PLATO

Gorgias

ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ

The Greek text of John Burnet
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with a new English translation and notes

447a–527e

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INTRODUCTION

The dialogue

The *Gorgias* is a conversation set down in dramatic form, without a narrator, among five persons: Socrates and his companion Chaerephon; Gorgias of Leontini, the most famous teacher of speaking of his day; Polus, his pupil; and Callicles, an Athenian at whose house Gorgias is lodging (447b). It opens just after Gorgias has given a display. Callicles greets Socrates with a saying, "Of war and battle, Socrates, this is how they say one should take one's share", and Socrates answers with another: "Why, have we, as the saying goes, come after the feast, and are we late?" (447a). Socrates does not want the display. He wants "to learn from him what the power of the man's craft is, and what it is that he professes and teaches" (447c), and Chaerephon is to ask Gorgias "Who he is" (447d). The text does not say where the conversation is held; Gorgias has been answering "anyone of those inside" (447c), and the company that listens is large enough to raise an "uproar" when the talk threatens to end (458c).

The dialogue runs to eighty-one pages of Stephanus' edition (447a–527e), one hundred and seventeen of Burnet's, and is one of the longest Plato wrote. The ancient arrangement of the dialogues by Thrasyllus, which Diogenes Laertius preserves, puts it third in the sixth tetralogy, after the *Euthydemus* and the *Protagoras* and before the *Meno*, with the subtitle "or On Rhetoric", and classes it as "refutative" (3.59). The date of composition is not known; most scholars place it before the *Republic*, and many in the years after Plato's first journey to Sicily, about 387 BC (interpretation).

The dramatic date cannot be fixed. Socrates says that "last year" he sat on the Council and did not know how to put a question to the vote (473e), which, if the Council is that of 406, when the generals of Arginusae were tried, sets the conversation in 405 (interpretation); but Pericles, who died in 429, is "the one who has lately come to his end" (503c); Archelaus' crimes, which brought him to the throne of Macedonia about 413, happened "yesterday and the day before" (470d); and Nicias, who died in Sicily in 413, is offered as a living witness (472a). The notes at 473e–474a and

503c give the details. No single year fits them all, and Plato may not have meant one to (interpretation).

Speaking was power in democratic Athens, and the dialogue assumes it. Laws, war and peace were decided in the assembly, which every citizen might attend and address, on business prepared by a council of five hundred chosen by lot; cases were tried before juries of several hundred citizens, and a man accused had to speak for himself; and a leading man could be sent into exile for ten years by ostracism. Teachers such as Gorgias taught young men, for pay, to speak in these places (*Apology* 19e). Socrates himself was tried before such a jury in 399 BC, on charges of impiety and of corrupting the young, and was put to death; Plato wrote the dialogue after that, and Callicles' warnings (486a–c) and Socrates' picture of his own trial (521b–522c) are commonly read in its light (interpretation).

The question and the answers

The dialogue is three conversations, with Gorgias (447a–461b), with Polus (461b–481b) and with Callicles (481b–527e), and each begins where the last breaks down.

Gorgias. Asked what his craft is, Gorgias answers "In rhetoric" (449a), and asked what rhetoric is about, "About speeches" (449e). Socrates shows that medicine and gymnastics too are about speeches (450a–b); Gorgias answers that rhetoric is about "The greatest of human affairs" (451d), and names the greatest good: "That which truly is the greatest good, Socrates, and the cause at the same time of freedom for human beings themselves, and at the same time of ruling others, for each in his own city", which is "To be able, I say, to persuade by speeches judges in a law court, and councillors in a council-chamber, and assemblymen in an assembly" (452d–e). Socrates sums this up, "rhetoric is a craftsman of persuasion" (453a), and asks of what persuasion, and about what. Gorgias answers, "the one in the law courts and in the other crowds, ... and about those things that are just and unjust" (454b). Socrates then separates "two forms of persuasion, the one providing conviction without knowing, the other knowledge" (454e), and Gorgias agrees that rhetoric "is a craftsman of persuasion that convinces, not of persuasion that teaches, about the just and the unjust" (455a). Gorgias praises its power: he has persuaded his brother's patients where the doctor could not, and in a contest for the post of public doctor "the doctor would appear nowhere" (456b–c). If a pupil misuses it, the fault is the pupil's,

as a boxer's is his own and not his trainer's (456c–457c). Socrates gets him to grant that his pupils must know the just things, and that "if he in fact does not know, he will learn these things too from me" (460a); and since "the one who has learned the just things is just too" (460b), "the rhetorician will never want to do injustice" (460c). That contradicts what Gorgias said of the pupil who misuses his craft, and Socrates says that the things said "did not sing together" (461a).

Polus. Polus breaks in: Gorgias conceded only from shame (461b–c). Asked in turn what rhetoric is, Socrates calls it "A certain routine" (462c), "Of the production of a certain gratification and pleasure" (462c), a part of a "pursuit" that is "not masterly" and whose sum is "flattery" (463a–b). There are two crafts that tend the body, gymnastics and medicine, and two that tend the soul, legislation and justice, the parts of politics; flattery has divided itself into four and "slipped in under each of the parts" (464b–d), so that "what cosmetics is to gymnastics, sophistry is to legislation, and ... what cookery is to medicine, rhetoric is to justice" (465c). It is "not a craft but a routine, because it has no account by which it applies the things it applies" (465a). Polus answers that the orators have the greatest power in the cities, like tyrants (466b–c). Socrates replies that they "have the smallest power", since "they do nothing of what they want, so to speak; they do, however, whatever they think best" (466d–e): we want the good for whose sake we act, not the act itself, and one who kills or banishes "thinking it better for himself, while it is in fact worse", does what he thinks fit but not what he wants (467c–468d). Polus asks whether Socrates would not envy a man allowed to kill whom he thinks fit; Socrates answers that doing injustice is "the greatest of bad things", and that "if it were necessary either to do injustice or to suffer injustice, I would choose to suffer injustice rather than do injustice" (469b–c). Polus offers Archelaus, who murdered his way to the throne of Macedonia, as a man happy in his crimes (470d–471d), and appeals to what every Athenian would choose (471c–d, 473e); Socrates wants one witness only, the man he is talking to (471e–472c, 474a). He then proves two things. First, doing injustice is worse than suffering it: Polus grants that it is more shameful (474c); the beautiful is beautiful by pleasure or benefit or both (474d–475a); doing injustice is not more painful; it is therefore more shameful by exceeding in bad, and so worse (475a–e). Second, the one who does injustice is more wretched if he does not pay the penalty: such as the doer does, such is what

the sufferer suffers (476b–d); the one who pays the penalty justly suffers just things, beautiful things, good things, and is "rid of vice of soul" (477a); penalty "becomes a medicine for baseness" (478d); and "not paying the penalty when doing injustice is naturally the greatest and first of all bad things" (479d). Rhetoric, then, is useful for accusing oneself and one's own people, so that they may pay the penalty (480b–d), and, if one is to harm an enemy, for keeping him from paying it (480e–481b).

Callicles. Callicles asks whether Socrates is in earnest, "or is he playing?" (481b), for if he is, "our life, the life of human beings, would be overturned" (481c). His long speech (482c–486d) is the subject of a section of its own below. He accuses Polus of the shame Polus had imputed to Gorgias (482c–e), sets nature against law, and tells Socrates to leave philosophy, a charming thing at the right time of life, for the affairs of men (484c–486d). Socrates asks what he means by "the stronger" (488b–491d), draws from him the life of the largest desires and their filling (491e–492c), and spends the long middle of the dialogue on it.

Callicles and nature

Callicles' speech (482c–486d) sets out the view that justice is a convention made by the weak. What the text says is this. Nature and law, "for the most part these are contrary to each other" (482e), and Socrates, says Callicles, works the difference: "if someone speaks according to law, you ask back according to nature, and if of the things of nature, the things of law" (483a). By nature the worse thing is also the more shameful, and that is suffering injustice; doing injustice is shameful only "by law" (483a). The laws are made by "the feeble human beings and the many", who "lay down the laws" with a view "to what is to their own advantage", frightening "the more robust of human beings, who are able to have more", so that they say "that overreaching is shameful and unjust" (483b–c). But, he says, "nature itself, I think, at any rate, sets it forth, that it is just for the superior to have more than the inferior, and the abler than the less able"; it shows this "both among the other animals and among human beings, in whole cities and races", where "the stronger rules the weaker and has more" (483c–d). Xerxes against Greece and his father against the Scythians acted "according to the nature of the just, and yes, by Zeus, according to law, at any rate, the law of nature; not, however, perhaps according to this law that we lay down" (483e). The city tames its best men "like lions", "singing charms

over them and practising sorcery on them, saying that one must have an equal share"; but if a man comes who has "a sufficient nature", "the slave has come to light as our master, and there the just of nature has shone forth" (483e–484b). Pindar's "Law, the king of all", which "leads, making just the most violent", and Heracles' driving off of Geryon's cattle, "neither buying them nor with Geryon giving them", are Callicles' witnesses (484b–c).

The second half of the speech is advice. Philosophy is "a charming thing ... if one touches it moderately at the right time of life", but the man who philosophizes too long becomes "unversed" in the laws, the speeches of contracts and "human pleasures and desires", "whispering with lads in a corner, three or four of them" (484c–485e). Taking Zethus' part against his brother in Euripides' *Antiope*, and quoting him (485e–486a), Callicles warns Socrates in his own words that if someone led him off to prison he "would be dizzy and gape, not having anything to say", and that such a man "one is allowed to strike on the jaw and not pay the penalty" (486a–c).

Under Socrates' questions the speech changes shape. Callicles grants that "the stronger and the better and the mightier" are the same (488d), and then that the many are stronger than the one (488d–489a), so that their law of equal shares is just "by nature too" (489b). He calls that word-hunting and the many "a rabble of slaves" (489c); "the better" become "the more intelligent" (489e), then "those who are intelligent in the affairs of the city, ... and not only intelligent but also courageous" (491b). Asked whether such men must rule themselves, he scorns temperance: "the one who is going to live rightly must let his own desires be as great as possible and not punish them", and must be able "to fill them up with whatever the desire is for at any time"; "luxury and licentiousness and freedom, if it has aid, this is virtue and happiness" (491e–492c). The argument with Callicles from then on is an argument about this life. Socrates' answer to the claim about nature is his account of order: "the wise say, Callicles, that partnership and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justness hold together heaven and earth and gods and human beings", and Callicles has neglected "geometrical equality" (507e–508a). Where Callicles comes from, and how his view stands to his contemporaries and to later readers, is the subject of an essay at the back of the volume.

The argument's main stretch

From 492e to 509c Socrates argues that the pleasant is not the good and that the good life is the ordered one. He begins with likenesses. Some say the body is a grave and the part of the soul where the desires are a leaky jar, so that the senseless carry water "into the perforated jar with another such perforated thing, a sieve" (493a–c); and of two men who own many jars, the temperate one fills his and rests, while the licentious one, whose vessels are "perforated and unsound", must "always, night and day, ... fill them, or be in pain with the utmost pains" (493d–494a). Callicles is not moved: the one who has filled them lives "like a stone"; "living pleasantly lies in this: in as much as possible flowing in" (494a–b). Socrates offers him the stone-curlew, the itch, and the life of catamites (494b–e), and Callicles, "So that my argument may not be in disagreement", says that the pleasant and the good are the same (495a).

Two arguments follow. One cannot fare well and badly at the same time, but one can be in pain and rejoice at once, as when one drinks while thirsty; so rejoicing is not faring well (495e–497a). And the good are good "by the presence of good things"; if the good things were the pleasures, then since the foolish and the cowardly rejoice and are in pain about as much as the intelligent and the courageous, the bad would be good and bad about equally with the good (497e–499b). Callicles then says that of course "some pleasures are better and others inferior" (499b), and that he had been playing (499b–c). The good, it is agreed, "is the end of all actions" (499e), and choosing among pleasures needs "a master of the craft" (500a). Socrates goes back over his account to Polus: cookery is a routine and medicine a craft (500e–501a), and the music of the pipe and lyre, dithyramb and tragedy, which aim at the pleasure of crowds, are flattery; poetry stripped of its melody, rhythm and metre is "a kind of addressing the people" (501d–502d). Has any orator spoken "with a view to the best" (502e)? Callicles names Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades and Pericles (503c). Socrates answers that the good orator, like every craftsman, will put his work into "a certain arrangement" (503e); arrangement and order in the body are health, and in the soul "the lawful and law, whence they also become lawful and orderly; and these are justice and temperance" (504d). To keep a soul from its desires is to punish it, and "being punished ... is better for the soul than licentiousness" (505b).

Here Callicles withdraws: "ask someone else" (505c). He refuses to go on, and Socrates, at Gorgias' request, carries the argu-

ment on alone, asking his own questions and giving the answers (506c–507c), until Callicles answers again at 509c. The temperate soul is the good one; the temperate man does what is fitting concerning gods and human beings and is just, holy and courageous, "a perfectly good man", and "the one who does well is blessed and happy" (507a–c). The happy man must "flee licentiousness as fast as each of us has feet" (507d), for the licentious man can be friend neither to man nor to god (507e). The conclusions are "held down and bound, ... by arguments of iron and adamant" (508e–509a); yet Socrates adds, "I do not know how these things are", only that no one who says otherwise has escaped being ridiculous (509a).

The ending

The last part (509c–527e) turns from the soul to the city. What protects a man from suffering injustice is power, and to have power in a city ruled by a savage tyrant he must become as like the ruler as possible; but then he will do injustice and not pay the penalty, which is the greatest of bad things (510a–511a). Rhetoric, which keeps people safe in the law courts, is like swimming and piloting, which keep people safe and do not boast; the pilot does not know whether he has benefited or harmed those he has landed (511c–512b). The man who is "in truth a man" must not "love his life", but must ask "in what way he might live as well as possible this time that he is going to live" (512e). Socrates tests Callicles, who is "just now beginning to do the affairs of the city" (515a), and then the four great men: Pericles, as Socrates hears it said, made the Athenians "idle and cowardly and talkative and lovers of silver" (515e), and they turned on him; Cimon was ostracized, Themistocles exiled, and Miltiades voted into the pit (516d–e). A caretaker of animals who turns them out more savage than he took them over is a bad one (516a–b). These men were good servants of the city's desires, "more able to procure for the city what it desired", but did not redirect its desires toward what would make the citizens better (517b–c); they "filled the city full of harbours and dockyards and walls and tributes and such nonsense" (519a). The sophist who complains that his pupils cheat him, and the statesman who complains that his city treats him unjustly, refute themselves (519b–520e).

Callicles says that Socrates should serve the city. Socrates replies that he alone, or nearly alone, of the Athenians attempts "the craft that is in truth political" (521d), and that if he is brought into court he will be "tried as a doctor would be tried among little children,

with a cook accusing him" (521e). He would rather die than help himself by flattering rhetoric, "For no one is afraid of dying itself, ... but of doing injustice he is afraid" (522e). Then he tells the account of the judgment of the dead (523a–527a), and the dialogue ends with his summons to Callicles to follow the one argument that has stood unmoved.

The judgment myth

Socrates introduces the myth as an account, not a tale: "Listen, then, as they say, to a very beautiful account, which you will believe a tale, I think, but I an account; for I will speak to you the things I am going to say as being true" (523a). Under Cronus, and still in the first days of Zeus' rule, the living judged the living on the day they were to die, and the cases were tried badly, because "those on trial ... are tried clothed": the judges were struck with amazement by beautiful bodies, lineages, wealth and witnesses, and judged with "eyes and ears and the whole body put as a veil before their own soul" (523b–d). Zeus' remedy has three parts: men must be stopped from knowing their death beforehand, which "has indeed already been said to Prometheus"; they must be tried naked, dead; and their judges, his own sons Minos, Rhadamanthys and Aeacus, must be dead too, judging "in the meadow, at the place where three roads meet", from which one road leads to the Islands of the Blessed, the other to Tartarus (523d–524a).

Socrates then draws out what follows. Death is "the separation of two things, the soul and the body", and each keeps its condition for a time: the corpse shows its size, its long hair, its scars, and the soul, "stripped naked of the body", shows "the sufferings which the person has come to have in his soul because of his pursuit of each matter" (524b–d). Rhadamanthys, not knowing whose soul it is, has often found a king's "whipped all over and full of scars from perjuries and injustice" and "all crooked from falsehood and imposture" (524e–525a). Punishment is for two ends: the curable "become better and be availed", "for it is not possible to be rid of injustice otherwise"; the incurable, who are mostly "tyrants and kings and potentates", become "examples, spectacles and admonitions" for others (525b–d). Homer's sufferers in Hades, Tantalus, Sisyphus and Tityus, were kings; Thersites, a private man, was not allowed so much injustice, "because of which he was also happier" (525d–e). Rarely a man in power lives justly, like "Aristides son of Lysimachus" (526a–b); and Rhadamanthys sends to the Islands of

the Blessed the soul that has lived "holily and with truth", "most of all, ... a philosopher's who has done his own and has not been a busybody in his life" (526c).

The myth caps the argument (interpretation). Its account of punishment is the account Socrates gave Polus, that paying the penalty rids the soul of injustice and is a benefit (476a–479e), carried beyond death, and its incurable tyrants are Archelaus and his kind, as Socrates says (525d). Its judgment of the naked soul answers the false refutation by witnesses (471e–472c), and its living judges, "struck with amazement" by appearances (523d), are like the many before orators. And it turns Callicles' warning back on him: it is Callicles who, before "the son of Aegina", "will gape and be dizzy there no less than I here", and whom "perhaps someone will strike ... even on the jaw" (526e–527a). Socrates grants that Callicles may think it "said as a tale, like an old woman's", but says that the three of them, "the wisest of the Greeks now", cannot show a better life: "among so many arguments, while the others are refuted, this argument alone stands unmoved: that one must beware of doing injustice more than of suffering injustice" (527a–b). An essay at the back of the volume gives some of the myth's later readers.

What is most exposed

A first reader will find several things hard.

Polus' concession. The proof that doing injustice is worse than suffering it starts from Polus' admission that it is more shameful (474c), and from a definition of the beautiful by pleasure and benefit that he accepts at once (474d–475a). Callicles says that Polus was "hobbled" by shame (482d–e), as Polus said of Gorgias (461b–c); many readers have thought the argument weak at just this point, and the reader should see that the proof binds Polus through two things he grants: that doing injustice is more shameful, and that the beautiful is beautiful by pleasure or benefit (interpretation).

The just man who has learned justice. The refutation of Gorgias rests on a step of a few lines: "the one who has learned the just things is just too" (460b). It is taken from the crafts (the one who has learned carpentry is a carpenter), and it is commonly read as the thesis that knowledge of justice makes a man just (interpretation). Gorgias grants it at once: "Surely, in every way" (460b).

The rules of the conversation. Socrates asks for short answers instead of speeches (449b–c, 461d–462a), and for answers that say

what the answerer thinks: he tells Callicles that "you would no longer be examining with me sufficiently the things that are, if you will say things contrary to what you think" (495a), and asks him not to "answer whatever comes to you contrary to what you think" (500b). A refutation is won by the agreement of the one man being questioned (472b–c, 474a). That is why shame, sincerity and Callicles' withdrawal matter to the argument.

Rhetoric condemned? Socrates does not condemn all speaking to the people. He allows that of two kinds of addressing the people one would be flattery and "the other beautiful: preparing so that the souls of the citizens will be the best possible" (503a), speaks of "the true rhetoric" (517a), and ends by saying "one must make use of rhetoric thus, always for what is just" (527c), as at 480d and 508b.

Want and think fit. The claim that orators and tyrants have "the smallest power" (466d) depends on separating what one wants (the good for whose sake one acts) from what one thinks fit (the act). It can look like a verbal trick. Socrates later appeals to it for the claim that "no one does injustice wanting to" (509e), though that claim follows only with the proof that doing injustice is worse for the one who does it (interpretation; see the note at 509e).

An argument without a partner. Callicles answers grudgingly ("Let it be so", 504d, 505a; "so that I may gratify you", 516b), withdraws (505c), and is left unpersuaded: "I am not altogether persuaded by you" (513c). Socrates carries the argument on by himself (506c–507c), and after calling his conclusions bound by arguments of iron and adamant he says, "I do not know how these things are" (509a). Whether the dialogue refutes Callicles or only silences him is still argued.

Doing well. At 507c the man who "does well" is "blessed and happy". The Greek *eu prattein* means both acting rightly and faring well, and Socrates seems to pass from one to the other (interpretation); the note at 507c says so.

The statesmen. Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades and Themistocles, the heroes of Athenian memory, are judged failures as caretakers of the citizens (515c–517a), and Socrates claims that he attempts the true political craft "with few Athenians, so as not to say alone" (521d). The reader should note what he grants them: they were "more serving than those now" and good at procuring what the city desired (517b).

Foreknowledge. Callicles' picture of Socrates led off to prison and condemned (486a–b), and Socrates' own picture of himself

before the jury (521c–522c), are commonly read as Plato's allusions to the trial of 399 BC (interpretation); the note at 486b marks them.

The myth. After saying he does not know how these things are (509a), Socrates tells the judgment of the dead "as being true" (523a), and then allows that Callicles may despise it as an old woman's tale (527a). How seriously the myth is meant, and how its punishments fit with the claim that no one does injustice willingly, is one of the questions its readers have most often asked (see the essay on later readings).

The manner

The *Gorgias* is among the harshest of Plato's dialogues (interpretation), but it is full of comedy. It begins with proverbs about arriving late (447a), and Gorgias' boast that "no one has asked me anything new for many years" (448a) gives Polus his chance to show off: "routine makes our life journey by craft, and lack of routine by chance" (448c), which Socrates later turns back on him as "A certain routine" (462c). Socrates calls Polus "Most beautiful Polus" (461c) and "most worthy Polus", in a chime of sounds of the kind Polus' own style was known for (467b–c), and breaks off an oath half sworn, "By the—no, not you" (466e). He imagines himself in the market-place with a dagger under his armpit, a tyrant with power to break heads and tear cloaks (469d–e); laughs at the witnesses Polus could call, "Nicias son of Niceratus and his brothers with him, whose tripods stand in a row" (472a); and remembers that when he had to put a question to the vote on the Council "I provided a laugh and did not know how to put it to the vote" (474a). Of Polus' tortured tyrant Socrates says, "Again you are frightening me with bogeys" (473d).

Callicles' contempt makes its own comedy. Socrates pictures them as two lovers, each "in love ... with two", he with Alcibiades and philosophy, Callicles with "the people of the Athenians and the son of Pyrilampes", whose name was Demos (481d). When Socrates asks whether the better should have the biggest cloak and the most shoes, Callicles cries, "How you always say the same things, Socrates!", and Socrates answers, "Not only so, at any rate, Callicles, but also about the same things" (490e–491a). The stone-curlew's life (494b), the itch (494c), "You are happy, Callicles, because you have been initiated into the great before the small" (497c), "Oh, oh, Callicles, what a rogue you are, and you use me like a child" (499b–c), and Socrates' offer to do alone what in Epicharmus "two men were saying before" (505e), lighten the

hardest stretch of argument. Callicles' gibe, that Socrates may call himself "a Mysian" (521b), and Socrates' doctor tried before children by a cook ("Children, this man has worked many bad things on you", 521e–522a), come just before the myth. The myth itself ends in a joke turned serious, as Socrates hands Callicles back his blow on the jaw (527a, 527c–d).

On reading this edition

Each left-hand page is one page of Burnet's Greek, line for line, with his margin and apparatus; the right-hand page opposite translates it. The letters in the margins of both pages (a–e) mark the sections of Stephanus' pages, by which Plato is cited; the numbers (448, 449 and so on) mark where each of his pages begins. The small numbers 5 and 10 in the Greek margin count Burnet's lines, by which his apparatus is keyed. The dialogue is a conversation among five persons, Callicles, Socrates, Chaerephon, Gorgias and Polus, and the speaker's name stands at the head of each speech (in the English, Call., Soc., Chaer., Gorg. and Pol.). Where Burnet runs a quick exchange of short answers into one paragraph, joining each speech to the last with a dash (from 449d), the English does the same; where Socrates argues with himself (506c–507b), his questions and answers are joined by dashes alone, without speakers' names, on both pages. Burnet sets in quotation marks the words of imagined questioners and answerers (450e–451c, 452a–d, 454d, 455d), and round a question of Polus' as Socrates repeats it (466c–d) and round imagined speeches (469d–e), the words of Epicharmus (505e), the question a young man might put to himself (510d), the words of the cook who accuses the doctor before children, with the doctor's answer (521e–522a), and Zeus' speech in the myth (523c–524a), and capitalizes the first word of such words where he does not quote them (452a–c, 454a, 514d, 515a, 518c, 521b, 522b); he letterspaces the words of a drinking-song (451e) and the words of Euripides that Callicles works into his prose (484e, 486b–c) and Socrates gives back to him (521e), but not the words of the speaker's own sentence around them, and the English sets the same words in italics; lines of verse, Pindar's (484b), Euripides' (484e, 492e) and Homer's (526d), are set as verse on both pages, and Burnet's quotation marks round the speech of Euripides' Zethus (485e–486a) are kept. Words in angle brackets ⟨ ⟩, which the principal manuscripts lack, are added by Burnet, from another scholar's conjecture (451d5, Heindorf; 481a3, Schanz; 492b4, Woolsey) or

from a later hand in a manuscript (461c1), and are translated. Words in square brackets [ ], which Burnet deletes, are not translated (451b4, 467b4, 470a9, 470b11, 478b3, 478e4, 481c6, 491e3, 497a8, 498b1, 498c7, 500c7, 503d2, 503e2, 503e3, 513c8, 519c6). The notes are numbered afresh on each page. The Key Words of the Dialogue, which follow this Introduction, explain the words on which the dialogue turns and how they are rendered. At the back of the volume are an Outline of the dialogue, two essays on later readings, of Callicles and of the judgment myth, an Editorial Note on Burnet's text, his apparatus and the translation, a Glossary of the key terms with the places where they occur, and a Note on how this edition was made.

A note on the persons

What the text itself establishes is this. Gorgias is a stranger at Athens (487a), lodging with Callicles (447b); he has just given a display, professes to answer whatever anyone asks, and says "that no one has asked me anything new for many years" (447c–448a). His brother Herodicus is a doctor (448b, 456b). He claims to make others orators (449b), and he does not claim to teach virtue: Meno says so in the dialogue named after him (*Meno* 95c), and here he says only that a pupil who did not know the just things would learn them from him (460a). Polus has written a work on rhetoric, which Socrates "read recently" (462b–c); he is young (463e, 466a) and claims to know what Gorgias knows (462a). Chaerephon is a friend of Gorgias (447b) and Socrates' companion. Callicles is "of Acharnae" (495d), Gorgias' host, a man "just now beginning to do the affairs of the city" (515a), in love with the Athenian people and with Demos son of Pyrilampes (481d, 513b), and one of four "partners in wisdom", with Teisander of Aphidna, Andron son of Androtion and Nausicydes of Cholargus (487c). Socrates is "of Alopece" (495d) and sat on the Council "last year" (473e).

Outside sources add more, and some of it is disputed. Gorgias came to Athens as an envoy of Leontini in 427 (Diodorus 12.53), and two of his display speeches, the *Encomium of Helen* and the *Defence of Palamedes*, survive. Polus is named among the masters of the handbooks in the *Phaedrus* (267b–c), and Aristotle quotes his saying on routine and craft (*Metaphysics* 981a4). Chaerephon asked the oracle at Delphi whether anyone was wiser than Socrates (*Apology* 21a) and is mocked with him in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. Of Callicles nothing is known outside this dialogue. Some scholars take him for a real Athenian, others for a figure of Plato's making, and

the question is not settled; Andron, one of his partners, is known from the *Protagoras* (315c) and from other sources. Archelaus, the Great King, Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades, Themistocles, Nicias and Aristides are identified in the notes where they are named.

Each entry says what the word meant in Athens, what the dialogue does with it, and how it is rendered. The Glossary at the back lists the renderings with the places where they occur.

Do injustice, suffer injustice; just, justice (adikein, adikeisthai; dikaios; dikaiosynē; adikia)

Adikein is the verb of *adikos*, "unjust": to act against *dikē*, the right or due. Its passive, *adikeisthai*, is to have it done to one. In ordinary Greek they are "to wrong" and "to be wronged", but the dialogue's thesis is that "doing injustice is worse than suffering injustice" (473a), and in Greek the thesis is made of the words of justice. The English keeps the family visible in every place: *adikein* "do injustice", *adikeisthai* "suffer injustice", *adikia* "injustice", *adikēma* "act of injustice", *adikos* "unjust", *dikaios* "just", *dikaiosynē* "justice", *dikaiōs* "justly", and never "do wrong" or "be wronged". The reader can therefore follow the word from Gorgias' admission that the rhetorician must know "the just things and the unjust" (460a), through Polus' "many human beings who do injustice are happy" (470d) and Callicles' "it is just for the superior to have more than the inferior" (483d), to the soul that arrives in Hades "laden with many acts of injustice" (522e) and the last argument, "that one must beware of doing injustice more than of suffering injustice" (527b). The cost is some stiffness, as in "to this man no one will do injustice and rejoice" (510d), where the Greek idiom means "with impunity". See *Penalty* and *Nature and law*.

Beautiful, shameful (kalos; aischros)

Kalos meant beautiful to look at, and also fine, noble, honourable; *aischros*, its contrary, ugly and shameful. Greek used the same pair for a body and for a deed, and the argument with Polus depends on it. Polus grants that doing injustice is "more shameful" but denies that it is worse (474c); Socrates asks what makes bodies, colours, shapes, voices, laws, pursuits and studies "beautiful", and Polus agrees that it is pleasure or benefit or both (474d–475a); so the more shameful must exceed in pain or in bad (475a–c). In English

"fine" and "noble" would hide the step from a beautiful body to a beautiful law, so *kalos* is "beautiful" in every use, and the comparative "more beautiful"; the adverb *kalōs* is "well", save at 507c, where it stands beside *eu*: "well and beautifully". The series' ruling is kept, as in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, with a note at the first use (447a) and at the first use of conduct (459d). So Callicles speaks of "the beautiful and the just" (484a) and sneers at "the beautiful thing of justice and of temperance" (492c), and Socrates' good man "does well and beautifully whatever he does" (507c). *Kalos kai agathos*, the Athenian phrase for a gentleman, is "beautiful and good" (470e, 515a).

Rhetoric, orator, rhetorician (rhētorikē; rhētōr; rhētorikos)

Rhētōr was the ordinary word for a public speaker, the man who spoke in the assembly and so took part in politics; *rhētorikē*, "the craft of the speaker", is a word not found before Plato, and some scholars think he coined it (note at 449a). The English renders *rhētorikē* "rhetoric", *rhētōr* "orator", and the adjective used of a person, *rhētorikos*, "rhetorician", as in "you are able to make a rhetorician" (458e). Gorgias calls himself an orator (449a) and his craft the one that persuades "judges in a law court, and councillors in a council-chamber, and assemblymen in an assembly" (452e). Socrates' first account of it is that it is "a craftsman of persuasion that convinces, not of persuasion that teaches" (455a); his second, that it is "an image of a part of politics", "the counterpart of cookery in the soul" (463d, 465d); his third, that it could be beautiful if it fought it out for the best (503a), but that no orator, old or new, has done so (503b–c, 517a). He names the two rhetorics again, "the true rhetoric" and "the flattering one" (517a), and the last argument says "one must make use of rhetoric thus, always for what is just" (527c). See *Flattery* and *Persuade*.

Craft, routine, knack (technē; empeiria; tribē)

Technē was any skilled practice that could be taught by rule: medicine, carpentry, piloting, the arts of speech. *Empeiria*, "experience", was the practice that knows only what usually happens; *tribē*, "practice", "knack", the facility that comes from rubbing away at a thing. Polus' first set speech turns on a jingle in which "routine makes our life journey by craft" (448c), and Socrates answers him in his own words: rhetoric is "a certain routine" (462c), as cookery is "not a craft but routine and knack" (463b),

and flattery is no craft "because it has no account by which it applies the things it applies, of what sort they are in their nature, so that it does not have the means to say the cause of each" (465a). So medicine "has looked into both the nature of what it tends and the cause of what it does", while cookery "by knack and routine" keeps "only a memory of what usually happens" (501a–b). The English renders *technē* "craft", *empeiria* "routine" (as in the *Phaedrus*, 270b), *apeiria* "lack of routine", *empeiros* "versed", and *tribē* "knack", so that Polus' boast and Socrates' verdict show as one word. *Technikos* is "masterly" of a pursuit (463a, 501b) and "master of the craft" of a person (500a, 504d).

Flattery; gratification, gratify (kolakeia; charis, charizesthai)

The *kolax*, "flatterer", was a stock figure of comedy, the hanger-on who pleased a rich man for his dinner (note at 463b). Socrates makes *kolakeia*, "flattery", the name of the whole family of pursuits that aim "at the pleasant without the best" (465a): cookery, cosmetics, sophistry and rhetoric (463b), and later the music of the pipe and lyre, the dithyramb and tragedy (501d–502d). Their aim is *charis*, which meant both the pleasure one gives and the gratitude one gets for it; Socrates calls rhetoric a "routine", "Of the production of a certain gratification and pleasure" (462c), and Polus picks up the verb at once: "Then do you not think rhetoric a beautiful thing, to be able to gratify human beings?" (462c). The English renders *charis* "gratification" and *charizesthai* "gratify", against the series' "favour" and "grace", so that the play between the noun and the verb shows (note at 462c). Callicles answers "and I may gratify Gorgias here" (501c) and "so that I may gratify you" (516b); Socrates refuses to speak "for gratification" (521d). Where *charis* is the return owed for a benefit, as in the sophist's complaint, it is "gratitude" (470c, 519c, 520c).

Persuade, persuasion; conviction (peithein, peithō; pisteuein, pistis)

Peithein is "persuade", and *peithesthai*, its middle, "be persuaded", which is also "obey". Gorgias' craft is "a craftsman of persuasion" (453a), and Socrates asks what kind. He separates "having learned" from "having been convinced" (454c–d): there is a conviction that is false and one that is true, but no knowledge that is false (454d), so there are "two forms of persuasion, the one providing conviction without knowing, the other knowledge"

(454e). Here *pistis* is "conviction", and *pisteuein* "be convinced", the state it names; set against knowledge, they are kept apart from *hēgeisthai*, "believe". Where no contrast with knowledge is drawn, *pisteuein* is "trust": of the women relied on (512e), of an argument (527e), and in Callicles' charge that Socrates trusts he will suffer nothing (521c); and in the myth Socrates says of the account "which I have heard and am convinced are true" (524a). Callicles' answer to the argument is that he has "suffered the suffering of the many: I am not altogether persuaded by you" (513c), and Socrates' last exhortation is "So be persuaded by me and attend me thither" (527c).

Power, have great power; want, think fit (dynasthai, dynamis; boulesthai; ha dokei autois)

Dynasthai is "to be able", "to have power", and *mega dynasthai*, "to have great power", was the phrase for influence in a city. Gorgias undertakes "to unveil for you clearly the whole power of rhetoric" (455d), and Polus says that orators, like tyrants, "have the greatest power in the cities" (466b). Socrates' answer turns on two verbs that Polus uses as one: they "put to death whomever they want", Polus says, "and throw out of the cities whomever they think fit" (466c). *Boulesthai*, "want", is aimed at the good for whose sake we act; *ha dokei autois*, "what they think fit" or "think best", is the act itself (467c–468c). So one who acts "thinking it better for himself, while it is in fact worse", does what he thinks fit and not what he wants, and "it is possible for a person doing in a city what he thinks fit not to have great power" (468d–e). The English renders *dynasthai* "have power", *dynamis* "power", *boulesthai* "want" and *ha dokei autois* "what they think fit" throughout, keeping "able" for *dynatos* and *hoios te*. The distinction returns in the last part, where Socrates asks whether one avoids suffering injustice by "Power or wanting?" (509d–e).

Penalty, pay the penalty; punish; retribution (dikē, dikēn didonai; kolazein; timōria)

Dikē is the due that is exacted for a wrong, and *dikēn didonai*, "to give the due", is to pay the penalty; the word is the root of *dikaios*, "just", and *adikein*, "do injustice". *Kolazein* is to check or chasten, and so to punish; *timōria* is the retribution exacted on behalf of the one wronged. Socrates' second thesis against Polus is that the one who does injustice is more wretched "if he does not pay the

penalty" (472e), and his proof makes paying the penalty a benefit: "the one who pays the penalty suffers good things", is "rid of vice of soul" (477a), and penalty "becomes a medicine for baseness" (478d). The English renders *dikē* "penalty" and *dikēn didonai* "pay the penalty" throughout, *kolazein* "punish", *timōria* "retribution" and *timōreisthai*, passive, "suffer retribution" (525b–e). Where *dikē* is a case at law, in the myth, it is "case" (523b–c, 526e), and in Euripides' "the counsels of justice" (486a) it is the poet's right. The licentious soul, *akolastos*, is the "unpunished" one, a play the English cannot carry (note at 505b). See *Do injustice*.

Refute, refutation (elenchein, elenchos)

Elenchein, in Homer "to put to shame", was in Attic to cross-examine and test, and in argument to refute; *elenchos* is the refutation. The *Gorgias* is a dialogue about refutation as much as about rhetoric. Socrates is one of those "who would gladly be refuted if I say anything not true, and would gladly refute if anyone says anything not true" (458a); he sets the refutation of the law courts, by "many reputable witnesses", against his own, which needs one witness only, the man he is talking with (471e–472c, 474a); and when Polus laughs, he asks whether laughing is "another form of refutation" (473e). The English renders *elenchein* "refute" and *elenchos* "refutation" in every place. At the end the refutation becomes a test of lives: "while the others are refuted, this argument alone stands unmoved" (527b). See *Persuade*.

Nature and law (physis; nomos)

Physis is what a thing is by birth and growth; *nomos* is what is customary, and so both custom and written law. The sophists of the fifth century often set them against each other (note at 483a). Callicles builds his speech on the antithesis: "for the most part these are contrary to each other, nature and law" (482e). By law doing injustice is more shameful, by nature suffering it; by law all should have an equal share, by nature "it is just for the superior to have more than the inferior" (483c–d); and Xerxes acted "according to law, at any rate, the law of nature" (483e), a phrase that turns law against itself. Since Greek has one word for custom and statute, the English keeps "law" for *nomos* in every place, and "lawful things" for *nomima* (488d, 488e); *physis* is "nature", *kata physin* "according to nature", *physei* "by nature". Socrates' reply makes law the order of the soul: "the lawful and law, whence they also become law-

ful and orderly; and these are justice and temperance" (504d). See *Stronger*.

Stronger, better, superior, mightier; overreach (kreittōn, beltiōn, ameinōn, ischyroteros; pleonektein)

Greek had several comparatives that meant "better", and *kreittōn*, the comparative of strength, also meant "superior" and "better" in common speech. Callicles uses *kreittōn*, *ameinōn* and *beltiōn* as one (483d–e; restated by Socrates at 488b and granted at 488d), and Socrates asks whether "the stronger and the better and the mightier" are the same (488d), adding *ischyroteros*, the word of bodily strength. The English keeps the words apart in every place: *kreittōn* "stronger", *hēttōn* "weaker", *beltiōn* "better", *ameinōn* "superior" (of persons), *cheirōn* "inferior", *ischyros* "mighty", *ischyroteros* "mightier", *asthenēs* "feeble". So the reader can see Callicles' "better" turn from "mightier" to "more intelligent" to "courageous" (491c). The verb of his view is *pleonektein*, from *pleon echein*, "to have more", rendered "overreach" (483c), with *pleonexia* "overreaching"; Socrates answers it with "geometrical equality" (508a). See *Nature and law*.

Pleasure, pleasant; good (hēdonē, hēdys; agathos)

Hēdonē is pleasure, *hēdys* pleasant, *chairein* "rejoice"; *agathos* is good, and *to agathon*, "the good", the end of action. The beautiful, as Polus grants, is pleasure or benefit (474d–475a), and Callicles' life is the life of the largest desires filled (491e–492a). Callicles at first says that the pleasant and the good are the same (495a); Socrates shows that one can be in pain and rejoice at once, but not fare well and badly at once (495e–497a), and that the cowardly and foolish rejoice as much as the courageous and intelligent (497e–499b). Callicles then grants that "some pleasures are better and others inferior" (499b), and the good is agreed to be "the end of all actions" (499e). The English renders *hēdonē* "pleasure", *hēdys* "pleasant", *hēdesthai* "be pleased", *chairein* "rejoice", and *agathos* "good" throughout; *ōphelimos* is "beneficial", *blaberos* "harmful", *sympheron* "to one's advantage". *Eu prattein* is "fare well" in the argument about pleasure (495e–497a) and "do well" at 507c (note there).

Temperance, licentiousness; order, arrangement (sōphrosynē, akolasia; kosmos, taxis)

Sōphrosynē was soundness of mind, self-control and modesty; the common account, as Socrates gives it, is "being temperate and master of himself, ruler of the pleasures and desires within himself" (491d–e). Callicles calls the temperate "simpletons" (491e), and Socrates answers with the leaky jars of the licentious man (493a–494a). *Akolasia*, "licentiousness", is the state of the unpunished, unchastened soul. In the series these are "temperance" and "licentiousness", *sōphrōn* "temperate", *akolastos* "licentious". Socrates' positive account is drawn from the crafts: every craftsman puts his work into "a certain arrangement" (*taxis*, 503e), so that the whole is "a thing arranged and ordered" (*kosmos*, 504a). *Kosmos* meant order, ornament, and, as at 508a, the universe; the English renders it "order" throughout this passage, with "orderly", "orderliness", "unordered" and "disorder" for its family, and *taxis* "arrangement" (note at 504a), so that the chain runs from the house and the ship to the soul, and to heaven and earth, of which the wise, Socrates says, "call this whole order" (507e–508a). In the myth, of the dead man's finery, *kosmos* is "adornment" (523e).

Tend, take care of; politics (therapeuein, epimeleisthai; politikē)

Therapeuein is to serve, attend to, care for, and so to tend a body or a soul as a doctor or trainer does; *epimeleisthai* is to take care of, and an *epimelētēs* is a caretaker. Socrates' map of the crafts is a map of tendings: "the tending of the body being one", it has two parts, gymnastics and medicine, and the soul has politics, with legislation and justice (464b–c). In the last part the question is "To which tending of the city, then, are you summoning me?" (521a): the one that fights it out for the best, "as a doctor", or the one that serves. Pericles is judged as a caretaker "of asses and horses and oxen" would be (516a). *Politikē* is "politics", the craft that has the city in its charge (note at 463d), *politikos* "politician", and *prattein ta tēs poleōs pragmata* "do the affairs of the city" (515a). The English renders *therapeuein* "tend", *therapeia* "tending", *epimeleisthai* "take care of", and *kēdesthai* "care for", and keeps "serve" for *hypēretein* and "act as servant" for *diakonein* (517b–521a).

Tale and account (mythos; logos)

Logos is speech, word, account and argument; *mythos* is a tale, a story told. Socrates' myth at the end is introduced with the two words set against each other: "Listen, then, as they say, to a very beautiful account, which you will believe a tale, I think, but I an account" (523a), and he closes by allowing that Callicles may think it "said as a tale, like an old woman's" (527a). Earlier he has called the leaky jar "legends" told by "some refined man" (493a, 493d), and said that one must not leave even tales without a head (505c–d). The English renders *mythos* "tale" and *logos* "speech" where it is a speech made, "account" where it is a story or a statement of how things are (523a, 524b, 526d), and "argument" where it is the argument of the conversation (527b–e): "this argument alone stands unmoved" (527b), "let us, then, use as a leader the argument that has now shown itself" (527e). See *Refute*.

ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ

ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ ΠΩΛΟΣ

St. I p. 447

ΚΑΛ. Πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ χρῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, a
οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἑορτῆς ἥκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν;

ΚΑΛ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἑορτῆς· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ 5
Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο.

ΣΩ. Τούτων μέντοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, αἴτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὅδε, ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρῖψαι.

ΧΑΙ. Οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι. b
φίλος γάρ μοι Γοργίας, ὥστ' ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῖν, εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, εἰς αὖθις.

ΚΑΛ. Τί δέ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν; ἐπιθυμεῖ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαι Γοργίου; 5

ΧΑΙ. Ἐπ' αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ' ἐμὲ ἥκειν οἴκαδε· παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας καταλύει καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν.

ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. ἀλλ' ἆρα ἐθελήσειεν ἂν ἡμῖν διαλεχθῆναι; βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ τίς ἡ c

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a 3 *ἀλλ' ἦ* B² P: *ἀλλ' ἢ* B T F Olympiodorus Suidas: *ἄρα* in marg. T (schol. B *ἀλλ' ἢ ἄλλ' ἄρα*) *καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν* secl. Cobet (non laudat Olympiodorus) **a** 5 *ἑορτῆς* secl. Hirschig **b** 3 *εἰς* P: *ἐς* B T F **b** 7 *ἥκειν*] *ἥκετ'* Cobet **b** 8 *γὰρ* B W: om. T P F *καὶ* secl. Schanz (post *καταλύει* distinguens) **b** 9 *ἐθελήσειεν ἂν* B T P F: *ἐθελήσει* Olympiodorus

CALL. Of war and battle, Socrates, this is how they say one should 447a
take one's share.[1]

SOC. Why, have we, as the saying goes, come after the feast, and are we late?

CALL. Yes, and a very urbane feast; for Gorgias displayed many beautiful things to us a little earlier.[2]

SOC. Of this, however, Callicles, Chaerephon here is the cause, compelling us to spend time in the market-place.[3]

CHAER. It is no matter, Socrates; for I shall cure it too. For Gorgias b
is a friend of mine, so that he will make a display for us, now, if that is decided, or, if you want, another time.

CALL. What, Chaerephon? Does Socrates desire to hear Gorgias?

CHAER. That is the very thing we are here for, you know.

CALL. Then whenever you want to come to my house: for Gorgias is lodging with me, and will make a display for you.

SOC. You speak well, Callicles. But would he be willing to con- c
verse with us? For I want to learn from him what the

1. Callicles cites a saying known only from this passage, taken as advice to arrive at a war late, when it is over (the *Suda*, μ 699, glosses the verb "come too late"): they have come when the "battle" of Gorgias' display has been fought. Socrates caps it with another proverb, "after the feast", for coming too late. So the joke is commonly read. Callicles, Gorgias' host, is known only from this dialogue.

2. Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily, the most famous teacher of rhetoric of his day, came to Athens as an envoy in 427 (Diodorus 12.53). *Displayed*: *epideiknysthai*, the word for a sophist's show-piece, the *epideixis*, "display". *Beautiful*: *kalos*, also "fine", "noble"; rendered "beautiful" in every use, as in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*.

3. Chaerephon, Socrates' devoted companion, who asked the oracle at Delphi whether anyone was wiser than Socrates (*Apology* 21a).

δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός, καὶ τί ἐστιν ὃ ἐπαγγέλλεταί τε καὶ διδάσκει· τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν εἰς αὖθις, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ποιησάσθω.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐδὲν οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἓν τοῦτ' ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν νυνδὴ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλοιτο τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καλῶς λέγεις. ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.

ΧΑΙ. Τί ἔρωμαι;

ΣΩ. Ὅστις ἐστίν.

ΧΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός, ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δήπου σοι ὅτι σκυτοτόμος· ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὡς λέγω;

ΧΑΙ. Μανθάνω καὶ ἐρήσομαι. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλῃ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι ἄν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ;

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν· καὶ γὰρ νυνδὴ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμην, καὶ λέγω ὅτι οὐδείς μέ πω ἠρώτηκε καινὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν.

ΧΑΙ. Ἦ που ἄρα ῥᾳδίως ἀποκρινῇ, ὦ Γοργία.

ΓΟΡ. Πάρεστι τούτου πεῖραν, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, λαμβάνειν.

ΠΩΛ. Νὴ Δία· ἂν δέ γε βούλῃ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ. Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ· πολλὰ γὰρ ἄρτι διελήλυθεν.

ΧΑΙ. Τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; οἴει σὺ κάλλιον ἂν Γοργίου ἀποκρίνασθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Τί δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν σοί γε ἱκανῶς;

ΧΑΙ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ σὺ βούλει, ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρώτα.

ΧΑΙ. Ἐρωτῶ δή. εἰ ἐτύγχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ὢν

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d 7 ἀποκρίνεσθαι B T P: ἀποκρινεῖσθαι F **a** 4 ἀποκρινεῖ B: ἀποκρίνει T: ἀποκρινη P F **a** 5 λαμβάνειν B T P: λαβεῖν F **a** 6 δέ B T P: om. F **a** 8 διελήλυθεν B T P: διεξελήλυθε F

power of the man's craft is, and what it is that he professes and teaches;[1] the rest of the display let him make another time, as you say.

CALL. There is nothing like asking the man himself, Socrates. For this was actually one item of his display: just now, at any rate, he was telling anyone of those inside to ask whatever he wanted, and claimed he would answer to everything.[2]

SOC. Truly, you speak well. Chaerephon, ask him.

CHAER. What am I to ask?

SOC. Who he is. d

CHAER. How do you mean?

SOC. Just as, if he were in fact a craftsman of shoes, he would have answered you, surely, that he was a shoemaker. Or do you not understand how I mean?

CHAER. I understand, and I will ask. Say to me, Gorgias, is what Callicles here says true, that you profess to answer whatever anyone asks you?

GORG. True, Chaerephon; for I was actually professing these very 448
things just now, and I say that no one has asked me anything new for many years.

CHAER. Then I take it you will answer easily, Gorgias.

GORG. You may take a trial of this, Chaerephon.

POL. Yes, by Zeus; and, if you want, Chaerephon, of me. For Gorgias, I think, has even given out; for he has just gone through a great deal.[3]

CHAER. What, Polus? Do you think you would answer better than Gorgias?

POL. And what of that, if sufficiently for you, at any rate? b

CHAER. Nothing; but since you want to, answer.

