

PLATO

LYSIS

ΛΥΣΙΣ

The Greek text of John Burnet

Platonis Opera, tomus III (Oxford, 1903; second impression, corrected,
January 1909, printed by Horace Hart)

with a new English translation and notes

THE COMPLETE DIALOGUE

203a–223b

Translation by Diotimos Editions

2026

CONTENTS

Introduction	iv
Key Words of the Dialogue	xii
The Text, 203a–223b	2
Outline	57
Editorial Note	64
Glossary of Key Terms	69
Note on this Edition	73

INTRODUCTION

THE DIALOGUE

The *Lysis* is a conversation that Socrates tells, from beginning to end, to a listener who is never named and who never speaks; once, it seems, near the end of the argument about opposites, he turns to him with "And indeed, my companion" (216a). He was making his way from the Academy to the Lyceum by the road outside the city wall, he says, when Hippothales the son of Hieronymus, Ctesippus of Paeania and other young men stopped him at the little gate by the spring of Panops and asked him into a newly built wrestling-school, where the time "is spent mostly in talk" (203a–204a). It is the *Hermaea*, the festival of *Hermes*, and so for that day the young men and the boys "are mixed together in the same place" (206d). Inside, Socrates questions two boys: *Lysis*, the son of *Democrates* of *Aexone*, with whom *Hippothales* is in love, and *Menexenus*, the son of *Demophon* and *Ctesippus*' cousin, whose closest companion *Lysis* is. *Hippothales* listens, hidden among the bystanders, "afraid of making himself hateful to him" (207b). The talk ends when the boys' tutors come to take them home (223a–b).

It is a short work: twenty-one pages of *Stephanus*' edition (203a–223b), twenty-seven of *Burnet*'s. The ancient arrangement of *Plato*'s works by *Thrasyllus*, which *Diogenes Laertius* preserves, puts it last in the fifth tetralogy, after the *Theages*, the *Charmides* and the *Laches*, with the subtitle "or On Friendship", and classes it as "maieutic", a word taken from the midwife's art (3.59). *Diogenes* also tells a story that *Socrates*, hearing *Plato* read the *Lysis*, said "Heracles, how many lies the young man tells about me!" (3.35); the story cannot be used to date the dialogue (interpretation). The dialogue is usually counted among *Plato*'s earlier works, with the *Charmides* and the *Laches*, which also take a word that everyone uses and fail to define it; its date is not known.

THE QUESTION AND THE ANSWERS

The question, what the friend is, is named in so many words only late (218b, 222b), and the dialogue ends on it: "these people, as

they go away, will say that we think we are friends of one another", Socrates tells the boys, "but have not yet been able to find out what the friend is" (223b). The word for "friend", *philos*, is said both of the one who loves and of the one who is loved, of people and of things; the translation renders it "friend" every time, so that the reader can see the same word tried in each answer (see the Key Words).

The talk with Lysis begins from Hippothales' request to know what talk would make him a friend to his darling (206c), and turns at once to love of another kind. His father and mother love him, Lysis agrees, and want him to be happy; yet they do not let him drive the chariot or touch his mother's loom, and "someone rules" him, his tutor, who is a slave (207d–208e). They do entrust him with what he understands, reading, writing and the lyre (209a–c), and his father will entrust him with everything on whatever day he believes that Lysis understands better than he does; so will the neighbor and the Athenians, and the Great King would sooner let strangers who understood cooking or medicine better than his son throw salt into his broth or treat his son's eyes (209c–210a). The conclusion is hard: in the things in which we are of no benefit, no one will be a friend to us, "not even your father", and if Lysis becomes wise, "everyone will be a friend to you and everyone akin to you, for you will be useful and good" (210c–d).

Menexenus is then asked the question that runs through the rest of the dialogue: "when someone loves someone, which becomes a friend of which, the one who loves of the one loved, or the one loved of the one who loves?" (212a–b). Each answer fails in turn. If one loves and is not loved back, or is even hated, the two cannot both be friends (212b–d); if only those who love each other are friends, then there are no "friends of horses" or "friends of wisdom" unless the horses and wisdom love them back, and the poet who called children and horses friends is lying (212d–e); if what is loved is the friend, then "many are loved by their enemies and hated by their friends" (213a–b); and the last answer fares no better (213b–c). Menexenus gives up: "I don't see much of a way through, myself" (213c).

Socrates turns to Lysis, who has blurted out that they were not seeking rightly (213d), and takes up the poets' saying that "the god himself" brings like to like (214a), which the natural philosophers repeat (214b). Perhaps half of it is right, Socrates answers, and perhaps all of it: if the wicked are like one another, half of it is not true, since the wicked man does wrong and those who do wrong can-

not be friends (214b–c); so the poets may mean that the bad are not like even themselves, and that “the good man alone is a friend to the good man alone” (214c–d). Yet what is like, insofar as it is like, has nothing to give what is like it (214e–215a), and the good, insofar as they are good, are “sufficient for themselves” and have no use for each other, and so cannot “set great store by each other” (215a–c). The opposite view, which Socrates once heard with Hesiod brought in as a witness, that like is most hostile to like and “the most opposite is most a friend to the most opposite” (215c–216a), falls to the objection the “masters of contradiction” would make, that enmity is most opposite to friendship (216a–b).

THE ARGUMENT’S MAIN STRETCH

At 216c Socrates proposes something new, “divining” it, he says (216d): that there are, as it were, three kinds, “the good, the bad, and what is neither good nor bad”, and that what is neither good nor bad is a friend of the good. The healthy body needs no doctor; the sick body, which is neither good nor bad, loves medicine because of disease (217a–b). What is neither good nor bad “becomes a friend of the good because of the presence of bad”, but only before it has itself become bad (217b–c): white lead on fair hair makes it only “appear” white, while old age makes it white (217c–e). In the same way, neither the wise, gods or men, nor those who are bad and unlearned “love wisdom”, but those who have ignorance and still believe that they do not know what they do not know (218a–b). Socrates tells the boys that they “have most certainly found out what the friend is and what it is not” (218b), and he is “very glad, like a hunter” (218c).

Almost at once “a most strange suspicion” comes to him, and he fears that “we have been rich in a dream” (218c). The sick man is a friend of the doctor because of disease and for the sake of health; health is itself a friend, and so a friend for the sake of something that is a friend; and so on, until one must either give up or arrive at “some starting point”, “first friend, for the sake of which we say all the other things too are friends” (219c–d). The other things that are called friends for its sake may be like “images” of it, and deceive us (219d); what a father sets great store by is not the cup or the wine but the son for whose sake he provides them (219d–220a); and so “what is really a friend is that very thing in which all these friendships, as they are called, end” (220b).

Is the good, then, loved because of the bad (220b–c)? If the bad went away, the good would be “in no way useful to us, but have

become useless", like a remedy where there is no illness (220c–d), and what is really a friend would turn out to be a friend "for the sake of an enemy" (220e). But desires that are neither good nor bad, such as hunger that does no harm, would remain even if the bad perished, and one who desires cannot but love what he desires; so there will still be things that are friends, and the bad was not the cause (221a–c). Desire, then, may be "the cause of friendship", and what "we were calling a friend before" may have been "some idle talk, like a long poem put together" (221d).

THE ENDING

What desires desires what it lacks; it comes to lack "whatever is taken away from it"; and so "it is of what is akin, it seems, that love and friendship and desire are in fact" (221d–e). The boys agree that if they are friends to each other, they are "by nature in some way akin to each other" (221e), and Socrates draws the conclusion that no one would desire or love another "unless he were in fact in some way akin to his beloved" (222a). Menexenus agrees; Lysis is silent. Since "it is necessary for us to love what is akin by nature", "it is necessary for the genuine lover, and not the pretended one, to be loved by his darling" (222a); the two boys nod "somehow, just barely", and Hippothales, "from pleasure, turned colors of every kind" (222b).

Socrates then asks whether the akin is the same as the like. If it is, it is not easy to throw out their earlier argument that like is useless to like (222b–c). Granting, "drunk, as it were, with the argument", that the akin is something different, the boys answer that each is akin to its own kind, and the argument falls back into those it threw out at first, for the bad man will be a friend to the bad (222c–d); and if the good is what is akin, then "the good man" will be "a friend to the good alone", which they thought they had refuted (222d). He counts over everything they have said, "like the wise men in the law courts": neither those who are loved, nor those who love, nor those who are like or unlike, nor the good, nor those who are akin, nor any of the rest has proved to be a friend, and "I no longer know what to say" (222e). He is about to "rouse someone else", one of the older people, when the tutors arrive, "like spirits of some kind", and, the worse for a drink at the festival and "impossible to deal with", take the boys home (223a–b). His last words are that they "have become ridiculous", an old man and two boys (223b).

A first-time reader is likely to be troubled at five points. The first is the word itself. *Philos* is “friend” and “dear”, and is said of the one who loves and of the one who is loved; the argument of 212a–213c turns on that double use, and the translation, which keeps “friend” throughout, shows the argument’s moves but makes some sentences strange, as when “the friend is a friend of the friend” “for the sake of the friend, because of the enemy” (219b), where “of the friend” is Burnet’s own addition. Such sentences are the Greek’s, not the translator’s.

The second is the conclusion of the talk with Lysis, that “not even your father” loves him, nor does anyone love anyone “insofar as he is useless” (210c–d). It is drawn from what parents entrust to their son, and Socrates tells the listener that he very nearly said to Hippothales at once, “This, Hippothales, is how one should talk to one’s darling, humbling him and taking him down” (210e): the reader must decide how far the argument is meant and how far it is a lesson for Hippothales.

The third is the argument that the good, being sufficient for themselves, have no use for each other and so cannot be friends (215a–c). It assumes that one cherishes only what one needs, an assumption the dialogue does not defend there, but returns to when it asks whether the good would be loved if the bad perished (220b–221c) and when it finds that what desires desires what it lacks (221d–e).

The fourth is the “first friend” (219c–d). Whether Socrates means that only the first friend is a friend in truth and the friends we love for its sake are no friends at all, or only that they are friends for its sake, the text does not settle (interpretation). The passage turns on the difference between “for the sake of” and “because of”, which the English keeps apart throughout the passage; at 220e the Greek itself says “for the sake of an enemy” where the earlier steps had “because of”, and the note there says so.

The fifth is the ending. The akin is offered at 221e–222a, nearly made the answer, and then, granted to be different from the like, falls back into the arguments about like and the good that were thrown out at first (222b–d); and the conclusion that the genuine lover must “be loved by his darling” (222a) is drawn while Hippothales listens. The dialogue gives no answer; its last words are what, Socrates says, these people will say as they go away: that he and the two boys think they are friends of one another “but have not yet been able to find out what the friend is” (223b). Several

of Burnet's readings in the last third of the text are conjectures or later readings that change the sense (217c, 218a, 219b, 219c, 220b, 220c, 222c), and the notes say where.

THE MANNER

The *Lysis* is one of the most playful of Plato's dialogues. Ctesippus mocks Hippothales' poems: Hippothales has "deafened" them all with the name of Lysis, "And what he tells in prose, dreadful as it is, isn't so very dreadful; but when he sets about drenching us with his poems and compositions!" (204c-d); the poems are about the family's horses and its ancestor who entertained Heracles, "things more Cronian still" (205c-d). Socrates calls himself "paltry and useless" in all but one thing, "to be able to know quickly one who is in love and one who is beloved" (204b-c), and later "altogether like one in love" toward the acquiring of friends (211e). The questioning of Lysis is comic in its turns: the boy may not beat the mules, but "the muleteer" may (208b), and he would be beaten if he so much as touched his mother's loom (208e); the Great King, who would not let his own son throw in even a little, would let Socrates and Lysis "grab a handful of the salt" and throw it into his broth (209e). Socrates swears "by the Dog" straight after a dog (211e), says "Talk I must" when urged to talk (211c), and finds himself, a moment after he has "most certainly found out" what the friend is, "rich in a dream" (218b-c). The argument makes them "drunk, as it were" (222c), and Socrates counts it over "like the wise men in the law courts" (222e). The tutors arrive at the end "like spirits of some kind", speaking "half-foreign Greek" and the worse for the festival's wine (223a-b). Lysis' youth is drawn in a few touches: he keeps turning round to look at the speakers and hesitates to come over alone (207a-b), speaks to Socrates "very boyishly and in a friendly way" (211a), blushes when he blurts out an answer (213d), is silent when Menexenus agrees that a lover must be akin to his beloved, and only just nods at the conclusion (222a-b).

ON READING THIS EDITION

Each left-hand page is one page of Burnet's Greek, line for line, with his margin and apparatus; the right-hand page opposite translates it. The letters in the margins of both pages (a-e) mark the sections of Stephanus' pages, by which Plato is cited; the numbers 204 to 223 mark where each of his pages begins. The small numbers 5 and 10 in the Greek margin count Burnet's lines, by which

his apparatus is keyed. Socrates tells the whole story himself, to a listener who is never named, so the speeches stand inside his narration, in quotation marks. Where the talk goes quickly, Burnet runs the questions and answers on in one paragraph, divided by dashes, and the English does the same. Burnet sets three quotations of verse on lines of their own (212e, 214a, 215c–d), and so does the English. Words in square brackets [] are deleted by Burnet and are not translated (204a, 209d, 213e, 216b, 217c, 218d, 220e); words in angle brackets < > are supplied by Burnet where the principal manuscripts lack them, and are translated (211e, 213c, 215d, 219a, 219b). The notes are numbered afresh on each page. At the back of the volume are an Outline of the argument, an Editorial Note on Burnet's text, his apparatus and the translation, a Glossary of the key terms with the places where they occur, and a Note on how this edition was made.

A NOTE ON THE PERSONS

What the text itself establishes is this. Lysis is the eldest son of Democrates of Aexone and the grandson of another Lysis; the family is rich, has won chariot races at the great games, and traces its descent from a son of Zeus who entertained Heracles (204e–205d). He is young enough to have a tutor and to be “not yet of age” (208c, 209a), and is “outstanding in looks” (207a). Menexenus, the son of Demophon, is about his age, since they dispute which of them is the elder (207b–c); Lysis is his closest companion (206d); and he is “contentious”, “a pupil of Ctesippus” (211b–c). Hippothales, the son of Hieronymus, is in love with Lysis and writes poems about him (204b–205d). Ctesippus of Paeania is Menexenus' cousin (206d). Miccus, who teaches at the wrestling-school, is “a companion” of Socrates (204a). Lysis' tutor is a slave (208c).

Outside sources add a little, and most of it is uncertain. Aexone was a deme on the coast south of Athens (Strabo 9.1.21). A Ctesippus of Paeania appears in the *Euthydemus* (273a), and Ctesippus of Paeania and a Menexenus are among those present at Socrates' death in the *Phaedo* (59b); a Menexenus gives his name to Plato's *Menexenus*. That these are the young men of the *Lysis* is likely but not certain. A Hippothales of Athens appears in Diogenes Laertius' list of Plato's pupils (3.46). A marble gravestone in the form of a loutrophoros, of the second quarter of the fourth century BC, from Moschato near Piraeus and now in the Piraeus Museum, was set up for Timocleides son of Lysis; the old man seated on its re-

lief is Lysis son of Democrates, of Aexone, whose father's name and deme make him the boy of the dialogue (R. S. Stroud, "The Gravestone of Socrates' Friend, Lysis", *Hesperia* 53, 1984, 355–360). Miccus is not otherwise known.

KEY WORDS OF THE DIALOGUE

Each entry says what the word meant in Athens, what the dialogue does with it, and how it is rendered. The Glossary at the back lists the renderings with the places where they occur.

FRIEND (PHILOS)

Philos was the ordinary word for a friend, and also for anything or anyone dear; in Homer and the early poets it could mean one's own, and in the plural it meant one's family and allies. It is said both of the one who loves and of the one who is loved, and the neuter, *philon*, is said of things. The dialogue's question is "what the friend is" (223b), and its argument turns again and again on the word's two directions: at 212a–213c both are first friends if one of them loves, then neither unless both love, then the friend is the one who is loved, then the one who loves; at 216c–218c it is "what is neither good nor bad", a friend of the good, and at 219c–220b the "first friend" for whose sake the others are friends. The English renders *philos* "friend" throughout, of people, of things and of the neuter, and never "dear", as settled with the publisher, so that the reader sees the same word tried each time; the note at its first occurrence (206a) says so. Where the Greek has the dative, the English has "a friend to" someone, and where it has the genitive, "a friend of" someone, and the two are kept apart (213a, 213b). The cost is a few sentences that are strange in English, as when Solon's children are "friends" (212e) or "the beautiful is a friend" (216c); the notes say what the Greek means there.

LOVE, BE IN LOVE (PHILEIN; ERŌS, ERAN)

Philein, the verb of *philos*, meant to love in the widest sense: parents love their children, men love wine and horses, and it is also the word for a kiss. *Erōs* was the love of a lover, desire for a beautiful person, and *eran* "to be in love". Hippothales is "in love" from the start (204b), and the verb first appears with the parents who "love" Lysis (207d); its argument then uses *philein* throughout. The noun *erōs*, used of Hippothales' love at the start (204b–e), returns only at the end, where "love and friendship and desire" are found to

be of what is akin (221e). The English renders *philein* “love” every time, and keeps the noun “love” for *erōs* and “be in love” for *eran*, so that the two families can be told apart (the note at 207d says so). Socrates is “altogether like one in love” (*erōtikōs*) toward the acquiring of friends (211e).

FRIENDSHIP (PHILIA)

Philia was friendship, affection, and the bond between kin, allies and partners. In the dialogue it is the relation whose ground is sought: the two boys’ “friendship” (207c), “true friendship” (214d), the friendship of the most unlike (215d), “its friendship for the good” (217e), and the “friendships, as they are called” that end in the first friend (220b). The English renders it “friendship” every time, and never uses the noun “love” for it.

COMPANION (HETAIROS)

Hetairos was a comrade, a member of one’s circle or club, and, of a teacher’s circle, a disciple. The English renders it “companion”, and never “friend”, so that “friend” is always *philos*. Miccus is “a companion” of Socrates (204a); Lysis is Menexenus’ “closest companion of all” (206d); Socrates would sooner “acquire a companion than Darius’ gold” and calls himself “a friend of companions” (*philetairos*, 211e); Menexenus is “my friend and companion” (213b); and at 216a, it seems, the listener to whom Socrates tells the story is addressed as “my companion”.

DARLING, LOVER, BELOVED (TA PAIDIKA; ERASTĒS; ERŌMENOS)

In the language of Athenian courtship an older *erastēs*, a “lover”, courted a boy, his *erōmenos*, “beloved”, or, in the everyday word, his *paidika*, his “darling”. Hippothales is Lysis’ lover; he asks “what talk one could hold, or what one could do, to become a friend to one’s darling” (206c), and Socrates’ lesson is “how one should talk to one’s darling” (210e). The English renders *erastēs* “lover”, *erōmenos* “beloved” and *ta paidika* “darling” every time (205a, 206a, 222a). The conclusion that “the genuine lover” must “be loved by his darling” (222a) is drawn in these words, while Hippothales listens.

LIKE, UNLIKE (HOMOIOS, ANOMOIOS)

Homoios meant “like”, “similar”, and also “equal”. The poets say that “the god brings like to like” (214a), and “the wisest men”, “who talk and write about nature and the whole”, say “that like must always be a friend to like” (214b); Socrates shows that the wicked cannot be friends, however like they are (214b–c), and that what is like, insofar as it is like, has nothing to give what is like it (214e–215a), while the good, insofar as they are good, are sufficient for themselves and need nothing (215a–b). The opposite view, that “like is most hostile to like” (215c), fails too, and at the end the akin, granted to be “something different from what is like” (222c), falls back into the arguments about like and the good that were thrown out (222c–d). The English renders *homoios* “like” and *anomoios* “unlike” throughout (the superlative is “most alike”, 215d); where the Greek speaks of persons, it says “one who is like” or “those who are like” (214e–215a, 222e), and of things “like ... to like”. *Eoike*, “resembles” (216c, 220e), is kept apart from it; “like” in a comparison (“like fathers and guides of wisdom”, 214a; “like a hunter”, 218c) renders *hōsper*, which is “as it were” at 219d.

OPPOSITE (ENANTIOS)

Enantios meant “opposite”, “contrary”, and of persons “hostile”. The man Socrates once heard held that “the most opposite is most a friend to the most opposite”, the dry desiring the wet and the cold the hot (215e); the masters of contradiction will ask whether “enmity is not most opposite to friendship” (216a–b). The English renders it “opposite”, and the noun *enantiotēs* “oppositeness” (216b).

GOOD, BAD, NEITHER (AGATHOS, KAKOS; PONĒROS)

Agathos was “good” in every sense, of men, of things and of conduct, and *kakos* “bad” in all the same senses. The argument of 216c–221d rests on three kinds, “the good, the bad, and what is neither good nor bad” (216d), and the English keeps these three phrases word for word, in the order the Greek gives them (“neither good nor bad”, “neither bad nor good”; with “not yet” at 218b, “not yet either good or bad”). *Ponēros*, “wicked”, is used of the men who do wrong (214b–c) and is kept apart from *kakos*.

AKIN, ALIEN (OIKEIOS, ALLOTRIOS)

Oikeios meant “of one’s household”, one’s own, kin, and so proper or natural to something; *allotrios* “belonging to others”, “foreign”. At 210c anything “more akin to us” than our father and mother will get in our way in the things in which we do not acquire sense, and if Lysis becomes wise “everyone will be a friend to you and everyone akin to you” (210d). At the end the word nearly becomes the answer: “it is of what is akin, it seems, that love and friendship and desire are in fact”, and the boys are “by nature in some way akin to each other” (221e); but the akin, granted to be different from the like, falls back into the arguments about like and the good (222c–d). The English renders *oikeios* “akin” every time. At 210c *allotrios* is “strangers” of persons, and the things in which we do not acquire sense “will belong to others”; it is “alien” of the bad, where the good is said to be akin to everything (222c).

DESIRE (EPITHYMEIN, EPITHYMIA)

Epithymein was “to desire”, to set one’s heart on something, of food and drink as of honors and persons. Lysis’ parents prevent him from doing what he desires (207e–208e); Socrates has “in fact desired a certain possession”, friends, ever since he was a boy (211d–e); the opposite desires its opposite (215e); and at the end desire is offered as “the cause of friendship” (221d), and then “what desires desires what it lacks” (221d–e). The English renders the verb and the noun “desire” throughout, and keeps the verb “want” for *boulesthai*.

USEFUL, USELESS; BENEFIT (CHRĒSIMOS, ACHRĒSTOS; ŌPHELIA, ŌPHELIMOS)

Chrēsimos was “useful”, *achrēstos* “useless”; *ōphelia* was “benefit” or “help”, and *ōphelimos* “beneficial”. At 210c–d friendship is tied to usefulness: no one loves anyone “insofar as he is useless”, and Lysis, once wise, will be “useful and good”. The good, needing no benefit, would have no use for each other (214e–215b), and the good itself, if the bad went away, would be “in no way useful to us, but have become useless” (220c). The English renders *chrēsimos* “useful”, *achrēstos* “useless”, *chreia* “use”, and the *ōphel-* words “benefit” and “beneficial” throughout. Socrates calls himself “paltry and useless” in all but the one thing given him by a god, “to be able to know quickly one who is in love and one who is beloved”

(204b-c).

FOR THE SAKE OF, BECAUSE OF (HENEKA; DIA)

Heneka meant “for the sake of”, the end for which a thing is done or loved; *dia* with the accusative meant “because of”, its cause. From 218d the argument turns on the difference. The friend is a friend “for the sake of something and because of something” (218d), the sick man a friend of the doctor “because of disease and for the sake of health” (218e), and at 219b the friend is a friend of the friend “for the sake of the friend, because of the enemy”. The things that are friends for the sake of another friend must come at last to “that which is first friend” (219c-d), and the good, it is asked, may be loved “because of the bad” (220b-d). The English keeps “for the sake of” for *heneka* every time, and “because of” for *dia* with the accusative throughout 218d-221d, where the argument turns on the difference; at 220e the Greek itself shifts to “for the sake of an enemy”, and the note there says so.

UNDERSTAND (PHRONEIN; APHRŌN)

Phronein was “to think”, “to have understanding”, “to be sensible”; *phronimos* was “understanding” or “sensible”, and *aphrōn* “without understanding”, “foolish”. The talk with Lysis turns on it: he is entrusted with what he understands, and will be entrusted with everything once he is believed to “understand better” than the one who entrusts it (209c-210b). The play at 210d, that one cannot “think highly of oneself” (*mega phronein*) in things in which one “does not yet understand”, and that one who is “without understanding” is not “proud” (*megalophrōn*), is in the words, and the note there says so. The English renders *phronein* “understand” throughout, and keeps *nous*, “sense” (210b), apart.

CHERISH (AGAPAN)

Agapan meant “to be fond of”, “to be content with”, “to welcome”. It appears where the argument asks what one needs: things that have no aid to give each other cannot “be cherished by each other” (215a), whoever is not in need of anything “would not cherish anything either” (215b), the one who does not know “must cherish the one who knows and love him” (215d), and “we cherished and loved the good” because of the bad (220d). The English renders it “cherish” every time, and never “love”.

LOVE WISDOM (PHILOSOPHEIN; PHILOSOPHOS; PHILOSOPHIA)

Philosophos was a lover of wisdom, a philosopher, and *philosophein* was “to pursue wisdom”; the words were formed, like the other *phil-* compounds, from *philos* and the thing loved. At 212d the *philosophoi* stand last in a list of “friends of” horses, quails, dogs, wine and exercise, and are “friends of wisdom”, unless “wisdom loves them back”; at 213d Socrates is pleased with Lysis’ *philosophia*, his “philosophy”; and at 218a–b those who “love wisdom” are neither the wise nor the bad and unlearned, but those who still believe that they do not know what they do not know. The English renders the compound “friends of wisdom”, the verb “love wisdom”, and the noun “philosophy”, with notes at each place.

BEAUTIFUL (KALOS)

Kalos was “beautiful”, “fine”, “noble”, said of persons, of things and of acts; *kalos kagathos*, “beautiful and good”, was the Athenian phrase for a gentleman, and Lysis is worthy to be called both (207a). At 216c Socrates recalls the old proverb that “the beautiful is a friend”, and says that “the good is beautiful” (216d); his new proposal is that what is neither good nor bad is “a friend of the beautiful and good” (216d). The English renders *kalos* “beautiful” of persons and of the beautiful that the proverb calls a friend, and “fine” of other things (205e).

ΛΥΣΙΣ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ

St. II
p. 203

Ἐπορευόμενῃ μὲν ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας εὐθὺς Λυκείου τὴν ἔξω a
τείχους ὑπ' αὐτὸ τὸ τεῖχος· ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐγενόμην κατὰ τὴν
πυλῖδα ἧ ἢ Πάνοπος κρήνη, ἐνταῦθα συνέντυχον Ἴπποθάλει τε
τῷ Ἰερωνύμῳ καὶ Κτησίππῳ τῷ Παιανιεῖ καὶ ἄλλοις μετὰ
τούτων νεανίσκοις ἀθροίσι συνεστῶσι. καί με προσιόντα ὁ 5
Ἴπποθάλης ἰδὼν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ποῖ δὴ πορεύῃ καὶ
πόθεν; b

Ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πορεύομαι εὐθὺς Λυκείου.
Δεῦρο δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, εὐθὺς ἡμῶν. οὐ παραβάλλεις; ἄξιον
μέντοι.

Ποῖ, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις, καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς ὑμᾶς; 5
Δεῦρο, ἔφη, δείξας μοι ἐν τῷ καταντικρὺ τοῦ τείχους περί-
βολόν τέ τινα καὶ θύραν ἀνεωγμένην. διατρίβομεν δέ, ἦ δ'
ὅς, αὐτόθι ἡμεῖς τε αὐτοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι πάνν πολλοὶ καὶ καλοί.

