival, when he does them at all; but with those he is in earnest about, using the farming craft, would he sow them in what is fitting and cherish what he sowed when it reached its end in the eighth month?[1]

PHAEDR. So, I take it, Socrates: some he would do in earnest, and c
the others otherwise, as you say.

SOC. And the one who has kinds of knowledge of just and beautiful and good things, shall we say he has less sense than the farmer as regards his own seeds?

PHAEDR. Least of all, at any rate.

SOC. Then he will not in earnest write them in water, black water, sowing them through a reed pen with speeches that are unable to help themselves by speech, and unable to teach what is true sufficiently.[2]

PHAEDR. It is not likely, at any rate.

SOC. No; but the gardens in letters, it seems, he will sow and d
write for the sake of play, when he writes, storing up reminders for himself, against the *old age of forgetfulness*, if he *reaches* it, and for everyone who goes in quest of the same track; and he will be pleased, contemplating them as they grow tender; and when others use other sorts of play, watering themselves with drinking parties and with other things that are brothers of these, then he, it seems, instead of these, will pass his life playing with the things I speak of.[3]

PHAEDR. An altogether beautiful play you speak of, beside a pal- e
try one, Socrates:

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1. *Gardens of Adonis*: pots of seeds sown for the summer festival of Adonis, which sprang up and withered quickly (Theophrastus, *Enquiry into Plants* 6.7.3; Aristophanes, *Lysistrata* 389–398).

2. *In water, black water*: writing in water was proverbial for labour in vain (*Suda* ϵ 3238; Sophocles fr. 811 Radt); the water here is ink, *melan*, "the black". *Unable ... unable*: B's reading, of the speeches; T's makes the writer unable, and Heindorf, so reading, leaves out "with speeches" (c8).

3. *Old age ... reaches*: spaced by Burnet as a quotation, of unknown source. *When he writes*: Burnet brackets a *de* after "when", with Bekker (d2); *and when others*: the *de* is from a Paris manuscript (Par. 1811); B and T lack it (d5). *Watering*: the word for the wing and soul watered by beauty (251b–c). *The things I speak of*: a variant in Par. 1812; B and T have *legōn*, "saying" (d8).

κρατες, τοῦ ἐν λόγοις δυναμένου παίζειν, δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄλλων ὧν λέγεις πέρι μυθολογοῦντα.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι γάρ, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, οὕτω· πολὺ δ' οἶμαι καλλίων σπουδὴ περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος, λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν, φυτεύῃ τε καὶ σπείρῃ μετ' ἐπιστήμης λόγους, οἳ ἑαυτοῖς τῷ τε φυτεύσαντι βοηθεῖν ἱκανοὶ καὶ οὐχὶ ἄκαρποι ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες σπέρμα, ὅθεν ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἤθεσι φυόμενοι τοῦτ' ἀεὶ ἀθάνατον παρέχειν ἱκανοί, καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦντες εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατὸν μάλιστα.

ΦΑΙ. Πολὺ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔτι κάλλιον λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δὴ ἐκεῖνα ἤδη, ὦ Φαῖδρε, δυνάμεθα κρίνειν, τούτων ὡμολογημένων.

ΦΑΙ. Τὰ ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Ὧν δὴ πέρι βουληθέντες ἰδεῖν ἀφικόμεθα εἰς τόδε, ὅπως τὸ Λυσίου τε ὄνειδος ἐξετάσαιμεν τῆς τῶν λόγων γραφῆς πέρι, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους οἳ τέχνῃ καὶ ἄνευ τέχνης γράφοιντο. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔντεχνον καὶ μὴ δοκεῖ μοι δεδηλῶσθαι μετρίως.

ΦΑΙ. Ἔδοξέ γε δή· πάλιν δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με πῶς.

ΣΩ. Πρὶν ἄν τις τό τε ἀληθὲς ἑκάστων εἰδῇ πέρι ὧν λέγει ἢ γράφει, κατ' αὐτό τε πᾶν ὁρίζεσθαι δυνατὸς γένηται, ὁρισάμενός τε πάλιν κατ' εἴδη μέχρι τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνειν ἐπιστηθῇ, περί τε ψυχῆς φύσεως διιδὼν κατὰ ταὐτά, τὸ προσαρμόττον ἑκάστῃ φύσει εἶδος ἀνευρίσκων, οὕτω τιθῇ καὶ διακοσμῇ τὸν λόγον, ποικίλῃ μὲν ποικίλους ψυχῇ καὶ παναρμονίους διδοὺς λόγους, ἁπλοῦς δὲ ἁπλῇ, οὐ πρότερον δυνατὸν τέχνῃ ἔσεσθαι καθ' ὅσον πέφυκε μεταχειρισθῆναι τὸ λόγων γένος, οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ διδάξαι οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ πεῖσαι, ὡς ὁ ἔμπροσθεν πᾶς μεμήνυκεν ἡμῖν λόγος.

ΦΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε οὕτω πως ἐφάνη.

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a 1 καὶ B: τε καὶ T **a** 3 καὶ om. Schanz **b** 5 εἰδῇ corr. D: ἰδῇ (sic) T: ιδη B **b** 6 τε B T: γε vulg. **b** 7 κατ' εἴδη T: κατίδη B

the play of the one who is able to play in speeches, telling legends about justice and the other things you speak of.[1]

SOC. So it is, my friend Phaedrus; but a far more beautiful earnestness about them comes about, I think, when someone, using the dialectical craft, takes a fitting soul and plants and sows in it, with knowledge, speeches which are capable of helping themselves and the one who planted them, and are not fruitless but have seed, from which others, growing in other characters, are capable of rendering this immortal for ever, and make the one who has it happy, as far as is most possible for a human being.[2] 277

PHAEDR. Yes, this you speak of is far more beautiful still.

SOC. Now at last, Phaedrus, these things being agreed, we are able to judge those.

PHAEDR. What sort of things?

SOC. Those about which, wanting to see them, we arrived at this point: how we might examine the reproach against Lysias concerning the writing of speeches, and the speeches themselves, which would be written by craft and which without craft. Now what is with craft and what is not, I think, has been made plain moderately. b

PHAEDR. So I thought, at any rate; but remind me again how.

SOC. Until someone knows the truth of each of the things he speaks or writes about, and becomes able to define everything by itself, and, having defined it, knows how to cut it again by forms down to the uncuttable; and, seeing through the nature of soul alike, finding out the form that suits each nature, so sets out and orders his speech, giving a subtle soul subtle and all-harmonious speeches, and simple ones to a simple soul—not before then will it be possible for the kind that speeches are to be handled by craft, as far as it is naturally able to be, either for teaching anything or for persuading anything, as the whole earlier account has disclosed to us.[3] c

PHAEDR. Altogether so; this, at any rate, appeared somehow so.

1. *Telling legends*: Phaedrus' words fit Socrates' own palinode; some readers hear the *Republic*'s conversation about justice (an interpretation).

2. *The dialectical craft*: the craft of those who can divide and collect, whom Socrates calls dialecticians (266b–c).

3. The method of 265d–266b and 270b–272b, recapitulated. *Knows*: *eidēi*, a correction in D; B and T have forms of *idēi*, "sees" (b5).

ΣΩ. Τί δ' αὖ περὶ τοῦ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ λόγους d
λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν, καὶ ὅπῃ γιγνόμενον ἐν δίκῃ λέγοιτ'
ἂν ὄνειδος ἢ μή, ἆρα οὐ δεδήλωκεν τὰ λεχθέντα ὀλίγον
ἔμπροσθεν—

ΦΑΙ. Τὰ ποῖα; 5

ΣΩ. Ὡς εἴτε Λυσίας ἤ τις ἄλλος πώποτε ἔγραψεν ἢ
γράψει ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ νόμους τιθείς, σύγγραμμα πολιτικὸν
γράφων καὶ μεγάλην τινὰ ἐν αὐτῷ βεβαιότητα ἡγούμενος
καὶ σαφήνειαν, οὕτω μὲν ὄνειδος τῷ γράφοντι, εἴτε τίς
φησιν εἴτε μή· τὸ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν ὕπαρ τε καὶ ὄναρ δικαίων 10
καὶ ἀδίκων πέρι καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐκφεύγει τῇ e
ἀληθείᾳ μὴ οὐκ ἐπονείδιστον εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἂν ὁ πᾶς ὄχλος
αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ.

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γε ἐν μὲν τῷ γεγραμμένῳ λόγῳ περὶ ἑκάστου 5
παιδιάν τε ἡγούμενος πολλὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ οὐδένα
πώποτε λόγον ἐν μέτρῳ οὐδ' ἄνευ μέτρου μεγάλης ἄξιον
σπουδῆς γραφῆναι, οὐδὲ λεχθῆναι ὡς οἱ ῥαψῳδούμενοι ἄνευ
ἀνακρίσεως καὶ διδαχῆς πειθοῦς ἕνεκα ἐλέχθησαν, ἀλλὰ τῷ
ὄντι αὐτῶν τοὺς βελτίστους εἰδότων ὑπόμνησιν γεγονέναι, 278
ἐν δὲ τοῖς διδασκομένοις καὶ μαθήσεως χάριν λεγομένοις καὶ
τῷ ὄντι γραφομένοις ἐν ψυχῇ περὶ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν
καὶ ἀγαθῶν [ἐν] μόνοις ἡγούμενος τό τε ἐναργὲς εἶναι καὶ
τέλεον καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς· δεῖν δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους 5
αὑτοῦ λέγεσθαι οἷον υἱεῖς γνησίους εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν
ἐν αὑτῷ, ἐὰν εὑρεθεὶς ἐνῇ, ἔπειτα εἴ τινες τούτου ἔκγονοί
τε καὶ ἀδελφοὶ ἅμα ἐν ἄλλαισιν ἄλλων ψυχαῖς κατ' ἀξίαν b
ἐνέφυσαν· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους χαίρειν ἐῶν—οὗτος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος

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d 1 *τοῦ* T: *τὸ* B **d** 2 *λέγοιτ' ἂν* T: *λέγει τὰν* B **d** 3 *ἤ* corr. Par. 1812: *εἰ* B T **d** 7 *γράψει* B: *γράφει* T *νόμους τιθείς* secl. Schleiermacher **d** 10 *δικαίων καὶ* B: *δικαίων τε καὶ* T **e** 8 *οὐδὲ . . .* **e** 9 *ἐλέχθησαν* secl. Schanz: *ὡς οἱ . . . ἐλέχθησαν* secl. Ast *ὡς οἱ*] *ὅσοι* Schleiermacher **a** 1 *αὐτῶν* T: *αὐτῷ* B **a** 4 *ἐν* secl. ci. Heindorf *ἡγούμενος* T W: om. B **a** 7 *ἐν αυτῷ* B: *ἑαυτῷ* T

SOC. And what, again, about whether speaking and writing d
speeches is beautiful or shameful, and in what way, when it is done, it would justly be spoken of as a reproach or not—have not the things said a little earlier made plain—

PHAEDR. What sort of things?

SOC. That whether Lysias or some other ever wrote or will write, privately or publicly, laying down laws, writing a political written work and believing there is a certain great firmness and clearness in it, then it is a reproach to the one who writes, whether someone says it or not; for to be ignorant, waking or dreaming, about just e
and unjust things and bad and good does not truly escape being a matter of reproach, not even if the whole crowd praises it.[1]

PHAEDR. No indeed.

SOC. But the one who believes that in a written speech about each thing much play is necessary, and that no speech in metre or without metre was ever written worthy of great earnestness, nor spoken either, as those recited by rhapsodes were spoken, without questioning and teaching, for the sake of persuasion; but that the 278
best of them have in reality been a reminding for those who know; and who believes that only in the things that are taught and spoken for the sake of learning, and in reality written in the soul, about just and beautiful and good things, is there what is clear and perfect and worthy of earnestness; and that such speeches must be spoken of as his own, being like legitimate sons: first the one in himself, if it is found and is in him, then any that are offspring of it and brothers b
at the same time and have grown up, according to their worth, in other souls of other men; and who lets the others pass, bidding them farewell—this one, of this sort,[2]

1. *A political written work*: the decrees and laws of 257e–258c.

2. *Rhapsodes*: professional reciters of Homer, as in the *Ion*. *Questioning*: *anakrisis*, also the word for a magistrate's preliminary examination of the parties to a suit. *Only in*: Burnet brackets a repeated "in" before "only", after Heindorf (a4).

ἀνὴρ κινδυνεύει, ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἶναι οἷον ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ εὐξαίμεθ' ἂν σέ τε καὶ ἐμὲ γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε βούλομαί τε καὶ εὔχομαι ἃ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἤδη πεπαίσθω μετρίως ἡμῖν τὰ περὶ λόγων· καὶ σύ τε ἐλθὼν φράζε Λυσίᾳ ὅτι νὼ καταβάντε ἐς τὸ Νυμφῶν νᾶμά τε καὶ μουσεῖον ἠκούσαμεν λόγων, οἳ ἐπέστελλον λέγειν Λυσίᾳ τε καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος συντίθησι λόγους, καὶ Ὁμήρῳ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος αὖ ποίησιν ψιλὴν ἢ ἐν ᾠδῇ συντέθηκε, τρίτον δὲ Σόλωνι καὶ ὅστις ἐν πολιτικοῖς λόγοις νόμους ὀνομάζων συγγράμματα ἔγραψεν· εἰ μὲν εἰδὼς ἦ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχει συνέθηκε ταῦτα, καὶ ἔχων βοηθεῖν, εἰς ἔλεγχον ἰὼν περὶ ὧν ἔγραψε, καὶ λέγων αὐτὸς δυνατὸς τὰ γεγραμμένα φαῦλα ἀποδεῖξαι, οὔ τι τῶνδε ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχοντα δεῖ λέγεσθαι τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἐφ' οἷς ἐσπούδακεν ἐκείνων.

ΦΑΙ. Τίνας οὖν τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῷ νέμεις;

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν σοφόν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καλεῖν ἔμοιγε μέγα εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ θεῷ μόνῳ πρέπειν· τὸ δὲ ἢ φιλόσοφον ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι μᾶλλόν τε ἂν αὐτῷ καὶ ἁρμόττοι καὶ ἐμμελεστέρως ἔχοι.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὖ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα τιμιώτερα ὧν συνέθηκεν ἢ ἔγραψεν ἄνω κάτω στρέφων ἐν χρόνῳ, πρὸς ἄλληλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν, ἐν δίκῃ που ποιητὴν ἢ λόγων συγγραφέα ἢ νομογράφον προσερεῖς;

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν τῷ ἑταίρῳ φράζε.

ΦΑΙ. Τί δὲ σύ; πῶς ποιήσεις; οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸν σὸν ἑταῖρον δεῖ παρελθεῖν.

ΣΩ. Τίνα τοῦτον;

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b 8 ἐς T: εἰς B τὸ T: τὸν B **b** 9 μουσεῖον T: μουσιον B: μουσῶν vulg. ἐπέστελλον B: ἐπελλον T **d** 1 ἐφ' B: ὑφ' T **d** 5 τοιοῦτόν τι B: τι τοιοῦτον T αὐτῷ καὶ T: αὐτῷ B **d** 8 αὖ τὸν t: αὐτὸν B T **e** 1 ἐν δίκῃ T: δίκῃ B που B: om. T **e** 4 ἑταίρῳ T: ἑτέρῳ B

is a man, it looks like, Phaedrus, such as I and you would pray that you and I might become.

PHAEDR. Altogether so; I for my part both want and pray for what you say.

SOC. Then let the matter of speeches now have been played by us moderately. And you, go and declare to Lysias that we two, going down to the stream and Muse-shrine of the Nymphs, heard speeches which charged us to say to Lysias and anyone else who c composes speeches, and to Homer and anyone else who in turn has composed poetry, bare or in song, and third to Solon and to anyone who wrote written works in political speeches, naming them laws: if he composed these knowing how the truth stands, and with the means to help them when he goes into refutation about what he wrote, and, speaking himself, able to demonstrate the written things to be paltry, such a man must not be spoken of as hav- d ing a title from any of these, but from those things he is in earnest about.[1]

PHAEDR. What titles, then, do you assign him?

SOC. To call him wise, Phaedrus, is, I think, a great thing, and becoming to a god alone; but either lover of wisdom or some such thing would both be more in harmony with him and be more in tune.[2]

PHAEDR. And nothing out of the way, at any rate.

SOC. Then again the one who has nothing more precious than the things he composed or wrote, turning them up and down over time, gluing them to one another and taking away, you will justly, e I take it, address as poet or writer of speeches or law-writer?

PHAEDR. Of course.

SOC. Declare these things, then, to your companion.

PHAEDR. And what of you? What will you do? For neither must your own companion be passed by.

SOC. Who is this?

1. *The stream and Muse-shrine of the Nymphs*: the spring under the plane tree, sacred to the Nymphs and Achelous (230b–c); *Muse-shrine*: *mouseion*, as Polus' "Muse-shrines of speeches" (267b). *Poetry, bare or in song*: verse spoken or sung to music. Solon, the lawgiver of Athens and a poet (258c).

2. As in the *Symposium* (204a), no god loves wisdom, being wise; Diogenes Laertius (1.12) tells that Pythagoras first called himself a lover of wisdom, since no one is wise but a god.

ΦΑΙ. Ἰσοκράτη τὸν καλόν· ᾧ τί ἀπαγγελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες; τίνα αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Νέος ἔτι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, Ἰσοκράτης· ὃ μέντοι μαντεύομαι κατ' αὐτοῦ, λέγειν ἐθέλω. 279

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δή;

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ μοι ἀμείνων ἢ κατὰ τοὺς περὶ Λυσίαν εἶναι λόγους τὰ τῆς φύσεως, ἔτι τε ἤθει γεννικωτέρῳ κεκρᾶσθαι· ὥστε οὐδὲν ἂν γένοιτο θαυμαστὸν προϊούσης τῆς ἡλικίας εἰ περὶ αὐτούς τε τοὺς λόγους, οἷς νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖ, πλέον ἢ παίδων διενέγκοι τῶν πώποτε ἁψαμένων λόγων, ἔτι τε εἰ αὐτῷ μὴ ἀποχρήσαι ταῦτα, ἐπὶ μείζω δέ τις αὐτὸν ἄγοι ὁρμὴ θειοτέρα· φύσει γάρ, ὦ φίλε, ἔνεστί τις φιλοσοφία τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοίᾳ. ταῦτα δὴ οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν παρὰ τῶνδε b τῶν θεῶν ὡς ἐμοῖς παιδικοῖς Ἰσοκράτει ἐξαγγέλλω, σὺ δ' ἐκεῖνα ὡς σοῖς Λυσίᾳ.