POL. Ask.

CHAER. I ask, then. If Gorgias were in fact knowledgeable in

1. *Craft*: *technē*, any skilled practice with rules that can be taught; rendered "craft" throughout the series.

2. Gorgias' famous challenge to any audience to name a question (*Meno* 70b–c; Cicero, *On Ends* 2.1).

3. Polus of Acragas in Sicily, Gorgias' pupil and the author of a handbook of rhetoric (462b–c; *Phaedrus* 267b–c).

τῆς τέχνης ἥσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρόδικος, τί ἂν αὐτὸν ὠνομάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὅπερ ἐκεῖνον;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΧΑΙ. Ἰατρὸν ἄρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΧΑΙ. Εἰ δέ γε ἥσπερ Ἀριστοφῶν ὁ Ἀγλαοφῶντος ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἔμπειρος ἦν τέχνης, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς ἐκαλοῦμεν;

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι ζωγράφον.

ΧΑΙ. Νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν, τίνα ἂν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῖμεν;

ΠΩΛ. Ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ηὑρημέναι· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην. ἑκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι· ὧν καὶ Γοργίας ἐστὶν ὅδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Γοργία, φαίνεται Πῶλος παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς λόγους· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὃ ὑπέσχετο Χαιρεφῶντι οὐ ποιεῖ.

ΓΟΡ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Τὸ ἐρωτώμενον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰ βούλει, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.

ΣΩ. Οὔκ, εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον σέ. δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐρομένου Χαιρεφῶντος τίνος Γοργίας

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b 5 *ἡρόδικος* B T P: *πρόδικος* F *τί* Olympiodorus: *τίνα* B T W F **c** 3 *καλοῖμεν* B T P: *ἂν καλοῖμεν* F **d** 2 *εἰς* B T P f: *περὶ* F **d** 7 *ἀποκρίνεσθαι* B T P: *ἀποκρίνασθαι* F **d** 8 *σέ* F: *σοί* B (sed accentum add. B²) T W et suprascr. f

the craft in which his brother Herodicus is, what would we justly name him? Would it not be what we name that man?[1]

POL. Certainly.

CHAER. So in asserting that he was a doctor we would be speaking well.

POL. Yes.

CHAER. And if he were versed in the craft in which Aristophon, son of Aglaophon, or his brother is, what would we rightly call him?[2]

POL. Plainly, a painter. c

CHAER. But now, since he is knowledgeable in what craft, what would we call him if we were to call him rightly?

POL. Chaerephon, many crafts exist among human beings, found out by routine from routines; for routine makes our life journey by craft, and lack of routine by chance. Of these, severally, different men partake of different ones in different ways, and of the best, the best; among whom is Gorgias here too, and he shares in the most beautiful of the crafts.[3]

SOC. Polus appears, Gorgias, to have prepared himself well, at d any rate, for speeches; but what he promised Chaerephon he is not doing.[4]

GORG. What in particular, Socrates?

SOC. He does not quite appear to me to be answering what is asked.

GORG. Then you ask him, if you want.

SOC. No, not if you yourself want to answer; I would much more gladly ask you. For it is plain to me, even from what he has said, that Polus has practised what is called rhetoric more than conversing.

POL. Why so, Socrates? e

SOC. Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked in what craft Gorgias

1. Herodicus, Gorgias' brother, a doctor (456b); not Herodicus of Selymbria, the trainer (*Protagoras* 316e; *Republic* 406a). *What*: *ti*, Olympiodorus' reading; B, T, W and F have the masculine *tina*, as at b12 and c2 (b5).

2. Aristophon and his more famous brother Polygnotus, painters, sons of the painter Aglaophon of Thasos (*Ion* 532e).

3. Polus speaks in the jingling manner of Gorgias; Aristotle quotes him: routine "made craft, as Polus says" (*Metaphysics* 981a4). *Routine*: *empeiria*, "experience"; rendered "routine", as in the *Phaedrus* (270b), so that Socrates' verdict on rhetoric (462c) answers Polus here.

4. *Speeches*: *logoi*, also "words", "arguments"; "speeches" wherever it is not the argument of the conversation, so that Socrates' point shows at 449e–450b.

ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἥτις δέ ἐστιν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι εἴη ἡ καλλίστη;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ ποία τις ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὄντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν· ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαιρεφῶν καὶ αὐτῷ καλῶς καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἰπὲ τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον δέ, ὦ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἰπὲ τίνα σε χρὴ καλεῖν ὡς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης.

ΓΟΡ. Τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ῥήτορα ἄρα χρή σε καλεῖν;

ΓΟΡ. Ἀγαθόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὅ γε εὔχομαι εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ βούλομαι.

ΓΟΡ. Κάλει δή.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι ποιεῖν;

ΓΟΡ. Ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐθελήσαις ἄν, ὦ Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος, τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ Πῶλος ἤρξατο, εἰς αὖθις ἀποθέσθαι; ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνῇ, μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΓΟΡ. Εἰσὶ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνιαι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πειράσομαί γε ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἔν ἐστιν ὧν φημι, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὦ Γοργία· καί μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ

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e 5 ἡ B T P: om. F **e** 6 ἐρωτᾷ B T P: τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾶ F: ἠρώτα Bekker εἴη post ποία τις add. B T: post Γοργίου F: delevi **b** 7 ἀποθέσθαι B T P F (sed να supra πο f) post ἀποθέσθαι lacunam indicat Schanz **c** 2 ἔν ἐστιν B P F t: ἔνεστιν T **c** 4 μὴν B T P F: μέντοι Olympiodorus

is knowledgeable, you make an encomium of his craft as though someone were censuring it, but what it is you did not answer.

POL. Did I not answer that it was the most beautiful?

SOC. Quite so. But no one is asking what sort of thing Gorgias' craft is, but what it is, and what Gorgias must be called; just as Chaerephon held out the earlier examples to you, and you answered him well and briefly, so now too say what the craft is, and what we ought to call Gorgias. Or rather, Gorgias, you yourself say to us what we ought to call you, as knowledgeable in what craft. 449

GORG. In rhetoric, Socrates.[1]

SOC. Then we ought to call you an orator?

GORG. And a good one, Socrates, if indeed you want to call me what I boast to be, as Homer said.[2]

SOC. Well, I do want to.

GORG. Then call me so.

SOC. Are we then to claim that you are able to make others such too? b

GORG. That is indeed what I profess, not only here but elsewhere too.

SOC. Would you be willing, then, Gorgias, to go on to the end as we are now conversing, now asking, now answering, and to put off to another time this length of speeches, such as Polus began on? But do not prove false to what you promise; be willing to answer briefly what is asked.

GORG. There are some answers, Socrates, for which it is necessary to make one's speeches at length; nevertheless I shall try, at any rate, to be as brief as possible. For this too, again, is one of the things I claim, that no one could say the same things more briefly than I.[3] c

SOC. That is just what is needed, Gorgias; and make me a display

1. *Rhetoric*: *rhētorikē*, the craft of the orator, *rhētōr*. The word is not found before Plato, and some scholars think he coined it (E. Schiappa, *American Journal of Philology* 111, 1990).

2. *I boast to be*: the Homeric formula of heroes declaring their birth (*Iliad* 6.211, 14.113).

3. Socrates credits Tisias and Gorgias with finding out "concision of speech and boundless lengths on every subject" (*Phaedrus* 267a–b), and says he has heard that Protagoras can speak both at length and briefly, "so that no one could say it in fewer words than you" (*Protagoras* 334e–335a).

τούτου ποίησαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ εἰς 5
αὖθις.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ *ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογωτέρου ἀκοῦσαι.*

ΣΩ. Φέρε *δή· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ φῂς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον ῥήτορα· ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ τί* d
τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει οὖσα; ὥσπερ ἡ ὑφαντικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱματίων ἐργασίαν· ἦ γάρ;—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν *καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν;*—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Νὴ *τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Γοργία, ἄγαμαί γε τὰς ἀποκρίσεις,* 5
ὅτι ἀποκρίνῃ ὡς οἷόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων.

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ *γὰρ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς τοῦτο ποιεῖν.*

ΣΩ. Εὖ *λέγεις. ἴθι δή μοι ἀπόκριναι οὕτως καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη;*—ΓΟΡ. Περὶ *λόγους.*—ΣΩ. Ποίους *τούτους, ὦ Γοργία; ἆρα* e
οἳ δηλοῦσι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὡς ἂν διαιτώμενοι ὑγιαίνοιεν;—ΓΟΡ. Οὔ.—ΣΩ. Οὐκ *ἄρα περὶ πάντας γε τοὺς λόγους ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν.*—ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.—ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ *μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς.*—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν *περὶ ὧνπερ* 5
λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν;—ΓΟΡ. Πῶς *γὰρ οὔ;*—ΣΩ. Ἆρ' *οὖν,* 450
ἣν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ τῶν καμνόντων ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν;—ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη.—ΣΩ. Καὶ *ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, περὶ λόγους ἐστίν.*—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Τούς *γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα;*—ΓΟΡ. Μάλιστα.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν *καὶ ἡ γυμναστικὴ περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν* 5
τοὺς περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ καχεξίαν;—ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ *γε.*—ΣΩ. Καὶ *μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, ὦ Γοργία, οὕτως ἔχουσιν· ἑκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τούτους, οἳ τυγ-* b
χάνουσιν ὄντες περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἑκάστη ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη.

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c 5 *τῆς βραχυλογίας* secl. Cobet **c** 7 *φήσεις* B T P: *φαίης* δεῖν F (sed δεῖν punctis del. f) **c** 9 *ἐπιστήμων τέχνης* B T P: *τέχνης ἐπιστήμων* F **e** 5 *ποιεῖ* B W F: *ποιεῖν* T **e** 6 *λέγειν* B T P: *καὶ λέγειν* F *οὖν* B T P F: *οὐ καὶ* suprascr. b **a** 1 *ἣν* B T P f: *ἡ* F *ἐλέγομεν ἡ* scr. recc.: *λέγομεν ἡ* B W: *λέγομεν* T: *λεγομένη* F *ποιεῖ* F: om. B T et re vera W **a** 3 *ἡ* B T P: om. F

of this very thing, brief-speech, and of long-speech another time.

GORG. I will, and you will claim you have never heard anyone briefer of speech.

SOC. Come, then: you claim to be knowledgeable in the craft of d
rhetoric, and that you could make another an orator too: rhetoric, about which of the things that are is it in fact? Just as weaving is about the working of cloaks; is it not?—GORG. Yes.—SOC. And music about the making of songs?—GORG. Yes.

SOC. By Hera, Gorgias, I do admire your answers, that you answer as briefly as can be.

GORG. Yes, for I think, Socrates, I do this quite reasonably.

SOC. You speak well. Come, then, answer me in this way about rhetoric too: about which of the things that are is it knowledge?—GORG. About speeches.—SOC. What kind of speeches are these, e
Gorgias? Those that make plain how the sick, by their living, would be healthy?—GORG. No.—SOC. Then it is not about all speeches, at any rate, that rhetoric is.—GORG. No indeed.—SOC. But indeed it makes people able to speak, at any rate.—GORG. Yes.—SOC. And to be intelligent about the very things they speak of?—GORG. How could it not?—SOC. Now, does medicine, which 450
we spoke of just now, make people able to be intelligent and to speak about the sick?—GORG. It is a necessity.—SOC. Then medicine too, it seems, is about speeches.—GORG. Yes.—SOC. The ones about illnesses, at any rate?—GORG. Most of all.—SOC. And is gymnastics too about speeches, those about the good condition and bad condition of bodies?—GORG. Certainly.—SOC. And indeed the other crafts too, Gorgias, are in the same case: each of them b
is about those speeches that are in fact about the thing of which each is the craft.

—ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται.—ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δή ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας
οὐ ῥητορικὰς καλεῖς, οὔσας περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην
ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς, ἢ ἂν ᾖ περὶ λόγους; 5

ΓΟΡ. Ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ
χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πᾶσά
ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστιν τοιοῦτον
χειρούργημα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων
ἐστίν. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ c
λόγους, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγώ φημι.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν μανθάνω οἵαν αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν; τάχα
δὲ εἴσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναι· εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχναι.
ἦ γάρ; 5

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πασῶν δὴ οἶμαι τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ
πολύ ἐστιν καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενὸς
ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνοιτο ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἷον
γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί. τὰς τοι- 10
αύτας μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ἃς οὐ φῂς τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι· d
ἢ οὔ;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἕτεραι δέ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν αἳ διὰ λόγου πᾶν
περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργου ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ οὐδενὸς προσδέονται 5
ἢ βραχέος πάνυ, οἷον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεω-
μετρικὴ καὶ πεττευτική γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι, ὧν
ἔνιαι σχεδόν τι ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αἱ
δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους, καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ τὸ
κῦρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἐστίν. τῶν τοιούτων τινά μοι e
δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ῥητορικήν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὗτοι τούτων γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαί σε βούλεσθαι
ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι ἡ διὰ 5

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c 7 δὴ B T W F: δὲ al. *μὲν* B T P: *μὲν ἐν* F **d** 1 *δοκεῖς* B T P: *δοκεῖ* F **e** 4 *οὗτοι* F: *οὔ τι* B T W

—GORG. So it appears.—SOC. Why ever, then, do you not call the other crafts rhetorical, though they are about speeches, if you call that rhetoric which is about speeches?

GORG. Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other crafts is, so to speak, wholly about handiwork and actions of that sort, while of rhetoric there is no such piece of handiwork, but all its action and its accomplishment is through speeches. For this reason I deem c that the craft of rhetoric is about speeches, speaking rightly, as I claim.

SOC. Do I understand, then, what sort of craft you want to call it? But maybe I shall know more clearly. But answer: there are crafts for us; is that not so?

GORG. Yes.

SOC. Of all the crafts, I think, in some the working is the greater part, and they need brief speech, and some need none, but what belongs to the craft could be carried through even in silence, such as painting and statue-making and many others. Such, I think, are d the crafts you mean, about which you claim rhetoric is not; or not?

GORG. You take it up very well indeed, Socrates.

SOC. But there are other crafts that carry everything through by speech, and need, so to speak, either no work besides or very little, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry, and draughts too, and many other crafts, some of which have speeches about equal to their actions, but most have more, and altogether all the action and the accomplishment they have is through speeches. It is one e of these, I think, that you mean rhetoric to be.[1]

GORG. You speak the truth.

SOC. But not one of these, you know, do I think you want to call rhetoric, though in your expression you did put it so, that the craft which through

1. *Draughts*: *petteutikē*, the craft of *petteia*, a board game played with counters.

λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστιν, καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις, εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, "Τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἄρα ῥητορικήν, ὦ Γοργία, λέγεις;" ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶμαί σε οὔτε τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν οὔτε τὴν γεωμετρίαν ῥητορικὴν λέγειν.

ΓΟΡ. Ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ δικαίως ὑπο- 451
λαμβάνεις.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι νυν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἣν ἠρόμην διαπέρανον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ῥητορικὴ τυγχάνει μὲν οὖσα τούτων τις τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι 5
τοιαῦται οὖσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἡ περὶ τί ἐν λόγοις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστιν. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τίς με ἔροιτο ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον περὶ ἡστινοσοῦν τῶν τεχνῶν· "Ὦ Σώκρατες, τίς ἐστιν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη;" εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ σὺ ἄρτι, b
ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κῦρος ἐχουσῶν. καὶ εἴ με ἐπανέροιτο· "Τῶν περὶ τί;" εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν [γνῶσις], ὅσα ἂν ἑκάτερα τυγχάνῃ ὄντα. εἰ δ' αὖ ἔροιτο· "Τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην;" εἴποιμ' 5
ἂν ὅτι καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν τῶν λόγῳ τὸ πᾶν κυρουμένων· καὶ εἰ ἐπανέροιτο· "Ἡ περὶ τί;" εἴποιμ' ἂν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἡ c
λογιστικὴ ἔχει—περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστιν, τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν—διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἔχει πλήθους ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον ἡ λογιστική. καὶ εἴ τις τὴν ἀστρονομίαν ἀνέ- 5
ροιτο, ἐμοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι καὶ αὕτη λόγῳ κυροῦται τὰ πάντα, "Οἱ δὲ λόγοι οἱ τῆς ἀστρονομίας," εἰ φαίη, "περὶ τί εἰσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες;" εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φορὰν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τάχους ἔχει.

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e 7 *ἐν* F: om. B T W **e** 9 *γεωμετρίαν ῥητορικὴν* B T^2 P F: *γεωμετρικὴν* (ut videtur) T **a** 3 *νῦν* B T W: *οὖν* F ἦν] ᾖ ci. Sauppe **a** 5 *λόγῳ* B T P: *τῷ λόγῳ* F **a** 7 *ὧν* B T P: *τῶν* F (suprascr. *ὧν ὂν νῦν* f) **b** 2 *ἐχουσῶν* B T^2 W F: *ἔχουσαν* T **b** 4 *γνῶσις* secl. Bekker *ὅσα ἂν . . . τυγχάνῃ* B T P: *ὅσ' ἂν . . . τυγχάνει* F: *ὅσα . . . τυγχάνει* Ast **c** 5 *ἀνέροιτο* T P: *ἀναιροῖτο* B (sed ε supra αι b): *ἔροιτο* F **c** 9 *πῶς* B T P: *καὶ πῶς* F

speech has its accomplishment is rhetoric; and someone might take you up, if he wanted to make difficulties in the arguments: "So you mean arithmetic to be rhetoric, Gorgias?" But I do not think you mean either arithmetic or geometry to be rhetoric.

GORG. Yes, for you think rightly, Socrates, and you take it up 451
justly.

SOC. Come, then, you too carry through the answer to what I asked. For since rhetoric is in fact one of these crafts that use speech for the most part, and there are in fact others of that kind too, try to say: rhetoric is the craft having its accomplishment in speeches about what? Just as, if someone were to ask me about any of the crafts I was speaking of just now, "Socrates, what is the craft of b
arithmetic?", I would say to him, as you did just now, that it is one of those that have their accomplishment through speech. And if he were to ask me further, "Of those about what?", I would say that it is of those about the even and the odd, however many each may in fact be. And if he were to ask again, "And calculation, what craft do you call it?", I would say that this too is one of those that are accomplished in everything by speech. And if he were to ask further, "The one about what?", I would say, as those who draft motions c
before the people do, that in other respects calculation stands as arithmetic does—for it is about the same thing, the even and the odd—but it differs in this much, that calculation looks into how the odd and the even stand in quantity both to themselves and to one another. And if someone were to ask about astronomy, when I said that it too is accomplished in everything by speech, "And the speeches of astronomy," should he say, "what are they about, Socrates?", I would say that they are about the motion of the stars and of the sun and moon, how they stand to one another in speed.[1]

1. *Of those about the even and the odd*: Burnet brackets *gnōsis*, "knowledge", after "odd", following Bekker (b4); it is not translated. *Draft motions*: in amending a decree in the assembly the mover wrote, "In other respects as the council proposes, but ..." (so the rider to *IG* I³ 102).

ΓΟΡ. Ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Γοργία. τυγχάνει μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ οὖσα τῶν λόγῳ τὰ πάντα διαπραττομένων τε καὶ κυρουμένων· ἦ γάρ; d

ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ τῶν περὶ τί; ⟨τί⟩ ἐστι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων, περὶ οὗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰσὶν οἷς ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρῆται;

ΓΟΡ. Τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄριστα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Γοργία, ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις καὶ οὐδέν πω σαφές. οἴομαι γάρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν τοῖς e συμποσίοις ᾀδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν, ἐν ᾧ καταριθμοῦνται ᾄδοντες ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὡς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀκήκοα γάρ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι εἴ σοι αὐτίκα παρασταῖεν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τού- 452
των ὧν ἐπῄνεσεν ὁ τὸ σκολιὸν ποιήσας, ἰατρός τε καὶ παιδοτρίβης καὶ χρηματιστής, καὶ εἴποι πρῶτον μὲν ὁ ἰατρὸς ὅτι "Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξαπατᾷ σε Γοργίας· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τούτου τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' 5
ἡ ἐμή"—εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην· Σὺ δὲ τίς ὢν ταῦτα λέγεις; εἴποι ἂν ἴσως ὅτι ἰατρός. Τί οὖν λέγεις; ἦ τὸ τῆς σῆς τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν; "Πῶς γὰρ οὔ," φαίη ἂν ἴσως, "ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑγίεια; τί δ' ἐστὶν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώποις ὑγιείας;" εἰ δ' αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ παιδοτρίβης εἴποι b
ὅτι "Θαυμάζοιμί τἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς εἴ σοι ἔχοι Γοργίας μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδεῖξαι τῆς αὑτοῦ τέχνης ἢ ἐγὼ

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d 3 *κυρουμένων* F (suprascr. *τις* f): *κυρουμένων τινῶν* B T W **d** 5 *τί* add. Heindorf: om. B T W F **d** 6 *οὗ* B T W F: *ὃ* Hirschig *οὗτοι* secl. Cobet **e** 1 *οἴομαι* B T P: *οἶμαι* F **a** 1 *εἴ σοι* F: *σοι* B T P *αὐτίκα* B T P F (sed *ἂν* suprascr. f) **a** 7 *ἦ* B T P: *ἔστι* F **a** 9 *ὑγίεια* secl. ci. Hirschig: ⟨*ἧς γ'*⟩ *ὑγίεια* ci. Vahlen **b** 1 *τοῦτον* B T P F: *τοῦτο* Olympiodorus **b** 2 *τἄν* B T P F: *γ' ἄν* Coraes: *ἄν* Heindorf: *μεντἄν* Cobet *ἔχοι* B T: *ἔχει* P F

GORG. And you would be speaking rightly, Socrates.

SOC. Come, then, you too, Gorgias. For rhetoric is in fact one of d
those crafts that carry out and accomplish everything by speech; is it not?

GORG. It is so.

SOC. Then say: of those about what? What is this, among the things that are, which these speeches that rhetoric uses are about?[1]

GORG. The greatest of human affairs, Socrates, and the best.

SOC. But this too, Gorgias, that you say is disputable, and not yet e
at all clear. For I think you have heard human beings at drinking-parties singing this drinking-song, in which they count up as they sing that *to be healthy* is *best*, and *second, to be born beautiful, and third*, as the poet of the drinking-song says, *to be wealthy without fraud*.[2]

GORG. Yes, I have heard it; but with what in view do you say this?

SOC. Because if the craftsmen of the things that the one who 452
made the drinking-song praised were to stand beside you right now, doctor and trainer and money-maker, and the doctor said first, "Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you; for it is not his craft that is about the greatest good for human beings, but mine"—if, then, I were to ask him, And who are you, to say this? he would say, perhaps, that he is a doctor. What, then, do you mean? Is the work of your craft the greatest good? "How could it not be," he might perhaps say, "Socrates, health? What greater good is there for human b
beings than health?" And if after him, in turn, the trainer were to say, "I too would marvel, you know, Socrates, if Gorgias had the means to display to you a greater good of his craft than I

1. *What is this*: the second *ti*, "what", is supplied by Heindorf (d5); the manuscripts lack it.

2. An Attic drinking-song: "To be healthy is best for a mortal man; second, to be born beautiful in form; third, to be wealthy without fraud; and fourth, to be young with one's friends" (Athenaeus 15.694e). Burnet letterspaces the words of the song.

τῆς ἐμῆς·" εἴποιμ' ἂν αὖ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον· Σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, καὶ τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον; "Παιδοτρίβης," φαίη ἄν, "τὸ δὲ ἔργον μού ἐστιν καλούς τε καὶ ἰσχυροὺς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα." μετὰ δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην εἴποι ἂν ὁ χρηματιστής, ὡς ἐγῷμαι πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἁπάντων· "Σκόπει δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν σοι πλούτου φανῇ τι μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἢ παρὰ Γοργίᾳ ἢ παρ' ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν." φαῖμεν ἂν οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν· Τί δὲ δή; ἢ σὺ τούτου δημιουργός; Φαίη ἄν. Τίς ὤν; "Χρηματιστής." Τί οὖν; κρίνεις σὺ μέγιστον ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πλοῦτον; φήσομεν. "Πῶς γὰρ οὔκ;" ἐρεῖ. Καὶ μὴν ἀμφισβητεῖ γε Γοργίας ὅδε τὴν παρ' αὑτῷ τέχνην μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν εἶναι ἢ τὴν σήν, φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτ' ἄν· "Καὶ τί ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἀποκρινάσθω Γοργίας." ἴθι οὖν νομίσας, ὦ Γοργία, ἐρωτᾶσθαι καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων καὶ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, ἀπόκριναι τί ἐστιν τοῦτο ὃ φῂς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ.

ΓΟΡ. Ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει ἑκάστῳ.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΓΟΡ. Τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ' οἷόν τ' εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστὰς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ συλλόγῳ παντί, ὅστις ἂν πολιτικὸς σύλλογος γίγνηται. καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἕξεις τὸν ἰατρόν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην· ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς οὗτος ἄλλῳ ἀναφανήσεται

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b 7 δὲ Vind. 21: δὴ B T P F **c** 1 *σκόπει* B T P: *σκόπει τούτων* F *φανῇ* B T P: *φανείη* F **c** 3 *τί* δὲ δή; ἢ] *γρ. τι* δὲ δὴ ἢ in marg. b: *τί* δὲ *ἀν ἦι* B W: *τι* δε *η* T (sed supra *η* ras. et suprascr. δ): *γρ. τι* δὲ *ἂν ἡ* t: *τί* δὲ ἢ F **c** 4 *σὺ* B T W: om. F **c** 5 *φήσομεν* B T P: *φήσει* F **d** 3 *σὺ* supra versum T **d** 7 *τοῦ* B T P f: *τῶν* F **e** 2 *καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς* T W F et in marg. b: om. B **e** 4 *γίγνηται* B T P: *γένηται* F

of mine," I would say to this one too, in turn, And who are you, my man, and what is your work? "A trainer," he would say, "and my work is to make human beings beautiful and mighty in their bodies." And after the trainer the money-maker would say, as I think, utterly despising them all: "Look into it, then, Socrates, whether c any good greater than wealth appears to you, either with Gorgias or with anyone else whatever." We would say to him, then, What, then? Are you a craftsman of this? He would claim so. Being who? "A money-maker." What then? Do you judge wealth to be the greatest good for human beings? we shall say. "How could I not?" he will say. And indeed Gorgias here disputes it, maintaining that the craft he has is the cause of a greater good than yours, we would say. It is plain, then, what he would ask next: "And what is this good? d Let Gorgias answer." Come, then, Gorgias, holding that you are asked both by them and by me, answer what this is that you claim is the greatest good for human beings, and you its craftsman.

GORG. That which truly is the greatest good, Socrates, and the cause at the same time of freedom for human beings themselves, and at the same time of ruling others, for each in his own city.

SOC. What, then, do you mean by this?

GORG. To be able, I say, to persuade by speeches judges in a law e court, and councillors in a council-chamber, and assemblymen in an assembly, and in every other gathering whatever that is a political gathering. And yet with this power you will have the doctor as your slave, and the trainer as your slave; and this money-maker of ours will be revealed as making money for another,

χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη.

ΣΩ. Νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλῶσαι, ὦ Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἥντινα τέχνην ἡγῇ εἶναι, καὶ εἴ τι ἐγὼ συνίημι, 453
λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἅπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ· ἢ ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλέον τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύνασθαι ἢ πειθὼ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν; 5

ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς ἱκανῶς ὁρίζεσθαι· ἔστιν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς.

ΣΩ. Ἄκουσον δή, ὦ Γοργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἄλλῳ διαλέγεται βουλό- b
μενος εἰδέναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ὅτου ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, καὶ ἐμὲ εἶναι τούτων ἕνα· ἀξιῶ δὲ καὶ σέ.

ΓΟΡ. Τί οὖν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πειθώ, 5
ἥτις ποτ' ἐστὶν ἣν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ ὧντινων πραγμάτων ἐστὶν πειθώ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὑποπτεύω γε ἣν οἶμαί σε λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὧν· οὐδὲν μέντοι ἧττον ἐρήσομαί σε τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἶναι. τοῦ ἕνεκα δὴ αὐτὸς c
ὑποπτεύων σὲ ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα οὕτω προΐῃ ὡς μάλιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ποιοῖ περὶ ὅτου λέγεται. σκόπει γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκῶ δικαίως ἀνερωτᾶν σε· ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε 5
ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστιν τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἴ μοι εἶπες ὅτι ὁ τὰ ζῷα γράφων, ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν δικαίως σε ἠρόμην ὁ τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζῴων γράφων καὶ ποῦ;

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e 7 *χρηματιζόμενος* T F: *χρηματιζομένῳ* B (sed suprascr. *ος* et accentum supra *ο* posuit B²): *χρηματιζόμενος* P et suprascr. *ωι* W *σοὶ* B T P f: *εἰ* F **a** 4 *ἐπὶ* B T P F (sed *ἔτι* suprascr. f) Stobaeus *πλέον* B T P Stobaeus: *πλεῖον* F **a** 5 *ποιεῖν* B T P F Stobaeus: *ἐμποιεῖν* Cobet **a** 6 *δοκεῖς* B T P F: *δοκεῖ* Stobaeus **b** 3 δὲ B T P: δ' ἔγωγε F **c** 8 *καὶ ποῦ* B T P F (et sic legit schol. B sed non habet Olympiodorus): *ἢ οὔ* Woolsey

and not for himself, but for you, who have the power to speak and to persuade the multitudes.

SOC. Now, Gorgias, I think you have made plain most nearly what craft you believe rhetoric to be; and, if I comprehend anything, you say that rhetoric is a craftsman of persuasion, and that its whole occupation and its sum end in this. Or have you the means to say that rhetoric has power for anything more than to make persuasion in the soul of those who hear? 453

GORG. By no means, Socrates; rather, I think you define it sufficiently; for this is its sum.

SOC. Listen, then, Gorgias. For I, be well assured, as I persuade myself, if anyone converses with another wanting to know the very thing the argument is about, am one of these; and I deem that you are too. b

GORG. What then, Socrates?

SOC. I will say now. The persuasion that comes from rhetoric, whatever it is that you mean, and about what affairs it is persuasion, be well assured that I do not know clearly; nevertheless I suspect which I think you mean, and about what. None the less I shall ask you what you mean the persuasion from rhetoric to be, and about what. Why, then, shall I ask you, suspecting it myself, and not say it myself? Not for your sake, but for the argument's, so that it may go forward in such a way as would make most apparent to us what is being spoken of. For look into whether you think I am questioning you justly: just as, if I were in fact asking you who among the painters Zeuxis is, and you had said to me that he is the one who paints living things, would I not justly have asked you, the one who paints what sort of living things, and where?[1] c

1. Zeuxis of Heraclea (Pliny, *Natural History* 35.61), the celebrated painter of the late fifth and early fourth centuries, usually taken to be the "Zeuxippus of Heraclea" of *Protagoras* 318b. *Living things*: *zōia*, also the word for painted figures; a painter, *zōgraphos*, is literally "one who paints living things".

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γράφοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῷα; d

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἄλλος ἦ Ζεῦξις ἔγραφε, καλῶς ἄν σοι ἀπεκέκριτο; 5

ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ· πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ πειθὼ ποιεῖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόνη ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ὅστις διδάσκει ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, πότερον ὃ διδάσκει πείθει ἢ οὔ; 10

ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὴ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγωμεν ὥνπερ e νυνδή· ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὅσα ἐστὶν τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος;—ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πείθει;—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Πειθοῦς ἄρα δημιουργός ἐστιν καὶ ἡ ἀριθμητική;—ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται.— 5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις ἐρωτᾷ ἡμᾶς ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ τί, ἀποκρινούμεθά που αὐτῷ ὅτι τῆς διδασκαλικῆς τῆς περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ τὸ περιττὸν ὅσον ἐστίν· καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἃς 454 νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τέχνας ἁπάσας ἔξομεν ἀποδεῖξαι πειθοῦς δημιουργοὺς οὔσας καὶ ἡστινος καὶ περὶ ὅτι· ἢ οὔ;—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικὴ μόνη πειθοῦς ἐστιν δημιουργός.—ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. 5

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλαι, δικαίως ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπανεροίμεθ' ἂν τὸν λέγοντα· Ποίας δὴ πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν τέχνη; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι; b

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d 5 *ἀπεκέκριτο* B T f: *ἀπεκρίνατο* P F **d** 8 *ἡ* B T P: om. F **d** 10 *ὃ* B T P f: *ἃ* F **e** 1 *δὴ* B P F: *δ' εἰ* T *λέγωμεν* T P: *λέγομεν* B F **e** 3 *ἀριθμοῦ* B T F: *ἀριθμητικοῦ* W *καὶ . . . ἄνθρωπος* secl. Cobet **a** 1 *ὅσον ἐστίν* secl. Kratz: *ὅσα ἐστίν* v. Kleist **a** 2 *ἐλέγομεν* B T P: *εἴπομεν* F **a** 3 *ὅτι* B T P (sed *ὅ* in ras. B) f: *ὅτου* F et rec. t **a** 4 *ῥητορικὴ* B T P: *ἡ ῥητορικὴ* F

GORG. Certainly.

SOC. Is it because there are other painters too, painting many other living things? d

GORG. Yes.

SOC. But if no one other than Zeuxis painted, would you have answered well?

GORG. How could I not?

SOC. Come, then, say about rhetoric too: do you think that rhetoric alone makes persuasion, or other crafts too? I mean something like this: whoever teaches any matter whatever, does he persuade of what he teaches, or not?

GORG. No indeed, Socrates; rather, he persuades most of all.

SOC. Let us speak again, then, in the case of the same crafts as just now: does not arithmetic teach us how many are the things of number, and the person skilled in arithmetic?—GORG. Certainly.—SOC. Then does it also persuade?—GORG. Yes.—SOC. Then arithmetic too is a craftsman of persuasion?—GORG. So it appears.—SOC. Then if someone asks us of what sort of persuasion, and about what, we shall answer him, I take it, that it is of the persuasion that teaches about the even and the odd, how much it is; and all the other crafts we were speaking of just now we shall have the means to demonstrate to be craftsmen of persuasion, and of which, and about what; or not?—GORG. Yes.—SOC. Then rhetoric is not the only craftsman of persuasion.—GORG. You speak the truth. e 454

SOC. Since, then, it is not alone in producing this work, but others do too, we would justly, as about the painter, ask the speaker further after this: Of what sort of persuasion, then, and of persuasion about what, is rhetoric the craft? Or do you not think it just to ask further? b

ΓΟΡ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀπόκριναι δή, ὦ Γοργία, ἐπειδή γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως.

ΓΟΡ. Ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἅ ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγώ τοι ὑπώπτευον ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθὼ καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὦ Γοργία· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς ἐὰν καὶ ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἀνέρωμαι, ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν δῆλον εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ—ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, τοῦ ἕξῃς ἕνεκα c περαίνεσθαι τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶ, οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἐθιζώμεθα ὑπονοοῦντες προαρπάζειν ἀλλήλων τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν βούλῃ περαίνῃς.

ΓΟΡ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμαθηκέναι;—ΓΟΡ. Καλῶ.—ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πεπιστευκέναι;—ΓΟΡ. Ἔγωγε.—ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ταὐτὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθη- d κέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι;—ΓΟΡ. Οἴομαι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο.—ΣΩ. Καλῶς γὰρ οἴει· γνώσῃ δὲ ἐνθένδε. εἰ γάρ τίς σε ἔροιτο· "Ἆρ' ἔστιν τις, ὦ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής;" φαίης ἄν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι.—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής;—ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.—ΣΩ. Δῆλον ἄρ' αὖ ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν.—ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.—ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι εἰσὶν καὶ οἱ e πεπιστευκότες.—ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν δύο εἴδη θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμην;—ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ

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b 5 *τοίνυν* B T P F Olympiodorus: δὴ al. **b** 9 *θαυμάζῃς* scr. recc.: *θαυμάζοις* B T P F *ἐὰν καὶ* F: *ἐὰν* B T P **b** 10 *σε* B T P: *σε ἕτερον* F **d** 3 *οἴομαι* B T P: *οἶμαι* F **d** 6 *ἐγὼ οἶμαι* B T P: *ἐγῶμαι* F **d** 7 *ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδής* P **d** 8 *ἄρ' αὖ* scripsi: *ἄρα* Olympiodorus: *γὰρ αὖ* B T W F: *γὰρ δὴ* Schanz *ἐστιν*] *ἐστόν* Badham **e** 1 *τέ* B T W: om. F **e** 3 *εἴδη* post *πειθοῦς* transp. F

GORG. I do.

SOC. Then answer, Gorgias, since you too think so.

GORG. I mean, then, Socrates, of this persuasion, the one in the law courts and in the other crowds, as I was saying just now too, and about those things that are just and unjust.

SOC. I too, you know, suspected that you meant this persuasion, and about these things, Gorgias. But so that you may not marvel if a little later too I question you about some such thing, which seems to be plain, and yet I ask further—for, as I say, I ask so that c
the argument may be carried through in order, not for your sake, but so that we may not get into the habit of snatching in advance, by conjecture, the things said by each other, but so that you may carry through your own part according to the assumption however you want.

GORG. And I think you do rightly, Socrates.

SOC. Come, then, let us look into this too. Do you call something "having learned"?—GORG. I do.—SOC. What? "Having been convinced"?[1]—GORG. I do.—SOC. Then do you think having learned d
and having been convinced are the same, and learning and conviction, or something different?—GORG. I for my part think, Socrates, something different.—SOC. And you think well; you will know it from this. For if someone were to ask you, "Is there a conviction, Gorgias, that is false, and one that is true?", you would claim so, as I think.—GORG. Yes.—SOC. What? Is there a knowledge that is false, and one that is true?—GORG. By no means.—SOC. So, again, it is plain that they are not the same.[2]—GORG. You speak the truth.—SOC. But indeed both those who have learned have been persuaded, e
and those who have been convinced.—GORG. It is so.

SOC. Do you want us, then, to set down two forms of persuasion, the one providing conviction without knowing, the other knowledge?—GORG. Certainly.

1. *Convinced*: *pepisteukenai*, from *pisteuein*; *pistis*, "conviction", is the state the verb names. Set against learning and knowledge (*epistēmē*), the pair is rendered "be convinced", "conviction"; "believe" is kept for *hēgeisthai*, and "trust", as in the *Symposium* (207c), for *pisteuein* where no contrast with knowledge is drawn.

2. *So, again*: *ar' au*, Burnet's own correction (*scripsi*); the manuscripts have *gar au*, "for, again", and Olympiodorus read *ara*, "so".

γε.—ΣΩ. Ποτέραν οὖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ πειθὼ ποιεῖ ἐν δικαστηρίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις περὶ τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων; ἐξ ἧς πιστεύειν γίγνεται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἢ ἐξ ἧς τὸ εἰδέναι;—ΓΟΡ. Δῆλον δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν.—ΣΩ. Ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν πιστευτικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ ἄδικον.—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶν δικαστηρίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων δικαίων τε πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ πιστικὸς μόνον· οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὄχλον γ' ἂν δύναιτο τοσοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα.—ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς· ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ τοι οὐδ' αὐτός πω δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι ὅτι λέγω. ὅταν περὶ ἰατρῶν αἱρέσεως ᾖ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς οὐ συμβουλεύσει; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἑκάστῃ αἱρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἱρεῖσθαι. οὐδ' ὅταν τειχῶν περὶ οἰκοδομήσεως ἢ λιμένων κατασκευῆς ἢ νεωρίων, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχιτέκτονες· οὐδ' αὖ ὅταν στρατηγῶν αἱρέσεως πέρι ἢ τάξεώς τινος πρὸς πολεμίους ἢ χωρίων καταλήψεως συμβουλὴ ᾖ, ἀλλ' οἱ στρατηγικοὶ τότε συμβουλεύσουσιν, οἱ ῥητορικοὶ δὲ οὔ· ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Γοργία, τὰ τοιαῦτα; ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτός τε φῂς ῥήτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλους ποιεῖν ῥητορικούς, εὖ ἔχει τὰ τῆς σῆς τέχνης παρὰ σοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι. καὶ ἐμὲ νῦν νόμισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν· ἴσως γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει τις τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων μαθητής σου

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e 7 *ἐξ ἧς* (bis) T P F: *ἐξῆς* (bis) B (spiritus corr. rec. b) *πιστεύειν* B T P F: *τὸ πιστεύειν* vulg. **e** 8 *ἐξ ἧς* T P F: *ἐξῆς* B (non correctum) **a** 4 *πιστικὸς μόνον* B T sed suprascr. *ει* T: *πειστικὸς μόνον* P: *πιστικοῦ μόνου* F **b** 1 *μὲν* B T P F: om. Olympiodorus *τοι* B T P F Olympiodorus: om. al. **b** 4 *ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε* P F: *ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡ τότε* B: *ἄλλό τι τότε* T (*ἢ* suprascr. rec. t) **b** 6 *περὶ* B P F: *πέρι* T **b** 8 *αἱρέσεως πέρι* B T P: *πέρι αἱρέσεως* F **c** 3 *τε* T P F: *γε* B **c** 4 *ῥητορικούς* secl. Cobet

—SOC. Which persuasion, then, does rhetoric make in law courts and the other crowds about just things and unjust? The one from which being convinced comes about without knowing, or the one from which knowing comes?—GORG. It is plain, surely, Socrates, that it is the one from which being convinced comes.—SOC. Rhetoric, then, as it seems, is a craftsman of persuasion 455
that convinces, not of persuasion that teaches, about the just and the unjust.—GORG. Yes.—SOC. Then neither is the orator one who teaches law courts and the other crowds about just things and unjust, but only one who convinces; for surely he would not have the power to teach so great a crowd such great matters in a short time.—GORG. No indeed.

SOC. Come, then, let us see what in the world we are actually saying about rhetoric; for not even I myself yet have the power to b
apprehend what I am saying. When the city has a gathering about the choice of doctors, or of shipwrights, or of some other class of craftsmen, is it not the case that then the rhetorician will not advise?[1] For it is plain that in each choice one must choose the most masterly. Nor when it is about the building of walls, or the construction of harbours or dockyards, but the master-builders will; nor again when, about the choice of generals, or some arrangement against foes, or the seizing of positions, there is advice to be given, c
but then those skilled in generalship will advise, and the rhetoricians not. Or how do you speak of such things, Gorgias? For since you claim both that you are an orator yourself and that you make others rhetoricians, it is well to inquire from you about the things of your craft. And now hold that I am also pressing your interest; for perhaps one of those inside does in fact

1. Cities engaged public doctors by vote; compare 514d–e and Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.2.5.

βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὡς ἐγώ τινας σχεδὸν καὶ συχνοὺς αἰσθάνομαι, οἳ ἴσως αἰσχύνοιντ' ἄν σε ἀνερέσθαι. ὑπ' ἐμοῦ οὖν ἀνερωτώμενος νόμισον καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀνερωτᾶσθαι· d
"Τί ἡμῖν, ὦ Γοργία, ἔσται, ἐάν σοι συνῶμεν; περὶ τίνων τῇ πόλει συμβουλεύειν οἷοί τε ἐσόμεθα; πότερον περὶ δικαίου μόνον καὶ ἀδίκου ἢ καὶ περὶ ὧν νυνδὴ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν;" πειρῶ οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι. 5

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι πειράσομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σαφῶς ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν ἅπασαν· αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι τὰ νεώρια ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τείχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατασκευὴ e
ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονεν, τὰ δ' ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν.

ΣΩ. Λέγεται ταῦτα, ὦ Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους· Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἤκουον ὅτε συνεβούλευεν ἡμῖν περὶ 5
τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους.

ΓΟΡ. Καὶ ὅταν γέ τις αἵρεσις ᾖ ὧν νυνδὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, ὦ 456
Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς ὅτι οἱ ῥήτορές εἰσιν οἱ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας περὶ τούτων.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα καὶ θαυμάζων, ὦ Γοργία, πάλαι ἐρωτῶ τίς ποτε ἡ δύναμίς ἐστιν τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δαιμονία γάρ τις 5
ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι.

ΓΟΡ. Εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἁπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑφ' αὑτῇ ἔχει. μέγα δέ σοι τεκμήριον ἐρῶ· πολλάκις γὰρ ἤδη ἔγωγε μετὰ b
τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἰατρῶν εἰσελθὼν παρά τινα τῶν καμνόντων οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα ἢ φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἰατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ

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d 1 *καὶ* B T P: δὴ *καὶ* F **d** 2 *περὶ* B T P: *ἢ περὶ* F **d** 4 *νῦν* δὴ B T P f: δὴ F **e** 1 *τὰ Ἀθηναίων* secl. Cobet **e** 3 *τῶν*] *τῆς τῶν* Schaefer: *τῆς* Buttmann **e** 6 *τοῦ* B P F t: *τὸν* T **a** 1 *νυνδὴ* scripsi: *νῦν αὖ* F: δὴ B T P f **a** 4 *πάλαι* B T P F: *πάλιν* Olympiodorus *τίς* F: *ἥτις* B T P **a** 5 *ἡ δύναμίς ἐστιν* B T P: *ἐστιν ἡ δύναμις* F **a** 7 Εἰ] Τί *εἰ* Madvig: Τί δ' *εἰ* H. Richards **b** 4 *ἢ καῦσαι*] *καὶ καῦσαι* Blomfield

want to become your pupil, as I perceive some, and pretty nearly a good many, who perhaps would be ashamed to question you. So when you are questioned by me, hold that you are being questioned by them too: "What will we get, Gorgias, if we are with you? About what shall we be able to advise the city? About just and unjust only, or also about the things Socrates was speaking of just now?" Try, then, to answer them. d

GORG. Well, I will try, Socrates, to unveil for you clearly the whole power of rhetoric; for you yourself have led the way well. For you know, surely, that these dockyards and the walls of the Athenians and the construction of the harbours came about from the advice of Themistocles, and some from that of Pericles, but not from the craftsmen. e

SOC. These things are said, Gorgias, about Themistocles; and Pericles I heard myself, when he was advising us about the middle wall.[1]

GORG. And whenever there is a choice of the men you were speaking of just now, Socrates, you see that it is the orators who advise and who carry their proposals about these things. 456

SOC. It is marvelling at this too, Gorgias, that I have long been asking what in the world the power of rhetoric is. For it appears to me something daimonic in its greatness, when I look into it in this way.[2]

GORG. If only you knew all of it, Socrates: that it gathers together, so to speak, all the powers and holds them under itself. And I will say to you a great piece of evidence. For many times already I have gone in with my brother[3] and with the other doctors to one of the sick who was not willing either to drink a drug or to offer himself to the doctor for cutting or burning, and when the b

1. Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to build a fleet (Herodotus 7.144), to rebuild their city wall after the Persian Wars, and to fortify the Piraeus as their harbour (Thucydides 1.90–93). The middle wall, a second long wall to the Piraeus, was built on Pericles' proposal; Plutarch (*Pericles* 13) cites this passage for it.

2. *Daimonic*: *daimonios*, of what passes the human, as the work of a *daimōn*; in ordinary speech, "astonishing".

3. His brother Herodicus, a doctor (448b).

ἰατροῦ πεῖσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ ἢ τῇ ῥητορικῇ. φημὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὅπῃ βούλει ἐλθόντα ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ἰατρόν, εἰ δέοι λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ συλλόγῳ ὁπότερον δεῖ αἱρεθῆναι ἰατρόν, οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἰατρόν, ἀλλ' αἱρεθῆναι ἂν τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατόν, εἰ βούλοιτο. καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλον γε δημιουργὸν ὁντιναοῦν ἀγωνίζοιτο, πείσειεν ἂν αὐτὸν ἑλέσθαι ὁ ῥητορικὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν περὶ ὅτου οὐκ ἂν πιθανώτερον εἴποι ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἢ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐν πλήθει. ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις τοσαύτη ἐστὶν καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς τέχνης· δεῖ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ πρὸς ἅπαντας χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔμαθεν πυκτεύειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, ὥστε κρείττων εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα τοὺς φίλους δεῖ τύπτειν οὐδὲ κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι. οὐδέ γε μὰ Δία ἐάν τις εἰς παλαίστραν φοιτήσας εὖ ἔχων τὸ σῶμα καὶ πυκτικὸς γενόμενος, ἔπειτα τὸν πατέρα τύπτῃ καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἢ τῶν φίλων, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ τοὺς παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις διδάσκοντας μάχεσθαι μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ παρέδοσαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίως χρῆσθαι τούτοις πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἀμυνομένους, μὴ ὑπάρχοντας· οἱ δὲ μεταστρέψαντες χρῶνται τῇ ἰσχύϊ καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ σὺκ ὀρθῶς. οὔκουν οἱ διδάξαντες πονηροί, οὐδὲ ἡ τέχνη οὔτε αἰτία οὔτε πονηρὰ τούτου ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι οἶμαι ὀρθῶς. ὁ αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δυνατὸς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ περὶ

b 6 *ὅπῃ* B T P F: *ὅποι* scr. recc. *ἐλθόντε* Dobree **c** 7 *τῇ . . . ὥσπερ* B T P (in lacuna textus suppl. f *τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ*) **d** 1 *τούτου ἕνεκα* secl. Findeisen *ἕνεκα* δεῖ B T F: δεῖ *ἕνεκα* P **d** 6 *πυκτικὸς*] *ποιητικὸς* P **e** 3 *τῷ* B T P: *τὸ* F **a** 2 *οὔκουν* T P F b: *οὐκοῦν* B

doctor had not the power to persuade him, I have persuaded him, by no other craft than rhetoric. And I claim too that if a rhetorician and a doctor came into whatever city you want, and they had to contend in speech in an assembly or in some other gathering about which of them should be chosen as doctor, the doctor would c
appear nowhere, but the one able to speak would be chosen, if he wanted. And if he contended against any other craftsman whatever, the rhetorician, rather than anyone else whatever, would persuade them to choose him; for there is nothing about which the rhetorician would not speak more persuasively than any other of the craftsmen whatever, in a multitude. So great, then, and such is the power of the craft. One must, however, Socrates, use rhetoric as one uses every other kind of competition. For the other competi- d
tion too one must not use against all human beings for this reason, that one has learned to box and to do the pancratium and to fight in armour, so as to be stronger than friends and enemies alike;[1] not for this reason must one strike one's friends, or stab and kill them. No, by Zeus, nor, if someone who has gone to the wrestling-school, and is in good condition of body and has become a boxer, then strikes his father and mother, or anyone else of his own people or his friends, not for this reason must one hate the trainers e
and those who teach fighting in armour, and throw them out of the cities. For they handed these things on to be used justly against foes and those who do injustice, in defence, not in striking first; but 457
these men turn them about and use their might and their craft not rightly. So those who taught them are not base, nor is the craft either the cause or base for this reason, but, I think, those who do not use it rightly. The same account, then, holds for rhetoric too. For the orator is able to speak against everyone and about

1. *The pancratium*: an athletic contest combining boxing and wrestling. *Fighting in armour* was taught by professional masters (*Laches* 178a–184c).