Ἔστιν δέ δὴ τί τοῦτο, καὶ τίς ἡ διατριβή; 204
Παλαιότρα, ἔφη, νεωστὶ ᾠκοδομημένη· ἡ δὲ διατριβὴ τὰ
πολλὰ ἐν λόγοις, ὧν ἡδέως ἄν σοι μεταδιδόμην.
Καλῶς γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιῶντες· διδάσκει δὲ τίς αὐτόθι;
Σὸς ἐταῖρός γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ ἐπαινέτης, Μίκκος. 5

203 a 1 ἀκαδημίας B (sed t ex emend. B) T (et mox b 1) a 3 ἱπποθαλεῖ B (et mox
a 6 ἱπποθαλῆς) b 3 εὐθὺς* B: εὐθὺς T W παραβάλλεις] παραβαλεῖς Hirschig
b 5 ἔφην] ν postea add. B b 8 αὐτοὶ T W: αὐτοὶ ἦ B 204 a 2 ἔφη t: φῆν B: ἔφην T:
φησι b a 3 ἄν T: δὴ B a 4 γε W: δὲ B T a 5 γε scr. recc.: τε B T W

I was making my way from the Academy straight to the Lyceum, 203a
 taking the road outside the wall, right under the wall itself; and
 when I came to the little gate where the spring of Panops is,¹
 there I fell in with Hippothales the son of Hieronymus and Ctesip-
 pus of Paeania,² and other young men with them, standing about
 together in a body. And Hippothales, seeing me coming, said,
 “Socrates, where are you making your way, and where from?” b

“From the Academy,” I said; “I’m making my way straight to
 the Lyceum.”

“This way, then,” he said, “straight to us. Won’t you drop in? It’s
 worth it, you know.”

“Where do you mean,” I said, “and to whom? Who are ‘you’?”

“This way,” he said, pointing out to me, opposite the wall, an
 enclosure of some sort with its door open. “We spend our time,”
 he said, “right there, we ourselves and a great many others too,
 and beautiful ones.”

“And what is this place, and how do you spend the time?” 204

“A wrestling-school,” he said, “newly built; and the time is spent
 mostly in talk, which we would gladly share with you.”

“You do well to,” I said; “and who teaches there?”

“A companion of yours,” he said, “and one who praises you:
 Miccus.”³

1. The Academy, a gymnasium in a sacred grove northwest of the city, and the Lyceum, a gymnasium east of it sacred to Apollo Lyceus; the Lyceum was one of Socrates’ haunts (*Euthyphro* 2a, *Symposium* 223d). Panops is taken to have been an Attic hero; the spring is not certainly located.

2. Hippothales is known only from this dialogue, though a Hippothales of Athens appears in Diogenes Laertius’ list of Plato’s pupils (3.46). Ctesippus of Paeania, Menexenus’ cousin (206d), is the sharp-tongued young man of the *Euthydemus* and was present at Socrates’ death (*Phaedo* 59b).

3. Miccus is otherwise unknown.

Μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ φαῦλός γε ἀνὴρ, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸς σοφιστής.

Βούλει οὖν ἔπεσθαι, ἔφη, ἵνα καὶ ἴδῃς τοὺς ὄντας αὐτόθι [αὐτοῦ];

Πρῶτον ἡδέως ἀκούσαιμ' ἂν ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ εἵσεμι καὶ τίς ὁ b
καλός.

Ἄλλος, ἔφη, ἄλλω ἡμῶν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σοὶ δὲ δὴ τίς, ὦ Ἰππόθαλες; τοῦτό μοι εἰπέ.

Καὶ ὃς ἐρωτηθεὶς ἡρυθρίασεν. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ παῖ 5
Ἱερωνύμου Ἰππόθαλες, τοῦτο μὲν μηκέτι εἴπῃς, εἴτε ἐρᾷς του
εἴτε μή· οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐρᾷς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόρρω ἤδη εἰ
πορευόμενος τοῦ ἔρωτος. εἰμὶ δ' ἐγὼ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα φαῦλος
καὶ ἄχρηστος, τοῦτο δέ μοί πως ἐκ θεοῦ δέδοται, ταχὺ οἶω c
τ' εἶναι γινῶναι ἐρώντά τε καὶ ἐρώμενον.

Καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας πολὺν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἡρυθρίασεν. ὁ οὖν
Κτήσιππος, Ἀστεϊόν γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ἐρυθριᾶς, ὦ Ἰππόθαλες,
καὶ ὀκνεῖς εἰπεῖν Σωκράτει τοῦνομα· ἐὰν δ' οὗτος καὶ σμικρὸν 5
χρόνον συνδιατρίβῃ σοι, παραταθήσεται ὑπὸ σοῦ ἀκούων
θαμὰ λέγοντος. ἡμῶν γοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκκεκώφωκε τὰ
ὦτα καὶ ἐμπέπληκε Λύσιδος· ἂν μὲν δὴ καὶ ὑποπῇ, εὐμαρία d
ἡμῖν ἐστίν καὶ ἐξ ὕπνου ἐγρομένοις Λύσιδος οἶεσθαι τοῦνομα
ἀκούειν. καὶ ἃ μὲν καταλογάδην διηγείται, δεινὰ ὄντα, οὐ
πάνυ τι δεινὰ ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴν τὰ ποιήματα ἡμῶν ἐπι-
χειρήσῃ καταντλεῖν καὶ συγγράμματα. καὶ ὃ ἐστίν τούτων 5
δεινότερον, ὅτι καὶ ᾄδει εἰς τὰ παιδικὰ φωνῇ θαυμασίᾳ, ἣν
ἡμᾶς δεῖ ἀκούοντας ἀνέχεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ
ἐρυθριᾷ.

Ἔστιν δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Λύσις νέος τις, ὡς ἔοικε· τεκμαί- e
ρομαι δέ, ὅτι ἀκούσας τοῦνομα οὐκ ἔγνων.

a6 ἀνὴρ Schanz: ἀνὴρ B T W a8 ἴδῃς Ficinus: εἰδῇς B T αὐτόθι om. Schanz
a9 αὐτοῦ seclusi (alteri tribuunt B T) b1 εἵσεμι T: εἴσεμι B b4 μοι T: ποι B
b5 ἡρυθρίασεν] ἦ ex emend. B b6 Ἰππόθαλες secl. Cobet b8 πορευόμενος
secl. Schanz c7 ἐκκεκώφωκε B T: ἐκκεκώφηκε T² d5 καταντλεῖν] λ
ex emend. B

“By Zeus,” I said, “the man is no paltry one, either, but a capable sophist.”

“Do you want to come along, then,” he said, “so that you can also see the people who are there?”

“First I would gladly hear on what terms I’m going in, and who the beautiful one is.”

“One of us thinks it’s one, Socrates,” he said, “and another another.”

“And who is it for you, Hippothales? Tell me that.”

And at the question he blushed. And I said, “Son of Hieronymus, Hippothales, don’t tell me that any more, whether you are in love with someone or not. For I know that you are not only in love, but already far along, making your way in love. In other things I’m paltry and useless; but this, somehow, has been given me by a god: to be able to know quickly one who is in love and one who is beloved.”

And at this he blushed far more still. Then Ctesippus said, “Oh, that’s charming, Hippothales, that you blush and hesitate to tell Socrates the name! But if he spends even a little time with you, he’ll be worn to death hearing you say it so often. Our ears, at any rate, Socrates, he has deafened and filled full of Lysis. And if he has had a little to drink, it’s easy for us, even when we wake from sleep, to think we hear the name of Lysis. And what he tells in prose, dreadful as it is, isn’t so very dreadful; but when he sets about drenching us with his poems and compositions! And what is more dreadful than that, he even sings to his darling in a wondrous voice, and we have to hear it and put up with it. But now, asked by you, he blushes.”

“This Lysis is someone young, it seems,” I said. “I judge so because I heard the name and didn’t know it.”

Οὐ γὰρ πάννυ, ἔφη, τὸ αὐτοῦ τοῦνομα λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ἔτι πατρώθεν ἐπονομάζεται διὰ τὸ σφόδρα τὸν πατέρα γινώσκεισθαι αὐτοῦ. ἐπεὶ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι πολλοῦ δαίς τὸ εἶδος ἀγνοεῖν 5 τοῦ παιδός· ἱκανὸς γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ μόνου τούτου γινώσκεισθαι.

Λεγέσθω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτινος ἔστιν.

Δημοκράτους, ἔφη, τοῦ Αἰζωνέως ὁ πρεσβύτατος υἱός.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Ἰππόθαλες, ὡς γενναῖον καὶ νεανικὸν τοῦτον τὸν ἔρωτα πανταχῇ ἀνηῦρες· καὶ μοι ἴθι ἐπιδείξειαι ἃ 10 καὶ τοῖσδε ἐπιδείκνυσαι, ἵνα εἰδῶ εἰ ἐπίστασαι ἃ χρὴ ἐραστὴν 205 περὶ παιδικῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλους λέγειν.

Τούτων δέ τι, ἔφη, σταθμᾶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὧν ὅδε λέγει;

Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν ἑξαρνος εἰ οὐ λέγει ὅδε;

Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν εἰς τὰ παιδικὰ μηδὲ 5 συγγράφειν.

Οὐχ ὑγιαίνει, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ἀλλὰ ληρεῖ τε καὶ μαίνεται.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ Ἰππόθαλες, οὐ τι τῶν μέτρων δέομαι ἀκοῦσαι οὐδὲ μέλος εἶ τι πεποιήκας εἰς τὸν νεανίσκον, ἀλλὰ 6 τῆς διανοίας, ἵνα εἰδῶ τίνα τρόπον προσφέρῃ πρὸς τὰ παιδικά.

Ὅδε δὴπου σοι, ἔφη, ἐρεῖ· ἀκριβῶς γὰρ ἐπίσταται καὶ μέμνηται, εἶπερ, ὡς λέγει, ὑπ' ἐμοῦ αἰεὶ ἀκούων διατεθρύληται. 5

Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, πάννυ γε. καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶ καταγέλαστα, ὦ Σώκρατες. τὸ γὰρ ἐραστὴν ὄντα καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα τῷ παιδί ἴδιον μὲν μηδὲν ἔχειν λέγειν ὃ οὐχὶ καὶ παῖς εἴποι, πῶς οὐχὶ 7 καταγέλαστον; ἃ δὲ ἡ πόλις ὅλη ἄδει περὶ Δημοκράτους καὶ Λύσιδος τοῦ ἀπάππου τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ πάντων πέρι τῶν προ- 8 γόνων, πλούτους τε καὶ ἱπποτροφίας καὶ νίκας Πυθοῖ καὶ

e3 ἔτι T: εἰ B e4 σφόδρα τὸν T W: σφοδρότατον B e5 δαίς B (sed s erasum) W: δαί σε T e7 οὕτινός T: οὕτινός B: οὕτινός εἰ τι W (sed οὐ supra εἰ W) e8 αἰζωνέως T W: αἰζωνέως B e10 ἀνέυρες T: ἀνέυρες B a3 ὅδε T W: om. B

“That’s because they hardly use his own name,” he said; “he is still called after his father, because his father is exceedingly well known. Though I know well that you are far from not knowing the boy’s figure; for he can be known even by that alone.”

“Let it be said whose son he is,” I said.

“Democrates’ of Aexone,” he said: “his eldest son.”¹

“Very well, Hippothales,” I said. “How noble and dashing in every way is this love you have found! Come, show me what you show these people too, so that I may know whether you know what a lover should say about his darling, to the boy himself or to others.” 205

“But do you take any account, Socrates,” he said, “of anything this fellow says?”

“Do you deny,” I said, “even being in love with the one this fellow names?”

“No, I don’t,” he said; “but I deny that I make verses for my darling, or write compositions.”

“He’s not well,” said Ctesippus; “he’s babbling, he’s raving.”

And I said, “Hippothales, I have no need to hear any of your meters, or any lyric you may have made for the young man; but the thought, so that I may know how you conduct yourself toward your darling.” b

“This fellow will tell you, I’m sure,” he said; “for he knows it exactly and remembers it, if, as he says, he’s been talked deaf by hearing me all the time.”

“By the gods,” said Ctesippus, “very much so. And indeed it’s ridiculous, Socrates. A lover who pays attention to the boy beyond all the others, and has nothing of his own to say that even a boy wouldn’t say: how is that not ridiculous? But what the whole city sings about Democrates and Lysis, the boy’s grandfather, and about all his ancestors, their wealth and horse-breeding and victories at Pytho and c

1. Aexone was a deme on the coast south of Athens. The boy bears the name of his grandfather Lysis (205c), as eldest sons commonly did (Demosthenes 39.27).

Ἰσθμοὶ καὶ Νεμέα τεθρίπποις τε καὶ κέλησι, ταῦτα ποιῇ τε 5
καὶ λέγει, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτι τούτων κρονικώτερα. τὸν γὰρ
τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ξενισμὸν πρώην ἡμῖν ἐν ποιήματί τινι διήει,
ὡς διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἡρακλέους συγγένειαν ὁ πρόγονος αὐτῶν
ὑποδέξαιτο τὸν Ἡρακλέα, γεγονώς αὐτὸς ἐκ Διὸς τε καὶ τῆς d
τοῦ δήμου ἀρχηγέτου θυγατρὸς, ἅπερ αἱ γραῖαι ἄδουσι, καὶ
ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα, ὧ Σώκρατες· ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἂ οὗτος λέγων
τε καὶ ἄδων ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀκροᾶσθαι.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας εἶπον· ὦ καταγέλαστε Ἱππόθαλες, πρὶν 5
νενικηκέναι ποιεῖς τε καὶ ἄδεις εἰς σαντὸν ἐγκώμιον;

Ἄλλ' οὐκ εἰς ἐμαυτόν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔτε ποιῶ οὔτε
ἄδω.

Οὐκ οἶε γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Τὸ δὲ πῶς ἔχει; ἔφη. 10

Πάντων μάλιστα, εἶπον, εἰς σὲ τείνουσιν αὐται αἱ ᾠδαί. e
ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἔλῃς τὰ παιδικὰ τοιαῦτα ὄντα, κόσμος σοι
ἔσται τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ ἀσθέντα καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐγκώμια ὥσπερ
νενικηκότι, ὅτι τοιούτων παιδικῶν ἔτυχες· ἐὰν δέ σε διαφύγη, 5
ὅσῳ ἂν μείζω σοι εἰρημένα ἢ ἐγκώμια περὶ τῶν παιδικῶν,
τοσούτῳ μειζόνων δόξεις καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐστερημένος
καταγέλαστος εἶναι. ὅστις οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικά, ὦ φίλε, σοφός, 206
οὐκ ἐπαινεῖ τὸν ἐρώμενον πρὶν ἂν ἔλῃ, δεδιώς τὸ μέλλον ὅπῃ
ἀποβήσεται. καὶ ἅμα οἱ καλοί, ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐπαινῇ καὶ
αὖξῃ, φρονήματος ἐμπίμπλονται καὶ μεγαλαυχίας· ἢ οὐκ οἶε;

Ἐγώ γε, ἔφη. 5

Οὐκοῦν ὅσῳ ἂν μεγαλαυχότεροι ᾧσιν, δυσαλωτότεροι
γίνονται;

Εἰκός γε.

Ποῖός τις οὖν ἂν σοι δοκεῖ θηρευτῆς εἶναι, εἰ ἀνασοβοῖ
θηρεύων καὶ δυσαλωτοτέραν τὴν ἄγραν ποιοῖ; 10

c5 νεμέα T: νέμεα B c6 κρονικώτερα T W: χρονικώτερα B d6 σαντὸν B T²:
αὐτὸν T W d10 τὸ δὲ T: τόδε B a9 δοκεῖ scr. recc.: δοκοῖ B T W a10 ἄγρ*αν B
(ut videtur ἀγρίαν fuit)

the Isthmus and Nemea with four-horse chariots and racehorses,¹ these he makes verses of and recites, and on top of these, things more Cronian still than these.² For just the other day he was going through for us, in some poem, the entertaining of Heracles: how, because of their relationship to Heracles, their ancestor received Heracles as his guest, being himself born of Zeus and of the daughter of the deme's founder,³ just what the old women sing, and a great deal else of the kind, Socrates. That is what this fellow forces us to listen to as well, reciting it and singing it."

And when I heard this I said, "You ridiculous Hippothales! Before you have won, are you making verses and singing a song of praise about yourself?"

"But it isn't about myself, Socrates," he said, "that I make verses or sing."

"You don't think so," I said.

"How is it, then?" he said.

"Above everyone," I said, "these songs bear on you. For if you catch your darling, being the boy he is, what you have said and sung will be an ornament to you, and really songs of praise, as for a winner, for having gained such a darling. But if he gets away from you, the greater the songs of praise you have spoken about your darling, the greater the fine and good things you will seem ridiculous for having been robbed of. So whoever is wise in matters of love, my friend,⁴ does not praise his beloved before he has caught him, fearing how the future will turn out. Besides, the beautiful ones, when someone praises them and builds them up, are filled with pride and boastfulness. Don't you think so?"

"I do," he said.

"And the more boastful they are, the harder they become to catch?"

"Likely enough."

"Then what sort of hunter do you think a man would be if he scared off the game as he hunted, and made his quarry harder to catch?"

1. With Olympia, the games at Delphi (Pytho), the Isthmus and Nemea were the festivals of all the Greeks; racing was for the rich, the victory the owner's.

2. *More Cronian*: as old-fashioned as the age of Cronus, the father of Zeus; Aristophanes' Socrates calls Strepsiades, the old man of the *Clouds*, one who "smells of the Cronia" (398).

3. The ancestor was Heracles' half-brother; the legend is not otherwise known.

4. *My friend*: *ὁ φίλος*. *Philos*, the word this dialogue examines, means both "friend" and "dear", and is said both of the one who loves and of the one who is loved; this translation renders it "friend" throughout, of things as well as of people.

Δήλον ὅτι φαῦλος.

Καὶ μὲν δὴ λόγοις τε καὶ ὥδαῖς μὴ κηλεῖν ἀλλ' ἐξαγριαίνειν πολλὴ ἀμουσία· ἦ γάρ;

Δοκεῖ μοι.

Σκόπει δὴ, ὦ Ἰππόθαλες, ὅπως μὴ πᾶσι τούτοις ἔνοχον 5
σαυτὸν ποιήσεις διὰ τὴν ποιήσιν· καίτοι οἶμαι ἐγὼ ἄνδρα
ποιήσει βλάπτοντα ἑαυτὸν οὐκ ἂν σε ἐθέλιν ὁμολογήσαι ὡς
ἀγαθὸς ποτ' ἐστὶν ποιητής, βλαβερὸς ὢν ἑαυτῷ.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη· πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη. ἀλλὰ διὰ 6
ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνακοινοῦμαι, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο c
ἔχεις, συμβούλευε τίνα ἂν τις λόγον διαλεγόμενος ἢ τί
πράττων προσφιλὲς παιδικοῖς γένοιτο.

Οὐ ράδιον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' εἴ μοι ἐθελήσais αὐτὸν 7
ποιῆσαι εἰς λόγους ἐλθεῖν, ἴσως ἂν δυναίμην σοι ἐπιδείξαι 5
ᾧ χρὴ αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἀντὶ τούτων ὧν οὗτοι λέγειν τε καὶ
ᾗδεν φασί σε.

Ἄλλ' οὐδέν, ἔφη, χαλεπόν. ἂν γὰρ εἰσέλθης μετὰ 8
Κτησίππου τοῦδε καὶ καθεζόμενος διαλέγῃ, οἶμαι μὲν καὶ
αὐτός σοι πρόσεισι—φιλήκοος γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, διαφερόντως 10
ἐστίν, καὶ ἅμα, ὡς Ἑρμαῖα ἄγουσιν, ἀναμειγμένοι ἐν ταῦτῳ d
εἰσιν οἳ τε νεανίσκοι καὶ οἱ παῖδες—πρόσεισιν οὖν σοι.
εἰ δὲ μή, Κτησίππῳ συνήθης ἐστὶν διὰ τὸν τούτου ἀνεψιὸν
Μενέξενον· Μενέξένῳ μὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντων μάλιστα ἐταῖρος
ὢν τυγχάνει. καλεσάτω οὖν οὗτος αὐτόν, ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ προσή 5
αὐτός.

Ταῦτα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρὴ ποιεῖν. Καὶ ἅμα λαβὼν τὸν 9
Κτήσιππον προσῆα εἰς τὴν παλαιστραν· οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὕστεροι e
ἡμῶν ἦσαν.

Εἰσελθόντες δὲ κατελάβομεν αὐτόθι τεθυκότας τε τοὺς
παῖδας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ ἱερεῖα σχεδὸν τι ἤδη πεποιημένα,

b 4 δοκεῖ T W: δοκεῖ γάρ B b 6 ποιήσεις scr. Ven. 184: ποιήσης B T W c 7 σε T W:
γε B d 4 ἐταῖρος T W: ἕτερος B (sed ai supra e B²) d 5 προσή T: προσείη B
(sed i supra e B²) e 1 προσῆα] προσήει T: προσείη B e 4 ἱερεῖα ex emend. B
(ἱέρια fuit)

“A paltry one, obviously.”

“And to make wild with words and songs, instead of charming, is a great want of the Muses. Isn’t that so?”¹

“It seems so to me.”

“Then look to it, Hippothales, that you don’t make yourself liable to all these charges through your poetry. And yet I don’t think you would be willing to agree that a man who harms himself by his poetry is ever a good poet, being harmful to himself.”²

“No, by Zeus,” he said; “for that would be a great want of sense. But that is exactly why I am consulting you, Socrates; and if you have anything else, advise me what talk one could hold, or what one could do, to become a friend to one’s darling.”

“It isn’t easy to say,” I said. “But if you would be willing to get him to come and talk with me, perhaps I could show you what you ought to talk to him about instead of what these people say you recite and sing.”

“There’s nothing hard about it,” he said. “For if you go in with Ctesippus here and sit down and talk, I think he’ll come up to you himself; for he is exceptionally fond of hearing talk, Socrates, and besides, since they are celebrating the Hermaea, the young men and the boys are mixed together in the same place.³ So he’ll come up to you. If not, he is well acquainted with Ctesippus through this fellow’s cousin Menexenus;⁴ for he is in fact Menexenus’ closest companion of all. So let this fellow call him, if after all he doesn’t come up of his own accord.”

“That’s what we must do,” I said. And with that I took Ctesippus and went over to the wrestling-school; the others came after us.

Going in, we found that the boys had sacrificed there and that the business of the offerings was pretty much done already,

1. *Amousia*, “want of the Muses”: the lack of the education in music and poetry that the Muses stood for; said to a poet, it is a pointed charge (interpretation).

2. *Make ... poetry ... poet: poiein* is “make”, *poiēsis* “making” and “poetry”, *poiētēs* “maker” and “poet”; Socrates plays on the family.

3. The Hermaea was a festival of Hermes, a patron of the wrestling-schools. Aeschines says that the laws regulated it (*Against Timarchus* 10); the law quoted in his speech (12), forbidding anyone of age to join in, is generally judged a later insertion.

4. A Menexenus gives his name to Plato’s *Menexenus*, and one, named beside Ctesippus of Paeania, was present at Socrates’ death (*Phaedo* 59b); that both are this son of Demophon (207b) is likely but not certain.

ἀστραγαλίζοντάς τε δὴ καὶ κεκοσμημένους ἅπαντας. οἱ μὲν 5
 οὖν πολλοὶ ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ ἔπαιζον ἔξω, οἱ δέ τινες τοῦ ἀπο-
 δυτηρίου ἐν γωνίᾳ ἡρτίαζον ἀστραγάλοις παμπόλλοις, ἐκ
 φορμίσκων τινῶν προαιρούμενοι· τούτους δὲ περιέστασαν
 ἄλλοι θεωροῦντες. ὧν δὴ καὶ ὁ Λύσις ἦν, καὶ εἰστήκει ἐν 207
 τοῖς παισὶ τε καὶ νεανίσκοις ἐστεφανωμένος καὶ τὴν ὄψιν
 διαφέρων, οὐ τὸ καλὸς εἶναι μόνον ἄξιος ἀκοῦσαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι
 καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθός. καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ ἀποχωρή-
 σαντες ἐκαθεζόμεθα—ἦν γὰρ αὐτόθι ἡσυχία—καί τι ἀλλήλοις
 διελεγόμεθα. περιστρεφόμενος οὖν ὁ Λύσις θαμὰ ἐπεσκο- 5
 πεῖτο ἡμᾶς, καὶ δῆλος ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν προσελθεῖν. τέως μὲν
 οὖν ἠπόρει τε καὶ ὥκνει μόνος προσιέναι, ἔπειτα ὁ Μενέξενος
 ἐκ τῆς αὐλῆς μεταξὺ παῖζων εἰσέρχεται, καὶ ὥς εἶδεν ἐμέ τε b
 καὶ τὸν Κτήσιππον, ᾗει παρακαθίζόμενος· ἰδὼν οὖν αὐτὸν
 ὁ Λύσις εἶπετο καὶ συμπαρακαθέζετο μετὰ τοῦ Μενέξενου.
 προσῆλθον δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Ἴπποθάλης,
 ἐπειδὴ πλείους ἐώρα ἐφισταμένους, τούτους ἐπηλυγισάμενος 5
 προσέστη ἥ μὴ ᾤετο κατόψεσθαι τὸν Λύσιν, δεδιὼς μὴ αὐτῷ
 ἀπεχθάνοιτο· καὶ οὕτω προσεστὼς ἠκροᾶτο.

Καὶ ἐγὼ πρὸς τὸν Μενέξενον ἀποβλέψας, ὦ παῖ Δημο-
 φῶντος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πότερος ὑμῶν πρεσβύτερος; c

Ἀμφισβητοῦμεν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁπότερος γενναιότερος, ἐρίζοιτ' ἂν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Πάνν γε, ἔφη.

Καὶ μὴν ὁπότερός γε καλλίων, ὡσαύτως. 5

Ἐγελασάτην οὖν ἄμφω.

Οὐ μὴν ὁπότερός γε, ἔφην, πλουσιώτερος ὑμῶν, οὐκ
 ἐρήσομαι· φίλω γάρ ἐστον. ἦ γάρ;

e7 ἀστραγάλους παμπόλλους al. Pollux e8 προαιρούμενοι] κατερώμενοι Pol-
 lux a2 καλὸς B (sed λ in λλ ut videtur rasura B) T: κάλλος W b1 εἶδεν T:
 ἰδεν B b3 εἶπετο B et in marg. T: ἔσπετο T b4 οἱ secl. ci. H. Richards
 b5 ἐπηλυγισάμενος B T W: ἐπηλυγασάμενος t b6 προσέστη Stephanus:
 προέστη B T W ἥ T: ἦ B δεδιὼς B t: δεδειῶς T c8 ἐρήσομαι] é ex emend. B

and that they were all playing knucklebones, dressed in their finery.¹ Most of them were playing outside in the courtyard, but some were playing odds and evens in a corner of the undressing-room with a great many knucklebones, taking them out of some little baskets; and others stood round them, watching. Lysis too was one of these; and he stood among the boys and young men, wearing a garland, outstanding in looks, worthy to hear himself called not just “beautiful” but “beautiful and good.”² And we withdrew to the opposite side and sat down, for it was quiet there, and talked a little with one another. Lysis kept turning round and looking at us, and it was plain that he desired to come over. For a while he was at a loss, and hesitated to come over alone; then Menexenus, in the middle of his game, comes in from the courtyard, and when he saw me and Ctesippus, he came to sit down beside us. Seeing him, Lysis followed and sat down beside us with Menexenus. The others came up as well, and in particular Hippothales, when he saw that quite a number were standing there, used them for cover and stood by where he thought Lysis would not see him,³ afraid of making himself hateful to him; and so, standing by, he listened.

And I looked at Menexenus and said, “Son of Demophon, which of you two is the elder?”

“We dispute it,” he said.

“Then you would quarrel too over which is the nobler,” I said.

“Very much so,” he said.

“And over which is the more beautiful, likewise.”

At this they both laughed.

“Which of you is the richer, though,” I said, “I shan’t ask; for you two are friends. Isn’t that so?”

1. Knucklebones, the ankle-bones of sheep or goats, served as dice and as counters; “odds and evens” was guessing whether the number held in the hand was odd or even.

2. *Beautiful and good*, *kalos kagathos*: the Athenian phrase for a gentleman, said of birth and character, not only of looks.

3. *Stood by*: *prosestē*, Stephanus’ correction, which Burnet prints; the manuscripts have *proestē*, “stood in front” (apparatus, b6).