ΦΑΙ. Ταῦτ' ἔσται· ἀλλὰ ἴωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ πνῖγος ἠπιώτερον γέγονεν. 5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εὐξαμένῳ πρέπει τοῖσδε πορεύεσθαι;

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ὦ φίλε Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοί, δοίητέ μοι καλῷ γενέσθαι τἄνδοθεν· ἔξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναί μοι φίλια. πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν· τὸ δὲ c χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν δύναιτο ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώφρων.

Ἔτ' ἄλλου του δεόμεθα, ὦ Φαῖδρε; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ μετρίως ηὖκται. 5

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ ταῦτα συνεύχου· κοινὰ γὰρ τὰ τῶν φίλων.

ΣΩ. Ἴωμεν.

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a 4 τε B: δὲ T **a** 5 τῆς ἡλικίας T: ἰσηλικίας B **a** 6 τοὺς T: om. B **a** 7 ἔτι τε T: εἴτε B **a** 8 ἐπιμείζων δέ τις αυτῷ B: ἐπὶ μείζων δέ τις αὐτον T **a** 9 ὁρμῇ θειοτέρᾳ B **b** 2 ἐξαγγελῶ Stallbaum **b** 6 εὐξαμένω Bekker **c** 1 φιλία B: φίλα T

PHAEDR. Isocrates the beautiful. What will you report to him, Socrates? What shall we say he is?

SOC. Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus; but what I divine about 279
him I am willing to say.

PHAEDR. What sort of thing, then?

SOC. I think that he is better, in the things of his nature, than to be measured against the speeches of Lysias' circle, and further that he is blended with a nobler character; so that nothing marvellous would come about, as his age advances, if in the very speeches he now attempts he should surpass those who ever took up speeches by more than he would surpass boys; and further, if these should not suffice him, and a more divine impulse should lead him to greater things; for by nature, my friend, there is a certain philosophy in the man's mind. These things, then, from these gods here, I b
report to Isocrates, as to my darling, and you report those to Lysias, as to yours.[1]

PHAEDR. So it shall be; but let us go, since the stifling heat too has become gentler.

SOC. Then is it not becoming to be on one's way after praying to these here?[2]

PHAEDR. Of course.

SOC. My friend Pan, and all you other gods of this place, grant me to become beautiful within; and that whatever I have outside be a friend to the things within. And may I hold the wise man rich; c
and may I have such a quantity of gold as no one but the temperate man could either carry or lead off.[3]

Do we need anything else still, Phaedrus? For my part, I have prayed moderately.

PHAEDR. Pray for these things for me too, together with yourself; for the things of friends are common.[4]

SOC. Let us go.

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1. Isocrates of Athens (436–338 BC), later a famous teacher of rhetoric whose school rivalled Plato's Academy; whether the praise is meant straight or ironically is disputed (an interpretation). *As to yours*: Lysias, whom Socrates called Phaedrus' darling (236b).

2. *Be on one's way*: the verb of Phaedrus' first answer (227a) and of Socrates' account of Phaedrus' walk (228b).

3. Pan, the god of herdsmen and wild places, whom Socrates named with the Nymphs as more masterly in speeches than Lysias (263d). *Carry or lead off*: *pherein* and *agein*, a pair that usually means to plunder; here, as LSJ takes this place, simply to bear and carry.

4. A proverb Plato quotes elsewhere (*Lysis* 207c, *Republic* 424a, *Laws* 739c); Timaeus the historian ascribed it to Pythagoras (Diogenes Laertius 8.10).

OUTLINE

The divisions follow the dialogue's own joints: the speeches, the interludes between them, and the stages of the inquiry that follows. Socrates' second speech is divided along the stages of the growing of the wings, as in the Introduction. References are to Stephanus pages and sections, which stand in the margins of both pages of the text.

I. The meeting and the walk (227a–230e)

227a–c "My friend Phaedrus, ... where are you going, and where have you come from?" From Lysias, who has written "a speech on love": "one should gratify the one who is not in love rather than the one who is".

227c–228e Socrates will follow him to Megara to hear it. "Phaedrus, if I am ignorant of Phaedrus, I have forgotten myself as well": Socrates is sure Phaedrus has the speech by heart, and Phaedrus denies it; but the book is "in your left hand under your cloak".

229a–230a Along the Ilissus to the plane tree. Boreas and Oreithyia: Socrates has "no leisure at all" for setting myths straight, since he is "not yet able, according to the Delphic inscription, to know myself": "whether I am in fact some beast more intricately coiled and more fuming than Typhon, or a tamer and simpler animal".

230b–e The plane tree, the spring, the Nymphs and Achelous, the cicadas: "the best of guides to a stranger". "The country places and the trees are not willing to teach me anything, but the people in the town are"; Phaedrus has found "the drug to get me out".

II. Lysias' speech (230e–234c)

230e–232a "Of my circumstances you know": those in love "regret the good they have done, when they cease from their desire"; they "agree that they are sick rather than temperate".

232a–233a Those in love boast, are jealous, cut the boy off from others, and love the body before they know his ways.

233a–234c "If you obey me ... not overcome by love but mastering myself"; one should gratify "not those in great need but those most able to return the favour". "if you still yearn for anything, ... ask".

III. Socrates on the speech, and the challenge (234c–237a)

234c–235b "Daimonically, rather, my companion": Socrates attended only to its rhetoric; Lysias "said the same things twice and three times".

235b–236b Socrates' breast is full, "from other people's streams, from somewhere ... like a jar"; Phaedrus promises golden statues at Delphi.

236b–237a "You have come into the like holds": Phaedrus quotes Socrates back at him and swears by the plane tree; "Ah! You scoundrel".

IV. Socrates' first speech (237a–241d)

237a–b With his head covered, Socrates calls on the Muses. A wily lover "had persuaded the boy that he was not in love".

237b–238c "One must know what the deliberation is about": two figures rule in us, "desire for pleasures" and "acquired, opinion, aiming at the best"; temperance and insolence; the desire that "without reason has mastered opinion" towards beauty "has been called love".

238c–d The aside: "I have undergone a divine experience"; "taken by the nymphs"; "no longer far from dithyrambs".

238d–241d The harms to the boy's mind, body and property; the lover's unpleasantness and his faithlessness when "sense and temperance" replace "love and madness": "as wolves cherish lambs, so lovers love a boy".

V. The interlude: the offence (241d–243e)

241d–242a Socrates is "already uttering epic verses" and will cross the river; Phaedrus: "not until the heat has passed".

242b–d "The daimonic and the sign that customarily comes to me came": "I am, then, a seer"; the soul "is something prophetic".

242d–243b The speech was "Simple-minded, and somewhat impious": Love is "a god or something divine". Stesichorus and his Palinode: "Not true is this account".

243b–e "With my head bare"; a speech "of fresh water to rinse

away ... the brine of our hearing". "Where, then, is my boy"?

VI. The palinode: madness and the soul (243e–246a)

243e–244a "Not true is the account" that one should gratify the one not in love because he is temperate: "the greatest of goods come to us through madness—given, however, by divine gift".

244a–245a Three madnesses from the gods: prophecy (*manikē* and *mantikē*), rites, and poetry, for "whoever comes to the poetic doors without the madness of the Muses ... is himself imperfect".

245b–c Love's madness "is given by the gods for the greatest good fortune"; the demonstration "will be incredible to the formidable, but credible to the wise".

245c–246a "All soul is immortal": what moves itself is a beginning, ungenerated and indestructible.

VII. The winged soul and its fall (246a–248c)

246a–d "What it resembles": "the grown-together power of a winged team and charioteer"; "Difficult, then, and troublesome, of necessity, is the charioteering in our case"; how an animal came to be called mortal and immortal.

246d–247c "The power of the wing is naturally such as to lead what is heavy upward"; Zeus "driving a winged chariot", the eleven companies of gods, and the souls that "stand upon the back of heaven".

247c–e "The place beyond heaven": "the colourless and shapeless and intangible substance that really is, beheld only by intellect, the soul's pilot"; justice itself, temperance, knowledge.

248a–c The other souls, "lamed" and with "wings broken", "use nourishment of opinion"; the soul "loses its wings and falls to the earth".

VIII. The law of the lives (248c–249b)

248c–e The ordinance of Adrasteia: the soul "that has seen most" becomes "a lover of wisdom or a lover of the beautiful or someone musical and given to love"; the nine lives, down to the tyrant's.

248e–249b Ten thousand years, "except the soul of one who has loved wisdom without guile, or been a pederast together with philosophy"; judgement, and the choice of lives.

IX. Recollection and the fourth madness (249b–251a)

249b–d "A human being must understand what is said according to a form"; "this is recollection"; "only the mind of the lover of wisdom grows wings".

249d–250a The fourth madness: "seeing the beauty here and recollecting the true, grows wings"; "the one in love with beautiful ones is called a lover". Few remember.

250a–e The rite "most blessed"; "beauty alone has got this portion, to be most manifest and most lovely".

250e–251a The one "not newly perfected" "attempts to mount after the law of a quadruped".

X. The first sight, and the growth (251a–252c)

251a The freshly perfected one "first shudders" and "reveres it as a god".

251b–252b "Receiving the outflow of beauty through his eyes he is warmed, by which the nature of the wing is watered"; the itching, "longing", presence and absence; "the only doctor of its greatest toils".

252b–c "This experience, beautiful boy ... human beings name love"; the verses of the Homeridae and *Pterōs*.

XI. Following one's god (252c–253c)

252c–253c The followers of Zeus, of Ares, of Hera, of Apollo: those of Zeus seek a beloved "a lover of wisdom and fit to lead" and "make him as like as possible to their own god"; those of Hera seek "one who is kingly"; none uses "jealousy or servile ill will towards the darling". "The one taken is caught in this way."

XII. The charioteer and the two horses (253c–255a)

253c–e The good horse, "a lover of honour with temperance and modesty"; the other, "a companion of insolence and boastfulness".

254a–c The dark horse drags them to the darling; "his memory was carried to the nature of beauty, and saw it again, standing with temperance on a hallowed pedestal".

254c–255a The struggle repeated until "the base one leaves off his insolence, humbled": "then at last the lover's soul follows the darling in modesty and fear".

XIII. The beloved, and the outcomes (255a–257b)

255a–e The beloved admits the lover; "the stream of beauty, going back to the beautiful one through his eyes"; "He is in love, then, but with what, he is at a loss"; the mirror; "counter-love, an image of love", which he calls "not love but friendship".

255e–256e The pair who live in philosophy, "winged and light"; the honour-loving pair, "wingless, but having started to grow wings".

256e–257b The one not in love: "nine thousand years". The prayer to Love: "This palinode, my friend Love, as beautiful and as good as was in our power"; turn Lysias "towards philosophy".

XIV. Writing, and the cicadas (257b–259d)

257b–258b Phaedrus fears Lysias will stop writing; "Sweet bend": the politicians love to write, and the decree begins with its praisers.

258b–e "This much, then, is plain to everyone, that writing speeches is not in itself shameful"; "What, then, is the way of writing well and not well?"

259a–d The cicadas, who were once human beings, report to the Muses; "we must say something, and not sleep at midday".

XV. Rhetoric and truth (259e–262c)

259e–260d "There is no necessity for one who is going to be an orator to learn what is in reality just"; the ass praised as a horse; the craft's reply.

260d–261a "A genuine craft of speaking ... without laying hold of truth, there neither is nor shall ever come to be hereafter"; the arguments are called.

261a–262c Rhetoric is "a kind of leading of souls through speeches"; the Eleatic Palamedes; deception "among those that differ little"; the craft of one who does not know the truth is "laughable, it seems, and craftless".

XVI. The speeches as examples (262c–266c)

262c–264e Lysias' opening read again: it has no definition; he swims "backwards, on his back"; every speech "must be put together like an animal"; the epitaph of Midas.

264e–266b The two speeches: two forms of madness, four gods; "a sort of mythic hymn"; collection and division, "at the joints, as

it is by nature".

266b–c "Of these, Phaedrus, I am myself a lover, of the divisions and collections"; the "dialecticians".

XVII. The handbooks (266c–269c)

266c–267d The handbooks' parts of a speech and their authors: the *preamble*, Theodorus the "speech-Daedalus", Evenus, Tisias and Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, Polus, Licymnius, Protagoras, and "the might of the Chalcedonian".

268a–269c The would-be doctor, tragedian and harmonist: they know "the things before" the craft; Adrastus and Pericles would pardon the handbook writers.

XVIII. The true craft (269c–272b)

269c–270a Nature, knowledge and practice; Pericles and Anaxagoras, "idle talk and lofty talk about nature".

270b–d "The way of the craft of medicine is, I take it, the same as rhetoric's too"; Hippocrates and "the nature of the whole"; simple or "of many forms".

270d–272b The rhetorician must "write and make one see the soul", divide the kinds of soul and of speeches, and know "the right moments".

XIX. The wolf's part: the likely (272b–274b)

272b–273a "It is said, at any rate, Phaedrus, that it is just to speak the wolf's part too": the likely, "bidding the truth a long farewell".

273a–c Tisias' weak and manly man and mighty coward: "*How could I, such as I am, have made an attempt on such a man?*"

273c–274b "Ah! Tisias seems to have found out a craft dreadfully well hidden indeed": the likely comes about "through similarity to the truth"; the long circuit; gratifying "masters who are good and of the good".

XX. Theuth and Thamus; the written speech (274b–276a)

274b–275b "The becomingness and unbecomingness of writing": Theuth's letters, "a drug of memory and of wisdom"; the king: "not a drug of memory but of reminding".

275b–c "Egyptian" speeches; the oak of Dodona.

275c–e Writing "is in truth like painting": its offspring "keep silent, with great dignity"; the written speech "always needs its father as its helper".
276a Its "legitimate brother", "written with knowledge in the soul of the learner"; the written one "a kind of image".

XXI. The gardens of Adonis and the dialectical craft (276b–277a)

276b–d The farmer with sense and the gardens of Adonis; writing "in water, black water"; the gardens in letters sown "for the sake of play".
276e–277a "The dialectical craft": speeches sown in "a fitting soul", "not fruitless but have seed".

XXII. The summary, and the reproach of writing (277a–278b)

277a–c "Until someone knows the truth of each of the things he speaks or writes about": the method summed up.
277d–278b The reproach of writing; the speeches that are "like legitimate sons".

XXIII. The message, Isocrates, the prayer (278b–279c)

278b–e The message to Lysias, Homer and Solon; "To call him wise, Phaedrus, is, I think, a great thing, and becoming to a god alone; but either lover of wisdom or some such thing".
278e–279b Isocrates: "there is a certain philosophy in the man's mind".
279b–c "My friend Pan, and all you other gods of this place, grant me to become beautiful within"; Phaedrus: "for the things of friends are common". "Let us go."

The palinode's account of the winged soul and of love has been read, from late antiquity to the present, as a doctrine of the soul's descent and return, and its readers have made of it more than the text says. This essay names some of them, each with the work and place where the reading is found. What is Plato's is stated first, so that the readings can be measured against it.

What the text says

Socrates offers the winged team as a likeness: what sort of thing the soul is would need "a narration in every way and altogether divine, and long", and he tells only "what it resembles" (246a). The power of the wing is "naturally such as to lead what is heavy upward" (246d); it is nourished by the beautiful, the wise and the good (246e), lost through "forgetfulness and vice" (248c), and regrown through love, beginning at the sight of beauty, which alone of the Forms is grasped here "glittering most clearly" (250d, 251a–b). The soul that grows its wings soonest is that of "one who has loved wisdom without guile, or been a pederast together with philosophy" (249a). The text does not say what the wings are apart from this power, nor whether the procession of the gods, the ten thousand years and the nine lives are to be taken literally; afterwards Socrates calls the whole "a sort of mythic hymn", perhaps "laying hold of something true, and perhaps too being carried off elsewhere" (265b–c). Everything beyond this in what follows is the interpreters'.

Plotinus

Plotinus (third century AD) read the fall of the soul in the *Phaedrus* together with Plato's other accounts of how souls come into bodies. At the opening of his treatise *On the Descent of the Soul into Bodies* (*Enneads* IV.8.1) he gathers what Plato says, and notes that in the *Phaedrus* Plato makes the loss of the wings the cause of the soul's coming here; the treatise then sets this beside the *Timaeus*, where souls are sent by the god, and argues that the two accounts agree. In *On Beauty* (I.6.4) the soul's response to beauty is described in

the palinode's terms, as wonder, shock, longing and love, such as lovers feel. In *Enneads* VI.7.22 the movement of the palinode is turned towards the Good itself: the soul that receives an outflow from the Good is stirred, is seized with a Bacchic frenzy and goaded, and becomes love; it grows its wings, as the lover's soul does when it receives the outflow of beauty (251b–d). The transfer of the lover's experience from a beautiful person to a Good beyond beauty is Plotinus' own.

Hermias and the Athenian school

The only ancient commentary on the *Phaedrus* to survive is the *Scholia on the Phaedrus* of Hermias of Alexandria (fifth century AD), who studied at Athens with Proclus under Syrianus; how much of it records Syrianus' lectures and how much is Hermias' own is disputed. In its preface Hermias reports earlier views of what the dialogue is about, love, or rhetoric, or the soul, and takes its single aim to be beauty at every level, from the beauty of bodies and of speeches, through that of souls and of the gods, to the source of beauty itself. On the wings he holds that the human soul never loses them entirely: commenting on the "winged" team (246a) and on "all of it was winged long ago" (251b), he takes the wings of human souls to be lowered rather than shed, so that the power of rising is always present, though not always at work, while in the gods it is always active. The commentary is edited by P. Couvreur (Paris, 1901) and by C. M. Lucarini and C. Moreschini (Berlin, 2012), and translated by D. Baltzly and M. Share (London, 2018–2025). Proclus, Hermias' fellow pupil, used the myth's places, the "place beyond heaven", the "back of heaven" and the "vault beneath heaven" (247b–c), to set out the orders of the gods in the fourth book of his *Platonic Theology*.