παντὸς λέγειν, ὥστε πιθανώτερος εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἔμβραχυ περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται· ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον b
τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ οὔτε τοὺς ἰατροὺς τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι—
ὅτι δύναιτο ἂν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι—οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουρ-
γούς, ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ
ἀγωνίᾳ. ἐὰν δὲ οἶμαι ῥητορικὸς γενόμενός τις κᾆτα ταύτῃ 5
τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ μισεῖν
τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ
δικαίου χρείᾳ παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ' ἐναντίως χρῆται. τὸν οὖν c
οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ ἐκβάλλειν καὶ
ἀποκτεινύναι ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα.

ΣΩ. Οἶμαι, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν
λόγων καὶ καθεωρακέναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ῥᾳδίως 5
δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν διαλέγεσθαι διορισά-
μενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες ἑαυτούς,
οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας, ἀλλ' ἐὰν περί του ἀμφι- d
σβητήσωσιν καὶ μὴ φῇ ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον ὀρθῶς λέγειν ἢ
μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαίνουσί τε καὶ κατὰ φθόνον οἴονται τὸν
ἑαυτῶν λέγειν, φιλονικοῦντας ἀλλ' οὐ ζητοῦντας τὸ προκεί-
μενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ· καὶ ἔνιοί γε τελευτῶντες αἴσχιστα 5
ἀπαλλάττονται, λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκού-
σαντες περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα οἷα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας
ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ἠξίωσαν
ἀκροαταὶ γενέσθαι. τοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα λέγω ταῦτα; ὅτι νῦν e
ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα λέγειν οὐδὲ σύμφωνα οἷς
τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς· φοβοῦμαι οὖν διε-
λέγχειν σε, μή με ὑπολάβῃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα φιλονι-

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b 1 *ἔμβραχυ* B T P: *ἐν βραχεῖ* F et rec. t **b** 3 *δύναιτο* F et in ras. T: *δύναιντο* re vera B P et pr. T **b** 4 *ὥσπερ . . . ἀγωνίᾳ* secl. ci. Sauppe **b** 5 *κᾆτα* scr. recc.: *κατὰ* B T P F **c** 1 *δικαίου* B T P F: *δικαίᾳ* scr. recc. **c** 3 *διδάξαντα* B T P: *διδάσκοντα* F **c** 5 *λόγων*] *λογίων* Madvig: *ἀνθρώπων* Cobet: *φιλολόγων* Schanz **d** 1 *του* B T P: *τούτου* F *ἀμφισβητήσωσιν* B T P f: *ἀμφισβητῶσι* F **d** 6 *λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ* secl. Hirschig **d** 7 *περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν* secl. ci. Sauppe **d** 8 *ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν* secl. Cobet *ὅτι τοιούτων*] *οἵων* Cobet **e** 4 *φιλονικοῦντα* secl. W. Headlam

everything, so as to be more persuasive in multitudes about what- b
ever at all he wants; but not at all the more for this reason must he rob the doctors of their repute—because he would have the power to do this—nor the other craftsmen, but he must use rhetoric too justly, as he would the competition too. And if, I think, someone becomes a rhetorician and then does injustice with this power and this craft, it is not the one who taught him that one must hate and throw out of the cities.[1] For he handed it on for the use of what is c
just, and the other uses it the opposite way. So it is just to hate and throw out and kill the one who does not use it rightly, but not the one who taught him.

soc. I think, Gorgias, that you too are versed in many arguments, and have caught sight in them of this sort of thing: that people do not easily have the power, having defined for one another whatever they attempt to converse about, and having learned and taught one another, to break off their association in this way; but if they d
dispute about something, and one says the other is not speaking rightly or not clearly, they are harsh and think the other is speaking out of jealousy of them, engaging in rivalry and not seeking what is set before them in the argument. And some in the end part most shamefully, having reviled one another and said and heard such things about themselves that even those present are grieved for their own sakes, that they deemed it worth while to become e
listeners of such human beings. Why, then, do I say this? Because now I think you are saying things not quite following on, or consonant with, what you were first saying about rhetoric. So I am afraid to refute you, lest you take me to be speaking, engaging in rivalry not over the matter,

1. *And then*: *kāita* (*kai eita*), the reading of later manuscripts; the principal manuscripts accent the same letters as *kata*, "according to", which cannot govern the dative that follows.

κοῦντα λέγειν τοῦ καταφανὲς γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ. ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὥνπερ καὶ ἐγώ, ἡδέως ἄν σε διερωτῴην· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐῴην ἄν. ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέως δ' ἂν ἐλεγξάντων εἴ τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, οὐκ ἀηδέστερον μεντἂν ἐλεγχθέντων ἢ ἐλεγξάντων· μεῖζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι, ὅσῳπερ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι τοσοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα ψευδὴς περὶ ὧν τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὤν. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ φῂς τοιοῦτος εἶναι, διαλεγώμεθα· εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἐᾶν, ἐῶμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ διαλύωμεν τὸν λόγον.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ φημὶ μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷον σὺ ὑφηγῇ· ἴσως μέντοι χρὴν ἐννοεῖν καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων. πάλαι γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, ἐγὼ τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδειξάμην, καὶ νῦν ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν, ἢν διαλεγώμεθα. σκοπεῖν οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὸ τούτων, μή τινας αὐτῶν κατέχομεν βουλομένους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν.

ΧΑΙ. Τοῦ μὲν θορύβου, ὦ Γοργία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν βουλομένων ἀκούειν ἐάν τι λέγητε· ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο τοσαύτη ἀσχολία, ὥστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγομένων ἀφεμένῳ προὐργιαίτερόν τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πράττειν.

ΚΑΛ. Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς πολλοῖς ἤδη λόγοις παραγενόμενος οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ πώποτε ἥσθην οὕτως ὥσπερ νυνί· ὥστ' ἔμοιγε, κἂν τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐθέλητε διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε.

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b 4 *φημὶ* B T P: *φῂς* F **b** 5 *χρῆν* B T P F (in marg. ἔδει b t): *χρὴ* al. Olympiodorus **b** 6 *ὑμᾶς* B T P F (sed *ὑ* ex emend. T) **b** 7 *πολλὰ* B T P f: *πολὺ* F *ἀποτενοῦμεν* B T P f: *ἀποστεροῦμεν* F **c** 1 *ἢν* T P F: *μὴν* B (sed *μ* puncto notatum) **c** 2 *κατέχομεν* B P t: *κατέχωμεν* T F **c** 5 δ' *οὖν* B T P F: *γοῦν* Olympiodorus **c** 6 *προὐργιαίτερον*] *προτιμότερον* suprascr. P **c** 7 *γενέσθαι* B T P: *γίνεσθαι* F **d** 3 *οὕτως* B T P f: om. F *νυνί* B T P f: *νῦν* F *ὅλην* B T P: om. F **d** 4 *ἐθέλητε* F: *ἐθέλοιτε* B T P *χαριεῖσθε* T P F: *χαριεῖσθαι* B

so that it may become apparent, but against you. So I, if you too 458
are one of the human beings of whom I am one, would gladly go on questioning you; and if not, I would let it pass. And of whom am I one? Of those who would gladly be refuted if I say anything not true, and would gladly refute if anyone says anything not true, and would not, however, be less glad to be refuted than to refute; for I believe it a greater good, by just as much as it is a greater good for oneself to be rid of the greatest bad thing than to rid another of it. For I think nothing is so great a bad thing for a person as false opinion about the things our argument is in fact about now. b
If, then, you too claim to be such a one, let us converse; but if it is decided that we ought to let it pass, let us let it pass at once, bidding it farewell, and break off the argument.

GORG. Well, I claim, Socrates, that I too am the sort of man you are leading the way to; perhaps, however, we ought to have considered the situation of those present too. For a long while ago, before you all came, I displayed a great deal to those present, and now perhaps we shall stretch things out a long way, if we converse. So we c
ought to look into their situation too, lest we are keeping some of them who want to do something else as well.

CHAER. The uproar, Gorgias and Socrates, you hear yourselves, from these men who want to hear, if you say anything. For me myself, at any rate, may there never come to be so much business that, letting go of such arguments, spoken in such a way, it should become more pressing for me to do something else.

CALL. By the gods, Chaerephon; moreover, I myself too, though d
I have been present at many arguments already, do not know whether I was ever so pleased as now; so that, even if you are willing to converse the whole day, you will gratify me, at any rate.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει, εἴπερ ἐθέλει Γοργίας.

ΓΟΡ. Αἰσχρὸν δὴ τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμέ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλεται. ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοισί, διαλέγου τε καὶ ἐρώτα ὅτι βούλει.

ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δή, ὦ Γοργία, ἃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ· ἴσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνω. ῥητορικὸν φὴς ποιεῖν οἷός τ' εἶναι, ἐάν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μανθάνειν;—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστ' ἐν ὄχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ πείθοντα;—ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.—ΣΩ. Ἔλεγές τοι νυνδὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ.—ΓΟΡ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἔν γε ὄχλῳ.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται.—ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανώτερος γίγνεται;—ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἰατρός γε ὤν· ἦ γάρ;—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἰατρός γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐπιστήμων.—ΓΟΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι.—ΣΩ. Ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ᾖ. τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι;—ΓΟΡ. Τοῦτο ἐνταῦθά γε συμβαίνει.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἁπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική· αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν δέ τινα πειθοῦς ηὑρηκέναι ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων.

ΓΟΡ. Οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥᾳστώνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται,

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d 8 ad *ἐθέλειν* adscripsit *καὶ ταῦτα* f *ἐρωτᾶν . . . βούλεται* secl. Badham **e** 1 *τουτοισί* scr. recc.: *τούτοισι* P: *τούτοισιν* B T: *τούτοις* F **e** 7 *πάντων* B T P f: *παντὸς* f **a** 1 *τοι νυνδὴ* B^2 P: *τοίνυν δὴ* B (ut videtur) T: *τοίνυν νῦν δὴ* F **a** 2 *περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ* secl. Cobet **a** 5 *ἔσται* B T P f: *ἔστιν* F **b** 2 *ὁ* B T F: om. P **b** 7 *καὶ ἡ ῥητορική* secl. Cobet **b** 8 *αὐτὴν*] *αὐτὸν* Beck, Cobet

SOC. But indeed, Callicles, nothing on my part prevents it, if Gorgias is willing.

GORG. It becomes shameful from now on, Socrates, for me of all people not to be willing, when I myself professed that anyone might ask whatever he wants. Well, if these people here think fit, e converse, and ask whatever you want.

SOC. Listen, then, Gorgias, to what I marvel at in the things said by you; for perhaps, while you are speaking rightly, I am not taking it rightly. You claim you are able to make a rhetorician, if anyone wants to learn from you?—GORG. Yes.—SOC. Then about everything, so as to be persuasive in a crowd, not by teaching but by persuading?—GORG. Very much so.—SOC. You were saying just 459 now, you know, that even about what is wholesome the orator will be more persuasive than the doctor.—GORG. Yes, I was actually saying so, in a crowd at any rate.—SOC. Then "in a crowd" is this, among those who do not know? For surely among those who know he will not be more persuasive than the doctor.—GORG. You speak the truth.—SOC. Then if he will be more persuasive than the doctor, he comes to be more persuasive than the one who knows?—GORG. Certainly.—SOC. Not being a doctor, at any rate; is it not so?—GORG. b Yes.—SOC. And the one who is not a doctor is surely not knowledgeable in the things in which the doctor is knowledgeable.—GORG. Plainly.—SOC. Then the one who does not know will be more persuasive than the one who knows, among those who do not know, whenever the orator is more persuasive than the doctor. Is this what results, or something else?—GORG. This results here, at any rate.—SOC. Then the orator and rhetoric stand in the same way with regard to all the other crafts as well: it has no need to know how the matters themselves stand, but to have found some device of c persuasion, so as to appear to those who do not know to know more than those who know.

GORG. Then does not a great ease come about, Socrates,

μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου ᾖ· νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὕτως ἔχων ὁ ῥητορικὸς ὡς περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὧν αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ τί κακόν ἐστιν ἢ τί καλὸν ἢ τί αἰσχρὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, πειθὼ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος ὥστε δοκεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσιν μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος; ἢ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ προεπιστάμενον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν μέλλοντα μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ῥητορικήν; εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς ῥητορικῆς διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον—οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον —ποιήσεις δ' ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐχ οἷός τε ἔσῃ αὐτὸν διδάξαι τὴν ῥητορικήν, ἐὰν μὴ προειδῇ περὶ τούτων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; ἢ πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει, ὦ Γοργία; καὶ πρὸς Διός, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπὲ τίς ποθ' ἡ δύναμίς ἐστιν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐὰν τύχῃ μὴ εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθήσεται.

ΣΩ. Ἔχε δή· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. ἐάνπερ ῥητορικὸν σύ τινα ποιήσῃς, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἤτοι πρότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ.—ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὼς τεκτονικός, ἢ οὔ;—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός;—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τὰ ἰατρικὰ ἰατρικός;

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c 8 *πρὸς λόγου* B T P: *πρὸ λόγου* Olympiodorus: *πρὸς λόγον* F **d** 1 *περὶ* supra versum T: *καὶ περὶ* Olympiodorus **d** 3 *ὡς περὶ* B T P: *ὥσπερ* F **d** 4 *αὐτὰ* B T F: *αὐτὸς* P **e** 3 *εἰ δὲ μὴ σὺ* T P F et in marg. *γρ.* b: *εἰ δὲ σὺ* B **e** 7 *αὐτὸν διδάξαι* re vera B T F: *διδάξαι αὐτὸν* P **a** 4 *μαθήσεται* B T P f: *μαθήσεσθαι* F **a** 6 *εἰδέναι* B T P: *ἔσται εἰδέναι* F **a** 7 *ἤτοι* B T P f: *ἢ* F

for one who has not learned the other crafts, but this one only, to come off no worse than the craftsmen?

SOC. Whether the orator comes off worse than the others or does not come off worse through being so, we shall look into presently, if it is at all to the purpose of our argument; but now let us first look into this: is the rhetorician in fact in the same state about the just d
and the unjust and the shameful and the beautiful and good and bad as about the wholesome and the other things that the other crafts are about, not knowing the things themselves, what is good or what is bad, or what is beautiful or what shameful, or just or unjust, but having devised a persuasion about them so as to seem, not knowing, among those who do not know, to know more than e
the one who knows?[1] Or is it a necessity for him to know, and must the one who is going to learn rhetoric come to you knowing these things beforehand? And if not, will you, the teacher of rhetoric, teach the one who comes none of these things—for that is not your work—but make him seem among the many to know such things when he does not know them, and seem to be good when he is not? Or will you be altogether unable to teach him rhetoric unless he knows the truth about these things beforehand? Or how do such things stand, Gorgias? And, by Zeus, as you said just now, unveil 460
it and say what in the world the power of rhetoric is.

GORG. Well, I think, Socrates, if he in fact does not know, he will learn these things too from me.

SOC. Hold it there; for you speak well. If you make someone a rhetorician, it is a necessity for him to know the just things and the unjust, either beforehand or by learning them afterwards from you.—GORG. Certainly.—SOC. What then? Is the one who b
has learned the things of carpentry a carpenter, or not?—GORG. Yes.—SOC. And the one who has learned the things of music a musician?—GORG. Yes.—SOC. And the one who has learned the things of medicine a medical man?

1. *The shameful and the beautiful*: *to aischron kai to kalon*. *Kalos* is used here for the first time of conduct, where English would say "fine" or "noble"; the rendering stays "beautiful" (see 447a), for the argument with Polus (474d–475a) passes from beautiful bodies to beautiful laws and studies.

καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκὼς ἕκαστα τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεται;— ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος;—ΓΟΡ. Πάντως δήπου.—ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει.—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν;—ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεταί γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὅ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν.—ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη.—ΣΩ. Τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι.—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν.—ΓΟΡ. Οὐ φαίνεταί γε.

ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τοῖς παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐὰν ὁ πύκτης τῇ πυκτικῇ χρῆταί τε καὶ ἀδίκως χρῆται καὶ ἀδικῇ, ὡσαύτως δὲ οὕτως καὶ ἐὰν ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἀδίκως χρῆται, μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδ' ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ τῇ ῥητορικῇ; ἐρρήθη ταῦτα ἢ οὔ;—ΓΟΡ. Ἐρρήθη.—ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ὁ ῥητορικός, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀδικήσας. ἢ οὔ;—ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται.—ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὦ Γοργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ λόγους εἴη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου· ἦ γάρ;—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ τοίνυν σου τότε ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον ὡς οὐδέποτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄδικον πρᾶγμα, ὅ γ' ἀεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἔλεγες ὅτι ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ κἂν ἀδίκως χρῷτο, οὕτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἡγησάμενος οὐ συνᾴδειν τὰ λεγόμενα ἐκείνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους,

b 8 Ὁ δὲ . . . Ναί. secl. Deuschle (et mox **c** 4 Τὸν δὲ . . . **c** 5 Ναί) **c** 1 Οὐκοῦν . . . **c** 2 Φαίνεταί γε secl. Schanz (sed legit Quintilianus) ῥητορικὸν . . . δὲ secl. Hirschig **c** 2 ἀεὶ ante *βούλεσθαι* add. Hirschig, post *βούλεσθαι* add. Thompson **c** 3 οὐδέποτε . . . **c** 6 φαίνεταί γε fort. non legit Quintilianus (ii. 15. 27) **c** 4 τοῦ B T P: τοῦ σοῦ F **d** 2 supra πυκτικῇ add. καλῶς rec. f καὶ ἀδίκως χρῆται F: om. B T P **e** 1 ὁ ῥητορικός secl. Cobet **e** 6 ἡ ῥητορικὴ B T P: ῥητορικὴ F **e** 7 ὅ γ' B T P: εἴ γ' F

And the rest thus, by the same account: the one who has learned each thing is such as the knowledge of it produces each one?—GORG. Certainly.—SOC. Then by this account the one who has learned the just things is just too?—GORG. Surely, in every way.—SOC. And the just man does just things, I take it.—GORG. Yes.—SOC. Then it is a necessity that the rhetorician be just, and that the just c
man want to do just things?—GORG. So it appears, at any rate.—SOC. Then the just man, at any rate, will never want to do injustice.—GORG. It is a necessity.—SOC. And by the argument it is a necessity that the rhetorician be just.—GORG. Yes.—SOC. Then the rhetorician will never want to do injustice.—GORG. It does not appear so, at any rate.[1]

SOC. Do you remember, then, saying a little earlier that one must not accuse the trainers or throw them out of the cities if the boxer d
uses his boxing, and uses it unjustly, and does injustice; and in the same way thus, if the orator too uses rhetoric unjustly, one must not accuse the one who taught him or drive him out of the city, but the one who does injustice and does not use rhetoric rightly? Was this said or not?[2]—GORG. It was said.—SOC. But now this same e
man, the rhetorician, appears as one who would never do injustice. Or not?—GORG. So it appears.—SOC. And in our first arguments, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric was about speeches, not those of the even and the odd, but those of the just and the unjust. Is it not so?—GORG. Yes.—SOC. I, then, when you were saying this at that time, took it that rhetoric could never be an unjust thing, since it always makes its speeches about justice; but when a little later you were saying that the orator might even use rhetoric unjustly, I, so 461
marvelling, and believing that the things said did not sing together, spoke those speeches,

1. The inference rests on the analogy of the crafts (460b): as one who has learned carpentry is a carpenter, one who has learned just things is just. It is commonly read as the thesis that knowledge of justice makes a man just. Polus will say that shame made Gorgias grant that the rhetorician knows just things and would teach them (461b–c), the admission of 460a.

2. *And uses it unjustly*: words found only in F; Burnet prints them.

ὅτι εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἡγοῖο εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι ὥσπερ ἐγώ, ἄξιον εἴη διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν χαίρειν. ὕστερον δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπισκοπουμένων ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι αὖ ὁμολογεῖται τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδίκως χρῆσθαι τῇ ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν. ταῦτα οὖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει, μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὦ Γοργία, οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας ἐστὶν ὥστε ἱκανῶς διασκέψασθαι.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δοξάζεις ὥσπερ νῦν λέγεις; ἢ οἴει—ὅτι Γοργίας ᾐσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογῆσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρ' αὐτόν, αὐτὸς διδάξειν, ἔπειτα ἐκ ταύτης ἴσως τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐναντίον τι συνέβη ἐν τοῖς λόγοις—τοῦτο ⟨ὃ⟩ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήματα—ἐπεὶ τίνα οἴει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους διδάξειν;—ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλὴ ἀγροικία ἐστὶν τοὺς λόγους.

ΣΩ. Ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε, ἀλλά τοι ἐξεπίτηδες κτώμεθα ἑταίρους καὶ υἱεῖς, ἵνα ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορθῶτε ἡμῶν τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις. καὶ νῦν εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα, σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθου—δίκαιος δ' εἶ—καὶ ἐγὼ ἐθέλω τῶν ὡμολογημένων εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὡμολογῆσθαι, ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ, ἐάν μοι ἓν μόνον φυλάττῃς.

ΠΩΛ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τὴν μακρολογίαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἣν καθέρξῃς, ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας χρῆσθαι.

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a 5 *αὖ* B T P: *πάλιν αὖ* F **b** 4 *ἢ* F: *ἦ* B T: *καὶ* W **c** 1 *ὃ* add. f: om. B T P F **c** 2 *ἀπαρνήσεσθαι* B T: *ἀπαρνήσασθαι* P F **c** 3 *εἰς τὰ* B T P: *εἴ γε* F (σ supra *εἴ* f) **c** 4 *τοὺς λόγους* secl. Cobet **c** 6 *ἑταίρους καὶ υἱεῖς* F t: *ἑτέρους υἱεῖς* B T W: *ἑταίρους* Schanz *γενόμενοι* F: *γιγνόμενοι* B T P **c** 7 *ἐπανορθῶτε* F: *ἐπανορθοῖτε* B T P **d** 2 *ἐγὼ* B T et re vera W: *ἐγώ σοι* F *εἰ . . . ὡμολογῆσθαι* secl. Cobet **d** 6 *καθέρξῃς* B T P Olympiodorus: *καθέξῃς* F

that if you believed being refuted a gain, as I do, it would be worth conversing, and if not, to let it pass, bidding farewell. But later, as we were looking into it, you see yourself too that it is agreed, again, that it is impossible for the rhetorician to use rhetoric unjustly and to be willing to do injustice. How in the world these things stand, then, by the dog, Gorgias, it takes no little association to look thor- b
oughly into them sufficiently.[1]

POL. What, Socrates? Do you too hold such an opinion about rhetoric as you now state? Or do you think—because Gorgias was ashamed not to concede to you further that the rhetorician knows the just things and the beautiful and the good, and that if someone came to him without knowing these things, he would teach him himself, and then from this agreement perhaps something contrary resulted in the arguments—the very thing which you cherish, c
having yourself led on to such questions—for who do you think will deny that he himself too knows the just things and will teach others?—but to lead the arguments to such things is great boorishness.[2]

SOC. Most beautiful Polus, but it is on purpose, you know, that we acquire companions and sons, so that when we ourselves, having grown older, stumble, you younger men, being present, may set our life upright, both in deeds and in speeches. And now, if I and Gorgias are stumbling at all in the arguments, you, being d
present, set us upright—it is just that you should—and I am willing, if you think anything of what has been agreed has not been agreed well, to take back whatever you want, if you will guard one thing only for me.[3]

POL. What do you mean by this?

SOC. The long-speech, Polus, if you will keep it shut in, which you attempted to use at first.

1. *By the dog*: Socrates' own oath (compare *Apology* 22a); he swears it again at 466c, and at 482b names the dog "the god of the Egyptians".

2. *The very thing which you cherish*: Polus' sentence breaks off and starts again, as Burnet's dashes show, and the English keeps the breaks. "Which" is Burnet's supplement *ho*, from the later hand in F (f); B, T, P and F lack it.

3. *Take back*: *anathesthai*, to take back a move, as in draughts; compare *Hipparchus* 229e, "as if playing draughts, I am willing to take back for you in the arguments whatever you want of what has been said".

ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ; οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὁπόσα ἂν βούλωμαι;

ΣΩ. Δεινὰ μεντἂν πάθοις, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχήσαις. ἀλλὰ ἀντίθες τοι· σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεινὰ ἂν αὖ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι, εἰ μὴ ἐξέσται μοι ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου; ἀλλ' εἴ τι κήδῃ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν βούλει, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ἀναθέμενος ὅτι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου. φῂς γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ ἐπίστασθαι ἅπερ Γοργίας· ἢ οὔ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν ἑκάστοτε ὅτι ἄν τις βούληται, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει, ἐρώτα ἢ ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῂς εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Ἆρα ἐρωτᾷς ἥντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδεμία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τἀληθῆ εἰρῆσθαι.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Πρᾶγμα ὃ φῂς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι ὃ ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἀνέγνων.

ΠΩΛ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;

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a 4 τε post ἔλεγχε om. P **b** 6 εἶναι om. P **b** 8 γε B T f: om. F **b** 9 εἰρῆσθαι B T P f: δοκεῖ εἰρῆσθαι F **b** 11 σὺ φῂς P

POL. What? Shall I not be allowed to say as much as I want?

SOC. You would suffer dreadful things indeed, most excellent e
man, if, when you had come to Athens, where in all Greece there is the most licence of speaking, you then, alone, should fail to get it here. But set this against it, you know: when you speak at length and are not willing to answer what is asked, would I not, again, suffer dreadful things, if I shall not be allowed to go away and not 462
listen to you? But if you care at all for the argument that has been stated and want to set it upright, as I was saying just now, taking back whatever you think fit, asking and being asked in turn, as Gorgias and I did, refute and be refuted. For you claim, surely, that you too know the things Gorgias knows; or not?

POL. I do.

SOC. Then do you too tell people to ask you each time whatever anyone wants, as knowing how to answer?

POL. Very much so.

SOC. And now, then, do whichever of these you want: ask or an- b
swer.

POL. Well, I will do so. And answer me, Socrates: since you think Gorgias is at a loss about rhetoric, what do you claim it is?

SOC. Are you asking what craft I claim it is?

POL. I am.

SOC. None, I think, Polus, to speak the truth, to you at any rate.

POL. Well, what do you think rhetoric is?

SOC. A thing which you claim made craft, in the written work which I read recently.[1] c

POL. What do you mean by this?

SOC. A certain routine, I say.

POL. Then you think rhetoric is a routine?

1. *Made craft*: Aristotle reports Polus as saying that "routine made craft, ... but lack of routine, chance" (*Metaphysics* 1.1, 981a3–5); compare Polus' speech at 448c. Socrates' answer, "routine", takes Polus' own word.

ΣΩ. Ἔμοιγε, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.

ΠΩΛ. Τίνος ἐμπειρία;

ΣΩ. Χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν καλόν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἀνθρώποις;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; ἤδη πέπυσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ ὅτι φημὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς εἰ οὐ καλή μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ πέπυσμαι ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῂς εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾷς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρόν τί μοι χαρίσασθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὀψοποιία ἥτις μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ δή, τίς τέχνη ὀψοποιία;—ΣΩ. Οὐδεμία, ὦ Πῶλε.—ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι.—ΣΩ. Φημὶ δή, ἐμπειρία τις.—ΠΩΛ. Τίς; φάθι.—ΣΩ. Φημὶ δή, χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας, ὦ Πῶλε.

ΠΩΛ. Ταὐτὸν ἄρ' ἐστὶν ὀψοποιία καὶ ῥητορική;

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσεως μόριον.

ΠΩΛ. Τίνος λέγεις ταύτης;

ΣΩ. Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ᾖ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν· ὀκνῶ γὰρ Γοργίου ἕνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἴηταί με διακωμῳδεῖν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἣν Γοργίας ἐπιτηδεύει, οὐκ οἶδα—καὶ γὰρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ἐγένετο τί ποτε οὗτος ἡγεῖται—ὃ δ' ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, πράγματός τινός ἐστι μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν.

ΓΟΡ. Τίνος, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰπέ· μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθῇς.

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c 10 δέ B T P: δή F **d** 1 εἰ P F et suprascr. B²: ἦ B: ᾖ T **d** 8 ἥτις F: εἴ τις B T W τέχνη εἶναι B T P: εἶναι τέχνη F **d** 11 τίς B T P F: τίνος in marg. f **e** 2 ἆρ' F: ἄρα Olympiodorus: δ' B T P **e** 6 γὰρ W: om. B T F **a** 5 αἰσχυνθῇς B (sed supra η ead. m. ει): αἰσχυνθῆς T P F: αἰσχυνθείς scr. recc.

SOC. I do, unless you say something else.

POL. A routine of what?

SOC. Of the production of a certain gratification and pleasure.[1]

POL. Then do you not think rhetoric a beautiful thing, to be able to gratify human beings?

SOC. What, Polus? Have you already found out from me what I claim it is, so that you ask what comes after this, whether I do not d
think it beautiful?

POL. Why, have I not found out that you claim it is a certain routine?

SOC. Do you want, then, since you honour gratifying, to gratify me in some small thing?

POL. I do.

SOC. Ask me now what craft I think cookery is.

POL. I ask, then: what craft is cookery?—SOC. None, Polus.—POL. Well, what? Say.—SOC. I say, then: a certain routine.—POL. Which? Say.—SOC. I say, then: of the production of gratification and plea- e
sure, Polus.

POL. Then cookery and rhetoric are the same?

SOC. By no means; but a part of the same pursuit.[2]

POL. Which do you mean?

SOC. It may be rather boorish to speak the truth; for I hesitate to say it for Gorgias' sake, lest he think I am making a comedy of his own pursuit. As for me, whether this is the rhetoric that Gorgias makes his pursuit, I do not know—for actually from the argument 463
just now nothing became apparent to us of what in the world he believes—but what I call rhetoric is a part of a certain thing that is not one of the beautiful things.

GORG. Of what, Socrates? Say; do not be ashamed before me at all.

1. *Gratification*: *charis*, the noun to *charizesthai*, "gratify", which Polus takes up in the next line and Socrates turns back on him (462d); the English keeps one stem for both, so that the play shows.

2. *Pursuit*: *epitēdeusis*, and *epitēdeuma* at 462e and 463a, what one makes one's business; since Socrates divides it into parts (463b), the English has "pursuit" here, not "way of life", as this series' *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* have it.

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναί τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὔ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν. ταύτης μοι δοκεῖ τῆς ἐπι- b τηδεύσεως πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι, ἓν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὀψοποική· ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή. ταύτης μόριον καὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τήν γε κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν 5 σοφιστικήν, τέτταρα ταῦτα μόρια ἐπὶ τέτταρσιν πράγμασιν. εἰ οὖν βούλεται Πῶλος πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθανέσθω· οὐ γάρ πω πέπυσται ὁποῖόν φημι ἐγὼ τῆς κολακείας μόριον εἶναι c τὴν ῥητορικήν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν λέληθα οὔπω ἀποκεκριμένος, ὁ δὲ ἐπανερωτᾷ εἰ οὐ καλὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅτι ἐστίν. 5 οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ὦ Πῶλε· ἀλλ' εἴπερ βούλει πυθέσθαι, ἐρώτα ὁποῖον μόριον τῆς κολακείας φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ δή, καὶ ἀπόκριναι ὁποῖον μόριον.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκριναμένου; ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ d ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον.

ΠΩΛ. Τί οὖν; καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Αἰσχρὸν ἔγωγε—τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλῶ—ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς ἤδη εἰδότι ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω. 5

ΓΟΡ. Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς συνίημι ὅτι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Εἰκότως γε, ὦ Γοργία· οὐδὲν γάρ πω σαφὲς λέγω, e Πῶλος δὲ ὅδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς.

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a 6 *τι* B T P F: om. Aristides (sed habent Proll. in Aristidem) **a** 8 *αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ* B T P Aristides: *ἐγὼ αὐτοῦ* F **b** 2 *ἡ* B T P F: om. Aristides **c** 2 *οὔπω* F Aristides et suprascr. b: *οὔτω* B T P **c** 4 *εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν* B T P: *εἴτε αἰσχρὸν εἴτε καλὸν* F Aristides **c** 5 *ὅτι ἐστίν* B T P F: *ὅ ἐστιν* Aristides **c** 6 *πυθέσθαι* B T P F: *πυνθάνεσθαι* Aristides **c** 8 *καὶ . . . μόριον* secl. Cobet (legit Aristides) *μοι* post *ἀπόκριναί* add. Aristides **d** 5 *ἐγὼ* B T P F: om. Aristides **d** 6 *ἐγὼ* B T P F: *ἔγωγε* Aristides

SOC. Well then, Gorgias, I think there is a certain pursuit, not masterly, but of a soul good at aiming, and courageous, and formidable by nature at consorting with human beings; and I call b
the sum of it flattery.[1] Of this pursuit I think there are many other parts too, and one is cookery too; which seems to be a craft, but, as my account goes, is not a craft but routine and knack. A part of it I call rhetoric too, and cosmetics, and sophistry: these four parts, over four things. If, then, Polus wants to inquire, let him inquire; for he has not yet found out what sort of part of flattery I claim rhetoric c
is, but it has escaped his notice that I have not yet answered, and he asks further whether I do not believe it beautiful. But I shall not answer him whether I believe rhetoric beautiful or shameful before I first answer what it is. For that is not just, Polus; but if you want to find out, ask what sort of part of flattery I claim rhetoric is.

POL. I ask, then; and answer what sort of part.

SOC. Would you understand, then, if I answered? For rhetoric, d
by my account, is an image of a part of politics.[2]

POL. What then? Do you say it is beautiful or shameful?

SOC. Shameful, I say—for I call bad things shameful—since I must answer you as if you already knew what I mean.

GORG. By Zeus, Socrates, but I myself do not comprehend what you mean either.

SOC. As is likely, Gorgias; for I am saying nothing clear yet; but e
Polus here is young and keen.[3]

1. *Flattery*: *kolakeia*, the way of the *kolax*, the hanger-on who pleases a rich man for a place at his table, a stock figure of comedy (Eupolis wrote a *Flatterers*).

2. *Politics*: *politikē*, the craft that has the city (*polis*) in its charge; at 464b Socrates divides it into legislation and justice.

3. *Young and keen*: Polus' name means "colt", and others made the jest: Aristotle reports a gibe at Polus by one Herodicus (he does not say which), "you are always a colt" (*Rhetoric* 2.23.29, 1400b20). It is an interpretation that Socrates' words play on it.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ' εἰπὲ πῶς λέγεις πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὅ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἡ ῥητορική· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὂν τοῦτο, Πῶλος ὅδε ἐλέγξει. σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχήν;—ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; —ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἴει τινὰ εἶναι ἑκατέρου εὐεξίαν;—ΓΟΡ. Ἔγωγε.—ΣΩ. Τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὖσαν δ' οὔ; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, οὓς οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως αἴσθοιτό τις ὅτι οὐκ εὖ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ ἰατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις.—ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.—ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὃ ποιεῖ μὲν δοκεῖν εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον.—ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω. δυοῖν ὄντοιν τοῖν πραγμάτοιν δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὔσης τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικήν, τὴν δὲ ἰατρικήν· τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς τὴν νομοθετικήν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὴν δικαιοσύνην. ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὖσαι, ἑκάτεραι τούτων, ἥ τε ἰατρικὴ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ· ὅμως δὲ διαφέρουσίν τι ἀλλήλων. τεττάρων δὴ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχήν, ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη

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e 6 ἡ T P F Aristides: om. B τυγχάνει T P Aristides: τυγχάνῃ B F **a** 6 ἀλλ' ἢ Aristides: ἄλλος ἢ B T P F ἰατρός B T P Aristides: ὁ ἰατρός F **a** 8 ὃ F Aristides: ὅτι B T P **b** 2 ἐπιδείξω B T P Aristides: ἐπιδείξαι F **b** 3 ὄντοιν τοῖν πραγμάτοιν B T P: ὄντοιν πραγμάτοιν F: ὄντων τῶν πραγμάτων Aristides τὴν μὲν B T P: καὶ τὴν μὲν F: τὴν μὲν οὖν Aristides **b** 4 τῇ ψυχῇ B T² P F Aristides: τὴν ψυχὴν T σώματι B T P: τῷ σώματι F Aristides **b** 7 ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς B T P F: ἀντίστροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ Aristides **b** 8 δικαιοσύνην B T P Aristides Olympiodorus: δικαστικὴν F et Proll. ad Aristidem **c** 2 δικαιοσύνη B T P Aristides: δικαστικὴ F **c** 4 δὴ B T P F: δὲ Aristides Olympiodorus **c** 5 αἰσθομένη F Aristides: αἰσθανομένη B T P

GORG. Well, let him pass; but say to me how you mean that rhetoric is an image of a part of politics.

SOC. Well, I shall try to declare what rhetoric appears to me to be, at any rate; and if it is not in fact this, Polus here will refute me. 464
You call something body, I take it, and soul?—GORG. How could I not?—SOC. Then do you think there is also a certain good condition of each of these?—GORG. I do.—SOC. What? One that seems good condition, but is not? I mean something like this: many seem to be in good condition in their bodies, whom no one would easily perceive not to be in good condition, except a doctor and one of those skilled in gymnastics.[1]—GORG. You speak the truth.—SOC. I say that such a thing exists both in body and in soul, which makes the body and the soul seem to be in good condition, though they b
are no more so.—GORG. It is so.

SOC. Come, then, let me display to you more clearly, if I have the power, what I mean. The things being two, I speak of two crafts. The one over the soul I call politics; the one over the body I do not have the means to name for you thus as one, but, the tending of the body being one, I speak of two parts of it, the one gymnastics, the other medicine; and of politics, in place of gymnastics, legislation, and as counterpart to medicine, justice.[2] They are partners with c
each other, then, each pair of them, since they are about the same thing, medicine with gymnastics and justice with legislation; yet they differ somewhat from each other. These being four, then, and always tending, the one pair the body, the other the soul, with a view to the best, flattery, having perceived it

1. *Those skilled in gymnastics*: *gymnastikoi*; "trainer" in this edition is the *paidotribēs* (452a–b, 452e, 456e, 460d).
2. *Justice*: Burnet prints *dikaiosynē* here, at 464c2 and at 465c3, with B T P and Aristides (and, here, Olympiodorus); F has *dikastikē*, "the judicial craft", at all three places, and so have the *Prolegomena* to Aristides here.

—οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη—τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδυ, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου οὐδὲν φροντίζει, d
τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστου ἀξία εἶναι. ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἡ ὀψοποικὴ ὑποδέδυκεν, καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ βέλτιστα σιτία τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστ' εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι 5
ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ ἰατρόν, ἢ ἐν ἀνδράσιν οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, πότερος ἐπαΐει περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἢ ὁ ὀψοποιός, λιμῷ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν e
ἰατρόν. κολακείαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρόν φημι εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὦ Πῶλε—τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ λέγω—ὅτι 465
τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου· τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὔ φημι εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ᾧ προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει ὁποῖ' ἄττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ 5
καλῶ ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα· τούτων δὲ πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς, ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον.

Τῇ μὲν οὖν ἰατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἡ ὀψοποικὴ κολακεία b
ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γυμναστικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἡ κομμωτική, κακοῦργός τε καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεννὴς καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασιν καὶ χρώμασιν καὶ λειότητι καὶ ἐσθῆσιν ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλότριον κάλλος ἐφελκομένους τοῦ 5
οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν. ἵν' οὖν μὴ μακρολογῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι—ἤδη γὰρ

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d 1 *ὅπερ* P Aristides et suprascr. rec. b: *ὅπου* B T F: *ὑπὸ ὃ* Schanz (*ὅπερ ὑπέδυ* om. Sauppe) **d** 2 *ἀεὶ* B T P F: om. Aristides *θηρεύεται* B T P F: *θηρεύει* Aristides **d** 3 δοκεῖ B T P (sed *ν* add. B²): δοκεῖν F Aristides (qui mox *ἀξίαν*) **a** 1 *εἶναι* post Πῶλε transp. F **a** 2 *αὐτὴν* B T P f Aristides Olympiodorus: *αὐτοῦ* F **a** 4 *ᾧ προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει* B T P F Philodemus: *ᾧ προσφέρει* Aristides: *ὧν προσφέρει* Cornarius **b** 1 *ὀψοποικὴ* B T P: *ὀψοποιητικὴ* F **b** 2 *τοῦτον* T P F: *τούτων* B: om. Aristides **b** 3 *τε* B T P F Aristides Olympiodorus (sed *οὖσα* in marg. add. f) **b** 4 *λειότητι* B T P F Aristides: *λειότησι* scr. recc. *ἐσθῆσι* F (*ν* add. f): *ἐσθῆτι* Aristides: *αἰσθήσει* B T P: *ἐσθήσει* Coraes **b** 5 *ἐφελκομένους* B T P F: *ἐφελκομένη* Aristides *τοῦ . . . γυμναστικῆς* secl. Cobet (habet Aristides)

—not knowing, I mean, but by aiming—having divided itself into four, having slipped in under each of the parts, pretends to be that d
which it slipped in under; and it takes no thought for the best, but with what is ever most pleasant it hunts senselessness and deceives it, so that it seems to be worth the most.[1] Under medicine, then, cookery has slipped in, and pretends to know the best foods for the body; so that if a cook and a doctor should need to contend among children, or among men as senseless as children, over which of the two is expert about decent foods and base, the doctor or the cook, e
the doctor would die of hunger.[2] I call it flattery, then, and I claim that such a thing is shameful, Polus—for this I say to you—because 465
it aims at the pleasant without the best; and I claim it is not a craft but a routine, because it has no account by which it applies the things it applies, of what sort they are in their nature, so that it does not have the means to say the cause of each.[3] And I do not call a craft whatever is a thing without account; and if you dispute about these things, I am willing to submit an account.

Under medicine, then, as I say, the flattery that is cookery lies; b
and under gymnastics, in this same way, cosmetics, mischievous and deceitful and ignoble and servile, deceiving by shapes and colours and smoothness and clothes, so as to make people, drawing to themselves an alien beauty, be heedless of their own, the one that comes through gymnastics.[4] So that I may not make a long-speech, then, I am willing to say to you as the geometers do—for by now

1. *By aiming*: *stochazesthai*, to aim at a mark, and so to guess; the English keeps "aim" here, at 463a ("good at aiming") and at 465a.

2. Socrates returns to the image at 521e, of himself on trial: "I shall be tried as a doctor would be tried among little children, with a cook accusing him".

3. *By which it applies*: the Greek *hōi* can also be taken as "to whom", as at 501a, where medicine "has looked into the nature of that which it tends": "no account of the one to whom it applies the things it applies, of what sort they are in their nature".

4. *Clothes*: *esthēsin*, F's reading (its later hand adding the final *n*); B T P have *aisthēsei*, "sensation", and Aristides "clothing" in the singular.

ἂν ἴσως ἀκολουθήσαις—ὅτι ὦ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικήν, c
τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικήν, καὶ ὅτι ὦ ὀψοποικὴ πρὸς
ἰατρικήν, τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην. ὅπερ μέντοι
λέγω, διέστηκε μὲν οὕτω φύσει, ἅτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύρονται
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ 5
ἔχουσιν ὅτι χρήσονται οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι
ἄνθρωποι τούτοις. καὶ γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι
ἐπεστάτει, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖτο d
καὶ διεκρίνετο ἥ τε ὀψοποικὴ καὶ ἡ ἰατρική, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ
σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθμώμενον ταῖς χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὑτό, τὸ τοῦ
Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ἦν, ὦ φίλε Πῶλε—σὺ γὰρ τούτων
ἔμπειρος—ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, 5
ἀκρίτων ὄντων τῶν τε ἰατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ὀψοποικῶν.
ὦ μὲν οὖν ἐγώ φημι τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκήκοας· ἀντί-
στροφον ὀψοποιίας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι. ἴσως e
μὲν οὖν ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἐῶν μακροὺς λόγους
λέγειν αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα. ἄξιον μὲν οὖν
ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστίν· λέγοντος γάρ μου βραχέα οὐκ
ἐμάνθανες, οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἦν σοι ἀπεκρινάμην 5
οὐδὲν οἷός τ' ἦσθα, ἀλλ' ἐδέου διηγήσεως. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν καὶ
ἐγὼ σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου μὴ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι, ἀπότεινε 466
καὶ σὺ λόγον, ἐὰν δὲ ἔχω, ἔα με χρῆσθαι· δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ
νῦν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἴ τι ἔχεις χρῆσθαι, χρῶ.

ΠΩΛ. Τί οὖν φῄς; κολακεία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ
ῥητορική; 5

ΣΩ. Κολακείας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μόριον. ἀλλ'

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c 1 *ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* ita F Aristides: ante haec verba add. *ὅτι ὦ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικήν, τοῦτο ὀψοποϊκὴ πρὸς ἰατρικήν· μᾶλλον* δὲ *ὧδε* B T P (secluserat Thompson: ego delevi) **c** 3 *δικαιοσύνην* B T P Aristides: *δικαστικήν* F **c** 4 *διέστηκε μὲν* F: *διέστηκεν* B T P **c** 6 *χρήσονται* B P F: *χρήσωνται* T **d** 2 *ὀψοποιητικὴ* F **d** 5 *ἐφύρετο* F: *ἐφέρετο* B T W *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ* secl. Hirschig **d** 6 *ὑγιεινῶν καὶ* secl. Dobree *ὀψοποιητικῶν* F **e** 1 *ψυχῇ* B T P: *τῇ ψυχῇ* F **e** 3 *λόγον* B T P f: om. F **e** 4 *ἐμοὶ* B T P f: *μοι* F **a** 1 *ἀποκρινομένου* B T P: *ἀπολογουμένου* F *χρήσωμαι* B T P: *χρήσομαι* F t **a** 3 *χρῆσθαι* B T P: *χρήσασθαι* F

perhaps you could keep up—that what cosmetics is to gymnastics, c
sophistry is to legislation, and that what cookery is to medicine,
rhetoric is to justice.[1] However, as I say, they are thus distinct by
nature; but since they are near, sophists and orators are mixed up
in the same place and about the same things, and neither do they
themselves have any use to make of themselves, nor other human
beings of them. For actually, if the soul did not preside over the d
body, but the body over itself, and if cookery and medicine were
not contemplated and distinguished by the soul, but the body itself
judged, measuring by the gratifications that come to it, Anaxago-
ras' saying would be rife, my friend Polus—for you are versed in
these things—all things would be mixed up together in the same
place, the things of medicine and the wholesome and the things
of cookery being undistinguished.[2] What I claim rhetoric is, then,
you have heard: the counterpart of cookery in the soul, as that is in e
the body.[3] Perhaps, then, I have done an outlandish thing, in not
letting you speak long speeches while I myself have stretched out
a lengthy speech. Yet it is worth while to pardon me; for when I
was speaking briefly, you were not understanding, nor were you
able to make any use at all of the answer I answered you, but you
needed a narration.[4] If, then, I too, when you answer, have no use 466
to make of it, stretch out a speech yourself too; but if I have, let me
use it; for that is just. And now, if you have the means to make any
use of this answer, use it.

POL. What then do you claim? Do you think rhetoric is flattery?

SOC. A part of flattery, rather, is what I said. But

1. *As the geometers do*: in the form of a proportion, A is to B as C is to D. Before "that", B T P add "that what cosmetics is to gymnastics, cookery is to medicine; or rather, thus"; Thompson bracketed the words, and Burnet removes them (*ego delevi*, "I have deleted"), with F and Aristides, who lack them.

2. *All things together* (*homou panta chrēmata*): the first words of Anaxagoras' book, "all things were together" (*homou chrēmata panta ēn*, fr. B1, from Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 155.26), of the mixture before Mind separated it. *Versed*: *empeiros*, the adjective of *empeiria*, "routine"; it may be chosen to tease Polus.

3. *Counterpart*: *antistrophos*. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* opens, "Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic" (1.1, 1354a1), commonly read as an answer to this passage.