Πάνν γ', ἐφάτην.

Οὐκοῦν κοινὰ τὰ γε φίλων λέγεται, ὥστε τούτῳ γε οὐδὲν 10
διοίσετον, εἴπερ ἀληθὴ περὶ τῆς φιλίας λέγετον.

Συνεφάτην.

Ἐπεχειρουν δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾶν ὁπότερος δικαιότερος d
καὶ σοφώτερος αὐτῶν εἴη. μεταξὺ οὖν τις προσελθὼν ἀν-
έστησε τὸν Μενέξενον, φάσκων καλεῖν τὸν παιδοτρίβην·
ἐδόκει γὰρ μοι ἱεροποιῶν τυγχάνειν. ἐκείνος μὲν οὖν ὥχετο·
ἐγὼ δὲ τὸν Λύσιον ἡρόμην, Ἥ που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Λύσι, 5
σφόδρα φιλεῖ σε ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ;—Πάνν γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.
—Οὐκοῦν βούλουντο ἄν σε ὡς εὐδαιμονέστατον εἶναι;—
Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;—Δοκεῖ δέ σοι εὐδαιμῶν εἶναι ἀνθρώπος e
δουλεύων τε καὶ ὧ μὴδὲν ἐξείη ποιεῖν ὧν ἐπιθυμοί;—Μὰ
Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε, ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν εἴ σε φιλεῖ ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἡ
μήτηρ καὶ εὐδαιμόνά σε ἐπιθυμοῦσι γενέσθαι, τοῦτο παντὶ 5
τρόπῳ δῆλον ὅτι προθυμοῦνται ὅπως ἂν εὐδαιμονοίης.—Πῶς
γὰρ οὐχί; ἔφη.—Ἐῷσιν ἄρα σε ἂ βούλει ποιεῖν, καὶ οὐδὲν
ἐπιπλήττουσιν οὐδὲ διακωλύουσι ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμῇς;—
Ναὶ μὰ Δία ἐμέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ μάλα γε πολλὰ
κωλύουσιν.—Πῶς λέγεις; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. βουλόμενοί σε μακά- 208
ριον εἶναι διακωλύουσι τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὃ ἂν βούλῃ; ὧδε δέ
μοι λέγε. ἦν ἐπιθυμῆσης ἐπὶ τινος τῶν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀρμάτων
ὀχεῖσθαι λαβὼν τὰς ἡνίας, ὅταν ἀμιλλᾶται, οὐκ ἂν ἐῷέν σε
ἀλλὰ διακωλύοιεν;—Μὰ Δί' οὐ μέντοι ἄν, ἔφη, ἐῷεν.—
Ἀλλὰ τίνα μὴν;—Ἔστιν τις ἡνίοχος παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς 5
μισθὸν φέρων.—Πῶς λέγεις; μισθωτῷ μᾶλλον ἐπιτρέπουσιν
ἢ σοὶ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούληται περὶ τοὺς ἵππους, καὶ προσέτι
αὐτοῦ τούτου ἀργύριον τελοῦσιν;—Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; ἔφη. b
Ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὀρικοῦ ζεύγους οἶμαι ἐπιτρέπουσίν σοι ἄρχειν,
κἂν εἰ βούλοιο λαβὼν τὴν μᾶστιγα τύπτειν, ἐῷεν ἄν.—

e1 (ἄν) ἄνθρωπος Madvig a5 τίνα] τί Schanz (ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; Lysidi tribuit
H. Richards) a6 μισθωτῷ T: μισθωτῇ B b1 τούτου B: τοῦτο T

“Very much so,” they both said.

“Well, the things of friends are said to be common,¹ so in this, at least, you two won’t differ, if you are telling the truth about your friendship.”

They both agreed.

After this I set about asking which of them was the juster and d
wiser. But in the middle someone came up and made Menexenus
get up, saying that the trainer was calling him; for he was in
fact, as it seemed to me, officiating at the sacrifice. He went off,
then; and I asked Lysis, “I take it, Lysis,” I said, “your father
and mother love you very much?”²—“Very much so,” he said.—
“Then they would want you to be as happy as possible?”—“Of e
course.”—“And do you think a man is happy who is a slave and
is allowed to do nothing that he desires?”—“No, by Zeus, I don’t,”
he said.—“Then if your father and mother love you and desire
you to become happy, it is clear that they are eager in every way
for you to be happy.”—“Of course,” he said.—“Then they let you
do what you want, and don’t scold you or prevent you from doing
what you desire?”—“Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, me they do stop, and
from a great many things.”—“What do you mean?” I said. “They
want you to be blessed, and they prevent you from doing what 208
you want? Tell me this: if you desire to ride in one of your father’s
chariots and take the reins when there is a race, they wouldn’t
let you, would they, but would prevent you?”—“No, by Zeus,”
he said, “they certainly wouldn’t let me.”—“But whom, then?”—
“There’s a charioteer who draws wages from my father.”—“What
do you mean? They entrust a hired man, rather than you, with
doing whatever he wants with the horses, and on top of that
they pay him money for this very thing?”—“Well, what else?” he b
said.—“But the mule team, I think, they entrust you with ruling,
and if you wanted to take the whip and beat the mules, they
would let you.”—

1. A proverb that, according to the historian Timaeus (cited by Diogenes Laertius 8.10), Pythagoras was the first to use; Plato uses it again at *Phaedrus* 279c and *Republic* 424a.

2. *Love*: *philein*, the verb of *philos*, “friend”; the verb “love” renders it throughout (the noun “love” is *erōs*, and “be in love” is *eran*).

Πόθεν, ἡ δ' ὅς, ἐῶεν;—Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐδενὶ ἔξεστιν
 αὐτοὺς τύπτειν;—Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, τῷ ὀρεοκόμῳ.—Δούλω 5
 ὄντι ἢ ἐλευθέρῳ;—Δούλω, ἔφη.—Καὶ δοῦλον, ὡς ἔοικεν,
 ἡγούνται περὶ πλείονος ἢ σὲ τὸν ὑόν, καὶ ἐπιτρέπουσι τὰ
 ἑαυτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ σοί, καὶ ἐῶσιν ποιεῖν ὅτι βούλεται, σὲ δὲ
 διακωλύουσι; καὶ μοι ἔτι τόδε εἶπέ, σὲ αὐτὸν ἐῶσιν ἄρχειν c
 σεαυτοῦ, ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐπιτρέπουσί σοι;—Πῶς γάρ, ἔφη,
 ἐπιτρέπουσιν;—Ἄλλ' ἄρχει τίς σου;—Ὅδε, παιδαγωγός,
 ἔφη.—Μῶν δοῦλος ὢν;—Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; ἡμέτερός γε, ἔφη.
 —Ἦ δεινόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐλεύθερον ὄντα ὑπὸ δούλου ἄρχεσθαι. 5
 τί δὲ ποιῶν αὐ οὗτος ὁ παιδαγωγός σου ἄρχει;—Ἄγων δῆπου,
 ἔφη, εἰς διδασκάλου.—Μῶν μὴ καὶ οὗτοί σου ἄρχουσιν, οἱ
 διδάσκαλοι;—Πάντως δῆπου.—Παμπόλλους ἄρα σοι δε- d
 σπώτας καὶ ἄρχοντας ἐκὼν ὁ πατήρ ἐφίστησιν. ἀλλ' ἄρα
 ἐπειδὰν οἴκαδε ἔλθῃς παρὰ τὴν μητέρα, ἐκείνη σε ἐᾷ ποιεῖν
 ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ, ἵν' αὐτῇ μακάριος ᾖς, ἢ περὶ τὰ ἔρια ἢ περὶ 5
 τὸν ἰστόν, ὅταν ὑφαίνῃ; οὐ τι γάρ που διακωλύει σε ἢ τῆς
 σπάθης ἢ τῆς κερκίδος ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν περὶ ταλασιουργίαν
 ὀργάνων ἄπτεσθαι.—Καὶ ὅς γελάσας, Μὰ Δία, ἔφη, ὦ
 Σώκρατες, οὐ μόνον γε διακωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τυπτοίμην ἂν εἰ e
 ἀπτοίμην.—Ἡράκλεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μῶν μὴ τι ἡδίκηκας τὸν
 πατέρα ἢ τὴν μητέρα;—Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἔφη.

Ἄλλ' ἀντὶ τίνος μὴν οὕτω σε δεινῶς διακωλύουσιν εὐδαί-
 μονα εἶναι καὶ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ, καὶ δι' ἡμέρας ὅλης 5
 τρέφουσὶ σε αἰεὶ τῷ δουλεύοντα καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ ὀλίγου ὢν
 ἐπιθυμεῖς οὐδὲν ποιοῦντα; ὥστε σοι, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔτε τῶν
 χρημάτων τοσοῦτων ὄντων οὐδὲν ὄφελος, ἀλλὰ πάντες
 αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἄρχουσιν ἢ σύ, οὔτε τοῦ σώματος οὕτω γεν- 209
 ναίου ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλος ποιμαίνει καὶ θεραπεύει·
 σὺ δὲ ἄρχεις οὐδενός, ὦ Λύσι, οὐδὲ ποιεῖς οὐδὲν ὢν ἐπιθυ-

b 4 ἐῶεν secl. Hirschig b 8 σὲ δὲ T: σε B (sed suprascr. δὲ B²) c 1 καὶ μοι ἔτι B W
 et in marg. T: καὶ ἔτι μοι T c 3 ὅδε] ὁ δὲ B T παιδαγωγός secl. ci. H. Richards
 d 4 βούλῃ ἵν' αὐτῇ T: βούλῃ ναύτῃ B ᾖς ἢ T: ἡσῃ B e 1 ἂν T: om. B

“Let me? Not likely!” he said.—“What then?” I said. “Is no one allowed to beat them?”—“Someone certainly is,” he said: “the muleteer.”—“Is he a slave or free?”—“A slave,” he said.—“So it seems they think more of a slave than of you, their son, and entrust what is theirs to him rather than to you, and let him do what he wants, while you they prevent? And tell me this too: do they let c
you rule yourself, or don’t they entrust even this to you?”—“How could they entrust it?” he said.—“But someone rules you?”—“This man here, my tutor,” he said.¹—“Not a slave, surely?”—“Well, what else? Ours, though,” he said.—“How dreadful,” I said, “that a free man should be ruled by a slave! And what, in turn, does this tutor of yours do in ruling you?”—“He leads me, of course,” he said, “to my teacher’s.”—“Surely they don’t rule you too, the teachers?”—“Of course they do.”—“Then your father has willingly d
set a great many masters and rulers over you. But when you go home to your mother, does she let you do whatever you want, so that you may be blessed in her eyes, with the wool or the loom, when she is weaving? For she doesn’t, I take it, prevent you from touching the batten or the shuttle, or any other of the tools for working wool.”—And he laughed and said, “By Zeus, Socrates, e
she doesn’t just prevent me: I’d be beaten if I touched them.”²—“Heracles!” I said. “You haven’t done some wrong to your father or your mother, have you?”—“No, by Zeus, not I,” he said.

“But then for what reason do they so dreadfully prevent you from being happy and doing what you want, and all day long bring you up always in slavery to someone, and, in a word, doing hardly anything that you desire? So it seems you get no use out of your wealth, great as it is: everyone rules it rather than you; nor out of 209
your body, noble as it is: this too someone else shepherds and tends. And you, Lysis, rule nothing, and do nothing that you desire.”

1. The *paidagōgos*, “boy-leader”, was the household slave who took a boy to school and watched over him. The tutors return at the end of the dialogue (223a).

2. *Typtōimēn* ... *haptōimēn*, “be beaten ... touch”: Lysis’ answer rhymes.

μείς.—Οὐ γάρ πω, ἔφη, ἡλικίαν ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες.—Μὴ οὖ
 τοῦτό σε, ὦ παῖ Δημοκράτους, κωλύη, ἐπεὶ τό γε τοσόνδε, 5
 ὥς ἐγῶμαι, καὶ ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ σοι ἐπιτρέπουσιν καὶ
 οὐκ ἀναμένουσιν ἕως ἂν ἡλικίαν ἔχῃς. ὅταν γὰρ βούλωνται
 αὐτοῖς τινα ἀναγνωσθῆναι ἢ γραφῆναι, σέ, ὥς ἐγῶμαι,
 πρῶτον τῶν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἐπὶ τοῦτο τάττουσιν. ἢ γάρ;— b
 Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν ἔξεστί σοι ἐνταῦθ' ὅτι ἂν βούλη
 πρῶτον τῶν γραμμάτων γράφειν καὶ ὅτι ἂν δεύτερον· καὶ
 ἀναγιγνώσκειν ὡσαύτως ἔξεστιν. καὶ ἐπειδάν, ὥς ἐγῶμαι,
 τὴν λύραν λάβῃς, οὐ διακωλύουσί σε οὔτε ὁ πατήρ οὔτε ἡ 5
 μήτηρ ἐπιτεῖναί τε καὶ ἀνείναι ἦν ἂν βούλη τῶν χορδῶν,
 καὶ ψῆλαι καὶ κρούειν τῷ πλήκτρῳ. ἢ διακωλύουσιν;—Οὐ
 δῆτα.—Τί ποτ' ἂν οὖν εἴη, ὦ Λύσι, τὸ αἴτιον ὅτι ἐνταῦθα
 μὲν οὐ διακωλύουσιν, ἐν οἷς δὲ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν κωλύουσι;— c
 Ὅτι οἶμαι, ἔφη, ταῦτα μὲν ἐπίσταμαι, ἐκείνα δ' οὐ.—Εἶεν,
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἄριστε· οὐκ ἄρα τὴν ἡλικίαν σου περιμένει
 ὁ πατήρ ἐπιτρέπειν πάντα, ἀλλ' ἢ ἂν ἡμέρα ἡγήσῃται σε
 βέλτιον αὐτοῦ φρονεῖν, ταύτῃ ἐπιτρέψει σοι καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ 5
 τὰ αὐτοῦ.—Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἔφη.—Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τί δέ; τῷ
 γείτονι ἄρ' οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς ὅρος ὅσπερ τῷ πατρὶ περὶ σοῦ;
 πότερον οἶει αὐτὸν ἐπιτρέψειν σοι τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν οἰκονο- d
 μεῖν, ὅταν σε ἡγήσῃται βέλτιον περὶ οἰκονομίας ἑαυτοῦ
 φρονεῖν, ἢ αὐτὸν ἐπιστατήσῃν;—Ἐμοὶ ἐπιτρέψειν οἶμαι.—
 Τί δ'; Ἀθηναίους οἶει σοι οὐκ ἐπιτρέψειν τὰ αὐτῶν, ὅταν
 αἰσθάνωνται ὅτι ἱκανῶς φρονεῖς;—Ἐγωγε.—Πρὸς Διός, ἦν 5
 δ' ἐγώ, τί ἄρα ὁ μέγας βασιλεὺς; πότερον τῷ πρεσβυτάτῳ
 υἱέ, οὐ ἢ τῆς Ἀσίας ἀρχὴ γίγνεται, μᾶλλον ἂν ἐπιτρέ-
 ψειεν ἐφομένων κρεῶν [ἐμβάλλειν] ὅτι ἂν βούληται ἐμ-

a 4 πω corr. Coisl.: που B T W a 7 ἔχῃς scr. recc.: ἔχοις B T W: σχῆς? H. Richards
 a 8 τινα] τι ἢ Badham b 7 ψῆλαι B T W sed in marg. τῖλαι T: γρ. καὶ τῖλλαι
 in marg. W c 1 ἐν οἷς . . . κωλύουσι om. W sed add. in marg. W c 6 τί δαί' τωι
 in ras. B² d 1 οἰκονομεῖν T²: οἰκοδομεῖν B T W d 2 οἰκονομίας T: οἰκοδομίας B W
 d 7 ἐπιτρέψειεν ἐφομένων W (sed o supra ω W): ἐπιτρέψειν ἐνεφομένων B:
 ἐπιτρέψειεν ἐν ἐφομένων T d 8 ἐμβάλλειν secl. Heindorf: ἐμβαλεῖν Bekker (secl.
 mox ἐμβαλεῖν)

—“That’s because I’m not yet of age,¹ Socrates,” he said.—“I rather think it isn’t that which stops you, son of Democrates, since this much at least, I imagine, your father and mother do entrust to you, and they don’t wait until you are of age: when they want something read or written for them, it’s you, I imagine, they put to this first of all the household. Isn’t that so?”—“Very much so,” he said.—“Then here you are allowed to write whichever letter you want first and whichever second; and you are allowed to read in the same way. And when, I imagine, you take up the lyre, neither your father nor your mother prevents you from both tightening and loosening whichever of the strings you want, and plucking them with your fingers and striking them with the plectrum. Or do they prevent you?”—“Certainly not.”—“Then what can the reason be, Lysis, that here they don’t prevent you, but in the things we were speaking of just now they stop you?”—“I think it’s because I know these things,” he said, “and I don’t know those.”—“Very well, my excellent boy,” I said. “So your father isn’t waiting for you to be of age before he entrusts everything to you, but on whatever day he believes that you understand better than he does, on that day he will entrust to you both himself and what is his.”—“I think so,” he said.—“Very well,” I said. “What then? Hasn’t your neighbor the same standard as your father where you are concerned? Do you think he will entrust you with managing his house, when he believes that you understand managing a house better than he does,² or will he oversee it himself?”—“He’ll entrust it to me, I think.”—“What then? Don’t you think the Athenians will entrust what is theirs to you, when they perceive that you understand well enough?”—“I do.”—“In the name of Zeus,” I said, “what, then, about the Great King? Would he sooner, when meat is boiling, entrust his eldest son, to whom the rule of Asia passes, with throwing whatever he wants

1. *Not yet*: Burnet prints *pō* from a correction in the Coislinianus; B, T and W have *pou*, “I take it” (apparatus, a4).

2. *Managing*: Burnet prints *oikonomein* from a correction in T and *oikonomias* from T; B and W have “building” in both places (apparatus, d1–2).

βαλεῖν εἰς τὸν ζυμὸν, ἣ ἡμῖν, εἰ ἀφικόμενοι παρ' ἐκείνων e
 ἐνδειξαίμεθα αὐτῷ ὅτι ἡμεῖς κάλλιον φρονοῦμεν ἢ ὁ υἱὸς
 αὐτοῦ περὶ ὧσιν σκευασίας;—Ἡμῖν δὴλον ὅτι, ἔφη.—
 Καὶ τὸν μὲν γε οὐδ' ἂν σμικρὸν ἐάσειεν ἐμβαλεῖν ἡμᾶς
 δέ, κἂν εἰ βουλοίμεθα δραξάμενοι τῶν ἀλῶν, ἐφῇ ἂν 5
 ἐμβαλεῖν.—Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;—Τί δ' εἰ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὁ υἱὸς
 αὐτοῦ ἀσθενοῖ, ἄρα ἐφῇ ἂν αὐτὸν ἄπτεσθαι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ
 ὀφθαλμῶν, μὴ ἱατρὸν ἡγούμενος, ἢ κωλύοι ἄν;—Κωλύοι 210
 ἄν.—Ἡμᾶς δέ γε εἰ ὑπολαμβάνοι ἱατρικοὺς εἶναι, κἂν
 εἰ βουλοίμεθα διανοίγοντες τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐμπάσαι τῆς
 τέφρας, οἴμαι οὐκ ἂν κωλύσειεν, ἡγούμενος ὀρθῶς φρονεῖν.
 —Ἀληθῇ λέγεις.—Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ἡμῖν ἐπι- 5
 τρέποι ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῷ υἱεῖ, περὶ ὧσιν ἂν
 δόξωμεν αὐτῷ σοφώτεροι ἐκείνων εἶναι;—Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ
 Σώκρατες.

Οὕτως ἄρα ἔχει, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Λύσι· εἰς μὲν ταῦτα,
 ἃ ἂν φρόνιμοι γενώμεθα, ἅπαντες ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέψουσιν, Ἐλ- b
 ληνές τε καὶ βάρβαροι καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες, ποιήσομέν
 τε ἐν τούτοις ὅτι ἂν βουλώμεθα, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμᾶς ἐκὼν εἶναι
 ἐμποδιεῖ, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ τε ἐλεύθεροι ἐσόμεθα ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ
 ἄλλων ἄρχοντες, ἡμέτερά τε ταῦτα ἔσται—ὀνησόμεθα γὰρ 5
 ἀπ' αὐτῶν—εἰς ἃ δ' ἂν νοῦν μὴ κτησώμεθα, οὔτε τις ἡμῖν
 ἐπιτρέψει περὶ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν τὰ ἡμῖν δοκοῦντα, ἀλλ' ἐμπο-
 διούσι πάντες καθ' ὅτι ἂν δύνωνται, οὐ μόνον οἱ ἀλλότριοι, c
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ καὶ εἴ τι τούτων οἰκειότερόν
 ἐστίν, αὐτοὶ τε ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐσόμεθα ἄλλων ὑπήκοοι, καὶ ἡμῖν
 ἔσται ἀλλότρια· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὀνησόμεθα. συγχω-
 ρεῖς οὕτως ἔχειν;—Συγχωρῶ.—Ἄρ' οὖν τῷ φίλῳ ἐσόμεθα 5
 καὶ τις ἡμᾶς φιλήσει ἐν τούτοις, ἐν οἷς ἂν ὤμεν ἀνωφελεῖς;

a1 ἱατρὸν B T W Priscianus: ἱατρικὸν scr. Coisl. a3 διανοίγοντες W:
 διαγαγόντες B: διανύγοντες T a6 ἂν δόξωμεν] δὴ δόξαμεν ci. H. Richards
 a7 αὐτῷ . . . ἐκείνων] αὐτῶν . . . ἐκείνῳ Heindorf a9 ἄρα ἔχει Priscianus: ἄρα
 ἔχοι B T: ἄρ' ἂν ἔχοι ci. Stallbaum b6 ἃ in ras. duarum litterarum B c6 φιλήσει
 ἐν scr. Laur. lxxxv. 17: φιλήσειεν ἐν B T W

into the broth, or us, if we came to him and showed him that we understand the preparing of a dish better than his son does?”—“Us, obviously,” he said.—“And him, at least, he would not let throw in even a little; but us, even if we wanted to grab a handful of the salt, he would let throw it in.”—“Of course.”—“And what if his son’s eyes were ailing: would he let him touch his own eyes, not believing him a doctor, or would he stop him?”—“He would stop him.”—“But us, if he took us to be skilled in medicine, even if we wanted to open the eyes wide and sprinkle ash into them, I think he would not stop, believing that we understand rightly.”—“What you say is true.”—“Then would he also entrust everything else to us rather than to himself and his son, whatever we seemed to him to be wiser in than they are?”—“Necessarily, Socrates,” he said. 210

“So that is how it is, my friend Lysis,” I said: “in the things in which we come to have understanding, everyone will entrust them to us, Greeks and barbarians, men and women, and in these we shall do whatever we want, and no one will willingly get in our way; but we ourselves will be free in them, and rulers of others, and these things will be ours, for we shall profit from them. But in the things in which we do not acquire sense, no one will entrust us with doing in them what seems good to us, but everyone will get in our way as far as they can, not only strangers but our father and mother too, and anything more akin to us than they are; and we ourselves will be subject to others in them, and they will belong to others, for we shall profit nothing from them. Do you grant that it is so?”—“I grant it.”—“Then shall we be friends to anyone, and will anyone love us, in the things in which we are of no benefit?” b c

—Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη.—Νῦν ἄρα οὐδὲ σὲ ὁ πατὴρ οὐδὲ ἄλλος
 ἄλλον οὐδένα φιλεῖ, καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἦ ἄχρηστος.—Οὐκ ἔοικεν,
 ἔφη.—Ἐὰν μὲν ἄρα σοφὸς γένη, ὦ παῖ, πάντες σοι φίλοι d
 καὶ πάντες σοι οἰκεῖοι ἔσονται—χρήσιμος γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθὸς
 ἔσῃ—εἰ δὲ μή, σοὶ οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς οὔτε ὁ πατὴρ φίλος
 ἔσται οὔτε ἡ μήτηρ οὔτε οἱ οἰκεῖοι. οἷόν τε οὖν ἐπὶ τούτοις,
 ὦ Λύσι, μέγα φρονεῖν, ἐν οἷς τις μήπω φρονεῖ;—Καὶ πῶς 5
 ἄν; ἔφη.—Εἰ δ' ἄρα σὺ διδασκάλου δέῃ, οὐπω φρονεῖς.—
 Ἀληθῆ.—Οὐδ' ἄρα μεγαλόφρων εἰ, εἴπερ ἄφρων ἔτι.—Μὰ
 Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας αὐτοῦ ἀπέβλεψα πρὸς τὸν Ἱπποθάλῃ, e
 καὶ ὀλίγου ἐξήμαρτον· ἐπῆλθε γάρ μοι εἰπεῖν ὅτι Οὕτω
 χρή, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, ταπεινούντα
 καὶ συστέλλοντα, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ σὺ χαννούντα καὶ διαθρύ- 5
 πτοντα. κατιδὼν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀγωνιῶντα καὶ τεθορυβημένον
 ὑπὸ τῶν λεγομένων, ἀνεμνήσθην ὅτι καὶ προσεστὼς λαν-
 θάνειν τὸν Λύσιν ἐβούλετο· ἀνέλαβον οὖν ἑμαυτὸν καὶ
 ἐπέσχον τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὁ Μενέξενος πάλιν ἦκεν, 211
 καὶ ἐκαθέζετο παρὰ τὸν Λύσιν, ὅθεν καὶ ἐξανέστη. ὁ οὖν
 Λύσις μάλα παιδικῶς καὶ φιλικῶς, λάθρα τοῦ Μενεξένου,
 σμικρὸν πρὸς με λέγων ἔφη· ὦ Σώκρατες, ἅπερ καὶ ἐμοὶ
 λέγεις, εἶπε καὶ Μενεξένω. 5

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Ταῦτα μὲν σὺ αὐτῷ ἐρεῖς, ὦ Λύσι·
 πάντως γὰρ προσείχες τὸν νοῦν.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Πειρῶ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπομνημονεύσαι αὐτὰ ὅτι
 μάλιστα, ἵνα τούτῳ σαφῶς πάντα εἴπῃς· ἐὰν δέ τι αὐτῶν b
 ἐπιλάβῃ, αὐθὶς με ἀνερῆσθαι ὅταν ἐντύχῃς πρῶτον.

Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, ἔφη, ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάνυ σφόδρα,
 εὖ ἴσθι. ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο αὐτῷ λέγε, ἵνα καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούω,
 ἕως ἂν οἴκαδε ὥρα ἦ ἀπιέναι. 5

c7 οὐδὲ . . . οὐδὲ . . .] οὔτε . . . οὔτε . . . ci. H. Richards d5 φρονεῖ T: φρόνιμος B W
 (sed οἱ supra ιμος W) d8 δοκεῖ] δοκῶ ci. H. Richards b2 ἀνερῆσθαι] εἰ in ras. B

—“Certainly not,” he said.—“So now not even your father loves you, nor does anyone else love anyone else, insofar as he is useless.”—“It seems not,” he said.—“So if you become wise, my boy, everyone will be a friend to you and everyone akin to you, for you will be useful and good; but if not, no one else will be a friend to you, nor your father, nor your mother, nor those akin to you. Is it possible, then, Lysis, to think highly of oneself on account of things in which one does not yet understand?”¹—“And how could one?” he said.—“And if you need a teacher, you do not yet understand.”—“True.”—“Then you are not proud either, if you are still without understanding.”—“By Zeus, Socrates,” he said, “I think not.”

And when I heard him say this, I looked over at Hippothales, and very nearly slipped; for it occurred to me to say, “This, Hippothales, is how one should talk to one’s darling, humbling him and taking him down, not, as you do, puffing him up and pampering him.” So, seeing him in agony and thrown into confusion by what was being said, I remembered that even in standing by he wanted to escape Lysis’ notice; so I pulled myself up and held back from saying it. And at this point Menexenus came back, and sat down beside Lysis, just where he had got up from. Then Lysis, very boyishly and in a friendly way, without Menexenus noticing, said to me softly, “Socrates, say to Menexenus too what you are saying to me.”

And I said, “You will tell him that yourself, Lysis; for you were certainly paying attention.”

“Very much so,” he said.