Christian readers

The "place beyond heaven" (247c) entered the quarrel between pagan and Christian philosophers. The pagan Celsus charged that some Christians, misunderstanding Plato's words, boasted of a God above heaven; Origen, answering him in the third century, quoted the passage himself and set it beside the "heavens of heavens" of the Psalms (148:4; *Against Celsus* 6.19).

Ficino

Marsilio Ficino, who translated the whole of Plato into Latin (printed at Florence in 1484), wrote a commentary on the *Phaedrus* and a set of chapter summaries, edited and translated by M. J. B. Allen (*Marsilio Ficino and the Phaedran Charioteer*, 1981; *Commentaries on Plato*, vol. I, 2008). In his commentary on the *Symposium*, *De amore*, he arranged the four divine madnesses of the palinode in an ascending order, from poetry through the mysteries and prophecy to love, by which the soul is raised step by step to the One (*De amore* 7.14), and through him the doctrine of the "divine frenzy" became a commonplace of Renaissance thought about poetry and love. The ascending order is Ficino's: the palinode names the madnesses in the order prophecy, rites, poetry and love (244a–245c, 249d), as Socrates' later summary does (265b), and ranks love only as "the best" (249e).

Modern readings

Modern readers have argued chiefly over two questions the palinode raises. The first is whether it revises what Plato said of love elsewhere. Martha Nussbaum (*The Fragility of Goodness*, 1986, chapter 7) read it as Plato's own palinode, in which madness, passion and the love of one particular person, held suspect in the *Symposium* and the *Republic*, are given a place in the good life. The second is how the two halves of the dialogue belong together; G. R. F. Ferrari (*Listening to the Cicadas*, 1987) read the setting, the cicadas and the dramatic play of the conversation as part of its argument about speaking and writing, and Jacques Derrida ("La pharmacie de Platon", 1968; in English "Plato's Pharmacy") took the "drug" of writing (274e–275a) as the key to the whole. These are interpretations; the text decides none of them.

The Greek text. The Greek is John Burnet's, from the second volume of his Oxford Classical Text of Plato (1901; second edition, 1910), which holds the third and fourth of Thrasyllus' tetralogies; the *Phaedrus* stands fourth in the third, after the *Parmenides*, the *Philebus* and the *Symposium*. The copy reproduced is the one used for the *Symposium* of this series: an undated later impression of the second edition, printed at Oxford by John Johnson as Printer to the University and published by Humphrey Milford, and issued no earlier than January 1935, the date of a list of the Oxford Classical Texts bound in after the last page of the text, which offers this volume as "Ed. 2". It carries Burnet's preface of March 1901 and the short addendum of April 1910 that marks the second edition, in which he records that in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* he has noted the readings of the Oxyrhynchus papyri (*lectiones Oxyrhynchitas commemoravi*); the apparatus of the *Phaedrus* in this impression, however, cites no papyrus, and the list of sigla names only the papyrus of the *Symposium* (Grenfell and Hunt, vol. V, pp. 243 ff.). The text is reproduced page for page and line for line: each left-hand page of this edition is one page of Burnet, with his line-ends, his marginal section letters and line numbers, and his apparatus criticus at the foot. In the margin, "St. III p. 227" at the head of the dialogue gives the volume and page of Stephanus' edition at which it begins; where each later page of Stephanus begins, its number stands in place of the letter a; and within each section every fifth line is numbered. Burnet sets these in the outer margin of his page, this edition in the right-hand margin; his running heads, and the printer's signature line at the foot of every sixteenth page (PLATO, VOL. II., with the number of the gathering, on pages 3, 19, 35, 51 and 67), are not reproduced. The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library's digital transcription of Burnet, and every line was then checked against the photographs of this copy; where the two differ, this edition prints what Burnet printed. Burnet's title, ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ, and beneath it the names of the two speakers, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ and ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ, are kept, with their abbreviations at the head of each speech (ΣΩ., ΦΑΙ.); so are his paragraphing, his capitals at the openings of speeches and paragraphs, and his ac-

cents, breathings and punctuation. His quotation marks round the words of Pindar (227b9–10) are kept, and so is his letterspacing of them, which takes in *πρᾶγμα*, Pindar's word, outside the marks; so are his quotation marks and letterspacing where Phaedrus quotes Socrates' words of 228a and 228c back at him (236c4–6), where Phaedrus in his turn quotes Pindar (236d2), and where Socrates borrows a poet's words in calling on the Muses (237a9); so are his quotation marks round the words of an Athenian decree (258a4–5), round Homer's "no word to be cast aside" (260a5), and round the words Socrates gives to the craft of speaking (260d4–9), whose closing mark his page omits, so that the quotation opened at 260d4 is not closed; and so are his quotation marks round the opening of Lysias' speech as Phaedrus reads it again (262e1–4, 263e6–264a3), each time broken off with a dash after the closing mark, round the words Socrates shapes from Homer (266b6–7), which he does not letterspace, and round the words Socrates gives to others in the inquiry into the craft that follows: the would-be doctor (268a9–b4, 268b9–c1), the musician (268e1–6), Adrastus and Pericles (269b4–c5, with the full stop after the closing mark) and the writer of a handbook (272b2–4); and round the words of Theuth and Thamus in Socrates' Egyptian tale (274e4–275b2). So are the blank lines with which he sets off Lysias' speech (before 230e6 and before 234c6), the parts of Socrates' first speech, with his aside to Phaedrus within it (before 237b2, 237b7, 238c5 and 238d8), the end of that speech (before 241d2), the beginning of the second (before 243e9), and its end (before Phaedrus' reply, 257b7). Verses he quotes stand on lines of their own, without quotation marks, indented as he indents them (Ibycus at 242d1, Stesichorus at 243a8–b1, the verses of the Homeridae at 252b8–9, the epitaph of Midas at 264d3–6); the small extra space he leaves above and below them is not reproduced. Burnet letterspaces the four names whose making Socrates explains at 244c–d (*μανικὴν*, *μαντικὴν*, *οἰονοϊστικὴν*, *οἰωνιστικὴν*), and the name of the letter whose insertion he describes, *ταῦ* (244c4), and the handbooks' names for the parts of a speech and the devices of style at 266d7–267c6 (*προοίμιον*, *διήγησίν*, *μαρτυρίας*, *τεκμήρια*, *εἰκότα*, *πίστωσιν*, *ἐπιπίστωσιν*, *ἔλεγχόν*, *ἐπεξέλεγχον*, *ὑποδήλωσίν*, *παρεπαίνους*, *παραψόγους*, *διπλασιολογίαν*, *γνωμολογίαν*, *εἰκονολογίαν*, *Ὀρθοέπειά*), with the dashes that join *παρεπαίνους* and *εἰκονολογίαν* to the words after them left outside the spacing; and later *ἐπάνοδον*, the name of the recapitulation (267d4), the epithet and name *μελίγηρυν Ἄδραστον* (269a5), *βραχυλογιῶν* and *εἰκονολογιῶν* (269a7), the

first spaced only after the dash that joins it to τεχνημάτων, and the words Tisias puts in the defendant's mouth, Πῶς δ' ἂν ἐγὼ τοιόσδε τοιῷδε ἐπεχείρησα (273c1–2), and λήθης γῆρας and ἵκηται (276d3–4), but not the ἐὰν between them, all without quotation marks; and he prints the omega of 244d1 with a bar above it, ω̄, the long o, which is not an accent. Angle brackets ⟨ ⟩ enclose what the principal manuscripts lack and Burnet supplies: ἂν at 232b7, by Hirschig's addition, τι at 234c5, by Heindorf's, ἂν at 235a2, by Burnet's own, ἄν at 235b4, from the Aldine edition, ἢ at 248d6, by Badham's addition, ἐν at 250a7, by Hirschig's, καὶ ὃς at 258a5, by Winckelmann's, the ν of ἃ⟨ν⟩ at 260c10, by Hirschig's, closed up with the letter before it, ὃν at 263c11, by Burnet's own addition on Heindorf's suggestion, ἓν at 266a2, by Heindorf's, ὅν at 269c3, by Heindorf's, τὰ at 272e2, Heindorf's reading, which joins B's αυτὰ to the τὰ of T's αὖ τὰ, and δὲ at 276d5, from a Paris manuscript (Par. 1811). Square brackets [ ] enclose words that the manuscripts have and Burnet deletes: Λυσίου at 236b3, by his own judgement, εὐλαβήθητι at 236c3, after Cobet, τῶν at 239a6, after Nutzhorn, ἑαυτῆς at 244e3, by his own judgement, ψυχή at 246d8, which Plutarch does not have, τὸν ἵμερον at 251c8, as Stallbaum once did, οὗ at 254d3, after Heindorf, συγγράμματι at 258a1, by his own judgement, εἶναι ἢ φίλον at 260c4, which Hermias did not read, Καὶ at 266d7, after Hirschig, ποιεῖν at 268c1, after Buttmann, δὲ at 276d2, after Bekker, and ἐν at 278a4, on Heindorf's conjecture. He prints Love's name with a capital where the digital transcription has a small letter, in Socrates' words before the palinode (242d9, 242e4, 243d1, 243d4), before and in the first of the verses of the Homeridae (252b5, 252b8), at 252d5, at the end of the palinode (257b6), and at 263d8 and 265c2; Aphrodite's at 265b4; Χαλκῆ, the first word of Midas' epitaph (264d3); and Οὐκ, with a capital, at the head of Stesichorus' verses (243a8) and where Socrates repeats them in prose (244a3); and he prints the Muses' name with a capital at 259b7 and 259c5, where the transcription has a small letter, and capitals at the head of the quoted words at 258a4, 260a5, 260d4, 262e1, 263e6, 268a9, 268b9, 268e1, 268e2, 269b4, 272b2, 273c1, 274e4 and 274e7; and after Socrates' prayer at the close he begins a paragraph without a speaker's name (279c4). His προσήκουσὰ, with a grave before the enclitic γέ (227c3), is printed as it stands, and so are his ὥς δή τι, with an acute on ὥς (242c3), πυίησις for ποίησις at 245a7 and σποπῶμεν for σκοπῶμεν at 260a9, wrong letters in this impression (the translation renders ποίησις and σκοπῶμεν), ἐστιν without an accent af-

ter δ᾽ at 249c1, the dative *τέχνῃ* at 260e3, for which he reports no variant (the translation renders the nominative, with a note), and the enclitic *σφων* without an accent, and *μαθητάς* with the acute that an oxytone keeps before an enclitic (269c4), where the digital transcription has *μαθητὰς σφῶν*. At 273a7 his apparatus sets *λέγειν*, the reading of Par. 1826, a copy of Hermias' commentary, before the colon, as if it were the text's reading, though his text prints *λέγει* with B and T; both are reproduced, and the translation renders *λέγει*. At 273d8 his text prints *νυνδὴ* and his apparatus *νῦν δὴ* as the reading of T and W, and at 275a6 his text prints *ηὗρες* and his apparatus *εὗρες* as T's; both forms are reproduced in each place. At 273c10 he sets a space before the dash after *μὴ*, as he does not before his other dashes, and the space is kept. At 236c6 the *ι* of *ἐπεθύμει* did not print in this copy, though its room is left, and the word is printed whole.

Reading the apparatus. The notes at the foot of each Greek page are Burnet's, unaltered. Entries are keyed by section letter and line as numbered in the margin, so that "a 5" is the fifth line of section a. The section letters begin again with each Stephanus page, so that "a 4" after "c 9" on page 2 belongs to the new page (227c9, 228a4). A further entry on the same line follows after a wider space without repeating the key. Usually the reading printed in the text comes first, followed by the witnesses that have it; a colon separates it from the alternatives, each followed by its witnesses (at 264b5 the alternatives are two proposals, Madvig's deletion of *δεῖν* and Schanz's *δὴ*). Where the text's reading is followed by a square bracket], the bracket closes the lemma, and what follows is set against it: a scholar's proposal (228b6, 231b5, 232c5, 232d6, 233a3, 234a6, 235b2, 237c8, 237d6, 239d4, 242b1, 242b4, 243a7, 244c7, 250c5, 251e5, 253a6, 254a1, 255c4, 258c8, 259b6, 265c9, 274d4, 275c8, 275e3, 276c8, 277e8; at 269d7 Ficino's rendering and Schaefer's proposal), one witness's variant (265c9, Galen's *εἰδῶν*), the reading of an early edition (235c5, the Aldine's *περ*), or, where no witness has the text's reading exactly as printed, the witnesses' own readings (229b2, 232d2, 236d2, 263d6, 266b7, 268a9, 269c4, 271b7); and at 259d7, where the text's *ἰᾶσιν* is the later hand's correction of T, the entry gives only the witnesses' readings, as it does at 279a8 and 279c1, where no witness he reports has the text's *μείζω* or *φίλια*. An entry with no colon gives a single proposal or report: an addition (232b8, 248d6, 258a5, 263c11, 264e6; at 229c7 Ast's proposed *ἂν*, at 249b7 Heindorf's *τὸ*, at 254a5 Herwerden's *τῷ*, at 258a7 Krische's *τὸ*, at 261a1 H. Richards' *ἀκροᾶσθαι*

and at 261c1 Herwerden's *καὶ Ὀδυσσέως* and at 264e6 Herwerden's *μὲν* and δ' and at 269a5 Hirschig's *ἂν* and at 276c7 Badham's *ἐν*, which Burnet does not adopt, are set in angle brackets), a deletion (229d1, 236b3, 236c3, 238c2, 241c2, 242a4, 242c1, 246e3, 248b6, 251c8, 253c6, 253d6, 254d3, 255d6, 257d9–e1, 258d10, 260e5, 261b7, 265b2, 266a7, 266d7, 267c2, 275a2, 277a3, 277d7, 278a4), a conjecture (228e2, 243e7, 255d5, 256e2, 257a2, 267c2, 267c9, 268e1, 275a4, 279b2, 279b6), a doubt (263c1), a transposition (251b2), the manuscripts' own form (229b2, *κατακλιθῆναι* B T W, where the text has *κατακλινῆναι*), one witness's variant (238a4, Stobaeus' *ἐπονομαζόμενον* for *ὀνομαζόμενον*; 244c4, Aristides' *ἐπεμβαλόντες*; 246c1, Syrianus' *μετεωροπολεῖ*; 256d8, Eusebius' *διαγαγόντας*; 279a9, B's *ὁρμῇ θειοτέρᾳ*), or an omission (238c1, *ὑπὸ αὖ* om. marg. B² alt. loc. Dionysius; 245b6, *ὁ* om. V Stobaeus; 253d7, *ἀληθινῆς* om. Heraclitus; 274b6, *δὴ . . . ἀπρεπείας* om. Stobaeus), or a note on how a witness's reading is written (267a6, δὲ written over an erasure in T). Two line numbers joined by a dash key an entry that runs over two lines (248c4–5, 267b7–8), and a longer passage is keyed at both ends (257d9 ... e1, 260e5 ... e7, 277e8 ... e9). Round brackets enclose a remark on the entry or a reference (227a5, 229c2, 229e6, 230a4, 234a6, 235b4, 235d7, 236d2, 237c7, 242b9, 242c6, 242d7, 243e7, 244c7, 244e3, 245a6, 245d3, 247b1, 249c6, 251a5, 254e9, 255a2, 258a1, 259d7, 261c10, 263c11, 266e4, 268b1, 273b5, 276c8). Three spaced points between two words cover the whole passage from the first to the last (229d1, 229e1, 232d2, 238a3, 238c2, 242a4, 242c1, 248c4–5, 251b2, 257d9–e1, 260e5–7, 262c6, 264e6, 265c9, 267b7–8, 271d3, 274b6, 274e3, 275a4, 277e8). Where Dionysius of Halicarnassus quotes a passage in two places, *pr. loc.* (*priore loco*), "in the first place", is his *Letter to Gnaeus Pompeius*, which repeats pages of his *On Demosthenes* with their quotations, and *alt. loc.* (*altero loco*), "in the other", is the *On Demosthenes* itself (238c1, 238c3). (*sic*) after a manuscript's form marks it as written there, odd as it is (230e3, 234c1, 242a6, 268c8, 277b5). Forms are given as the manuscripts have them, not brought into line with the text: B's *λυσίου* with a small letter (228e1), B's *προσαντε*, *κατακεισθαι*, *ἀποψυχημεν*, *φυωσιν*, *την* and *της* without accents (230c4, 230e3, 242a6, 251c3, 257a1, 257a2), B and W's *αὐτα* with no accent (229e4), T's *ὑποθεις* without an accent (234c5), the *ὡς δε ποιω* of B and W² and B's *ὁτι* without accents (242c6, 242d11), T's *ἐοικε τῳ* (246a6), B's *ουδη*, *ᾗ* and *αυτῃ* (248b2, 250b8, 250c4), B's *ην δ' ἐγὼ*, *πρὸς ἐμε νου* and *δὲ ω* (253c4, 255b3, 256b3), B's *λασιοκωφος*, one word as

Photius and Synesius also read it, and Heraclitus' *περιωτάλσιος* (253e4), B's *ϊασιν*, *ουνεκεν* and δε without accents (259d7, 261c3), B's *ἡ τις* (261e2), the *κὰν* of the witnesses without the coronis of the text's *κἂν* (248c4–5), B's *κάν* without the coronis of the text's *κἄν* (258e1), B's *μὴ το* without an accent (264c4), *μίδα* T and *μίδᾳ* B with small letters (264d3), B and T's *τάδε ἡ*, with no accent (266a1), *ἱππίαν . . . τὸν ἠλεῖον* T and *ἱππείαν . . . τὸν ἤλιον* B with small letters (267b7–8), the lemma *τινῶν*, accented, where the text has the enclitic *τινων* (265c9), the lemmas *του*, *τῳ* and *τι* without the accents of the text's *τοῦ*, *τῷ* and *τί* (270d5, 270e3, 271a10), T's *τἀλλα* with a circumflex and no coronis and B's *ταλλα* without an accent, both marked (*sic*) (268c8), T's *σφῶιν*, with the iota written beside the omega (269c4), B's *ἔχοιμαν* (272c5), B's *αυτὰ* without a breathing (272e2), *τισίαν* and *τισιν* with small letters, *τισιν* without an accent (273a6), B's *ἐρῃ* and *πλημμενος* without accents (275d6, 275e3), B's *νυν* and *ω* without accents (276b1, 276b2), B's *ταληθῆ* without the coronis of the text's *τἀληθῆ* (276c9), T's *ἰδῇ* and B's *ιδῃ* (277b5), B's *αυτῷ* without a breathing (278a7, 279a8) and T's *αὐτον* without an accent (279a8), B's *μουσιον* and T's *ἐπελλον* without accents (278b9), and B's *δίκη* without the iota subscript of the text's *δίκῃ* (278e1). Burnet's page is reproduced as it stands where a form looks misprinted, as with *οὐχ ὧς*, with a circumflex, given as the reading of B and T at 274a3, where the text has *ὡς*; and so are the slips of his apparatus: the key b 8 at 232b, where Hirschig's *ἂν* stands in line b7, and the key e 8 at 233e, where *προσαιτοῦσι* stands in line e7, the key d 9 at 249d, where *μανικῶς* stands in line d8, and the keys b 7 and b 9 at 266b, where *πεφυκόθ'* and *ἢ μὴ* stand in lines b6 and b8; and his reference "Symp. 176 b, 6" (227a5), where the name stands in line b5 of this impression.