4. *Narration*: *diēgēsis*, the handbooks' name for the part of a speech that sets out the facts (*Phaedrus* 266e).

οὐ μνημονεύεις τηλικοῦτος ὤν, ὦ Πῶλε; τί τάχα δράσεις;

ΠΩΛ. Ἆρ' οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες;

ΣΩ. Ἐρώτημα τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέγεις;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν;

ΣΩ. Οὔκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαί γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγω γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεινύασίν τε ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;

ΣΩ. Νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐφ' ἑκάστου ὧν λέγεις πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ γνώμην σαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνῃ, ἢ ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾷς.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε σὲ ἐρωτῶ.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν, ὦ φίλε· ἔπειτα δύο ἅμα με ἐρωτᾷς;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δύο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες· "Ἦ οὐχὶ ἀποκτεινύασιν οἱ ῥήτορες οὓς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;"

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

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a 8 ad δράσεις adscripsit in B manus saec. xvi non antiquior λείπει (sic) *πρεσβύτης γενόμενος*, quod ortum est ex interpretatione verborum *τηλικοῦτος* et *τάχα* quae in W ita legitur *νέος ὢν πρεσβύτης γενόμενος* **b** 6 γε B T P: om. F **b** 8 μὴν scripsi: μὴν δὴ B T P F: μὲν δὴ Heindorf **c** 7 εἶεν T P F b: εἰ ἓν B ἔπειτα T P F: ἐπεὶ τὰ B **c** 9 Ἦ οὐχὶ scripsi: εἰ οὐχὶ F: εἰ ὅτι B T W: ὅτι P

do you not remember, at your age, Polus? What will you do by and by?[1]

POL. Then do you think that the good orators are held paltry in the cities, as flatterers?

SOC. Are you asking this as a question, or speaking the beginning of some speech? b

POL. I am asking.

SOC. I think they are not held at all.[2]

POL. How, not held? Do they not have the greatest power in the cities?

SOC. No, if at any rate you mean that having power is something good for the one who has power.

POL. But indeed I do mean it.

SOC. Then I think the orators have the least power of those in the city.

POL. What? Do they not, like the tyrants, put to death whomever they want, and take away money and throw out of the cities whomever they think fit?[3] c

SOC. By the dog, I am, however, in doubt, Polus, over each thing you say, whether you are saying these things yourself and setting forth a judgement of your own, or asking me.

POL. But I am asking you.

SOC. Very well, my friend; so you are asking me two things at once?

POL. How two?

SOC. Were you not saying just now something like this: "Do the orators not put to death whomever they want, like the tyrants, and take away money and drive out of the cities whomever they think fit?"[4] d

POL. I was.

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1. *At your age*: Polus is young (463e), and a young man's memory should be at its best. An old explanation, found in W, glosses the words "being young ... when you have grown old"; from it a sixteenth-century hand in B writes beside them, "'when you have grown old' is understood".

2. *Not held at all*: *nomizesthai*, "be held" (in some regard), used alone means "be held in esteem" (LSJ, citing this place); Socrates drops Polus' "paltry".

3. *Whomever they want ... whomever they think fit*: Polus uses the two phrases as one; Socrates will part them (466d–467b), and the English keeps "want" (*boulesthai*) and "think fit" (*ha dokei autois*) apart throughout.

4. *Do ... not*: Burnet's own reading (*scripsi*), *Ē ouchi*, which makes Polus' words a direct question, quoted; the manuscripts have *ei ouchi*, "whether ... not" (F), which would make the question reported, or *ei hoti* (B T W) and *hoti* (P).

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν σοι ὅτι δύο ταῦτ' ἐστιν τὰ ἐρωτήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι;

ΣΩ. Οὔχ, ὥς γέ φησιν Πῶλος.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγὼ οὔ φημι; φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Μὰ τὸν—οὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἔφης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.

ΠΩΛ. Φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἴει εἶναι, ἐάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς σὺ μέγα δύνασθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τέχνην τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας; εἰ δέ με ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο κεκτήσονται, ἡ δὲ δύναμίς ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ φῂς, ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνευ νοῦ ἃ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν εἶναι· ἢ οὔ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πώλου ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;

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d 5 *τὰ* B T W F Stobaeus: om. al. **e** 2 *βέλτιστον εἶναι* secl. Cobet **e** 4 *πῶλος* B T P F: *ὁ πῶλος* Stobaeus **e** 6 *μὰ τὸν* B T P F: *μὰ τὸν κύνα* Stobaeus *ἔφης* B T P F Stobaeus: *φῂς* Baiter **e** 9 *ἃ ἂν* B T² P F Stobaeus: *ἃ* T **e** 10 *βέλτιστα εἶναι* secl. Cobet *εἶναι* om. P **e** 11 *σὺ* F Stobaeus: om. B T P **e** 13 *ἀποδείξεις . . .* **a** 1 *ἐξελέγξας* B T F Stobaeus: *ἀποδείξεις . . . ἐλέγξας* P: *ἀποδείξας . . . ἐξελέγξεις* Hirschig **a** 1 *τὴν ῥητορικὴν* secl. Cobet (habet Stobaeus) **a** 3 *τοῦτο* B T P F Stobaeus: *τούτω* fecit rec. b **a** 4 *ἡ δὲ* B T P F: *εἰ δὲ* Stobaeus: *εἰ δὴ* Heindorf

SOC. Then I say to you that these questions are two, and I shall indeed answer you as to both. For I claim, Polus, that both the orators and the tyrants have the smallest power in the cities, as I was saying just now; for they do nothing of what they want, so to speak; e they do, however, whatever they think best.

POL. Then is this not having great power?

SOC. No, as Polus claims, at any rate.

POL. I do not claim it? On the contrary, I do claim it.

SOC. By the—no, not you, since you claimed that having great power is good for the one who has power.[1]

POL. Yes, I do claim it.

SOC. Do you think it good, then, if someone does what he thinks best without having sense? And do you call this having great power?

POL. Not I.

SOC. Then will you demonstrate that the orators have sense and rhetoric is a craft and not flattery, by refuting me? But if you let me 467 pass unrefuted, the orators who do in the cities what they think fit, and the tyrants, will possess nothing good in this; but power is, as you claim, a good, and doing what one thinks fit without sense, as you too agree, is bad; or not?

POL. I do.

SOC. How, then, could the orators or the tyrants have great power in the cities, unless Socrates is refuted by Polus, to the effect that they do what they want?

1. *By the*—: Socrates breaks off his oath; Stobaeus, quoting the passage, completes it, "by the dog".

ΠΩΛ. Οὗτος ἀνήρ— b

ΣΩ. Οὔ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται· ἀλλά μ' ἔλεγχε.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἄρτι ὠμολόγεις ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι, [τούτου πρόσθεν];

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ. 5

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ οὖν ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;

ΣΩ. Οὔ φημι.

ΠΩΛ. Ποιοῦντες ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς;

ΣΩ. Φημί.

ΠΩΛ. Σχέτλιά γε λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες. 10

ΣΩ. Μὴ κακηγόρει, ὦ λῷστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον ὅτι c ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βού- 5 λεσθαι ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἑκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσιν τοῦθ' ὃ πράττουσιν; οἷον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνεκα πίνουσιν;—ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ 10 ὑγιαίνειν.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλέοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον d χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἑκάστοτε (τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ πράγματ' ἔχειν;) ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οἶμαι οὗ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν, πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν.—ΠΩΛ. 5 Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων; ἐάν τίς

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b 3 *βέλτιστα εἶναι* secl. Cobet (habet Stobaeus) **b** 4 *τούτου πρόσθεν* secl. Schleiermacher (habet Stobaeus) **b** 8 *ποιοῦντες* F Stobaeus: *ποιοῦντες* δὲ B T P: *ποιοῦντές γε* ci. H. Richards **b** 10 *σχέτλια* B T P f: *ἔχεται* ἃ F *γε* Olympiodorus Stobaeus: om. B T P F **b** 11 *κακηγόρει* Naber: *κατηγόρει* libri **c** 10 *δῆλον . . . ὑγιαίνειν* B W: om. T F sed add. in marg. T f **d** 1 *οὗ ἕνεκα πίνουσιν* post *ὑγιαίνειν* quoque add. W et in marg. T: om. B F Stobaeus **d** 3 *τε καὶ* B T P: *καὶ* F Stobaeus **d** 5 *πλούτου . . . πλέουσιν* secl. Cobet (habet Stobaeus) **d** 6 *πάντων* B T P: *ἁπάντων* F Stobaeus

POL. This man— b

SOC. I claim they do not do what they want; but refute me.

POL. Did you not agree just now that they do what they think best?[1]

SOC. Yes, for I agree now too.

POL. Then they do not do what they want?

SOC. I claim not.

POL. Doing what they think fit?

SOC. I claim so.

POL. Shocking things you do say, and prodigious, Socrates.

SOC. Do not speak evil, most worthy Polus, so that I may address you after your fashion; but if you have the means to ask me, display c that I am speaking falsely; and if not, answer yourself.[2]

POL. Well, I am willing to answer, so that I may also know what you mean.

SOC. Do you think human beings want this, whatever they do each time, or that for the sake of which they do this which they do? For example, do you think those who drink drugs from the doctors want this, which they do, to drink the drug and be in pain, or that, being healthy, for the sake of which they drink?—POL. Plainly, be- d ing healthy.—SOC. Then also those who sail and carry on the rest of money-making: it is not this that they want, what they do each time (for who wants to sail and run risks and have troubles?), but that, I think, for the sake of which they sail, to be wealthy; for they sail for the sake of wealth.—POL. Certainly.—SOC. Is it not so, then, with all things too? If anyone

1. After "best" Burnet brackets *toutou prosthen*, "before this", after Schleiermacher; Stobaeus has the words. They are not translated.

2. *Do not speak evil*: *kakēgorei*, Naber's correction, which Burnet prints; the manuscripts have *katēgorei*, "do not accuse". *Most worthy Polus*: *ō lōiste Pōle*, a chime of sounds of the kind Polus' own style was known for (compare 448c and *Phaedrus* 267b–c).

τι πράττῃ ἕνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο
οὗ ἕνεκα πράττει;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν e
ὄντων ὃ οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν γ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων,
οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν;—ΠΩΛ. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ
ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τἀναντία 5
τούτων;—ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.—ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε
κακὰ ἆρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,
ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ 468
βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα
καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα καλεῖς
τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακά;—ΠΩΛ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.—
ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἕνεκα τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράτ- 5
τουσιν ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τἀγαθὰ τῶν μεταξύ;—ΠΩΛ. Τὰ
μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν.—ΣΩ. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες b
καὶ βαδίζομεν ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ
τὸ ἐναντίον ἕσταμεν ὅταν ἑστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ· ἢ οὔ;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνυ-
μεν, εἴ τιν᾽ ἀποκτείνυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα 5
χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή;—
ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Ἕνεκ᾽ ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα
ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες.—ΠΩΛ. Φημί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν
ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἕνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν;—ΠΩΛ.—Μάλιστα. c
—ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ᾽ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν
πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν
μὲν ὠφέλιμα ᾖ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερὰ
δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὡς φῂς 5
σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ

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d 7 *τι* B T P F: om. Stobaeus **e** 4 *εἶναι ἀγαθὸν* B T P F: *ἀγαθὰ* Stobaeus *τε καὶ* B T P f: *καὶ* F Stobaeus **e** 6 *μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ* B T P Stobaeus: *μήτε κακὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ* F **a** 5 *ἕνεκα*] ἓν *ἐκ* P: *ἕνεκεν* B T F Stobaeus **b** 6 *ἡμῖν ταῦτα* B T P Stobaeus: *ταῦτα ἡμῖν* F

does anything for the sake of something, he does not want this which he does, but that for the sake of which he does it?—POL. e
Yes.—SOC. Is there, then, any of the things that are which is not either good or bad or between these, neither good nor bad?[1]—POL. It is a great necessity, Socrates.—SOC. Then do you say that wisdom and health and wealth and the other such things are good, and their contraries bad?—POL. I do.—SOC. And by the things neither good nor bad do you mean such things as these, which sometimes share in the good, sometimes in the bad, and sometimes in neither, 468
as sitting and walking and running and sailing, and again as stones and timbers and the other such things? Do you not mean these? Or do you call other things neither good nor bad?—POL. No, these.—SOC. Do people, then, do these things between for the sake of the good things, when they do them, or the good things for the sake of the things between?—POL. The things between, surely, for the b
sake of the good things.—SOC. It is pursuing the good, then, that we both walk, when we walk, thinking it better, and, contrariwise, stand, when we stand, for the sake of the same thing, the good; or not?—POL. Yes.—SOC. Then also we put to death, if we put anyone to death, and throw out, and take away money, thinking it better for us to do these things than not?—POL. Certainly.—SOC. It is for the sake of the good, then, that those who do all these things do them.—POL. I claim so.—SOC. Did we not agree that the things we do for the sake of something we do not want, but that for the sake of c
which we do them?—POL. Most of all.—SOC. Then we do not want to slaughter, or to throw out of the cities, or to take away money, simply thus; but if these things are beneficial, we want to do them, and if they are harmful, we do not want them. For we want the good things, as you claim, and the things neither good nor bad we do not want, nor the bad

1. The same three kinds as *Lysis* 216d: the good, the bad, and what is neither good nor bad.

κακά. ἦ γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ οὔ; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ;—ΠΩΛ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει d
τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὂν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἦ γάρ;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει 5
ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ;—ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' οὔ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.—ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνα- e
σθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν;—ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔστιν.—ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι μηδὲ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται. 5

ΠΩΛ. Ὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναί σοι ποιεῖν ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα ἢ δήσαντα.

ΣΩ. Δικαίως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως; 10

ΠΩΛ. Ὁπότερ' ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν; 469

ΣΩ. Εὐφήμει, ὦ Πῶλε.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε τοὺς ἀθλίους, ἀλλ' ἐλεεῖν. 5

ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ; οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω τῶν ἀνθρώπων;

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΠΩΛ. Ὅστις οὖν ἀποκτείνυσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως ἀποκτεινύς, ἄθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεινός; 10

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἄρτι ἄθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι;

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e 8 *ἀποκτείναντα* B T P f Stobaeus: *ἀποκτείνοντα* F **a** 1 *ζηλωτόν* B T P F Stobaeus: *ζηλωτός* al. **a** 7 *τῶν* B T P Stobaeus: om. F

things. Is it not so? Do you think I speak the truth, Polus, or not? Why do you not answer?—POL. True.

SOC. Then, if we agree on these things, if someone puts someone d
to death, or throws him out of a city, or takes away money, whether he is a tyrant or an orator, thinking it better for himself, while it is in fact worse, this man surely does what he thinks fit; is it not so?—POL. Yes.—SOC. Does he, then, also do what he wants, if these things are in fact bad? Why do you not answer?—POL. Well, I do not think he does what he wants.—SOC. Is there any way, then, that such a man has great power in this city, if having great power is something e
good, by your agreement?—POL. There is not.—SOC. I was speaking the truth, then, when I said that it is possible for a person doing in a city what he thinks fit not to have great power, nor to do what he wants.

POL. As if you, Socrates, would not accept being allowed to do what you think fit in the city, rather than not, and do not envy when you see someone who has put to death whom he thought fit, or taken away money, or put someone in bonds!

SOC. Do you mean justly or unjustly?

POL. Whichever way he does it, is it not enviable both ways? 469

SOC. Speak words of good omen, Polus.[1]

POL. Why so?

SOC. Because one ought not to envy the unenviable or the wretched, but pity them.

POL. What? Do you think it is so with the human beings I speak of?

SOC. How could it not?

POL. Then whoever puts to death whomever he thinks fit, putting him to death justly, you think is wretched and pitiable?

SOC. Not to my mind; nor, however, enviable.

POL. Did you not claim just now that he is wretched?

1. *Speak words of good omen*: *euphēmei*, the call for reverent silence at a rite, as if Polus' words were ill-omened.

ΣΩ. Τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεινόν b
γε πρός· τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον.

ΠΩΛ. Ἦ που ὅ γε ἀποθνήσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεινός τε καὶ ἄθλιός ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἧττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτεινύς, ὦ Πῶλε, καὶ ἧττον ἢ ὁ 5
δικαίως ἀποθνήσκων.

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὕτως, ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

ΠΩΛ. Ἦ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μεῖζον; 10

ΣΩ. Ἥκιστά γε.

ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν;

ΣΩ. Βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη c
ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἑλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.

ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο;

ΣΩ. Οὔκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ 5
πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτεινύντι καὶ
ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν.

ΣΩ. Ὦ μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ.
εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχει- d
ρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σὲ ὅτι "Ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύναμίς τις καὶ
τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ
δόξῃ τινὰ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ ὁρᾷς αὐτίκα μάλα
δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει οὗτος ὃν ἂν δόξῃ· κἄν τινα δόξῃ μοι 5
τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν καταγῆναι δεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα

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b 2 γε F Stobaeus: δὲ B T P **b** 5 supra ὦ in B *πάνυ μὲν οὖν* manus recentissima **b** 10 ἢ] suprascr. ει B² **b** 11 γε B T P Stobaeus: *γάρ* F **c** 1 ἂν ἔγωγε om. Simplicius (habet Stobaeus): ἂν om. P οὐδέτερα B T P F Stobaeus: *οὐδέτερον* Simplicius ἀναγκαῖον εἴη B T P F Stobaeus: *ἀνάγκη* Simplicius **c** 2 ἢ ἀδικεῖν secl. Cobet (habet Stobaeus) **c** 7 πάντα B T P: *παντα χῶς* F **d** 3 post ἄρα add. *προσγένηται ἐμοὶ* F (om. mox δόξῃ pr. F) **d** 4 τουτωνὶ B T P: *τούτων* F **d** 5 τεθνήξει B T P: *τεθνήξεται* F et *ξεται* suprascr. P **d** 6 αὐτῶν B T F: *αὐτὸν* P καταγῆναι scripsi: *κατεαγῆναι* B T W F: *κατεαγέναι* recc.

SOC. The one who has put to death unjustly, at any rate, my companion, and indeed pitiable besides; but the one who has done it justly, unenviable. b

POL. Assuredly, I take it, the one who dies unjustly is pitiable and wretched.

SOC. Less than the one who puts him to death, Polus, and less than the one who dies justly.

POL. How so, then, Socrates?

SOC. Thus: that doing injustice is in fact the greatest of bad things.

POL. Is this, then, the greatest? Is not suffering injustice greater?

SOC. Least of all.

POL. Then you would want to suffer injustice rather than do injustice?

SOC. I would want neither, for my part; but if it were necessary either to do injustice or to suffer injustice, I would choose to suffer injustice rather than do injustice.[1] c

POL. Then you would not accept being a tyrant?

SOC. No, if by being a tyrant you mean what I do, at any rate.

POL. But I mean what I did just now: to be allowed in the city to do whatever one thinks fit, putting to death and throwing out and doing everything according to one's opinion.

SOC. You blessed man, lay hold of me in argument as I speak, then. For if in a crowded market-place I took a dagger under my armpit and said to you, "Polus, a power and a marvellous tyranny has just come to me; for if, then, I think fit that any one of these human beings you see must be dead this very moment, dead this man will be, whomever I think fit; and if I think fit that one of them must have his head broken, broken-headed he will be this very moment; d

1. Socrates' thesis, which he proves against Polus at 474c–475e; the second, that the one doing injustice is more wretched if he escapes the penalty (472e), follows at 476a–479e.

μάλα, κἂν θοιμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται—οὕτω μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει," εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι e
δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν ὅτι "Ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναιντο, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπρησθείη οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥντινά σοι δοκοῖ, καὶ τά γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ αἱ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ 5
δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἴδια·" ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε.

ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν δι' ὅτι μέμφῃ τὴν τοιαύτην 470
δύναμιν;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δή; λέγε.

ΠΩΛ. Ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιοῦσθαί 5
ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ζημιοῦσθαι οὐ κακόν;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, [τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι] πάλιν αὖ σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἕπηται τὸ ὠφελί- 10
μως πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι. σκεψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τόδε· ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίοτε μὲν b
ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτεινύναι τε καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὔ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. 5

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

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e 4 *ἥντινά σοι δοκοῖ* F: *ἥντιν' ἄν σοι δοκοῖ* B T: *ἥντιν' ἄν σοι δοκῇ* P (sed suprascr. *οι*) **a** 1 *οὖν* B T P: om. F **a** 5 *τὸν οὕτω*] *τοῦτο* Olympiodorus **a** 9 *τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι* secl. Thompson **a** 12 posterius *δύνασθαι* non legisse videtur Olympiodorus: secl. Thompson **b** 1 δὲ B T P: δὴ F

and if his cloak torn apart, torn apart it will be—such great power e
do I have in this city"; if, then, when you were not convinced,
I showed you the dagger, perhaps you would say on seeing it,
"Socrates, thus everyone would have great power, since in this way
there might be set on fire any house you thought fit, and indeed
the dockyards of the Athenians, and the triremes, and all the ships,
both the public and the private ones"; but then this is not having
great power, doing what one thinks fit; or do you think so?

POL. No indeed, not thus, at any rate.

SOC. Do you have the means to say, then, why you find fault with 470
such power?

POL. I do.

SOC. Why so? Say.

POL. Because it is necessary that one who does thus suffer loss.

SOC. And is suffering loss not bad?

POL. Certainly.

SOC. Then, you marvellous man, it appears to you, once more,
that if doing it beneficially follows one who does what he thinks
fit, it is good, and this, it seems, is having great power; and if not,
it is bad, and having small power.[1] And let us look into this too: b
do we not agree that sometimes it is better to do these things we
were speaking of just now, to put human beings to death, and drive
them out, and take away money, and sometimes not?

POL. Certainly.

SOC. This, then, it seems, is agreed on your part and on mine.

POL. Yes.

1. After "you marvellous man" Burnet brackets *to mega dynasthai*, "having great power", after Thompson. The words are not translated.

ΣΩ. Πότε οὖν σὺ φῂς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπὲ τίνα ὅρον ὁρίζῃ.

ΠΩΛ. Σὺ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι [ταὐτὸ] τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴ σοι παρ' ἐμοῦ ἥδιόν ἐστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως τις ταῦτα ποιῇ, ἄμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως, κάκιον.

ΠΩΛ. Χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἕξω, ἴσην δὲ καὶ σοί, ἐάν με ἐλέγξῃς καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃς φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴ κάμῃς φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ παλαιοῖς πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην γεγονότα ταῦτα ἱκανά σε ἐξελέγξαι ἐστὶν καὶ ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι εὐδαίμονές εἰσιν.

ΣΩ. Τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀρχέλαον δήπου τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκου ὁρᾷς ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἀκούω γε.

ΠΩΛ. Εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἄθλιος;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐ γάρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ; συγγενόμενος ἂν γνοίης, ἄλλως δὲ αὐτόθεν οὐ γιγνώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ;

ΣΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα.

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γιγνώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ; ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν;

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b 9 *πότε* F (*ρον* suprascr. f): *πότερον* B T P *σὺ φῂς* B T P f: *φῂς σὺ* F *ταῦτα* B T P: *ταὐτὸ τοῦτο* F **b** 11 *ταὐτὸ* secl. ci. Heindorf **c** 1 *μὲν τοίνυν* T P F: *μέντοι νῦν* B **c** 2 *ἐστιν ἀκούειν* B T P: *ἀκούειν ἔστιν* F **c** 4 *οὐχὶ* B T P f: *οὐ* F **c** 6 *ἴσην* T P F: *ἴσιν* B (suprascr. *η* B²) **d** 1 *ἐχθὲς* B T P Stobaeus: *χθὲς* F

SOC. When, then, do you claim it is better to do these things?[1] Say what definition you define.

POL. Rather, you answer this, Socrates.[2]

SOC. Well then, I claim, Polus, if it is more pleasant for you to c
hear it from me, that when someone does these things justly it is better, and when unjustly, worse.

POL. Difficult indeed to refute you, Socrates! But could not even a child refute you, to the effect that you do not speak the truth?

SOC. Then I shall have much gratitude toward the child, and as much toward you, if you refute me and rid me of nonsense. But do not grow weary of doing good to a man who is a friend, but refute me.

POL. But indeed, Socrates, there is no need at all to refute you d
with old matters; for these things that happened yesterday and the day before are sufficient to refute you and to demonstrate that many human beings who do injustice are happy.

SOC. What sort of things are these?

POL. You see, surely, this Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, ruling Macedonia?[3]

SOC. If not, I hear of it, at any rate.

POL. Do you think, then, that he is happy or wretched?

SOC. I do not know, Polus; for I have not yet associated with the man.

POL. What? Would you know if you had associated with him, e
and otherwise, from right here, you do not know that he is happy?

SOC. By Zeus, no indeed.

POL. Plainly, then, Socrates, you will claim not to know even that the Great King is happy.[4]

SOC. Yes, and I shall speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands in education and justice.

POL. What? Is the whole of happiness in this?

1. *When*: F's *pote*, which Burnet prints; B, T and P have *poteron*, which makes the question "Do you claim, then, that it is better to do these things?"

2. Burnet brackets *tauto*, "the same", before "this", as Heindorf proposed; it is not translated.

3. Archelaus, son of Perdiccas II, was king of Macedonia from about 413 to 399 BC; Thucydides praises the forts and straight roads he built (2.100.2). Euripides spent his last years at his court, where Aristotle shows him (*Politics* 5.10, 1311b30–34).

4. The king of Persia, the type of wealth and power; compare *Apology* 40d–e.

ΣΩ. Ὅς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὦ Πῶλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐδαίμονα εἶναί φημι, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον.

ΠΩΛ. Ἄθλιος ἄρα οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Ἀρχέλαος κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον; 471

ΣΩ. Εἴπερ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος; ᾧ γε προσῆκε μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν ἦν νῦν ἔχει, ὄντι ἐκ γυναικὸς ἣ ἦν δούλη Ἀλκέτου τοῦ Περδίκκου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον δοῦλος ἦν Ἀλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ἐδούλευεν ἂν Ἀλκέτῃ καὶ ἦν εὐδαίμων κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. νῦν δὲ θαυμασίως ὡς ἄθλιος γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἠδίκηκεν· ὅς γε πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον μεταπεμψάμενος ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, ξενίσας καὶ καταμεθύσας αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀνεψιὸν αὑτοῦ, σχεδὸν ἡλικιώτην, ἐμβαλὼν εἰς ἅμαξαν, νύκτωρ ἐξαγαγὼν ἀπέσφαξέν τε καὶ ἠφάνισεν ἀμφοτέρους. καὶ ταῦτα ἀδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν ἀθλιώτατος γενόμενος καὶ οὐ μετεμέλησεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον τὸν ἀδελφόν, τὸν γνήσιον τοῦ Περδίκκου υἱόν, παῖδα ὡς ἑπτέτη, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐβουλήθη εὐδαίμων γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀποδοὺς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' εἰς φρέαρ ἐμβαλὼν καὶ ἀποπνίξας πρὸς τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν χῆνα ἔφη διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν. τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα ἠδικηκὼς τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστιν πάντων Μακεδόνων, ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, καὶ ἴσως ἔστιν ὅστις Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος δέξαιτ' ἂν ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν Μακεδόνων γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ Ἀρχέλαος.

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e 10 *εὐδαίμονα* B T P F: *εὐδαίμονας* Stobaeus **a** 3 *γε* B T P f: om. F **a** 4 *μὲν* B T P F: *μὴν* al. Olympiodorus **a** 8 *ἦν* B T P: *ἣν ἂν* F **a** 9 *ὡς* B T P: om. F *ἐπεὶ* B T P: *ἐπειδὴ* F **b** 1 *μὲν τοῦτον* B T F: *τοῦτον μὲν* P **b** 4 *σχεδὸν* B T P: *καὶ σχεδὸν* F **c** 1 *τοῦ* F: *τὸν* B T P **c** 2 *ἑπτέτη* F: *ἑπταετῆ* B T: *ἑπταέτη* P **d** 1 *δέξαιτ'* T P F: *δείξαιτ'* B (ε suprascr. b) *ἄλλος* B F: *ἄλλως* T W

SOC. As I say, at any rate, Polus; for I claim that the beautiful and good man and woman is happy, and the unjust and base one wretched.

POL. Then this Archelaus is wretched, by your account? 471

SOC. If he is unjust, at any rate, my friend.

POL. But then, how is he not unjust? He to whom none of the rule he now holds belonged, being born of a woman who was a slave of Alcetas, Perdiccas' brother; and by what is just he was Alcetas' slave, and if he wanted to do the just things he would be a slave to Alcetas and would be happy, by your account. But now he has become marvellously wretched, since he has done the greatest injustices: for, first, he sent for this very man, his master and uncle, b as if to give back the rule that Perdiccas had taken away from him, entertained and made drunk both him and his son Alexander, his own cousin, nearly of his age, threw them into a wagon, took them out by night, slaughtered them, and made them both disappear. And having done these injustices he escaped his own notice as he became most wretched, and he did not repent of it; but a little later, c his brother, the legitimate son of Perdiccas, a boy of about seven, to whom the rule was coming by what is just, he did not want to become happy by justly bringing him up and giving back the rule to him, but threw him into a well and drowned him, and claimed to the boy's mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while pursuing a goose and died. Therefore now, since he has done the greatest injustices of those in Macedonia, he is the most wretched of all Macedonians, but not the happiest; and perhaps there is someone among the Athenians, beginning from you, who would accept be- d coming any other Macedonian whatever rather than Archelaus.

ΣΩ. Καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὦ Πῶλε, ἔγωγέ σε ἐπῄνεσα ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν πεπαιδεῦσθαι, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἠμεληκέναι· καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ᾧ με καὶ ἂν παῖς ἐξελέγξειε, καὶ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν, ὡς σὺ οἴει, ἐξελήλεγμαι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, φάσκων τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; πόθεν, ὠγαθέ; καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γέ σοι τούτων ὁμολογῶ ὧν σὺ φῄς.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω.

ΣΩ. Ὦ μακάριε, ῥητορικῶς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὰν τῶν λόγων ὧν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχωνται καὶ εὐδοκίμους, ὁ δὲ τἀναντία λέγων ἕνα τινὰ παρέχηται ἢ μηδένα. οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἔλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστιν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυρηθείη τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναί τι. καὶ νῦν περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσιν ταὐτὰ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι, ἐὰν βούλῃ κατ' ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω· μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ, ὧν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἑστῶτές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίου, οὗ αὖ ἐστιν ἐν Πυθίου τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περικλέους ὅλη οἰκία ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια ἥντινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐκλέξασθαι. ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι εἷς ὢν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ· οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας πολλοὺς κατ' ἐμοῦ παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἕνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν

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d 3 *τῶν λόγων*, *ὦ* Πῶλε B T P: *ὦ* Πῶλε, *τῶν λόγων* F Olympiodorus σε B T P f: om. F **d** 4 *ἐπῄνεσα* addubitant Cobet Schanz *δοκεῖς*] fort. *ἐδόκεις* Thompson **d** 5 *τοῦ* δὲ B T F: *οὐδὲ* P **d** 7 *οἴει* B T P: *οἴει εἶναι* F **e** 4 *ἐκεῖ οἱ* B T F: *ἐκεῖνοι* P **b** 1 *πυθίου* F (cf. Thuc. vi. 54. 7, C. I. A. i. 189): *πυθοῖ* B T W f **b** 3 *ἐνθάδε* B T F: *ἄλλων* P

SOC. At the beginning of our speeches too, Polus, I praised you because I think you are well educated for rhetoric, but have been heedless of conversing.[1] And now is not this the argument with which even a child would refute me, and have I now been refuted by you, as you think, by this argument, when I assert that the one who does injustice is not happy? Whence, my good friend? And indeed I agree with you on none at all of the things you claim.

POL. For you are not willing; since you do think as I say. e

SOC. You blessed man, you are attempting to refute me rhetorically, like those in the law courts who believe they refute. For there too one side seems to refute the other when they provide many reputable witnesses for the speeches they make, and the one who says the contrary provides one only, or none. But this refutation is worth nothing toward the truth; for sometimes someone might 472 even be borne false witness against by many people who seem to be somebody. And now, about the things you say, nearly all, Athenians and strangers, will concur with you in the same things, if you want to provide witnesses against me that I do not speak the truth: there will bear witness for you, if you want, Nicias son of Niceratus and his brothers with him, whose tripods stand in a row in the precinct of Dionysus; or, if you want, Aristocrates son of Scel- b lias, whose, again, is that beautiful dedication in the Pythion; or, if you want, the whole house of Pericles, or any other kinship of those here you want to pick out.[2] But I, being one, do not agree with you; for you do not compel me, but, providing many false witnesses against me, you attempt to throw me out of my substance and of the truth.[3] But if I do not provide you yourself, being one, as a witness agreeing about what I say, I think I have carried through nothing worth speaking of about the things

1. Socrates recalls 448d, where he says Polus has practised what is called rhetoric more than conversing.

2. Nicias son of Niceratus, the general who died in Sicily in 413; Plutarch mentions the temple standing under his choregic tripods in the precinct of Dionysus (*Nicias* 3.3). Aristocrates son of Scellias was one of the generals in 412 (Thucydides 8.9.2) and, with Theramenes, a leader of the moderates in 411 (8.89.2); he was among the generals put to death after Arginusae in 406 (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.7.2, 1.7.34). *In the Pythion*: Burnet prints F's *Pythiou*, comparing Thucydides 6.54.7, where the same phrase names the precinct of Pythian Apollo at Athens; B, T and W have *Pythoi*, "at Pytho", that is, at Delphi.

3. *Out of my substance*: *ek tēs ousias*, the phrase for ousting a man from his property (as Demosthenes 29.2); *ousia* also means being, what a thing is. That Socrates plays on the second sense, beside "the truth", is an interpretation.

ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ ἐγώ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἷς c
ὢν μόνος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν ἐᾷς. ἔστιν
μὲν οὖν οὗτός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὡς σύ τε οἴει καὶ ἄλλοι
πολλοί· ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι. παραβα-
λόντες οὖν παρ' ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα εἴ τι διοίσουσιν ἀλλή- 5
λων. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν οὐ πάνυ
σμικρὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ταῦτα περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι τε
κάλλιστον μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἴσχιστον· τὸ γὰρ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν
ἐστιν ἢ γιγνώσκειν ἢ ἀγνοεῖν ὅστις τε εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν καὶ
ὅστις μή. αὐτίκα πρῶτον, περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, σὺ d
ἡγῇ οἷόν τε εἶναι μακάριον ἄνδρα ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἄδικον
ὄντα, εἴπερ Ἀρχέλαον ἄδικον μὲν ἡγῇ εἶναι, εὐδαίμονα δέ.
ἄλλο τι ὡς οὕτω σου νομίζοντος διανοώμεθα;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. 5

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δέ φημι ἀδύνατον. ἓν μὲν τουτὶ ἀμφισβη-
τοῦμεν. εἶεν· ἀδικῶν δὲ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσται ἆρ', ἂν τυγχάνῃ
δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας;

ΠΩΛ. Ἥκιστά γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γ' ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν, κατὰ τὸν e
σὸν λόγον εὐδαίμων ἔσται;

ΠΩΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Κατὰ δέ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε
καὶ ὁ ἄδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ἐὰν μὴ 5
διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνῃ τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἧττον δὲ ἄθλιος
ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

ΠΩΛ. Ἄτοπά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν. 473

ΣΩ. Πειράσομαι δέ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταὐτὰ
ἐμοὶ λέγειν· φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἃ διαφε-

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c 3 *τις* B T P: *τίς ὁ* F **c** 4 *ἐγὼ αὖ* B T P: *αὖ ἐγὼ* F *παραβαλόντες* F: *παραλαβόντες* B T W **c** 6 *καὶ γὰρ καὶ* F: *καὶ γὰρ* B T P **d** 4 *ἄλλο τι* F: *ἀλλ' ὅτι* B T P: *ἀλλ' ὅτι ἢ* rec. b *διανοώμεθα* B T P: *διανοούμεθα* F **e** 4 *γε* B T P: om. F **e** 5 *πάντως* F Stobaeus: *ἁπάντων* B T P *μέντοι* F Stobaeus: *μὲν τοίνυν* B T P **e** 7 *τε καὶ* B T P: *καὶ* F *ἀνθρώπων* B T P: *ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων* F Stobaeus

our argument may be about; nor, I think, have you, unless I, being one alone, bear witness for you, and you let all these others pass, bidding farewell. This, then, is one way of refutation, as you think and many others too; but there is another as well, which I, again, think. Let us set them beside each other, then, and look into whether they will differ at all from each other. For actually the things we are disputing about are also in fact not very small, but nearly those which it is most beautiful to know and most shameful not to know; for the sum of them is knowing or being ignorant of who is happy and who is not. To start with, first, about what the argument is now: you believe it possible for a man to be blessed while doing injustice and being unjust, if you believe Archelaus to be unjust but happy. Are we not to be minded that you hold it so?

POL. Certainly.

SOC. But I claim it is impossible. This is one thing we dispute. Very well: will the one doing injustice be happy, then, if he meets with penalty and retribution?[1]

POL. Least of all, since thus, at any rate, he would be most wretched.

SOC. But if, then, the one doing injustice does not meet with penalty, by your account he will be happy?

POL. I claim so.

SOC. But by my opinion, at any rate, Polus, the one doing injustice and the unjust man is wretched in every way, more wretched, however, if he does not pay the penalty and does not meet with retribution when he does injustice, and less wretched if he pays the penalty and meets with penalty from gods and human beings.

POL. Outlandish things indeed, Socrates, you attempt to say.

SOC. Yes, and I shall try to make you too, my companion, say the same things as I; for I believe you a friend. Now, then, the things on which we differ

1. *Penalty and retribution*: *dikē*, the due exacted for a wrong, the word behind *dikaios*, "just", and *adikein*, "do injustice"; and *timōria*, retribution exacted for the one who suffered injustice. "Pay the penalty" is *dikēn didonai*.

ρόμεθα ταῦτ' ἐστιν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. εἶπον ἐγώ που ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἔφην εἶναι ἐγώ, καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ.

ΠΩΛ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία.

ΣΩ. Ὡς σύ γε οἴει, ὦ Πῶλε. b

ΠΩΛ. Ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως. σὺ δέ γε εὐδαίμονας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἐὰν μὴ διδῶσι δίκην.

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δέ γε αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημί, τοὺς δὲ διδόντας δίκην ἧττον. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτ' ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξελέγξαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Πῶλε, ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται.

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος ληφθῇ τυραννίδι ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται c καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάηται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ παντοδαπὰς λώβας αὐτός τε λωβηθεὶς καὶ τοὺς αὑτοῦ ἐπιδὼν παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκα τὸ ἔσχατον ἀνασταυρωθῇ ἢ καταπιττωθῇ, οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται ἢ ἐὰν διαφυγὼν 5 τύραννος καταστῇ καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ πόλει διαβιῷ ποιῶν ὅτι ἂν βούληται, ζηλωτὸς ὢν καὶ εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων; ταῦτα λέγεις ἀδύνατον εἶναι d ἐξελέγχειν;

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a 10 ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ B T P: ἐξηλέγθης F (suprascr. αν ὑπὸ σοῦ f): ἐξηλέγχθησαν ὑπὸ σοῦ t **b** 1 γε F: om. B T P **b** 3 ὅσως revera Socrati tribuit B (sed add. quoque :): Polo vulgo continuant αὖ τοὺς T P: αὐτοὺς B (sed accentum super αὐ add. rec. b) F **b** 6 δέ γε F: δὲ B T P **b** 12 ἀδικῶν secl. Dobree **c** 4 γυναῖκα B T P: γυναῖκας F **c** 5 εὐδαιμονέστερος F: εὐδαιμονέστατος B T P

are these; and look into it, you too. I said, I take it, in what went before, that doing injustice is worse than suffering injustice.

POL. Certainly.

SOC. And you, suffering injustice.

POL. Yes.

SOC. And I claimed that those who do injustice are wretched, and I was refuted by you.

POL. Yes, by Zeus.

SOC. As you think, at any rate, Polus. b

POL. Thinking the truth, at any rate.

SOC. Perhaps. And you, again, claimed those who do injustice happy, if they do not pay the penalty.

POL. Very much so.

SOC. But I, at any rate, claim they are most wretched, and those who pay the penalty less so. Do you want to refute this too?

POL. Well, this is still more difficult to refute than that, Socrates.

SOC. No indeed, Polus, but impossible; for the truth is never refuted.

POL. What do you mean? If a person is caught doing injustice, plotting for a tyranny, and once caught is racked, and castrated, c and has his eyes burnt out, and after he has been outraged himself with many other great outrages of every kind, and has looked on at his own children and wife, is at the last impaled or coated with pitch, this man will be happier than if he escapes, sets himself up as tyrant, and lives out his life ruling in the city, doing whatever he wants, enviable and called happy by the citizens and by strangers d besides? Is this what you say it is impossible to refute?

ΣΩ. Μορμολύττῃ αὖ, ὦ γενναῖε Πῶλε, καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγχεις· ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου. ὅμως δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με σμικρόν. ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι, εἶπες;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν τοίνυν οὐδέποτε ἔσται οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατειργασμένος τὴν τυραννίδα ἀδίκως οὔτε ὁ διδοὺς δίκην—δυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλίοιν εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη—ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ὁ διαφεύγων καὶ τυραννεύσας. τί τοῦτο, ὦ Πῶλε; γελᾷς; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδάν τίς τι εἴπῃ, καταγελᾶν, ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ οἴει ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγῃς ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τινα τουτωνί.

ΣΩ. Ὦ Πῶλε, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέρυσι βουλεύειν λαχών, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιψηφίζειν, γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν με κέλευε ἐπιψηφίζειν τοὺς παρόντας, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔχεις τούτων βελτίω ἔλεγχον, ὅπερ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει παράδος, καὶ πείρασαι τοῦ ἐλέγχου οἷον ἐγὼ οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὧν ἂν λέγω ἕνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι μάρτυρα ἐπίσταμαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς ὃν ἄν μοι ὁ λόγος ᾖ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἐῶ χαίρειν, καὶ ἕνα ἐπιψηφίζειν ἐπίσταμαι, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. ὅρα οὖν εἰ ἐθελήσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει διδόναι ἔλεγχον ἀποκρινόμενος τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγὼ δέ γε οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. ἐπεὶ σὺ δέξαι' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν;

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d 9 διδοὺς *δίκην* F: διδοὺς B T P: *δίκην δούς* H. Schmidt **e** 1 *διαφεύγων* B T W F: *διαφυγὼν* Vind. 21 *τυραννήσας* F **e** 2 *τοῦτο αὖ ἄλλο* F *εἶδος τοῦτο* P **e** 6 *βασιλεύειν* P **a** 1 *ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν*] *ἠδυνάμην ἐπιψηφίσαι* Athenaeus **a** 1 post *ἐπιψηφίζειν* add. *τοὺς παρόντας* F **a** 3 *ἔχεις* P F: *ἔχῃς* B T *ἔλεγον ἐγώ* P **a** 5 *δεῖν* B T P f: om. F *μὲν*] *μόνον* Cobet **a** 6 *αὐτὸν*] *αὐτὸν τὸν* Cobet **b** 6 *ἄλλον* B P: *ἄλλων* T F

SOC. Again you are frightening me with bogeys, noble Polus, and not refuting; and just now you were calling witnesses.[1] Still, remind me of a small thing: if unjustly plotting for a tyranny, you said?

POL. I did.

SOC. Then neither of them will ever be happier, neither the one who has achieved the tyranny unjustly nor the one who pays the penalty—for of two wretched men neither would be happier— e
more wretched, however, is the one who escapes and has become tyrant. What is this, Polus? You laugh? Is this, again, another form of refutation, when someone says something, to laugh at it, and not refute?

POL. Do you not think you have been refuted, Socrates, when you say such things as no one among human beings would claim? For ask any of these people here.

SOC. Polus, I am not one of the politicians; and last year, having been chosen by lot to be on the Council, when my tribe held the presidency and I had to put the question to the vote, I provided a 474
laugh and did not know how to put it to the vote.[2] So do not tell me now either to put the question to the vote of those present; but if you do not have a better refutation than these, as I was saying just now, hand it over to me in turn, and try the refutation such as I think it must be. For I know how to provide one witness to whatever I say, the very man with whom my argument may be, and I let the many pass, bidding farewell; and I know how to put the question to the vote of one, but with the many I do not even converse. b
See, then, whether you will be willing in turn to give refutation by answering what is asked. For I think that both I and you and the rest of human beings believe doing injustice worse than suffering injustice, and not paying the penalty worse than paying it.

POL. But I, at any rate, think that neither I nor anyone else among human beings does. For would you accept suffering injustice rather than doing injustice?

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1. *Frightening me with bogeys*: *mormolyttēi*, from Mormo, the bogey with which nurses frightened children.

2. Socrates sat on the Council in 406, when his tribe held the presidency at the trial of the generals after Arginusae (*Apology* 32b); Xenophon has him alone refuse to put an unlawful motion to the vote (*Hellenica* 1.7.15; *Memorabilia* 1.1.18). That the joke alludes to this is an interpretation. Taken literally, "last year" sets the conversation in 405; other indications point earlier: Nicias, who died in 413, and Aristocrates, put to death in 406, are offered as living witnesses at 472a–b, and Pericles, who died in 429, has "lately come to his end" at 503c. Athenaeus already charged Plato with these inconsistencies (5.217d–218a).

ΣΩ. Καὶ σύ γ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

ΠΩΛ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἐγὼ οὔτε σὺ οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδείς.

ΣΩ. Οὔκουν ἀποκρινῇ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτ' ἐρεῖς.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δή μοι, ἵν' εἰδῇς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς σε ἠρώτων· πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Πῶλε, κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;—ΠΩΛ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε.—ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; αἴσχιον πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἀποκρίνου.—ΠΩΛ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖν.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἴπερ αἴσχιον.—ΠΩΛ. Ἥκιστά γε.—ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡγῇ σύ, ὡς ἔοικας, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν.—ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἷον καὶ σώματα καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἑκάστοτε καλά; οἷον πρῶτον τὰ σώματα τὰ καλὰ οὐχὶ ἤτοι κατὰ τὴν χρείαν λέγεις καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾖ, πρὸς τοῦτο, ἢ κατὰ ἡδονήν τινα, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς θεωροῦντας; ἔχεις τι ἐκτὸς τούτων λέγειν περὶ σώματος κάλλους;—ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτω καὶ σχήματα καὶ χρώματα ἢ διὰ ἡδονήν τινα ἢ διὰ ὠφελίαν ἢ δι' ἀμφότερα καλὰ προσαγορεύεις;—ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.—ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν πάντα ὡσαύτως;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τά γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δήπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστίν, τὰ καλά, τοῦ ἢ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι ἢ ἡδέα ἢ ἀμφότερα.—ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθη-

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d 1 *καὶ κακὸν* B W F: *κακὸν* T **d** 4 *καὶ σχήματα* B T P: om. F **d** 6 *τὰ καλὰ* B T P f: *καλὰ* F **d** 8 *ἐν* B T P: om. F *θεωρεῖσθαι* B (sed ras. ante *θ* et post *ω*: aliquid suprascr. rec. b) **e** 2 *καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα* F **e** 5 *πάντα* B T P: *ἅπαντα* F *γε* B T P: *τε* F **e** 7 *τὰ καλὰ* re vera B T P F *τοῦ ἢ ὠφέλιμα* W F: *ἢ ὠφέλιμα* B: *τοῦ ὠφέλιμα* T **a** 1 *μαθημάτων* T W F: *μαθητῶν* B

SOC. And you would too, at any rate, and all the others.

POL. Far from it, at any rate; but neither I nor you nor anyone else.

SOC. Will you not answer, then? c

POL. Very much so; for, actually, I desire to know what ever you will say.

SOC. Say to me, then, so that you may know, just as if I were asking you from the beginning: which do you think, Polus, is worse, doing injustice or suffering injustice?—POL. Suffering injustice, I think.—SOC. What, then? Which is more shameful, doing injustice or suffering injustice? Answer.—POL. Doing injustice.—SOC. Then it is worse too, if it is more shameful.—POL. Least of all.—SOC. I understand: you do not believe, it seems, that beautiful and good are d the same, nor bad and shameful.—POL. No indeed.

SOC. What of this? All the beautiful things, such as bodies and colours and shapes and voices and pursuits: is it looking to nothing that you call them beautiful each time?[1] For example, first, beautiful bodies: do you not say they are beautiful either according to their use, in respect of whatever each is useful for, or according to some pleasure, if in being contemplated it makes those who contemplate it rejoice? Have you the means to say anything outside these about beauty of body?—POL. I have not.—SOC. Then all e the other things too, thus, both shapes and colours: is it through some pleasure or through benefit or through both that you address them as beautiful?—POL. I do.—SOC. Is it not in the same way with voices too, and all the things of music?—POL. Yes.—SOC. And indeed the things in the laws, at any rate, and the pursuits, the beautiful ones, are surely not outside these, outside being either beneficial or pleasant or both.—POL. I do not think so.—SOC. Then also, 475 of studies, the

1. *Beautiful*: *kala*. The argument that follows, to 475a, applies the one word to bodies, colours, shapes, voices, pursuits, laws and studies, and the English keeps it. Polus has just granted that doing injustice is more *aischron*, "shameful", and Socrates now takes the shameful as the contrary of the beautiful.

μάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως;—ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὁρίζῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὁριζόμενος τὸ καλόν.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπῃ τε καὶ κακῷ;—ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.—ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῖν θάτερον κάλλιον ᾖ, ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτοιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιόν ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἡδονῇ ἢ ὠφελίᾳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις.—ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἴσχιον ᾖ, ἤτοι λύπῃ ἢ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἔσται· ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πῶς ἐλέγετο νυνδὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι; οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον;—ΠΩΛ. Ἔλεγον.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἤτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστιν καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἂν εἴη ἢ κακῷ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις; οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη;—ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἀδικούμενοι;—ΠΩΛ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα λύπῃ γε ὑπερέχει.—ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπῃ, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὑπερβάλλοι.—ΠΩΛ. Οὐ φαίνεται.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ λείπεται.—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Τῷ κακῷ.—ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.—ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὡμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἴσχιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε κάκιον ἐφάνη.—ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικε.—ΣΩ. Δέξαιο ἂν οὖν σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἀντὶ τοῦ ἧττον; μὴ

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a 6 *τούτοιν* B T P: *αὐτοῖν* F **a** 7 *ἢ* prius B T P: *ἢ καὶ* F **a** 8 *δὲ δὴ* B T P f: *δὴ* F **b** 1 post *κακῷ* add. *ἢ ἀμφοτέροις* Hirschig **b** 3 *ἐλέγετο* P F: *ἐλέγετο τὸ* B T W **b** 4 *κάκιον* B P F t: *κακὸν* T **c** 2 *ἀργοῦσι* P **c** 4 *γε* in ras. B **d** 2 *ἔμπροσθεν* B T F: *πρόσθεν* P *χρόνῳ*] *λόγῳ* Findeisen: secl. ci. Cron **d** 5 *σὺ* supra versum P **d** 5 *αἴσχιον* F: *αἰσχρὸν* B T W *τοῦ* P: *τοῦ τὸ* B T f: *τοῦτο* F

beauty in the same way?—POL. Certainly; and well, at any rate, you define now, Socrates, defining the beautiful by pleasure and good.[1]—SOC. Then the shameful by the contrary, by pain and bad?—POL. It is a necessity.—SOC. Whenever, then, of two beautiful things one is more beautiful, it is more beautiful by exceeding in one of these two or in both, either in pleasure or in benefit or in both.—POL. Certainly.—SOC. And whenever, then, of two shameful things one is more shameful, it will be more shameful by exceeding b
either in pain or in bad; or is it not a necessity?—POL. Yes.

SOC. Come, then: how was it said just now about doing injustice and suffering injustice? Were you not saying that suffering injustice is worse, but doing injustice more shameful?—POL. I was.—SOC. Then if doing injustice is more shameful than suffering injustice, either it is more painful, and would be more shameful by exceeding in pain, or in bad, or in both? Is this not a necessity too?—POL. How could it not?—SOC. First, then, let us look into whether doing injus- c
tice exceeds suffering injustice in pain, and whether those who do injustice are more in pain than those who suffer injustice.[2]—POL. By no means, Socrates, this at any rate.—SOC. Then it does not surpass in pain, at any rate.—POL. No indeed.—SOC. Then if not in pain, it would no longer exceed in both.—POL. It does not appear so.—SOC. Then it remains: in the other.—POL. Yes.—SOC. In bad.—POL. It seems so.—SOC. Then by exceeding in bad, doing injustice would be worse than suffering injustice.—POL. Plainly, then.

SOC. Was it not agreed with us, then, by the many among human d
beings and by you, in the time before, that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering injustice?—POL. Yes.—SOC. But now, at any rate, it has appeared worse.—POL. It seems so.—SOC. Would you, then, rather accept the worse and the more shameful in place of the less? Do not

1. *Well*: *kalōs*, the adverb of *kalos*: Polus praises a definition of the beautiful in its own word.

2. *Are more in pain*: *algousi*, from *algos*, another word for pain than *lypē*. Socrates uses the two as one, and the English gives both "pain" (so *algeinōs*, "painfully", and *algeinos*, "painful", from 476c on, and *algēdōn*, "pain", 477e, 478c).

ὄκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσῃ· ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἢ φάθι ἢ μὴ ἃ ἐρωτῶ.—ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὦ Σώ- e
κρατες.—ΣΩ. Ἄλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων;—ΠΩΛ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.—ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὔτ' ἂν ἐγὼ οὔτ' ἂν σὺ οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώ-
πων δέξαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ 5
τυγχάνει ὄν.—ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον παραβαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ ἐξαρκεῖς εἷς ὢν
μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυρῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ μόνον ἐπιψη- 476
φίζων τοὺς ἄλλους ἐῶ χαίρειν. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως ἐχέτω· μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν σκεψώμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἆρα μέγιστον τῶν
κακῶν ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ ᾤου, ἢ μεῖζον τὸ μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὖ 5
ἐγὼ ᾤμην.

Σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇδε· τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα ἆρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς;—ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.—
ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν λέγειν ὡς οὐχὶ τά γε δίκαια πάντα καλά b
ἐστιν, καθ' ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ.—ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.—ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε· ἆρα εἴ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου
τοῦ ποιοῦντος;—ΠΩΛ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.—ΣΩ. Ἆρα τοῦτο 5
πάσχον ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;—
ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.—ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ ταχὺ ὁ τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.— c
ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστὶν οἷον ἂν τὸ

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d 6 *ἀποκρίνεσθαι* F **e** 1 *ἃ* B T P f: *ἂν* F **a** 1 *ἐπιψηφίζων* B^2 T P: *ἐπιψηφίζω* B F **a** 2 *τοὺς* B T P: *τοὺς* δὲ F **a** 3 *οὗ* F Stobaeus: *ὃ* B T P *τὸ* B T F: om. P **a** 5 *ὡς αὖ* B T P: *ὥς γε αὖ* F **b** 2 *δίκαια* B T P F: *καὶ δίκαια* Stobaeus *διασκεψάμενος* B T F: *δὴ σκεψάμενος* P **b** 4 *πάσχον* B T P F: *πάσχειν* Stobaeus **b** 7 *τὸ τοιόνδε* B T P: *τόδε τοι***** F: *τοιόνδε* Stobaeus

hesitate to answer, Polus; for you will not be harmed at all. But offering yourself nobly to the argument, as to a doctor, answer, and either say so or not to what I ask.—POL. But I would not accept it, e
Socrates.—SOC. And would anyone else among human beings?—POL. I think not, according to this argument at any rate.—SOC. Then I was speaking the truth, that neither I nor you nor anyone else among human beings would accept doing injustice rather than suffering injustice; for it is in fact worse.—POL. So it appears.

SOC. You see, then, Polus, the refutation, when set beside the refutation, how it resembles it not at all: with you all the others agree except me, but for me you are enough, being one, alone, both 476
agreeing and bearing witness; and I, putting the question to the vote of you alone, let the others pass, bidding farewell.[1] And let this be so for us. But after this let us look into what we disputed about second: whether paying the penalty when doing injustice is the greatest of bad things, as you thought, or not paying it greater, as I, again, thought.

And let us look into it this way: paying the penalty and being punished justly when doing injustice, do you call them the same?—POL. I do.—SOC. Have you the means, then, to say that just things, b
at any rate, are not all beautiful, so far as they are just? Say, when you have looked thoroughly into it.—POL. Well, I think they are, Socrates.—SOC. Look into this too, then: if anyone does anything, is it a necessity that there also be something that suffers at the hands of this doer?[2]—POL. I think so.—SOC. Does it suffer that which the doer does, and of such a kind as the doer does it? I mean this sort of thing: if anyone strikes, is it a necessity that something be struck?—POL. It is a necessity.—SOC. And if the striker strikes violently or c
quickly, is what is struck also struck thus?—POL. Yes.—SOC. Such, then, is the suffering in what is struck as the

1. Socrates returns to 471e–472c, where Polus called the many as witnesses and Socrates wanted only the one he was talking with; *putting the question to the vote* recalls 473e–474a.

2. *Suffers*: *paschein*, to have a thing done to one, the counterpart of *poiein*, "do". The English keeps "suffer" for it through 476b–477a, so that each step of the argument shows; in Greek *dikaia paschein*, "suffer just things" (476e), and *agatha paschein*, "suffer good things" (477a), are ordinary phrases for being justly and well treated.

τύπτον ποιῇ;—ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κάει τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι;—ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε κάει ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτω κάεσθαι τὸ καόμενον ὡς ἂν τὸ κᾶον κάῃ;—ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τι, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; τέμνεται γάρ τι.—ΠΩΛ. Ναί. —ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἢ βαθὺ τὸ τμῆμα ἢ ἀλγεινόν, τοιοῦτον τμῆμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον οἷον τὸ τέμνον τέμνει;— ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.—ΣΩ. Συλλήβδην δὴ ὅρα εἰ ὁμολογεῖς, ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, περὶ πάντων, οἷον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιοῦν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πάσχον πάσχειν.—ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ὁμολογῶ.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον πάσχειν τί ἐστιν ἢ ποιεῖν;—ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάσχειν.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὑπό τινος ποιοῦντος;—ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ὑπό γε τοῦ κολάζοντος.—ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων δικαίως κολάζει;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Δίκαια ποιῶν ἢ οὔ; —ΠΩΛ. Δίκαια.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ κολαζόμενος δίκην διδοὺς δίκαια πάσχει;—ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.—ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ δίκαιά που καλὰ ὡμολόγηται;—ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Τούτων ἄρα ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ κολαζόμενος.—ΠΩΛ. Ναί. —ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά, ἀγαθά; ἢ γὰρ ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέλιμα.—ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.—ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδούς;—ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν.—ΣΩ. Ὠφελεῖται ἄρα;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφελίαν; βελτίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ δικαίως κολάζεται;—ΠΩΛ. Εἰκός γε.—ΣΩ. Κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδούς;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἆρα οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου ἀπαλλάττεται κακοῦ; ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου κακίαν ἄλλην τινὰ ἐνορᾷς ἢ πενίαν;—ΠΩΛ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πενίαν.—ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ; κακίαν ἂν φήσαις ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἶσχος καὶ τὰ

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c 7 *τι* T P: *τί* B F: *τις* Stobaeus **d** 3 *ἂν* B T P Stobaeus: *ἄν τι* F **e** 4 *ὡμολόγηται* B T P F: *ὁμολογεῖται* Stobaeus **a** 5 *βελτίων* B P F Stobaeus: *βελτίω* T **b** 4 *ἂν* B T P F: om. Stobaeus

striker does?—POL. Certainly.—SOC. Then if anyone burns, too, is it a necessity that something be burned?—POL. How could it not?—SOC. And if he burns violently, at any rate, or painfully, is what is burned burned thus, as the burner burns?—POL. Certainly.—SOC. Then if anything cuts, too, is it the same argument? For something is cut.—POL. Yes.—SOC. And if the cut is great, at any rate, or deep, or painful, is the thing cut cut with such a cut as the cutter cuts?— d
POL. So it appears.—SOC. Taken all together, then, see whether you agree to what I was saying just now about all things: that such as the doer does, such is what the sufferer suffers.—POL. Well, I agree.

SOC. These things being agreed, then, is paying the penalty suffering something, or is it doing?—POL. It is a necessity, Socrates: suffering.—SOC. Then at the hands of someone doing?—POL. How could it not? At the hands of the one who punishes, at any rate.—SOC. And the one who punishes rightly punishes justly?—POL. e
Yes.—SOC. Doing just things, or not?—POL. Just things.—SOC. Then the one being punished, paying the penalty, suffers just things?—POL. So it appears.—SOC. And just things, I take it, have been agreed to be beautiful?—POL. Certainly.—SOC. Of these, then, the one does beautiful things, and the other suffers them, the one being punished.—POL. Yes.—SOC. Then if beautiful, good? For they 477
are either pleasant or beneficial.—POL. It is a necessity.—SOC. Then the one who pays the penalty suffers good things?—POL. It seems so.—SOC. Then he is benefited?—POL. Yes.

SOC. Is it the benefit that I take it to be? He becomes better as to his soul, if he is justly punished?—POL. Likely, at any rate.—SOC. Then the one who pays the penalty is rid of vice of soul?[1]—POL. Yes.—SOC. Is he, then, rid of the greatest bad thing? Look into it this b
way: in the constitution of a person's money do you see in it any other vice than poverty?—POL. No, but poverty.—SOC. What in the constitution of a body? Would you claim that its vice is feebleness and disease and ugliness and the

1. *Vice*: *kakia*, the badness of anything, here of money and body as well as of soul, as the next lines show; the English "vice" in its old sense of a defect.

τοιαῦτα;—ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἡγῇ τινα εἶναι;—ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—ΣΩ. Ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;—ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρημάτων καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὄντων, τριττὰς εἴρηκας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν πονηριῶν αἰσχίστη; οὐχ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία;—ΠΩΛ. Πολύ γε.—ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη;—ΠΩΛ. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὧδί· ἀεὶ τὸ αἴσχιστον ἤτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρέχον ἢ βλάβην ἢ ἀμφότερα αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν.—ΠΩΛ. Μάλιστα.—ΣΩ. Αἴσχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νυνδὴ ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν;—ΠΩΛ. Ὡμολόγηται γάρ.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνίᾳ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιστον τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ βλάβῃ ἢ ἀμφότερα;—ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.—ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστιν τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμνειν τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ;—ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε.—ΣΩ. Ὑπερφυεῖ τινι ἄρα ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ καὶ κακῷ θαυμασίῳ ὑπερβάλλουσα τἆλλα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἴσχιστόν ἐστι πάντων, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος.—ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.—ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν που τό γε μεγίστῃ βλάβῃ ὑπερβάλλον μέγιστον ἂν κακὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων.—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἡ ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν ἐστιν;—ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

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b 5 *πονηρίαν ἡγεῖ* B T P F: *ἡγῇ πονηρίαν* Stobaeus **c** 2 *οὖν* B T P F: om. Stobaeus **c** 3 *οὐχ ἡ* B T P Stobaeus: *οὐχὶ* F **c** 4 *δὴ* B T P Stobaeus: *δὲ* F **c** 7 *ὡμολογημένων* B T P F: *ὁμολογουμένων* Stobaeus **d** 2 *ἢ* F: *ᾗ* B T P: *εἰ* Stobaeus *ἀνιαρότατον* F t: *ἀνιαρώτατον* B T P Stobaeus *ἐστι καὶ* F Stobaeus: *ἐστιν* B P et compendio T *αἴσχιστον τούτων ἐστὶν* secl. Dobree (habet Stobaeus) **d** 3 *βλάβῃ* F Stobaeus: *βλάβῃ ἢ λύπῃ* B T P *ἀμφότερα* B T P F Stobaeus: *ἀμφοτέροις* Hirschig **e** 2 *ὡς* B T P: *ὡς φησὶν* F *φαίνεται* B T P F: *οὕτως φαίνεται* Stobaeus **e** 6 *κακόν* B T F P: *κακῶν* Stobaeus

like?—POL. I would.—SOC. Then in a soul too do you believe there is some baseness?—POL. How could I not?—SOC. Do you not call this, then, injustice and want of learning and cowardice and the like?—POL. Very much so.—SOC. Then of money and body and soul, c which are three, you have spoken of three basenesses: poverty, disease, injustice?[1]—POL. Yes.—SOC. Which, then, of these basenesses is most shameful? Is it not injustice, and, taken all together, the baseness of the soul?—POL. By far.—SOC. If, then, most shameful, also worst?—POL. What do you mean, Socrates?

SOC. Like this: the most shameful is always most shameful by providing either the greatest pain or harm or both, from what has been agreed before.—POL. Most of all.—SOC. And that injustice and all baseness of soul is most shameful has been agreed by us d just now?—POL. It has been agreed, yes.—SOC. Then either it is most distressing, and is most shameful of these by exceeding in distress, or in harm, or in both?[2]—POL. It is a necessity.—SOC. Is being unjust and licentious and cowardly and unlearned, then, more painful than being poor and being ill?—POL. I do not think so, Socrates, from these things at any rate.—SOC. It is by some prodigiously great harm, then, and a marvellous bad thing, that the baseness of the soul exceeds the rest and is most shameful e of all, since it is not by pain, at any rate, as your argument has it.—POL. So it appears.—SOC. But indeed, I take it, what, at any rate, exceeds by the greatest harm would be the greatest bad thing of the things that are.—POL. Yes.—SOC. Then injustice and licentiousness and the other baseness of soul is the greatest bad thing of the things that are?—POL. So it appears.

1. *Basenesses*: *ponēriai*, from *ponēros*, "base", the bad condition of each of the three.

2. Burnet prints F's readings here: *ē*, "either", where B, T and P have *hēi*, "in so far as", and "in harm" alone, where they have "in harm or pain".

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ χρηματιστική;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ νόσου; οὐκ ἰατρική;—ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.—ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας; εἰ μὴ 478
οὕτως εὐπορεῖς, ὧδε σκόπει· ποῖ ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς κάμνοντας τὰ σώματα;—ΠΩΛ. Παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὦ Σώκρατες.—ΣΩ. Ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας;—ΠΩΛ. Παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις;—ΣΩ. Οὐ- 5
κοῦν δίκην δώσοντας;—ΠΩΛ. Φημί.—ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ τινὶ χρώμενοι κολάζουσιν οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες; ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δή.—ΣΩ. Χρηματιστικὴ μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, ἰατρικὴ δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας.— b
ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν [ὧν λέγεις];—ΠΩΛ. Τίνων λέγεις;—ΣΩ. Χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης. —ΠΩΛ. Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν 5
αὖ ἤτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ ἢ ὠφελίαν ἢ ἀμφότερα, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι ἡδύ ἐστιν, καὶ χαίρουσιν οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι;—ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.—ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὠφέλιμόν γε. ἦ γάρ;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσι- c
τελεῖ ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιῆ εἶναι.—ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἰατρευόμενος, ἢ μηδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν;—ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι μηδὲ κάμνων.—ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν εὐδαιμονία, 5
ὡς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγή, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις.—ΠΩΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῖν ἐχόντοιν κακὸν d
εἴτ' ἐν σώματι εἴτ' ἐν ψυχῇ, ὁ ἰατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττό-

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e 8 *τίς* B T P F: *τῆς* Stobaeus **a** 4 *καὶ τοὺς* B T P: *τοὺς καὶ* F: *καὶ* Stobaeus **b** 3 *οὖν* T P f Olympiodorus: om. B F Stobaeus *ὧν λέγεις* B T P F Stobaeus: secl. Hermann (non vertit Ficinus): *ὧν λέγω* Findeisen **c** 2 *καὶ ὑγιῆ εἶναι* B T P F Stobaeus: secl. Morstadt: *καὶ ὑγιεῖ εἶναι* Par. 1815 **c** 3 *εὐδαιμονέστερος* F **d** 1 *τί* B T P f: *τίς* F Stobaeus *πότερος* B T P F: *πότερον* Stobaeus *κακὸν* B T Stobaeus: *κακῶς* P: *κακοῦν* F **d** 2 *καὶ* B T P F: *καὶ ὁ* Stobaeus

SOC. What craft, then, rids of poverty? Is it not money-making?—POL. Yes.—SOC. And which of disease? Is it not medicine?—POL. It 478
is a necessity.—SOC. And which of baseness and injustice? If you do not have resource thus, look into it this way: where do we take those who are ill in their bodies, and to whom?—POL. To the doctors, Socrates.—SOC. And where do we take those who do injustice and those who are licentious?—POL. To the judges, do you mean?—SOC. Then to pay the penalty?—POL. I claim so.—SOC. Then do not those who punish rightly punish by making use of a certain justice?—POL. Plainly, then.—SOC. Money-making, then, rids of poverty, medicine of disease, and penalty of licentiousness and b
injustice.[1]—POL. So it appears.

SOC. Which of these, then, is most beautiful?[2]—POL. Which do you mean?—SOC. Money-making, medicine, penalty.—POL. Penalty far excels, Socrates.—SOC. Then, again, it makes either the most pleasure, or benefit, or both, if it is most beautiful?—POL. Yes.—SOC. Is being treated pleasant, then, and do those being treated rejoice?—POL. I do not think so.—SOC. But beneficial, at any rate. Is it not?—POL. Yes.—SOC. For he is being rid of a great bad c
thing, so that it profits him to endure the pain and be healthy.—POL. How could it not?—SOC. Would a person, then, be happiest in respect of body thus, being treated, or not even being ill at the outset?—POL. Plainly, not even being ill.—SOC. For this, it seems, was not happiness, riddance of a bad thing, but not even the acquisition of it at the outset.—POL. It is so.

SOC. What? Of two who have a bad thing, whether in body or in d
soul, which is more wretched: the one being treated and being rid

1. *Penalty*: *dikē*, the word in "pay the penalty" (*dikēn didonai*), which Socrates now sets as a craft beside money-making and medicine: the "certain justice" by which the judges punish (478a), as justice was set beside medicine at 464b. The English keeps "penalty" (472d), so that the cure is what is paid.

2. Burnet brackets *hōn legeis*, "of those you mean", after "most beautiful", following Hermann (Ficino's Latin does not render them); the English omits them, and Polus' question follows on.

μενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος, ἔχων δέ;—ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεταί μοι ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἦν, πονηρίας;—ΠΩΛ. Ἦν γάρ. —ΣΩ. Σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη.—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη.—ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δή.—ΣΩ. Δεύτερος δέ που ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.—ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν.—ΣΩ. Οὗτος δ' ἦν ὁ νουθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενος καὶ δίκην διδούς.—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὁ ἔχων [ἀδικίαν] καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.—ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν ὃς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικῶν καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστῃ ἀδικίᾳ διαπράξηται ὥστε μήτε νουθετεῖσθαι μήτε κολάζεσθαι μήτε δίκην διδόναι, ὥσπερ σὺ φῂς Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυράννους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικε.

ΣΩ. Σχεδὸν γάρ που οὗτοι, ὦ ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ διαπεπραγμένοι εἰσὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις νοσήμασιν συνισχόμενος διαπράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἁμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ ἰατρεύεσθαι, φοβούμενος ὡσπεranεὶ παῖς τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι ἀλγεινόν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ οὕτω;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀγνοῶν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρετὴ σώματος. κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὡμολογημένων τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες,

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d 4 ἔχων δέ post ἰατρευόμενος add. F **d** 5 μεγάλου Stobaeus **d** 8 τοῦτο om. Stobaeus **e** 2 δέ που F: δήπου B T W Stobaeus **e** 4 ἀδικίαν] κακίαν Dobree: om. Stobaeus **e** 6 τὰ om. Stobaeus **a** 4 ἔοικε B T F: om. P Stobaeus **a** 6 μεγίστοις om. Stobaeus **a** 7 συνισχόμενος T F Stobaeus: συνησχόμενος B: συνεχόμενος P διαπράξαιτο] διεπράξατο Stobaeus **a** 9 ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ παῖς B T P: ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποις F Stobaeus **b** 3 γε B T P Stobaeus: δὲ F **b** 4 σώματος] τοῦ σώματος Stobaeus

of the bad thing, or the one not being treated, but having it?—POL. The one not being treated appears so to me.—SOC. Then paying the penalty was a riddance of the greatest bad thing, baseness?—POL. It was, yes.—SOC. For penalty, I take it, brings people to temperance and makes them more just, and becomes a medicine for baseness.[1]—POL. Yes.—SOC. Happiest, then, is the one who has no vice in soul, since this appeared the greatest of bad things.—POL. e
Plainly, then.—SOC. And second, I take it, the one who is being rid of it.—POL. It seems so.—SOC. And this was the one who is admonished and rebuked and pays the penalty.—POL. Yes.—SOC. Worst, then, lives the one who has it and is not rid of it.[2]—POL. So it appears.

SOC. Then is this not in fact the man who, doing the greatest injustices and making use of the greatest injustice, contrives neither to be admonished nor to be punished nor to pay the penalty, as 479
you claim Archelaus has prepared himself, and the other tyrants and orators and potentates?

POL. It seems so.

SOC. For these men, I take it, best of men, have contrived nearly the same thing as if someone held fast by the greatest illnesses were to contrive not to pay the penalty to the doctors for his errors concerning the body, and not to be treated, being afraid, just like a child, of being burned and being cut, because it is painful.[3] Or do b
you not think so too?

POL. I do.

SOC. Being ignorant, at any rate, as it seems, of what sort of thing health and virtue of body are. For from what has now been agreed by us it looks like those too who flee the penalty do some such thing,[4]

1. *Brings people to temperance*: *sōphronizei*, from *sōphrōn*, "temperate".

2. Burnet brackets *adikian*, "injustice", as the object of "has" (Stobaeus omits it; Dobree proposed *kakian*, "vice").

3. Cautery and the knife, the surgeon's remedies, as at 456b and 521e.

4. *Flee the penalty*: *tēn dikēn pheugein*, which in the courts also means to be the defendant in a suit.

ὦ Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅσῳ ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιοῦς σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρᾷ καὶ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ, ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι c μηδ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως ἂν ὦσιν ὡς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν· εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀληθῆ ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἆρ' αἰσθάνῃ τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ βούλει συλλο- 5 γισώμεθα αὐτά;

ΠΩΛ. Εἰ σοί γε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἡ ἀδικία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν;—ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεταί γε.—ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγή γε d ἐφάνη τούτου τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ δίκην διδόναι;—ΠΩΛ. Κινδυνεύει.—ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμμονὴ τοῦ κακοῦ;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Δεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγι- 5 στόν τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν πέφυκεν.—ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ τούτου, ὦ φίλε, ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν, σὺ μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα δίκην οὐδεμίαν διδόντα, ἐγὼ δὲ τοὐναντίον οἰόμενος, e εἴτε Ἀρχέλαος εἴτ' ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ὁστισοῦν μὴ δίδωσι δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ προσήκειν ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικουμένου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ διδόντα δίκην τοῦ 5 διδόντος; οὐ ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγόμενα;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετο;

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· εἰ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ Πῶλε, τίς ἡ 480 μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς; δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν

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b 8 *ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ* T P F Stobaeus: *ὑγιὴς ψυχὴ* B (corr. rec. b) **c** 7 *σοί γε* F: *σοί γε ἄλλως* B T P: *μὴ σοί γε ἄλλως* vulg. **d** 3 *δέ γε* B W F: *γε* T **d** 5 *ἀδικεῖν*] *ἀδικεῖν δίκην διδόντα* Stallbaum: *ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην* Hirschig **d** 6 *τε* T P F: *γε* B **d** 7 *οὖν οὐ* F: *οὖν* B T P

Polus: they catch sight of the painful in it, but are blind toward the beneficial, and are ignorant how much more wretched than living with a body not healthy it is to live with a soul not healthy, but unsound and unjust and unholy. That is why they do everything c
so as not to pay the penalty and not to be rid of the greatest bad thing, preparing both money and friends, and how they may be as persuasive as possible in speaking. But if we have agreed to true things, Polus, do you perceive the things that result from the argument? Or do you want us to reckon them up?

POL. If you think fit, at any rate.

SOC. Does it result, then, that the greatest bad thing is injustice and doing injustice?—POL. So it appears, at any rate.—SOC. And in- d
deed paying the penalty appeared a riddance, at any rate, of this bad thing?—POL. It looks like it.—SOC. And not paying it, at any rate, an abiding in the bad thing?—POL. Yes.—SOC. Doing injustice, then, is second of bad things in magnitude; but not paying the penalty when doing injustice is naturally the greatest and first of all bad things.—POL. It seems so.

SOC. Was it not about this, then, my friend, that we disputed: you calling Archelaus happy, who does the greatest injustices while e
paying no penalty, while I thought the contrary, that whether Archelaus or anyone else whatever among human beings does not pay the penalty when doing injustice, it is fitting for this man to be wretched beyond the rest of human beings, and that always the one doing injustice is more wretched than the one suffering injustice, and the one not paying the penalty than the one paying it? Were these not the things said by me?

POL. Yes.

SOC. Has it not been demonstrated, then, that what was said was true?

POL. So it appears.

SOC. Very well: if these things are true, then, Polus, what is 480
rhetoric's great use? For one must, from what

νῦν ὡμολογημένων αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα φυλάττειν ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσει, ὡς ἱκανὸν κακὸν ἕξοντα. οὐ γάρ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰν δέ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις ὧν ἂν κήδηται, αὐτὸν ἑκόντα ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε ὅπου ὡς τάχιστα δώσει δίκην, παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ὥσπερ παρὰ τὸν ἰατρόν, σπεύδοντα ὅπως μὴ ἐγχρονισθὲν τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀδικίας ὕπουλον τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσει καὶ ἀνίατον· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴπερ τὰ πρότερον μένει ἡμῖν ὁμολογήματα; οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα ἐκείνοις οὕτω μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ μή;

ΠΩΛ. Τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας τῆς αὑτοῦ ἢ γονέων ἢ ἑταίρων ἢ παίδων ἢ πατρίδος ἀδικούσης οὐ χρήσιμος οὐδὲν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἡμῖν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις ὑπολάβοι ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον—κατηγορεῖν δεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἑαυτοῦ, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὃς ἂν ἀεὶ τῶν φίλων τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ φανερὸν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῷ δίκην καὶ ὑγιὴς γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν τε αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ἀποδειλιᾶν ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κάειν ἰατρῷ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν διώκοντα, μὴ ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἐὰν μέν γε πληγῶν ἄξια ἠδικηκὼς ᾖ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δεσμοῦ, δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας, ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγῆς, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνῄσκοντα, αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὄντα κατήγορον καὶ αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρώμενον τῇ ῥητορικῇ, ὅπως ἂν καταδήλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάτ-

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a 4 *ἀδικήσει* F: *ἀδικήσῃ* B T P *ἱκανὸν* secl. Cobet *κακὸν* secl. v. Kleist **b** 2 *ποιήσει* scr. recc.: *ποιήσῃ* B T W F *λέγομεν* W F: *λέγωμεν* B T **c** 1 *ἐπὶ* B T P f: *ἐπεὶ* F: secl. Deuschle **c** 5 *τε* F (*καὶ* add. f): δὲ *καὶ* B T P **c** 6 *εὖ καὶ* F: *καὶ* B T P **d** 4 *καὶ* B T P: *καὶ μὴ φειδόμενον ἀλλ'* F **d** 5 *ἀπαλλάττωνται* B P t (sed *ω* in ras. B): *ἀπαλλάττονται* T F

has now been agreed, oneself guard oneself most of all, so as not to do injustice, as one who will have a sufficient bad thing. Is it not so?

POL. Certainly.

SOC. And if, at any rate, either he himself or anyone else he cares for does injustice, he must go himself, willingly, to where he will pay the penalty as quickly as possible, to the judge as to the doctor, hurrying so that the illness of injustice may not, by lingering, make b
the soul festering and incurable.[1] Or how do we say it, Polus, if our earlier agreements remain? Is it not a necessity that these be in consonance with those thus, but otherwise not?

POL. For what indeed are we to claim, Socrates?

SOC. For making a defence, then, on behalf of injustice, one's own, or one's parents' or companions' or children's, or one's fatherland's when it does injustice, rhetoric is useful to us for nothing, Polus, unless someone were to take it to be for the contrary—that c
one must accuse oneself most of all, and then one's own people too and the others, whichever of one's friends is in fact doing injustice at any time, and not hide it, but bring the act of injustice into the open, so that he may pay the penalty and become healthy; and compel oneself and the others not to play the coward, but to offer oneself, eyes shut, well and courageously, as to a doctor for cutting and burning, pursuing the good and beautiful, not taking the painful into account: if, at any rate, one has done injustices worthy of blows, offering oneself to be struck; if of bonds, to be bound; d
if of a fine, paying it;[2] if of exile, going into exile; if of death, dying; being oneself the first accuser both of oneself and of the others of one's own people, and making use of rhetoric for this, so that, as the acts of injustice become plain, they may be rid

1. *Festering*: *hypoulos*, of a sore closed over at the surface but corrupt beneath.

2. *A fine*: *zēmia*, "loss", here in its legal sense, a penalty in money; the verb from it was rendered "suffer loss" at 470a.

τωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας. φῶμεν οὕτως ἢ μὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Πῶλε;

ΠΩΛ. Ἄτοπα μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέντοι e
ἔμπροσθεν ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ κἀκεῖνα λυτέον ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί, τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχει.

ΣΩ. Τοὐναντίον δέ γε αὖ μεταβαλόντα, εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινα 5
κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἐχθρὸν εἴτε ὁντινοῦν, ἐὰν μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς ἀδικῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ—τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εὐλαβητέον—ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ὁ ἐχθρός, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον, καὶ πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δῷ δίκην μηδὲ ἔλθῃ παρὰ 481
τὸν δικαστήν· ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθῃ, μηχανητέον ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῷ δίκην ὁ ἐχθρός, ἀλλ' ἐάντε χρυσίον ⟨ᾖ⟩ ἡρπακὼς πολύ, μὴ ἀποδιδῷ τοῦτο ἀλλ' ἔχων ἀναλίσκῃ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, ἐάντε αὖ θανάτου 5
ἄξια ἠδικηκὼς ᾖ, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται, μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος ἔσται πονηρὸς ὤν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπως ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον βιώσεται τοιοῦτος ὤν. ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα b
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῷ γε μὴ μέλλοντι ἀδικεῖν οὐ μεγάλη τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἡ χρεία αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ δὴ καὶ ἔστιν τις χρεία, ὡς ἔν γε τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδαμῇ ἐφάνη οὖσα. 5

ΚΑΛ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει;

ΧΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς σπουδάζειν· οὐδὲν μέντοι οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.

ΚΑΛ. Νὴ τοὺς θεούς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώ- 10
κρατες, πότερόν σε θῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα ἢ παίζοντα; εἰ c
μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ

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d 6 *μεγίστου* B T P: *μεγάλου* F *ἀδικίας* B T F: om. P **e** 3 *κἀκεῖνα* B T P F: *'κεῖνα* Hirschig **a** 3 *δῷ* F t: *δώιη* B: *δώηι* P T *ᾖ* add. Schanz (post *ἡρπακὼς* Par. 1811) **a** 4 *ἀναλίσκῃ* L. Dindorf: *ἀναλίσκητε* P (sed *τε* puncto del.): *ἀναλίσκηται* B T F **a** 5 *αὖ* F: om. B T P **c** 1 *θῶμεν* Madvig: *φῶμεν* B T P F: om. nonnulli teste Olympiodoro *νυνὶ* B T P: *νῦν* F

of the greatest bad thing, injustice. Are we to claim so, or not claim it, Polus?

POL. Outlandish things, Socrates, I think; with what went before, e
however, they are perhaps in agreement, for you.

SOC. Then either those things too must be undone, or it is a necessity that these result?

POL. Yes, this at any rate is so.

SOC. And again, changing to the contrary, at any rate, if, then, one must do ill to anyone, whether an enemy or anyone whatever, provided only that one does not oneself suffer injustice at the hands of the enemy—for one must beware of this—but if the enemy does injustice to another, one must prepare in every way, both by doing and by saying, so that he may neither pay the penalty 481
nor come to the judge; and if he comes, one must devise that the enemy escape and not pay the penalty; but if he has seized much gold, that he not give it back but, keeping it, spend it on himself and on his own, unjustly and godlessly; and if, again, he has done injustices worthy of death, that he not die, most of all never, but be immortal, being base, and if not, that he live the longest time pos- b
sible, being such.[1] For such things, Polus, I think rhetoric is useful, since for the one, at any rate, who is not going to do injustice its use is not, I think, any great one, if indeed it has any use at all, as in what went before, at any rate, it appeared to be none at all.

CALL. Say to me, Chaerephon: is Socrates in earnest in this, or is he playing?

CHAER. I think he is prodigiously in earnest, Callicles. There is nothing, however, like asking the man himself.[2]

CALL. By the gods, I do desire to. Say to me, Socrates, are we to c
set you down now as in earnest, or as playing?[3] For if you are in earnest, and these things are in fact true which

1. Socrates takes up the common rule of helping friends and harming enemies (*Meno* 71e; *Republic* 332a–d) and draws from it a use for rhetoric that no one would avow; that the passage is ironic is the usual reading, and an interpretation.

2. Callicles, Gorgias' host (447b), speaks for the first time since 458d, and Chaerephon gives him back his own words of 447c.

3. *Set you down*: *thōmen*, Madvig's conjecture, which Burnet prints; the manuscripts have *phōmen*, "are we to claim" (some copies known to Olympiodorus lacked the verb).

λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἃ δεῖ;

ΣΩ. Ὦ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μή τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι [ἢ] τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλά τις ἡμῶν ἴδιόν τι ἔπασχεν πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ῥᾴδιον ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα. λέγω δ' ἐννοήσας ὅτι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταὐτόν τι πεπονθότες, ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυοῖν ἑκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ δυοῖν, τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου ἑκάστοτε, καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι ἂν φῇ σου τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου· ἔν τε τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐάν τι σοῦ λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων μὴ φῇ οὕτως ἔχειν, μεταβαλλόμενος λέγεις ἃ ἐκεῖνος βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυριλάμπους νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαῦτα ἕτερα πέπονθας. τοῖς γὰρ τῶν παιδικῶν βουλεύμασίν τε καὶ λόγοις οὐχ οἷός τ' εἶ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὥστε, εἴ τίς σου λέγοντος ἑκάστοτε ἃ διὰ τούτους λέγεις θαυμάζοι ὡς ἄτοπά ἐστιν, ἴσως εἴποις ἂν αὐτῷ, εἰ βούλοιο τἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὅτι εἰ μή τις παύσει τὰ σὰ παιδικὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ σὺ παύσῃ ποτὲ ταῦτα λέγων. νόμιζε τοίνυν καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ χρῆναι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούειν, καὶ μὴ θαύμαζε ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγουσαν. λέγει γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ἃ νῦν ἐμοῦ ἀκούεις, καί μοί ἐστιν τῶν ἑτέρων παιδικῶν πολὺ ἧττον ἔμπληκτος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κλεινίειος οὗτος ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἐστὶ λόγων, ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία ἀεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, λέγει δὲ ἃ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρῆσθα δὲ καὶ

c 3 ἢ B T P f: om. F **c** 6 ἢ T P F: ἡ B: om. Aldina **d** 4 δυοῖν B T P F: om. Vind. 21 **d** 6 ὅτι ἂν φῇ F: ὅτι ὅπως ἂν φῇ B: ὅτι ὅπως ἂν ἀντιφῇ T P **e** 2 ὁ δῆμος ὁ T P F: ὁ δῆμος B **e** 5 βουλεύμασι(ν) B T P F: βουλήμασι vulg. **a** 5 ἃ re vera B F: ἀεὶ ἃ T (?) P f **a** 6 ἑτέρων B F: ἑταίρων T P ἔμπληκτος B T P F: γρ. ἔκβλητος B² quam lectionem novit Olympiodorus **a** 7 ἀεὶ corr. Coisl: εἶ F: om. B T P

you say, is it not that our life, the life of human beings, would be overturned, and that we are doing, as it seems, all the contrary of what we must?

soc. Callicles, if there were not, for human beings, some suffering that was the same, for some one thing, for others another, but one of us suffered some suffering of his own, other than the others do, it would not be easy to point out his own suffering to the d
other.[1] I say this having considered that you and I have in fact now suffered something the same: being two, we are in love, each of us with two, I with Alcibiades son of Clinias and with philosophy, and you with two, the people of the Athenians and the son of Pyrilampes.[2] So I perceive you each time, formidable though you are, having no power to contradict whatever your darling claims, and however he claims things are, but changing, up and down. Both e
in the assembly, if, while you are saying something, the people of the Athenians claim it is not so, changing, you say what they want; and toward this beautiful young man, the son of Pyrilampes, you have suffered other such things. For you are not able to oppose the counsels and speeches of your darlings, so that, if someone were to marvel at how outlandish the things are that you say each time because of them, you would perhaps say to him, if you wanted to speak the truth, that unless someone stops your darlings from 482
these speeches, you too will never cease saying these things. Hold, then, that from me too you must hear other such things, and do not marvel that I say these things, but stop philosophy, my darling, from saying them. For she says, my friend and companion, what you now hear from me, and she is much less capricious to me than my other darling; for this son of Clinias is of different speeches at different times, but philosophy always of the same,[3] and she says b
the things you now marvel at; and you were present, too,

1. *Suffering*: *pathos*, what befalls one, here a feeling, love; the *Phaedrus* calls love a *pathos* (252b), rendered there "experience". It and *pathēma* are kept with *paschein*, "suffer", as at 476b–477a, since Callicles throws the words back at 482c and calls suffering injustice no man's suffering at 483b. *The same*: Burnet brackets the *ē*, "than", of T, P and F ("rather than the same"; B writes it without accent), which the Aldine edition omits.

2. Alcibiades son of Clinias, whose lover Socrates is in the *Alcibiades I* (103a) and the *Protagoras* (309a); compare the *Symposium* (213c–d). Pyrilampes' son was Demos, a famous beauty (Aristophanes, *Wasps* 97–98); his name is the Greek for "people", so that Callicles is in love with two *dēmoi*.

3. *Always*: *aei*, from a correction in a Coislin manuscript; B, T and P lack it, and F has *ei*.

αὐτὸς λεγομένοις. ἢ οὖν ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγξον, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστιν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ διδόναι ἁπάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν· ἢ εἰ τοῦτο ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, οὔ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφωνήσει ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ. καίτοι ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀνάρμοστόν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοίην, καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ' ἐναντία λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἕνα ὄντα ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν.

ΚΑΛ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὤν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς ταὐτὸν παθόντος Πώλου πάθος ὅπερ Γοργίου κατηγόρει πρὸς σὲ παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ που Γοργίαν ἐρωτώμενον ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐὰν ἀφίκηται παρ' αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος τὰ δίκαια ὁ τὴν ῥητορικὴν βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξοι αὐτὸν ὁ Γοργίας, αἰσχυνθῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ φάναι διδάξειν διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἂν εἴ τις μὴ φαίη—διὰ δὴ ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἀναγκασθῆναι ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὑτῷ εἰπεῖν, σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶν—καί σου καταγελᾶν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς, τότε· νῦν δὲ πάλιν αὐτὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἔπαθεν. καὶ ἔγωγε κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄγαμαι Πῶλον, ὅτι σοι συνεχώρησεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὖ τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη, αἰσχυνθεὶς ἃ ἐνόει εἰπεῖν. σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν, ἃ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν καλά, νόμῳ δέ. ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντί' ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἥ τε φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμος· ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύ-

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b 5 *τὸν αἰγυπτίων* B: *τὸν αἰγύπτιον* F Olympiodorus: *τῶν αἰγυπτίων* T P (sed *τὸν* supra *τῶν* T) *καλλικλῆς* T W F: *καλλικλεῖ* B **b** 8 *ἀναρμοστεῖν* Heusde **c** 1 *πλείστους* B T P: *πολλοὺς* F **c** 4 *δοκεῖς* B T P: *δοκεῖς μοι* F **d** 3 *εἰ μή τις φαίη* P (sed add. signis transpositionis) **d** 5 *καταγελᾶν* B T P F: *κατεγέλα* f Vind. 21 **e** 6 *ἐὰν οὖν τις* B T P: *καὶ ἐάν τις οἶμαι* F

yourself, as they were being said. So either refute her, the very thing I was saying just now, showing that doing injustice, and not paying the penalty when doing injustice, is not the utmost of all bad things; or, if you let this pass unrefuted, by the dog, the god of the Egyptians, Callicles will not agree with you, Callicles, but will be in dissonance with you in all his life.[1] And yet I, for my part, think, most excellent man, that it is better for my lyre to be out of harmony and in dissonance, and for a chorus that I might furnish as choregus, and for most human beings not to agree with me but c
to say contrary things, rather than that I, being one, should be out of consonance with myself and say contrary things.[2]

CALL. Socrates, you seem to swagger like a young man in the arguments, being in truth one who addresses the people; and now you are addressing the people with these things, Polus having suffered the same suffering that he accused Gorgias of having suffered toward you. For he claimed, I take it, that Gorgias, when asked by you whether, if there came to him without knowing the just things the one who wants to learn rhetoric, Gorgias would d
teach him, was ashamed and claimed he would teach him, because of the habit of human beings, since they would be vexed if someone claimed not—and that because of this agreement, then, he was compelled to say contrary things, himself to himself, and that you cherished this very thing—and that he laughed at you, rightly, as I think at least, at that time.[3] But now again he himself has suffered this same thing. And I, for my part, do not admire Polus in this very respect, that he granted you that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering injustice; for from this agreement, again, he himself, e
hobbled by you in the arguments, was muzzled, being ashamed to say what he had in mind. For you in reality, Socrates, lead into such vulgar things, fit for addressing the people, asserting that you pursue the truth, things which are not beautiful by nature, but by law. And for the most part these are contrary to each other, nature and law; so if someone is ashamed

1. *By the dog*: Socrates' oath (*Apology* 22a, *Phaedrus* 228b; so 461b and 466c, broken off at 466e); here he names the dog as the Egyptians' god, commonly taken to be Anubis, whom the Greeks pictured dog-headed.

2. *Better*: *kreitton*, used impersonally, from *kreittōn*, "stronger", which in common speech also means "better", "superior"; so again at 483b. Socrates will ask at 488b–d whether Callicles' "stronger" is the same as "better". *Choregus*: the rich citizen who paid for a festival chorus.

3. Callicles recalls 460a–461c: Gorgias granted that he would teach the just to a pupil who did not know it, and so contradicted his admission that a pupil may use rhetoric unjustly (457b–c, 460e–461a); Polus put the concession down to shame (461b–c). The one who laughed is Polus.

νηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία 483
λέγειν. ὦ δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκὼς κακουρ-
γεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, κατὰ
φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου.
ὥσπερ αὐτίκα ἐν τούτοις, τῷ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι, 5
Πώλου τὸ κατὰ νόμον αἴσχιον λέγοντος, σὺ τὸν λόγον
ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν. φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν
ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. οὐδὲ
γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶν τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' b
ἀνδραπόδου τινὸς ᾧ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, ὅστις
ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος μὴ οἷός τέ ἐστιν αὐτὸς
αὑτῷ βοηθεῖν μηδὲ ἄλλῳ οὗ ἂν κήδηται. ἀλλ' οἶμαι οἱ
τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν καὶ οἱ 5
πολλοί. πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὑτοῖς συμφέρον τούς τε
νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ τοὺς
ψόγους ψέγουσιν· ἐκφοβοῦντες τοὺς ἐρρωμενεστέρους τῶν c
ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλέον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν
πλέον ἔχωσιν, λέγουσιν ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄδικον τὸ πλεον-
εκτεῖν, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων
ζητεῖν ἔχειν· ἀγαπῶσι γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχωσιν 5
φαυλότεροι ὄντες. διὰ ταῦτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ
αἰσχρὸν λέγεται, τὸ πλέον ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ
ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν· ἡ δέ γε οἶμαι φύσις αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει
αὐτό, ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον d
ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ δὲ
ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις
καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν,

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a 3 *κατὰ* (bis) B T P: *τὰ κατὰ* (bis) F **a** 6 *αἴσχιον* (*αἰσχρὸν* F) . . . *νόμον* T F: om. B W *λόγον* Riemann: *νόμον* B T P F **a** 7 *ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν* B W (*τὸ* ante *κατὰ* add. P): *ἐδιώκαθες* T: (*ἐδίωκες* F et in marg. T et *γρ.* W) **a** 8 ante *τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι* lacunam statuit Stephanus *τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι* . . . *ἀδικεῖν* secl. Dobree **b** 2 *ἐστι(ν) τεθνάναι* B P F: *τεθνάναι ἐστὶν* T (compendio) **b** 4 *οὗ* B P F: *ᾧ* T **b** 5 *οἱ* ante *ἀσθενεῖς* om. P **c** 3 *λέγουσιν* secl. Hermann **d** 1 *αὐτό* B T P F: *αὖ* Par. 2110

and does not dare to say the very things he has in mind, he is com- 483
pelled to say contrary things. This wise thing, indeed, you too have apprehended, and you do mischief in the arguments: if someone speaks according to law, you ask back according to nature, and if of the things of nature, the things of law.[1] As, for instance, in these things, doing injustice and suffering injustice: when Polus spoke of what is more shameful according to law, you pursued the argument according to nature.[2] For by nature everything is more shameful that is also worse, suffering injustice; but by law, doing injustice. For this is not even a man's suffering, at any rate, suffer- b
ing injustice, but some chattel slave's, for whom being dead is better than living, who, when suffering injustice and being dragged in the mud, is not able himself to help himself, nor anyone else he cares for. But, I think, those who lay down the laws are the feeble human beings and the many. With a view, then, to themselves and to what is to their own advantage they lay down the laws, and praise their praises and censure their censures; frighten- c
ing the more robust of human beings, who are able to have more, so that they may not have more than they, they say that overreaching is shameful and unjust, and that this is doing injustice, seeking to have more than the others; for they cherish it, I think, if they themselves have an equal share, being more paltry.[3] It is because of these things, then, that by law this is said to be unjust and shameful, seeking to have more than the many, and they call it doing injustice; but nature itself, I think, at any rate, sets it forth, that it is d
just for the superior to have more than the inferior, and the abler than the less able. And it makes these things plain in many places, that they are so, both among the other animals and among human beings, in whole cities and races,

1. *Nature ... law*: *physis*, *nomos*, the antithesis on which Callicles' speech is built; *nomos* is written law and custom alike. It was a commonplace of the fifth-century sophists: Hippias in the *Protagoras* calls law "a tyrant of human beings" that does much violence against nature (337d), and Antiphon's *On Truth* holds that the rules of law are agreed on, those of nature necessary (87 B 44 DK).