“Then try,” I said, “to recall it as fully as you can, so that you can tell him everything clearly; and if you forget any part of it, ask me again the first time you meet me.”

“I’ll do that, Socrates,” he said, “most earnestly, rest assured. But say something else to him, so that I can hear too, until it’s time to go home.”

1. *Think highly of oneself* ... *proud*: *mega phronein* (literally “think big”) is built on *phronein*, “understand”, and *megalophrōn*, “proud”, is formed like *aphrōn*, “without understanding”: the argument is in the words.

Ἀλλὰ χρὴ ποιεῖν ταῦτα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ σὺ κελεύεις. ἀλλὰ ὅρα ὅπως ἐπικουρήσεις μοι, ἐάν με ἐλέγχειν ἐπιχειρήῃ ὁ Μενέξενος· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἐριστικός ἐστιν;

Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἔφη, σφόδρα γε· διὰ ταῦτά τοι καὶ βούλομαι σε αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι.

Ἵνα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καταγέλαστος γένωμαι;

Οὐ μὰ Δία, ἔφη, ἀλλ' ἵνα αὐτὸν κολάσῃς.

Πόθεν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. οὐ ῥάδιον· δεινὸς γάρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, Κτησίππου μαθητῆς. πάρεστι δέ τοι αὐτός—οὐχ ὀρᾷς;—
Κτήσιππος.

Μηδενός σοι, ἔφη, μελέτω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἴθι διαλέγου αὐτῷ.

Διαλεκτέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Ταῦτα οὖν ἡμῶν λεγόντων πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, Τί ὑμεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κτησίππος, αὐτῷ μόνῳ ἐστιᾶσθον, ἡμῖν δὲ οὐ μεταδίδοτον τῶν λόγων;

Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταδοτέον. ὅδε γάρ τι ὦν λέγω οὐ μανθάνει, ἀλλὰ φησιν οἶεσθαι Μενέξενον εἰδέναι, καὶ κελεύει τοῦτον ἐρωτᾶν.

Τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἐρωτᾷς;

Ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καί μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Μενέξενε, ὃ ἂν σε ἔρωμαι. τυγχάνω γὰρ ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιθυμῶν κτήματός του, ὥσπερ ἄλλος ἄλλον. ὁ μὲν γάρ τις ἵππους ἐπιθυμεῖ κτᾶσθαι, ὁ δὲ κύνας, ὁ δὲ χρυσίον, ὁ δὲ τιμάς· ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα πρᾶως ἔχω, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν φίλων κτήσιν πάννυ ἐρωτικῶς, καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν μοι φίλον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν ἄριστον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὄρτυγα ἢ ἀλεκτρυνόνα, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία ἔγωγε μᾶλλον ἢ ἵππον τε καὶ κύνα—οἶμαι δέ, νῆ τὸν κύνα, μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ Δαρείου χρυσίον κτήσασθαι δεξαίμην πολὺν πρότερον ἐταῖρον, μᾶλλον <δὲ>

b7 ὅρα secl. Cobet ἐπικουρήσεις T: ἐπικουρήσης B (ἡμισ refectum in ras. sed non videtur εἰς fuisse) e2 πρᾶως] παρέργως ci. H. Richards (coll. Dinarch. 3. 14)
e7 μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτὸν Δαρείον secl. Schanz δὲ add. Buttmann

“Well, I must do it,” I said, “since you too tell me to. But mind you come to my aid if Menexenus tries to refute me. Or don’t you know that he is contentious?”

“Yes, by Zeus,” he said, “very much so; that is exactly why I want you to talk with him.”

“So that I become ridiculous?” I said.

“No, by Zeus,” he said, “so that you can punish him.”

“Not likely,” I said. “It isn’t easy, for the man is formidable, a pupil of Ctesippus. And he is here himself, you know—don’t you see?—Ctesippus.”

“Don’t you worry about anything, Socrates,” he said; “just go and talk with him.”

“Talk I must,” I said.

While we were saying this to each other, “Why are you two,” said Ctesippus, “feasting all by yourselves and not giving us a share of the talk?”

“Why, a share you must have,” I said. “For this boy doesn’t follow something I’m saying, but says he thinks Menexenus knows it, and tells me to ask him.”

“Then why don’t you ask?” he said.

“I will ask,” I said. “Tell me, Menexenus, what I ask you. For ever since I was a boy I have in fact desired a certain possession, as one man desires one thing and another another. For one man desires to acquire horses, another dogs, another gold, another honors; but I am mild about these things, while toward the acquiring of friends I am altogether like one in love; and I would want a good friend to come to me rather than the best quail or cock among men,¹ and yes, by Zeus, rather than a horse and a dog; and I think, by the Dog,² that I would far rather acquire a companion than Darius’ gold,³ or rather,

1. Quail-fighting and cockfighting were favorite sports of Athenian boys, and of some grown men too (Plato, *Laws* 789b); lovers gave such birds to boys as presents (Aristophanes, *Birds* 705–707).

2. Socrates’ favorite oath (*Gorgias* 482b, “by the dog, the god of the Egyptians”), here sworn straight after “a dog”.

3. The Persian king’s wealth was a byword (compare *Alcibiades I* 123b–c); his gold coin was the daric, which ancient writers derived from Darius’ name.

ἢ αὐτὸν Δαρεῖον—οὕτως ἐγὼ φιλέταιρός τίς εἰμι. ὑμᾶς
οὖν ὁρῶν, σέ τε καὶ Λύσιν, ἐκπέπληγμαι καὶ εὐδαιμονίζω 212
ὅτι οὕτω νέοι ὄντες οἶοι τ' ἐστὸν τοῦτο τὸ κτῆμα ταχὺ καὶ
ῥαδίως κτᾶσθαι, καὶ σύ τε τοῦτον οὕτω φίλον ἐκτήσω ταχύ
τε καὶ σφόδρα, καὶ αὖ οὗτος σέ· ἐγὼ δὲ οὕτω πόρρῳ εἰμὶ
τοῦ κτήματος, ὥστε οὐδ' ὄντινα τρόπον γίνεταί φίλος 5
ἕτερος ἐτέρου οἶδα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα δὴ αὐτὰ σε βούλομαι
ἐρέσθαι ἅτε ἔμπειρον.

Καί μοι εἰπέ· ἐπειδάν τίς τινα φιλή, πότερος ποτέρου
φίλος γίνεταί, ὁ φιλῶν τοῦ φιλουμένου ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος b
τοῦ φιλοῦντος· ἢ οὐδὲν διαφέρει;—Οὐδέν, ἔφη, ἔμοιγε
δοκεῖ διαφέρειν.—Πῶς λέγεις; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀμφότεροι ἄρα
ἀλλήλων φίλοι γίνονται, ἐὰν μόνος ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον
φιλή;—Ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.—Τί δέ; οὐκ ἔστιν φιλοῦντα 5
μὴ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου ὃν ἂν φιλή;—Ἔστιν.—Τί δέ;
ἄρα ἔστιν καὶ μισεῖσθαι φιλοῦντα; οἷόν που ἐνίοτε δοκοῦσι
καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ πάσχειν πρὸς τὰ παιδικά· φιλοῦντες γὰρ
ὥς οἷόν τε μάλιστα οἱ μὲν οἶονται οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι, οἱ c
δὲ καὶ μισεῖσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ἀληθές δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο;—
Σφόδρα γε, ἔφη, ἀληθές.—Οὐκοῦν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ἦν δ'
ἐγώ, ὁ μὲν φιλεῖ, ὁ δὲ φιλεῖται;—Ναί.—Πότερος οὖν αὐ-
τῶν ποτέρου φίλος ἐστίν; ὁ φιλῶν τοῦ φιλουμένου, ἐάντε 5
καὶ ἀντιφιλήται ἐάντε καὶ μισῇται, ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος τοῦ
φιλοῦντος; ἢ οὐδέτερος αὖ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ οὐδετέρου φίλος
ἐστίν, ἂν μὴ ἀμφότεροι ἀλλήλους φιλῶσιν;—Ἔοικε γοῦν
οὕτως ἔχειν.—Ἀλλοίως ἄρα νῦν ἡμῖν δοκεῖ ἢ πρότερον d
ἔδοξεν. τότε μὲν γάρ, εἰ ὁ ἕτερος φιλοῖ, φίλω εἶναι ἅμφω·
νῦν δέ, ἂν μὴ ἀμφότεροι φιλῶσιν, οὐδέτερος φίλος.—Κιν-
δυνεύει, ἔφη.—Οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν φίλον τῷ φιλοῦντι οὐδὲν μὴ
οὐκ ἀντιφιλοῦν.—Οὐκ ἔοικεν.—Οὐδ' ἄρα φίλιπποί εἰσιν 5

a 3 σύ τε Heindorf: σὺ δὲ B T b 4 μόνος] μόνος μόνον ci. C. Schmidt: μόνον
ci. H. Richards c 1 οἱ μὲν Heindorf: οἰόμενοι B T c 4 πότερος Hirschig:
ὀπότερος B T c 6 καὶ ἀντιφιλήται] μὴ ἀντιφιλήται ci. H. Müller

than Darius himself: so much a friend of companions am I. So 212
when I see you two, you and Lysis, I am amazed, and count you
happy, that being so young you are able to acquire this posses-
sion quickly and easily, and you have acquired him as a friend so
quickly and so thoroughly, and he in turn you; but I am so far from
the possession that I do not even know how one becomes a friend
of another; and that is just what I want to ask you, as one who has
experience of it.

“And tell me: when someone loves someone, which becomes b
a friend of which, the one who loves of the one loved, or the one
loved of the one who loves? Or does it make no difference?”—“No
difference,” he said, “it seems to me, at least.”—“What do you
mean?” I said. “Then do both become friends of each other, if the
one alone loves the other?”—“It seems so to me,” he said.—“What
then? Is it not possible for one who loves not to be loved back by
the one he loves?”—“It is.”—“What then? Is it possible for one
who loves even to be hated? As lovers, I take it, sometimes seem c
to be treated by their darlings: for though they love them as much
as possible, some think they are not loved back, and some that
they are even hated. Or don’t you think that is true?”—“Very
true,” he said.—“Then in such a case,” I said, “the one loves, and
the other is loved?”—“Yes.”—“Which of them, then, is a friend of
which? Is the one who loves a friend of the one loved, whether
he is loved back or even hated, or the one loved a friend of the
one who loves? Or again, in such a case, is neither a friend of the d
other, unless both love each other?”—“It seems, at any rate, to be
so.”—“Then it seems otherwise to us now than it seemed before.
For then, if one loved, both were friends; but now, unless both love,
neither is a friend.”—“It looks like it,” he said.—“Then nothing is
a friend to the one who loves unless it loves him back.”—“It seems
not.”—“Then they are not friends of horses

οὓς ἂν οἱ ἵπποι μὴ ἀντιφιλῶσιν, οὐδὲ φιλόρτυγες, οὐδ' αὖ
 φιλόκυνές γε καὶ φίλοινοι καὶ φιλογυμνασταὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι,
 ἂν μὴ ἢ σοφία αὐτοὺς ἀντιφιλῇ. ἢ φιλοῦσι μὲν ταῦτα
 ἕκαστοι, οὐ μέντοι φίλα ὄντα, ἀλλὰ ψεύδεθ' ὁ ποιητής, ὃς
 ἔφη—

ὄλβιος, ὃ παιδὲς τε φίλοι καὶ μώνυχες ἵπποι

καὶ κύνες ἀγρευταὶ καὶ ξένος ἄλλοδαπός;

—Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅς.—Ἄλλ' ἀληθῆ δοκεῖ λέγειν σοι; 5

—Ναί.—Τὸ φιλούμενον ἄρα τῷ φιλοῦντι φίλον ἐστίν, ὡς
 ἔοικεν, ὦ Μενέξευε, ἔαντε φιλῇ ἔαντε καὶ μισῇ· οἶον καὶ
 τὰ νεωστὶ γεγονότα παῖδιά, τὰ μὲν οὐδέπω φιλοῦντα, τὰ
 δὲ καὶ μισοῦντα, ὅταν κολάζεται ὑπὸ τῆς μητρὸς ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ
 πατρός, ὅμως καὶ μισοῦντα ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ πάντων
 μάλιστα ἐστὶ τοῖς γονεῦσι φίλτατα.—Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη,
 οὕτως ἔχειν.—Οὐκ ἄρα ὁ φιλῶν φίλος ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου,
 ἀλλ' ὁ φιλούμενος.—Ἐοικεν.—Καὶ ὁ μισούμενος ἐχθρὸς 5
 ἄρα, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ μισῶν.—Φαίνεται.—Πολλοὶ ἄρα ὑπὸ τῶν
 ἐχθρῶν φιλοῦνται, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν φίλων μισοῦνται, καὶ τοῖς
 μὲν ἐχθροῖς φίλοι εἰσίν, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ἐχθροί, εἰ τὸ φιλού- b
 μενον φίλον ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ φιλοῦν. καίτοι πολλὴ
 ἀλογία, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε, μᾶλλον δὲ οἶμαι καὶ ἀδύνατον, τῷ
 τε φίλῳ ἐχθρὸν καὶ τῷ ἐχθρῷ φίλον εἶναι.—Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη,
 ἔοικας λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.—Οὐκοῦν εἰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον, τὸ 5
 φιλοῦν ἂν εἴη φίλον τοῦ φιλουμένου.—Φαίνεται.—Τὸ
 μισοῦν ἄρα πάλιν ἐχθρὸν τοῦ μισουμένου.—Ἀνάγκη.—Οὐ-
 κοῦν ταῦτά ἡμῖν συμβήσεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὁμολογεῖν,
 ἅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πρότερον, πολλάκις φίλον εἶναι μὴ φίλου, c
 πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐχθροῦ, ὅταν ἢ μὴ φιλοῦν τις φιλῇ ἢ καὶ
 μισοῦν φιλῇ· πολλάκις δ' ἐχθρὸν εἶναι μὴ ἐχθροῦ ἢ καὶ
 φίλου, ὅταν ἢ ⟨μὴ⟩ μισοῦν τις μισῇ ἢ καὶ φιλοῦν μισῇ.—
 Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη.—Τί οὖν δὴ χρησώμεθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μήτε 5

e7 ἔάν τε ⟨μὴ⟩ φιλῇ Schanz a6 μισῶν scr. rec.: φιλῶν B T W c4 ἢ μὴ μισοῦν
 τις Cornarius: ἢ μισοῦν τις B T: μὴ μισοῦν τις scr. rec. μισῇ scr. rec.: φιλῇ B T:
 om. Cornarius

whom the horses do not love back, nor friends of quails, nor again friends of dogs, and friends of wine, and friends of exercise, and friends of wisdom, unless wisdom loves them back.¹ Or do they love these things, each of them, though these are not friends, but e is the poet lying who said,

*Fortunate he to whom children are friends, and single-hoofed horses,
and dogs for the hunt, and a guest from abroad?*²

—“It doesn’t seem so to me,” he said.—“But you think he speaks the truth?”—“Yes.”—“Then what is loved is a friend to the one who loves it, it seems, Menexenus, whether it loves or even hates: as with newborn children, some of whom do not yet love, and 213 some of whom even hate, when they are punished by their mother or their father; and yet even while they hate they are at that time, more than anything, the greatest friends to their parents.”³—“It seems so to me,” he said.—“Then on this argument it is not the one who loves who is a friend, but the one who is loved.”—“It seems so.”—“And the one who is hated is an enemy, then, not the one who hates.”⁴—“Apparently.”—“Then many are loved by their enemies and hated by their friends, and are friends to their enemies b and enemies to their friends, if what is loved is a friend and not what loves. And yet it is a great want of sense, my friend and companion, or rather I think even an impossibility, to be an enemy to one’s friend and a friend to one’s enemy.”—“What you say seems true, Socrates,” he said.—“Then if this is impossible, what loves would be a friend of what is loved.”—“Apparently.”—“And what hates, in turn, an enemy of what is hated.”—“Necessarily.”—“Then it will turn out that we must agree to the same things as in the ear- c
lier case: that often one is a friend of what is not a friend, and often even of an enemy, when one loves what does not love, or even loves what hates; and often one is an enemy of what is not an enemy, or even of a friend, when one hates what does not hate, or even hates what loves.”⁵—“It looks like it,” he said.—“What then shall we do,” I said, “if neither

1. Each is one Greek word compounded with *philos*: *philippoi*, *philortyges*, *philokynes*, *philoinoi*, *philogymnastai*, *philosophoi*, the last being “philosophers”.

2. Solon fr. 23 West; Theognis 1253–1254 has a slightly different version. “Friends” is *philoi*, which in the poem means “dear”.

3. *Greatest friends*: *philtata*, the superlative of *philos*; in ordinary Greek, “dearest”.

4. *The one who hates*: Burnet prints *misōn* from later manuscripts; B, T and W have *philōn*, “the one who loves” (*apparatus*, a6).

5. *Hates what does not hate*: Burnet supplies “not”, after Cornarius, and prints “hates” from later manuscripts; B and T have “loves what hates” (*apparatus*, c4).

οἱ φιλοῦντες φίλοι ἔσονται μήτε οἱ φιλούμενοι μήτε οἱ
 φιλοῦντές τε καὶ φιλούμενοι; ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλους
 τινὰς ἔτι φήσομεν εἶναι φίλους ἀλλήλοις γιγνομένους;—
 Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάννυ εὐπορῶ ἔγωγε.
 —Ἄρα μή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Μενέξενε, τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ὀρθῶς d
 ἐζητοῦμεν;—Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ὁ Λύσις,
 καὶ ἅμα εἰπὼν ἡρυθρίασεν· ἐδόκει γάρ μοι ἄκοντ' αὐτὸν
 ἐκφεύγειν τὸ λεχθέν διὰ τὸ σφόδρα προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν
 τοῖς λεγομένοις, δηλὸς δ' ἦν καὶ ὅτε ἡκροᾶτο οὕτως ἔχων. 5

Ἐγὼ οὖν βουλόμενος τόν τε Μενέξενον ἀναπαῦσαι καὶ
 ἐκείνου ἡσθεῖς τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, οὕτω μεταβαλὼν πρὸς τὸν
 Λύσιν ἐποιούμην τοὺς λόγους, καὶ εἶπον· ὦ Λύσι, ἀληθῆ e
 μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν ὅτι εἰ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκοποῦμεν, οὐκ ἂν
 ποτε οὕτως ἐπλανώμεθα. ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν μηκέτι ἴωμεν—
 καὶ γὰρ χαλεπὴ τίς μοι φαίνεται ὥσπερ ὁδὸς ἡ σκέψις—ἦ
 δὲ ἐτράπημεν, δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι ἰέναι, σκοποῦντα [τὰ] κατὰ 5
 τοὺς ποιητάς· οὗτοι γὰρ ἡμῖν ὥσπερ πατέρες τῆς σοφίας 214
 εἰσὶν καὶ ἡγεμόνες. λέγουσι δὲ δήπου οὐ φαύλως ἀποφαινό-
 μενοι περὶ τῶν φίλων, οἱ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες· ἀλλὰ τὸν θεὸν
 αὐτόν φασιν ποιεῖν φίλους αὐτούς, ἄγοντα παρ' ἀλλήλους.
 λέγουσι δὲ πως ταῦτα, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ᾠδί— 5

αἰεὶ τοι τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον
 καὶ ποιεῖ γινώριμον· ἦ οὐκ ἐντετύχηκας τούτοις τοῖς ἔπεισιν; b
 —Ἐγὼ γ', ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς τῶν σοφωτάτων συγγραμ-
 μασιν ἐντετύχηκας ταῦτα αὐτὰ λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὸ ὁμοῖον τῷ
 ὁμοίῳ ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ φίλον εἶναι; εἰσὶν δὲ που οὗτοι οἱ περὶ
 φύσεώς τε καὶ τοῦ ὅλου διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες.— 5
 Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.—Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὖ λέγουσιν;—

c7 ἀλλὰ] ἀρα ci. Cornarius (ante ἀλλὰ signum interrogandi posuit Goldbacher)

c9 εὐπορῶ B T²: ἀπορῶ T d2 ἔφη Vat. 1029: om. B T e5 σκοποῦντα]

σκοποῦντας ci. Schleiermacher τὰ secl. Heindorf a5 ᾠδί T: ᾠδί B (sed

δί ex emend. in ras.): ᾠδήν W b3 ταῦτα αὐτὰ] ταῦτα ταῦτα Heindorf

b4 ἀνάγκη B: ἀνάγκη T

those who love will be friends, nor those who are loved, nor those who both love and are loved? Or shall we say that there are still others besides these who become friends to each other?"—"No, by Zeus, Socrates," he said, "I don't see much of a way through, myself."—"Can it be, Menexenus," I said, "that we were not seeking rightly at all?"—"We were not, I think, Socrates," said Lysis; and as he said it he blushed; for it seemed to me that what he said had escaped him involuntarily, because he was paying such close attention to what was being said; and he had plainly been in that state while he listened, too.

So I, wanting to let Menexenus rest, and pleased with the other's philosophy,¹ changed over in this way and turned my talk to Lysis, and said, "Lysis, I think what you say is true, that if we had been looking into it rightly, we would never have wandered like this. But let us not go this way any longer, for the looking into it seems to me a hard sort of road, as it were; but where we turned off, there I think one must go, looking into it along the lines of the poets. For they are to us like fathers and guides of wisdom. And they speak, I take it, in no paltry way when they declare who friends are in fact; rather they say that the god himself makes them friends, bringing them to each other. And they say it something like this, I imagine:

*Ever, you know, the god brings like to like,*²

and makes him known to him. Or haven't you come across these verses?"—"I have," he said.—"Then have you also come across the compositions of the wisest men, saying these very things, that like must always be a friend to like? These are, I take it, the people who talk and write about nature and the whole."³—"What you say is true," he said.—"Then do they speak well?" I said.—

1. *Philosophia*, "philosophy", is formed from *philos* and *sophia*, "wisdom"; the *philosophoi* of 212d were "friends of wisdom".

2. *Odyssey* 17.217–218, where the goatherd Melanthius jeers at the swineherd Eumaeus as he leads the beggar who is Odysseus in disguise: "now one wretch leads another, as the god ever brings like to like". In Homer the line is an insult.

3. Perhaps Empedocles and Democritus (interpretation), who held that like is drawn to like (for Empedocles, Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.1, 1155b7; for Democritus, Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.116–118).

Ἵσως, ἔφη.—Ἵσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ἡμῖν αὐτοῦ, Ἵσως δὲ καὶ
 πᾶν, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς οὐ συνίμεν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡμῖν ὃ γε πονηρὸς
 τῷ πονηρῷ, ὅσῳ ἂν ἐγγυτέρῳ προσίῃ καὶ μᾶλλον ὁμιλῇ, c
 τοσοῦτῳ ἐχθίων γίγνεσθαι. ἀδικεῖ γάρ· ἀδικοῦντας δὲ καὶ
 ἀδικουμένους ἀδύνατόν που φίλους εἶναι. οὐχ οὕτως;—Ναί,
 ἦ δ' ὅς.—Ταύτῃ μὲν ἂν τοίνυν τοῦ λεγομένου τὸ ἡμῖν οὐκ
 ἀληθὲς εἴη, εἴπερ οἱ πονηροὶ ἀλλήλοις ὅμοιοι.—Ἀληθῇ 5
 λέγεις.—Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦσιν λέγειν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ὁμοίους
 εἶναι ἀλλήλοις καὶ φίλους, τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς, ὅπερ καὶ λέγεται
 περὶ αὐτῶν, μηδέποτε ὁμοίους μηδ' αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἀλλ'
 ἐμπλήκτους τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους· ὁ δὲ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἀνόμιον d
 εἴη καὶ διάφορον, σχολῇ γέ τῳ ἄλλῳ ὅμοιον ἢ φίλον γένοιτ'
 ἂν. ἦ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως;—Ἐμοιγ', ἔφη.—Τοῦτο
 τοίνυν αἰνίττονται, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οἱ τὸ ὅμοιον 5
 τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον λέγοντες, ὥς ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνος
 μόνῳ φίλος, ὁ δὲ κακὸς οὔτε ἀγαθῷ οὔτε κακῷ οὐδέποτε
 εἰς ἀληθῇ φιλίαν ἔρχεται. συνδοκεῖ σοι;—Κατένευσεν.—
 Ἐχομεν ἄρα ἤδη τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ φίλοι· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμῖν e
 σημαίνει ὅτι οἱ ἂν ὦσιν ἀγαθοί.—Πάννυ γε, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.

Καὶ ἐμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καίτοι δυσχεραίνω τί γε ἐν αὐτῷ·
 φέρε οἶν, ὦ πρὸς Διός, ἴδωμεν τί καὶ ὑποπτεύω. ὁ ὅμοιος
 τῷ ὁμοίῳ καθ' ὅσον ὅμοιος φίλος, καὶ ἔστιν χρήσιμος ὁ
 τοιοῦτος τῷ τοιούτῳ; μᾶλλον δὲ ὦδε· ὅτι οὖν ὅμοιον ὅτῳ οὖν 5
 ὁμοίῳ τίνα ὠφελίαν ἔχειν ἢ τίνα βλάβην ἂν ποιῆσαι
 δύναιτο, ὁ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ; ἢ τί ἂν παθεῖν, ὁ μὴ καὶ ὑφ'
 αὐτοῦ πάθοι; τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα πῶς ἂν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαπηθεῖη, 215
 μηδεμίαν ἐπικουρίαν ἀλλήλοις ἔχοντα; ἔστιν ὅπως;—Οὐκ
 ἔστιν.—Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπῶτο, πῶς φίλον;—Οὐδαμῶς.—Ἀλλὰ
 δὴ ὁ μὲν ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ οὐ φίλος· ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ

b 8 οὐ T W: om. B c 1 προσίῃ T: προσείῃ B c 2 δὲ in ras. refinxit B² d 2 εἴη T:
 ἂν εἴη B σχολή γέ B T: σχολῇ γ' ἂν Bekker γένοιτ' ἂν scripsi: γένοιτο B T
 e 2 τί γε] γέ τι ci. H. Richards e 6 ἔχειν B: ἔχει T: secl. Schanz e 7 prius ὅ] ἦν
 ci. H. Richards αὐτῷ B T: αὐτό T²

“Perhaps,” he said.—“Perhaps,” I said, “half of it, and perhaps even all of it, but we don’t grasp it. For it seems to us that the wicked man, the nearer he comes to the wicked man and the more he has to do with him, the more of an enemy he becomes; for he does wrong; and those who do wrong and those who are wronged cannot, I take it, be friends. Isn’t that so?”—“Yes,” he said.—“In this way, then, half of what is said would not be true, if the wicked are like one another.”—“What you say is true.”—“But they seem to me to mean that the good are like one another and are friends, and that the bad, as is said of them too, are never like one another, not even like themselves, but capricious and unaccountable; and what is unlike itself and at odds with itself would hardly become like anything else or a friend to it. Or don’t you think so too?”—“I do,” he said.—“This, then, is the riddle they speak, it seems to me, my companion, those who say that like is a friend to like: that the good man alone is a friend to the good man alone, while the bad man never comes into true friendship with either a good man or a bad one. Does it seem so to you too?”—He nodded.—“So now we have it, who friends are; for the argument indicates to us that they are whoever are good.”—“Very much so,” he said, “it seems.”