The witnesses. Burnet's apparatus rests chiefly on three manuscripts: B, the Bodleian Plato (MS. E. D. Clarke 39); T, the Venice manuscript (Marcianus, Append. Class. 4, cod. 1); and W, the Vienna manuscript (Vindobonensis 54, suppl. phil. Gr. 7). Later hands are marked by the small letter, b for B and t for T (228b7, 230d7, 231c2, 232a2, 232b4, 235b4, 236b2, 237c4, 238c3, 239d3, 242a4, 242b1, 243d8, 244c7, 245e1, 246e2, 250b4, 251c1, 253b1, 253d7, 255a2, 255a6, 263d6, 264c3, 268a8, 268b3, 268e5, 270a6, 273a6, 275b8, 275d4, 278d8); *rec. b* is a recent hand among the later hands of B (229c2, 231d5, 249b7, 264a5); *pr. B* is B's first hand, before correction (231c1, 238c2, 244c7, 268a8, 270a6, 272c7, 273a6, 275b8), and *pr. T* T's (241a2, 242b1, 261d1, 270c3); at 275d4 *pr. B T* gives the reading of B's first hand and of T, and B² a second

hand correcting B, in the line or in the margin (238b8, 238c1–2); W^2 is likewise a second hand in W (242c6, 247d1), and *corr. V* a corrector of V (244b5, 246c7). Letters written together share a reading, so that "B T W" is all three. G is a manuscript in Venice (Append. Class. 4, cod. 54; 227b10, 228b7, 233e2, 235e4, 236e3, 241a2, 247d2), and D another (cod. Venetus 185; 232a2, 252e1; *corr. D*, a corrector of D, 248b5); V is a manuscript in Vienna (cod. Vindobonensis 109; 238a3, 239a2, 239b8, 241d4, 242b9, 245b6, 246a6, 246b7, 253e2, 257e5, 258e3); and *corr. Coisl.* is a corrector of Coislinianus 155 in Paris, whose corrections, like those in Ven. 189, Burnet's preface holds to be conjectures (241a2, 241b3, 243c7, 252d3, 255a6, 255b1, 256a6, 257a1, 261b7, 261e2, 263a3). Burnet also cites single later manuscripts by their libraries and numbers: in Paris, Par. 1811 (227b10); in Venice, Ven. 184 (233b6, 256d7; *corr. Ven. 184*, a corrector of it, 232c5) and Ven. 189 (234c5, 238b7, 244b5; *corr. Ven. 189*, 247c1); in Vienna, Vind. 80 (229e6) and Vind. 89 (228e5, 245d3); and in Florence, Laur. 2643 (234a8), a manuscript of the Laurentian Library, formerly no. 2643 of the Badia (now Conv. Soppr. 78). *recc.* (*recentiores*) are the later manuscripts (230d5, 230d7, 247b4, 250b8, 252d2, 253a5, 256d2, 264a7, 270d7, 271d8); *al.* (*alii*) other manuscripts or editions (232d2, 242b9, 246b2, 249d5, 260d7, 263d6, 266a2, 270a5); *vulg.* (*vulgata*) the text of the early printed editions (228b7, 229e1, 230a4, 230b7, 232d2, 233b5, 235e6, 237b2, 240a5, 240e2, 241b1, 241c4, 241d1, 241d3, 242b2, 245a2, 246a6, 247d7, 249d5, 250a7, 255a3, 257c4, 258a1, 258a4, 258d4, 258d8, 259c6, 261d7, 265d1, 266b7, 268a2, 271e2, 273e9, 277b6, 278b9); and the Aldina the first printed edition of Plato, published by Aldus at Venice in 1513 (233d6, 235b4, 235c5). Ficinus is Marsilio Ficino, whose Latin translation of Plato is cited where it implies a reading: his *colent*, "they will cultivate", is a future, as in Stephanus' σπουδάσουσιν (234a6). Later works and authors are cited as witnesses where they quote or paraphrase the dialogue: the anonymous lexicon called the Antiatticist, printed in the first volume of Immanuel Bekker's *Anecdota Graeca* (Bekk. Anecd. i. 101; 229a2); the Byzantine scholar Eustathius (229c2); Athenaeus, author of the *Learned Banqueters* (229e1; at 5.221a); the Platonist Proclus, in his commentary on the *Alcibiades I* (229e6), in his commentary on the *Republic* (242d7, 245a6, 245d4), and elsewhere (242b9, 242c1, 242c3); the letter-writer Aristaenetus (230b7, 240c1); the anthologist Stobaeus (233b5, 233b6, and often from 237a on); Plutarch (234e7, *On Listening* 45b; 239d1, *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend* 51d); Hermias of Alexandria, whose commen-

tary on the *Phaedrus* survives (234e7, 238c1, 245e1, 246a6, 249c6), and who reports at 249c6 that both readings were handed down (*utrumque traditum fuisse testatur*), and that θεός, "a god", was also handed down in place of θεῖός, "divine" (*θεός quoque traditum fuisse testatur*); the patriarch Photius, in his lexicon (236b4); Heraclitus, author of the *Homeric Problems* (237a8, 237b5); Simplicius, in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* (237c1, 245d3); and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who quotes passages of Socrates' first speech in his *Letter to Gnaeus Pompeius* (ad Cn. Pompeium, ch. 2) and in his *On Demosthenes* (de Demosthene, ch. 7; 237a8, 238b8–c3). From 241d on Burnet cites, besides, the scholia on the rhetorician Hermogenes, who himself quotes the line of 241d1 as verse (*On Types of Style* 2.4; schol. Hermogenis, 241d1); the lexicon called the *Suda*, under σταθερόν (Suidas, 242a4); the Atticist lexicographer Phrynichus (242a6); the orator Aelius Aristides, whose speech *To Plato: In Defence of Oratory* quotes the account of the kinds of madness word for word (244a8–245b1); the Stoic Seneca, whose Latin *poeticas* (*On Tranquillity of Mind* 17.10) implies ποιητικάς (245a6); the bishop Synesius (245a6); and, for the demonstration of the soul's immortality, Iamblichus, in his commentary on Nicomachus' *Introduction to Arithmetic*, words ascribed in Doric to the Pythagorean Timaeus of Locri by the bishop Theodoret (Timaeum Locrum ap. Theodoretum), Cicero, who translated 245c–e into Latin in the sixth book of his *Republic* (6.27–28) and quotes his version in the *Tusculan Disputations* (1.53–54), Philoponus, Syrianus in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, and Alexander of Aphrodisias in his commentary on Aristotle's *Topics* (245d3–e2). From 246a on he cites, besides, the Christian writers Eusebius, in his *Preparation for the Gospel* (246b6, at 15.9.4, in an extract from the Platonist Atticus; 249b3, at 13.16.8), and Clement of Alexandria, in his *Miscellanies* (Clemens, 247c7; *Stromateis* 5.3.16); the Platonists Syrianus again, in the same commentary (246c1, 247a5), Damascius (247a5, 247d1), Proclus again (246c7, 246e2, 247a8, 247b1, 247c1, 247c7) and Simplicius again, in the same commentary (246b6, 247c7, 247d1); Plutarch again (246d8, *Platonic Questions* 6, 1004c); and Alexander of Aphrodisias again, here in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (247a7). γρ. *t* (γρ. for γράφεται, "it is (also) written") marks a variant noted by a later hand in T (246a6, 250a3). From 251c on he cites, besides, a corrector of Par. 1808, a manuscript in Paris (*corr. Par. 1808*, 253c3), and again Eusebius, in the same work (255b8, 255c1, 255e6, 256a4, 256c4, 256d7, 256d8, at 13.20.1–6), Stobaeus (252b6–9), Hermias

(253c3, 257b1), Heraclitus, in his *Homeric Problems* (253d7–e4, at ch. 17), Photius, in his *Lexicon* under λασιόκωφος, and Synesius, in his *Praise of Baldness* (253e4, at ch. 5). From 257c on he cites, besides, Stobaeus again (258e1–259d3), Hermias again (260c3–4), and the physician Galen, who quotes 261e6–262c3 in his *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* (262a2, 262b5; at 9.2, Kühn V 729–730); *corr. t* is a correction by the later hand of T, and *suprascr. b* a reading written above the line by the later hand of B (259d7). From 262e on he cites, besides, Galen again, who quotes 263a2–d1 and 265c8–e3 in the same work (263a3, 265c9, 265e1; at 9.2, Kühn V 730–732, and 9.5, Kühn V 754), and once a manuscript of that work in Venice (*codex Marcianus Galeni*, 263c9), the fifteenth-century Marcianus gr. 284, where Kühn's text has συγχωρῆσαι with B and T; Stobaeus again (265b5, 265e1–266b7); Cicero again, who read λογοδαίδαλον (*et legit Cicero*, 266e4): in the *Orator* (39) he names Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Gorgias of Leontini, Theodorus of Byzantium "and many others, whom Socrates in the *Phaedrus* calls λογοδαιδάλους"; and Par. 1808 again, by its corrector (265b8, 267b4) and in its own reading (267d2). From 267d on he cites, besides, W again (268a1, 268c8, 270c2, 271b2, 272a6), V again (268a10, 270a5, 270d7) and D again (272a2); Galen again, who quotes 270c1–d7 in his *Method of Healing* (1.2, Kühn X 13–14; also in his commentary on Hippocrates' *Nature of Man*, Kühn XV 4–5) (270c3, 270d6), and 271c10–272b2 in *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* (9.5, Kühn V 755–756; 271d3–e4, 272a2–6), with the Marcian manuscript of that work once more (*Galeni cod. Marc.*, 271d8); Plutarch again (270a2, τελεσιουργόν, in his *Life of Pericles* 8.1, which paraphrases 270a1–8 under Plato's name); Aelius Aristides again, in the same speech (269d6) and in his *To Plato: In Defence of the Four* (270a5); Hermias again (269c3); Ficino again (269d7; and at 272d8 Stephanus' μέλειν, *e Ficino*, "from Ficino"); the Aldine edition again (269d5); Par. 1826, a sixteenth-century copy of Hermias' commentary in Paris (273a7); and the corrector of Ven. 184 again (*corr. Ven. 184*, 272c8). From 273c on he cites, besides, V again (274d3, 275b5, 275e1, 276a1, 276b2, 276b4), W again (273d8, 274e3, 275c1, 278a4), the corrector of Coislinianus 155 again (273c9, 276a1), the corrector of D again (*corr. D*, 277b5), the later hands of B (275b8, 275d4) and of T (278d8), Par. 1811 again (276d5), Par. 1812, another manuscript in Paris, both for a variant written in it (γρ. Par. 1812, 276d8) and for its correction (*corr. Par. 1812*, 277d3), Stobaeus again, who quotes the passage from the becomingness of writing through the tale of Theuth and

after it (274b6–275d6), and Hermias again (274c6). *fort. non legerunt*, "perhaps did not read", says that Plutarch and Hermias seem not to have had the words *καὶ ἀκριβῶς* (234e7). Burnet also refers the reader to the *Symposium* (227a5, "cf. Symp. 176 b, 6"): he prints *Ἀκουμενῷ*, accented on the last syllable, against B and T's *ἀκουμένῳ*, as he prints the genitive *Ἀκουμενοῦ* there against B, T and W's *ἀκουμένου*. At 236d2 he prints Pindar's *ὅ τοι*, though B and T have *ὅ σοι* "in this place" (*hoc loco*), "but compare" (*at cf.*) the *Meno* (76d), where the line is quoted with *τοι*.

Names and abbreviations. A scholar's name standing alone after a reading marks that scholar's reading or proposal; *ci.* (*coniecit*), "conjectured", marks a conjecture (228b6, 230a4, 230b4, 233a3, 234a6, 237c8, 240e6, 242b9, 274a3); *scripsi*, "I have written", a reading of Burnet's own (229c2, 235d7, 238a3, 268c2, 272b3); *addidi*, "I have added" (235a2, 263c11); and *seclusi*, "I have bracketed" (236b3, 244e3, 258a1), where at 244e3 Burnet adds that he suspects the word began as a gloss, *ἔξω ἄτης*, "out of ruin" (*glossema ... fuisse suspicor*). The scholars named in these pages are Martin Schanz, Henri Estienne (Stephanus), whose edition of 1578 supplies the page numbers by which Plato is cited, Karl Friedrich Hermann and Gottfried Hermann (G. Hermann), Rudolf Bernhard Hirschig, Charles Badham, Gottfried Stallbaum, Ernst Bratuscheck, Friedrich Ast, Friedrich Jakob Bast, David Ruhnken, Ludwig Friedrich Heindorf, Carel Gabriel Cobet, August Wilhelm Winckelmann, Johan Nicolai Madvig, William Hepworth Thompson, Nutzhorn (239a6), Leonhard Spengel, Immanuel Bekker, Herbert Richards (H. Richards), Philipp Buttmann, Hendrik van Herwerden, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Johannes Vahlen, John Percival Postgate, Curt Wachsmuth (the editor of Stobaeus), August Bernhard Krische, Gottfried Heinrich Schaefer, Anton Salomon Vögelin (Voegelin), Janus Cornarius and Friedrich Gotthilf Osann. *add.*, adds (232b8, 235a2, 248d6, 258a5, 276d5); *addubitat*, doubts (263c1: H. Richards doubts *εἶδος*); *alii alia*, others propose other readings (232a2, 234a8, 235d7); *ante*, before, and *post*, after (235a2, 251b2, 259c4); *alterum*, the second of two like words (228b7, 255d6); *ap.* (*apud*), in another author's work (245d3); *bis*, twice (276c8); *at legit*, but (Proclus) reads it (242c1); the two asterisks of *γὰρ* * * B, two letters lost or erased in B, where T has *δή* (244a8), and the single asterisk of T's *νώτωι* στάσας*, one letter lost or erased in T, where B has *νώτωι ἱστάσας*, both with the iota written beside the omega (247c1); *auctore*, on the suggestion of (232d6, 263c11); *cf.*, compare (227a5, 236d2, 245d3); *cod.*

Marc. (*codex Marcianus*), the Venice manuscript of Galen's work (271d8); *corr.*, a correction (232c5, 244c7, 259d7, 263a3, 265b8, 267b4, 272c8, 273c9, 276a1, 277b5, 277d3); *del.*, deletes, and *del. ci.*, proposes to delete (228b7, 242b9), and *del. τ b t*, the later hands of B and T delete the *τ* (263d6: the *τ* of *πάντα*, which leaves the letters of the text's Π*ᾶνα*); *et*, and (247d1), and *et sic*, and so reads (245d3, 276c8); *ex*, (altered) from (237c5: T has *ἄλλοις*, made from *ἀλλήλοις*); *ex emend.*, by correction (240c1, 273b5); *dub.*, doubted (253e6: Heindorf doubted *αἰσθήσει*, which Herwerden brackets); *fecit*, made (the reading) so (236b2); *fuisse susp.* (*fuisse suspicatur*), suspects (it) was (Stobaeus' reading) (275d1); *fort.* (*fortasse*), perhaps (250c5, 263a3, 273c9); *in marg.* or *marg.*, in the margin (231c2, 235b4, 238b8, 238c1, 238c3, 245e1, 255a2); *in ras.* (*in rasura*), written over an erasure (230a4, 267a6, 268b1); *infra*, below (263c11: Hirschig would add *ὢν* lower down, after *ἀγαθῶν* at the head of the next line, 263c12); *legit*, reads, and *non legit*, does not read (260c3–4), and *et legit*, and (Cicero) read it (266e4); *malit*, would prefer (259b6); *mox*, just after (242b9, 243e7), and *et mox*, and just after (242d7, 258a1, 258d10, 261c10); *olim*, formerly (251c8: Stallbaum once bracketed the words); *omissis*, omitting (276c8: Heindorf reads *ἀδυνατῶν* and leaves out *μετὰ λόγων*); *om.*, leaves out; *p.*, page, and *i.*, the first volume; *pr.*, the first hand (231c1, 238c2, 241a2, 242b1, 244c7, 261d1, 268a8, 270a6, 270c3, 272c7, 273a6, 275b8, 275d4); *prius*, the first of two like letters or words (230a4, 252d5); *punctis notatum*, marked with dots, as for deletion (251a5); *rec.*, a later hand (229c2, 231d5, 249b7, 264a5); *s. v.* (*supra versum*), above the line (237c7, 242c6, 247d1), and *supra*, above (247b1), and *suprascr.* (*suprascriptum*), written above (259d7); *secl.*, bracketed as spurious (229d1, 235d7, 236c3, 238c2, 239a6, 241c2, 242a4, 242c1, 243e7, 244c6, 245a6, 246b7, 246e3, 248b6, 249d6, 251c8, 253c6, 253d6, 253e6, 254d3, 255d6, 257d9, 258a1, 258d10, 260e5, 261b7, 264b5, 265b2, 266a7, 266d7, 267c2, 268c1, 277d7, 277e8), and *secl. ci.*, proposes to bracket (266d8, 278a4); *sed*, but (230a4, 237c7, 247b1, 251a5, 254e9), and *supra versum*, above the line (254e9); *transp. ci.*, proposes to transpose (251b2), and *transp.*, transposes (259c4); *ut videtur*, as it seems (245d3); *vel*, or (247d1); *voluit*, meant (244c7: the corrector b meant *νοήσει*).

The English. The translation is new. It aims to be exact, with every clause answering to a clause of the Greek, and to keep the humor of the conversation: Socrates' irony and his mock-solemn oaths, Phaedrus' eagerness and his pretence of reluctance, and the flat, repetitive, lawyerly manner of Lysias' speech, whose repeti-

tions are kept; nothing is added to make it funnier, and the effects the English cannot carry are explained in a note. The reading Burnet prints is translated, including the conjectures he adopts and the letters he supplies; where his choice of reading changes the sense, a note says so.

