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Gorgias

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GorgiasLater Readings of Callicles

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English Introduction · Branch 131 of 154

Later Readings of Callicles

Gorgias: Later Readings of Callicles

p. 248

Later Readings of Callicles

Callicles’ speech on nature and law has been cited since Aristotle, and read in modern times as the classic statement of the view that justice is a convention by which the weak restrain the strong, and his name has been joined to those of later writers who held something like it. This essay names some of the parallels and readers, each with the work and place where the reading is found. What is Plato’s is stated first, so that the readings can be measured against it.

What the text says

Callicles holds that “for the most part these are contrary to each other, nature and law” (482e); that the laws are laid down by “the feeble human beings and the many” for their own advantage (483b); that by nature “it is just for the superior to have more than the inferior” (483d); and that Xerxes and Darius acted according to “the law of nature” (483e). He does not say that might makes right without qualification: under questioning he grants that “the stronger and the better and the mightier” are the same (488d), refuses to count the many or “a rabble of slaves” among the better (489c), and names as the better “those who are intelligent in the affairs of the city” and “courageous” (491b–c). His second claim, that the good life is the largest desires and their filling, and that “luxury and licentiousness and freedom, if it has aid, this is virtue and happiness” (492c), is distinct from the first, and Socrates spends most of the argument with Callicles on it. Callicles is never brought to agree with the conclusion; he withdraws (505c) and is “not altogether persuaded” (513c). Nothing in the text says who he was or where his view came from. Everything beyond this in what follows is the interpreters’.

His contemporaries

The antithesis of nature (physis) and law (nomos) was common in the later fifth century, and several texts set out views close to Callicles’. They are parallels, not his sources. The sophist Antiphon, in his On Truth, holds that the rules of law are agreed on and those of nature necessary, and that a man will best serve himself by keeping the laws before witnesses and the rules of nature when he is alone (87 B 44 DK, from an Oxyrhynchus papyrus); the note at 483a cites it. In Thucydides, the Athenian envoys at Sparta say that “it has always been established that the weaker is held down by the more powerful” (1.76.2), and the Athenians at Melos say that both the divine and the human, “by a necessity of nature, rule wherever they have power”, adding that they neither laid down this law nor were the first to use it (5.105.2). Herodotus quotes Pindar’s “law is king of all” of custom, to show that each people holds its own customs best (3.38); Callicles quotes the same lines for the opposite, and the note at 484c gives the fragment.

Plato’s own returns

Plato came back to the view more than once, and each time gave it to someone else. In the first book of the Republic, Thrasymachus says that “the just is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger” (338c); in the second, Glaucon restates, as the view of many and not his own, that law is a compact made by those too weak to do injustice with impunity, and that every nature pursues “overreaching” as a good, but is forced by law to honour equality (358e–359c). In the Laws, the Athenian lists among the claims to rule that “the stronger rule and the weaker be ruled”, which is “according to nature, as the Theban Pindar once said” (690b–c), and returns to Pindar’s lines “leading, making just the most violent” (714e–715a). These are Plato’s speakers, not readers of the Gorgias; that Plato is answering in them the position he gave Callicles is an interpretation.

Aristotle

Aristotle names Callicles once, in the Sophistical Refutations, as an example of a trick of argument: leading an opponent into paradox by appealing to nature against law and to law against nature, “as Callicles too is written in the Gorgias as saying”, since the two are held to be contrary (ch. 12, 173a7–18). He takes Callicles, that is, as a figure in Plato’s book, and his point is about method, as Callicles’ own charge against Socrates was (482e–483a).

Nietzsche, and the comparison with him

The best-known modern parallel is Friedrich Nietzsche. In Beyond Good and Evil (1886) he writes that life itself is essentially appropriation, injury and the overpowering of what is alien and weaker (§259), and he distinguishes a master morality of the strong from a slave morality of the weak (§260); in On the Genealogy of Morals (1887) the moral judgments of the weak are compared to the lambs’ resentment of the birds of prey (I.13). The comparison was set out at length by E. R. Dodds in his commentary on the Gorgias (Oxford, 1959), in an appendix titled “Socrates, Callicles, and Nietzsche”, where he noted that Nietzsche does not name Callicles in his published works and argued that some of Nietzsche’s doctrines were in some measure inspired by the Gorgias; whether the likeness is more than one of doctrine is disputed, and it has been a standard topic since. Dodds also held, in the introduction to the same edition, that Callicles was a real Athenian, which others doubt.

Who Callicles was

No source outside the dialogue mentions him. Those who take him for a historical person point to the details Plato gives, his deme (495d), his friends (487c) and his entry into politics (515a), and to Andron son of Androtion, one of the friends, who appears also in the Protagoras (315c); those who take him for a figure of Plato’s making point to the absence of any other record. The question is not settled, and the essay takes no side. What the text shows is what Socrates says he valued in him: “knowledge and goodwill and frankness” (487a).

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About This Reading Edition

Socrates questions Gorgias, Polus and Callicles about rhetoric, power, pleasure and justice, and asks what it means to live well. This complete edition presents 447a–527e across 117 Greek–English page pairs, with an introduction, Key Words of the Dialogue, an outline, later readings of Callicles and the judgment myth, a glossary, critical apparatus, and 208 translator’s notes.

Historical Text and Translation

The Greek follows John Burnet’s Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford, 1903), in the corrected second impression of January 1909, printed by Horace Hart. The supplied Editorial Note reports checking the Perseus Digital Library transcription against photographs of the printed pages. Burnet’s readings, speaker labels, verse quotations, editorial signs and critical apparatus are retained. The unchanged PDF preserves the complete printed layout.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared the independent English translation and editorial matter in 2026. Each English dialogue page translates the Greek page opposite it, with matching Stephanus references and linked translator’s notes. The introductory and concluding sections remain complete, including both later-readings essays, the Editorial Note, glossary, and all twelve records in the Note on this Edition. The supplied English-only EPUB is available alongside the complete Greek–English downloads.

Rights

The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s historical printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, under CC BY-SA 4.0. The new English translation and editorial matter are © 2026 Diotimos Editions and appear with the site owner’s permission. All five supplied downloads are preserved unchanged.