“To me too,” I said. “And yet there is something in it that troubles me. Come then, in the name of Zeus, let us see just what I suspect. Is one who is like a friend to one who is like, insofar as he is like, and is such a man useful to such a man? Or rather, put it this way: what benefit could anything whatever that is like have for anything whatever that is like it, or what harm could it do it, that it could not also have for itself, or do to itself? Or what could it suffer that it would not also suffer from itself? Such things, then, how could they be cherished by each other, having no aid to give each other? Is there any way?”—“There is not.”—“And what is not cherished, how can it be a friend?”—“In no way.”—“Well then, one who is like is not a friend to one who is like; but the good man, to the good man,

καθ' ὅσον ἀγαθός, οὐ καθ' ὅσον ὅμοιος, φίλος ἂν εἴη;—Ἰσως. 5
 —Τί δέ; οὐχ ὁ ἀγαθός, καθ' ὅσον ἀγαθός, κατὰ τοσοῦτον
 ἱκανὸς ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ;—Ναί.—Ὁ δέ γε ἱκανὸς οὐδενὸς δεό-
 μενος κατὰ τὴν ἱκανότητα.—Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;—Ὁ δὲ μὴ του
 δεόμενος οὐδέ τι ἀγαπῶν ἄν.—Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.—Ὁ δὲ μὴ b
 ἀγαπῶν, οὐδ' ἂν φιλοῖ.—Οὐ δῆτα.—Ὁ δὲ μὴ φιλῶν γε οὐ
 φίλος.—Οὐ φαίνεται.—Πῶς οὖν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς
 ἡμῖν φίλοι ἔσονται τὴν ἀρχήν, οἳ μήτε ἀπόντες ποθεινοὶ
 ἀλλήλοις—ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χωρὶς ὄντες—μήτε πα- 5
 ρόντες χρειάν αὐτῶν ἔχουσιν; τοὺς δὲ τοιοῦτους τίς μηχανή
 περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι ἀλλήλους;—Οὐδεμία, ἔφη.—Φίλοι
 δέ γε οὐκ ἂν εἶεν μὴ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμενοι ἑαυτούς.— c
 Ἀληθῆ.

Ἄθρει δὴ, ὦ Λύσι, πῇ παρακρουόμεθα. ἄρά γε ὅλω
 τυὶ ἐξαπατώμεθα;—Πῶς δῆ; ἔφη.—Ἦδη ποτέ του ἤκουσα
 λέγοντος, καὶ ἄρτι ἀναμνησσκομαι, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅμοιον τῷ 5
 ὁμοίῳ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς πολεμιώτατοι εἶεν· καὶ δὴ
 καὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον ἐπήγετο μάρτυρα, λέγων ὥς ἄρα—

καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ αἰοιδὸς αἰοιδῷ

καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ,

καὶ τᾶλλα δὴ πάντα οὕτως ἔφη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι μάλιστα τὰ
 ὁμοιότατα (πρὸς) ἀλλήλα φθόνου τε καὶ φιλονικίας καὶ
 ἔχθρας ἐμπίμπλασθαι, τὰ δ' ἀνομοιότατα φιλίας· τὸν γὰρ
 πένητα τῷ πλουσίῳ ἀναγκάζεσθαι φίλον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀσθενῆ 5
 τῷ ἰσχυρῷ τῆς ἐπικουρίας ἕνεκα, καὶ τὸν κάμνοντα τῷ ἰατρῷ,
 καὶ πάντα δὴ τὸν μὴ εἰδότα ἀγαπᾶν τὸν εἰδότα καὶ φιλεῖν.
 καὶ δὴ καὶ ἔτι ἐπεξήγει τῷ λόγῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον, λέγων e
 ὥς ἄρα παντὸς δέοι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον εἶναι, ἀλλ'
 αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον εἴη τούτου· τὸ γὰρ ἐναντιώτατον τῷ
 ἐναντιωτάτῳ εἶναι μάλιστα φίλον. ἐπιθυμεῖν γὰρ τοῦ

b1 ὁ... ἀγαπῶν] ὁ... ἀγαπῶν ci. Schleiermacher d2 ἔφη B W: ἐφάνη T
 d3 πρὸς add. corr. Coisl. d7 φιλεῖν T W: φιλεῖν καὶ φιλεῖ*** B: φιλεῖν καὶ
 φιλεῖσθαι b e4 ἐπιθυμεῖν T W: ἐπιθυμεῖ B

insofar as he is good, not insofar as he is like, would he be a friend?"—"Perhaps."—"What then? Would not the good man, insofar as he is good, be to that extent sufficient for himself?"—"Yes."—"And the sufficient man is in need of nothing, by reason of his sufficiency."—"Of course."—"And whoever is not in need of anything would not cherish anything either."—"No, he would not."—"And what he did not cherish he would not love either."—"Certainly not."—"And the one who does not love is not a friend."—"Apparently not."—"How then will the good be friends to the good for us at all, who neither are missed by each other when apart, since even separated they are sufficient for themselves, nor have any use for each other when together? What means is there for such people to set great store by each other?"—"None," he said.—"Friends, though, they would not be, if they did not set great store by each other."—"True."

"Look now, Lysis, where we are being led astray. Are we perhaps deceived in the whole of it?"—"How so?" he said.—"I once heard someone say, and I am just now reminded of it, that like is most hostile to like, and the good are to the good; and indeed he even brought in Hesiod as a witness, saying, as he would have it,

*And potter is angry with potter, and singer with singer,
and beggar with beggar;*¹

and all other things, he said, must in the same way, those most alike most of all, be filled with envy and rivalry and enmity toward each other, and those most unlike with friendship; for the poor man is compelled to be a friend to the rich, and the weak to the strong, for the sake of aid, and the sick man to the doctor, and everyone who does not know must cherish the one who knows and love him. And indeed he went further still in his argument, in more magnificent style, saying, as he would have it, that like is as far as can be from being a friend to like, but the very opposite of this is the case; for the most opposite is most a friend to the most opposite. For each thing, he said, desires

1. *Works and Days* 25–26, quoted loosely: in Hesiod potter is angry with potter and builder with builder, beggar envies beggar and singer singer.

τοιούτου ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ὁμοίου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ξηρὸν 5
 ὑγροῦ, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμοῦ, τὸ δὲ πικρὸν γλυκέος, τὸ δὲ
 ὀξύ ἀμβλέος, τὸ δὲ κενὸν πληρώσεως, καὶ τὸ πλήρες δὲ
 κενώσεως, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. τροφήν
 γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου 216
 οὐδὲν ἂν ἀπολαῦσαι. καὶ μέντοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ κομψὸς
 ἐδόκει εἶναι ταῦτα λέγων· εὖ γὰρ ἔλεγεν. ὑμῖν δέ, ἦν δ'
 ἐγώ, πῶς δοκεῖ λέγειν;—Εὖ γε, ἔφη ὁ Μενέξενος, ὥς γε
 οὕτωςι ἀκοῦσαι.—Φῶμεν ἄρα τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ μά-
 λιστα φίλον εἶναι;—Πάνυ γε.—Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐκ ἀλλό- 5
 κοτον, ὦ Μενέξενε; καὶ ἡμῖν εὐθὺς ἄσμενοι ἐπιπηδήσονται
 οὗτοι οἱ πάσσοφοι ἄνδρες, οἱ ἀντιλογικοί, καὶ ἐρήσονται εἰ
 οὐκ ἐναντιώτατον ἔχθρα φιλία; οἷς τί ἀποκρινόμεθα; ἢ b
 οὐκ ἀνάγκη ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν;—Ἀνάγκη.—Ἄρ'
 οὖν, φήσουσιν, τὸ ἐχθρὸν τῷ φίλῳ φίλον ἢ τὸ φίλον τῷ
 ἐχθρῷ;—Οὐδέτερα, ἔφη.—Ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ, ἢ τὸ
 σῶφρον τῷ ἀκολάστῳ, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῷ κακῷ;—Οὐκ ἂν μοι 5
 δοκεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν.—Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ γε κατὰ
 τὴν ἐναντιότητά τί τῳ [φίλῳ] φίλον ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα
 φίλα εἶναι.—Ἀνάγκη.—Οὔτε ἄρα τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ οὔτε
 τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φίλον.—Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε σκεψώμεθα, μὴ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς λανθά- c
 νει τὸ φίλον ὥς ἀληθῶς οὐδὲν τούτων ὄν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μῆτε
 ἀγαθὸν μῆτε κακὸν φίλον οὕτω ποτὲ γιγνόμενον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
 —Πῶς, ἢ δ' ὅς, λέγεις;—Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ
 οἶδα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι αὐτὸς εἰλιγγιῶ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἀπο- 5
 ρίας, καὶ κινδυνεύει κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν παροιμίαν τὸ καλὸν
 φίλον εἶναι. ἔοικε γοῦν μαλακῷ τινι καὶ λείῳ καὶ λιπαρῷ·
 διὸ καὶ ἴσως ῥαδίως διολισθαίνει καὶ διαδύεται ἡμᾶς, ἅτε d
 τοιοῦτον ὄν. λέγω γὰρ τὰγαθὸν καλὸν εἶναι· σὺ δ' οὐκ

a5 ἀλλόκοτον Baiter: ἀλλοκότων B T: ἀλλοκότως t b4 ἢ τὸ T: τὸ B (sed ἢ
 suprascr. B²) b7 τῳ φίλον Cornarius: τῷ φίλῳ φίλον B t: τῷ φίλον φίλον T
 c1 ἔτι μᾶλλον T W: om. B λανθάνει] ei in ras. B d1 ἴσως] οὕτως Schanz

what is of that sort, not what is like it: the dry desires the wet, the cold the hot, the bitter the sweet, the sharp the blunt, the empty filling, and the full emptying, and everything else in the same way, by the same account. For the opposite is food to its opposite; for like would get no enjoyment from like.” And indeed, my companion,¹ 216 he seemed a clever fellow, saying this; for he spoke well. “And how does he seem to you two to speak?” I said.—“He speaks well,” said Menexenus, “at least as one hears it put like this.”—“Shall we say, then, that the opposite is most a friend to the opposite?”—“Very much so.”—“Very well,” I said; “is it not outlandish, Menexenus? And at once those all-wise men, the masters of contradiction, will gladly leap on us and ask whether enmity is not most opposite b to friendship. What shall we answer them? Or must we not agree that what they say is true?”—“Necessarily.”—“Then, they will say, is the enemy a friend to the friend, or the friend to the enemy?”—“Neither,” he said.—“Then the just to the unjust, or the temperate to the intemperate, or the good to the bad?”—“I don’t think it can be so.”—“But indeed,” I said, “if anything is a friend to anything² by way of oppositeness, these things too must be friends.”—“Necessarily.”—“Then neither is like a friend to like, nor opposite to opposite.”—“It seems not.”

“Let us look further into this too: whether the friend is escap- c ing our notice still more, being in truth none of these, but what is neither good nor bad becoming in this way, at some time, a friend of the good.”—“What do you mean?” he said.—“But, by Zeus,” I said, “I don’t know, but I am really dizzy myself from the perplexity of the argument, and it looks as if, as the old proverb has it, the beautiful is a friend.³ At any rate it resembles something soft and smooth and glossy; which is perhaps why it slips through and d gets past us so easily, being of that kind. For I say that the good is beautiful; and you, don’t

1. *My companion*: Socrates turns here, it seems, to the listener to whom he tells the story (interpretation).

2. *A friend to anything*: Burnet follows Cornarius, reading *tōi*, “to anything”, and bracketing *philōi*, “friend”; B and t have “a friend to the friend” (apparatus, b7).

3. The Muses and Graces sang it at the wedding of Cadmus: “what is beautiful is dear (*philon*), what is not beautiful is not dear” (Theognis 15–17). The chorus of Euripides’ *Bacchae* sings the first half as a refrain, “what is beautiful is dear forever” (881, 901).

οἶει;—Ἐγωγε.—Λέγω τοῖνυν ἀπομαντευόμενος, τοῦ καλοῦ
 τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον εἶναι τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν·
 πρὸς ᾧ δὲ λέγων μαντεύομαι, ἄκουσον. δοκεῖ μοι ὥσπερ 5
 τρία ἄττα εἶναι γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακόν, τὸ δ' οὐτ'
 ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν· τί δὲ σοί;—Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη.—Καὶ οὔτε
 τὰγαθὸν τὰγαθῷ οὔτε τὸ κακὸν τῷ κακῷ οὔτε τὰγαθὸν τῷ
 κακῷ φίλον εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὁ ἐμπροσθεν λόγος ἔειπε· 5
 λείπεται δὴ, εἴπερ τῷ τί ἐστὶν φίλον, τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε
 κακὸν φίλον εἶναι ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ τοῦ τοιούτου οἶον αὐτό
 ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν πού τῷ κακῷ φίλον ἂν τι γένοιτο.—
 Ἀληθῆ.—Οὐδὲ μὴν τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἔφαμεν ἄρτι· ἢ 5
 γάρ;—Ναί.—Οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται τῷ μήτε ἀγαθῷ μήτε κακῷ τὸ
 τοιούτον φίλον οἶον αὐτό.—Οὐ φαίνεται.—Τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἄρα
 τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν μόνῳ μόνον συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι 217
 φίλον.—Ἀνάγκη, ὥς ἔοικεν.

Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ παῖδες, ὑφηγεῖται ἡμῖν
 τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον; εἰ γοῦν θέλομεν ἐννοῆσαι τὸ ὑγιαῖνον
 σῶμα, οὐδὲν ἱατρικῆς δεῖται οὐδὲ ὠφελίας· ἱκανῶς γὰρ ἔχει, 5
 ὥστε ὑγιαίνων οὐδεὶς ἱατρῷ φίλος διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν. ἢ γάρ;
 —Οὐδεὶς.—Ἄλλ' ὁ κάμνων οἶμαι διὰ τὴν νόσον.—Πῶς γὰρ
 οὔ;—Νόσος μὲν δὴ κακόν, ἱατρικὴ δὲ ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἀγαθόν. b
 —Ναί.—Σῶμα δέ γε πού κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι οὔτε ἀγαθὸν
 οὔτε κακόν.—Οὔτως.—Ἀναγκάζεται δέ γε σῶμα διὰ νόσον
 ἱατρικὴν ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν.—Δοκεῖ μοι.—Τὸ μήτε
 κακὸν ἄρα μήτ' ἀγαθὸν φίλον γίνεσθαι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διὰ κακοῦ 5
 παρουσίαν.—Ἐοικεν.—Δῆλον δέ γε ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι αὐτὸ
 κακὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ οὐ ἔχει. οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε κακὸν γεγονὸς
 ἔτι ἂν τι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ [οὔ] ἐπιθυμοῖ καὶ φίλον εἶη· ἀδύνατον c
 γὰρ ἔφαμεν κακὸν ἀγαθῷ φίλον εἶναι.—Ἀδύνατον γάρ.—

d 5 λέγων] βλέπων ci. anonymus apud Heindorf e 2 δὴ Heindorf: δ' BT e 3 τοῦ
 ἀγαθοῦ B: οὐ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ T e 4 ἂν πού] δήπου Schanz a 1 γίνεσθαι φίλον TW:
 γίνεσθαι B a 4 ἐθέλομεν Ast c 1 ἔτι ci. Salvini: ἐστὶ B: ἐστὶν T ἂν τι
 C. Schmidt: ἀντὶ B T: ἂν Heindorf οὐ om. recc.

you think so?"—"I do."—"Then I say, divining, that what is neither good nor bad is a friend of the beautiful and good; and hear what I am speaking of when I divine it. It seems to me that there are, as it were, some three kinds: the good, the bad, and what is neither good nor bad. And to you?"—"To me too," he said.—"And that neither the good to the good, nor the bad to the bad, nor the good to the bad is a friend, as the argument before does not let it be so either. It remains, then, if anything is a friend to anything, that what is neither good nor bad is a friend either of the good or of what is of the same sort as itself. For nothing, I take it, could become a friend to the bad."—"True."—"Nor, indeed, like to like, we said just now. Isn't that so?"—"Yes."—"Then to what is neither good nor bad, what is of the same sort as itself will not be a friend."—"Apparently not."—"Then it is to the good alone, it turns out, that what is neither good nor bad, and it alone, becomes a friend."—"Necessarily, it seems."

"Then is what we are now saying, boys," I said, "actually leading us well? At any rate, if we were willing to think of the healthy body, it is in no need of medicine or of benefit; for it is in a sufficient state, so that no one who is healthy is a friend to a doctor because of his health. Isn't that so?"—"No one is."—"But the sick man is, I think, because of his disease."—"Of course."—"Disease, now, is bad, and medicine beneficial and good."—"Yes."—"And a body, I take it, insofar as it is a body, is neither good nor bad."—"So it is."—"But a body is compelled, because of disease, to welcome and love medicine."—"It seems so to me."—"Then what is neither bad nor good becomes a friend of the good because of the presence of bad."—"It seems so."—"And plainly before it has itself become bad through the bad that it has. For indeed, once it has become bad, it would no longer desire anything of the good, or be a friend;¹ for, we said, it is impossible for bad to be a friend to good."—"Yes, it is impossible."—

1. *Would no longer desire anything*: Burnet prints two conjectures here, Salvini's *eti*, "any longer", and C. Schmidt's *an ti*, "would ... anything"; B and T have *esti(n) anti*, "is ... instead of" (apparatus, c1).

Σκέψασθε δὴ ὁ λέγω. λέγω γὰρ ὅτι ἕνια μὲν, οἶον ἂν ἦ
 τὸ παρόν, τοιαῦτά ἐστι καὶ αὐτά, ἕνια δὲ οὐ. ὥσπερ εἰ
 ἐθέλοι τις χρώματί τῳ ὅτιοῦν [τι] ἀλείψαι, πάρεστίν που 5
 τῷ ἀλειφθέντι τὸ ἐπαλειφθέν.—Πάνυ γε.—Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ
 ἔστιν τότε τοιοῦτον τὴν χροάν τὸ ἀλειφθέν, οἶον τὸ ἐπόν;
 —Οὐ μανθάνω, ἦ δ' ὅς.—Ἄλλ' ὧδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. εἴ τίς d
 σου ξανθὰς οὐσας τὰς τρίχας ψιμυθίῳ ἀλείψειεν, πότερον
 τότε λευκαὶ εἶεν ἢ φαίνοντ' ἄν;—Φαίνοντ' ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς.—
 Καὶ μὴν παρεῖη γ' ἂν αὐταῖς λευκότης.—Ναί.—Ἄλλ' ὁμως
 οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἂν εἶεν λευκαὶ πῶ, ἀλλὰ παρούσης λευκό- 5
 τητος οὔτε τι λευκαὶ οὔτε μέλαιναί εἰσιν.—Ἀληθῆ.—Ἄλλ'
 ὅταν δὴ, ὦ φίλε, τὸ γῆρας αὐταῖς ταῦτόν τοῦτο χρῶμα ἐπα-
 γάγῃ, τότε ἐγένοντο οἷόνπερ τὸ παρόν, λευκοῦ παρουσία
 λευκαί.—Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;—Τοῦτο τοῖνυν ἐρωτῶ νῦν δὴ, εἰ ᾧ e
 ἂν τι παρῇ, τοιοῦτον ἔσται τὸ ἔχον οἶον τὸ παρόν· ἦ ἐὰν
 μὲν κατὰ τινα τρόπον παρῇ, ἔσται, ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὐ;—Οὕτω
 μᾶλλον, ἔφη.—Καὶ τὸ μήτε κακὸν ἄρα μήτ' ἀγαθὸν ἐνίοτε
 κακοῦ παρόντος οὐπῶ κακόν ἐστιν, ἔστιν δ' ὅτε ἤδη τὸ 5
 τοιοῦτον γέγονεν.—Πάνυ γε.—Οὐκοῦν ὅταν μήπω κακὸν ἦ
 κακοῦ παρόντος, αὕτη μὲν ἢ παρουσία ἀγαθοῦ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ
 ἐπιθυμεῖν· ἢ δὲ κακὸν ποιούσα ἀποστερεῖ αὐτὸ τῆς τε ἐπι-
 θυμίας ἅμα καὶ τῆς φιλίας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐστὶν
 οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ κακόν· φίλον δὲ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν 218
 οὐκ ἦν.—Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.—Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ φαίμεν ἂν καὶ τοὺς
 ἤδη σοφοὺς μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν, εἴτε θεοὶ εἴτε ἀνθρωποὶ
 εἰσιν οὗτοι· οὐδ' αὖ ἐκείνους φιλοσοφεῖν τοὺς οὕτως ἄγνοιαν
 ἔχοντας ὥστε κακοὺς εἶναι· κακὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀμαθῆ οὐδένα 5
 φιλοσοφεῖν. λείπονται δὴ οἱ ἔχοντες μὲν τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο,
 τὴν ἄγνοιαν, μήπω δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὄντες ἀγνώμονες μηδὲ

c5 τι B T W: om. rec. c6 πάνυ γε B W: om. T c7 ἀλειφθέν Heindorf:
 ἐπαλειφθέν B T ἐπόν (vel ἐπιόν) Heindorf: ἔτι ὄν B T d3 τότε Heindorf:
 ποτε B T altero loco φαίνοντ' ἂν B d7 τοῦτο B: τοῦτο τὸ T a1 ἀγαθῷ κακὸν
 Heindorf: ἀγαθῶν κακῷ T: ἀγαθὸν κακῷ B t

“Now look into what I am saying. For I say that some things are themselves of the same sort as whatever is present to them, and some are not. As, if someone were willing to smear anything whatever with some color, what was smeared on is present, I take it, to the thing smeared.”—“Very much so.”—“Then is the thing smeared, at that time, also of the same sort in color as what is on it?”¹—“I don’t follow,” he said.—“Well, like this,” I said. d
 “If someone smeared your hair, which is fair, with white lead, would it then be white, or appear so?”—“It would appear so,” he said.—“And yet whiteness would be present to it.”—“Yes.”—“But all the same it would be no whit the more white yet, but, though whiteness is present, it is neither white at all nor black.”—“True.”—
 “But when, my friend, old age brings this same color upon it, then it has become of the same sort as what is present: by the presence of white, white.”—“Of course.”—“This, then, is what I am asking e
 now: whether whatever has something present to it will be of the same sort as what is present; or whether, if it is present in a certain way, it will be, and if not, not?”—“That way rather,” he said.—“Then what is neither bad nor good, too, is sometimes not yet bad when bad is present, and sometimes it has already become such.”—“Very much so.”—“Then when it is not yet bad although bad is present, that presence makes it desire good; but the one that makes it bad robs it at once of its desire and of its friendship for the good. For it is no longer neither bad nor good, but bad; 218
 and bad was not a friend to good.”²—“No, it was not.”—“For this reason, then, we would say that those too who are already wise no longer love wisdom,³ whether these are gods or men; nor again do those love wisdom who have ignorance in such a way as to be bad; for no one bad and unlearned loves wisdom. There remain, then, those who have this bad thing, ignorance, but are not yet, through it, without judgment or

1. *The thing smeared ... what is on it*: both are Heindorf’s corrections; B and T have “what was smeared on” and “still being” (apparatus, c7).

2. *Bad was not a friend to good*: Heindorf’s correction; B and a later hand in T have *agathon kakōi*, “good ... to bad”, and T *agathōn kakōi* (apparatus, a1).

3. *Love wisdom: philosophēin*, “philosophize”, the verb of the *philosophoi*, “friends of wisdom”, of 212d.

ἀμαθείς, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἡγούμενοι μὴ εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ ἴσασιν. διὰ b
 δὴ καὶ φιλοσοφοῦσιν οἱ οὔτε ἀγαθοὶ οὔτε κακοὶ πῶ ὄντες,
 ὅσοι δὲ κακοὶ οὐ φιλοσοφοῦσιν, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοί· οὔτε γὰρ
 τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου οὔτε τὸ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου φίλον
 ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις. ἢ οὐ μένησθε;— 5
 Πάνυ γε, ἐφάτην.—Νῦν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Λύσι τε καὶ
 Μενέξενε, παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐξηυρήκαμεν ὃ ἔστιν τὸ φίλον καὶ
 οὐ. φαμέν γὰρ αὐτό, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ
 σῶμα καὶ πανταχοῦ, τὸ μῆτε κακὸν μῆτε ἀγαθὸν διὰ κακοῦ c
 παρουσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον εἶναι.—Παντάπασιν ἐφάτην τε
 καὶ συνεχωρείτην οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν.

Καὶ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ πάνυ ἔχαιρον, ὥσπερ θηρευτὴς τις,
 ἔχων ἀγαπητῶς ὃ ἐθρευνόμην. κᾶπειτ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὁπόθεν μοι 5
 ἀτοπωτάτῃ τις ὑποψία εἰσῆλθεν ὥς οὐκ ἀληθὴ εἶη τὰ
 ὠμολογημένα ἡμῖν, καὶ εὐθὺς ἀχθεσθεῖς εἶπον· Βαβαί, ὦ
 Λύσι τε καὶ Μενέξενε, κινδυνεύομεν ὄναρ πεπλουτηκέναι.

Τί μάλιστα; ἔφη ὁ Μενέξενος. d

Φοβοῦμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ ὥσπερ ἀνθρώποις ἀλαζόσιν
 λόγοις τισὶν τοιούτοις [ψευδέσιν] ἐντετυχήκαμεν περὶ τοῦ
 φίλου.

Πῶς δὴ; ἔφη. 5

ᾧδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σκοπῶμεν· φίλος ὃς ἂν εἶη, πότερόν
 ἐστὶν τῷ φίλος ἢ οὐ;—Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.—Πότερον οὖν οὐδενὸς
 ἔνεκα καὶ δι' οὐδέν, ἢ ἔνεκά του καὶ διὰ τι;—Ἐνεκά του καὶ
 διὰ τι.—Πότερον φίλου ὄντος ἐκείνου τοῦ πράγματος, οὐ
 ἔνεκα φίλος ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ, ἢ οὔτε φίλου οὔτε ἐχθροῦ; 10
 —Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔπομαι.—Εἰκότως γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ'
 ὧδε ἴσως ἀκολουθήσεις, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ μᾶλλον εἴσομαι
 ὅτι λέγω. ὁ κάμνων, νυνδὴ ἔφαμεν, τοῦ ἱατροῦ φίλος· οὐχ
 οὕτως;—Ναί.—Οὐκοῦν διὰ νόσον ἔνεκα ὑγίειας τοῦ ἱατροῦ

b6 πάνυ γε ἐφάτην· νῦν ἄρα B: νῦν πάνυ γε ἐφάτην ἄρα T W b8 αὐτό]
 fort. οὕτω H. Richards d3 ψευδέσιν secl. ci. Heindorf d6 πότερον scr. recc.:
 πότερος B T W e3 ἔφαμεν Heindorf: φαμέν B T

unlearned, but still believe they do not know what they do not know. That is why those who are not yet either good or bad love wisdom, while those who are bad do not love wisdom, nor do the good; for neither opposite of opposite nor like of like appeared to us to be a friend in our arguments before. Or don't you remember?"—"Very much so," they both said.—"Now, then," I said, "Lysis and Menexenus, we have most certainly found out what the friend is and what it is not. For we say that in the soul and in the body and everywhere it is what is neither bad nor good that, because of the presence of bad, is a friend of the good."—They both said and granted that this was altogether so. b
c

And I myself, too, was very glad, like a hunter, having, if only just, what I had been hunting. And then, I don't know from where, a most strange suspicion entered my mind that what we had agreed on was not true, and at once, vexed, I said, "Bless me, Lysis and Menexenus, it looks as if we have been rich in a dream."

"Why, exactly?" said Menexenus. d

"I am afraid," I said, "that, as with impostors among men, we have come across arguments of that sort about the friend."

"How so?" he said.