Each right-hand page translates the Greek page opposite. When a sentence runs over the turn of Burnet's page, the English breaks at the nearest point English word order allows and leaves the sentence unfinished at the foot of the page, as the Greek does. The Stephanus section letters in the margin of the English mark where each section begins.

Key terms. *Erōs* is "love", with a capital where the god is named; the verb *eran* is "be in love", and *ho erōn*, "the one in love", is kept apart from *erastēs*, "lover", and *ho mē erōn* is always "the one who is not in love", never a single word such as "non-lover", so that the contrast on which Lysias' speech turns is always visible. *Erōmenos* is "beloved", *charizesthai* "gratify", *charis* "favour" ("be grateful" for *charin eidenai*), *philos* "friend" and never "dear" (save in Homer's address *philē kephalē*, "dear head", 264a8), *philia* "friendship", and *philein* "love". *Kalos* is "beautiful" in all its uses and the adverb *kalōs* "well". *Epithymia* is "desire", *hēdonē* "pleasure", *ōphelia* "benefit", *aretē* "virtue", *nomos* "law", whether written or customary, *sōphronein* "be temperate", and *hōra* "youth", the season of a boy's beauty. *Logos* is "speech" where it is a speech, "talk" for conversation (230a), "account" where it is a story or saying (229d, 240c), "speech" against "deeds" (231c, 240e), and "reason" where it is the faculty that opinion and desire obey or defy (237e–238c). In Socrates' first speech *hybris* is "insolence", the vice opposed to temperance; *idea* is "figure" and *eidos* "form"; *ousia* is "substance", both for what each thing is (237c) and for wealth (232c, 240a); *paidika* is "darling", kept apart from *erōmenos*, "beloved"; and *onoma* is "name" where things are named (237e–238c), "word" where it is a word of a speech (234c, 234e). In the palinode *mania* is "madness", *pteron* "wing" (*pterousthai* "grow wings", *pterorruein* "lose its wings"), *anamnēsis* "recollection" and *aisthēsis* "perception"; *nous* is "intellect" where it is the faculty that beholds what really is (247c–d), against "sense" elsewhere (241a–c, 244c), *dianoia* "mind" and *phronēsis* "intelligence"; *ontōs* is "really", and so *tōi onti* is "in reality" (228d, 238c); *theasthai* is "behold", *theōrein* "contemplate" and *kathoran* "catch sight of"; and the words of the mysteries are kept together as one family: *teleos* "perfect", *teletē* "rite", *teleisthai* "be perfected", *atelēs* "imperfect", with *myeisthai* "be ini-

tiated" and *epopteuein* "be admitted to the beholding". In the account of the growth and of the horses, *himeros* is "longing", *pothos* "yearning", *anterōs* "counter-love", *aidōs* "modesty" (*aischynē* is "shame"), and *philein*, elsewhere "love", is "kiss" at 255e and 256a. As in the *Symposium*, *philosophos* is "lover of wisdom" (as an adjective, "wisdom-loving") and *philosophein* "love wisdom", *akolastos* is "licentious" and *kosmios* "orderly"; *noein* is "apprehend" (237d, 245c, 246c). In the inquiry into speaking and writing that follows the palinode, *technē* is "craft", as in the *Symposium*: *technēi* "by craft", *atechnos* "craftless", *entechnos* "with craft" and *technikos* "master of the craft"; *rhētorikē* is "rhetoric" and *rhētōr* "orator"; *logographos* is "speech-writer"; *graphein* and *syngraphein* are both "write", *syngramma* is "written work" and *syngrapheus* "writer"; the *logoi* that come forward as witnesses (260e–261a) are "arguments", the same word as "speeches"; *psychagōgia* is "leading of souls"; and *homoiotēs* is "similarity". In the account of collection and division that follows (265d–266c), *eidos* is still "form" and *idea* "figure"; *synagōgē* is "collection", *diairesis* "division", *horizesthai* "define", and *dialektikos* "dialectician"; the names the handbooks give to the parts of a speech and the devices of style are put into English and set in italics where Burnet letterspaces them (266d–267c). In the account of the true craft (268a–273c), *physis* is "nature", *methodos* "method", *empeiria* "routine" beside *tribē* "knack", *harmonikos* "harmonist", *to eikos* "the likely" and *ta eikota* "likelihoods"; and *pathēmata* are "the things these undergo" (271b), from *paschein*, "undergo". In the last part, on writing (274b–279c), *pharmakon* is "drug", as at 230d; *mnēmē* is "memory", *hypomnēsis* "reminding" and *hypomnēmata* "reminders", against *anamimnēskesthai*, "recollect"; *lēthē* is "forgetfulness"; *gramma* is "letter" and *graphē* "writing"; *gnēsios* is "legitimate"; *spoudē* is "earnestness", *spoudēi* "in earnest", and *paidia* "play"; *charizesthai*, Lysias' word for the boy's favours, is "gratify" here too, where its object is the gods; *euprepeia* is "becomingness", from *prepein*, "be becoming"; and *poreuesthai*, "journey" since the palinode, is "be on one's way" at 279b, as in Phaedrus' first answer and in Socrates' account of Phaedrus' walk (227a, 228b).

The notes. The notes identify persons, places and quotations, explain what the English cannot carry, and mark the places where Burnet's choice of reading makes a real difference to the sense. Interpretations are labelled as such. They are numbered afresh on each page.

The English words on which the speeches and the argument depend, in alphabetical order, with the Greek they render and the places where they occur, by Stephanus page and section. Where a word has a longer entry in the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Glossary says so.

able, δυνατός (*dynatos*); **unable**, ἀδύνατος, ἀδυνατεῖν (*adynatos*, *adynatein*). 239a, 248a, 248c, 249d, 260b, 266b, 269b, 270d, 271e, 273e, 274e, 275e, 276a, 276c, 277b, 278c. Kept apart from **capable**.

alike, κατὰ ταὐτά (*kata tauta*). 255d, 277b. Kept apart from **likewise** and **in the same way**.

appear, φαίνεσθαι (*phainesthai*). 229b, 229e, 230c, 230e, 234c, 235a, 257c, 257d, 258a, 259b, 260c, 261d, 261e, 264b, 265c, 267a, 267c, 268a, 269d, 272b, 272c, 277c; "since it has appeared immortal", 245e. Kept apart from **seem**.

association, συνουσία (*synousia*). 232b, 232c, 239b, 240c, 241a.

attempt, ἐπιχειρεῖν (*epicheirein*). 231d, 232b, 236b, 250e, 252e, 264a, 264e, 265e, 271a, 273c, 274a, 279a. Kept apart from πειρᾶσθαι (*peirasthai*), "try", 233c, 243b, 246b, 248b, 253c, 272c.

beautiful, καλός (*kalos*); **beauty**, κάλλος (*kallos*). Throughout; of beauty in the palinode, 249d, 250b–e, 251a–c, 251e, 252a–b, 254b, 255c; the prayer, 279b. The adverb καλῶς (*kalōs*) is **well**. See Key Words, *Beautiful, beauty*.

becoming, **be**, πρέπειν (*prepein*); **becomingness**, **unbecomingness**, εὐπρέπεια, ἀπρέπεια (*euprepeia*, *aprepeia*). 259b, 264c, 268d, 274b, 278d, 279b. Kept apart from **fitting**.

behold, θεᾶσθαι (*theasthai*). 247c, 247e, 249e, 250b, 250e, 251a, 258c, 271d. Kept apart from **contemplate**, **catch sight of** and "see".

believe, ἡγεῖσθαι (*hēgeisthai*). 229d, 231b, 231d, 232b, 232d, 234c, 234d, 240a, 243c, 244b, 256d, 258c, 259a, 260b, 266a, 266b, 269c, 277d, 277e, 278a. Kept apart from οἴεσθαι (*oiesthai*), "think", and νομίζειν (*nomizein*), "hold".

beloved, ἐρώμενος (*erōmenos*). 231b, 231c, 232a, 232c, 233b, 238e, 239a, 239e, 240d, 245b, 252c, 252d, 252e, 253a, 254a, 255b, 255d, 263c. Kept apart from **darling**.

brother, ἀδελφός (*adelphos*). 238b, 252a, 257b; of speeches, 276a, 276d, 278b.
capable, ἱκανός (*hikanos*). 242c, 245a, 258b, 261a, 264b, 277a; at 268c for οἷός τ᾽ εἶναι (*hoios t′ einai*), so as not to supply the verb Burnet brackets. **Sufficient**, **sufficiently**, of quantity, elsewhere. Kept apart from **able**.
catch sight of, καθορᾶν, κατιδεῖν (*kathoran*, *katidein*). 247d, 248a, 248c, 259a.
charioteer, ἡνίοχος (*hēniochos*). 246a, 246b, 247b, 247e, 248a, 248b, 253c, 253e, 254a, 254b, 254c, 254e, 255e, 256a.
contemplate, θεωρεῖν (*theōrein*). 247c, 247d, 276b, 276d.
counter-love, ἀντέρως (*anterōs*). 255e. See Key Words, *Longing, yearning; counter-love*.
craft, τέχνη (*technē*); **by craft**, τέχνῃ (*technēi*). Throughout the second part, 260d–277c; earlier 244c, 245a, 257a. **Craftless**, ἄτεχνος (*atechnos*), 260e, 262c, 262e; **craftlessness**, ἀτεχνία (*atechnia*), 274b; **with craft**, ἔντεχνος (*entechnos*), 262c, 277b; **master of the craft**, **masterly**, τεχνικός (*technikos*), 262b, 263d, 270d, 271c, 273a, 273b, 273e, 274e. See Key Words, *Craft*.
daimonic, δαιμόνιος (*daimonios*); **daimon**, δαίμων (*daimōn*); **the daimonic**, τὸ δαιμόνιον (*to daimonion*). 234d, 235c, 240a, 242b, 246e, 268a, 274c. See **sign** and Key Words, *Daimonic; the sign*.
darling, τὰ παιδικά (*ta paidika*). 236b, 239a, 239b, 240a, 240b, 240c, 241a, 243c, 251a, 252c, 253b, 254a, 254b, 254d, 256a, 264a, 279b.
decide, δοκεῖ (*dokei*), impersonal. 228e, 229a, 231c, 234d, 256c, 263e, 267d, 268b, 272b; "Resolved" in the decree formula, 258a, a stated exception. The personal δοκεῖ μοι, δοκῶ is "I think" (μοι δοκῶ with a future, "I mean to", 230e), and δοκεῖν of what seems so to others is "seem" (260a, 261d, 264b, 274e, 275b).
define, ὁρίζεσθαι (*horizesthai*); **definition**, ὅρος (*horos*). 237d, 238d, 239d, 263d, 265d, 269b, 277b.
demonstrate, **demonstration**, ἀποδεικνύναι, ἀπόδειξις (*apodeiknynai*, *apodeixis*). 245b, 245c, 278c.
desire, ἐπιθυμία, ἐπιθυμεῖν (*epithymia*, *epithymein*). 227d, 228b, 228c, 231a, 232b, 232e, 233b, 233d, 234a, 236c, 237d, 238a, 238b, 238c, 238e, 240a, 243d, 255e, 258c, 264a.
dialectician, διαλεκτικός (*dialektikos*); **the dialectical craft**, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη (*hē dialektikē technē*). 266c, 276e. With **collection**, συναγωγή (*synagōgē*), 266b; **division**, διαίρεσις (*diairesis*), 266b; and **divide**, διαιρεῖν (*diairein*), 263b, 265b, 270b, 271d, 273e. See Key Words, *Form, figure; collection, division; dialectician*.
divination, μαντική (*mantikē*); **prophetic**, μαντικός (*mantikos*);

seer, μάντις (*mantis*); **prophecy**, μαντεία (*manteia*); **divine**, μαντεύεσθαι (*manteuesthai*). 242c, 244b–d, 248d, 265b, 275b, 275c, 278e. **Prophetess**, **prophesy**, προφῆτις, προφητεύειν (*prophētis*, *prophēteuein*), 244a, 244d.

drug, φάρμακον (*pharmakon*). 230d, 242e, 268c, 270b, 274e, 275a. See Key Words, *Drug*.

earnest, **be in earnest**, σπουδάζειν (*spoudazein*); **earnestness**, **in earnest**, σπουδή, σπουδῇ (*spoudē*, *spoudēi*). 234a, 234d, 236b, 248b, 249d, 260b, 271a, 276b, 276c, 276e, 277e, 278a, 278d. See **play** and Key Words, *Play, earnestness*.

ensouled, ἔμψυχος (*empsychos*); **soulless**, ἄψυχος (*apsychos*). 245e, 246b, 276a.

favour, χάρις (*charis*). 231b, 233e, 234c, 234e, 241a, 254a, 257a. See **gratify**.

figure, ἰδέα (*idea*). 237d, 238a, 246a, 251a, 253b, 265d, 273e. Kept apart from **form**. See Key Words, *Form, figure; collection, division; dialectician*.

filled with the god, **be**, ἐνθουσιάζειν (*enthousiazein*). 241e, 249d, 249e, 253a, 263d. **God-filled**, ἔνθεος (*entheos*), 244b, 255b.

fitting, **be**, προσήκειν (*prosēkein*). 227c, 231a, 233a, 233b, 233d, 233e, 238b, 247d, 248b, 264e, 275e, 276b, 276e. Kept apart from **becoming** and **suit**.

forgetfulness, λήθη (*lēthē*). 248c, 250a, 275a, 276d. See **memory**.

form, εἶδος (*eidos*). 229d, 237a, 246b, 249b, 251b, 253c, 253d, 259d, 263b, 263c, 265a, 265c, 265d, 265e, 266a, 266c, 270d, 271a, 271d, 272a, 273e, 277b, 277c. Kept apart from **figure**. See Key Words, *Form, figure; collection, division; dialectician*.

friend, φίλος (*philos*); **friendship**, φιλία (*philia*). Throughout; never "dear" except in the stock phrase "dear head" (264a). Of the beloved's counter-love, "not love but friendship", 255e; "the things of friends are common", 279c.

gratify, χαρίζεσθαι (*charizesthai*). 227c, 231b, 231c, 233d, 233e, 234b, 235b, 235e, 237b, 238e, 241b, 241d, 243d, 243e, 244a, 250c, 256a, 265a, 273e, 274b. See **favour** and Key Words, *Gratify*.

harmony, ἁρμονία (*harmonia*); **harmonist**, ἁρμονικός (*harmonikos*); **be in harmony**, ἁρμόττειν (*harmottein*). 248e, 268d–e, 278d; **all-harmonious**, παναρμόνιος (*panarmonios*), 277c.

image, εἴδωλον (*eidōlon*). 250d, 255d, 276a. Kept apart from εἰκών (*eikōn*), "likeness", 235d, 250b, and ὁμοίωμα (*homoiōma*), "similitude", 250a, 250b.

immortal, ἀθάνατος (*athanatos*). 245c, 245e, 246a, 246b, 246c,

246d, 247b, 252b, 258c, 277a.

in love, **be**, ἐρᾶν (*eran*); **the one in love**, ὁ ἐρῶν (*ho erōn*); **the one who is not in love**, ὁ μὴ ἐρῶν (*ho mē erōn*). Throughout the speeches, 227c–257b, and again 263c, 265a; of the politicians, "most in love with speech-writing", 257e; never one word ("non-lover"). See **love**, **lover** and Key Words, *Love, be in love*.

in the same way, ὡσαύτως, ὡς δ' αὕτως (*hōsautōs*, *hōs d' hautōs*). 240e, 247e, 275e; "in the same condition", ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν, 260c. Kept apart from **alike** and **likewise**.

insolence, ὕβρις (*hybris*); **insolent**, ὑβριστής (*hybristēs*). 238a, 250e, 252b, 253e, 254c, 254e.

intellect, νοῦς (*nous*), of the faculty that beholds what really is. 247c, 247d, 270a. See **sense** and Key Words, *Temperance, temperate; sense*.

journey, πορεύεσθαι, πορεία (*poreuesthai*, *poreia*). 246c, 246e, 247b, 249c, 254b, 256d, 256e, 269d, 270e. "Be on one's way" at 227a, 228b and 279b, stated exceptions.

knowledge, ἐπιστήμη (*epistēmē*); **knowledgeable**, ἐπιστήμων (*epistēmōn*). 247c, 247d, 247e, 266c, 268b, 269d, 276a, 276c, 276e.

leading of souls, ψυχαγωγία (*psychagōgia*). 261a, 271c. See Key Words, *Leading of souls*.

legitimate, γνήσιος (*gnēsios*). 276a, 278a.

letters, γράμματα (*grammata*). 242c, 274d, 274e, 275a, 275c, 276d. See **write** and Key Words, *Write, writing, letters*.

likely, **the likely**, εἰκός (*eikos*); **likelihoods**, εἰκότα (*eikota*); **as is likely**, εἰκότως (*eikotōs*). 229e, 231c, 231e, 232c, 233a, 237c, 238e, 252b, 255e, 258c, 266e, 267a, 269d, 269e, 270b, 272e, 273b, 273d, 276c. See Key Words, *The likely*.

likewise, ὁμοίως (*homoiōs*). 234a, 234c, 240a, 275e. Kept apart from **alike**.

longing, ἵμερος (*himeros*). 251c, 251d, 251e, 255c. See Key Words, *Longing, yearning; counter-love*.

love, ἔρως (*erōs*); **Love**, Ἔρως (*Erōs*), where the god is named, with Burnet's capital. Throughout the speeches and their discussion, 227c–266b; the gods' name for him, *Pterōs*, 252b. See **in love, be**, **lover** and Key Words, *Love, be in love*.

lover, ἐραστής (*erastēs*). 227c, 228c, 231a, 233a, 237b, 239a–241d, 243c–244a, 249e, 253d, 254e, 255c, 255e, 256a, 256e, 257b, 262e, 264a; "I am myself a lover, of the divisions and collections", 266b. Kept apart from **the one in love**.

lover of wisdom, φιλόσοφος (*philosophos*); **love wis-**

dom, φιλοσοφεῖν (*philosophein*); **philosophy**, φιλοσοφία (*philosophia*). 239b, 248d, 249a, 249c, 252e, 256a, 256c, 257b, 259d, 261a, 278d, 279a. See Key Words, *Lover of wisdom, philosophy*.