2. *The argument*: *logon*, Riemann's conjecture, which Burnet prints; the manuscripts have *nomon*, "you pursued the law according to nature" (B and W, by an omission, lack the clause).

3. *Overreaching*: *pleonektein*, from *pleon echein*, "to have more", which Callicles sets beside it. Glaucon in the *Republic* gives, as others' view, the same account of law as a compact of the weak (358e–359b), and says that every nature pursues *pleonexia*, "overreaching", as a good, but is forced by law to honour equality (359c).

ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας; ἢ ἄλλα μυρία ἄν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι οὗτοι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου ταῦτα πράττουσιν, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως κατὰ τοῦτον ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα· πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας, κατεπᾴδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες καταδουλούμεθα λέγοντες ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρὴ ἔχειν καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐὰν δέ γε οἶμαι φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνήρ, πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισάμενος καὶ διαρρήξας καὶ διαφυγών, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπῳδὰς καὶ νόμους τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας, ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξέλαμψεν τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος ἅπερ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι ἐν ᾧ λέγει ὅτι—

> νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς
> θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων·

οὗτος δὲ δή, φησίν,—

> ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον
> ὑπερτάτᾳ χειρί· τεκμαίρομαι
> ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλέος, ἐπεὶ—ἀπριάτας—

λέγει οὕτω πως—τὸ γὰρ ᾆσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι—λέγει δ' ὅτι οὔτε πριάμενος οὔτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρυόνου ἠλάσατο τὰς βοῦς, ὡς τούτου ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου φύσει, καὶ βοῦς καὶ τἆλλα κτή-

e 2 *τὴν τοῦ δικαίου* secl. Schleiermacher **e 3** *τῆς* re vera B T (?) P F: om. Schanz (errore typothetarum ut videtur) **e 4** *τιθέμεθα* secl. Hermann **a 1** *λέγοντες* secl. Cobet **a 3** *ἀνὴρ* B P F: *ὁ ἀνὴρ* T **a 4** *διαφυγών* secl. Naber *γράμματα*] *περιάμματα* Valckenaer: *πλάσματα* Cobet **b 7** *δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον* Aristides (cf. Legg. 714 e *ἄγειν δικαιοῦντα τὸ βιαιότατον*): *βιαίων τὸ δικαιότατον* B T P F **b 8** *χειρί* B F: *χερί* T P

that thus the just has been judged: that the stronger rules the weaker and has more. For using what sort of just did Xerxes lead an army against Greece, or his father against the Scythians?[1] Or countless other such things one might have the means to speak of. e
But, I think, these men do these things according to the nature of the just, and yes, by Zeus, according to law, at any rate, the law of nature; not, however, perhaps according to this law that we lay down.[2] Moulding the best and most robust of ourselves, taking them from youth, like lions, we enslave them, singing charms over them and practising sorcery on them, saying that one must have 484
an equal share and that this is the beautiful and the just. But if, I think, a man comes to be who has a sufficient nature, shaking off all these things and breaking through and escaping, trampling on our letters and trickeries and charms and the laws that are against nature, all of them, rising up, the slave has come to light as our master, and there the just of nature has shone forth. And I think b
Pindar too points out the very things I say, in the song in which he says that—

> *Law, the king of all,*
> *of mortals and immortals;*

and this, then, he says—

> *leads, making just the most violent,*
> *with highest hand; I take as evidence*
> *the deeds of Heracles, since—unbought—*

he says something like this—for I do not know the song—but he says that, neither buying them nor with Geryon giving them, he drove off the cattle, on the ground that this is the just by nature, c
that both the cattle and the other possessions[3]

1. Xerxes invaded Greece in 480; his father Darius had marched against the Scythians beyond the Danube about 513 (Herodotus 4.1, 4.83–142).

2. *The law of nature*: *nomos tēs physeōs*, commonly said to be the earliest use of the phrase that survives; Callicles makes a law of the nature he has set against law. Thucydides' Athenians at Melos say that gods and men, by a necessity of nature, rule wherever they are stronger (5.105.2).

3. Pindar, fr. 169a Snell–Maehler, on Heracles' theft of the cattle of Geryon, his tenth labour; Herodotus applies "law, the king of all" to custom (3.38), and the *Laws* returns to the lines (690b–c, 714e–715a). *Making just the most violent*: *dikaiōn to biaiotaton*, the reading of Aelius Aristides, which Burnet prints; the manuscripts have *biaiōn to dikaiotaton*, "doing violence to the most just".

ματα εἶναι πάντα τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ κρείττονος τὰ τῶν χειρόνων τε καὶ ἡττόνων.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς οὕτως ἔχει, γνώσῃ δέ, ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἔλθῃς ἐάσας ἤδη φιλοσοφίαν. φιλοσοφία γάρ τοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἄν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἅψηται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πάνυ εὐφυὴς ᾖ καὶ πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ, ἀνάγκη πάντων ἄπειρον γεγονέναι ἐστὶν ὧν χρὴ ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα. καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων ἄπειροι γίγνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην τῶν ἠθῶν παντάπασιν ἄπειροι γίγνονται. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἴς τινα ἰδίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν πρᾶξιν, καταγέλαστοι γίγνονται, ὥσπερ γε οἶμαι οἱ πολιτικοί, ἐπειδὰν αὖ εἰς τὰς ὑμετέρας διατριβὰς ἔλθωσιν καὶ τοὺς λόγους, καταγέλαστοί εἰσιν. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου· λαμπρός τέ ἐστιν ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται,

> νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,
> ἵν' αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὤν·

ὅπου δ' ἂν φαῦλος ᾖ, ἐντεῦθεν φεύγει καὶ λοιδορεῖ τοῦτο, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἐπαινεῖ, εὐνοίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἡγούμενος οὕτως αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι τὸ ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων μετασχεῖν. φιλοσοφίας μὲν ὅσον παιδείας χάριν καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἔτι φιλοσοφῇ, καταγέλαστον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ χρῆμα γίγνεται, καὶ ἔγωγε ὁμοιότατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς

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d 2 *εὐδόκιμον* T W F Gellius: *εὐδαίμον'* B **d** 3 *τὴν* B T P: om. F **e** 4 *καὶ ἐπὶ* B T P F: *κἀπὶ* vulg. **e** 7 *τυγχάνει* T: *τυγχάνῃ* B (cf. Alc. ii. 146 a 6): *τυγχάνῃ* P F *βέλτιστος*] *κράτιστος* Alc. ii. l. c.

of the inferior and weaker, all of them, are the better and stronger's.

So the truth is thus, and you will know it, if you go on to the greater things, letting philosophy pass at last. For philosophy is a charming thing, Socrates, if one touches it moderately at the right time of life; but if one spends time in it further than is needed, it is the corruption of human beings. For even if he is of a very good nature and philosophizes far on in his time of life, it is a necessity d
that he has become unversed in all the things in which the man must be versed who is going to be beautiful and good and of good repute.[1] For they become unversed in the laws of the city, and in the speeches which one must use in keeping company with human beings in contracts, both privately and publicly, and in human pleasures and desires, and, taken all together, they become wholly unversed in characters. So whenever they come to some private or political action, they become ridiculous, just as, I think, the politi- e
cians, again, whenever they come to your pastimes and arguments, are ridiculous. For what Euripides says results: *brilliant* is *each man* in this, *and to this he presses on*,

> *assigning the greatest part of the day to this,*
> *where he is in fact himself at his own best;*

and wherever he is paltry, from there he flees and reviles it, and 485
praises the other, from goodwill toward himself, believing that thus he praises himself.[2] But, I think, the most right thing is to share in both. It is beautiful to share in philosophy so far as is for education's sake, and it is not shameful to philosophize when one is a lad; but whenever a person, being now older, still philosophizes, the thing becomes ridiculous, Socrates, and I, for my part, suffer b
toward those who philosophize something most like what I suffer toward

1. *Of good repute*: *eudokimon*, the reading of T, W and F, and of Aulus Gellius, who quotes 484c–485e (*Attic Nights* 10.22); B has *eudaimon'*, "happy".

2. Euripides, *Antiope* (fr. 184 Kannicht), from the debate of the twin brothers Zethus, the herdsman and man of action, and Amphion, the musician, over the active and the quiet life; Callicles takes Zethus' part (485e–486c). Burnet letterspaces the poet's words that stand in Callicles' prose. Aristotle quotes the lines (*Rhetoric* 1371b31–34); the *Alcibiades II* (146a) works them into its prose, with "strongest" for "best".

τοὺς ψελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ παιδίον ἴδω, ᾧ ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω, ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παῖζον, χαίρω τε καὶ χαρίεν μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ πρέπον τῇ τοῦ παιδίου ἡλικίᾳ, ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγομένου παιδαρίου ἀκούσω, πικρόν τί μοι δοκεῖ χρῆμα εἶναι καὶ ἀνιᾷ μου τὰ ὦτα καί μοι δοκεῖ δουλοπρεπές τι εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃ τις ψελλιζομένου ἢ παίζοντα ὁρᾷ, καταγέλαστον φαίνεται καὶ ἄνανδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον. ταὐτὸν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας. παρὰ νέῳ μὲν γὰρ μειρακίῳ ὁρῶν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ἐλεύθερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδενὸς ἀξιώσοντα ἑαυτὸν οὔτε καλοῦ οὔτε γενναίου πράγματος· ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ ἀνήρ. ὃ γὰρ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κἂν πάνυ εὐφυὴς ᾖ, ἀνάνδρῳ γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι, καταδεδυκότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον βιῶναι μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν γωνίᾳ τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ ἱκανὸν μηδέποτε φθέγξασθαι. ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς· κινδυνεύω οὖν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφίονα ὁ Εὐριπίδου, οὗπερ ἐμνήσθην. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐπέρχεται πρὸς σὲ λέγειν, οἷάπερ ἐκεῖνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὅτι "Ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὧν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὧδε γενναίαν μειρακιώδει τινὶ διατρέπεις μορφώματι, καὶ οὔτ' ἂν δίκης βου-

b 2 *καὶ παίζοντας* secl. Morstadt (et mox **b 4** *καὶ παῖζον*, **c 1** *ἢ παίζοντα ὁρᾷ*) **b 3** *ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παῖζον* secl. Cobet **c 3** *τοῦτο πάσχω* B T P: *πάσχω τοῦτο* F *παρὰ* Stephanus: *περὶ* B² T P F: *πέρι* B post hanc vocem distinguens **c 6** *καὶ* B T P: *τινα εἶναι καὶ* F **d 2** *μοι* B T P: *ἐμοὶ* F **e 1** *ἱκανὸν*] *καλὸν* Coraes: *νεανικὸν* ci. Heindorf **e 2** *πάνυ* supra *ἐπιεικῶς* P **e 7** *γενναίαν*] *γενναίαν ἔχων* Ruhnken (*ἔχων* add. Nauck post *ψυχῆς*, *λαχὼν* Cron) **a 1** *διατρέπεις* F (coniecerat Grotius): *διαπρέπεις* B T P: *διαστρέφεις* Valckenaer *ἂν*] *ἐν* Coraes

those who lisp and play. For whenever I see a little child, for whom it is still fitting to converse thus, lisping and playing, I rejoice, and it appears charming to me and befitting the free and becoming to the little child's time of life; but whenever I hear a little boy conversing clearly, I think it is something bitter, and it distresses my ears, and I think it is something becoming a slave; and whenever one hears a man lisping, or sees him playing, it appears ridiculous c
and unmanly and worthy of blows. So I, for my part, suffer this same thing toward those who philosophize too. For seeing philosophy in a young lad, I admire it, and I think it is becoming, and I believe this person is someone free, and the one who does not philosophize servile and one who will never deem himself worthy of any beautiful or noble matter; but whenever, then, I see an d
older man still philosophizing and not being rid of it, this man, Socrates, I think, by now needs blows. For what I was saying just now is in store for this person, even if he is of a very good nature: to become unmanly, fleeing the middle of the city and the marketplaces, in which, the poet said, men become pre-eminent, and, having sunk out of sight, to live the rest of his life whispering with lads in a corner, three or four of them, and never to utter anything free e
and great and sufficient.[1] But I, Socrates, am reasonably friendly toward you; so it looks as if I have now suffered what the Zethus of Euripides, of whom I made mention, suffered toward Amphion. For it comes over me too to say to you some such things as he said to his brother: "You are heedless, Socrates, of the things you must take care of, and a nature of soul so noble you turn aside with some 486
lad-like guise, and to the counsels of justice you would neither[2]

1. *The poet*: Homer, *Iliad* 9.441, where Phoenix recalls that Achilles as a boy knew neither war nor "assemblies (*agorai*), where men become pre-eminent"; Callicles takes the *agorai* as the market-places.

2. Euripides, *Antiope* (fr. 185 Kannicht), Zethus' rebuke of Amphion, run into prose with Socrates' name. *You turn aside*: *diatrepeis*, F's reading, which Grotius had conjectured; B, T and P have *diaprepeis*, "you adorn". *Justice*: *dikē*, here the poet's word for right; elsewhere "penalty".

λαῖσι προσθεῖ ἂν ὀρθῶς λόγον, οὔτ' εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν ἂν λάβοις, οὔθ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιο." καίτοι, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες—καί μοι μηδὲν ἀχθεσθῇς· εὐνοίᾳ γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ—οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ σὲ οἶμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπάγοι, φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὅτι χρήσαιο σαυτῷ, ἀλλ' ἰλιγγιῴης ἂν καὶ χασμῷο οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀναβάς, κατηγόρου τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ, ἀποθάνοις ἄν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι. καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἥτις εὐφυῆ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε χείρονα, μήτε αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε ἑαυτὸν μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλᾶσθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἄτιμον ζῆν ἐν τῇ πόλει; τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον εἰρῆσθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἀλλ' ὠγαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου, παῦσαι δὲ ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ' εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν, ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα ἀφείς, εἴτε ληρήματα χρὴ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φλυαρίας, ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις· ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' οἷς ἔστιν καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθά.

ΣΩ. Εἰ χρυσῆν ἔχων ἐτύγχανον τὴν ψυχήν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἂν οἴει με ἄσμενον εὑρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων ᾗ βασανίζουσιν τὸν χρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἥντινα ἔμελ-

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a 3 *ἂν λάβοις* B T P f: *ἀναλάβοις* F: *λάβοις* recc.: *λάκοις* Bonitz **a** 5 *εἶναι* B T P: om. F **a** 7 *νῦν* B T P: *νυνὶ* F **a** 8 *ἀπάγοι* B T P F Philodemus: *ἀπαγάγοι* Par. 2110 **a** 9 *μηδὲν*] *οὐθὲν* Philodemus **b** 1 *ἰλιγγιῴης* F b t: *εἰλιγγιῴης* B T P **b** 5 *ἥτις* B Philodemus: *ἤ τις* F: *εἴ τις* T P *εὐφυῆ* B T P: *εὐφυεῖ* F: *εὐφυᾶ* vulg. **c** 2 *τὸν* δὲ T P F: *τόνδε* B: *τὸν δὴ* ci. Heindorf *εἴ τι καὶ* T P F: *εἴ τι* B **c** 4 *πείθου* B T P F: *πιθοῦ* Cobet *ἐλέγχων* B T F: *ματαιάζων* P: *ἐν ἄλλῳ πρόσκειται παῦσαι ματαιάζων* in marg. T **d** 4 *ᾗ* B T P: *ἧ* F: *αἷς* ci. Stallbaum; *αἳ* Par. 1812

add a speech rightly, nor take hold of the likely and persuasive, nor counsel a spirited counsel on another's behalf." And yet, my friend Socrates—and do not be at all grieved with me, for I will say it from goodwill toward you—do you not think it shameful to be thus, as I think you are, and the others who are always driving far on into philosophy? For now, if someone took hold of you, or of anyone else whatever of such people, and led you off to the prison, asserting that you do injustice when you are doing no injustice, you know that you would not have any use to make of yourself, b
but you would be dizzy and gape, not having anything to say; and having gone up into the law court, meeting with a very paltry and depraved accuser, you would die, if he wanted to propose death as your penalty.[1] And yet how is this wise, Socrates, *a craft which, taking a man of good nature, made him inferior*, having power neither himself to help himself, nor to bring safe out of the greatest dangers either himself or anyone else, but to be robbed of all his substance c
by his enemies, and simply to live dishonoured in the city?[2] Such a man, if it is even something rather boorish to have said it, one is allowed to strike on the jaw and not pay the penalty.[3] But, my good friend, be persuaded by me: *cease refuting, and exercise yourself in the good music of affairs*, and exercise yourself in that from which you will seem to be intelligent, *leaving to others these refined things*, whether one must claim they are drivel or nonsense, *from which you will dwell in empty houses*; envying, not men who refute these small d
things, but those who have both a livelihood and repute and many other good things.[4]

SOC. If I in fact had a golden soul, Callicles, do you not think I would be glad to find some one of these stones by which they test gold, the best one, to which I was going,[5]

1. *Led you off*: *apagein*, the summary arrest of a wrongdoer by a private person. *Propose death*: *timasthai*, the accuser's assessment of the penalty, against which the condemned man proposed his own. Callicles' picture is commonly read as Plato's allusion to Socrates' trial in 399 (*Apology* 36b–38b; compare 521b–522c); an interpretation.

2. Euripides, *Antiope* (fr. 186 Kannicht). *Dishonoured*: *atimos*, in law one deprived of a citizen's rights.

3. *Strike on the jaw*: the insulting blow; Socrates takes up the phrase at 508d and 527a.

4. Euripides, *Antiope* (fr. 188 Kannicht), where Zethus bids his brother cease playing the fool (*mataiazōn*, P's reading here) and exercise himself in a "good music" of another kind, the lost word being variously restored; Callicles puts "refuting" and "affairs" in their place.

5. *Stones*: the touchstone, a dark stone on which gold was rubbed to judge its purity by the streak it left.

λον προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, εἴ μοι ὁμολογήσειεν ἐκείνη καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, εὖ εἴσεσθαι ὅτι ἱκανῶς ἔχω καὶ οὐδέν με δεῖ ἄλλης βασάνου;

ΚΑΛ. Πρὸς τί δὴ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ· νῦν οἶμαι ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐντετυχηκὼς τοιούτῳ ἑρμαίῳ ἐντετυχηκέναι.

ΚΑΛ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἄν μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσῃς περὶ ὧν ἡ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ δοξάζει, ταῦτ' ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τἀληθῆ. ἐννοῶ γὰρ ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα βασανιεῖν ἱκανῶς ψυχῆς πέρι ὀρθῶς τε ζώσης καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν ἃ σὺ πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὔνοιαν καὶ παρρησίαν. ἐγὼ γὰρ πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω οἳ ἐμὲ οὐχ οἷοί τέ εἰσιν βασανίζειν διὰ τὸ μὴ σοφοὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ σύ· ἕτεροι δὲ σοφοὶ μέν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν δέ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ μὴ κήδεσθαί μου ὥσπερ σύ· τὼ δὲ ξένω τώδε, Γοργίας τε καὶ Πῶλος, σοφὼ μὲν καὶ φίλω ἐστὸν ἐμώ, ἐνδεεστέρω δὲ παρρησίας καὶ αἰσχυντηροτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος· πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ὥ γε εἰς τοσοῦτον αἰσχύνης ἐληλύθατον, ὥστε διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἐναντία λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων. σὺ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν· πεπαίδευσαί τε γὰρ ἱκανῶς, ὡς πολλοὶ ἂν φήσαιεν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἶ εὔνους. τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι; ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα ὑμᾶς ἐγώ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τέτταρας ὄντας κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας, σέ τε καὶ Τεισανδρον τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον καὶ Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ Ναυσικύδην τὸν Χολαργέα· καί ποτε ὑμῶν ἐγὼ

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d 6 εὖ B T P: ἤδη εὖ F **d** 7 με B T W F: μοι scr. recc. δεῖ B T P: ἔτι δεῖ F **e** 1 δὴ B T P: δὲ F **e** 5 ἄν ci. Bekker (ἃ ἄν Par. 1811): ἄν B T P F **a** 2 τρία ἄρα B T P F Stobaeus: τριᾶ ἄττα ci. Thompson ἃ σὺ πάντ(α) B T P F: ἅττινα σὺ πάντως Stobaeus **a** 3 εὔνοιαν corr. Ven. 189 et legisse videtur Clemens: δόξαν B T P F Stobaeus **b** 1 αἰσχυντηροτέρω B T P: αἰσχυντηλοτέρω F **b** 5 ταῦτα πάντα B T P: πάντα ταῦτα F **b** 7 ⟨οἱ⟩ πολλοὶ ci. Sauppe **c** 3 τεισανδρον F: τίσανδρον B T P f **c** 4 ὑμῶν ἐγὼ B T P: ἐγὼ ὑμῶν F

bringing it, if that one agreed with me that the soul had been well tended, to know well that I am in a sufficient state and need no other touchstone?

CALL. To what end, then, do you ask this, Socrates? e

SOC. I will say it to you. Now I think that I, having come upon you, have come upon just such a godsend.[1]

CALL. Why so?

SOC. I know well that whatever you agree with me about the things on which my soul holds opinions, these at once are the very truth.[2] For I consider that the one who is going to test sufficiently a 487 soul, whether it lives rightly or not, must, then, have three things, all of which you have: knowledge and goodwill and frankness.[3] For I come upon many who are not able to test me, because of not being wise, as you are; and others are wise, but are not willing to speak the truth to me, because of not caring for me as you do; and these two strangers here, Gorgias and Polus, are wise and friends b of mine, but more lacking in frankness and more given to shame, more than is needed. How could they not be? They have come to such a pitch of shame that, because of being ashamed, each of them dares to say contrary things, himself to himself, in the presence of many human beings, and that about the greatest things. But you have all these things which the others do not have; for you have been sufficiently educated, as many of the Athenians would claim, and you are well disposed to me. What piece of evidence do I use? c I will say it to you. I know that you, Callicles, four of you, have become partners in wisdom: you and Teisander of Aphidna and Andron son of Androtion and Nausicydes of Cholargus; and once I[4]

1. *Godsend*: *hermaion*, a lucky find, the gift of Hermes.

2. *Whatever*: *han*, Bekker's conjecture (*ha an* in a Paris manuscript, Par. 1811); the manuscripts' *an* gives "if you agree with me".

3. *Goodwill*: *eunoian*, written by a corrector of a Venice manuscript (Ven. 189), and apparently read by Clement of Alexandria; B, T, P, F and Stobaeus have *doxan*, "repute". The three are taken up in turn at 487b–e.

4. Andron son of Androtion is among Hippias' listeners in the *Protagoras* (315c); Nausicydes of Cholargus may be the rich maker of barley-meal of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (2.7.6). Teisander is not named elsewhere in Plato.

ἐπήκουσα βουλευομένων μέχρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον εἴη, καὶ οἶδα ὅτι ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλοις ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γενόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες. ἐπειδὴ οὖν σου ἀκούω ταὐτὰ ἐμοὶ συμβουλεύοντος ἅπερ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἑταιροτάτοις, ἱκανόν μοι τεκμήριόν ἐστιν ὅτι ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι εὔνους εἶ. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε οἷος παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι, αὐτός τε φῂς καὶ ὁ λόγος ὃν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες ὁμολογεῖ σοι: ἔχει δὴ οὑτωσὶ δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πέρι νυνί· ἐάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογήσῃς μοι, βεβασανισμένον τοῦτ' ἤδη ἔσται ἱκανῶς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι αὐτὸ δεήσει ἐπ' ἄλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸ συνεχώρησας σὺ οὔτε σοφίας ἐνδείᾳ οὔτ' αἰσχύνης περιουσίᾳ, οὐδ' αὖ ἀπατῶν ἐμὲ συγχωρήσαις ἄν· φίλος γάρ μοι εἶ, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς φῂς. τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ σὴ ὁμολογία τέλος ἤδη ἕξει τῆς ἀληθείας. πάντων δὲ καλλίστη ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, περὶ τούτων ὧν σὺ δή μοι ἐπετίμησας, ποιόν τινα χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τί ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ, καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα. ἐγὼ γὰρ εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττω κατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ, εὖ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἑκὼν ἐξαμαρτάνω ἀλλ' ἀμαθίᾳ τῇ ἐμῇ· σὺ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἤρξω νουθετεῖν με, μὴ ἀποστῇς, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς μοι ἔνδειξαι τί ἔστιν τοῦτο ὃ ἐπιτηδευτέον μοι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτησαίμην ἂν αὐτό, καὶ ἐάν με λάβῃς νῦν μέν σοι ὁμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ μὴ ταὐτὰ πράττοντα ἅπερ ὡμολόγησα, πάνυ με ἡγοῦ βλᾶκα εἶναι καὶ μηκέτι ποτέ με νουθετήσῃς ὕστερον, ὡς μηδενὸς ἄξιον ὄντα. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δέ μοι ἐπανάλαβε πῶς φῂς τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ

c 5 *ἐπήκουσα* B T P: *ὑπήκουσα* F **d** 3 *ταὐτὰ* Ficinus (*idem te mihi consilium dantem*): *ταῦτα* B T P: *ταυτα ταῦτ'* F **d** 6 *ὀλίγον* B T f: *ὀλίγῳ* P: om. F **d** 7 *νυνί* B T F: *νῦν* P **e** 4 *συνεχώρησά* F *σὺ* B T: *σοι* F: om. P **e** 5 *περιουσίᾳ* F: *παρουσίᾳ* B T P **e** 6 *ἡ σὴ* B T P F: *σὴ* vulg. **e** 9 *τινα* B T P: *τινα ποτὲ* F **a** 6 *ἐάν με* F: *ἐὰν μὲν* B T: *ἐὰν* P: *ἐάν γε* f **b** 2 *καὶ σὺ* B T P: *σύ τε* F

overheard you deliberating how far one should exercise oneself in wisdom, and I know that some such opinion as this prevailed among you: not to be eager to philosophize to the point of precision, but to beware, you urged one another, lest, becoming wiser d
than is needed, you escape notice as you are corrupted. So since I hear you advising me the same things as to your own closest companions, it is a sufficient piece of evidence to me that you are in truth well disposed to me.[1] And indeed, that you are, at any rate, the sort to speak frankly and not be ashamed, you yourself claim, and the speech you were making a little earlier agrees with you. So it is plainly like this about these things now: if you agree with e
me on anything in the arguments, this will at once have been sufficiently tested by me and by you, and there will no longer be need to carry it to another touchstone. For you would never have granted it either from lack of wisdom or from excess of shame,[2] nor again would you grant it deceiving me; for you are a friend to me, as you yourself also claim. In reality, then, my agreement and yours will at once have the end of truth. And the most beautiful inquiry of all, Callicles, is about these things for which you reproved me: what sort the man must be, and what he must make his pursuit, 488
and up to what point, both when older and when younger. For if I do anything not rightly in my own life, know this well, that I do not err willingly, but by my own want of learning; so you, as you began to admonish me, do not stand off, but point out to me sufficiently what this is that must be made my pursuit, and in what way I might acquire it; and if you catch me now having agreed with you, but at a later time not doing the same things that I agreed to, believe me to be altogether a dolt, and never admonish me again b
afterwards, as being worth nothing. Take it up again for me from the beginning: how do you claim the just stands, both

1. *The same things*: Burnet prints the reading implied by Ficino's Latin (*idem*, "the same"); the manuscripts' accent and breathing give "these things".
2. *Excess*: *periousia*, F's reading; B, T and P have *parousia*, "presence".

σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; ἄγειν βίᾳ τὸν κρείττω τὰ τῶν ἡττόνων καὶ ἄρχειν τὸν βελτίω τῶν χειρόνων καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ φαυλοτέρου; μή τι ἄλλο λέγεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ ὀρθῶς μέμνημαι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἔλεγον καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν λέγω.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν βελτίω καλεῖς σὺ καὶ κρείττω; οὐδὲ γάρ τοι τότε οἷός τ' ἦ μαθεῖν σου τί ποτε λέγοις. πότερον τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ δεῖ ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους, οἷόν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὡς αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τὰς σμικρὰς κατὰ τὸ φύσει δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὅτι κρείττους εἰσὶν καὶ ἰσχυρότεραι, ὡς τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ βέλτιον ταὐτὸν ὄν, ἢ ἔστι βελτίω μὲν εἶναι, ἥττω δὲ καὶ ἀσθενέστερον, καὶ κρείττω μὲν εἶναι, μοχθηρότερον δέ· ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς ὅρος ἐστὶν τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τοῦ κρείττονος; τοῦτό μοι αὐτὸ σαφῶς διόρισον, ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερόν ἐστιν τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι σαφῶς λέγω, ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶν κατὰ φύσιν; οἷς δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἑνί, ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες.

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα τὰ τῶν κρειττόνων ἐστίν.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τῶν βελτιόνων; οἱ γὰρ κρείττους βελτίους πολὺ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τούτων νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλά, κρειττόνων γε ὄντων;

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b 4 πλέον] πλεῖον B T P: πλείω F **b** 7 ἔλεγον secl. Schanz **c** 1 τ' ἦ F (τ' εἶ f): τ' ἦι B T: τ' ἦν P λέγοις F: λέγεις B T P **c** 3 δοκεῖς] ἐδόκεις Coraes **c** 6 καὶ τὸ F: καὶ B T P **c** 7 ἢ T P F: ἦ B **e** 2 πολὺ B T P F: που Hermann

you and Pindar, the just according to nature? That the stronger leads by force the things of the weaker, and the better rules the inferior, and the superior has more than the more paltry? You do not say the just is anything else, do you, or do I remember rightly?

CALL. Well, I said these things then too, and I say them now.

SOC. And do you call the same man better and stronger? For even c
then I was not able to understand from you what ever you meant. Do you call the mightier stronger, and must the feebler listen to the mightier, as I think you were pointing out then too, that the great cities go against the small according to the just by nature, because they are stronger and mightier, as if the stronger and the mightier and better were the same thing, or can one be better but weaker and feebler, and be stronger but more depraved? Or is there the d
same definition of the better and of the stronger? Determine this very thing for me clearly: is the stronger and the better and the mightier the same or different?[1]

CALL. Well, I say to you clearly that it is the same.

SOC. Are not the many stronger than the one according to nature? Those, indeed, who also lay down the laws against the one, as you too were saying just now.

CALL. How could they not be?

SOC. The lawful things of the many, then, are those of the stronger.

CALL. Certainly.

SOC. Are they not, then, those of the better? For the stronger are e
by far better, according to your account.

CALL. Yes.

SOC. Are not the lawful things of these, then, beautiful according to nature, since they are, at any rate, stronger?

1. Socrates asks whether three words name one thing: Callicles' *kreittōn*, "stronger", and *beltiōn*, "better", and *ischyroteros*, "mightier", the word of bodily strength (as 452b), which Socrates brings in here; the English keeps the three apart.

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὡς ἄρτι αὖ σὺ ἔλεγες, δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὔ; καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἁλώσῃ 489
ἐνταῦθα σὺ αὖ αἰσχυνόμενος. νομίζουσιν, ἢ οὔ, οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ πλέον δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; μὴ φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἵν᾽, ἐάν μοι ὁμολογήσῃς, βεβαιώσωμαι 5
ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγνῶναι ὡμολογηκότος.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ᾽ οἵ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει· b
ὥστε κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ ὀρθῶς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς κακουργῶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων, ἐὰν δέ 5
τις κατὰ νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν.

ΚΑΛ. Οὑτοσὶ ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ τηλικοῦτος ὢν ὀνόματα θηρεύων, καὶ ἐάν τις ῥήματι ἁμάρτῃ, ἕρμαιον τοῦτο ποιούμενος; ἐμὲ γὰρ c
οἴει ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττους εἶναι ἢ τὸ βελτίους; οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω ὅτι ταὐτόν φημι εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κρεῖττον; ἢ οἴει με λέγειν, ἐὰν συρφετὸς συλλεγῇ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς ἀξίων πλὴν ἴσως τῷ 5
σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα;

ΣΩ. Εἶεν, ὦ σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάζω d
τοιοῦτόν τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅτι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο

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a 2 *αὖ* F: om. B T P **a** 5 *βεβαιώσωμαι* T F: *βεβαιώσομαι* re vera B P **b** 6 *νόμον* F: *τὸν νόμον* B T P **c** 4 *συλλεγῇ* B² T P f: *συλλέγῃ* B: *σὺ λέγῃ* F **c** 6 *αὐτὰ*] *ἅττα* ci. Heindorf

CALL. I claim so.

SOC. Then do the many hold thus, as you, again, were saying just now, that it is just to have an equal share, and more shameful to do injustice than to suffer injustice? Is this so or not? And see 489
that you, again, are not caught here being ashamed. Do the many hold, or not, that to have an equal share, and not more, is just, and that it is more shameful to do injustice than to suffer injustice? Do not begrudge answering me this, Callicles, so that, if you agree with me, I may at once have it confirmed from you, since a man sufficient to discern will have agreed.

CALL. Well, the many, at any rate, hold thus.

SOC. Then it is not by law alone that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering injustice, and having an equal share just, b
but by nature too; so it looks as if you were not speaking the truth in what went before, nor accusing me rightly when you said that law and nature are contrary, and that I too, indeed, having come to know it, do mischief in the arguments, if someone speaks according to nature, leading to law, and if someone speaks according to law, to nature.[1]

CALL. This man here will not stop talking nonsense. Say to me, Socrates, are you not ashamed, at your age, hunting words, and, if someone errs in an expression, making a godsend of it? For do c
you think I mean that being stronger is anything other than being better? Have I not long been saying to you that I claim the better and the stronger are the same? Or do you think I mean, if a rabble of slaves and human beings of every sort is gathered together, worth nothing except perhaps for exerting might with the body, and these claim things, that these very things are lawful?

SOC. Very well, most wise Callicles: do you mean it thus?

CALL. Very much so.

SOC. But I, for my part, you daimonic man, have myself long been d
guessing that you mean some such thing by the stronger, and I question you because I am eager to know clearly what you mean. For surely you, at any rate, do not believe the two

1. Socrates turns Callicles' charge of 482e–483a back on him, almost in Callicles' own words.

βελτίους ἡγῇ τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους σοῦ, ὅτι ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰπὲ τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους; καὶ ὦ θαυμάσιε πρᾳότερόν με προδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ.

ΚΑΛ. Εἰρωνεύῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ᾧ σὺ χρώμενος πολλὰ νυνδὴ εἰρωνεύου πρός με· ἀλλ' ἴθι εἰπέ, τίνας λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. Τοὺς ἀμείνους ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς ἄρα ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν; οὐκ ἐρεῖς, τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλους τινάς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Πολλάκις ἄρα εἷς φρονῶν μυρίων μὴ φρονούντων κρειττων ἐστὶν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον ἄρχειν δεῖ, τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἀρχομένων· τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖς βούλεσθαι λέγειν—καὶ οὐ ῥήματι θηρεύω—εἰ ὁ εἷς τῶν μυρίων κρείττων.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἃ λέγω. τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίω ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν φαυλοτέρων.

ΣΩ. Ἔχε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τί ποτε αὖ νῦν λέγεις; ἐὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἀθρόοι, καὶ ἡμῖν ᾖ ἐν κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὦμεν δὲ παντοδαποί, οἱ μὲν ἰσχυροί, οἱ δ' ἀσθενεῖς, εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν ᾖ φρονιμώτερος περὶ ταῦτα, ἰατρὸς ὤν, ᾖ δέ, οἷον εἰκός, τῶν μὲν ἰσχυρότερος, τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἄλλο τι ἢ οὗτος, φρονιμώτερος ἡμῶν ὤν, βελτίων καὶ κρείττων ἔσται εἰς ταῦτα;

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d 6 *τί* B T P: *ὅτι* F: *τίνας* Routh (*quos* Ficinus) *βελτίους* W F: *βελτίστους* B T f **e** 2 *μὰ* B T P F: *οὐ μὰ* Hermogenes **a** 5 *ῥήματι* B T P F: *ῥήματα* vulg.: *ῥημάτια* Badham **a** 7 *τὸ*] *τὸν* Madvig **b** 2 *ἀθρόοι* scripsi: *ἀνθρόοι* F (*ἄνθρωποι ὄντες* ut videtur f): *ἀθρόοι ἄνθρωποι* B T: *ἄνθρωποι ἀθρόοι* P **b** 4 *φρονιμώτερος* B T P f: *φρόνιμος* F **b** 6 *φρονιμώτατος* F

better than the one, nor your slaves better than you, because they are mightier than you. But say again from the beginning what ever you mean by the better, since not the mightier. And, you marvellous man, teach me first more gently, so that I do not stop coming to you.[1]

CALL. You are being ironic, Socrates.[2] e

SOC. Not so, by Zethus, Callicles, using whom you were just now very ironic toward me.[3] But come, say: whom do you mean by the better?

CALL. I mean the superior.

SOC. So you see that you yourself are saying words, but making nothing plain? Will you not say whether by the better and stronger you mean the more intelligent, or some others?

CALL. Well, yes, by Zeus, it is these I mean, and vehemently so.

SOC. Often, then, one who is intelligent is stronger than ten thou- 490
sand who are not intelligent, according to your account, and this man must rule and they be ruled, and the ruler must have more than the ruled; for this, I think, is what you want to say—and I am not hunting with an expression—if the one is stronger than the ten thousand.

CALL. Well, these are the things I mean. For this, I think, is the just by nature: that the one who is better and more intelligent should both rule and have more than the more paltry.

SOC. Hold it there. What ever do you mean now, again? If we are b
in the same place, as now, many of us crowded together, and we have in common many foods and drinks, and we are of every sort, some mighty, others feeble, and one of us is more intelligent about these things, being a doctor, but is, as is likely, mightier than some and feebler than others, will not this man, being more intelligent than we are, be better and stronger in these matters?

1. *Stop coming to you*: *apophoitan*, to leave off going to a teacher's school.

2. *Ironic*: *eirōneuesthai*, to dissemble, feigning ignorance or modesty; Alcibiades charges Socrates with it in the *Symposium* (216e).

3. Socrates swears by the Zethus of Euripides whose part Callicles took at 485e–486c.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων πλέον ἡμῶν ἑκτέον αὐτῷ, c
ὅτι βελτίων ἐστίν, ἢ τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν πάντα ἐκεῖνον δεῖ νέμειν,
ἐν τῷ δὲ ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρῆσθαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ
σῶμα οὐ πλεονεκτητέον, εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν
μὲν πλέον, τῶν δ' ἔλαττον ἑκτέον· ἐὰν δὲ τύχῃ πάντων 5
ἀσθενέστατος ὤν, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ, ὦ Καλ-
λίκλεις; οὐχ οὕτως, ὠγαθέ;

ΚΑΛ. Περὶ σιτία, λέγεις, καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ φλυα-
ρίας· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω. d

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὐ τὸν φρονιμώτερον βελτίω λέγεις; φάθι
ἢ μή.

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν βελτίω πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν; 5

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ ποτῶν.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱματίων, καὶ δεῖ τὸν ὑφαντι-
κώτατον μέγιστον ἱμάτιον ἔχειν καὶ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα
ἀμπεχόμενον περιιέναι;

ΚΑΛ. Ποίων ἱματίων; 10

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰς ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν
φρονιμώτατον εἰς ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστον. τὸν σκυτοτόμον e
ἴσως μέγιστα δεῖ ὑποδήματα καὶ πλεῖστα ὑποδεδεμένον
περιπατεῖν.

ΚΑΛ. Ποῖα ὑποδήματα; φλυαρεῖς ἔχων.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἴσως τὰ τοιάδε· οἷον 5
γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα περὶ γῆν φρόνιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν,
τοῦτον δὴ ἴσως δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ ὡς
πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ γῆν.

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c 3 *τῷ* δὲ B T P F: δὲ *τῷ* scr. recc. **c** 4 *μέλλει* T² P: *μέλλῃ* B T F **c** 7 *ὠγαθέ* Callicli tribuit Hirschig **c** 8 *περὶ* B T P F: *τί* δὲ Vind. 21 et suprascr. b **d** 2 *οὐ* B F: *οὖν* T P f **d** 5 δεῖν B F: δεῖ T (sed suprascr. *ν*): γε δεῖν P **d** 6 *οὐ*] ἀλλ' *οὐ* Cobet **d** 7 *καὶ* B T P f: om. F **e** 1 *φρονιμώτατον* F: *φρονιμώτερον* B T P **e** 4 ἔχων B T P f: λέγων F

CALL. Certainly.

SOC. Must he, then, have more of these foods than we do, because he is better? Or must he, in ruling, assign them all, but in spending them and using them up on his own body must he not overreach, if he is not going to suffer loss, but have more than some and less than others; and if he is in fact the feeblest of all, the best man must have the least of all, Callicles? Is it not thus, my good friend? c

CALL. About foods, you speak, and drinks and doctors and nonsense; but I do not mean these things. d

SOC. Do you not mean that the more intelligent is better? Say so or not.

CALL. I do.

SOC. But not that the better must have more?

CALL. Not of foods, at any rate, nor of drinks.

SOC. I understand, but perhaps of cloaks, and the one most skilled in weaving must have the biggest cloak and go about clothed in the most and the most beautiful?

CALL. What cloaks?

SOC. But in shoes it is plain that the most intelligent and best in these must overreach. The shoemaker, perhaps, must walk about with the biggest shoes on and the most of them. e

CALL. What shoes? You keep talking nonsense.

SOC. Well, if you do not mean such things, perhaps these: a man skilled in farming, for example, intelligent and beautiful and good about the land, this man, perhaps, must overreach in seeds and use as much seed as possible on his own land.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΚΑΛ. Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύῃ, ὡς περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον. 491

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν σὺ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ φρονιμώτερος πλέον ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὔτε ἐμοῦ ὑποβάλλοντος ἀνέξῃ οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐρεῖς; 5

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς κρείττους οἵ εἰσιν οὐ σκυτοτόμους λέγω οὐδὲ μαγείρους, ἀλλ' οἳ ἂν εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι ὦσιν, ὅντινα ἂν τρόπον εὖ οἰκοῖτο, καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἃ ἂν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν τῆς ψυχῆς. b

ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς, ὦ βέλτιστε Καλλίκλεις, ὡς οὐ ταὐτὰ σὺ τ' ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φῂς ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγειν, καὶ μέμφῃ μοι· ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τοὐναντίον, ὅτι οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους ὡρίζου, αὖθις δὲ τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, νῦν δ' αὖ ἕτερόν τι ἥκεις ἔχων· ἀνδρειότεροί τινες ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρείττους καὶ οἱ βελτίους. ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι τίνας ποτὲ λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους καὶ εἰς ὅτι. c 5

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' εἴρηκά γε ἔγωγε τοὺς φρονίμους εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρείους. τούτους γὰρ προσήκει τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν, πλέον ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων. d

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a 1 *ἀτεχνῶς* T P F: *ἀτέχνως* B **a** 2 *κναφέας* B T P (sed *κ* ex *γ* T): *γναφέας* F (sed *κν* supra *γν* f) *ὡς*] *ὥσπερ* Baiter **a** 3 *ὄντα* re vera B P F t: *τα* T **a** 4 *περὶ* secl. Hirschig **a** 5 *ἢ* T P F: om. B (sed suprascr. B²) **b** 5 *οὐ ταὐτὰ* T P: *οὔτ' αὐτὰ* B: *οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ* F **b** 8 *τότε* B P F: *τότ̓ ἐ* T **c** 1 *βελτίστους* P **c** 7 *τούτους* B T P f: *τούτοις* F

CALL. How you always say the same things, Socrates!

SOC. Not only so, at any rate, Callicles, but also about the same things.[1]

CALL. By the gods, you simply never stop, always speaking of 491
cobblers and fullers and butchers and doctors, as if our argument were about these.[2]

SOC. Then will you say about what things the stronger and more intelligent man justly overreaches when he has more? Or will you neither bear it when I suggest them, nor say yourself?

CALL. But I have long been saying it. First, by the stronger I do not mean shoemakers or butchers, but those who are intelligent b
in the affairs of the city, about the way in which it would be well managed, and not only intelligent but also courageous, sufficient to fulfil whatever they have in mind, and who do not flag because of softness of soul.

SOC. Do you see, most excellent Callicles, that you do not accuse me of the same things that I accuse you of? For you claim that I always say the same things, and find fault with me; but I accuse you of the contrary, that you never say the same things about the same things, but at one time you defined the better and stronger c
as the mightier, at another time as the more intelligent, and now, again, you have come bringing something else: the stronger and the better are said by you to be some who are more courageous. But, my good friend, say it and be rid of it: whom ever do you mean by the better and stronger, and in what?

CALL. But I have said it, at any rate: those who are intelligent in the affairs of the city, and courageous. For it is fitting for these to d
rule the cities, and this is the just: that these have more than the others, the rulers than the ruled.

1. The same retort in Xenophon (*Memorabilia* 4.4.6), where Hippias asks, as if mocking him, whether Socrates is still saying the same things he heard from him long ago.

2. *Butchers*: *mageiroi*, who slaughtered the beast and cooked the meat; "cook" and "cookery" are kept for *opsopoios* and *opsopoiia* (462d–465e).

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; αὐτῶν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τί; ἢ τι ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἕνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα· ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ποικίλον ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ· τοὺς ἠλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας.

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ [οὔ]; οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίη ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγω.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὁτῳοῦν; ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγώ σοι νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἐᾶν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὔσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι ὧν ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' οἶμαι τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατόν· ὅθεν ψέγουσιν τοὺς τοιούτους δι' αἰσχύνην, ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὑτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ αἰσχρὸν δή φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δουλούμενοι τοὺς βελτίους τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς πλήρωσιν ἐπαινοῦσιν τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἀνανδρίαν. ἐπεὶ ὅσοις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν ἢ βασιλέων ὑέσιν εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς τῇ φύσει ἱκανοὺς ἐκπορίσασθαι ἀρχήν τινα ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ δυνα-

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d 4 *αὑτῶν* B T: *αὐτῶν* W F *τί; ἢ τι*] *τί ἢ τί* B: *τί ἢ τί* T W F: *ὁτιὴ* Olympiodorus (Callicli tribuens) *ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους* T W F: *ἀρχομένους* B (*ἢ τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ ἀρχομένους* in marg. rec. b) **e** 3 *οὔ* secl. Routh *ὅστις ἀγνοοίη* Alexander *οὐ τοῦτο* P F Alexander: *οὐ τοῦτο* ** (sed *τοῦ* ex emend.) T: *ουτω* B **a** 2 *ἡ*] *ἐν* P **a** 6 *πρόσθεν* B P F: *ἔμπροσθεν* T **b** 2 *ὅσοις* F: *θεοῖς* B T P: δὲ *οἷς* W: *γε οἷς* f et rec. b: *τοῖς* t **b** 3 *ἐκπορίσασθαι* B T P: *πορίσασθαι* F

SOC. What? Of themselves, my companion, what? Are they in some way rulers, or ruled?

CALL. What do you mean?

SOC. I mean each one himself ruler of himself; or is there no need of this, that he rule himself, but that he rule the others?

CALL. What do you mean, ruler of himself?

SOC. Nothing subtle, but as the many say: being temperate and master of himself, ruler of the pleasures and desires within him- e
self.[1]

CALL. How pleasant you are! By the temperate you mean the simpletons.

SOC. How could I? There is no one who would not know that I do not mean this.[2]

CALL. Certainly, Socrates, vehemently. For how could a person become happy while he is a slave to anyone whatever? But this is the beautiful and just according to nature, which I now say to you, speaking frankly: that the one who is going to live rightly must let his own desires be as great as possible and not punish them, and 492
to these, being as great as possible, he must be sufficient to serve because of courage and intelligence, and to fill them up with whatever the desire is for at any time. But this, I think, is not possible for the many; hence they censure such people out of shame, hiding their own inability, and they claim, then, that licentiousness is shameful, as I was saying in what went before, enslaving the human beings who are better by nature; and not having the power themselves to procure the filling of their pleasures, they praise temperance and justice because of their own unmanliness. For those to b
whom it fell from the beginning either to be sons of kings, or to be sufficient by their own nature to procure some rule or tyranny or dominion,

1. The common account of temperance, as the *Republic* also gives it: "a kind of order, and a mastery of certain pleasures and desires" (430e).

2. *How could I?*: Burnet brackets, after Routh, the *ou* of the manuscripts, with which Socrates would seem to assent: "How could I not?"

στείαν, ⟨τί ἂν⟩ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἴη σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οἷς ἐξὸν ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδὼν ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς δεσπότην ἐπαγάγοιντο τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον; ἢ πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἄθλιοι γεγονότες εἶεν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης, μηδὲν πλέον νέμοντες τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς αὑτῶν ἢ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἄρχοντες ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν πόλει; ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἣν φῂς σὺ διώκειν, ὧδ' ἔχει· τρυφὴ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετή τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα ἀνθρώπων, φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐπεξέρχῃ τῷ λόγῳ παρρησιαζόμενος· σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μέν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. δέομαι οὖν ἐγώ σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνεῖναι, ἵνα τῷ ὄντι κατάδηλον γένηται πῶς βιωτέον. καί μοι λέγε· τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῂς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἷον δεῖ εἶναι, ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἁμόθεν γέ ποθεν ἑτοιμάζειν, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν;

ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ ταῦτα ἐγώ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι εὐδαίμονες εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. Οἱ λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονέστατοι εἶεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὡς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος.