"Let us look into it like this," I said. "Whoever is a friend, is he a friend to someone or not?"—"Necessarily," he said.—"Then is he a friend for the sake of nothing and because of nothing, or for the sake of something and because of something?"—"For the sake of something and because of something."—"Is that thing, for the sake of which the friend is a friend to the friend, a friend, or neither friend nor enemy?"—"I'm not quite keeping up," he said.—"Naturally," I said; "but perhaps you will keep up this way, and I think I too shall know better what I am saying. The sick man, as we said a moment ago, is a friend of the doctor; isn't that so?"—"Yes."—"Then because of disease and for the sake of health he is e

φίλος;—Ναί.—Ἡ δέ γε νόσος κακόν;—Πῶς δ' οὐ;—Τί δέ 5
 ὑγίεια; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ οὐδέτερον;—Ἀγαθόν,
 ἔφη.—Ἐλέγομεν δ' ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, ὅτι τὸ σῶμα, οὔτε ἀγα- 219
 θὸν οὔτε κακὸν (ὄν), διὰ τὴν νόσον, τοῦτο δὲ διὰ τὸ κακόν,
 τῆς ἱατρικῆς φίλον ἐστίν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἱατρικῇ ἕνεκα δὲ τῆς
 ὑγείας τὴν φιλίαν ἢ ἱατρικὴ ἀνήρηται, ἢ δὲ ὑγίεια ἀγαθόν.
 ἢ γάρ;—Ναί.—Φίλον δὲ ἢ οὐ φίλον ἢ ὑγίεια;—Φίλον.— 5
 Ἡ δὲ νόσος ἐχθρόν.—Πάνυ γε.—Τὸ οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε
 ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διὰ τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἐχθρόν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον b
 ἐστὶν ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φίλου.—Φαίνεται.—Ἐνεκα ἄρα
 τοῦ φίλου (τοῦ φίλου) τὸ φίλον φίλον διὰ τὸ ἐχθρόν.—
 Ἔοικεν.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἤκομεν, ὦ παῖδες, 5
 πρόσσχωμεν τὸν νοῦν μὴ ἐξαπατηθῶμεν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φίλον
 τοῦ φίλου τὸ φίλον γέγονεν, ἐὼ χαίρειν, καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου γε
 τὸ ὁμοιον φίλον γίγνεται, ὃ φαμεν ἀδύνατον εἶναι· ἀλλ'
 ὅμως τόδε σκεψώμεθα, μὴ ἡμᾶς ἐξαπατήσῃ τὸ νῦν λεγό-
 μενον. ἢ ἱατρικῇ, φαμέν, ἕνεκα τῆς ὑγείας φίλον.—Ναί. c
 —Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἢ ὑγίεια φίλον;—Πάνυ γε.—Εἰ ἄρα φίλον,
 ἕνεκά του.—Ναί.—Φίλου γέ τινος δὴ, εἴπερ ἀκολουθήσει τῇ
 πρόσθεν ὁμολογία.—Πάνυ γε.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐκείνο φίλον αὖ
 ἔσται ἕνεκα φίλου;—Ναί.—Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἀπειπεῖν 5
 ἡμᾶς οὕτως ἰόντας ἢ ἀφικέσθαι ἐπὶ τινα ἀρχήν, ἢ οὐκέτ'
 ἐπανοίσει ἐπ' ἄλλο φίλον, ἀλλ' ἥξει ἐπ' ἐκείνο ὃ ἐστὶν
 πρῶτον φίλον, οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα φαμέν πάντα φίλα d
 εἶναι;—Ἀνάγκη.—Τοῦτο δὴ ἐστὶν ὃ λέγω, μὴ ἡμᾶς τᾶλλα
 πάντα ἂ εἴπομεν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα φίλα εἶναι, ὥσπερ εἶδωλα

a2 ὄν add. Heindorf διὰ τὸ κακόν B (sed διὰ in ras. et τὸ κα extra lineam
 suppl. B²) a3 δὲ] δ' ἢ Heindorf a4 ἀνήρηται B T (sed suprascr. ἐπ B² t)
 b3 τοῦ φίλου addidi: post τὸ φίλον add. Hermann b6 πρόσσχωμεν T:
 πρόσχωμεν B b7 γε] γ' ὅτι ci. Madvig b8 φαμέν B T: ἔφαμεν t c2 ἢ B T:
 om. W c3 δὴ W: δεῖ B T (an δὴ τινος? Schanz) c6 ἢ Schanz: καὶ B T ἢ recc.:
 ἢ B T: ἢ W c7 ἄλλο scr. recc.: ἄλλον B T ἀλλ' ἥξει secl. Schanz d1 (τὸ) πρῶτον
 Heindorf d2 ἡμᾶς τᾶλλα T et γρ. W: μάλιστα ἄλλα B: μάλιστα ἀλλὰ B² W

a friend of the doctor?"—"Yes."—"And disease is bad?"—"Of course."—"And what about health?" I said. "Good or bad or neither?"—"Good," he said.—"And we were saying, it seems, that the body, being neither good nor bad, because of disease, and that because of the bad, is a friend of medicine, and medicine is good; and medicine has won the friendship for the sake of health, and health is good. Isn't that so?"—"Yes."—"And is health a friend or not a friend?"—"A friend."—"And disease an enemy."—"Very much so."—"Then what is neither bad nor good is, because of the bad and the enemy, a friend of the good, for the sake of the good and the friend."—"Apparently."—"Then the friend is a friend of the friend¹ for the sake of the friend, because of the enemy."—"It seems so."

"Very well," I said. "Since we have come to this point, boys, let us pay attention, so as not to be deceived. For that the friend has become a friend of the friend, I let pass, and like, indeed, becomes a friend of like, which we say is impossible; but all the same let us look into this, so that what we are saying now may not deceive us. Medicine, we say, is a friend for the sake of health."—"Yes."—"And health is a friend too?"—"Very much so."—"Then if it is a friend, it is for the sake of something."—"Yes."—"Of something that is a friend, surely, if it is to keep to our earlier agreement."—"Very much so."—"Then will that, in turn, also be a friend for the sake of a friend?"—"Yes."—"Then must we not either give up, going on like this,² or arrive at some starting point which will no longer lead back to another friend, but will come to that which is first friend, for the sake of which we say all the other things too are friends?"—"Necessarily."—"This, then, is what I mean: that all the other things which we said are friends for the sake of that thing, being, as it were, images

1. *Of the friend*: Burnet's own addition, which the manuscripts lack; Hermann added the same words after *to philon*, "the friend" (apparatus, b3).

2. *Either give up ... or*: "or" is Schanz's correction; B and T have "and" (apparatus, c6).

ἅττα ὄντα αὐτοῦ, ἐξαπατᾷ, ἥ δ' ἐκείνο τὸ πρῶτον, ὃ ὡς
 ἀληθῶς ἐστι φίλον. ἐννοήσωμεν γὰρ οὕτως· ὅταν τίς τι 5
 περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῇται, οἶόνπερ ἐνίοτε πατήρ υἱὸν ἀντὶ πάντων
 τῶν ἄλλων χρημάτων προτιμᾷ, ὃ δὴ τοιοῦτος ἔνεκα τοῦ τὸν
 υἱὸν περὶ παντὸς ἡγεῖσθαι ἄρα καὶ ἄλλο τι ἂν περὶ πολλοῦ e
 ποιοῖτο; οἶον εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο αὐτὸν κώνειον πεπωκότα, ἄρα
 περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῖτ' ἂν οἶνον, εἴπερ τοῦτο ἡγοῖτο τὸν υἱὸν
 σώσειν;—Τί μήν; ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἀγγεῖον, ἐν ᾧ ὁ
 οἶνος ἐνείη;—Πάνυ γε.—Ἄρ' οὖν τότε οὐδὲν περὶ πλείονος 5
 ποιεῖται, κύλικα κεραμέαν ἢ τὸν υἱὸν τὸν αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τρεῖς
 κοτύλας οἴνου ἢ τὸν υἱόν; ἢ ὥδέ πως ἔχει· πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη
 σπουδὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐστὶν ἐσπουδασμένη, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔνεκά
 του παρασκευαζομένοις, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ οὐ ἔνεκα πάντα τὰ
 τοιαῦτα παρασκευάζεται. οὐχ ὅτι πολλάκις λέγομεν ὡς 220
 περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμεθα χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον· ἀλλὰ μὴ
 οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οὕτω τό γε ἀληθὲς ἔχη, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ ἐστὶν
 ὃ περὶ παντὸς ποιούμεθα, ὃ ἂν φανῇ ὄν, ὅτου ἔνεκα καὶ
 χρυσίον καὶ πάντα τὰ παρασκευαζόμενα παρασκευάζεται. 5
 ἄρ' οὕτως φήσομεν;—Πάνυ γε.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ φίλου
 ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; ὅσα γάρ φαμεν φίλα εἶναι ἡμῖν ἔνεκα φίλου
 τινὸς ἑτέρου, ῥήματι φαινόμεθα λέγοντες αὐτό· φίλον δὲ b
 τῷ ὄντι κινδυνεύει ἐκείνο αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἰς ὃ πᾶσαι αὐταὶ αἰ
 λεγόμεναι φιλαὶ τελευτῶσιν.—Κινδυνεύει οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχειν.
 —Οὐκοῦν τό γε τῷ ὄντι φίλον οὐ φίλου τινὸς ἔνεκα φίλον
 ἐστίν;—Ἀληθῆ. 5

Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀπήλλακται, μὴ φίλου τινὸς ἔνεκα τὸ
 φίλον φίλον εἶναι· ἀλλ' ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν φίλον;—
 Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.—Ἄρ' οὖν διὰ τὸ κακὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖται,
 καὶ ἔχει ὥδε· εἰ τριῶν ὄντων ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀγαθοῦ c
 καὶ κακοῦ καὶ μήτε ἀγαθοῦ μήτε κακοῦ, τὰ δύο λειφθείη, τὸ

d 5 ἐννοήσω μὲν T ὅταν ci. Stephanus: ὃ ἂν B T: εἰ ὃ ἂν W τι secl. Heindorf
 (servato ὃ ἂν) e 6 κεραμέαν T W: κεραμέα B b 1 ἑτέρου Hermann: ἐτέρω B T
 c 2 λειφθείη Heindorf: λιφθείη (ut videtur) B: ληφθείη B² T

of it, may deceive us, and that that first thing may be the one which is in truth a friend. For let us think of it this way: whenever someone sets great store by something, as a father sometimes values his son above all the rest of his wealth, would such a man, for the sake of holding his son above everything, also set great store by something else? For instance, if he perceived that the boy had drunk hemlock, would he set great store by wine, if he believed that this would save his son?"—"What else?" he said.—"And also by the vessel the wine was in?"—"Very much so."—"Then does he at that time set no greater store by an earthenware cup than by his own son, nor by three half-pints¹ of wine than by his son? Or is it somehow like this: all such earnestness is not spent on these things, the things provided for the sake of something, but on that for the sake of which all such things are provided. Not that we do not often say that we set great store by gold and silver; but it may be that the truth is no whit the more so for that, and that what we set above everything is that, whatever it shows itself to be, for the sake of which gold and everything that is provided are provided. Shall we say so?"—"Very much so."—"Then does the same argument hold for the friend too? For all the things that we say are friends to us for the sake of some other friend, we evidently say it in word only;² but it looks as if what is really a friend is that very thing in which all these friendships, as they are called, end."—"It looks as if it is so," he said.—"Then what is really a friend is not a friend for the sake of some friend?"—"True."

"This, then, is settled: that the friend is not a friend for the sake of some friend. But is the good a friend?"—"It seems so to me."—"Then is the good loved because of the bad, and is it like this: if, of the three we were speaking of a moment ago, good and bad and neither good nor bad, the two were left,³

1. *Half-pints*: *kotylai*; the *kotylē* was a measure of about half a pint (LSJ).

2. *Some other friend ... in word only*: *heterou*, "other", is Hermann's correction; B and T have *heterōi*, which goes with the next word: "we evidently say it in another word" (apparatus, b1).

3. *Were left*: Heindorf's correction; B's corrector and T have *lēphtheiē*, "were taken"; B itself seems to have *liphtheiē*, which differs from Heindorf's word only in spelling (apparatus, c2).

δὲ κακὸν ἐκποδὼν ἀπέλθοι καὶ μηδενὸς ἐφάπτοιο μήτε
 σώματος μήτε ψυχῆς μήτε τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ δὴ φαμεν αὐτὰ
 καθ' αὐτὰ οὔτε κακὰ εἶναι οὔτε ἀγαθὰ, ἄρα τότε οὐδὲν ἂν
 ἡμῖν χρήσιμον εἴη τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἄχρηστον ἂν γεγονὸς
 εἴη; εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ἔτι βλάπτει, οὐδὲν ἂν οὐδεμιᾶς
 ὠφελίας δεοίμεθα, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἂν τότε γένοιτο κατάδηλον
 ὅτι διὰ τὸ κακὸν τὰγαθὸν ἡγαπῶμεν καὶ ἐφιλοῦμεν, ὡς
 φάρμακον ὃν τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακὸν νόσημα·
 νοσήματος δὲ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν δεῖ φαρμάκου. ἄρ' οὕτω
 πέφυκε τε καὶ φιλεῖται τὰγαθὸν διὰ τὸ κακὸν ὑφ' ἡμῶν, τῶν
 μεταξὺ ὄντων τοῦ κακοῦ τε καὶ τὰγαθοῦ, αὐτὸ δ' ἑαυτοῦ
 ἔνεκα οὐδεμίαν χρεῖαν ἔχει;—Ἔοικεν, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτως ἔχειν.
 —Τὸ ἄρα φίλον ἡμῖν ἐκείνο, εἰς ὃ ἐτελεύτα πάντα τὰ ἄλλα
 —ἔνεκα ἐτέρου φίλου φίλα ἔφαμεν εἶναι ἐκείνα—οὐδὲν [δὲ]
 τούτοις ἔοικεν. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ φίλου ἔνεκα φίλα κέκληται,
 τὸ δὲ τῷ ὄντι φίλον πᾶν τοῦναντίον τούτου φαίνεται πεφυ-
 κός· φίλον γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀνεφάνη ὃν ἐχθροῦ ἔνεκα, εἰ δὲ τὸ
 ἐχθρὸν ἀπέλθοι, οὐκέτι, ὡς ἔοικ', ἔσθ' ἡμῖν φίλον.—Οὐ μοι
 δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὥς γε νῦν λέγεται.—Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς
 Διός, ἐὰν τὸ κακὸν ἀπόληται, οὐδὲ πεινῇ ἔτι ἔσται οὐδὲ
 διψῇ οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων; ἢ πείνῃ μὲν ἔσται,
 ἐάνπερ ἀνθρωποί τε καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα ἦ, οὐ μέντοι βλαβερά
 γε; καὶ δίψα δὴ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιθυμίαι, ἀλλ' οὐ κακαί, ἅτε
 τοῦ κακοῦ ἀπολωλότες; ἢ γελοῖον τὸ ἐρώτημα, ὅτι ποτ'
 ἔσται τότε ἢ μὴ ἔσται; τίς γὰρ οἶδεν; ἀλλ' οὖν τόδε γ'
 ἴσμεν, ὅτι καὶ νῦν ἔστιν πεινῶντα βλάπτεσθαι, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ
 ὠφελείσθαι. ἦ γάρ;—Πάνυ γε.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ διψῶντα καὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων πάντων ἐπιθυμοῦντα ἔστιν ἐνίοτε
 μὲν ὠφελίμως ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἐνίοτε δὲ βλαβερῶς, ἐνίοτε δὲ
 μηδέτερα;—Σφόδρα γε.—Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν ἀπολλύηται τὰ κακά,
 ἃ γε μὴ τυγχάνει ὄντα κακά, τί προσήκει τοῖς κακοῖς συν-

e1 ᾧ ante ἔνεκα add. Cornarius secl. mox ἐκείνα post εἶναι δὲ] δὴ Heindorf:
 om. Cornarius a2 ἐάνπερ] ἕωσπερ ἂν ci. H. Richards b4 τυγχάνει scr. recc.:
 τυγχάνη B T W

and the bad went away, out of the way, and touched nothing, neither body nor soul nor the other things that we say are in themselves neither bad nor good, would the good then be in no way useful to us, but have become useless? For if nothing harmed us any longer, we would in no way be in need of any benefit, and so it would then become plain that it was because of the bad that we cherished and loved the good, the good being a remedy for the bad, and the bad an illness; and where there is no illness there is no need of a remedy. Is the good by nature such that it is loved by us, who are in between the bad and the good, because of the bad, while for its own sake it has no use?"—"It seems," he said, "to be so."—"Then that which is a friend to us, in which all the other things ended—those, we said, were friends for the sake of another friend—in no way resembles them. For those are called friends for the sake of a friend, but what is really a friend appears to be by nature the very opposite of this; for it has come to light as a friend to us for the sake of an enemy,¹ and if the enemy were to go away, it is no longer, it seems, a friend to us."—"I think not," he said, "at least as it is now being put."—"In the name of Zeus," I said, "if the bad perishes, will there no longer be any hungering either, or thirsting, or anything else of the sort? Or will there be hunger, if indeed there are men and the other animals, but not harmful hunger? And thirst, and the other desires, but not bad ones, since the bad will have perished? Or is the question laughable, what will be then and what will not? For who knows? But this at least we know: that even now it is possible for one who is hungry to be harmed, and also to be benefited. Isn't that so?"—"Very much so."—"Then is it also possible for one who is thirsty, and who desires all the other things of that sort, to desire sometimes beneficially, sometimes harmfully, and sometimes neither?"—"Very much so."—"Then if the bad things perish, what reason is there for things that are not in fact bad to perish along with the bad?"

1. *For the sake of an enemy*: so the Greek, *echthrou heneka*; at 219b the friend was a friend "because of" the enemy, and at 220b–d the good was loved "because of" the bad.

ἀπόλλυσθαι;—Οὐδέν.—Ἔσονται ἄρα αἱ μήτε ἀγαθαὶ μήτε 5
 κακαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ ἐὰν ἀπόληται τὰ κακά.—Φαίνεται.—
 Οἶόν τε οὖν ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμοῦντα καὶ ἐρώντα τούτου οὐ ἐπι-
 θυμῇ καὶ ἐρᾷ μὴ φιλεῖν;—Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.—Ἔσται ἄρα
 καὶ τῶν κακῶν ἀπολομένων, ὥς ἔοικεν, φίλ' ἅττα.—Ναί.— c
 Οὐκ ἂν, εἴ γε τὸ κακὸν αἷτιον ἦν τοῦ φίλον τι εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν
 ἦν τούτου ἀπολομένου φίλον ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ. αἰτίας γὰρ
 ἀπολομένης ἀδύνατόν που ἦν ἔτ' ἐκεῖνο εἶναι, οὐ ἦν αὕτη ἡ
 αἰτία.—Ὅρθως λέγεις.—Οὐκοῦν ὠμολόγηται ἡμῖν τὸ φίλον 5
 φιλεῖν τι καὶ διὰ τι· καὶ ὠήθημεν τότε γε διὰ τὸ κακὸν τὸ
 μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν;—Ἀληθῆ.—
 Νῦν δέ γε, ὥς ἔοικε, φαίνεται ἄλλη τις αἰτία τοῦ φιλεῖν τε d
 καὶ φιλεῖσθαι.—Ἔοικεν.—Ἄρ' οὖν· τῷ ὄντι, ὥσπερ ἄρτι
 ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς φιλίας αἰτία, καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν
 φίλον ἐστὶν τούτῳ οὐ ἐπιθυμῇ καὶ τότε ὅταν ἐπιθυμῇ, ὃ δὲ
 τὸ πρότερον ἐλέγομεν φίλον εἶναι, ὕθλος τις ἦν, ὥσπερ 5
 ποίημα μακρὸν συγκεκείμενον;—Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη.—Ἀλλὰ μέν-
 τοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τό γε ἐπιθυμοῦν, οὐ ἂν ἐνδεὲς ἦ, τούτου
 ἐπιθυμῇ. ἦ γάρ;—Ναί.—Τὸ δ' ἐνδεὲς ἄρα φίλον ἐκείνου e
 οὐ ἂν ἐνδεὲς ἦ;—Δοκεῖ μοι.—Ἐνδεὲς δὲ γίγνεται οὐ ἂν τι
 ἀφαιρῇται.—Πῶς δ' οὐ;—Τοῦ οἰκείου δή, ὥς ἔοικεν, ὃ τε
 ἔρωσ καὶ ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τυγχάνει οὕσα, ὥς φαίνεται,
 ὧ Μενέξενε τε καὶ Λύσι.—Συνεφάτην.—Ὑμεῖς ἄρα εἰ φίλοι 5
 ἐστὸν ἀλλήλοις, φύσει πῃ οἰκεῖοί ἐσθ' ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς.—Κομδῆ,
 ἐφάτην.—Καὶ εἰ ἄρα τις ἕτερος ἐτέρου ἐπιθυμῇ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
 ὧ παῖδες, ἡ ἐρᾷ, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐπεθύμει οὐδὲ ἥρα οὐδὲ ἐφίλει, 222
 εἰ μὴ οἰκεῖός πῃ τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐτύγχανεν ὣν ἢ κατὰ τὴν
 ψυχὴν ἢ κατὰ τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἡθὸς ἢ τρόπους ἢ εἶδος.—
 Πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὁ Μενέξενος· ὁ δὲ Λύσις ἐσίγησεν.—Εἶεν,

b6 ἀπόλληται scr. reccl.: ἀπόλληται B T: ἀπολύηται W c2 οὐκ ἂν] οὐ τᾶν ci.
 H. Richards c4 ἂν post ἀδύνατον add. ci. Goldbacher d6 ποίημα μακρὸν]
 ποίημα μάτην ci. Ast: ποίημα Κρόνῳ ci. Madvig e2 τι Stephanus: τις B T
 e5 λύσι T: λύσις B a2 τῷ ἐρωμένῳ T: τῶν ἐρωμένων B W ὦν T: ὄν B
 a3 τρόπους B T (sed v erasum in B)

—“None.”—“Then the desires that are neither good nor bad will exist even if the bad things perish.”—“Apparently.”—“Now, is it possible for one who desires and is in love not to love what he desires and is in love with?”—“It doesn’t seem so to me.”—“Then there will be, even when the bad things have perished, it seems, c some things that are friends.”—“Yes.”—“There would not, if the bad were the cause of anything’s being a friend: if that had perished, one thing would not be a friend to another. For when a cause has perished, it is impossible, I take it, for that to exist any longer of which this was the cause.”—“You speak rightly.”—“Now, it has been agreed by us that the friend loves something, and because of something; and we thought then that it was because of the bad that what is neither good nor bad loves the good?”—“True.”—“But now, it seems, some other cause of loving and being loved d appears.”—“It seems so.”—“Then is it really, as we were saying just now, desire that is the cause of friendship, and is what desires a friend to that which it desires, and at the time when it desires it; and was what we were calling a friend before some idle talk, like a long poem put together?”—“It looks like it,” he said.—“But surely,” I said, “what desires desires what it lacks. Isn’t that so?”— e “Yes.”—“Then is what lacks a friend of that which it lacks?”—“It seems so to me.”—“And it comes to lack whatever is taken away from it.”—“Of course.”—“Then it is of what is akin, it seems, that love and friendship and desire are in fact, apparently, Menexenus and Lysis.”—They both agreed.—“Then if you two are friends to each other, you are by nature in some way akin to each other.”—“Absolutely,” they both said.—“And so, if one person desires another,” I said, “boys, or is in love with him, he would never desire 222 him, or be in love, or love, unless he were in fact in some way akin to his beloved, either in his soul, or in some character of his soul, or in his ways, or in his figure.”—“Very much so,” said Menexenus; but Lysis was silent.—“Very well,”

ἦν δ' ἐγώ. τὸ μὲν δὴ φύσει οἰκείον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν πέφαν- 5
ται φιλεῖν.—Ἔοικεν, ἔφη.—Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τῷ γνησίῳ
ἐραστῇ καὶ μὴ προσποιήτῳ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν παιδικῶν.—
Ὁ μὲν οὖν Λύσις καὶ ὁ Μενέξενος μόγις πως ἐπενευσάτην, b
ὁ δὲ Ἱπποθάλῃς ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς παντοδαπὰ ἠφίει χρώματα.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, βουλόμενος τὸν λόγον ἐπισκέψασθαι, Εἰ
μέν τι τὸ οἰκείον τοῦ ὁμοίου διαφέρει, λέγομεν ἂν τι, ὡς
ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Λύσι τε καὶ Μενέξενε, περὶ φίλου, ὃ ἔστιν. 5
εἰ δὲ ταῦτόν τι τυγχάνει ὃν ὁμοίον τε καὶ οἰκείον, οὐ ῥάδιον
ἀποβαλεῖν τὸν πρόσθεν λόγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ
κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα ἄχρηστον· τὸ δὲ ἄχρηστον φίλον
ὁμολογεῖν πλημμελές. βούλεσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ c
ὥσπερ μεθύομεν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, συγχωρήσωμεν καὶ φῶμεν
ἕτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ οἰκείον τοῦ ὁμοίου;—Πάνυ γε.—Πότερον
οὖν καὶ τἀγαθὸν οἰκείον θήσομεν παντί, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀλλότριον
εἶναι; ἢ τὸ μὲν κακὸν τῷ κακῷ οἰκείον, τῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ τὸ 5
ἀγαθόν, τῷ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθῷ μήτε κακῷ τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν
μήτε κακόν;—Οὕτως ἐφάτην δοκεῖν σφίσιν ἕκαστον ἐκάστῳ
οἰκείον εἶναι.—Πάλιν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ παῖδες, οὓς τὸ d
πρῶτον λόγους ἀπεβαλόμεθα περὶ φιλίας, εἰς τούτους
εἰσπεπτώκαμεν· ὁ γὰρ ἄδικος τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ὁ κακὸς τῷ
κακῷ οὐδὲν ἦττον φίλος ἔσται ἢ ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ.—
Ἔοικεν, ἔφη.—Τι δέ; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ οἰκείον ἂν ταῦτόν 5
φῶμεν εἶναι, ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνον φίλος;—
Πάνυ γε.—Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γε ὠόμεθα ἐξελέγξει ἡμᾶς
αὐτούς· ἢ οὐ μέμνησθε;—Μεμνήμεθα.

Τί οὖν ἂν ἔτι χρῆσαιμέθα τῷ λόγῳ; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδέν; e
δέομαι οὖν, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, τὰ εἰρημένα
ἅπαντα ἀναπεμπάσασθαι. εἰ γὰρ μήτε οἱ φιλοῦμενοι μήτε

b 4 τί ὡς T: πως B W b 7 ἀποβαλεῖν T: ἀπολιπεῖν B: ἀπολεῖν W sed
γρ. καὶ ἀπολιπεῖν καὶ ἀποβαλεῖν in marg. W c 2 μεθύομεν in marg. T:
μυθεύομεν B T c 4 θήσομεν] φήσομεν Schanz d 6 ἄλλο τι T: ἢ ἄλλο τι B
e 3 ἀναπεμπάσασθαι B (sed ε supra ai B²)

I said. “It has appeared, then, that it is necessary for us to love what is akin by nature.”—“It seems so,” he said.—“Then it is necessary for the genuine lover, and not the pretended one, to be loved by his darling.”—Lysis and Menexenus nodded, somehow, just barely; b but Hippothales, from pleasure, turned colors of every kind.

And I said, wanting to look into the argument, “If what is akin differs in some way from what is like, we would be saying something, it seems to me, Lysis and Menexenus, about the friend, what it is; but if like and akin are in fact the same, it is not easy to throw out our earlier argument, as though like were not useless to like by way of likeness; and to agree that the useless is a friend is out c of tune. Do you want us, then,” I said, “since we are drunk, as it were, with the argument,¹ to grant and say that what is akin is something different from what is like?”—“Very much so.”—“Then shall we also set down that the good is akin to everything, and the bad alien? Or that the bad is akin to the bad, the good to the good, and what is neither good nor bad to what is neither good nor bad?”—They both said that this was how it seemed to them: each d to each was akin.—“Then we have fallen back, boys,” I said, “into the arguments about friendship that we threw out at first; for the unjust man will be a friend to the unjust and the bad man to the bad no less than the good man to the good.”—“It seems so,” he said.—“What then? If we say that the good and the akin are the same, will the good man not be a friend to the good alone?”—“Very much so.”—“But this too we thought we had refuted ourselves; or don’t you remember?”—“We remember.”

“What then could we still do with the argument? Or is it plain e that we could do nothing? So I need, like the wise men in the law courts, to count over everything that has been said. For if neither those who are loved nor

1. *Drunk*: Burnet prints *methyomen*, the reading in the margin of T; B and T have *mytheuomen*, “we are telling stories” (apparatus, c2).

οἱ φιλοῦντες μήτε οἱ ὅμοιοι μήτε οἱ ἀνόμοιοι μήτε οἱ ἀγαθοὶ
μήτε οἱ οἰκείοι μήτε τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα διεληλύθαμεν—οὐ γὰρ 5
ἔγωγε ἔτι μέμνημαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους—ἀλλ' εἰ μηδὲν τούτων
φίλον ἐστίν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκέτι ἔχω τί λέγω.

Ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν ἐν νῶ εἶχον ἄλλον ἤδη τινὰ τῶν πρεσβυ- 223
τέρων κινεῖν· κᾷτα, ὥσπερ δαίμονές τινες, προσελθόντες οἱ
παιδαγωγοί, ὃ τε τοῦ Μενεξένου καὶ ὁ τοῦ Λύσιδος, ἔχοντες
αὐτῶν τοὺς ἀδελφούς, παρεκάλουν καὶ ἐκέλευον αὐτοὺς οἴκαδ'
ἀπιέναι· ἤδη γὰρ ἦν ὀψέ. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον καὶ ἡμεῖς 5
καὶ οἱ περιστώτες αὐτοὺς ἀπηλαύνομεν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν
ἐφρόντιζον ἡμῶν, ἀλλ' ὑποβαρβαρίζοντες ἡγανάκτουν τε καὶ
οὐδὲν ἦττον ἐκάλουν, ἀλλ' ἐδόκουν ἡμῖν ὑποπεπωκότες ἐν τοῖς b
Ἑρμαίοις ἄποροι εἶναι προσφέρεσθαι, ἡττηθέντες οὖν αὐτῶν
διελύσαμεν τὴν συνουσίαν. ὅμως δ' ἔγωγε ἤδη ἀπιόντων
αὐτῶν, Νῦν μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Λύσι τε καὶ Μενέξενε, κατα-
γέλαστοι γεγόναμεν ἐγώ τε, γέρων ἀνὴρ, καὶ ὑμεῖς. ἐροῦσι 5
γὰρ οἷδε ἀπιόντες ὥς οἰόμεθα ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλων φίλοι εἶναι—
καὶ ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν τίθημι—οὐπω δὲ ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ φίλος οἰοί
τε ἐγενόμεθα ἐξευρεῖν.

e7 φίλον B: φίλων T a2 κᾷτα B: κᾷτα T: εἴτα in marg. T b1 ἀλλ'] καὶ Heindorf
ὑποπεπωκότες B (sed πω refinxit B²): ὑποπεπτωκότες T

those who love, nor those who are like, nor those who are unlike, nor the good, nor those who are akin, nor any of the other things we have gone through—for I for my part no longer remember them, there are so many—but if none of these is a friend, I no longer know what to say.”

Having said this, I had it in mind to rouse someone else now, one 223
of the older people; and then, like spirits of some kind, the tutors came up, Menexenus’ and Lysis’, bringing the boys’ brothers, and called to them and told them to go home; for it was already late. At first both we and those standing around set about driving them off; but when they paid no heed to us, but were annoyed, in their half-foreign Greek, and went on calling them none the less, but b
seemed to us, having had a bit to drink at the Hermaea,¹ impossible to deal with, we yielded to them and broke up the gathering. All the same, as they were already going away, I said, “Now, Lysis and Menexenus, we have become ridiculous, I, an old man, and you. For these people, as they go away, will say that we think we are friends of one another—for I put myself, too, among you—but have not yet been able to find out what the friend is.”

1. *The Hermaea*: the festival of Hermes during which the conversation takes place (206d).

OUTLINE

The divisions follow the argument. References are to Stephanus pages and sections, which stand in the margins of both pages of the text.

I. HIPPOTHALES AND HIS POEMS (203A–206E)

- 203a–204a** Socrates, “making my way from the Academy straight to the Lyceum”, is stopped by Hippothales and Ctesippus at the spring of Panops and asked into a wrestling-school, “newly built”, where “the time is spent mostly in talk” and Miccus teaches.
- 204b–c** Asked who the beautiful one is for him, Hippothales blushes; Socrates knows that “you are not only in love, but already far along, making your way in love”, for this has been given him by a god: “to be able to know quickly one who is in love and one who is beloved”.
- 204c–e** Ctesippus: Hippothales has “deafened and filled full of Lysis” their ears, in prose and with “his poems and compositions”; the boy “is still called after his father”, Democrates of Aexone.
- 204e–205d** Socrates asks to know “what a lover should say about his darling”; Hippothales denies that he makes verses, and Ctesippus tells what he sings: “what the whole city sings about Democrates and Lysis”, the family’s victories, and the entertaining of Heracles, “things more Cronian still”.
- 205d–206a** “Before you have won, are you making verses and singing a song of praise about yourself?” If the darling “gets away”, the songs make the lover ridiculous; “whoever is wise in matters of love, my friend, does not praise his beloved before he has caught him”.
- 206a–b** Praise fills the beautiful ones “with pride and boastfulness” and makes them “harder to catch”, like a hunter who “scared off the game as he hunted”; “to make wild with words and songs, instead of charming, is a great want of the Muses”. Hippothales agrees that a man who harms himself by his poetry is no good poet: that “would be a great want of sense”.

206c–e Hippothales asks “what talk one could hold, or what one could do, to become a friend to one’s darling”; Socrates could perhaps show him “what you ought to talk to him about”, if Hippothales gets Lysis to come and talk. It is the Hermaea, and Lysis is “Menexenus’ closest companion of all”.

II. IN THE WRESTLING-SCHOOL (206E–207D)

206e–207b The boys are playing knucklebones; Lysis, “outstanding in looks”, keeps “turning round and looking at us”, and comes over after Menexenus; Hippothales stands “where he thought Lysis would not see him”.

207b–d Socrates asks “which of you two is the elder?” “We dispute it”, says Menexenus. Socrates will not ask which is the richer, since they are friends, and “the things of friends are said to be common”. Menexenus is called away by the trainer.

III. LYSIS: WHAT ONE IS ENTRUSTED WITH (207D–210E)

207d–e Lysis’ father and mother “love you very much” and want him “to be as happy as possible”; yet “me they do stop, and from a great many things”.

208a–b They entrust the chariot to “a charioteer who draws wages from my father”, and the mules to “the muleteer”, a slave.

208c–e Lysis is ruled by his tutor, a slave (Socrates: “How dreadful ... that a free man should be ruled by a slave!”), and by his teachers; at home, “I’d be beaten if I touched” the tools of his mother’s loom.

208e–209a “So it seems you get no use out of your wealth, great as it is”, and “you, Lysis, rule nothing, and do nothing that you desire.”

209a–c “That’s because I’m not yet of age”; but he may write, read and play the lyre as he wants, “because I know these things”, and his father will entrust everything to him “on whatever day he believes that you understand better than he does”.

209c–210a So too the neighbor and the Athenians; and the Great King, if “we” showed him that we understand the preparing of a dish better than his son, would let us “grab a handful of the salt” and throw it into the broth, and would not stop us treating his son’s eyes if he took us “to be skilled in medicine”.

210a–c Socrates concludes that “in the things in which we come to have understanding, everyone will entrust them to us”, while in those in which we do not acquire sense, “everyone will get

in our way”.

210c–d “So now not even your father loves you, nor does anyone else love anyone else, insofar as he is useless”; “if you become wise, my boy, everyone will be a friend to you and everyone akin to you”. Lysis grants that if he needs a teacher he does not yet understand, and so he is not “proud”, “if you are still without understanding”.

210e Socrates nearly says to Hippothales, “This, Hippothales, is how one should talk to one’s darling, humbling him and taking him down”.

IV. MENEXENUS RETURNS (211A–D)

211a–b Lysis asks Socrates, “say to Menexenus too what you are saying to me”; Socrates tells him to report it himself.

211b–d Menexenus is “contentious”, “a pupil of Ctesippus”; Socrates agrees, “Talk I must”.

V. MENEXENUS: WHO BECOMES A FRIEND OF WHOM (211D–213D)

211d–212a Socrates has “in fact desired a certain possession” since he was a boy; toward the acquiring of friends he is “altogether like one in love”, and yet he does “not even know how one becomes a friend of another”.

212a–b Socrates asks: “when someone loves someone, which becomes a friend of which, the one who loves of the one loved, or the one loved of the one who loves?” “No difference”, says Menexenus; then both “become friends of each other, if the one alone loves the other”.

212b–d One may love and not be loved back, or even be hated: “now, unless both love, neither is a friend”, and “nothing is a friend to the one who loves unless it loves him back”.

212d–213a Then none are friends of horses whom the horses do not love back, nor friends of wisdom “unless wisdom loves them back”, or the poet is lying; since he speaks the truth, “what is loved is a friend to the one who loves it”, as newborn children, even while they hate, are “the greatest friends to their parents”.

213a–c On this argument “it is not the one who loves who is a friend, but the one who is loved”; but then “many are loved by their enemies and hated by their friends”, which is “a great want of sense”; and the reverse fails the same way.

213c–d Neither those who love, nor those who are loved, “nor those who both love and are loved” are friends. Socrates asks

whether they were “not seeking rightly at all”; Lysis answers, “We were not, I think, Socrates”, and blushes.

VI. LYSIS: LIKE AND LIKE (213D–215C)

- 213d–214b** Socrates, “pleased with the other’s philosophy”, turns to Lysis and to the poets, “like fathers and guides of wisdom”: “Ever, you know, the god brings like to like”; and the wisest men, who “talk and write about nature and the whole”, say “that like must always be a friend to like”.
- 214b–d** Half of it would not be true, “if the wicked are like one another”, for the wicked man becomes “the more of an enemy” the nearer he comes to the wicked; they mean that the good are like one another and friends, while the bad are “capricious and unaccountable”, so that “the good man alone is a friend to the good man alone”.
- 214e–215a** But “what benefit could anything whatever that is like have for anything whatever that is like it”? Things “having no aid to give each other” are not cherished: “one who is like is not a friend to one who is like”.
- 215a–c** The good man, “insofar as he is good”, is “sufficient for himself”, in need of nothing, and so cherishes and loves nothing: “How then will the good be friends to the good for us at all”.

VII. OPPOSITE AND OPPOSITE (215C–216B)

- 215c–d** Socrates once heard someone say “that like is most hostile to like”, with Hesiod’s potter, singer and beggar as witness, and that “the poor man is compelled to be a friend to the rich”.
- 215e–216a** Further, “the most opposite is most a friend to the most opposite”: “the dry desires the wet, the cold the hot”, and “the opposite is food to its opposite”. Menexenus: “He speaks well”.
- 216a–b** But “those all-wise men, the masters of contradiction”, will ask whether “enmity is not most opposite to friendship”; so “neither is like a friend to like, nor opposite to opposite”.

VIII. WHAT IS NEITHER GOOD NOR BAD (216C–218C)

- 216c–d** Perhaps the friend is “what is neither good nor bad”; Socrates is “really dizzy”, and recalls the old proverb that “the beautiful is a friend”, which “resembles something soft and smooth and glossy”; and “the good is beautiful”.

- 216d–217a** Socrates, “divining”, proposes that what is neither good nor bad “is a friend of the beautiful and good”, and sets out “some three kinds: the good, the bad, and what is neither good nor bad”; it is to the good alone that what is neither good nor bad “becomes a friend”.
- 217a–c** The healthy body is “in no need of medicine”, but the body, neither good nor bad, loves medicine because of disease: “what is neither bad nor good becomes a friend of the good because of the presence of bad”, and “before it has itself become bad”.
- 217c–e** Hair smeared “with white lead” would “appear” white, but when “old age brings this same color upon it” it has become white; so what is neither bad nor good is “sometimes not yet bad when bad is present”.
- 218a–b** Those who are already wise, “whether these are gods or men”, do not love wisdom, nor do the bad and unlearned, but those who have ignorance and “still believe they do not know what they do not know”.
- 218b–c** So “we have most certainly found out what the friend is and what it is not”, and Socrates is “very glad, like a hunter”.

IX. THE FIRST FRIEND (218c–220b)

- 218c–d** But “a most strange suspicion” enters Socrates’ mind: “it looks as if we have been rich in a dream”, and he fears that, “as with impostors among men, we have come across arguments of that sort about the friend”.
- 218d–219b** A friend is a friend “for the sake of something and because of something”: the sick man “because of disease and for the sake of health”; so “the friend is a friend of the friend for the sake of the friend, because of the enemy”.
- 219b–d** Unless they give up, they must “arrive at some starting point which will no longer lead back to another friend, but will come to that which is first friend”; the other friends are “as it were, images” of it.
- 219d–220a** A father who sets great store by his son sets store by wine, if the boy has drunk hemlock and he believes that wine will save him, and by its vessel, but not more than by his son: “all such earnestness is not spent on these things”.
- 220a–b** Rather, “it looks as if what is really a friend is that very thing in which all these friendships, as they are called, end”; “the friend is not a friend for the sake of some friend”.

X. IF THE BAD PERISHED (220B–221D)

- 220b–d** But “is the good loved because of the bad”? If the bad “went away”, would the good “have become useless”, “the good being a remedy for the bad, and the bad an illness”?
- 220d–e** Then what is really a friend is “the very opposite of this”, for “it has come to light as a friend to us for the sake of an enemy”, and “if the enemy were to go away, it is no longer, it seems, a friend to us”. Menexenus: “I think not”, “at least as it is now being put”.
- 220e–221b** If the bad perishes, will there be hunger, “but not harmful hunger”? “Or is the question laughable”? Even now one may desire beneficially, harmfully or neither, so “the desires that are neither good nor bad will exist even if the bad things perish”.
- 221b–d** One who desires and is in love loves what he desires, so there will be “some things that are friends” even then, and “some other cause of loving and being loved appears”.

XI. DESIRE AND THE AKIN (221D–222B)

- 221d** Perhaps it is “desire that is the cause of friendship”, and what was called a friend before was “some idle talk, like a long poem put together”.
- 221d–e** But “what desires desires what it lacks”, what lacks is “a friend of that which it lacks”, and it comes to lack what “is taken away from it”; so “it is of what is akin, it seems, that love and friendship and desire are in fact”.
- 221e–222a** If the boys are friends, they are “by nature in some way akin to each other”, and a lover is akin to his beloved “either in his soul, or in some character of his soul, or in his ways, or in his figure”. Menexenus assents; “Lysis was silent”.
- 222a–b** So “it is necessary for the genuine lover, and not the pretended one, to be loved by his darling”; Hippothales “turned colors of every kind”.

XII. AKIN AND LIKE; THE END (222B–223B)

- 222b–c** If “like and akin are in fact the same”, the earlier argument stands, that like is useless to like; “drunk, as it were, with the argument”, they grant that “what is akin is something different from what is like”.
- 222c–d** Shall they set down “that the good is akin to everything,

and the bad alien", or each akin to each? Either way they have fallen back "into the arguments about friendship that we threw out at first".

222e–223a Socrates counts it all over "like the wise men in the law courts": "if none of these is a friend, I no longer know what to say."

223a–b The tutors come "like spirits of some kind" and, "in their half-foreign Greek", call the boys home. People will say "that we think we are friends of one another", but "have not yet been able to find out what the friend is".

EDITORIAL NOTE

The Greek text. The Greek is John Burnet's, from the third volume of his Oxford Classical Text of Plato (1903), which holds the fifth to the seventh of Thrasyllus' tetralogies; the *Lysis* closes the fifth, after the *Theages*, the *Charmides* and the *Laches*. The copy reproduced is the one used for the *Charmides* of this series: the second impression of January 1909, "corrected in a number of places", printed at Oxford by Horace Hart. It is reproduced page for page and line for line: each left-hand page of this edition is one page of Burnet, with his line-ends, his marginal section letters and line numbers, and his apparatus criticus at the foot. In the margin, "St. II p. 203" at the head of the dialogue gives the volume and page of Stephanus' edition at which it begins; where each later page of Stephanus begins, its number stands in place of the letter a; and within each section every fifth line is numbered. Burnet sets these in the outer margin of his page, this edition in the right-hand margin; his running heads, and the printer's signatures at the foot of some pages, are not reproduced. The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library's digital transcription of Burnet, and every line was then checked against the photographs of this copy; where the two differ, this edition prints what Burnet printed. Burnet's title, ΛΥΣΙΣ, and beneath it the one name ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, since Socrates narrates, are kept, with his paragraphing (a new, indented paragraph where the speaker changes, except in the quick exchanges, which he runs on with dashes), his capitals at the openings of speeches, and his accents, breathings and punctuation, and two apparent misprints: a raised point after οὖν at 221d2, and Τι, without its accent, at 222d5. His verse quotations are set on lines of their own, as he sets them (212e, 214a, 215c–d). Square brackets [] enclose words he believed spurious: αὐτοῦ at 204a9, which he deletes himself, ἐμβάλλειν at 209d8 and τὰ at 213e5, both after Heindorf, φῶς at 216b7, after Cornarius, οἷ at 217c1 and τι at 217c5, which later manuscripts leave out, ψευδέειν at 218d3, as Heindorf proposed, and δὲ at 220e1, which Cornarius leaves out. Angle brackets < > enclose words that the principal manuscripts lack and that he supplies: δὲ at 211e7 (Buttmann), μὴ at 213c4 (Cornarius), πρὸς at 215d3 (a correction in the Coislinianus), ὄν at 219a2 (Heindorf) and τοῦ φίλου

at 219b3, which he adds himself.

Reading the apparatus. The notes at the foot of each Greek page are Burnet's, unaltered. Entries are keyed by section letter and line as numbered in the margin, so that "a 4" is the fourth line of section a. The section letters begin again with each Stephanus page. On the first page Burnet also sets the Stephanus page before the first entry for each page (203 a 1, 204 a 2); on later pages he does not, so that "a 3" after "e 10" on page 3 belongs to the new page (204e10, 205a3). A further entry on the same line follows after a wider space without repeating the key. Usually the reading printed in the text comes first, followed by the witnesses that have it; a colon separates it from the alternatives, each followed by its witnesses. Where the text's reading is followed by a square bracket], the bracket closes the lemma, and what follows is a reading of other witnesses (206e1, 206e8), a scholar's proposal (203b3), or a note of what a hand did to the word (203b5). Angle brackets < > enclose a word a scholar would add (207e1). An entry with no colon may give a scholar's proposal alone (204b6, 207e1). Round brackets enclose a remark on the entry, usually what a correcting hand did and where (203a1, 206d4). At 203a1 Burnet's "(et mox b 1)" refers to the second Ἀκαδημείας, which stands in b 2; it is printed as he prints it. Three spaced points stand for words of a passage left out of the quotation (209c1, 210c7). An asterisk stands for a letter erased in a manuscript (203b3, 206a10). Forms are given as the manuscripts have them, not brought into line with the text: T's νεμέα and B's νέμεα at 205c5 carry no iota subscript, and B's βούληι ναύτη at 208d4 keeps the iota written on the line.

The witnesses. The three principal manuscripts are B, the Bodleian Plato (MS. E. D. Clarke 39, written in 895); T, the Venice manuscript (Marcianus, Append. Class. 4, cod. 1); and W, the Vienna manuscript (Vindobonensis 54, suppl. phil. Gr. 7). The raised numerals and small letters are correcting hands: B² is B's old corrector, whom Burnet's Preface takes to be Arethas or Arethas' scribe, and b later hands; T² and t are hands correcting T, marked on the same pattern. Letters written together share a reading: "B T W" is all three, "B t" B and a later hand in T. Burnet also cites the Coislinius (Coisl.), a manuscript of the Coislin collection at Paris, one at Venice (Ven. 184), one at Florence (Laur. lxxxv. 17) and one in the Vatican Library (Vat. 1029), and the Latin translation of Marsilio Ficino (Ficinus; Florence, 1484), whose rendering implies a reading. The printed edition whose pages give the standard references is that of Stephanus (Henri Estienne, Geneva 1578); *ci. Stephanus*

(219d5) marks a conjecture of his. Two ancient writers are cited as witnesses to the text: Pollux, the lexicographer of the second century AD, who cites 206e, in his own words, in his *Onomasticon*, and the Latin grammarian Priscian (Priscianus, about AD 500), who quotes 210a (Burnet cites him at a1 and a9).

Names and abbreviations. A scholar's name standing alone after a reading marks that scholar's reading or proposal; *ci.* (*coniecit*), "conjectured", marks a scholar's conjecture (210a6, 221c2), and a question mark a proposal offered doubtfully (209a7). *Seclusi*, "I have bracketed", marks a deletion of Burnet's own (204a9), and *scripsi*, "I have written", a reading of his own (214d2). The scholars named in these pages are Martin Schanz, Rudolf Hirschig, Carel Gabriel Cobet, Herbert Richards, Johan Nicolai Madvig, Charles Badham, Ludwig Heindorf, Immanuel Bekker, Janus Cornarius, Gottfried Stallbaum, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Philipp Buttmann, Johann Georg Baiter, Friedrich Ast and Karl Friedrich Hermann, and four whom Burnet names by surname or initial only, Goldbacher, Salvini, C. Schmidt and H. Müller. *add.*, added (*addidi*, I have added, 219b3; *postea add.*, added later; *add. in marg.*, added in the margin; *add. corr. Coisl.*, added by a correction in the Coislinianus; *add. ci.*, proposed addition, 221c4); *al.* (*alii*), other manuscripts (206e7); *alteri tribuunt*, "they give it to the other speaker" (204a9); *altero loco*, in the second place (217d3); *an ... ?*, perhaps ... ? (219c3); *anonymus apud Heindorf*, an unnamed scholar cited by Heindorf (216d5); *ante*, before; *coll.*, comparing (211e2: Herbert Richards, proposing *παρέργως*, "as a side matter", for *πράως*, compares Dinarchus, *Against Philocles* 14, *μὴ παρέργως ἔχειν πρὸς*, "not to treat as a side matter"); *corr.*, corrected (*corr. Coisl.*, a correction in the Coislinianus); *duarum litterarum*, of two letters (210b6); *erasum*, erased; *et*, and; *et mox*, and just after; *ex emend.*, by correction; *extra lineam suppl.*, supplied outside the line (219a2); *fort.* (*fortasse*), perhaps (218b8); *fuit*, stood there before (206a10); *in marg.*, in the margin; *in ras.*, written over an erasure; *Lysidi tribuit*, "gives it to Lysis" (208a5); *mox*, just after (209d8: Bekker reads *ἐμβαλεῖν* and brackets the *ἐμβαλεῖν* that follows); *non videtur ... fuisse*, "it does not seem to have been" (211b7); *om.*, leaves out; *post*, after; *prius*, the first of two like words (214e7); *rasura*, erasure (207a2: B's single λ stands where λλ was, apparently by erasure); *recc.* (*recentiores*), later manuscripts; *refictum*, *refinxit*, reformed (211b7, 214c2); *scr.*, written (*scr. recc.*, the reading of later manuscripts; *scr. Ven. 184*, *scr. Coisl.*, *scr. Laur. lxxxv. 17*, the reading of that manuscript); *secl.*, bracketed as spurious (*secl. ci.*, pro-

posed bracketing, 218d3); *sed*, but; *servato*, keeping (219d5); *signum interrogandi posuit*, “set a question mark” (213c7); *supra*, above; *suprascr.*, written above; *ut videtur*, as it seems; *vel*, or (217c7). *γρ.* (*graphetai*, “it is written”) introduces a variant written beside the manuscript’s own reading (209b7). A vertical stroke marks the end of a line in the manuscript: B has *ησ* at the end of one line and *η* at the start of the next (208d4).

The English. The translation is new. It aims to be exact, with every clause answering to a clause of the Greek, and to keep what translations of this dialogue often lose: Socrates’ humor. That means his teasing of Hippothales, the lover who cannot stop writing poems about the boy, Ctesippus’ mockery of Hippothales, the gravity with which Socrates sets out to prove to a boy that his parents do not let him do as he likes, and the timing of the short exchanges. Socrates tells the story to an unnamed listener, and his narration keeps its historic presents (“Menexenus ... comes in”). Speech is set in double quotation marks, and where Burnet runs quick questions and answers on in one paragraph, the English runs them on too, with a dash at each change of speaker. Where a joke depends on the Greek and cannot be carried into English, a note explains it briefly; nothing is added to make it funnier. The reading Burnet prints is translated, including the conjectures he adopts; words he brackets as spurious are not translated, and where his choice of reading changes the sense, a note says so.

Each right-hand page translates the Greek page opposite. When a sentence runs over the turn of Burnet’s page, the English breaks at the nearest point English word order allows and leaves the sentence unfinished at the foot of the page, as the Greek does. The Stephanus section letters in the margin of the English mark where each section begins.

Key terms. The dialogue asks what a friend is, and its word, *philos*, has no single English equivalent: it means “friend” and “dear”, and it is said of the one who loves and of the one who is loved, of people and of things. It is rendered “friend” throughout, one word for one word, because the argument turns on the word’s two directions and the reader needs to see the same word tried each time; the note at 206a says so where the word first appears. *Philia* is “friendship”, and the verb *philein* is “love”; the noun “love” renders *erōs*, the love of a lover, whose verb *eran* is “be in love”. *Erastēs* is “lover”, *erōmenos* “beloved”, and *ta paidika*, the boy whom a lover courts, “darling”. *Hetairos* is “companion”, and never “friend”. *Kalos* is “beautiful” of persons and in the proverb that “the beauti-

ful is a friend" (216c–d), and "fine" of other things (205e), and the adverb *kalōs* is "well" (204a, 217a); *kalos kagathos* is "beautiful and good"; *gignōskein*, like *eidenai* and *epistasthai*, is "know" (the formula *eu isthi*, 211b, is "rest assured"). *Epithymēin* is "desire", *eudaimōn* "happy" and *makarios* "blessed"; *archein* is "rule", *epitrepēin* "entrust", and *phronein* "understand". *Echthros*, the opposite of *philos*, is "enemy", and *misein* "hate"; *agapan*, another verb of affection, is "cherish"; the verb *philosophēin* is "love wisdom" (218a–b); *heneka* is "for the sake of" and *dia* "because of", kept apart where the argument turns on the difference (218d–221d); *ponēros* (214b–c) is "wicked", and *kakos* "bad"; *oikeios*, which the argument comes to at its end, is "akin", and *allotrios*, said of the bad at 222c, "alien". The *philosophoi* of 212d, one of a list of words compounded with *philos*, are "friends of wisdom", and Lysis' *philosophia* at 213d is "philosophy", with a note.

The notes. The notes identify persons and places, explain what the English cannot carry, and mark the places where Burnet's choice of reading makes a real difference to the sense. Interpretations are labelled as such. They are numbered afresh on each page.

GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

The English words on which the argument depends, in alphabetical order, with the Greek they render and the places where they occur, by Stephanus page and section. Where a word has a longer entry in the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Glossary says so.

akin, οἰκέιος (*oikeios*). 210c–d, 221e–222e. Kept apart from **like**. See **alien** and Key Words, *Akin, alien*.

alien, ἀλλότριος (*allotrios*). 222c, of the bad, where the good is akin to everything. At 210c the same word is “strangers” of persons, and of things that “will belong to others”. See Key Words, *Akin, alien*.

bad, κακός (*kakos*). 214c–d, 216b–222d. Kept apart from **wicked**. See **good** and Key Words, *Good, bad, neither*.

be in love, ἐρᾶν (*eran*). 204b–c, 205a, 221b, 222a; “like one in love”, ἐρωτικῶς (*erōtikōs*), 211e. See **love**, **lover** and Key Words, *Love, be in love*.

be in need, δεῖσθαι (*deisthai*). 215a–b, 217a, 220d; “need”, 205a, 210d, 222e. See **lack** and **sufficient**.

beautiful, καλός (*kalos*); **beautiful and good**, καλὸς καγαθός (*kalos kagathos*); **the beautiful**, τὸ καλόν (*to kalon*). Of persons, 203b, 204b, 206a, 207a, 207c; 207a; 216c–d. Of other things the word is “fine” (205e). See Key Words, *Beautiful*.

because of, διὰ (*dia*) with the accusative. 205c, 217a–b, 218c–219b, 220b, 220d, 221c. Kept apart from **for the sake of**. See Key Words, *For the sake of, because of*.

beloved, ἐρώμενος (*erōmenos*). 204c, 206a, 222a. See **darling**, **lover** and Key Words, *Darling, lover, beloved*.

benefit, the noun ὠφελία (*ōphelia*) and the verb ὠφελεῖν (*ōphelein*); **beneficial**, ὠφέλιμος (*ōphelimos*), with the adverb, “beneficially”. 214e, 217a–b, 220d, 221a–b; “of no benefit”, ἀνωφελής (*anōphelēs*), 210c. Set against **harm**. See Key Words, *Useful, useless; benefit*.

blessed, μακάριος (*makarios*). 207e, 208d. See **happy**.

cherish, ἀγαπᾶν (*agapan*). 215a–b, 215d, 220d. Never “love”. See Key Words, *Cherish*.

companion, ἑταῖρος (*hetairos*). 204a, 206d, 211e, 213b, 214d, 216a; and φιλέταιρος (*philetairos*), “a friend of companions”, 211e.