madness, μανία (*mania*); **be mad**, μαίνεσθαι (*mainesthai*). 241a, 244a, 244b, 244d, 245a, 245b, 245c, 249d, 249e, 251a, 251d, 253c, 256b, 256d, 265a, 265b, 266a, 268c. See Key Words, *Madness*.

marvel, θαυμάζειν (*thaumazein*); **marvellous**, θαυμάσιος, θαυμαστός (*thaumasios*, *thaumastos*). 230c, 238d, 242a, 257c, 258b, 260d, 274a, 279a.

memory, μνήμη (*mnēmē*). 249c, 250a, 250c, 251d, 253a, 254b, 267a, 274e, 275a. See **recollect**, **remind** and Key Words, *Recollection, memory, reminding*.

method, μέθοδος (*methodos*); **methodically**, ὁδῷ (*hodōi*). 263b, 269d, 270c, 270d.

mind, διάνοια (*dianoia*), of the faculty. 239a, 239c, 244c, 247d, 249c, 256a, 256c, 259a, 259e, 265e, 270a, 279b; **thought**, of what is thought, 228d, 234c.

nature, φύσις (*physis*); **is naturally**, πέφυκε (*pephyke*). 229e, 230a, 230c, 239a, 240b, 245c, 245e, 246d, 248c, 248d, 249e, 251a, 251b, 252e, 253a, 253b, 254b, 255a, 255c, 265e, 266a, 266b, 269d, 270a–271a, 272a, 272d, 273e, 277b, 277c, 279a.

nourishment, τροφή (*trophē*); **be nourished**, τρέφεσθαι (*trephesthai*). 246e, 247d, 248b, 248c, 251b, 259c, 270b; **reared**, **nurture**, of upbringing, 239c, 243c, 247b, 272d, stated exceptions.

opinion, δόξα (*doxa*). 237d, 237e, 238b, 248b, 253d, 260c, 262b, 262c, 274c; **repute**, of what others think, 232a, 251a, 257d; **seeming**, 275a, a stated exception.

orator, ῥήτωρ (*rhētōr*). 258b, 260a, 269d. Kept apart from **rhetoric**, **rhetorician**. See Key Words, *Rhetoric, rhetorician, orator; speechwriter*.

perfect, τέλεος (*teleos*); **imperfect**, ἀτελής (*atelēs*); **rite**, τελετή (*teletē*); **be perfected**, τελεῖσθαι (*teleisthai*); **newly perfected**, **freshly perfected**, νεοτελής, ἀρτιτελής (*neotelēs*, *artitelēs*). 244d, 244e, 245a, 246b, 248b, 248e, 249c, 250b, 250e, 251a, 253c, 265b, 269c, 269d, 269e, 272a, 278a.

persuade, πείθειν (*peithein*); **be persuaded**, πείθεσθαι (*peithesthai*); **persuasion**, πειθώ (*peithō*); **persuasive**, πιθανός (*pithanos*). 229c, 230a, 232d, 237b, 245a, 252c, 253b, 260a–261a, 265b, 269c, 270b, 271a–272b, 272d, 273d, 277c, 277e.

play, παιδιά, παίζειν (*paidia*, *paizein*). 229b, 229c, 234d, 262d, 265c, 276b, 276d, 276e, 277e, 278b. See **earnest** and Key Words, *Play,*

earnestness.

pleasure, ἡδονή (*hēdonē*); **pleasant**, ἡδύς (*hēdys*); **be pleased**, ἥδεσθαι (*hēdesthai*). 228b, 229a, 230c, 232b, 233b, 233e, 237d–241c, 243b, 250e, 251a, 254a, 258e, 259b, 265c, 276d.

precious, τίμιος (*timios*). 241c, 250b, 257a, 278d.

recollect, ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι (*anamimnēskesthai*); **recollection**, ἀνάμνησις (*anamnēsis*). 249c, 249d, 250a, 254d, 272c, 273a, 275a. See **memory** and Key Words, *Recollection, memory, reminding*.

refutation, ἔλεγχος (*elenchos*); **refute**, ἐλέγχειν (*elenchein*). 235b, 267a, 273b, 273c, 278c.

remind, ὑπομιμνήσκειν (*hypomimnēskein*); **reminding**, ὑπόμνησις (*hypomnēsis*); **reminders**, ὑπομνήματα (*hypomnēmata*). 241a, 249c, 266d, 267d, 275a, 275d, 276d, 277b, 278a. See **memory** and Key Words, *Recollection, memory, reminding*.

reproach, ὄνειδος (*oneidos*); **a matter of reproach**, ἐπονείδιστος (*eponeidistos*); **reproach**, ὀνειδίζειν (*oneidizein*). 231e, 244b, 257c, 257d, 258c, 277a, 277d, 277e.

rhetoric, ῥητορική (*rhētorikē*); **rhetorician**, ῥητορικός (*rhētorikos*). 235a, 239a, 260c, 261a, 263b, 266c, 266d, 269b, 269c, 269d, 269e, 270b, 271a, 271d, 272d. See **orator**, **speech-writer** and Key Words, *Rhetoric, rhetorician, orator; speech-writer*.

seem, ἔοικε (*eoike*); δοκεῖν (*dokein*), of what seems so to others (260a, 261d, 264b, 274e, 275b). Throughout; the personal δοκεῖ *μοι* is "I think", the impersonal δοκεῖ "decide". Kept apart from **appear**.

sense, νοῦς (*nous*), in ordinary use; **who has sense**, νοῦν ἔχων (*noun echōn*); **senseless**, ἄνους (*anous*). 241a, 241b, 241c, 244c, 257a, 274a, 276b, 276c. See **intellect** and Key Words, *Temperance, temperate; sense*.

shameful, αἰσχρός (*aischros*); **shame**, αἰσχύνη (*aischynē*). 237a, 241a, 243b, 244b, 254c, 255a, 258d, 277d; **ugly**, against the beautiful, 246e.

sign, σημεῖον (*sēmeion*). 242b; "the other signs", of augury, 244c. See **daimonic**.

simple-minded, εὐήθης (*euēthēs*); **simple-mindedness**, εὐήθεια (*euētheia*). 242d, 242e, 275b, 275c.

soul, ψυχή (*psychē*). Throughout; the proof of its immortality, 245c–246a; its likeness, 246a–b; its nature in rhetoric, 270b–272a, 277b–c. See **ensouled** and Key Words, *Soul*.

speech, λόγος (*logos*). Throughout; **account**, of a story or saying, 229d, 240c, 243a, 244a, 245e, 246c, 270a, 270c, 272b–c, 274a,

274e, 277c; **arguments**, 260e–261a; **reason**, of the faculty, 237e–238c, 256a; **talk**, of a conversation, 230a, 254d, 255b, 272d. See Key Words, *Speech, account, argument, reason*.

speech-writer, λογογράφος (*logographos*); **speech-writing**, λογογραφία (*logographia*). 257c, 257e, 258b, 258c, 264b. See Key Words, *Rhetoric, rhetorician, orator; speech-writer*.

suit, προσαρμόττειν (*prosarmottein*). 271b, 277c. Kept apart from **fitting**.

temperance, σωφροσύνη (*sōphrosynē*); **temperate**, σώφρων (*sōphrōn*); **be temperate**, σωφρονεῖν (*sōphronein*). 231d, 237e, 241a, 241b, 244a, 244b, 244d, 245a, 245b, 247d, 250b, 253d, 254b, 256b, 256e, 273e, 279c. See Key Words, *Temperance, temperate; sense*.

title, ἐπωνυμία (*epōnymia*); **give the title**, ἐπονομάζειν (*eponomazein*). 237a, 238a, 238c, 244c, 246c, 260b, 278d; **namesake**, 250e.

truth, ἀλήθεια (*alētheia*); **the truth**, τὸ ἀληθές (*to alēthes*). Throughout; of the truth that rhetoric needs, 259e–262c, 272d–273d, 277b, 278c.

virtue, ἀρετή (*aretē*). 232d, 234b, 253d, 256b, 270b.

wing, πτερόν (*pteron*); **plumage**, πτέρωμα (*pterōma*); **grow wings**, πτεροῦσθαι (*pterousthai*); **lose its wings**, πτερορρυεῖν (*pterorruein*); **winged**, ὑπόπτερος, πτηνός (*hypopteros, ptēnos*). 246a, 246c, 246d, 246e, 248b, 248c, 249a, 249c, 249d, 251b, 251c, 251d, 252b, 252c, 255d, 256b, 256d, 256e. See Key Words, *Wing*, and the Introduction, *The growing of the wings*.

wise, σοφός (*sophos*); **wisdom**, σοφία (*sophia*). 229c, 229e, 235b, 235c, 236b, 237b, 239a, 243b, 245c, 246e, 258a, 260a, 266c, 267a, 267b, 269b, 273b, 273e, 274e, 275a, 275b, 278d, 279c; **wise in seeming**, δοξόσοφος (*doxosophos*), 275b.

write, γράφειν, συγγράφειν (*graphein, syngraphein*); **writing**, γραφή (*graphē*); **written work**, σύγγραμμα (*syngramma*); **writer**, συγγραφεύς (*syngrapheus*). 227c, 228a, 235b–c, 235e, 243d–e, 257c–258d, 259e, 261b, 264b–c, 266d, 269b–c, 271a–c, 272b, 274b–278e. See **letters** and Key Words, *Write, writing, letters*.

yearn, ποθεῖν (*pothein*); **yearning**, πόθος (*pothos*). 234c, 250c, 251e, 252a, 253e, 255d. See **longing** and Key Words, *Longing, yearning; counter-love*.

NOTE ON THIS EDITION

How the volume was made

The Greek was taken from the Perseus Digital Library's digital transcription of Burnet and cut into Burnet's lines by reading every line-end from the photographs of his page, in the impression described in the Editorial Note. Accents, breathings and iota subscripts were read on enlargements of the photograph of each page, and a doubtful mark was settled by setting it beside sure examples of each form. The digital transcription sets in lower case the openings of speeches, where Burnet prints capitals, and the names and words listed in the Editorial Note (Love, Aphrodite, the Muses, Χαλκῆ, Οὐκ and the first words of quotations), and these are restored; it runs Phaedrus' question after Lysias' speech (234c6) into the speech without his name, which Burnet prints, and the name is restored. It leaves out three words at 239a7 (*φθονερὸν δὴ ἀνάγκη*), which are supplied from Burnet's page. In a few places it has an accent or a letter other than Burnet's: *προσήκουσα* without the grave Burnet prints before the enclitic (227c3), *ὡς* for his *ὥς* (242c3), *ἐστὶν* for his *ἐστιν* (249c1), *μαθητὰς σφῶν* for his *μαθητάς σφων* (269c4), a plain *ω* for his barred *ϖ* (244d1), and *ποίησις* and *σκοπῶμεν* where this impression prints *πυίησις* (245a7) and *σποπῶμεν* (260a9); it closes the quotation at 260d9, which Burnet leaves open, has no space before the dash at 273c10, where Burnet has one, and sets the margin letter c before the verses of the Homeridae, where Burnet sets it after them (252c1). Burnet's page is followed in each. The section letters and line numbers in the margin were worked out from the Stephanus divisions rather than copied, and were then compared with Burnet's margin, page by page.

The dialogue was made in nine blocks (Burnet pages 1–10, 11–19, 20–26, 27–33, 34–41, 42–49, 50–56, 57–64 and 65–73), 2,066 lines in all. Each block was checked by four independent reviewers: two, dividing its pages between them, compared the Greek and the apparatus with the page images letter by letter, one compared the English with the Greek clause by clause, and one checked every fact and reference in the notes and in the Editorial Note. Each finding

was examined again against the evidence before it was adopted, and not all were adopted. What those checks caught is recorded at the end of this Note.

The volume was then read through again as one text, since a check made block by block cannot see some kinds of error: a word rendered one way in one block and another way in the next, a recapitulation that states a step in other words than the step itself, a rendering settled late that never reached the first pages. The translator read the whole, and four further reviewers read it independently: one for the consistency of terms across the whole book, two for sense, omissions and continuity in its two halves, and one for the Editorial Note against the scan of Burnet's volume. The Introduction, the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Outline, the essay on later readings and the Glossary were then written from the finished English, and three more reviewers checked them, claim by claim and citation by citation, together with the corrections made in the final reading.

What the final reading caught

It found some eighty points in the English and its notes that the block checks had passed, nearly all of them small, and nearly twenty in the Editorial Note. They fall into a few classes.

The largest class was renderings that had drifted from the rule of one English word for one Greek word, many of them in the first block, which was translated before the later rulings were made. *ἀνάγκη* is "it is a necessity" and *ὑπ᾽ ἀνάγκης* "by necessity" in Lysias' speech and before it (229d, 231a, 232a), as from the second block on, and *ἀναγκαῖον* is "it is necessary" at 232b, where "one must" had stood; and at 245d the added "must" is gone, so that the necessity of the proof is not confused with the δεῖ that follows; *ὄνειδος* is "reproach" at its first occurrence (231e), as when the reproach against Lysias is examined (277a–e); *λανθάνειν* is "escape the notice" at 235a, 237c and 257d–e, and at 237c "the many" answers the same phrase at 249d; *τὰ ἀλλότρια* is "what is other people's" (230a), as when the word returns with Socrates' want of learning at 235c–d; the impersonal δοκεῖ is "decide" at 228e and δοκῶ "I think" at 264e; *συνουσία* is "association" in Lysias' speech (232b, 232c), and *θεραπεύειν* "tend" at 233b; *διάνοια*, of the faculty, is "mind" at 244c and 270a; *ῥητορικός* of a person is "a rhetorician" (269d); *προσαρμόττειν* is "suit" at 271b, so that the summary's "the form that suits each nature" (277c) recalls it, and "fitting" is kept for *προσήκειν* alone; and a number of smaller

words now have the renderings settled for them elsewhere: *ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μήν* "but indeed ... not" (270e), *ὦ ἀγαθέ* "my good friend" (260d, as *ὠγαθέ* at 242b and 243c), *μάλιστα* "most of all" (262c), *πάλιν* "again" (265e), *χαίρειν ἐᾶν* "let pass, bidding farewell" (230a, as at 278b), and *μυθολογεῖν* "telling legends" (276e, as at 229c and 243a). Two rulings were changed in the final reading, and one was made, and all three were carried through the volume: *εἰκότως* is "as is likely" (232c, 252b, 269e; 272e keeps "in a likely way"), where it had been "with reason", which seemed to answer the "without reason" of the definition of love (238a–c); *σοφίζεσθαι* is "act the wise man" (229c), so that "play" is kept for *παίζειν* in the same sentence; and the particle *τοι*, where it is translated, is "you know" (263d, 271b, 272b, 274a), where it had been "I assure you", "I tell you" and "surely". Some English words had served two Greek words in one place: "opinion" for *δοκῶ* at 228c, now "what you think of me", "opinion" being kept for *δόξα*; "thinks nothing of" for *παρ᾽ οὐδὲν τίθεσθαι* at 252a, now "sets at nothing", "think" being kept for *οἴεσθαι*; "able" in one sentence for two constructions at 271e, now "can say sufficiently ... and is able"; and "resources" at 269c, the word of the *πόρος* family, which stands in the same sentence, now "by themselves".

Some renderings missed the Greek. At 257a the English had made the palinode "the most beautiful and best", where the Greek offers it "as beautiful and as good as was in our power"; at 253d the "alone" of "by command and speech alone" belongs to both nouns; at 227d the English had added "even" and "all the way" to the walk to Megara; at 258a and 267a two sentences that Burnet punctuates as statements had been made questions; the words of the "standing midday" (242a), of Stesichorus' "Not true is the account" where Socrates repeats them in prose (244a), and the titles "mortal" and "immortal" (246c) had been set in quotation marks that Burnet's page does not have, and so had the defendant's words in Tisias' example (273c), which are now in italics only, as Burnet letterspaces them; at the turn from 252e to 253a the English had made "to find out" depend on "tracking", where the Greek makes it depend on "they have resource" (*ἀνευρίσκειν ... εὐποροῦσι*), and the page now turns before "they have resource to find out", the nearest point the English allows; and two particles left untranslated in the opening exchange were restored (227b, 227c). The dashes of the English, which had been spaced in some blocks and closed up in others, are now closed up throughout, as Burnet sets his. In the notes, a cross-reference at 279b had ascribed to Phaedrus the ac-

count of his morning that Socrates gives (228b), and the note on *sōphronein* at 231d now cites the place where the madness of love is said to be given by the gods (245b–c).

In the Editorial Note, the second edition's addendum is now quoted for what it says of the papyri, and the Note says that the apparatus of the *Phaedrus* in this impression cites none; the places where Burnet capitalizes Love's name before the palinode and the digital transcription has a small letter (242d9, 242e4, 243d1, 243d4), and Οὐκ at the head of Stesichorus' verses (243a8, and 244a3, where Socrates repeats it in prose), are added; a fifth slip in Burnet's keys is recorded (d 9 at 249d, for d8); the entry at 232c5 is given as a corrector's reading of Ven. 184; the three places Proclus is cited at 242b9–c3 are no longer said to be in his commentary on the *Republic*; the recent hand of B is recorded from its first appearance (229c2), and the asterisk of T at 247c1 is explained; Athenaeus' place (5.221a), Hermogenes' own quotation of the line of 241d1 (*On Types of Style* 2.4) and the work of Iamblichus that Burnet cites (his commentary on Nicomachus' *Introduction to Arithmetic*) are given; and several lists of places were completed or corrected against the transcribed apparatus. The title page no longer carries the label of the blocks.

What remains undone

The places in their works of several ancient witnesses Burnet cites have not been found or confirmed: Hermias' commentary and Stobaeus' extracts at every place, Damascius, Proclus at 242b9–c3 and in the myth of the procession (246c7–247c7), Philoponus (245e1), Theodoret's place for the Doric words of Timaeus (245d3), Phrynichus (242a6), Synesius at 245a6, Eustathius, Aristaenetus, and the scholia on Hermogenes; the entry λ 110 of Photius' *Lexicon* was identified from reference works but not read, and Heraclitus' text (*Homeric Problems* 17, in Mehler's edition) differs from Burnet's report. Seneca's place and Synesius' *Praise of Baldness* were confirmed only from translations, and several witnesses are cited by their work alone, without the page of an edition: Proclus' commentaries on the *Alcibiades I* and the *Republic*, Iamblichus' commentary on Nicomachus, and Alexander's on the *Topics*. Where Nutzhorn (239a6), Postgate (257d2), Schaefer (260a6) and Osann (268e1) published their proposals has not been found, nor the page of Cornarius' Latin Plato (Basel, 1561) with προσεποίησεν (267c2); the manuscripts Laur. 2643 and Par. 1808 are given only by their shelfmarks, and Par. 1811, Par. 1812 and the corrector of D only as

Burnet names them.

