Diotimos Library · Plato Collection · Bilingual Edition
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Facing Pages · Branch 28 of 34
Lysis · 221b–222a
Ancient Greek
p. 50απόλλυσθαι;—Οὐδέν.—Ἔσονται ἄρα αἱ μήτε ἀγαθαὶ μήτε κακαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ ἐὰν ἀπόληται τὰ κακά.—Φαίνεται.— Οἷόν τε οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμοῦντα καὶ ἐρῶντα τούτου οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἐρᾷ μὴ φιλεῖν;—Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.—Ἔσται ἄρα 221c καὶ τῶν κακῶν ἀπολομένων, ὡς ἔοικεν, φίλ’ ἄττα.—Ναί.— Οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε τὸ κακὸν αἴτιον ἦν τοῦ φίλον τι εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν τούτου ἀπολομένου φίλον ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ. αἰτίας γὰρ ἀπολομένης ἀδύνατόν που ἦν ἔτ’ ἐκεῖνο εἶναι, οὗ ἦν αὕτη ἡ αἰτία.—Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.—Οὐκοῦν ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν τὸ φίλον φιλεῖν τι καὶ διά τι· καὶ ᾠήθημεν τότε γε διὰ τὸ κακὸν τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν;—Ἀληθῆ.— 221d Νῦν δέ γε, ὡς ἔοικε, φαίνεται ἄλλη τις αἰτία τοῦ φιλεῖν τε καὶ φιλεῖσθαι.—Ἔοικεν.—Ἆρ’ οὖν· τῷ ὄντι, ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς φιλίας αἰτία, καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν φίλον ἐστὶν τούτῳ οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ τότε ὅταν ἐπιθυμῇ, ὃ δὲ τὸ πρότερον ἐλέγομεν φίλον εἶναι, ὕθλος τις ἦν, ὥσπερ ποίημα μακρὸν συγκείμενον;—Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη.—Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, τό γε ἐπιθυμοῦν, οὗ ἂν ἐνδεὲς ᾖ, τούτου 221e ἐπιθυμεῖ. ἦ γάρ;—Ναί.—Τὸ δ’ ἐνδεὲς ἄρα φίλον ἐκείνου οὗ ἂν ἐνδεὲς ᾖ;—Δοκεῖ μοι.—Ἐνδεὲς δὲ γίγνεται οὗ ἄν τι ἀφαιρῆται.—Πῶς δ’ οὔ;—Τοῦ οἰκείου δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅ τε ἔρως καὶ ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τυγχάνει οὖσα, ὡς φαίνεται, ὦ Μενέξενέ τε καὶ Λύσι.—Συνεφάτην.—Ὑμεῖς ἄρα εἰ φίλοι ἐστὸν ἀλλήλοις, φύσει πῃ οἰκεῖοί ἐσθ’ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς.—Κομιδῇ, ἐφάτην.—Καὶ εἰ ἄρα τις ἕτερος ἑτέρου ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, 222a ὦ παῖδες, ἢ ἐρᾷ, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐπεθύμει οὐδὲ ἤρα οὐδὲ ἐφίλει, εἰ μὴ οἰκεῖός πῃ τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ κατά τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἢ τρόπους ἢ εἶδος.— Πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὁ Μενέξενος· ὁ δὲ Λύσις ἐσίγησεν.—Εἶεν,
Lysis
p. 51— “None.” — “Then the desires that are neither good nor bad will exist even if the bad things perish.” — “Apparently.” — “Now, is it possible for one who desires and is in love not to love what he desires and is in love with?” — “It doesn’t seem so to me.” — “Then there will be, 221c even when the bad things have perished, it seems, some things that are friends.” — “Yes.” — “There would not, if the bad were the cause of anything’s being a friend: if that had perished, one thing would not be a friend to another. For when a cause has perished, it is impossible, I take it, for that to exist any longer of which this was the cause.” — “You speak rightly.” — “Now, it has been agreed by us that the friend loves something, and because of something; and we thought then that it was because of the bad that what is neither good nor bad loves the good?” — “True.” — 221d “But now, it seems, some other cause of loving and being loved appears.” — “It seems so.” — “Then is it really, as we were saying just now, desire that is the cause of friendship, and is what desires a friend to that which it desires, and at the time when it desires it; and was what we were calling a friend before some idle talk, like a long poem put together?” — “It looks like it,” he said. — “But surely,” I said, “what desires 221e desires what it lacks. Isn’t that so?” — “Yes.” — “Then is what lacks a friend of that which it lacks?” — “It seems so to me.” — “And it comes to lack whatever is taken away from it.” — “Of course.” — “Then it is of what is akin, it seems, that love and friendship and desire are in fact, apparently, Menexenus and Lysis.” — They both agreed. — “Then if you two are friends to each other, you are by nature in some way akin to each other.” — “Absolutely,” they both said. — “And so, if one person desires another,” I said, 222a “boys, or is in love with him, he would never desire him, or be in love, or love, unless he were in fact in some way akin to his beloved, either in his soul, or in some character of his soul, or in his ways, or in his figure.” — “Very much so,” said Menexenus; but Lysis was silent. — “Very well,”
Socrates
Reading Lysis · Lysis · 221b–222a
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
The complete Lysis, 203a–223b: Socrates questions Lysis and Menexenus about friendship, love, desire, and what is akin, as Hippothales listens. Burnet’s Greek faces a new Diotimos Editions English translation, with an introduction, key words, outline, glossary, critical apparatus, and linked translator notes.
Historical Text and Translation
Greek: Plato, Lysis, in John Burnet, Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford, 1903; second impression, corrected, January 1909, printed by Horace Hart). The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library transcription and checked against photographs of this impression by the supplied edition; Burnet’s lineation and critical apparatus are retained. The digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, under CC BY-SA 4.0. English translation and editorial matter: Diotimos Editions, 2026.
About Diotimos Editions
This historical edition credits Diotimos Editions as its English translator.
Rights
The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are reused under CC BY-SA 4.0. The new English translation and editorial matter are credited to Diotimos Editions, 2026; no open license is stated in the supplied edition.
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