Never “friend”. See Key Words, *Companion*.

darling, τὰ παιδικὰ (*ta paidika*). 204d, 205a–b, 205e, 206c, 210e, 212b, 222a. See **beloved**, **lover** and Key Words, *Darling*, *lover*, *beloved*.

desire, ἐπιθυμεῖν (*epithymein*), ἐπιθυμία (*epithymia*). 207a, 207e–208a, 208e–209a, 211d–e, 215e, 217c, 217e, 221a–222a. Kept apart from “want”, βούλεσθαι (*boulesthai*). See Key Words, *Desire*.

disease, νόσος (*nosos*). 217a–b, 218e–219a. Kept apart from **illness**. See **medicine**.

enemy, ἐχθρός (*echthros*); **enmity**, ἔχθρα (*echthra*). 213a–c, 214c, 216b, 218d–219b, 220e; 215d, 216b. See **hate**.

entrust, ἐπιτρέπειν (*epitrepein*). 208a–c, 209a, 209c–210b.

first friend. See **friend**.

for the sake of, ἕνεκα (*heneka*). 215d, 218d–220b, 220d (“for its own sake”), 220e. Kept apart from **because of**. See Key Words, *For the sake of*, *because of*.

friend, φίλος (*philos*); **the friend**, τὸ φίλον (*to philon*); **first friend**, πρῶτον φίλον (*prōton philon*); **greatest friend**, φίλτατος (*philtatos*). 206a, 206c, 207c, 210a, 210c–d, and throughout the argument from 211e to the last words (223b); “first friend”, 219d; “greatest friends”, 213a. Never “dear”; “a friend to” renders the dative, “a friend of” the genitive. At 206c “become a friend to” renders προσφιλής (*prophilēs*). See **friendship**, **love** and Key Words, *Friend*.

friends of wisdom. See **love wisdom**.

friendship, φιλία (*philia*). 207c, 214d, 215d, 216b, 217e, 219a, 220b, 221d–e, 222d. Never the noun “love”. See Key Words, *Friendship*.

good, ἀγαθός (*agathos*); **neither good nor bad**, μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν (*mēte agathon mēte kakon*). 205e, 206b, 207a, 210d, 211e, and throughout the argument from 214c; 216c–217b, 217e–218a, 218c, 219a, 220c, 221b–c, 222c. The phrase keeps the Greek’s order, “neither good nor bad” or “neither bad nor good”; at 218b it is “not yet either good or bad”. See **bad** and Key Words, *Good*, *bad*, *neither*.

happy, εὐδαίμων (*eudaimōn*), εὐδαιμονεῖν (*eudaimonein*); **count happy**, εὐδαιμονίζεω (*eudaimonizein*). 207d–e, 208e; 212a. See **blessed**.

harm, βλάπτειν (*blaptein*), and the noun βλάβη (*blabē*); **harmful**, βλαβερός (*blaberos*), with the adverb, “harmfully”. 206b, 214e, 220c, 221a–b. Set against **benefit**.

hate, μισεῖν (*misein*). 212b–c, 212e–213c. See **enemy**.
ignorance, ἄγνοια (*agnoia*); **unlearned**, ἀμαθής (*amathēs*); **without judgment**, ἀγνώμων (*agnōmōn*). 218a; 218a–b; 218a. See **love wisdom**.
illness, νόσημα (*nosēma*); **remedy**, φάρμακον (*pharmakon*). 220d. Kept apart from **disease** and **medicine**.
image, εἶδωλον (*eidōlon*). 219d.
in truth, ὡς ἀληθῶς (*hōs alēthōs*). 216c, 219d. See **really**.
lack, ἐνδεής (*endeēs*), “lacking”, with “to be” or “to become”. 221d–e. See **be in need**.
like, ὅμοιος (*homoios*); **one who is like**, ὁ ὅμοιος (*ho homoios*); **unlike**, ἀνόμοιος (*anomoios*); **likeness**, ὁμοιότης (*homoiotēs*). 214a–215a, 215c–e, 216b, 216e, 218b, 219b, 222b–c, 222e (“most alike”, 215d); 214e–215a, 222e; 214d, 215d, 222e; 222b. Kept apart from **akin**, and from “resembles”, εἶοικε (*eoike*), at 216c and 220e. See Key Words, *Like, unlike*.
look into, σκοπεῖν (*skopein*), σκέπτεσθαι (*skeptesthai*). 213e, 216c, 217c, 218d, 219b, 222b. At 206b the same verb, in a warning, is “look to it”, and at 207a a compound of it is “looking at”.
love, the verb, φιλεῖν (*philein*). 207d–e, 210c, 212a–213c, 215b, 215d, 217b, 220b, 220d, 221b–d, 222a, 222e. **love**, the noun, ἔρως (*erōs*); **matters of love**, τὰ ἐρωτικά (*ta erōtika*). 204b, 204e, 221e; 206a. See **be in love**, **cherish**, **friend** and Key Words, *Love, be in love*.
love wisdom, φιλοσοφεῖν (*philosophēin*); **friends of wisdom**, φιλόσοφοι (*philosophoi*); **philosophy**, φιλοσοφία (*philosophia*). 218a–b; 212d; 213d. See **wise** and Key Words, *Love wisdom*.
lover, ἐραστής (*erastēs*). 205a–b, 212b, 222a. See **beloved**, **darling** and Key Words, *Darling, lover, beloved*.
medicine, ἰατρική (*iatrikē*). 217a–b, 219a, 219c. At 210a the adjective, ἰατρικός (*iatrikos*), is “skilled in medicine”. See **disease**.
neither good nor bad. See **good**.
opposite, ἐναντίος (*enantios*); **oppositeness**, ἐναντιότης (*enantiotēs*). 215e–216b, 218b, 220e; 216b. See Key Words, *Opposite*.
philosophy. See **love wisdom**.
presence, παρουσία (*parousia*); **be present**, παρεῖναι (*pareinai*). 217b, 217d–e, 218c; 217c–e.
proud, μεγαλόφρων (*megalophrōn*); **think highly of oneself**, μέγα φρονεῖν (*mega phronein*); **pride**, φρόνημα (*phronēma*). 210d; 210d; 206a. See **understand**.
really, τῷ ὄντι (*tōi onti*). 205e, 216c, 220b, 220e, 221d; “what is really a friend”, 220b, 220e. See **in truth**.

remedy. See **illness.**

rule, ἄρχειν (*archein*); **ruler,** ἄρχων (*archōn*); **rule,** the noun, ἀρχή (*archē*). 208b–209a; 208d, 210b; 209d.

sense, νοῦς (*nous*); **want of sense,** ἀλογία (*alogia*). 210b; 206b, 213b. The two Greek words share the English “sense”. In προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, “pay attention” (205b, 211a, 213d, 219b), and ἐν νῷ ἔχειν, “have it in mind” (223a), the word is not rendered on its own. Kept apart from **understand** and from **without judgment.**

set great store by, περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι (*peri pollou poieisthai*). 215b–c, 219d–220a.

sufficient, ἱκανός (*hikanos*); **sufficiency,** ἱκανότης (*hikanotēs*); **be in a sufficient state,** ἱκανῶς ἔχειν (*hikanōs echein*). 215a–b; 215a; 217a. Of ability the same word is “capable” (204a) and “can” (204e), and the adverb “well enough” (209d). See **be in need.**

understand, φρονεῖν (*phronein*); **come to have understanding,** φρόνιμος γίγνεσθαι (*phronimos gignesthai*); **without understanding,** ἀφρων (*aphrōn*). 209c–210a, 210d; 210b; 210d. Kept apart from **sense.** See **proud** and Key Words, *Understand.*

unlearned. See **ignorance.**

useful, χρήσιμος (*chrēsimos*); **useless,** ἄχρηστος (*achrēstos*); **use,** χρεία (*chreia*), ὄφελος (*ophelos*). 210d, 214e, 220c; 204c, 210c, 220c, 222b–c; 215b, 220d; 208e. See **benefit** and Key Words, *Useful, useless; benefit.*

wicked, πονηρός (*ponēros*). 214b–c. Kept apart from **bad.** See Key Words, *Good, bad, neither.*

wise, σοφός (*sophos*); **wisdom,** σοφία (*sophia*). 206a, 207d, 210a, 210d, 214b, 216a, 218a, 222e; 212d, 214a. See **love wisdom.**

without judgment. See **ignorance.**

NOTE ON THIS EDITION

HOW THE VOLUME WAS MADE

The Greek was taken from the Perseus Digital Library's digital transcription of Burnet and cut into Burnet's lines by reading every line-end from the photographs of his page, in the impression described in the Editorial Note. Accents, breathings and iota subscripts were read on the sharpest photograph of each page, and a doubtful mark was settled by setting it beside sure examples of each form on the same line or page. Two faults of the transcription were corrected throughout: it gives the forms of ᾄδω, "sing", that begin ᾄδ- a rough breathing and no accent (ᾄδεται for ᾗδεται, from 204d6 on), and it has a stray Latin letter in νεωστί at 204a2. The section letters and line numbers in the margin were worked out from the Stephanus divisions rather than copied, and were then compared with Burnet's margin, page by page.

The dialogue was made in three blocks (Burnet pages 1–9, 10–18 and 19–27), 774 lines in all. Each block was checked by four independent reviewers: two, dividing its pages between them, compared the Greek and the apparatus with the page images letter by letter, one compared the English with the Greek clause by clause, and one checked every fact and reference in the notes and in the Editorial Note. Each finding was examined again against the evidence before it was adopted, and not all were adopted. What those checks caught is recorded at the end of this Note.

The volume was then read through again as one text, since a check made block by block cannot see some kinds of error: a word rendered one way in one block and another way in the next, a recapitulation that states a step in other words than the step itself, a reading that Burnet rejects carried into the English by a small word. The translator read the whole, and four further reviewers read it independently: one for the consistency of terms across the whole book, two for sense, omissions and continuity in its two halves, each reading every entry of the apparatus against the English, and one for the Editorial Note against the scan of Burnet's volume. The Introduction, the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Outline and the Glossary were then written from the finished English, and three

more reviewers checked them, claim by claim and citation by citation, together with the corrections made in the final reading.

WHAT THE FINAL READING CAUGHT

It found some seventy points in the English and its notes, most of them small, that the block checks had passed, and a number in the Editorial Note. They fall into a few classes.

The most serious were readings that Burnet rejects. In seven places the English still followed one, each through a small word, although every block had been checked for them. “And you do well” was B and T’s δέ at 204a4, where Burnet prints W’s γε, “You do well to”; “no paltry man” was the manuscripts’ ἀνήρ at 204a6, where Burnet prints Schanz’s ἀνήρ, “the man is no paltry one”; “neither does your father love you” was Richards’ οὔτε ... οὔτε at 210c7, where Burnet’s οὐδὲ ... οὐδέ is “not even your father”; “I don’t think I am” at 210d8 was Richards’ δοκῶ, where Burnet prints οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, “I think not”; at 214e7 a relative that took up harm alone followed Richards’ ἦν, where Burnet’s ὅ takes up both benefit and harm; at 219b7 the English made “like, indeed, becomes a friend of like” depend on “I let pass”, as Madvig’s γ’ ὅτι would, where Burnet’s γε makes it a statement of its own; and “the first friend” at 219d1 had the article that Heindorf adds and Burnet does not print. Two new notes give Burnet’s πω at 209a4, “not yet”, from a correction in the Coislinianus, where B, T and W have πον, and the shift at 220e to “for the sake of an enemy”, where the argument had said “because of”.

The largest class was renderings that had drifted from one English word for one Greek word, most often between the first block and the others. Πάνυ γε is “Very much so” at 205b and 207d, as everywhere else; ἦ γάρ is “Isn’t that so?” at 206b and 207c, Δοκεῖ μοι “It seems so to me” at 206b, Ναί “Yes” at 207e, οἶμαι “I think” at 208b, πον “I take it” at 208d, τί δέ “What then?” at 209c, and Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ “It doesn’t seem so to me” at 212e. ἀκούειν is “hear” at 204d and in “fond of hearing talk” at 206c, where the draft had “listen”, which the edition keeps for ἀκροᾶσθαι; διαλέγεσθαι is “talk ... about” at 206c, so that Socrates’ lesson at 210e is given in the words of his promise at 206c; τῶ ὄντι is “really” at 205e; ἐὰν is “let” at 216e; ἐθέλειν is “be willing” at 217a and 217c, as at 206b–c; and Τί μάλιστα is “Why, exactly?” at 218d. The beautiful persons of 204b and 206a are “the beautiful one” and “the beautiful ones”, kept apart from the neuter, “the beautiful”, of 216c; and ἔοικε at

216c is “resembles”, kept apart from ὅμοιος, “like”. Three idioms had brought back words that the edition keeps for other Greek: “Oh dear” at 218c, the only “dear” in the English, is now “Bless me”; the “guest-friend” of Solon’s couplet (212e) is a “guest”, since ξένος is not φίλος; and the “kinship” of Lysis’ family with Heracles (205c) is a “relationship”, since “akin” is οἰκέλος.

Some renderings changed the sense or missed the Greek. At 207e the stress falls where Lysis puts it, on himself: “me they do stop, and from a great many things”. At 212e ἀλλά is “but”, not “and”: the things loved are “not friends, but is the poet lying”. At 214d the bad man never comes into true friendship “with either a good man or a bad one”, persons, not things; at 221a it is the one who is hungry who may be harmed or benefited; at 222c the good is akin “to everything”, since the other terms of the same question are neuter; and at 223a the tutors bring “the boys’ brothers”. The ridicule of 205e–206a now stands in one clause, as in the Greek. Small words that Burnet prints had gone untranslated (204a, 205b, 205c, 215c, 216a, 216c), words with no Greek behind them were removed (210c), and phrases that followed a published translation more closely than the Greek requires were reworded (204b, 205b, 205c, 205e, 206c, 206d, 207d, 207e, 208e, 211c, 211e, 212e, 214d, 222c). In the notes, the persons are now introduced where they are first named (203a, 206d); the note on the natural philosophers of 214b offers Empedocles and Democritus as an interpretation, with Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus as the sources for their view that like is drawn to like; the reference to the *Alcibiades I* for the Persian king’s wealth is corrected (123b–c); and the note at 216a calls the one to whom Socrates turns there his “listener”, not his “friend”.

In the Editorial Note, the examples of a lemma followed by a bracket were corrected (206e1, 206e8, 203b3); the spaced points are explained as words left out of a quotation (209c1, 210c7), and Burnet’s “(et mox b 1)” at 203a1 is explained; T² and t are described as hands correcting T; the Coislinianus is placed in the Coislin collection at Paris; Stephanus’ edition is placed at Geneva, not Paris; Goldbacher is named as Burnet names him, by surname only; and γρ. is “it is written”. The key terms now give “beautiful” for the beautiful that the proverb calls a friend, the full range in which *heneka* and *dia* are kept apart (218d–221d), and Lysis’ *philosophia*, “philosophy”.

WHAT REMAINS UNDONE

Four of the scholars in the apparatus are named as Burnet names them, by surname or initial only: Goldbacher, Salvini, C. Schmidt and H. Müller. For three of them a likely name was found. For Goldbacher and Salvini no source was found that ties the scholar to Plato's text; H. Müller is probably Hieronymus Müller, whose German translation of Plato includes the *Lysis* (1850), but the note behind his proposal at 212c6 has not been seen. C. Schmidt is not identified.

Three readings of this copy lie at the limit of what its photographs show: the marks over *οἶοι* at 212a2, which are an ink blot in this copy, so that the transcription's rough breathing and circumflex are printed; the point after *οὐν* at 221d2, printed as an apparent misprint on the measurements described in the record of Block III; and the breathing and accent of *ῆ*, the reading Burnet reports for B and T at 219c6. A second copy of the 1909 impression would settle all three.

The apparatus is Burnet's alone. It has not been collated against the manuscripts, and readings proposed since his edition are not reported. The translation follows Burnet's text even where later scholars would print something else.

The notes are a reader's aid, not a commentary. They were chosen to explain what the English cannot carry, and they label the more doubtful interpretations as such. What the dialogue finally holds about friendship is set out in the Introduction as a question, not argued; a reader who wants the scholarly debate will need a commentary.

The checks described above were made by independent reviewers working from the same page images. The volume has not been read by a specialist outside the project, and a reader who finds an error is asked to report it.

THE RECORD OF THE BLOCKS

The notes that follow are written when each block is finished, and are kept as a record of what its check found.

BLOCK I: 203A–209D (BURNET PAGES 1–9)

How it was made. Burnet pages 1–9 (scan pp. 111–119), 253 lines, from Socrates' walk outside the city wall, through Hippothales' poems and Socrates' advice on how to talk to a darling, to his ques-

tioning of Lysis: whether the parents who love him let him do as he likes, and what the boy is entrusted with because he knows it. The block ends at 209d8 with the first syllable of ἐμβαλεῖν, which the next page completes. The Greek was set line for line from the photographs of Burnet's page, with his apparatus, and the English written and annotated; independent reviewers then checked the Greek and the apparatus against the photographs letter by letter, the English against the Greek clause by clause, and every note and the Editorial Note against their sources.

What the reviewers caught. The Greek text was confirmed letter by letter, including the breathings of ἀθρόοις, ἀνὴρ and the αὐτ- forms of 209a-d, the ᾄδ- forms that the transcription had wrong, and the closed-up dashes and capitals of the quick exchanges. In the margin, a black square that the sharpest photograph shows at 207e1 was found to be a fault of that photograph: the page prints e. In the apparatus, five readings were corrected: the smooth breathing of οὖν, the particle, at 204e7 (twice); the acute of ἀνὴρ at 204a6; the iota subscript of εἰδῆς at 204a8; and at 207b6, where the draft gave both manuscripts the same form, Burnet's ἦ T: ἦ B. Burnet's Stephanus numbers before the first entries on the first page (203 a 1, 204 a 2) had been left out, and are now printed. In the English, a construction was misread at 204d (it is thinking they hear the name, even when they wake, that comes easily), and Lysis is "worthy to hear himself called" beautiful and good (207a), the sense of ἀκούειν with a predicate. Small words that carry sense had gone untranslated (γάρ four times, καί as "even" and "too", γε, αὖ, ἄρα). Renderings were made consistent within the block and with the series: γινώσκειν as "know", not "recognize"; φαῦλος as "paltry" all three times, so that Socrates calls Miccus what he then calls himself; ἐγκώμιον always "song of praise"; ἔξεστι always "allowed"; τὰ ἐαντῶν "what is theirs"; and the tutor who "leads" Lysis to school, the verb in *paidagōgos*. "Endear oneself", which brought "dear" into the family of *philos*, is now "become a friend to" (206c). Six Stephanus letters were moved to the first word of their section, the dashes between run-on speeches are now closed up throughout, as Burnet sets them, and phrases that followed a published translation more closely than the Greek requires were reworded. In the notes, the evidence for Socrates' haunts now supports only the Lyceum; the law on the Hermaea quoted in Aeschines' speech is described as a later insertion; the identity of the Menexenus of the *Phaedo* and of Plato's *Menexenus* with this son of Demophon is stated as likely, not assumed; and

the proverb of 207c is credited to Pythagoras on the authority Diogenes Laertius gives, Timaeus. In the Editorial Note, *al.* is “other manuscripts”, not “elsewhere”; the vertical stroke in the apparatus (208d4) marks the end of a line in the manuscript; and *Lysidi tribuit, mox, rasura* and the angle brackets are explained.

Not applied. The spelling of the sigla, spaced in this volume as in the *Epinomis*, is not closed up as in the *Charmides*. Burnet’s “(et mox b 1)” at 203a1 refers to the second Ἀκαδημείας, which stands in line b 2; it is printed as Burnet prints it.

BLOCK II: 209E–216D (BURNET PAGES 10–18)

How it was made. Burnet pages 10–18 (scan pp. 120–128), 268 lines, from the end of Socrates’ lesson to Lysis, that no one is a friend to anyone in what he is useless for (209e–210d), through his questioning of Menexenus on who becomes a friend of whom (211d–213c), to his turn back to Lysis: the poets and the natural philosophers, who say that like is a friend to like (213e–215c), the opposite view, that the most opposite is most a friend (215c–216b), and his first suggestion that what is neither good nor bad may be a friend of the good (216c–d). The block ends at 216d2 in the middle of a question, which the next page completes. The three verse quotations (Solon 212e, Homer 214a, Hesiod 215c–d) are set on lines of their own. The Greek, the English and the notes were made as in Block I, and four independent reviewers checked them in the same way.

What the reviewers caught. The Greek text and the margins were confirmed letter by letter, including the dashes at the heads and ends of lines and across the page turn at 210c, and three specks on the photographs (210a4, 212b6, 212c2) were judged blemishes, not points. In the apparatus six forms were corrected: W’s ὠδῆν with the smooth breathing (214a5); B’s προσείη without the iota subscript (214c1); at 214d2, the manuscripts’ σχολή with the acute and no subscript, and αὖν with the acute in Bekker’s reading and in Burnet’s own; and T’s αὐτό with the rough breathing (214e7). The Homer and Hesiod lines are now indented as far as Burnet indents them, measured as a share of his line, as the Solon couplet already was; the Hesiod lines had stood less far in than a paragraph’s first line. In the English, the question at 212e had been misread: it is the things loved, horses, quails and wisdom, that are not friends, and the poet “is lying”. The dative at 213a is “friends to their parents”; at 214e and 215a Socrates speaks of persons, “one who is like”, before he widens the question to “anything whatever that is like”,

and the English now shows the change. Two speeches had not been closed, after the Solon couplet and at 216a, where “And indeed, my companion” is Socrates turning to the listener to whom he tells the story, as a note now says. Eleven Stephanus letters were moved to the first word of their section. Ctesippus asks one question, “Why are you two ... feasting all by yourselves”, as Burnet punctuates it; Menexenus is “formidable”, not “dreadful”, for δεινός here means skill in argument; μέγα φρονεῖν is “think highly of oneself” and μεγαλόφρων “proud”, not “think big” and “high-minded”. Four phrases had followed readings Burnet rejects: “if only” (Richards’ μόνον, 212b), “these same things” (Heindorf’s ταῦτά, 214b), “we must go” (Schleiermacher’s plural, 213e) and “the matter according to the poets” (the article Burnet brackets, 213e). The reported speech of 215e now carries “he said”, so that the theory is not heard in Socrates’ own voice. Particles had gone untranslated (γάρ three times, ἀλλά, οὖν, μάλιστα), and renderings were made one: ἀκούειν “hear”, που “I take it”, ὡς ἐγῶμαι “I imagine”, Πάνν γε “Very much so”, Πῶς λέγεις “What do you mean?”, τί δέ “What then?” (also at 208b), λανθάνειν “escape notice”, and φιλέταιρος “a friend of companions”, like the compounds of 212d; the dogs of Solon’s couplet are “dogs”, as everywhere in the block. Thirteen passages whose wording followed Lamb’s Loeb translation were reworted. In the notes, the proverb of 216c is set at the wedding of Cadmus by Theognis alone; the chorus of Euripides’ *Bacchae* sings only its first half, in other words. New notes give the readings that change the sense at 213a (Burnet’s μισῶν from later manuscripts, against B, T and W) and 216b (Cornarius’ τῷ). The note on Darius’ gold rests on a cited place instead of calling it proverbial; Theognis’ version of Solon’s couplet is described as a different version; the quails and cocks, the Homeric line (now 17.217–218) and the natural philosophers are given their ancient sources. “On reading this edition” now gives the pages to 216 and the brackets of this block, the Editorial Note names the scholars behind each deletion, dates Priscian, explains *coll.* and *scr.*, and names C. Schmidt and H. Müller as Burnet names them, by initial only.

Not applied. The English sets the pentameter of Solon’s couplet level with the hexameter, as English verse is usually set, not further in as Burnet sets it. νοῦς is “sense” at 210b and ἀλογία “want of sense” at 213b, as ruled in Block I (206b); the two words share an English word, and the Glossary will say so. πάνν σφόδρα at 211b3 is “most earnestly”, not “most certainly”, which the series keeps for παντὸς μᾶλλον.

How it was made. Burnet pages 19–27 (scan pp. 129–137), 253 lines, from Socrates’ suggestion that what is neither good nor bad is a friend of the good because of the presence of bad (216d–218c), with the hair whitened by white lead and by old age and the lovers of wisdom, through his doubt and the “first friend”, for whose sake every other friend is a friend (218d–220b), the question whether the good would still be loved if the bad perished (220b–221d), and desire and what is akin (221d–222b), to the failure to tell akin from like and the arrival of the tutors (222b–223b), where the dialogue ends. The block was made as Blocks I and II were, and four independent reviewers checked it in the same way.

What the reviewers caught. The Greek text and the margins were confirmed letter by letter, including the dashes at the ends and heads of lines and the margin numbers that the sharpest photographs show as solid blocks (218a5, 220a1, 222a1). Two doubtful dots were measured against every printed point on their pages: the mark over the comma after Πάνν γε at 218b6 has a third of the ink of a printed point and sits too low, and is a blemish; but the dot after οὖν at 221d2 lies within the range of the raised points on its pages in size, weight and height, and is printed as Burnet’s page has it, an apparent misprint like Τι without its accent at 222d5. In the apparatus six forms were corrected: Heindorf’s δ’ ἦ, the article, with its rough breathing and no accent (219a3); ἦ in B and T and ῆ in W at 219c6; ἄν with the acute in Goldbacher’s proposal (221c4); B’s οὖν with the smooth breathing (222a2); and B’s ῆ with the circumflex (222d6). In the English, two places had followed readings Burnet rejects: “as long as” (Richards’ ἕως περ ἄν, 221a2) is now “if indeed”, and “and seemed” (Heindorf’s καί, 223b1) is “but seemed”. Three readings that change the sense now have notes: Heindorf’s ἀγαθῶ κακόν at 218a1, where B has “good ... to bad”; Hermann’s ἑτέρου at 220b1, without which the sentence says “in another word”; and Burnet’s own <τοῦ φίλου> at 219b3. The persons of the summing-up at 222e are “those who are like” and “those who are akin”, as at 214e; χρήσιμος is “useful” beside ἄχρηστος “useless” at 220c; τῷ ὄντι goes with “friend” at 220b (“what is really a friend”), as the next question takes it up; the imperfect ἀπηλαύνομεν is “set about driving them off”, since the tutors were not driven off; and the starting point of 219c no longer “refers us” but “leads back”. Renderings were made one: δέομαι “be in need” (217a, answering 220c–d), ἐθέλειν “be willing” (217a,

217c, as at 206b–c), *συγχωρεῖν* “grant”, *Συνεφάτην* “They both agreed” (also at 207c), *νυνδὴ* “a moment ago”, *ὥς ἀληθῶς* “in truth”, *ἀπέρχεσθαι* “go away” (220c, recalled at 220e), *εἶδος* “figure” (as at 204e), *χρήματα* “wealth” (as at 209a), *ἔοικε* “resembles”, kept apart from *ὅμοιος* “like”, *κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα* “by way of likeness” (as *κατὰ τὴν ἐναντιότητα* at 216b), and *ἀγνώμων* “without judgment”, kept apart from the “sense” of *νοῦς*. Small words were restored (*καί* four times, *γάρ*, *δή* *γε*, *ἀλλά*, *ἄττα*), with the articles of 216d–e and the run-on dash at the turn from page 19 to page 20; two Stephanus letters were moved, and four phrases that followed Lamb’s Loeb translation were reworded. In the notes, the readings at 217c1 and 220c2 are described more fully. In the Editorial Note, the examples of *ci.* are now conjectures (210a6, 221c2), not proposed deletions; *add. ci.* and Stephanus’ conjecture are explained; Salvini is named as Burnet names him, by surname only; and the key terms add *heneka* and *dia*, and *allotrios* “alien”.

Not applied. At 220e5 *Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ* stays “I think not” and is not made “It doesn’t seem so to me”: after a statement the second would read as disagreement, the fault corrected at 213d2. *ἀκολουθεῖν* is “keep up” of a listener (218e) and “keep to” of an agreement (219c).