Some readings of this copy lie at the limit of what its photographs show: T's ὦ at 227c9, read by comparison with the other forms of the interjection on the line, and ἐστιν without an accent at 249c1, which may be a misprint or a lost accent (the only other such enclitic in the dialogue, τ᾽ ἐστὶν at 229b1, is accented). Four points on Burnet's page could be settled by his first impression of 1901 or another edition, which has not been seen: the dative τέχνῃ at 260e3, which has no entry in the apparatus and which the English renders as the nominative, with a note; λέγειν set before the colon at 273a7, where the text prints λέγει; the circumflex of οὐχ ὧς B T at 274a3, where the text has ὡς; and the source of μείζω (279a8) and φίλια (279c1), which no witness he reports has.

The apparatus is Burnet's alone. It has not been collated against the manuscripts or the papyri, and readings proposed since his edition are not reported. The translation follows Burnet's text even where later scholars would print something else.

The notes are a reader's aid, not a commentary. They were chosen to explain what the English cannot carry, and they label the more doubtful interpretations as such. What the palinode finally holds about the soul and love is set out in the Introduction as a question, not argued, and the essay on later readings names some of its readers without attempting a history of its reception; a reader who wants the scholarly debate will need a commentary.

The checks described above were made by independent reviewers working from the same page images. The volume has not been read by a specialist outside the project, and a reader who finds an error is asked to report it.

The record of the blocks

The notes that follow were written as each block was finished, and are kept as a record of what its check found.

Block I (Burnet pages 1–10, 227a1–234c7)

The Greek. Two reviewers compared the text and apparatus of the ten pages with the photographs letter by letter, and every margin label with a full rendering of the page. They found that Burnet's letterspacing of Pindar's words takes in πρᾶγμα, Pindar's own word, which stands outside the quotation marks (227b10); that he prints προσήκουσὰ with a grave before the enclitic γέ (227c3), which the digital transcription leaves unaccented; and two forms in the ap-

paratus that the draft had read otherwise: T's ὃ ἐν (228d6), with a rough breathing and a grave, and T's οὗ (230d5), with a grave and no circumflex. They confirmed, by comparison with sure forms of the same fount, the three forms of the interjection at 227c9 (ὦ W: ὦ̃ T: ὦ̃ B) and the forms at 229b2 (ἦ ἐὰν W: ἦ̃ ἂν B: ἦ̃ ἐὰν T); the breathings of αὐτῶν throughout the speech; and that the keys b 8 (232b) and e 8 (233e) are Burnet's slips for b7 and e7.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause. The most serious finding was a dative the draft had left out, so that at 232e5 it rendered Hermann's text, which Burnet rejects, rather than B's, which he prints: the lovers' future is "unclear to them". At 231c2–3 the draft had reversed what those in love are ready for: it is to gratify their beloveds, while incurring others' enmity. Renderings were brought into line with the rule of one English word for one Greek word: ἥδεσθαι is "be pleased" (228b7, as 233e), ἀποδοῦναι χάριν "return the favour" (231b, as 234a), οἴεσθαι "think" (232a), "business" is kept for Pindar's ἀσχολία alone, ἱκανός is "sufficient" (230c), φοβεῖσθαι "be afraid" against δέδοικα "fear" (232c), ἀγνοεῖν "be ignorant" (228a, so that Socrates' "if I am ignorant of Phaedrus" answers his "while I am still ignorant of this", 230a), ὥρα "season" of the year (229a), and Lysias' repeated διὰ τοῦτο ... ὅτι is "on this account, that" each time. Particles were restored in four places (227c, 228c, 229a, 230d), Burnet's dash at 229d1 kept, seven Stephanus markers moved to the word where the section begins, and some fifteen phrases that followed a published translation more closely than the Greek requires were reworded.

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the Editorial Note against the sources. Pindar's lines are *Isthmian* 1.1–3, and his word for "your" is *teon*, which Socrates makes feminine; the conversation of the *Republic* is in the house of Polemarchus; the note on Herodicus now cites what the *Republic* says of him; *dromoi* are running-tracks, not covered ones; the note on Pharmaceia no longer calls her otherwise unknown; Hesiod's name for Typhon is Typhoeus. A textual note was added at 234c5, where Burnet prints a later manuscript's ποθεῖς against B and T. In the Editorial Note, Burnet's reference to the *Symposium* at 227a5 is explained (it concerns the accent of Ἀκουμενῷ, and points to a line numbered b5 in this impression); Laur. 2643 is identified; the lexicon of Bekker's *Anecdota* is named; and the account of round and angle brackets in the apparatus is completed.

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the nine pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter and every margin label with a full rendering of the page. In the text, they showed that at 240e4 Burnet prints *αὕτως* with a rough breathing, as the digital transcription has it, where the draft had changed it to a smooth one; the rough breathing was confirmed by setting the mark beside sure rough and smooth breathings with an acute on the same page. They measured the letterspacing of the quotation at 237a9 and found that *ξύμ* and *λάβεσθε* are spaced and *μοι* is not; and they found that the *ι* of *ἐπεθύμει* (236c6) did not print in this copy, though its room is left, so that the word is printed whole. In the apparatus they corrected three breathings and accents: the acute of *ἄν* in the Aldine's reading and in t's margin (235b4), the rough breathing of Cobet's *ἔσταθι* (236b4), and B's *ἓν ὄντων* (239a6), rough with a grave, which divides *ἐνόντων* into two words. They confirmed the three words that the digital transcription leaves out at 239a7, the quotation marks and letterspacing at 236c4–6 and 236d2, the four blank lines of Socrates' first speech, and every margin label, and they identified Dionysius' two works, which the apparatus distinguishes as the first and the other place.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause. The most serious findings were a *μᾶλλον* left untranslated at 237c7 ("whether one should rather go into friendship"); a *καί* left out at 238d6, so that the draft rendered T's reading rather than B's *κἂν*, which Burnet prints ("might even be turned away"); a *δή* that Burnet prints from Stobaeus and Aristaenetus and the draft left out (240c1); a *γάρ* at 235d4 and another at 237c5; the vocative of Phaedrus' parody at 236c4, which the draft had made read as though Phaedrus called himself Socrates; the construction of 239a5–7 after Burnet's deletion of *τῶν*, which the draft had left without a contrast between the evils present and "the others"; and the genitives of 240e4–6, which describe the lover sober and drunk, not the boy. A paragraph break that Burnet does not make (237d3) was removed. Renderings were brought into line with the series and with Block I: *Εἶεν* is "Very well", *ὡς ἀληθῶς* "in truth", *τῷ ὄντι* "really", *παλαιός* "old", *δεινός* "dreadful" of a beast, *μέλει* "matter", *εὐπορεῖν* "have resource", *ὁμονοεῖν* "be in concord", *ἁπαλός* "tender", *δίαιτα* "living", *παίζειν* "play" (as at 229b–c, since play and earnest return at the end of the dialogue), and *ἀνάγκη* "necessity" throughout the

first speech, so that its insistence on necessity shows. Five places in Block I were changed so that one English word answers one Greek word across both blocks: *οὐσία* is "substance" at 232c, as at 237c and 240a; *ἔμπειρος* is "versed" at 231d and 232e; *μυθολόγημα* is "legend" at 229c, keeping "tale" for *μῦθος*; and *διαφανής* is "transparent" at 229b, keeping "clear" for *σαφής*. Ten Stephanus markers were moved to the word where the section begins, and several phrases that followed a published translation more closely than the Greek requires were reworded.

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the Editorial Note against the sources. Badham's conjecture at 235d7 deletes "to say" rather than adding it; the archons' oath concerns breaking the laws in one chapter of the *Constitution of the Athenians* and taking gifts in the other, and Plutarch gives it to the thesmothetae; Socrates' recantation of the first speech begins in the conversation between the two speeches, not in the second speech; Pindar's line is fragment 105a; and the note on Socrates' "divine head" no longer makes Phaedrus a god. Textual notes were added at 237b5 (*αἰτῶν*, against B's *ἐρῶν*) and 239a6 (the deleted *τῶν*). In the Editorial Note the account of Socrates' first speech in "On reading this edition" now says that its opening and the aside carry the speakers' names; the abbreviation *ex* and a fifth kind of entry without a colon are explained; Plutarch's, Simplicius' and Dionysius' places are given; and the lists of places for the vulgate, the Aldine, *ci.*, *secl.*, round brackets and Ven. 189 are completed. The scholar Nutzhorn, whose deletion Burnet adopts at 239a6, has not been securely identified, and is named without a first name.

Block III (Burnet pages 20–26, 240e10–245e2)

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the seven pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter and every margin label with a full rendering of the page. In the text they found that Burnet prints *ὥς δή τι* with an acute on *ὥς* (242c3), where the digital transcription and the draft had the bare *ὡς*; that the mark over the omega at 244d1 is a bar, not a circumflex, so that the letter is printed *ω̄*; that the name of the letter *ταῦ* is letterspaced with the four names around it (244c4); and that this impression prints *πυίησις*, with a wrong letter, at 245a7, which is kept as printed. They measured the indents of the verses of Ibycus and Stesichorus from the margin of the text, where the draft had measured them from the indent of a paragraph or from

inside the first line, so that both stand further in than in the draft. In the apparatus they corrected B's ὅτι, which Burnet prints without an accent (242d11), and Hermann's ἦν, with a circumflex (244d7). They confirmed the two blank lines of these pages (before 241d2 and 243e9), the capitals restored for Love against the digital transcription, the breathings of αὑτῷ, αὑτὸν and the three forms of αὐτός in 245c–d, and every margin label, and they identified the corrector of Coislinianus 155 from Burnet's preface.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause. The most serious findings were readings Burnet does not print that the draft had translated: "taken in exchange" rendered a corrector's μεταλαβών, where Burnet prints μεταβαλών, "having changed" (241a2); "the daimonic sign" left out the τε καί that makes two names of it, as in a scholar's deletion (242b8–9); "the doors of poetry" rendered the genitive of Proclus and Synesius, where Burnet prints the adjective, "the poetic doors" (245a5); and particles Burnet prints from one witness against another, δή at 242c3 and 244a8. The English page facing 245a–245e had carried nothing of 245a7–8, which now stands at its head. A comma of Burnet's at 244d7 decides that it is for "those who needed it" that madness found deliverance; παρὰ θεοῖς at 242c9 is "before the gods", not "against" them; at 244d4 it is the people of old who testify, not Socrates who asserts. Renderings were brought into line with the series: ὑγιής "healthy", ἱκανός "capable" of ability, οἱ παλαιοί "the people of old", παλαιός "old" against ἀρχαῖος "ancient", παρεῖναι "be present", θορυβεῖν "throw into confusion", ἐξαιρεῖν λόγου "leave out of the reckoning", πορίζεσθαι "procure", and λέγειν "say" rather than "tell", which is kept for κελεύειν; one phrase at 239a in Block II was changed to keep "present" for παρεῖναι. Several perfects and participles were restored, and some phrases that followed a published translation more closely than the Greek requires were reworded.

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the Editorial Note against the sources. The Editorial Note now describes the omega at 244d1 as barred, explains *ap.* and *et sic*, names the Coislinianus, gives the places where Aristides, Seneca and Cicero quote or translate the passages, and no longer claims that the Doric words Theodoret ascribes to Timaeus of Locri come from the extant treatise. The note on the shell game no longer says which side fled, which could not be checked in Pollux; the note on Stesichorus' recantation now says only what the *Republic* says; the note on the derivation of *mantikē* adds that *man-*

tis does belong with *mainesthai*; and textual notes were added at 241d4 and 244b5, and completed at 244c8 and 245e1. The lists of examples in the Editorial Note were completed for these pages.

Block IV (Burnet pages 27–33, 245e2–251b7)

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the seven pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter and every margin label with a full rendering of the page. The text of all seven pages was confirmed as drafted, including the paragraphs Burnet opens with capitals at 246a3, 246d6, 247c3, 248a1, 249d4 and 250c7, the brackets at 246d8, 248d6 and 250a7, the rough breathings of *αὑτοῦ*, *αὑτὸ* and *αὑτῶν* at 245e6, 246c4, 247a6 and 250a7, and *ἐστιν* without an accent at 249c1, where the digital transcription has *ἐστὶν*: no trace of an accent shows on the photograph. The corrections were all in the forms the apparatus reports, where the draft had brought a witness's form into line with the text: at 248c4–5 Burnet prints *κὰν*, with a grave but without the coronis of the text's *κἂν*, in both forms; at 250a7 B and T have *αὐτῶν* with a smooth breathing, against the rough *αὑτῶν* of Hirschig's form and of the early editions; at 250b8 B has *ᾐ*, smooth and unaccented; and at 251b2 B has *ᾖ*, smooth under the circumflex, against T's *ᾗ*. Each was settled by setting the mark beside sure smooth and rough forms on the same page.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause. The most serious findings: *αὐτό* had been left untranslated in "what itself moves itself" (245e7, 246c4), against the same phrase at 245d7; the *ἀλλά* of 246c7 ("but we fashion") was missing; "their opposites" at 246e3 made the wing waste away by the opposites of the ugly and the bad; and the anacoluthon at 249d5, where the madness is introduced by a relative that never gets its verb, had been smoothed into a sentence with words of its own, and is now kept, with a note. Several renderings had drifted from rulings carried over from the *Symposium* and are now brought into line: *φιλόσοφος* "lover of wisdom" and *φιλοσοφεῖν* "love wisdom", *παιδεραστεῖν* "be a pederast", *μετέχειν* "share in" against *κοινωνεῖν* "be a partner", *κακία* "vice" (with *κάκη* "badness"), *ἁρμόττειν* "be in harmony", *διακεῖσθαι* "be disposed", *ἀμελεῖν* "heedless", *ἐραστός* "lovable" (with *ἐράσμιος* "lovely"), and the "on the ground that" of *ὡς* with a participle. Others were made to agree with the earlier blocks: *προσήκειν* "be fitting", *δέδοικα* "fear", *ὀνομάζειν* "name", *τροφή* "nourishment", *ἔννομος* "law-abiding", and *ἀφικνεῖσθαι* "arrive". With *νοῦς* now "intellect"

where it is the faculty that beholds, *νοεῖν* is "apprehend" at 237d, 245c and 246c, where "notice" had stood before; *ὄντως* is "really", and *τῷ ὄντι*, which Blocks I and II had rendered "really", is now "in reality" (228d, 238c); *χαλεπός* is "difficult" at 232b and 236a, as here, so that "hard" is kept for *σκληρός*; and at 240d *αἴσθησις* is "perception" and *ὄψις* "appearance", the words of this block. The angle brackets of the draft round two supplied words were removed, since the translation does not mark Burnet's supplements. Seven Stephanus markers were moved to the first word of their section, and a handful of particles (*γε*, *ἄρα*, *δή*, *αὐτῶν*) and tenses ("had not reared", "when they have stood") restored.

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the new sentences of the Editorial Note against the sources. The note on Hestia now says what the Greek says, that she is one of the twelve and stays at home while the other eleven lead; the note on B and T's *πλαττομένου* at 246c7 now construes it with "account", as its case requires; the note at 246a6 explains *γρ.* t as a variant noted by a later hand in T; the notes at 246e and 250e no longer say that beauty alone is visible here, but that it alone shines clearly to sight, while justice and the rest are seen dimly in their likenesses; and textual notes were added at 247b1 (Proclus' "where", against "already"), 249d5 and 250c6. The Editorial Note now names the works in which Eusebius, Clement, Syrianus, Simplicius, Plutarch and Alexander quote these pages, as far as they could be found; the places in Proclus, Damascius, Hermias and Stobaeus remain unidentified. It also states Hermias' report at 249c6 exactly, and completes its lists of examples for these pages.

Block V (Burnet pages 34–41, 251c1–257c3)

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the eight pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter and every margin label with a full rendering of the page. The text was confirmed as drafted: the verses of the Homeridae with their indent and the short line before them (252b7–9); the margin letter c at *τούτοις*, after the verses, where the digital transcription sets it before them; the paragraphs Burnet opens with capitals at 252c3, 253c7, 256e3, 257a3 and 257b7, and no others; the blank line before Phaedrus' reply; Love's capitals; the brackets at 251c8 and 254d3; Ruhnken's *ἑκάστη* without a subscript at 251d5; and every rough and smooth breathing of *αὐτός* and *αὐτός* on these pages, each set beside sure forms on the same line. Two lemmas of the apparatus had lost the accent Burnet prints: at 255d3 his lemma is

οὔθ', with the acute of the text, and at 256c1 τάχ' ἄν, with the acute before the enclitic, where the draft had a grave.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause. The most serious findings were in the placing of the Stephanus markers: the letter c at the head of page 34 was missing, and ten markers stood at the first English word of the Greek line rather than at the first English word whose Greek lies in the new section; all eleven are now placed by that rule. In the story of the horses the draft slid between present and past where the Greek keeps to the aorist (254b–c, 254e); the tenses now follow the Greek, with the historic present only where Plato has it. At 254e9 the darling is the object of the lover's following, not of his modesty ("follows the darling in modesty and fear"), and the English no longer opens a paragraph at 255a1, where Burnet runs on. Two words Burnet prints from T had been left untranslated, so that the English followed B: ἂν at 256a4 ("would not refuse") and δή at 256b3. Rulings carried over from the *Symposium* are now applied: ἑκὼν εἶναι "so far as it rests with it" (252a1), ἰατρός "doctor" (252b1), συγκατακεῖσθαι "lie" in bed rather than "recline" (255e3, 256a3), and ἔπη "epic verses" (252b5, as 241e1). Other renderings were corrected or brought into line: διαβεβλημένος is "misled", the sense the lexicon gives for this place, not "slandered" (255a5); ὁ ἐρῶν is "the one in love", not "lover" (255a2); ἐρώμενος is "beloved" (252e2); βιάζεσθαι and βία are "force" and "by force" throughout (254d4, 254e3); προσελθεῖν is "approach", as προσιέναι two lines before (254d5); παρέχεσθαι is "provide" (255b6); διάγουσι is "live as friends" (256d1); and the god is asked to "have" pardon and favour, as the single participle says, not to "grant" them (257a6–7). About twenty smaller points of particle, word order and vocative ("beautiful boy", without "my") were also corrected.

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the new sentences of the Editorial Note against the sources. The note on stage 9 had given the nine thousand years of wandering to the one not in love; it is the soul of his friend that rolls about the earth, as the English itself says (257a). The textual note at 253c3 said that B and T have a different verb; they have τε for γε and a compound of the same verb. The note on the proverb at 255b now says what the *Lysis* says, the note on *Zeus-like* gives D's reading, and the note on *himeros* refers to the *Cratylus* (419e–420a). Textual notes were added at 253a5, 255a6, 256a6 and 257a4, where Burnet's reading changes the sense. In the Editorial Note, Burnet's

entry at 253c3 is now described as a corrector of Par. 1808, not the manuscript; the works in which Eusebius, Heraclitus, Photius and Synesius quote or cite these pages are named, while the places in Stobaeus and Hermias remain unidentified; *dub.* and *olim* are explained by what the entries say; and the lists of examples in "Reading the apparatus" were completed, for these pages and for some of the earlier ones.

Block VI (Burnet pages 42–49, 257c4–262d8)

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the eight pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter and every margin label with a full rendering of the page. The text was confirmed as drafted, with one exception: at 260a9 Burnet's page prints *σποπῶμεν*, with a *π* for the *κ*, where the digital transcription has *σκοπῶμεν*; the wrong letter is now reproduced, as *πυήσις* is at 245a7, and the translation renders *σκοπῶμεν*. Confirmed as drafted were the bracket and line-end of [*συγ-γράμματι*] (258a1–2); the quotation marks, capitals and dashes of the decree (258a4–6); the Muses' capitals at 259b7 and 259c5; the closed-up *ἃ⟨ν⟩* (260c10); the quotation opened at 260d4 and never closed, for no closing mark stands after *τέχνῃ* at 260d9; the dative *τέχνῃ* at 260e3, with its subscript; and the rough breathings of *αὑτόν*, *αὑτῶν* and *αὑτούς* (258a5, 258c3, 259a3, 259c2), each set beside sure forms on the same line. Every entry of the apparatus was confirmed, among them B's *κάν* without the coronis and T's *ἕνεκ᾽ ἄν* (258e1), B's *ἴασιν* with a diaeresis only and T's *ἴασιν* (259d7), and the three forms of *ᾗ τις* (261e2).

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause. The most serious findings: at 259a the cicadas' thought had been given a purpose clause of its own, where the Greek says that they would believe slaves had come to their lodging and were sleeping there like little sheep; at 258b–c "capable enough ... to become an immortal speech-writer" had been turned into an actual result; the page break at 258d was one clause late, and English page 43 now ends where Burnet's does; and at 261e the craft of contradiction is again "this" craft, "if indeed it exists". Many renderings had departed from the rulings of Blocks I–V and of the *Symposium*, and are now brought into line: *ἡγεῖσθαι* "believe", *φαίνεσθαι* "appear", *που* "I take it", *τυγχάνειν* with a participle "in fact", *ἄμοιρος* "no portion", *ἀμελεῖν* "be heedless", *κηλεῖν* "enchant", *διάνοια* "mind", *καθορᾶν* "catch sight of", *δοκεῖ μοι* "I think", *λανθάνειν* "escape one's notice", *κεκτῆσθαι* "pos-

sess", ἐπονομάζειν "give the title", ἀνάγκη "necessity", εὐθύς "at once", βούλεσθαι "want", εἰπέ "say", δηλοῦν "make plain", μέγα φρονεῖν "be proud", σεμνῶς "with dignity", δόξα "repute"; and προσφιλής, which had been "dear" against the ruling for φίλος, is now "more her friends". The reviewer also restored a number of particles (γε at 259e4, δή at 260b6, γάρ at 258e3 and 260d5), the coordination of "laughable and a friend" at 260c3, and the order of the short answers, and asked for the dative τέχνῃ of 260e3 to be either translated or noted; it is noted.

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the new sentences of the Editorial Note against the sources. The note on the "craftless knack" had given to rhetoric the *Gorgias*' words about cookery; it now quotes each in its place (462c, 463b). The Laconian's saying, said to be known nowhere else, is in Plutarch's *Sayings of Spartans* (233b). The note on the decree now says that the approving body, the "praiser", stands first; the note on the "sweet bend" gives the ancient explanation exactly; and the gods of the place now include Pan. Textual notes were added at 258a4, 260b6, 260d6 and 260e3, and the note at 259d7 now says what B and T actually have. In the Editorial Note, the unclosed quotation is placed at 260d9, Stobaeus' citations are extended to 259d3, Galen's quotation is placed in his *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, Voegelin is identified as Anton Salomon Vögelin, the entry at 259d7 without a lemma is explained, and the lists of examples were completed by script against the apparatus of all six blocks.

Block VII (Burnet pages 50–56, 262e1–267d2)

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the seven pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter and every margin label with a full rendering of the page. The text was confirmed as drafted. In the apparatus one form was corrected: at 266a1 the reading of B and T is τάδε ἡ, with a rough breathing and no accent, not τάδε ἤ. Confirmed as drafted were the quotation marks and dashes round the opening of Lysias' speech (262e1–4, 263e6–264a3); the four verses of Midas' epitaph, indented, with the small extra space Burnet leaves above and below them not reproduced; the capitals of Ἔρωτα (263d8, 265c2), Ἀφροδίτης (265b4) and Χαλκῇ (264d3); ⟨ὂν⟩ (263c11), ⟨ἓν⟩ (266a2) and [Καὶ] (266d7); the sixteen letterspaced terms of the handbooks and nothing else, with the dashes after παρεπαίνους and εἰκονολογίαν outside the spacing (the typeset-

ting was changed for this block to space a word only up to such a dash); ἅνδρες and ἀνήρ with their rough breathings (266c6, 267a5, 267c9); ὁθενδὴ as one word (267d2); ὡς at 263d4, rough and unaccented; and Μίδᾳ (264c7) beside Μίδα (264d3). Both reviewers found that Burnet keys πεφυκόθ' and ἢ μὴ at 266b as lines 7 and 9, where by his own margin they stand in lines 6 and 8; the slip is reproduced and recorded in the Editorial Note, with those of 232b and 233e.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause. The most serious findings were of construction: at 264e the draft had the reader profit by making an effort not to imitate Lysias, where the Greek says he would profit if he did not attempt to imitate him at all; at 266c "now" belongs with "say", not with "those who have learned"; at 267b the relative is attracted to "speeches" ("the craft of the speeches that are needed"); at 266a the one that reviles left-handed love is a speech, not a man; and τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο is "the very thing", without the draft's "famous". Socrates' φεῦ at 263d is admiration, "Ah!", not "Alas!"; and love at 263c, which Burnet prints with a small letter, no longer stands with a capital at the head of the sentence. Renderings that had departed from the rulings of Blocks I–VI and of the *Symposium* are now brought into line: ἁμαρτάνειν "miss the mark", μετιέναι "go in quest of", οὐδὲν λέγειν "there is nothing in what I say", ἔοικε "seems", ἐπιχειρεῖν "attempt" (three places), the impersonal δοκεῖ "decide", δοκῶ and δοκεῖς μοι "I think", ἐμοὶ ... ἔδοξεν "I thought", ἱκανός "capable", πάσχειν "undergo", τὰ νόμιμα "the lawful things" (as at 252a), τεκμήρια "pieces of evidence", φράζειν "declare", ὦ παῖ "boy", ἐρωτικὸς λόγος "speech on love", ὀξέως "keenly", and παύεσθαι "cease", which picks up Lysias' word in the sentence just read. Particles were restored (γε at 263e, 264a and 266c; δή at 265d), one marker was moved (264c), and the names of the incidental praises and censures, which had followed the Loeb translation of 1914, now give the sense LSJ gives. The address φίλη κεφαλή at 264a8 is rendered "dear head", the only exception to the rule that φίλος is never "dear", so that it answers Homer's phrase as cited in the note at 234d.

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the new sentences of the Editorial Note against the sources. The note on the four gods now says that the account of the madnesses named only the Muses, gives prophecy to the priestesses at Dodona as well as to the prophetess at Delphi and the Sibyl, and calls Love Aphrodite's son, as 242d does; the note at

266a1 had given T the words "and the others", which are Stobaeus' alone; the note on the dialecticians had offered a derivation that its two places do not give; Polus' city and teacher, which come from later sources, were removed from his note. In the Editorial Note, Cicero is no longer said to call the teachers *logodaedali* in his own voice (he reports Socrates' word, *Orator* 39); the Homeric words are placed in 266b6–7; *infra* and *del.* *τ b t* are explained exactly; Galen's two quotations are located (*On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* 9.2 and 9.5) and the Venice manuscript of his work identified. Stobaeus' places for 265b–266b were not found. Four readings of B that give no sense in context, *εἶδος* for *πλῆθος* (263b8), *μὴ* for *με* (264b9), *ἑταίρους* for *ἑτέρους* (264e7) and *ὀργίσαιτο* for *ὀργίσαι τε* (267c9), are reported in the apparatus but not noted.

Block VIII (Burnet pages 57–64, 267d3–273c5)

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the eight pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter and every margin label with a full rendering of the page. The text was confirmed as drafted, including Burnet's *μαθητάς σφων* at 269c4, where the digital transcription has *μαθητὰς σφῶν*, his *Οὗτοι* at 271b7, and *λέγει* at the end of 273a7, which stands flush with the measure, so that no letter has been lost, although the apparatus sets *λέγειν* before the colon. Two accents in the apparatus were corrected: at 272c5 Burnet prints *ἄν* with an acute, in the lemma and in Schanz's conjecture, and at 272c2 Badham's *περιΐῃ* has a diaeresis. Confirmed as drafted were the quotation marks and the capitals at their heads, with the full stop after the closing mark at 269c5; the letterspacing of *ἐπάνοδον*, of both *μελίγηρυν* and *Ἄδραστον*, of *βραχυλογιῶν* and *εἰκονολογιῶν* without *τεχνημάτων*, the dash or the *τε καὶ* between them (the typesetting was changed again for this block, so that spacing can begin after a dash inside a word), and of *Πῶς ... ἐπεχείρησα* at 273c1–2, without the *τῷ* before it or the semicolon after; ⟨*ὄν*⟩, ⟨*τὰ*⟩ and [*ποιεῖν*]; and in the apparatus *εἴπερ* pr. B (268a8), T's *τἆλλα* and B's *ταλλα* with Burnet's (*sic*) (268c8), B's *ἐφῶν* and T's *σφῶιν* (269c4), and the unaccented lemmas *του*, *τῳ* and *τι* (270d5, 270e3, 271a10), now listed in the Editorial Note. One line number in the Editorial Note was corrected: the second quotation of the would-be doctor begins at 268b9.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause. The most serious finding was of construc-

tion: at 269c the clause about the pupils is governed by "they believe", so that it is the handbook writers, not Adrastus and Pericles, who think persuasive speaking and composition "no work at all"; the draft had made it a statement of the speakers' own. Also corrected: the articles ἡ μὲν ... ἡ δέ at 271b4, one soul persuaded and another not, where the draft had one soul in two cases; Burnet's μή at 272b3, now a question expecting "no" ("Surely ... is not to be accepted?"); the dative of agent at 272a ("by one who by now has all this"), with a note on the sentence Socrates leaves unfinished; "on the ground that" at 273b, where the draft seemed to make the strong man refute his own plea; and Phaedrus' κάλλιστα ... ἔχοι οὕτως at 271b, which is agreement, not a wish. Particles that Burnet prints from one manuscript against another were restored (γε at 269c6 and 270e1, δή at 271d3), with Heindorf's γε at 270c3, and the singular verb that B's καί requires at 270a2. Renderings were brought into line with Blocks I–VII and the *Symposium*: σύνοδοι "meetings", πάγκαλος "altogether beautiful", παγκάλως "altogether well", πορεύεσθαι and πορεία "journey", ἅμιλλα "rivalry", ἐνδείκνυσθαι "point out", εὐπετές "easy", διαισθάνεσθαι "perceive", κρατεῖν "have the mastery", μέλει "it matters", προσέχειν "pay attention", ἐπιχειρεῖν "attempt", κάκη "badness", τὸ ἀληθές "the truth" and ἀλλὰ μήν "but indeed". Two markers were moved (269c, 273c), the order of 270b now follows the Greek, and several phrases that followed the Loeb translation of 1914 were rewritten. In Block VI the note at 260e now gives the *Gorgias*' ἐμπειρία as "routine", the word ruled here.

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the new sentences of the Editorial Note against the sources. The note on the "knack" had again given to rhetoric what the *Gorgias* says of cookery at 463b; it now cites 462c and 465a for rhetoric. Tyrtaeus' epithet for Adrastus is *meilichogērys*, "soft-voiced", not Plato's *meligērys*, and the note no longer makes them one word. Galen's quotations are placed in his *Method of Healing* and *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, not in one passage; Aristides' two places are in two speeches; Plutarch's paraphrase is located at *Pericles* 8.1; and Par. 1826, which Burnet cites at 273a7, is identified as a sixteenth-century copy of Hermias' commentary, not a manuscript of Plato. The notes on Burnet's own readings at 268c2 and 272b3 now call them his corrections; the note at 272e2 says that Heindorf joined B's αὐτὰ to T's τὰ; the note on Hippocrates gives Galen's identification of the writing meant; and the lists of first hands and corrections were completed.

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the nine pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter and every margin label with a full rendering of the page; the second confirmed that the page after the dialogue's last is blank. The most serious finding was in the text: at 273c10 Burnet sets a space before the dash after *μὴ*, and the means used to reproduce the space had removed the dash itself; the dash is now printed, spaced as on his page (the typesetting was changed so that such a space can be carried). Four forms in the apparatus were corrected: T and W's *νῦν δὴ* at 273d8 is two words, against the text's *νυνδὴ*; Burnet prints *οὐχ ὧς*, with a circumflex, as the reading of B and T at 274a3, an apparent slip now reproduced; *γραφήν* at 275d4 has an acute; and B's *δίκη* at 278e1 has no iota subscript. Confirmed as drafted were the quotation marks of Theuth and Thamus with the capitals at their heads; the letterspacing of *λήθης γῆρας* and *ἴκηται* at 276d3–4, without *εἰς τὸ* or *ἐὰν*; [δὲ], ⟨δὲ⟩ and [*ἐν*]; the unlabelled paragraph at 279c4; the breathings settled on the photographs (*αὑτῷ* 275e5, *αὑτοῖς* 276c8, *αὑ-|τοὺς* 276d6, *αὑτοῦ* and *αὐτῷ* 278a6–7, *ᾗ* 278c4, against *αὐτὸς* and *αὐτοὺς* beside them); *τἀληθῆ* with its coronis; *ηὗρες* in the text against *εὗρες* in the apparatus; and in the apparatus *ἡ* B and *ᾗ* T at 273e9, *ἡ* T and *ᾗ* B at 274a2, *ἐρῃ*, *πλημμενος*, *νυν*, *ω*, *ιδῃ*, *μουσιον* and *ἐπελλον* without accents, B's *αυτῷ* and T's *αὐτον* at 279a8, and Bekker's dual *εὐξαμένω*.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause. Six Stephanus markers were moved to the first English word of the new section: at 276e the whole of Phaedrus' line belongs to e; at 277b and 277e "concerning" and "about" render the *πέρι* that opens the section; and at 275b, 275e and 279c the auxiliary or the subject goes with its verb. The draft had used "capable" both for *δυνατός* and for *ἱκανός*, which meet in one argument at 276a–277a; *δυνατός* and *ἀδύνατος* are again "able" and "unable", as in Blocks I–VIII and the *Symposium*, and "capable" is kept for *ἱκανοί* at 277a. Renderings were brought into line with the earlier blocks and the *Symposium*: *δεινός* "dreadful", *μαντεία* "prophecy", *φαῦλος* "paltry", *ἁρμόττειν* "be in harmony", *ἀδελφά* "brothers", *οἱ πολλοί* "the many", *θαυμάζειν* "marvel", *ἀγαπᾶν* "cherish", *μαθηταί* "pupils", *ἀναγκαῖος* "necessary", *χαίρειν* "rejoice", *ὁμοίως* "likewise" and *κατὰ ταὐτά* "alike", *Τί δ'*; "What?", *ἐθέλειν* "be willing", *τίκτειν* "give birth", *ὁρᾶν* "see", *ἐξαγγέλλειν* "report", *φέρειν* and *ἄγειν* "carry" and

"lead off", σαφής "clear", ποικίλος "subtle", ἐπιστῆμαι "kinds of knowledge", λέγεσθαι "be spoken of", and "say" for λέγειν where the draft had "tell", which is κελεύειν's. Also corrected: Burnet's ἱερόν at 274c, predicative ("to whom the bird too is sacred"), where the draft had followed B and T's τὸ ἱερόν; the aorist καταλιπεῖν at 275c ("thinks he has left behind"); the dative of agent at 279c ("For my part, I have prayed moderately"); the order of 273e–274a, so that the negative belongs to what the wiser say; and particles of the readings Burnet prints (γε at 273c7 and 275b5, δή, τοι, καί and others). Several phrases that followed the Loeb translation of 1914 were rewritten.

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the new sentences of the Editorial Note against the sources and the photographs. Two claims of the Editorial Note were true of Burnet's page but not yet of the volume, the spaced dash at 273c10 and νῦν δὴ at 273d8, and the Greek was corrected to match. In the notes: Lysias' "gratify" is cited where the boy's favours are meant (227c, 234b); "oak and rock" is given its two Homeric senses, origins and idle chatter; the proverb of writing in water is cited from the *Suda*, with Sophocles' use of the image beside it; the watering of 251b–c is that of the wing and the soul; Pan is named at 263d with the Nymphs, not felt; φέρειν and ἄγειν, a pair that usually means plunder, are taken here, as in LSJ, simply as bearing and carrying; "Ammon's prophecy" as the king's verdict is marked as an interpretation; and the prayer formula of 273c is cited from Plato's own *Cratylus* (400e) as well as Aeschylus. Two notes were added where Burnet's reading changes the sense: Stobaeus' "a god" at 274b9 and B's ἀδυνάτων at 276c8, which makes the speeches, not the writer, unable. The Editorial Note's lists of example places were extended for this block.