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b 4 *τί ἂν* Woolsey: om. B T P F (add. *τί* in marg. rec. b) **b** 5 *καὶ δικαιοσύνης* F: om. B T P **b** 6 *αὐτοὶ* F: *αὐτοῖς* B T P (sed *σ* erasum in B) **b** 7 *ἑαυτοῖς* om. P *ἐπάγοιντο* P **b** 8 *καὶ λόγον* secl. ci. Schanz **c** 1 *εἴησαν* B T P F *τοῦ τῆς σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης* F **c** 6 *ἐστὶν*] *ἄρα* Schanz **d** 7 *ἁμόθεν* (sic) F: *ἄμοθεν* f: *ἄλλοθέν* B T P **e** 2 *ἐγώ* B T P: *λέγω* F **e** 5, 6 *ἂν . . . εἶεν* F: *ἂν . . . εἰσιν* B T P: *δὴ . . . εἰσιν* Schanz **e** 7 *ὡς* B T P F Stobaeus: *ὢν* Badham *σὺ* B T P: *σύ γε* F

what would truly be more shameful and worse than temperance and justice for these human beings, who, when they are allowed to enjoy the good things and nothing stands in the way, should themselves bring in as master over themselves the law and speech and censure of the many human beings?[1][2] Or how would they not have become wretched by the beautiful thing of justice and of temperance, assigning nothing more to their own friends than to their enemies, and that while they rule in their own city? But in truth, Socrates, which you claim you pursue, it is this way: luxury and licentiousness and freedom, if it has aid, this is virtue and happiness, and these other things are the embellishments, the compacts of human beings against nature, nonsense and worth nothing.[3]

SOC. Not ignobly, at any rate, Callicles, do you go through with your speech, speaking frankly; for you now say clearly what the others think through, indeed, but are not willing to say. So I entreat you in no way to let up, so that it may in reality become manifest how one must live. And say to me: you claim that the desires must not be punished, if one is going to be such as one must be, but that, letting them be as great as possible, one must make ready a filling for them from somewhere or other, and that this is virtue?

CALL. I claim these things.

SOC. Then those who need nothing are not rightly said to be happy.

CALL. For thus, at any rate, the stones and the corpses would be most happy.

SOC. But then, even as you say, at any rate, the life is a dreadful one.

1. *What would*: *ti an*, supplied by Woolsey; the manuscripts lack the words, though a recent hand in B adds *ti* in the margin.

2. *Law and speech and censure*: *nomon te kai logon kai psogon*, a jingle the English cannot keep; Schanz proposed to delete "and speech".

3. Callicles gives the names of the virtues to their contraries; in the *Republic* the false and boastful arguments that seize the soul of the young man turning democratic do the same, calling modesty simplemindedness and temperance unmanliness, insolence good breeding, anarchy freedom and extravagance magnificence (560d–561a).

οὐ γάρ τοι θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ Εὐριπίδης ἀληθῆ ἐν τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων—

τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;

καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἴσως τέθναμεν· ἤδη γάρ του ἔγωγε καὶ ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶ τυγχάνει ὂν οἷον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω, καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνήρ, ἴσως Σικελός τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πειστικὸν ὠνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους ἀμυήτους, τῶν δ' ἀνοήτων τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὡς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας. τοὐναντίον δὴ οὗτος σοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται ὡς τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου—τὸ ἀιδὲς δὴ λέγων—οὗτοι ἀθλιώτατοι ἂν εἶεν, οἱ ἀμύητοι, καὶ φοροῖεν εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ κοσκίνῳ. τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι· τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἀπῄκασεν τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὡς τετρημένην, ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι' ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην. ταῦτ' ἐπιεικῶς μέν ἐστιν ὑπό

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e 8 *τοι* F Stobaeus: *τι* B T P Iamblichus **e** 10 δ' B T P f: om. F **a** 1 *ἤδη γάρ* F Iamblichus Stobaeus: *ἤδη* B T P: *ὅπερ ἤδη* vulg. **a** 3 *αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι* F **a** 4 ⟨*ὅτι*⟩ *τυγχάνει* ci. H. Richards **a** 5 *ἄνω κάτω* B P F Iamblichus Stobaeus: *ἄνω καὶ κάτω* T **a** 6 *σικελός* B T P: *σικελικός* F Iamblichus Olympiodorus Stobaeus *ἰταλικός* B T P F Stobaeus: *ἰταλικός τις* Iamblichus **a** 7 *πειστικὸν* F: *πιστικὸν* B T P Stobaeus Iamblichus **b** 1 δ' vel δὲ B T P F Iamblichus Stobaeus: secl. Madvig *ἀνοήτων* F Iamblichus Stobaeus: *ἀμυήτων* B T P *αἱ* B T P F Iamblichus: om. Stobaeus **b** 2 ⟨διὰ⟩ *τὸ ἀκόλαστον* ci. Heindorf *αὐτοῦ* om. Sauppe *τὸ . . . στεγανόν* secl. Hirschig **b** 4 *ἀιδὲς* F (cf. Phaed. 79, a 4 et passim): *ἀειδὲς* B T P f Stobaeus: *ἀηδὲς* Iamblichus **b** 5 *ἂν εἶεν* B T P f: *εἶεν* Stobaeus: *εἰσὶν* F Iamblichus **b** 6 *ὕδωρ*] *οἶνον* Stobaeus *τετρημένῳ* secl. Hirschig **c** 2 *τὴν . . . τετρημένην* secl. Cobet **c** 3 δι' . . . *λήθην* secl. Cobet *ἀπιστίαν*] *ἀπληστίαν* ci. Schleiermacher *ἐπιεικῶς* secl. Cobet

For I would not marvel if Euripides speaks the truth in these words, saying—

> *But who knows if to live is to die,*
> *and to die to live?*[1]

And we, in reality, are perhaps dead; for I, for my part, have before 493
now actually heard one of the wise say that we are now dead, and that the body is our grave, and that this part of the soul in which desires are is in fact such as to be persuaded over and to shift up and down;[2] and this part, then, some refined man telling legends, perhaps some Sicilian or Italian, by a play on the name named a jar, because of its being credulous and persuadable, and the senseless he named uninitiated,[3] and of the senseless[4] this part of the b
soul where the desires are, its licentious and not watertight part, he likened to a perforated jar, because of its insatiability. This man, then, Callicles, contrary to you, points out that of those in Hades—meaning the unseen—these would be most wretched, the uninitiated, and they would carry water into the perforated jar with another such perforated thing, a sieve.[5] And the sieve, then, he means, as the one who was speaking to me said, is the soul; and the soul of c
the senseless he likened to a sieve as perforated, since it has not the power to hold, because of faithlessness and forgetfulness. These things are reasonably, to be sure, somewhat

1. Euripides, fr. 638 Kannicht (*Polyidus*); compare fr. 833 (*Phrixus*).

2. *Grave*: *sēma*, against *sōma*, "body". The *Cratylus* gives the play to "some" (400c); Philolaus, as Clement quotes him, cites "the ancient theologians and seers" for the soul buried in the body as in a grave (fr. 14 DK).

3. *Jar*: *pithos*, as if from *pithanon*, elsewhere "persuasive", here "credulous", easily persuaded (LSJ); *uninitiated*: *amyētoi*, heard also as "unclosed". The Sicilian or Italian is commonly taken to be Empedocles or a Pythagorean; an interpretation.

4. *Of the senseless*: *anoētōn*, F, Iamblichus and Stobaeus; B T P have *amyētōn*, "of the uninitiated".

5. *The unseen*: *aides*, the play on Hades' name of *Phaedo* 80d; the *Cratylus* reports it as the common view (403a) and rejects it (404b). In the *Republic* Musaeus and his son make the unholy and unjust carry water in a sieve in Hades (363d).

τι ἄτοπα, δηλοῖ μὴν ὃ ἐγὼ βούλομαί σοι ἐνδειξάμενος, ἐάν πως οἷός τε ὦ, πεῖσαι μεταθέσθαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλήστως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος βίου τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐξαρκούντως ἔχοντα βίον ἑλέσθαι. ἀλλὰ πότερον πείθω τί σε καὶ μετατίθεσθαι εὐδαιμονεστέρους εἶναι τοὺς κοσμίους τῶν ἀκολάστων, ἢ οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μυθολογῶ, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον μεταθήσῃ;

ΚΑΛ. Τοῦτ' ἀληθέστερον εἴρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἄλλην σοι εἰκόνα λέγω ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. σκόπει γὰρ εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις περὶ τοῦ βίου ἑκατέρου, τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οἷον εἰ δυοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἑκατέρῳ πίθοι πολλοὶ εἶεν καὶ τῷ μὲν ἑτέρῳ ὑγιεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, ὁ μὲν οἴνου, ὁ δὲ μέλιτος, ὁ δὲ γάλακτος, καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν, νάματα δὲ σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ ἑκάστου τούτων εἴη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκποριζόμενα· ὁ μὲν οὖν ἕτερος πληρωσάμενος μήτ' ἐποχετεύοι μήτε τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τούτων ἡσυχίαν ἔχοι· τῷ δ' ἑτέρῳ τὰ μὲν νάματα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκείνῳ, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεπὰ δέ, τὰ δ' ἀγγεῖα τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, ἀναγκάζοιτο δ' ἀεὶ καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά, ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας· ἆρα τοιούτου ἑκατέρου ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ ἀκολάστου εὐδαιμονέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου; πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμιον βίον τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι, ἢ οὐ πείθω;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ πείθεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πληρωσαμένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ'

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c 4 δηλοῖ *μὴν* T f Iamblichus: δηλοίμην F: δηλοῖ *μὲν* B (δὲ suprascr. b) P **d** 1 *μετατίθεσθαι* B T P f: *μεταθέσθαι* F: *μετατίθεσαι* scr. recc. **d** 2 *οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλα* Sauppe: *οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ* B T: *οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἂν* P: *οὐδὲ ἀλλὰ* F: *οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ κἂν* t **d** 4 *ἀληθέστερον* B T P: *ἀληθέστατον* F Olympiodorus **e** 2 *καὶ χαλεπὰ* secl. Morstadt **e** 7 *ἐκείνῳ* B T P f: *ἐκει* F **e** 8 δ' *ἀεὶ* F Iamblichus: *ἀ(ι)εὶ* B T P (*καὶ* ante *ἀναγκάζοιτο* add. vulg.) **a** 2 *ἑκατέρου* B T P F: om. Iamblichus: *ἑκατέρῳ* scr. recc. **a** 7 *οὐκέτ'* P: *οὐκ ἐτι* F: *οὐκ ἔτ'* B: *οὐκ* T

outlandish, but indeed they make plain what I want, by pointing it out to you, if I am somehow able, to persuade you to change: to choose, in place of the life that is insatiable and licentious, the life that is orderly, and sufficiently and enough content with what is at hand at any time. But do I persuade you at all, and to change d to thinking the orderly happier than the licentious, or, even if I tell many other such legends, will you change not at all the more?

CALL. That is the truer thing you have said, Socrates.

SOC. Come, then, let me say to you another likeness from the same school as the present one. For look into whether you mean something like this about each life, both the temperate and the licentious: as if each of two men had many jars, and for the one they e were sound and full, this one of wine, that one of honey, another of milk, and many others of many things, and the streams for each of these were scarce and difficult and procured with many difficult toils; the one, then, having filled them for himself, would neither pour in more nor take any thought, but as far as these go would be at rest; but for the other the streams, as also for that one, were possible to procure, but difficult, and his vessels perforated and unsound, and he would be compelled always, night and day, to 494 fill them, or be in pain with the utmost pains. With each life being such, do you say that the life of the licentious man is happier than that of the orderly one? Do I persuade you at all by saying this to grant that the orderly life is superior to the licentious, or do I not persuade you?

CALL. You do not persuade me, Socrates. For to that one who has filled them for himself there is no longer any pleasure at all, but this

ἔστιν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὰν πληρώσῃ, μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι μήτε λυπούμενον. ἀλλ' ἐν b
τούτῳ ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὡς πλεῖστον ἐπιρρεῖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ', ἂν πολὺ ἐπιρρέῃ, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἀπιὸν εἶναι, καὶ μεγάλ' ἄττα τὰ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς ἐκροαῖς;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 5

ΣΩ. Χαραδριοῦ τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ' οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου. καί μοι λέγε· τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις οἷον πεινῆν καὶ πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν; c

ΚΑΛ. Λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἁπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.

ΣΩ. Εὖγε, ὦ βέλτιστε· διατέλει γὰρ ὥσπερ ἤρξω, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχυνῇ. δεῖ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μηδ' ἐμὲ ἀπαι- 5
σχυνθῆναι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπὲ εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα καὶ κνησιῶντα, ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνῆσθαι, κνώμενον διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος. d

ΣΩ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γορ-
γίαν καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῇς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῇς· ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ εἶ. ἀλλ' ἀπο- 5
κρίνου μόνον.

ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ τοίνυν καὶ τὸν κνώμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιῶναι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἡδέως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιῷ—ἢ ἔτι τί e
σε ἐρωτῶ; ὅρα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἀποκρινῇ, ἐάν τίς σε

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b 1 *πληρώσῃ* B T P F: *πληρώσηται* vulg.: *πληρωθῇ* ci. Stallbaum **b** 3 *γ' ἂν* B T P: *ἐὰν* F **c** 2 *ἁπάσας* om. P **c** 3 *πληροῦντα* B T P F: *πληροῦν* Stephanus **c** 6 *ψωρῶντα* B T P: *ψωριῶντα* F rec. t **c** 7 *κνησιῶντα* T P F: *κνηστιῶντα* B **d** 1 *ἀτεχνῶς* T P: *ἀτέχνως* B: *ἄτεχνος* F **d** 3 *καὶ* ante *ἐξέπληξα* om. F **d** 4 *οὐδ' οὐ μὴ* F **e** 1 *κνησιῷ* Bekker: *κνησιοῖ* B T P: *κνησθῇ* F **e** 2 *ἀποκρινεῖ* B: *ἀποκρίνει* T: *ἀποκρίνῃ* P F

is, as I was saying just now, living like a stone, once he has filled b
them, neither rejoicing any more nor being in pain. But living pleasantly lies in this: in as much as possible flowing in.

SOC. Then is it not a necessity, at any rate, if much flows in, that what goes out be much too, and that the holes for the outflows be some big ones?

CALL. Very much so.

SOC. It is, again, some stone-curlew's life you speak of, and not a corpse's or a stone's.[1] And say to me: do you mean something like being hungry, and eating when hungry?

CALL. I do.

SOC. And being thirsty, at any rate, and drinking when thirsty? c

CALL. I do; and that one who has all the other desires and has power, filling them and rejoicing, lives happily.

SOC. Well done, most excellent man; continue as you began, and see that you do not shrink back in shame. And it seems that I too must not shrink back in shame. And first say whether one who has the itch and has an urge to scratch, having scratching in abundance, can live happily, continuing all his life scratching.

CALL. How outlandish you are, Socrates, and simply one who d
addresses the people.

SOC. That is just why, Callicles, I both struck Polus and Gorgias with amazement and made them be ashamed; but you will certainly not be struck with amazement, nor be ashamed, for you are courageous. But just answer.

CALL. I claim, then, that even the one who scratches would live pleasantly.

SOC. Then if pleasantly, happily too?

CALL. Certainly.

SOC. Is it if he has an urge to scratch his head only—or shall I e
ask you something further? See, Callicles, what you will answer if someone

1. *Stone-curlew*: *charadrios*, one of the river birds of Aristophanes (*Birds* 1141); the scholia on this passage and Olympiodorus (*On the Gorgias* 30.8) say it excreted as soon as it ate.

τὰ ἐχόμενα τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἐρωτᾷ. καὶ τούτων τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, ὁ τῶν κιναίδων βίος, οὗτος οὐ δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος; ἢ τούτους τολμήσεις λέγειν εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, ἐὰν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς λόγους;

ΣΩ. Ἡ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὦ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκεῖνος ὃς ἂν φῇ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν, εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζηται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὁποῖαι ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί; ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε πότερον φῂς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναί τι τῶν ἡδέων ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἵνα δή μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος ᾖ ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτό φημι εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Διαφθείρεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς.

ΚΑΛ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὔτ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο, οὔτε σύ. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ἄθρει μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ᾖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ πάντως χαίρειν· ταῦτά τε γὰρ τὰ νυνδὴ αἰνιχθέντα πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται συμβαίνοντα, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς σύ γε οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰσχυρίζῃ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ ὡς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα.

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e 3 ἐχόμενα] ἑπόμενα ci. Bekker: secl. Schanz ⟨τὸ⟩ τούτων Buttmann **e** 4 κεφάλαιον F b: κεφαλαίων B T P: κεφαλαιότατον fort. Antiatticista Bekkeri **e** 6 ἄφθονα F **e** 7 τοὺς λόγους secl. Cobet **e** 10 ἀνέδην B T f: ἀναίδην P F **a** 2 ἀγαθαὶ καὶ P F: αἱ ἀγαθαὶ καὶ B T: αἱ ἀγαθαὶ καὶ αἱ W **a** 5 μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος B T P: μὴ ὁμολογούμενος F: γρ. καὶ ἀνομολογούμενος καὶ μὴ ὁμολογούμενος Olympiodorus **b** 5 πολλὰ secl. ci. Sauppe

asks you all the things that follow on these in order. And, these things being such, their sum, the life of catamites, is this not dreadful and shameful and wretched? Or will you dare to say that these are happy, if they have in abundance what they need?[1]

CALL. Are you not ashamed, leading the arguments into such things, Socrates?

SOC. Is it, then, I who lead them there, you noble man, or that man who claims so without restraint[2] that those who rejoice, in whatever way they rejoice, are happy, and does not determine 495
which of the pleasures are good and bad? But say even now whether you claim that the pleasant and the good are the same, or that there is something among the pleasant things that is not good.

CALL. So that my argument may not be in disagreement if I claim they are different, I claim they are the same.

SOC. You are corrupting the first arguments, Callicles, and you would no longer be examining with me sufficiently the things that are, if you will say things contrary to what you think.

CALL. For so do you, Socrates. b

SOC. Then neither am I doing rightly, if I am doing this, nor are you. But, you blessed man, observe whether it may be that the good is not this, rejoicing in every way; for both these things just now spoken in riddles appear to result, many and shameful ones, if this is so, and many others.

CALL. As you, at any rate, think, Socrates.

SOC. And do you in reality insist on these things, Callicles?

CALL. I do.

SOC. Shall we attempt the argument, then, as with you in c
earnest?

CALL. Certainly, vehemently.

1. *Catamites*: *kinaidoi*, men who took the passive part with men, a word of abuse.
2. *Without restraint*: *anedēn*, B T f; P and F have *anaidēn*, "shamelessly".

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε· ἐπιστήμην που καλεῖς τι;—ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.—ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ἀνδρείαν νυνδὴ ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ ἐπιστήμης;—ΚΑΛ. Ἔλεγον γάρ.—ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὡς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες;—ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.—ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡδονὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον;—ΚΑΛ. Ἕτερον δήπου, ὦ σοφώτατε σύ.—ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἑτέραν ἡδονῆς;—ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς ἔφη Ἀχαρνεὺς ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕτερον.

ΚΑΛ. Σωκράτης δέ γε ἡμῖν ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα. ἢ ὁμολογεῖ;

ΣΩ. Οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ· οἶμαι δέ γε οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὅταν αὐτὸς αὑτὸν θεάσηται ὀρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τοὐναντίον ἡγῇ πάθος πεπονθέναι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγιείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου; οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δήπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγιείας τε καὶ νόσου.

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οἷον περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν σκόπει. νοσεῖ που ἄνθρωπος ὀφθαλμούς, ᾧ ὄνομα ὀφθαλμία;—ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—ΣΩ. Οὐ δήπου καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε ἅμα τοὺς αὐτούς;—ΚΑΛ. Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.—ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται; ἆρα τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέρων ἀπήλλακται;—ΚΑΛ. Ἥκιστά γε.—ΣΩ. Θαυμάσιον γὰρ

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c 5 *εἶναι* supra versum T **c** 6 *ἕτερον* ⟨*ὂν*⟩ Heindorf **d** 2 *ἕτερον* P **d** 5 *ἀγαθοῦ*] *ἡδέος* H. Schmidt **d** 6 *δέ γε* B T f: *δὲ* P F **e** 11 *ὅτου* B T P: *τοῦ ὅτου* F (*ὅλου* suprascr. f) *ἀπολαβὼν* B T P f: *ἀναλαβὼν* F **a** 1 *ἄνθρωπος*] *ἄνθρωπος* Bekker

SOC. Come, then, since it is so decided, divide these things for me: you call something knowledge, I take it?—CALL. I do.—SOC. And were you not just now saying that there is a certain courage with knowledge?—CALL. Yes, I was.—SOC. Is it not, then, as courage being other than knowledge that you were speaking of these as two?—CALL. Vehemently so.—SOC. What? Pleasure and knowledge, the same or other?—CALL. Other, surely, you most wise man.—SOC. d
And courage too other than pleasure?—CALL. How could it not be?—SOC. Come, then, so that we may remember these things: that Callicles of Acharnae claimed that pleasant and good are the same, but knowledge and courage other both from each other and from the good.[1]

CALL. But Socrates of Alopece, at any rate, does not agree with us on these things. Or does he agree?

SOC. He does not agree; and I think Callicles does not either, e
when he himself beholds himself rightly. For say to me: do you not believe that those who fare well have suffered a suffering contrary to those who fare badly?[2]

CALL. I do.

SOC. Then, if these are contrary to each other, is it a necessity that it is with them as it is with health and disease? For surely a person is not healthy and sick at the same time, nor is he rid of health and disease at the same time.

CALL. What do you mean?

SOC. For example: taking apart whichever part of the body you want, look into it. A person is sick in the eyes, I take it, with what is 496
named ophthalmia?—CALL. How could it not be?—SOC. Surely he is not also healthy, at any rate, in the same eyes at the same time?—CALL. Not in any way whatever.—SOC. What, when he is rid of the ophthalmia? Is he then rid also of the health of his eyes, and in the end has he been rid of both at the same time?—CALL. Least of all, at any rate.—SOC. For marvellous,

1. *Callicles of Acharnae* … *Socrates of Alopece*: each is named by his deme, in the style of a public record.

2. *Fare well*: *eu prattein*, also "do well"; Socrates plays on the double sense at 507c.

οἶμαι καὶ ἄλογον γίγνεται· ἢ γάρ;—ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.— b
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐν μέρει οἶμαι ἑκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ ἀπολ-
λύει;—ΚΑΛ. Φημί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν
ὡσαύτως;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτῆτα;—
ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ 5
τἀναντία τούτων, κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει
καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἑκατέρου;—ΚΑΛ. Πάντως δήπου.
—ΣΩ. Ἐὰν εὕρωμεν ἄρα ἄττα ὂν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται c
ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τό
τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; καὶ εὖ μάλα
σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου.—ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμο-
λογῶ. 5

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν
ἔλεγες πότερον ἡδὺ ἢ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν.
—ΚΑΛ. Ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδὺ
λέγω.—ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν. d
ἢ οὐχί;—ΚΑΛ. Φημί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν;—ΚΑΛ.
Σφόδρα γε.—ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς
ἅπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι;—ΚΑΛ. Ὁμο-
λογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.—ΣΩ. Εἶεν· διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν 5
ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡδὺ φὴς εἶναι;—ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν
τούτου οὗ λέγεις τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δήπου ἐστίν;
—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας e
καὶ ἡδονή;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαί-
ρειν λέγεις;—ΚΑΛ. Μάλιστα.—ΣΩ. Διψῶντά γε.—ΚΑΛ.
Φημί.—ΣΩ. Λυπούμενον;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Αἰσθάνῃ οὖν
τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν 5
διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς; ἢ οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο γίγνεται κατὰ

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b 1 *γίγνεται*] *ἐγίγνετ' ἂν* Sauppe ἢ B T P f: *οὐ* F **b** 2 *ἀπολλύει* B T P: *ἀπολύει* F: *ἀπόλλυσι* Hirschig **c** 2 *ἄνθρωπος*] *ἄνθρωπος* Bekker *γε* om. P **c** 4 *ὑπερφυῶς ὡς* B W F: *ὑπερφυῶς* T **d** 1 *λέγω* Stallbaum: *καλῶ* ci. Badham: *καὶ ἐγὼ* B T P F (Socrati tribuentes): *ἐγὼ* al.: secl. Ast **d** 5 δὲ δὴ] δὴ F **d** 6 ἢ om. Sauppe **e** 1 *πλήρωσις* F: *πλήρης* B T P: *πλήρη* W

I think, and unaccountable is what it becomes; is it not?—CALL. b
Vehemently so.—SOC. But each, I think, he both takes and loses in turn?—CALL. I claim so.—SOC. Then might and feebleness in the same way?—CALL. Yes.—SOC. And speed and slowness?—CALL. Certainly.—SOC. And the good things and happiness, and their contraries, bad things and wretchedness: does he take each in turn, and in turn is he rid of each?—CALL. Altogether, surely.—SOC. If, c
then, we find some things of which a person is rid at the same time and which he has at the same time, it is plain that these, at any rate, would not be the good and the bad. Do we agree on these things? And answer having looked into it very well.—CALL. Well, I agree prodigiously.

SOC. Come, then, to the things agreed before. Being hungry: which did you say it was, pleasant or distressing? I mean being hungry itself.—CALL. Distressing, I do; eating when hungry, however, is pleasant, I say.[1]—SOC. I understand; but being hungry d
itself, at any rate, is distressing. Or not?—CALL. I claim so.—SOC. Then being thirsty too?—CALL. Vehemently so.—SOC. Shall I, then, ask still more, or do you agree that all lack and desire is distressing?—CALL. I agree; but do not ask.—SOC. Very well. But drinking when thirsty: do you not claim it is pleasant?—CALL. I do.—SOC. Then of this that you speak of, the being thirsty is, surely, being in pain?—CALL. Yes.—SOC. And the drinking is a e
filling of the lack and a pleasure?[2]—CALL. Yes.—SOC. Then it is in respect of the drinking that you say he rejoices?—CALL. Most of all.—SOC. While thirsty, at any rate.—CALL. I claim so.—SOC. While in pain?—CALL. Yes.—SOC. Do you perceive, then, what results: that you say that one who is in pain rejoices at the same time, when you say that one who is thirsty drinks? Or does this not come about at the same time, in

1. *I say*: *legō*, Stallbaum's conjecture; B, T, P and F have *kai egō*, "and I", and give the words to Socrates; other manuscripts have *egō*.
2. *A filling*: *plērōsis*, F; B, T and P have *plērēs*, "full".

τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει; οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὔ;—ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν.—ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς πράττειν ἅμα ἀδύνατον φῂς εἶναι.—ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ γάρ.—ΣΩ. 497
Ἀνιώμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυνατὸν ὡμολόγηκας.—ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.—ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. 5

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίζῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ἀκκίζῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· καὶ πρόιθί γε ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν, [ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς] ἵνα εἰδῇς ὡς σοφὸς ὢν με νουθετεῖς. οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πέ- b
παυται καὶ ἅμα ἡδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις.

ΓΟΡ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν ἕνεκα, ἵνα περανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι. 5

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν Σωκράτης, ὦ Γοργία· σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια ἀνερωτᾷ καὶ ἐξελέγχει.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλ' ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι ὅπως ἂν βούληται. 10

ΚΑΛ. Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ τὰ σμικρά τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, c
ἐπείπερ Γοργίᾳ δοκεῖ οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα με- 5
μύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ᾤμην θεμιτὸν εἶναι. ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται διψῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος.—ΚΑΛ. Φημί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν ἅμα

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e 7 *χρόνον* B T P f: *τρόπον* F **e** 8 *γὰρ οἶμαι* B T P f: *γάρ μοι* F **a** 1 *φῂς* Baiter: *ἔφης* B T P F **a** 7 *πρόιθι*] *προι οί* F **a** 8 *τοὔμπροσθεν* F *ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς* secl. Thompson: *τί ἔχων ληρεῖς* scripsit et Callicli tribuit Badham: post **b** 3 *λέγεις* transp. Hermann: post **b** 1 *νουθετεῖς* Lamberton *ἰδῇς* F **b** 3 *ὅτι* B T P: *τί* F **b** 8 *οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ* T W F: *οὔση αὐτὴ ἡ* B **c** 1 *τε* B T P: om. F **c** 2 *οὕτως* Socrati tribuunt B P **c** 5 *ἀπέλιπες* B T P: *ἀπέλειπες* F

the same place and time, whether of soul or of body, as you want? For it makes no difference, I think. Is this so or not?—CALL. It is.—SOC. But indeed you claim that for one faring well, at any rate, to 497
fare badly at the same time is impossible.—CALL. Yes, I claim so.—SOC. But that one who is distressed rejoices, at any rate, you have agreed is possible.—CALL. So it appears.—SOC. Then rejoicing is not faring well, nor being distressed faring badly, so that the pleasant comes to be other than the good.

CALL. I do not know what you are acting the wise man about, Socrates.

SOC. You know, but you are being coy, Callicles. And go on, at any rate, still further forward, so that you may know how wise you b
are to admonish me.[1] Is it not at the same time that each of us has ceased from being thirsty and at the same time from being pleased, through drinking?

CALL. I do not know what you are saying.

GORG. By no means, Callicles; but answer, for our sakes too, so that the arguments may be carried through.

CALL. But Socrates is always like this, Gorgias: he questions and refutes things small and worth little.

GORG. But what difference does it make to you? This honour is not yours in any case, Callicles; but submit to Socrates' refuting you in whatever way he wants.

CALL. Then you ask these small and narrow things, since Gorgias c
decides thus.

SOC. You are happy, Callicles, because you have been initiated into the great before the small; I did not think that was sanctioned.[2] Answer, then, from where you left off: whether each of us does not cease from being thirsty and from being pleased at the same time.—CALL. I claim so.—SOC. Then from being hungry too, and from the other desires and pleasures, at the same time

1. Burnet brackets, after Thompson, the words "since you keep talking drivel" (*hoti echōn lēreis*), which the manuscripts have after "further forward".

2. *Initiated*: the Lesser Mysteries, held at Agrae, came before the Great Mysteries of Eleusis; to receive both at once was not "sanctioned" (*ou themiton*, Plutarch, *Demetrius* 26).

παύεται;—ΚΑΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν γε καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα παύεται, ὡς σὺ ὡμολόγεις· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς;—ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε· τί οὖν δή; d

ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὦ φίλε, τἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἡδέσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαροῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα παύεται, τῶν δὲ οὔ, ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων· πῶς οὖν ταὐτὰ ἂν εἴη τὰ ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ τοῖς κακοῖς; ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, καὶ τῇδε ἐπίσκεψαι (οἶμαι γάρ σοι οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ὁμολογεῖσθαι· ἄθρει δέ) τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ;—ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.—ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς ἄφρονας καὶ δειλούς; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους ἔλεγες· ἢ οὐ τούτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς;—ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.—ΣΩ. Τί δέ; παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἤδη εἶδες;—ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.—ΣΩ. Ἄνδρα δὲ οὔπω εἶδες ἀνόητον χαίροντα;—ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;—ΣΩ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου.—ΚΑΛ. Εἶδον.—ΣΩ. Τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα;—ΚΑΛ. Φημί.—ΣΩ. Πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες;—ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρειν.—ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη εἶδες ἄνδρα δειλόν;—ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;—ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε [μᾶλλον]· εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν διαφέρει. e 5 498 5 b

d 2 γε F: om. B T P **d** 5 ὅτι B T P: om. F οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ P F: οὐ ταῦτα T: οὐ ταὐτὰ t: αὐτὰ B **d** 6 ad οὐδὲ add. ὅτι in marg. t **d** 7 ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων secl. Deuschle **d** 9 τῇδε T F et ex τί δέ P: τήνδε B **e** 1 δέ B F: δή T P f **e** 4 ἄφρονας B T W F: τοὺς ἄφρονας f **e** 5 ἔλεγες T W F: ὃ ἔλεγες B **e** 7 εἶδες B T P f: ἴδες F t (et mox) οὔπω B P F t: οὐδέπω T **a** 3 πότεροι F: πότερον B T W **b** 1 μᾶλλον B T P F: om. al.: ὁμοίως Sauppe: post μᾶλλον intercidisse putavit δ' ἴσως οἱ δειλοί Hermann

does he cease?—CALL. It is so.—SOC. Then from pains too and from d
pleasures he ceases at the same time?—CALL. Yes.—SOC. But indeed
from good things and bad things, at any rate, he does not cease at
the same time, as you were agreeing; and now do you not agree?—
CALL. I do; what of it, then?

SOC. That the good things do not come to be the same as the
pleasant, my friend, nor the bad as the distressing. For from the
one he ceases at the same time, from the other not, on the ground
that they are other; how, then, could the pleasant things be the
same as the good things, or the distressing things as the bad? And
if you want, look into it this way too (for I think that by you not
even this way is it agreed; but observe): do you not call the good e
good by the presence of good things, as you call beautiful those
to whom beauty is present?—CALL. I do.—SOC. What? Do you call
foolish and cowardly men good? For just now, at any rate, you
did not, but you were speaking of the courageous and intelligent;
or do you not call these good?—CALL. Very much so.—SOC. What?
Have you ever seen a senseless boy rejoicing?—CALL. I have.—SOC.
And a senseless man rejoicing, have you not yet seen one?—CALL.
I think so; but what of this?—SOC. Nothing; but answer.—CALL. 498
I have seen one.—SOC. What? One who has sense, being in pain
and rejoicing?—CALL. I claim so.—SOC. And which rejoice and are
in pain more, the intelligent or the foolish?—CALL. I think it does
not make much difference.—SOC. Well, this too is enough. And
in war have you ever seen a cowardly man?—CALL. How could I
not?—SOC. What then? When the foe were going away, which did
you think rejoiced more, the cowardly or the courageous?—CALL.
Both, to me; or if not, about equally, at any rate.[1]—SOC. It makes b
no difference.

1. Burnet brackets *mallon*, "more", after "Both, to me", which B, T, P and F have and other manuscripts omit.

χαίρουσιν δ' οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί;—ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.—ΣΩ. Καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὡς ἔοικεν.—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται ἢ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;—ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφότεροι.—ΣΩ. Ἆρα ὁμοίως;—ΚΑΛ. Μᾶλλον ἴσως οἱ δειλοί.—ΣΩ. Ἀπιόντων δ' οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν;—ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσιν καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως, ὡς σὺ φῄς, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων; —ΚΑΛ. Φημί.—ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσιν καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί;—ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί τε καὶ οἱ κακοί; ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ [οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί] εἰσιν οἱ κακοί;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῄς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθούς, καὶ κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας;—ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσιν πάρεστιν τἀγαθά, αἱ ἡδοναί, εἴπερ χαίρουσιν; —ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστιν τὰ κακά, αἱ λῦπαι;—ΚΑΛ. Πάρεστιν. —ΣΩ. Κακῶν δέ γε παρουσίᾳ φῄς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακούς· ἢ οὐκέτι φῄς;—ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.—ΣΩ. Ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα οἷς ἂν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἷς ἂν ἀνιῶνται;—ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Οἷς μέν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἷς δ' ἧττον ἧττον, οἷς δὲ παραπλησίως παραπλησίως;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φῄς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς φρονίμους

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b 4 *μόνον* B T P f: *μόνοι* F **c** 7 *καὶ οἱ* B T F: *καὶ* W *οἱ ἀγαθοὶ* secl. Routh *οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί* B: *οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοί* T W f: *καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοί* F: secl. H. Schmidt (*εἰσιν* quoque secl. Schanz) **d** 3 *καὶ κακοὺς* F: *κακοὺς* B T P: *τοὺς κακοὺς* f **d** 8 *αἱ* B T P: *καὶ αἱ* F **e** 4 *οἷς* (ter) F: *οἱ* (ter) B T P *ἧττον ἧττον* T W F: *ἧττον ἧττον ἡτ|τον* B

But anyway the cowardly too rejoice?—CALL. Vehemently so.—SOC. And the foolish too, as it seems.—CALL. Yes.—SOC. And when they are coming on, are only the cowardly in pain, or the courageous too?—CALL. Both.—SOC. Likewise?—CALL. The cowardly more, perhaps.—SOC. And when they go away, do they not rejoice more?—CALL. Perhaps.—SOC. Then are the foolish and the intelligent and the cowardly and the courageous in pain and rejoicing about equally, as you claim, but the cowardly more than the c
courageous?—CALL. I claim so.—SOC. But indeed the intelligent, at any rate, and the courageous are good, and the cowardly and foolish bad?—CALL. Yes.—SOC. About equally, then, the good and the bad rejoice and are in pain?—CALL. I claim so.

SOC. Then are the good and the bad good and bad about equally? Or are the bad even still more good?[1]

CALL. But, by Zeus, I do not know what you are saying. d

SOC. Do you not know that you claim that the good are good by the presence of good things, and the bad, too, by that of bad things? And that the good things are the pleasures, and the bad things the distresses?—CALL. I do.—SOC. Then to those who rejoice the good things are present, the pleasures, if they rejoice?—CALL. How could they not be?—SOC. Then, good things being present, those who rejoice are good?—CALL. Yes.—SOC. What? To those who are distressed are not the bad things present, the pains?—CALL. They are present.—SOC. And by the presence of bad things, at any e
rate, you claim that the bad are bad; or do you no longer claim it?—CALL. I do.—SOC. Good, then, are those who rejoice, and bad those who are distressed?—CALL. Certainly.—SOC. Those more, at any rate, more, those less, less, and those about equally, about equally?—CALL. Yes.—SOC. Then you claim that about equally they rejoice and are in pain, the intelligent

1. Burnet brackets, after H. Schmidt, the words "the good and the bad", which the manuscripts have after "good" in various forms.

καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλούς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων· καὶ δὶς γάρ τοι καὶ τρὶς φασιν καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν φαμεν. ἦ γάρ;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν;—ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιώμενον;—ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.—ΣΩ. Ἀνιᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁμοίως, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός; οὐ ταῦτα συμβαίνει καὶ τὰ πρότερα ἐκεῖνα, ἐάν τις ταὐτὰ φῇ ἡδέα τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι; οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;

ΚΑΛ. Πάλαι τοί σου ἀκροῶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι, κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῷ ὁτιοῦν, τούτου ἄσμενος ἔχῃ ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὡς δὴ σὺ οἴει ἐμὲ ἢ καὶ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους.

ΣΩ. Ἰοῦ ἰοῦ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανοῦργος εἶ καί μοι ὥσπερ παιδὶ χρῇ, τοτὲ μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με. καίτοι οὐκ ᾤμην γε κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἑκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι, ὡς ὄντος φίλου· νῦν δὲ ἐψεύσθην, καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστιν δὲ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ νῦν λέγεις, ὅτι ἡδοναί τινές εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί· ἦ γάρ;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ

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e 11 *ὡμολογουμένων* F **a** 1 *τὰ* T P F: *τὸ* B **a** 4 δὲ B T P: *τε* F **b** 4 *τοί σου* B T P: *του σοῦ* F **c** 1 *τὰ αὐτὰ* F: *αὖ* B T P **c** 4 *φίλου*] *φαύλου* F **c** 6 δὲ δή B T P F: δέ Stobaeus **c** 7 *τινές εἰσιν* B T P F: *εἰσί τινες* Stobaeus

and the foolish, and the cowardly and the courageous, or the cowardly even still more?

CALL. I do.

SOC. Reckon up, then, together with me, what results for us from the things agreed; for twice and three times, they say, it is beautiful 499
to say and to look into beautiful things.[1] The intelligent and courageous man, we claim, is good; is it not?—CALL. Yes.—SOC. And the foolish and cowardly bad?—CALL. Certainly.—SOC. And again the one who rejoices good?—CALL. Yes.—SOC. And the one who is distressed bad?—CALL. It is a necessity.—SOC. And the good man and the bad are distressed and rejoice likewise, and perhaps the bad man even more?—CALL. Yes.—SOC. Then does the bad man become b
bad and good likewise with the good man, or even more good? Do not these things result, and those earlier ones, if one claims that the same things are pleasant and good? Are these things not a necessity, Callicles?

CALL. I have long been listening to you, you know, Socrates, agreeing all along, and reflecting that, even if someone concedes anything whatever to you in play, you hold on to it gladly, as lads do. As if, indeed, you thought that I or anyone else whatever among human beings does not believe that some pleasures are better and others inferior.

SOC. Oh, oh, Callicles, what a rogue you are, and you use me c
like a child, at one time asserting that the same things are thus,[2] at another otherwise, deceiving me. And yet I did not think at the beginning, at any rate, that I would be deceived by you willingly, on the ground that you were a friend; but now I was mistaken, and, as it seems, it is a necessity for me, according to the old account, to make the best of what is present and to accept this that is given from you. And what you now say is, indeed, as it seems, that there are some pleasures, some good, others bad; is it not?—CALL. Yes.— d
SOC. Then are the beneficial ones good, and bad

1. A proverb, as Socrates calls it in the *Philebus* (60a); the scholiast on this passage traces it to Empedocles (fr. 25 DK), "what must be said, it is beautiful to say twice".

2. *The same things*: *ta auta*, F; B, T and P have *au*, "again".

δὲ αἱ βλαβεραί;—ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Ὠφέλιμοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ κακόν τι;—ΚΑΛ. Φημί. —ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέγεις, οἷον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἃς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς, ἢ ἄρα τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσαι ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ τἀναντία τούτων κακαί;—ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ λῦπαι ὡσαύτως αἱ μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πονηραί;—ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἱρετέον ἐστὶν καὶ πρακτέον;—ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὔ;—ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δή.—ΣΩ. Ἕνεκα γάρ που τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξεν πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πώλῳ. ἆρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἁπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα δεῖν πάντα τἆλλα πράττεσθαι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων; σύμψηφος ἡμῖν εἶ καὶ σὺ ἐκ τρίτων;—ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.—ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ἕνεκα δεῖ καὶ τἆλλα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων. —ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖα κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον;—ΚΑΛ. Τεχνικοῦ.

ΣΩ. Ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων. ἔλεγον γὰρ αὖ, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαὶ αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον παρασκευάζουσαι, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον, αἱ δὲ γιγνώσκουσαι ὅτι τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι κακόν· καὶ ἐτίθην τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν μαγειρικὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἀλλὰ οὐ

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d 2 δέ γε B T P: δὲ F Stobaeus **d** 5 *νῦν δὴ* B T P F: *δὴ νῦν* Stobaeus *ἢ ἄρα* Sauppe: *εἰ ἄρα* B T P F Stobaeus: *ἆρα* Heindorf (qui mox *ποιοῦσιν*) **d** 6 *ποιοῦσαι* B T P F Stobaeus: *ποιοῦσιν* al. **e** 9 *ἕνεκα* F Iamblichus Stobaeus: *ἕνεκεν* B T W **a** 2 *τρίτων*] *τούτων* F **a** 5 *ὁποῖα* B T P F: *ποῖα* Stobaeus **a** 8 *ἔλεγον γὰρ αὖ* F: *ἔλεγε γὰρ αὐτὸς* Stobaeus: *ἔλεγον γὰρ* B T P **b** 1 *μόνον* B T P F: om. Stobaeus **b** 3 *ἐτίθην* B T P: *ἐτίθειν* P: *ἔτι θεῖν* F: *ἐτίθουν* p f Stobaeus **b** 4 *μαγειρικὴν* B F Stobaeus: *μαγειρικὴν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα* T W: in marg. *περὶ τὸ σῶμα* f

the harmful ones?—CALL. Certainly.—SOC. And beneficial, at any rate, are those that do some good, and bad those that do some bad?—CALL. I claim so.—SOC. Then do you mean such ones as these, for example the ones in the body that we were speaking of just now, the pleasures in eating and drinking: is it, then, that of these those that make health in the body, or might, or some other virtue of the body, these are good, and those that make the contraries of e
these bad?[1]—CALL. Certainly.—SOC. Then pains too, in the same way, some are decent, others base?—CALL. How could they not be?—SOC. Then the decent ones, both pleasures and pains, must be both chosen and done?—CALL. Certainly.—SOC. But the base ones not?—CALL. Plainly, then.—SOC. For it was for the sake of the good things, I take it, that we decided all things must be done, if you remember, Polus and I. Do you too, then, join in deciding thus, that the good is the end of all actions, and that for its sake all the other things must be done, but not it for the sake of the others? Are 500
you too of the same vote with us, as the third?—CALL. I am.—SOC. For the sake of the good things, then, one must do both the other things and the pleasant ones, but not the good things for the sake of the pleasant.—CALL. Certainly.—SOC. Then is it for every man to pick out which of the pleasant things are good and which bad, or is there need of a master of the craft for each?—CALL. Of a master of the craft.

SOC. Let us recollect, then, what I, again, was in fact saying to Polus and Gorgias. For I was saying, again, if you remember, that b
there are preparations, some as far as pleasure, preparing this very thing alone, and ignorant of the better and the inferior, and others knowing what is good and what is bad; and I set down, among those concerned with pleasures, the butcher's routine,[2] but not

1. *Is it, then*: *ē ara*, Sauppe's conjecture; the manuscripts and Stobaeus have *ei ara*, "whether".

2. *The butcher's routine*: *mageirikē empeiria*, the routine of the *mageiros* (491a); at 462d–465e Socrates called it cookery.

τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην. καὶ πρὸς Φιλίου, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτὸς οἷου δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν μηδ' ὅτι ἂν τύχῃς παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτ' αὖ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀποδέχου ὡς παίζοντος· ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τούτου ἡμῖν εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι, οὗ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν, πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν ὑμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ [ἐπὶ] τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων. ἴσως οὖν βέλτιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι, διελομένους δὲ καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις, εἰ ἔστιν τούτω διττὼ τὼ βίω, σκέψασθαι τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν καὶ ὁπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν. ἴσως οὖν οὔπω οἶσθα τί λέγω.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. ἐπειδὴ ὡμολογήκαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μέν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δέ τι ἡδύ, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἑκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν μελέτην τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως, τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ—αὐτὸ δέ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἢ σύμφαθι ἢ μή. σύμφῃς;

ΚΑΛ. Οὕτως φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή, ἃ καὶ πρὸς τούσδε ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, διομολόγησαί μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ἔλεγον δέ που ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὀψοποιικὴ οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία, ἡ δ' ἰατρική, λέγων ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτου οὗ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὧν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἑκάστου δοῦναι, ἡ ἰατρική· ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς,

b 7 *μήτ' αὖ τὰ* B T P: *μὴ ταῦτα* F **c** 2 *ἡμῖν εἰσιν* B T F: *εἰσιν ἡμῖν* P **c** 7 *ἐπὶ* secl. Findeisen **d** 2 *ἔστιν*] *ἐστὸν* Hirschig **d** 3 *τε* B T P f: om. F **d** 4 *πότερον* F **d** 10 *δέ μοι* B T P f: *δὴ ἐμοὶ* F **e** 1 *μή. συμφῆς;* F: *μὴ συμφῇς* B T f **e** 3 *ἐγὼ* om P **e** 5 *ὀψοποικὴ* B T P: *ὀψοποιητικὴ* F **a** 3 ante *τῆς* add. *ἡ* f

a craft, and among those concerned with the good, the craft of medicine. And, by the god of friendship, Callicles, do not yourself think you must play with me, nor answer whatever comes to you contrary to what you think, nor, again, receive what comes from c
me in this way, as from one who is playing.[1] For you see that our arguments are about this, than which a person with even a little sense would be in earnest about nothing more: in what way one ought to live, whether the one to which you summon me, doing these things, the things of a man, indeed, speaking before the people and exercising myself in rhetoric and engaging in politics in this way in which you people now engage in politics, or this life, the one in philosophy, and what ever it is in which this one differs from that.[2] Perhaps, then, it is best, as I attempted just now, to d
divide, and, having divided and agreed with each other whether these are two lives, to look into what they differ in from each other and which of them must be lived. Perhaps, then, you do not yet know what I am saying.

CALL. No indeed.

SOC. Well, I will say it to you more clearly. Since you and I have agreed that there is something good and something pleasant, and that the pleasant is other than the good, and that of each of them there is a certain practice and preparation for its acquisition, the hunt for the pleasant and the one for the good—but this very point, first, either concur with me or not. Do you concur? e

CALL. Thus I claim.

SOC. Come, then, the things I was saying to these men too: come to agreement with me on them, whether, then, you thought I spoke the truth at that time. I was saying, I take it, that I do not think cookery is a craft, but a routine, while medicine is, saying that the 501
one, medicine, has looked into both the nature of what it tends and the cause of what it does, and has an account of each of these to give; while the other, the one of pleasure,

1. *By the god of friendship*: Zeus Philios, guardian of friendship; Socrates has just called Callicles a friend (499c).

2. *The things of a man*: an echo of Callicles' account of the life fit for a man (484c–486d).

πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία αὐτῇ ἐστιν ἅπασα, κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη, τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην μόνον σῳζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι, ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται τὰς ἡδονάς. ταῦτ' οὖν πρῶτον σκόπει εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ἱκανῶς λέγεσθαι, καὶ εἶναί τινες καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν τοιαῦται ἄλλαι πραγματεῖαι, αἱ μὲν τεχνικαί, προμήθειάν τινα ἔχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστου περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, αἱ δὲ τούτου μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμέναι δ' αὖ, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἂν αὐτῇ τρόπον γίγνοιτο, ἥτις δὲ ἢ βελτίων ἢ χείρων τῶν ἡδονῶν, οὔτε σκοπούμεναι οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι μόνον, εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε χεῖρον. ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, δοκοῦσίν τε εἶναι, καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι τὸ τοιοῦτον κολακείαν εἶναι καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ ἄλλο ὅτου ἄν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύῃ, ἀσκέπτως ἔχων τοῦ ἀμείνονός τε καὶ τοῦ χείρονος· σὺ δὲ δὴ πότερον συγκατατίθεσαι ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἢ ἀντίφῃς;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ ὁ λόγος καὶ Γοργίᾳ τῷδε χαρίσωμαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν μίαν ψυχὴν ἔστιν τοῦτο, περὶ δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς οὐκ ἔστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ περὶ πολλάς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἁθρόαις ἅμα χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι, μηδὲν σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον;

ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν αἵτινές εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύσεις αἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, ἢ

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a 4 *ἀτέχνως* B² P: *ἀτεχνῶς* B T F **a** 6 *ἀλόγως*] *ἄλογός* Findeisen **a** 7 *τριβῇ . . . ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην* B T P F: *τριβὴ . . . ἐμπειρία μνήμη* vulg. **b** 3 *ἄλλαι τοιαῦται* F **b** 6 *αὐτῇ* B P F: *αὐτὴ* T: *αὕτη* Heindorf **c** 5 *τοῦ χείρονος* B T P: *χείρονος* F **c** 6 *τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν* secl. Thompson **d** 3 *καὶ* B T P f: om. F **d** 4 *μηδὲν* F: *μηδὲ* B T P

toward which all its tending is, goes at it quite craftlessly,[1] having looked into neither the nature of pleasure in any way nor the cause, and altogether without account, so to speak, having counted over nothing, by knack and routine keeping safe only a memory of what b
usually happens, by which, indeed, it also procures its pleasures. Look into these things first, then, whether you think they are sufficiently stated, and whether there are also some other such occupations about the soul, some masterly, having a certain forethought for what is best about the soul, and others thinking little of this, but having looked, again, as there, only into the pleasure of the soul, in what way it might come to it, but, which of the pleasures is better or inferior, neither looking into it nor having anything matter to them other than gratifying only, whether better or inferior. For I, c
Callicles, do think that they exist, and I for my part claim that such a thing is flattery, both about body and about soul and about anything else whose pleasure one tends, without having looked into the superior and the inferior. And you, then, do you lay down the same opinion with us about these things, or do you speak against it?

CALL. Not I; but I grant it, so that the argument may be carried through for you, and I may gratify Gorgias here.

SOC. And is this so about one soul, but not about two and many? d

CALL. No, but about two and about many too.

SOC. Then can one gratify them crowded together at the same time too, looking in no way into what is best?

CALL. I think so.

SOC. Have you the means, then, to say which are the pursuits that do this? Or rather, if you want, as I ask, whichever

1. *Craftlessly*: ἀτέχνως (*atechnōs*), the reading of B's old corrector and of P; B, T and F accent it ἀτεχνῶς, "simply".

μὲν ἄν σοι δοκῇ τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἢ δ' ἂν μή, μὴ φάθι. πρῶτον δὲ σκεψώμεθα τὴν αὐλητικήν. οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοιαύτη e
τις εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡμῶν μόνον διώκειν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν φροντίζειν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε ἅπασαι, οἷον ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἡ 5
ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις; οὐ τοιαύτη τίς σοι καταφαίνεται; ἢ ἡγῇ τι φροντίζειν Κινησίαν τὸν Μέλητος, ὅπως ἐρεῖ τι τοιοῦτον 10
ὅθεν ἂν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίους γίγνοιντο, ἢ ὅτι μέλλει 502
χαριεῖσθαι τῷ ὄχλῳ τῶν θεατῶν;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κινησίου γε πέρι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μέλης; ἦ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρῳδεῖν; ἢ ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ 5
ἥδιστον; ἠνία γὰρ ᾄδων τοὺς θεατάς. ἀλλὰ δὴ σκόπει· οὐχὶ ἥ τε κιθαρῳδικὴ δοκεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις ἡδονῆς χάριν ηὑρῆσθαι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ θαυμαστή, ἡ τῆς b
τραγῳδίας ποίησις, ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν; πότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδή, ὡς σοὶ δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ διαμάχεσθαι, ἐάν τι αὐτοῖς ἡδὺ μὲν ᾖ καὶ κεχαρισμένον, πονηρὸν δέ, ὅπως τοῦτο μὲν μὴ ἐρεῖ, εἰ 5
δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ λέξει καὶ ᾄσεται, ἐάντε χαίρωσιν ἐάντε μή; ποτέρως σοι δοκεῖ παρεσκευάσθαι ἡ τῶν τραγῳδιῶν ποίησις;

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d 9 *μή* P et supra versum T f: om. B F **e** 1 *σκεψόμεθα* P **e** 5 *ἅπασαι* B T P: *πᾶσαι* F **e** 10 *φροντίζειν κινησίαν τὸν* B P F t: *κινησίαν φροντίζειν τὸν* T *ἐρεῖ τι* B W F t: *ἐρεῖται* T **a** 2 *γε πέρι* B T P: *τε πέρι* F **a** 5 *βλέπων* om. Coisl. **b** 2 *ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν* secl. Cobet *αὐτῆς . . . σπουδή* secl. Hermann **b** 3 *ὡς σοὶ* T W F: *ὥς σοι* B: *ὥς μοι* Schanz **b** 6 *ὠφέλιμον ⟨ὄν⟩* Hirschig

you think is one of these, say so, and whichever does not, do not say so. And first let us look into pipe-playing. Do you not think it is e
one of this kind, Callicles: pursuing only our pleasure, and taking thought for nothing else?

CALL. I think so.

SOC. Then all such ones as these too, for example lyre-playing in the contests?

CALL. Yes.

SOC. What of the training of choruses and the poetry of dithyrambs? Does it not appear to you to be one of this kind? Or do you believe that Cinesias the son of Meles takes any thought how he will say something of such a kind that his hearers might become better from it, or what he is going to gratify the crowd of spectators 502
with?[1]

CALL. Plainly, then, this at any rate, Socrates, in Cinesias' case at any rate.

SOC. What of his father Meles? Did you think he sang to the lyre looking to what is best? Or did that man not even look to what is most pleasant? For he distressed the spectators with his singing. But look into it: do you not think that all singing to the lyre, and the poetry of dithyrambs, has been found for the sake of pleasure?

CALL. I do.

SOC. What, then, of this dignified and marvellous thing, the po- b
etry of tragedy, and what it has been in earnest about? Is its undertaking and its earnestness, as you think, only to gratify the spectators, or also to fight it out, if something is pleasant to them and gratifying, but base, so that it will not say this, and if something is in fact unpleasant and beneficial, that it will both say this and sing it, whether they rejoice or not? In which of the two ways do you think the poetry of tragedies has been prepared?

1. Cinesias, a dithyrambic poet of Socrates' time, mocked in Aristophanes' *Birds* (1372–1409) and *Frogs* (153, 1437); his father Meles sang to the lyre.

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν μᾶλλον ὥρμηται καὶ τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς. c

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νυνδὴ κολακείαν εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, εἴ τις περιέλοι τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγοι γίγνονται τὸ λειπόμενον;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον οὗτοι λέγονται οἱ λόγοι;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιητική.

ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται. d

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ῥητορικὴ δημηγορία ἂν εἴη· ἢ οὐ ῥητορεύειν δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς ηὑρήκαμεν ῥητορικήν τινα πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον οἷον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἣν οὐ πάνυ ἀγάμεθα· κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτήν φαμεν εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· τί δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ῥητορικὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δήμους τοὺς τῶν e ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν αὕτη ἐστίν; πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες, τούτου στοχαζόμενοι, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται διὰ τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους, ἢ καὶ οὗτοι πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις ὥρμημένοι, καὶ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὐτῶν ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὥσπερ παισὶ προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς δήμοις, χαρίζεσθαι

b 9 δὴ B T P f: om. F **c** 5 *περιέλοι* F Aristides et schol. B: *περιέλοιτο* B T P f **d** 2 *ῥητορικὴ* scr. recc.: *ἡ ῥητορικὴ* B T P F **d** 8 *φαμεν*] *φῶμεν* P **e** 2 *ἡμῖν* F: *ἡμῶν* B T P **e** 7 *τοῖς* B T P: *τε τοῖς* F

CALL. Plainly, then, this at any rate, Socrates: that it has started more toward pleasure and gratifying the spectators. c

SOC. Then did we not claim just now, Callicles, that such a thing is flattery?

CALL. Certainly.

SOC. Come, then: if someone were to strip from all poetry the melody and the rhythm and the metre, does not what is left come to be speeches?

CALL. It is a necessity.

SOC. Then are these speeches spoken to a great crowd and people?

CALL. I claim so.

SOC. Poetry, then, is a kind of addressing the people.

CALL. So it appears. d

SOC. Then it would be a rhetorical addressing of the people; or do you not think the poets act as orators in the theatres?[1]

CALL. I do.

SOC. Now, then, we have found a certain rhetoric directed to a people of such a kind as children together with women and men, and slaves and free, which we do not altogether admire; for we claim it is flattering.[2]

CALL. Certainly.

SOC. Very well. What of the rhetoric directed to the people of the Athenians and to the other peoples in the cities, those of free men: e what in the world is this for us? Do you think the orators always speak with a view to the best, aiming at this, how the citizens will be the best possible because of their speeches, or have these too started toward gratifying the citizens, and, for the sake of what is privately their own, thinking little of what is common, do they consort with the peoples as with children,

1. *A rhetorical addressing of the people*: so the later manuscripts, which Burnet follows; B, T, P and F have *hē rhētorikē*, "rhetoric would be addressing the people".

2. This passage and *Laws* 658d and 817c are among the evidence that women attended the dramatic festivals, a question still disputed.

αὐτοῖς πειρώμενοι μόνον, εἰ δέ γε βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ χείρους διὰ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν; 503

ΚΑΛ. Οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς· εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ οἳ κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ἃ λέγουσιν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἵους σὺ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐξαρκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν 5
ἕτερόν που τούτου κολακεία ἂν εἴη καὶ αἰσχρὰ δημηγορία, τὸ δ' ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλ' οὐ πώποτε σὺ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ῥητορικήν· ἢ εἴ τινα b
ἔχεις τῶν ῥητόρων τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἔφρασας τίς ἐστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγέ σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε 5
νῦν ῥητόρων οὐδένα.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινὰ εἰπεῖν δι' ὅντινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος ἤρξατο δημηγορεῖν, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χείρους ὄντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν οὗτος.

ΚΑΛ. Τί δέ; Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν c
γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἔστιν γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἦν πρότερον σὺ ἔλεγες 5
ἀρετήν, ἀληθής, τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι καὶ τὰς αὑτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ λόγῳ ἠναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν—ὅτι αἱ μὲν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν πληρούμεναι βελτίω ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ταύτας μὲν ἀποτελεῖν, αἱ δὲ χείρω, μή, τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις d

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a 2 ἔτι B T Aristides: ἐστι P F τοῦτο Aristides: τοῦτο ὦ B T P F οἳ T F: οἱ B **a** 8 καὶ B P F t Aristides: καὶ ἀεὶ T **a** 9 ἔσται B T P F: ἐστὶ Aristides **b** 1 σὺ πώποτε F **b** 2 οὐχὶ B T P F: οὐ Aristides **b** 3 τίς B T P F: ὅστις Aristides **b** 4 μὰ B T P F: μὰ τὸν Aristides ἔγωγε B T P: om. F Aristides γε B T P F: om. Aristides **b** 9 μὲν om. P **d** 1 τέχνη τις εἴη scripsi (εἴη ἂν ci. Heindorf): τέχνη τις εἶναι B T P F: τέχνης εἶναι Ast: τέχνης τινὸς δεῖται Liebhold

trying only to gratify them, but whether, at any rate, they will be better or inferior because of these things, they take no thought at 503
all?

CALL. This is no longer a simple thing you are asking; for there are some who say what they say caring for the citizens, and there are also such as you speak of.

SOC. It is enough. For if this too is double, one of the two, I take it, would be flattery and shameful addressing of the people, and the other beautiful: preparing so that the souls of the citizens will be the best possible, and fighting it out saying the best things, whether they will be more pleasant or more unpleasant to those who hear. But you have never yet seen this rhetoric; or, if you have the means b
to speak of any of the orators as such, why have you not declared to me too who he is?

CALL. But by Zeus, I for my part do not have the means to speak to you of any one of the orators now, at any rate.

SOC. What? Of those of old, have you the means to speak of anyone because of whom the Athenians are reputed to have become better, from the time that man began to address the people, being inferior in the time before? For I do not know who this is.

CALL. What? Do you not hear that Themistocles became a good c
man, and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles here, the one who has lately come to his end, whom you too have heard?[1]

SOC. If, at any rate, Callicles, the virtue you were speaking of before is true: filling up the desires, both one's own and those of the others. But if not this, but what in the later argument we were compelled to agree—that those of the desires which, being filled, make the person better, these we were to satisfy, and those that d
make him inferior, not, and that this, a certain craft,

1. Miltiades won the battle of Marathon (490); Cimon, his son, led the Athenians and their allies against Persia in the 470s and 460s; Themistocles had the fleet built that won at Salamis (480; see the note at 455e). Pericles died in 429 (Thucydides 2.65); on "lately come to his end" see the note at 473e–474a. Socrates gives his verdict on all four at 515c–517a.

εἴη—τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τούτων τινὰ [γεγονέναι] οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε πῶς εἴπω.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἐὰν ζητῇς καλῶς, εὑρήσεις.

ΣΩ. Ἴδωμεν δὴ οὑτωσὶ ἀτρέμα σκοπούμενοι εἴ τις τούτων τοιοῦτος γέγονεν· φέρε γάρ, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων, ἃ ἂν λέγῃ ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων πρός τι; ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ e
[βλέποντες] πρὸς τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει [πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὑτῶν,] ἀλλ' ὅπως ἂν εἶδός τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο ὃ ἐργάζεται. οἷον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς ζωγράφους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, τοὺς ἄλλους 5
πάντας δημιουργούς, ὅντινα βούλει αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἕκαστος ἕκαστον τίθησιν ὃ ἂν τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἁρμόττειν, ἕως ἂν τὸ ἅπαν συστήσηται τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα· 504
καὶ οἵ τε δὴ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὗς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, παιδοτρίβαι τε καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσί που τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάττουσιν. ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν ἢ οὔ; 5

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Τάξεως ἄρα καὶ κόσμου τυχοῦσα οἰκία χρηστὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀταξίας δὲ μοχθηρά;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πλοῖον ὡσαύτως; 10

ΚΑΛ. Ναί. b

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d 2 εἴη] εἶναι tuetur et post hanc vocem lacunam indicat Schanz (ὡμολόγηται· πῶς ἄν τις ἔχοι εἰπεῖν supplet K. Fuhr) γεγονέναι seclusi: post γεγονέναι add. ἔχειν εἰπεῖν in marg. f οὐκ ἔχω . . . εἴπω cum W Socrati tribui et mox Ἀλλ' . . . εὑρήσεις Callicli: οὐκ ἔχω . . . εἴπω Callicli et Ἀλλ' . . . εὑρήσεις Socrati tribuit B et ut videtur T **d** 7 ἄλλο τι οὐκ F (sed ἢ suprascr. f) **e** 2 βλέποντες om. Sauppe **e** 3 προσφέρει B T P F: προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει Vind. 21 πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὑτῶν om. Sauppe αὑτῶν B: αὐτῶν T P F: αὑτοῦ vulg. **e** 4 εἶδός T W F: εἰδώς B αὐτῷ B T P: αὐτὸ F **a** 1 τε B T P: τί F **a** 2 δημιουργοὶ post ἐλέγομεν transp. F

would be—any one of these as such a man I for my part have no way to speak of.[1]

CALL. But if you seek well, you will find.

SOC. Let us see, then, looking into it quietly in this way, whether any of these has been such a man. Come, then: the good man, the one who speaks for the best, will he not say whatever he says not at random, but looking to something? Just as all the other craftsmen too, each of them, not picking out at random, applies to their own work, but so that this thing he is working at may take on a certain form for him.[2] For example, if you want to see the painters, the builders, the shipwrights, all the other craftsmen, whichever of them you want: how each puts each thing he puts into a certain arrangement, and compels the one to be becoming to the other and to be in harmony with it, until the whole is put together, a thing arranged and ordered; and both the other craftsmen, indeed, and those we were speaking of just now, those concerned with the body, trainers and doctors, order the body, I take it, and arrange it. Do we agree that this is so or not?[3]

CALL. Let this be so.

SOC. A house, then, that has met with arrangement and order would be a decent one, and one with disarrangement a sorry one?

CALL. I claim so.

SOC. Then a ship too in the same way?

CALL. Yes.

1. *Would be*: *eiē*, Burnet's own correction (Heindorf proposed *eiē an*); the manuscripts have *einai*, which Schanz keeps, marking a gap after it. After "any one of these" Burnet brackets *gegonenai*, "to have become", which is not translated. He gives "I for my part have no way to speak of" to Socrates and the reply, "But if you seek well, you will find", to Callicles, with W; B, and apparently T, give the first to Callicles and the reply to Socrates.

2. Burnet brackets, after Sauppe, who omitted them, *blepontes*, "looking", and the repeated *pros to ergon to hautōn*, "to their own work"; neither is translated, and the first "to their own work" is taken with "applies".

3. *Arrangement* ... *ordered*: *taxis* and *kosmos*. *Kosmos* is order, also adornment, and at 508a the universe; it is rendered "order" throughout this passage, with "order" for the verb, "ordered", "orderings", "orderly" (as at 493c–494a), "orderliness", "unordered" and "disorder" for its family, and *taxis* "arrangement" (with "arrange", "arranged", "disarrangement"), so that the chain from the craftsman to the universe can be followed.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἡ ψυχή; ἀταξίας τυχοῦσα ἔσται χρηστή, ἢ τάξεώς τε καὶ κόσμου τινός;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ τοῦτο συνομολογεῖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομένῳ;

ΚΑΛ. Ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνομένῳ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; πειρῶ εὑρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὸ ὄνομα.

ΚΑΛ. Τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἴ σοι ἥδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ· σὺ δέ, ἂν μέν σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔλεγχε καὶ μὴ ἐπίτρεπε. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος. ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ταῖς δέ γε τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσι καὶ κοσμήσεσιν νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίγνονται καὶ κόσμιοι· ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φῂς ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς ψυχαῖς οὓς ἂν λέγῃ, καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας, καὶ δῶρον ἐάν τι διδῷ, δώσει, καὶ ἐάν τι ἀφαιρῆται, ἀφαιρήσεται, πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολίταις δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία δὲ

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b 6 *πρόσθεν* T P F: *πρόσθε* B **c** 3 *ἐκεῖ* scripsi: *ἐκεῖνο* B T P F: *ἐκείνῳ* Heindorf **c** 7 *ἐμοὶ γὰρ* F: *ἔμοιγε* T W f: *ἔμοιγε γὰρ* B (sed *γὰρ* punctis notavit et *γὰρ* ad *γε* in marg. adscripsit B²) **d** 1 *δέ γε* F: *δὲ* B T P *καὶ* B T F: *τε καὶ* P **d** 5 *ταῦτα* ἃ pr. F **d** 9 *αὐτοῦ* T P F: *αὑτοῦ* B: *αὐτῷ* Deuschle: *δι' αὐτοῦ* fuisse susp. Schanz

SOC. And indeed our bodies too, we claim?

CALL. Certainly.

SOC. What of the soul? If it has met with disarrangement, will it be decent, or with arrangement and a certain order?

CALL. It is a necessity, from what went before, to agree to this too.

SOC. What name, then, is there in the body for what comes to be from the arrangement and the order?

CALL. You mean health and might, perhaps.

SOC. I do. And what, again, for what comes to be in the soul from c
the arrangement and the order? Try to find and say the name, as there.[1]

CALL. Why do you not say it yourself, Socrates?

SOC. Well, if it is more pleasant for you, I will say it; but you, if you think I speak well, say so, and if not, refute and do not permit it. For I think the name for the arrangements of the body is the wholesome, from which health comes to be in it and the rest of the body's virtue. Is this so or is it not?

CALL. It is.

SOC. And for the arrangements and orderings of the soul, at any d
rate, the lawful and law, whence they also become lawful and orderly; and these are justice and temperance. Do you claim so or not?

CALL. Let it be so.

SOC. Then, looking to these, that orator, the one who is master of the craft and good, will apply to souls both the speeches that he speaks and all his actions, and if he gives any gift, will give it, and if he takes anything away, will take it away, always having his mind on this: how justice may come to be in the souls of his citizens, and e
injustice be got rid of, and temperance come to be in them, and licentiousness

1. *As there*: *ekei*, Burnet's own correction, meaning as in the case of the body; the manuscripts have *ekeino*, "that", and Heindorf proposed *ekeinōi*, "for that".

ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία δὲ ἀπίῃ. συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Συγχωρῶ.

ΣΩ. Τί γὰρ ὄφελος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε κάμνοντι καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ σιτία πολλὰ διδόναι καὶ τὰ ἥδιστα ἢ ποτὰ ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν, ὃ μὴ ὀνήσει αὐτὸ ἔσθ' ὅτι πλέον ἢ τοὐναντίον κατά γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἔστι ταῦτα;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι λυσιτελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος ζῆν ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οἷον πεινῶντα φαγεῖν ὅσον βούλεται ἢ διψῶντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν ἐῶσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ ὡς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα δὲ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτ' ἐῶσιν ἐμπίμπλασθαι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ; συγχωρεῖς τοῦτό γε καὶ σύ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Περὶ δὲ ψυχήν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; ἕως μὲν ἂν πονηρὰ ᾖ, ἀνόητός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἴργειν αὐτὴν δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἄλλ' ἄττα ποιεῖν ἢ ἀφ' ὧν βελτίων ἔσται· φῂς ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω γάρ που αὐτῇ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ εἴργειν ἐστὶν ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

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e 6 ὄφελος T P f: ὤφελος B F **e** 8 ὀνήσει F: ὀνήσῃ B T W αὐτὸ T P f: αὐτὸν B (sed *ν* punctis notatum) F ἔσθ' ὅτι] ἔσθ' ὅτε Cornarius **e** 9 κατά γε] ἢ κατά γε Cornarius: κατὰ δὲ Schleiermacher **a** 1 ἔστω] ἔστιν P **a** 3 μοχθηρῶς P F Iamblichus: καὶ μοχθηρῶς B (sed καὶ punctis notatum) T **a** 6 οὐκοῦν καὶ F Iamblichus: οὐκοῦν B P: οὔκουν T **b** 4 ἀφ' ὧν B T P: ἃ ποιῶν F: ἃ ἂν ποιῶν Iamblichus

be got rid of, and the rest of virtue come to be in them, and vice go away. Do you grant or not?

CALL. I grant it.

SOC. For what service is it, Callicles, to a body that is ill and disposed in a sorry way, to give many foods and the most pleasant ones, or drinks, or anything else whatever, which will avail it in nothing more than the contrary, and, by just reckoning at any rate, even less? Is this so?

CALL. Let it be so. 505

SOC. For it does not profit a person, I think, to live with a sorry state of body; for so it is a necessity to live in a sorry way too. Or is it not so?

CALL. Yes.

SOC. Then the doctors too, for the most part, let the healthy man fill up his desires, for example, eat as much as he wants when hungry, or drink when thirsty, but the one who is ill, so to speak, they never let fill himself full of what he desires? Do you too grant this, at any rate?

CALL. I do.

SOC. And concerning the soul, best of men, is it not the same b
way? As long as it is base, being senseless and licentious and unjust and unholy, one must shut it out from its desires and not permit it to do other things than those from which it will be better. Do you claim so or not?

CALL. I claim so.

SOC. For so, I take it, it is better for the soul itself?

CALL. Certainly.

SOC. Then shutting it out from what it desires is punishing it?

CALL. Yes.

ΣΩ. Τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἢ ἡ ἀκολασία, ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ᾤου.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἄλλον c τινὰ ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχων περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐδέ γέ μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτά 5 σοι Γοργίου χάριν ἀπεκρινάμην.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν;

ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς γνώσῃ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξὺ θέμις εἶναι 10 καταλείπειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιθέντας κεφαλήν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ κεφαλῆς d περιίῃ. ἀπόκριναι οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπά, ἵνα ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος κεφαλὴν λάβῃ.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς βίαιος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ἐάσεις χαίρειν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ἢ καὶ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαλέξῃ. 5

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; μὴ γάρ τοι ἀτελῆ γε τὸν λόγον καταλίπωμεν.

ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἢ λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ;

ΣΩ. Ἵνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, ἃ "πρὸ τοῦ e δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον," εἷς ὢν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι. ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι οὕτως. εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονίκως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστιν περὶ ὧν λέγομεν καὶ τί ψεῦδος· 5

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b 11 ἢ om. F Iamblichus **c** 1 οἶδα τί λέγεις F **c** 3 αὐτὸς B T P F: αὐτὸ corr. Coisl. **c** 4 πάσχειν P **c** 5 σὺ om. F **c** 7 ποιήσομεν B T W: ποιήσωμεν F **c** 8 καταλύομεν B T P: καταλύσομεν in lacuna f **d** 1 καταλείπειν B T f: καταλιπεῖν P F **d** 2 περιίῃ T f: περιείῃι B: περιήῃ P F ἡμῖν post **d** 3 κεφαλὴν transp. P **d** 4 δὲ om. F **d** 5 καὶ om. F **d** 6 ἐθέλει B T P F: ἐθελήσει f ἀτελῆ] ἅτε δὴ F **d** 7 καταλίπωμεν W: καταλιπὼν μὲν F: καταλείπωμεν B T f **d** 9 σαυτῷ] αὐτῷ P **e** 1 ἵνα B T W F: μὰ δί' in marg. add. F **e** 2 ἄνδρες B T P F (sed σ puncto notatum in B) **e** 3 οὕτως· εἰ B T P: οὑτωσὶ F ποιήσομεν W: ποιήσωμεν B T F **e** 4 πάντας F: πάντα B T W

SOC. Being punished, then, is better for the soul than licentiousness, as you were thinking just now.[1]

CALL. I do not know what you are saying, Socrates; but ask someone else. c

SOC. This man does not abide being benefited and himself suffering this thing that the argument is about, being punished.

CALL. Nor, indeed, does anything you say matter to me at all; and I gave you these answers for Gorgias' sake.

SOC. Very well. What, then, shall we do? Are we breaking off the argument in the middle?

CALL. You will know for yourself.

SOC. But they say it is not right to leave even tales in the middle, d but to put a head on them, so that they may not go about without a head. Answer, then, the rest too, so that our argument may get a head.[2]

CALL. How violent you are, Socrates! But if you are persuaded by me, you will let this argument pass, bidding farewell, or converse with someone else too.

SOC. Who else, then, is willing? For let us not leave the argument imperfect, at any rate.

CALL. But would you not have the power yourself to go through the argument, either speaking by yourself or answering yourself?

SOC. So that Epicharmus' saying may come about for me: what e "two men were saying before," I, being one, may become sufficient for. And yet it looks as if it is most necessary so.[3] If, however, we are going to do this, I for my part think we ought all to engage in rivalry over knowing what is true about the things we are speaking of, and what is false;

1. *Being punished … licentiousness*: *kolazesthai … akolasia*. The Greek for licentiousness is formed from the verb "punish", *kolazein*, which is also to check or chasten: the licentious soul is the unchastened one, a play the English cannot carry.

2. A proverb: in the *Laws* the Athenian will not leave a tale headless, lest it wander about shapeless (752a), and in the *Phaedrus* Socrates requires a speech to be put together like an animal, neither headless nor footless (264c).

3. Epicharmus of Syracuse, writer of comedy in the early fifth century; the line (fr. 161 Kassel–Austin), "what two men were saying before, I, being one, suffice for", is quoted by Athenaeus (7.308c). Burnet's quotation marks enclose the first half, which Socrates keeps unchanged; the second he recasts in his own words.

κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἅπασι φανερὸν γενέσθαι αὐτό. δίειμι μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐγὼ ὡς ἄν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν· ἐὰν δέ τῳ 506
ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαυτῷ, χρὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν. οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ' ὑμῶν, ὥστε, ἂν τὶ φαίνηται λέγων ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν ἐμοί, ἐγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι. 5
λέγω μέντοι ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι διαπερανθῆναι τὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλεσθε, ἐῶμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίωμεν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, χρῆναί πω ἀπιέναι, ἀλλὰ διεξελθεῖν σε τὸν λόγον· φαίνεται δέ μοι b
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν. βούλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαί σου αὐτοῦ διιόντος τὰ ἐπίλοιπα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἂν Καλλικλεῖ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμην, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμ- 5
φίονος ἀπέδωκα ῥῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλεις συνδιαπεραῖναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων ἐπιλαμβάνου, ἐάν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν. καί με ἐὰν ἐξελέγχῃς, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαί c
σοι ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράψῃ.

ΚΑΛ. Λέγε, ὠγαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε.

ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοῦ ἀναλαβόντος τὸν λόγον. 5
Ἆρα τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν;—Οὐ ταὐτόν, ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὡμολογήσαμεν.—Πότερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρακτέον, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕνεκα τοῦ ἡδέος; —Τὸ ἡδὺ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.—Ἡδὺ δέ ἐστιν τοῦτο οὗ παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα, ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοί d
ἐσμεν;—Πάνυ γε.—Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσ' ἀγαθά ἐστιν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης;—Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις.— Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἥ γε ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος 5

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a 3 λέγω ἃ λέγω B T P: *πάνυ τί λέγω. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ* F **a** 5 ἐγὼ B T P: ἔγωγε F **a** 6 διαπερανθῆναι B T P f: διαπερᾶναι F **a** 7 ἤδη F: δὴ B T P f **b** 5 ἀμφίονος W F: ἀμφίωνος B T P **b** 6 τῆς om. F

for it is a common good for all that this become apparent. I will go through it, then, in argument, as I think it is; and if any of you 506
thinks I am agreeing with myself on things that are not so, one ought to take hold of it and refute it. For I do not say what I say knowing it, but I am seeking in common with you, so that, if the one disputing with me appears to be saying something, I shall be the first to grant it. I say these things, however, if it is decided that the argument ought to be carried through; and if you do not want, let us let it pass at once, bidding farewell, and go away.

GORG. Well, I for my part do not think, Socrates, that we ought to go away yet, but that you ought to go through the argument in b
full; and it appears to me that the others think so too. For I myself too want to hear you yourself going through what remains.

SOC. But then, Gorgias, I myself too would gladly still be conversing with Callicles here, until I had given him back Amphion's set speech in return for Zethus'; but since you, Callicles, are not willing to join in carrying the argument through, yet at any rate, listening to me, lay hold of me, if you think there is anything I am c
not saying well.[1] And if you refute me, I will not be grieved with you as you are with me, but you will be inscribed as my greatest benefactor.[2]

CALL. Speak, my good friend, yourself, and carry it through.

SOC. Listen, then, to me as I take up the argument from the beginning. Are the pleasant and the good the same?—Not the same, as I and Callicles agreed.—And must the pleasant be done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant?—The pleasant for the sake of the good.—And is pleasant that by whose coming to be present we are pleased, and good that by whose be- d
ing present we are good?—Certainly.—But indeed we are good, both we and all other things that are good, when some virtue has come to be present?—I think it is necessary, Callicles.—But then the virtue of each thing, both of an implement and of a body

1. Socrates would have answered Callicles' Zethus (485e–486c) with the speech of Amphion, who in Euripides' *Antiope* defended the musical and quiet life against his brother.

2. *Inscribed* … *benefactor*: *anagraphesthai euergetēs*, "to be registered as a benefactor", the phrase for the Persian king's roll of his benefactors (Herodotus 8.85; Thucydides 1.129.3) and for the honours Greek cities voted their benefactors by decrees inscribed on stone.

καὶ ψυχῆς αὖ καὶ ζῴου παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἥτις ἑκάστῳ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν· ἆρα ἔστιν ταῦτα;—Ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ φημι. —Τάξει ἆρα τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ e
ἑκάστου;—Φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε.—Κόσμος τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὁ ἑκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων;—Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.—Καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα κόσμον ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς ἀκοσμήτου;—Ἀνάγκη.—Ἀλλὰ μὴν 5
ἥ γε κόσμον ἔχουσα κοσμία;—Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει;—Ἡ δέ γε κοσμία σώφρων;—Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.—Ἡ ἄρα σώφρων 507
ψυχὴ ἀγαθή. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα φάναι, ὦ φίλε Καλλίκλεις· σὺ δ' εἰ ἔχεις, δίδασκε.

ΚΑΛ. Λέγ', ὠγαθέ.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ ὅτι, εἰ ἡ σώφρων ἀγαθή ἐστιν, ἡ τοὐ- 5
ναντίον τῇ σώφρονι πεπονθυῖα κακὴ ἐστιν· ἦν δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἄφρων τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος.—Πάνυ γε.—Καὶ μὴν ὅ γε σώφρων τὰ προσήκοντα πράττοι ἂν καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους· οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοῖ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα πράτ- b
των;—Ἀνάγκη ταῦτ' εἶναι οὕτω.—Καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώ- b
πους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοὺς ὅσια· τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκη δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον εἶναι.—Ἔστι ταῦτα.—Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν γε ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώφρονος ἀνδρός ἐστιν οὔτε 5
διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ἃ μὴ προσήκει, ἀλλ' ἃ δεῖ καὶ πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, καὶ ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ· ὥστε πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σώφρονα, ὥσπερ διήλθομεν, c
δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅσιον ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἃ ἂν

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d 6 *οὐ τῷ* B T Iamblichus: *οὐ τω* P: *οὕτοι* al. Sauppe: *οὐχ οὕτω* F *κάλλιστα* secl. Coraes **d** 8 *γάρ* B P F: *γὰρ δή* T **e** 1 *τεταγμένον* B T P F: *τεταγμένον τι* Iamblichus **e** 3 *ἑκάστου* B P F Iamblichus: *ἕκαστον* T: *ἑκάστων* t **a** 6 *σωφροσύνη* P **a** 8 *περὶ ἀνθρώπους* B T P F: *ἀνθρώπους* Iamblichus **b** 6 *ἀλλ' ἃ δεῖ* Heindorf: *ἀλλὰ δεῖ* B T f Iamblichus: *ἀλλὰ δὴ* P F **c** 3 *τε* B T P: *γε* F

and again of a soul and of every animal, does not come to be present best by what is at random, but by arrangement and rightness and craft, which has been assigned to each of them. Is this so?—I for my part do claim so.—Is the virtue of each, then, a e
thing arranged by arrangement and ordered?—I would claim so, for my part.—A certain order, then, coming to be in each, each thing's own, renders good each of the things that are?—I think so.—And a soul too, then, that has its own order, is superior to the unordered one?—It is a necessity.—But indeed the one that has order is orderly?—How could it fail to be?—And the orderly one is 507
temperate?—Great necessity.—The temperate soul, then, is good. I for my part do not have the means to claim other things beside these, my friend Callicles; but you, if you have, teach me.

CALL. Speak, my good friend.

SOC. I say, then, that if the temperate soul is good, the one that has suffered the contrary of the temperate one is bad; and this was the foolish and licentious one.—Certainly.—And indeed the temperate man would do the fitting things both concerning gods and concerning human beings; for he would not be temperate doing the unfitting things?—It is a necessity that these things are so.— b
And indeed doing the fitting things concerning human beings he would do just things, and concerning gods holy things; and it is a necessity that one who does the just and holy things is just and holy.—It is so.—Moreover, it is a necessity that he is courageous too; for it is not, indeed, the part of a temperate man either to pursue or to flee what is not fitting, but to flee and pursue what he must, both affairs and human beings and pleasures and pains, and to hold out, abiding, where he must;[1] so that there is great neces- c
sity, Callicles, that the temperate man, as we went through, being just and courageous and holy, is a perfectly good man, and that the good man does well and beautifully whatever

1. *What he must*: *all' ha dei*, Heindorf's correction, which Burnet prints; B, T, a later hand in F and Iamblichus have *alla dei*, "but he must flee and pursue...", P and F *alla dē*.

πράττῃ, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον· οὗτος δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων τῷ σώφρονι, ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ὃν σὺ ἐπῄνεις.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὕτω τίθεμαι καί φημι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, τὸν βουλόμενον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐδαίμονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἀσκητέον, ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευκτέον ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, καὶ παρασκευαστέον μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν δεῖσθαι τοῦ κολάζεσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ δεηθῇ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων, ἢ ἰδιώτης ἢ πόλις, ἐπιθετέον δίκην καὶ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει εὐδαίμων εἶναι. οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν, καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο τὰ αὑτοῦ συντείνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως δικαιοσύνη παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη τῷ μακαρίῳ μέλλοντι ἔσεσθαι, οὕτω πράττειν, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας ἐῶντα ἀκολάστους εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα πληροῦν, ἀνήνυτον κακόν, λῃστοῦ βίον ζῶντα. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ προσφιλὴς ἂν εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος οὔτε θεῷ· κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος, ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἔνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ ἂν εἴη. φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιότητα, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὤν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέν σε ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται, σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἴει δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμε-

c 5 *πονηρῶς* P **c** 8 *οὖν* om. Oxy. *ταῦτα ἀληθῆ* B P F Oxy. Stobaeus: *ἀληθῆ ταῦτα* T **c** 9 *εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ* om. F (add. in marg. f) δὲ B T P et in marg. f: δὴ Iamblichus Stobaeus **d** 3 *παρασκευαστέον* B T P f Oxy. Iamblichus: *ποῶς σκευαστέον* ut videtur F: *παρασκευαστέον ἑαυτὸν* Stobaeus **d** 4 *ἢ* prius B T P F Oxy. Stobaeus: om. Iamblichus **e** 1 *οὕτω* B² T P F: *οὐ τῷ* B **e** 2 *ταύτας* T W F Stobaeus: *ταῦτα* B Iamblichus (in Oxy. lacuna) **e** 4 *ἂν εἴη* B T P: *εἴη* F Oxy. Stobaeus **e** 5 δὲ B T P f: *γὰρ* Oxy. Iamblichus Stobaeus: om. F **a** 7 *οἴει πλεονεξίαν* P

he does, and that the one who does well is blessed and happy, and the base one, who does badly, wretched;[1] and this would be the one who is in the contrary state to the temperate man, the licentious one, whom you were praising.

I, then, set these things down so, and claim these are true; and if they are true, the one who wants, as it seems, to be happy must d
pursue temperance and exercise himself in it, and flee licentiousness as fast as each of us has feet, and must prepare, most of all, to have no need of being punished; but if he has need, either himself or anyone else of his own people, either a private person or a city, a penalty must be imposed and he must be punished, if he is going to be happy. This I think is the mark, looking to which one must live, and, straining all one's own things and those of the city toward this, so that justice and temperance will be present for the e
one who is going to be blessed, so to act, not letting the desires be licentious and attempting to fill them, an endless bad thing, living a robber's life. For such a man would be a friend neither to another person nor to a god; for he is unable to be a partner, and in whom there is no partnership, there would be no friendship. And the wise say, Callicles, that partnership and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justness hold together heaven and earth and gods 508
and human beings, and for these reasons they call this whole order, my companion, not disorder nor licentiousness.[2] But you, I think, do not pay attention to these things, and that though you are wise; but it has escaped your notice that geometrical equality has great power among both gods and human beings, and you think one must exercise oneself in overreaching; for of geometry

1. *Does well*: *eu prattein*, rendered "fare well" at 495e–497a, with *kakōs prattein* "fare badly". Socrates seems to pass from "doing well" in the sense of acting rightly to "doing well" in the sense of faring well, and so being happy (an interpretation); the English "do well" keeps both senses.

2. *The wise*: commonly taken to be Pythagoreans; an interpretation. Pythagoras was said to have been the first to call the universe *kosmos* (Aëtius 2.1.1; Diogenes Laertius 8.48). *Order*: *kosmos*, the Greek for the universe as well as for order; "not disorder nor licentiousness" keeps the sense of order in play.

τρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. εἶεν· ἦ ἐξελεγκτέος δὴ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐστιν, ὡς οὐ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης κτήσει εὐδαίμονες οἱ εὐδαίμονες, κακίας δὲ οἱ ἄθλιοι, ἢ εἰ οὗτος ἀληθής ἐστιν, σκεπτέον τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα. τὰ πρόσθεν ἐκεῖνα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, συμβαίνει πάντα, ἐφ' οἷς σύ με ἤρου εἰ σπουδάζων λέγοιμι, λέγοντα ὅτι κατηγορητέον εἴη καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑέος καὶ ἑταίρου, ἐάν τι ἀδικῇ, καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρηστέον· καὶ ἃ Πῶλον αἰσχύνῃ ὥου συγχωρεῖν, ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἦν, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὅσῳπερ αἴσχιον τοσούτῳ κάκιον· καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι δίκαιον ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων, ὃ αὖ Γοργίαν ἔφη Πῶλος δι' αἰσχύνην ὁμολογῆσαι.

Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων σκεψώμεθα τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ σὺ ἐμοὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ἆρα καλῶς λέγεται ἢ οὔ, ὡς ἄρα ἐγὼ οὐχ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ βοηθῆσαι οὔτε ἐμαυτῷ οὔτε τῶν φίλων οὐδενὶ οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκείων, οὐδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων, εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι τοῦ ἐθέλοντος, ἄντε τύπτειν βούληται, τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο τὸ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ἐπὶ κόρρης, ἐάντε χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐάντε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐάντε, τὸ ἔσχατον, ἀποκτεῖναι· καὶ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι πάντων δὴ αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος. ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸς ὅστις, πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη εἴρηται, οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ ἔτι λέγεσθαι· Οὔ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀδίκως αἴσχιστον εἶναι, οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλλάντιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τύπτειν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ἀδίκως καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον, καὶ κλέπτειν γε ἅμα καὶ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι καὶ

b 2 *ἄθλιοι* post δὲ add. Bekker: post *ἄθλιοι* Heindorf (semel habet Oxy.) **b 3** *τί* B T P F: *τίνα* vulg. (et mox **c 4**) **b 7** *τούτω* P **b 8** *τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι* P **c 2** *δεῖ* F (sed *ν* add. f) **c 7** *οὐδὲ σῶσαι* F Oxy. **c 8** *ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ* B T P: *ἐπὶ τῷ βουλευομένῳ* F: secl. Morstadt (sed *πι τω βο*[. . . . . iam Oxy.) *τοῦ ἐθέλοντος* secl. Hirschig **d 1** *τοῦτο τὸ* F: *τοῦτο* B T P **d 2** *ἐκβάλλειν* B T P F: *εκβαλειν* Oxy. **d 3** *ἀποκτεῖναι*] *ἀποκτιννύναι* Badham **d 4** *ἐστιν* om. F **e 1** prius *οὔτε* B T P: *οὐδὲ* F *βαλλάντιον* B T P: *βαλάντιον* F

you are heedless.[1] Very well: either this argument, then, must be refuted by us, proving that it is not by the acquisition of justice and b
temperance that the happy are happy, and the wretched by that of vice, or, if it is true, we must look into what the results are. All those earlier things, Callicles, result, about which you asked me whether I was speaking in earnest, when I said that one must accuse oneself and one's son and one's companion, if he does any injustice, and must make use of rhetoric for this; and what you thought Polus granted from shame was, then, true: that doing injustice is, by as much as it is more shameful than suffering injustice, by so much c
worse; and the one who is going to be rightly a rhetorician must, then, be just and knowledgeable of the just things, which again Polus claimed Gorgias agreed to because of shame.[2]

Since these things are so, let us look into what in the world it is that you reproach me with, whether it is said well or not: that I, then, am not able to help either myself or any of my friends or my own people, nor to bring safe out of the greatest dangers, but am in the power of whoever wants, as the dishonoured are in that of whoever is willing, whether he wants to strike, this spirited thing, d
indeed, of your argument, on the jaw, or to take away my money, or to throw me out of the city, or, the last thing, to put me to death; and that to be so disposed is the most shameful, indeed, of all, as your argument goes.[3] But what mine is has been said many times already; but nothing prevents its being said yet again. I claim, Callicles, that being struck on the jaw unjustly is not the most shameful thing, nor, at any rate, being cut, either my body or my purse, but e
that striking and cutting both me and mine unjustly is both more shameful and worse, and stealing too, at the same time, and making chattel slaves and

1. *Geometrical equality*: proportional equality, which gives more to the greater and less to the lesser according to worth (*Laws* 757b–c; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1131b12–13), against the "having more" and "overreaching" Callicles praised at 483c–d. *Heedless*: the word of Euripides' Zethus that Callicles turned on Socrates at 485e.

2. Callicles asked whether Socrates was in earnest at 481b–c, after Socrates said one must accuse oneself and one's own (480b–d); he charged that Polus granted from shame at 482d–e, as Polus said of Gorgias at 461b.

3. Socrates recalls Callicles' words at 486a–c: having power neither to help himself nor to bring himself safe out of the greatest dangers, living dishonoured (*atimos*, deprived of a citizen's rights), one whom anyone is allowed to strike on the jaw and not pay the penalty.

τοιχωρυχεῖν καὶ συλλήβδην ὁτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κάκιον καὶ αἴσχιον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ. ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις οὕτω φανέντα, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δέδεται, καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἔστιν, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις, ὡς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὑτωσί, οὓς σὺ εἰ μὴ λύσεις ἢ σοῦ τις νεανικώτερος, οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄλλως λέγοντα ἢ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω καλῶς λέγειν· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστιν ἀεί, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ἔχει, ὅτι μέντοι ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα, ὥσπερ νῦν, οὐδεὶς οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἄλλως λέγων μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὖ τίθημι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν· εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν ἡ ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἔτι τούτου μεῖζον μεγίστου ὄντος, εἰ οἷόν τε, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην, τίνα ἂν βοήθειαν μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ καταγέλαστος ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἴη; ἆρα οὐ ταύτην, ἥτις ἀποτρέψει τὴν μεγίστην ἡμῶν βλάβην; ἀλλὰ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν μήτε αὑτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὑτοῦ φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκείοις, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ καὶ τρίτην τὴν τοῦ τρίτου καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως· ὡς ἑκάστου κακοῦ μέγεθος πέφυκεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐφ' ἕκαστα βοηθεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνη τοῦ μή. ἆρα ἄλλως ἢ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.

ΣΩ. Δυοῖν οὖν ὄντοιν, τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μεῖζον μέν φαμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθήσειεν αὑτῷ, ὥστε ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὠφελίας ταύτας ἔχειν, τήν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι; πότερα δύναμιν

e 6 *πρόσθεν* T P F: *πρόσθε* B **e** 7 *καὶ εἰ* B T F: *εἰ καὶ* P **a** 2 *λύσεις* T² f: *λύσῃς* B W F **b** 3 *τὸ* corr. Par. 1811: *τὸν* B T P F ἂν] δὴ Hirschig **b** 5 *ἀποστρέψει* F **b** 7 *βοήθειαν* obelo notavit Schanz: *ἀδυναμίαν* ci. H. Richards **c** 1 *καὶ* ante *τρίτην* om. F **c** 3 *τοῦ μή* F rec. b: *ἑτοίμη* B T P **c** 7 *μέν* om. F

breaking into houses, and, taken all together, doing any injustice whatever both to me and to mine is both worse and more shameful for the one who does injustice than for me who suffer injustice. These things, having appeared so to us up there in the arguments before, as I say, are held down and bound, and, if one can 509
say something rather boorish, by arguments of iron and adamant, as it would seem, at any rate, in this way; and unless you undo them, or someone more spirited than you, it is not possible to speak well saying otherwise than as I now say. Since for me, at any rate, the argument is always the same: that I do not know how these things are, that, however, of those I have come upon, as now, no one is able, saying otherwise, not to be ridiculous. I, then, set down again that these things are so. And if they are so, and injustice is b
the greatest of bad things for the one who does injustice, and still greater than this, greatest as it is, if that is possible, is not paying the penalty when doing injustice, what is the help that a person would truly be ridiculous for not having the power to help himself with? Is it not this, which will turn away the greatest harm to us? But there is great necessity that this is the most shameful help, not to have the power to help either oneself or one's own friends and one's own people, and second the one against the second bad c
thing, and third the one against the third, and the rest thus: as the magnitude of each bad thing is naturally, so too is the beauty of being able to help against each, and the shame of not being able.[1] Is it otherwise than so, Callicles?

CALL. Not otherwise.

SOC. There being two, then, doing injustice and suffering injustice, we claim that doing injustice is the greater bad thing, and suffering injustice the lesser. By preparing what, then, would a person help himself, so as to have both these benefits, the one from not do- d
ing injustice and the one from not suffering injustice? Power

1. *Of not being able*: *tou mē*, the reading of F and of a recent hand in B, which Burnet prints; B, T and P have *hetoimē*, "ready".

ἢ βούλησιν; ὧδε δὲ λέγω· πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται, ἢ ἐὰν δύναμιν παρασκευάσηται τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ἐὰν δύναμιν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖν, ἱκανὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν—οὐ γὰρ ἀδικήσει—ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο δεῖ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην παρασκευάσασθαι, ὡς, ἐὰν μὴ μάθῃ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ, ἀδικήσει; τί οὐκ αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, πότερόν σοι δοκοῦμεν ὀρθῶς ἀναγκασθῆναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ Πῶλος ἢ οὔ, ἡνίκα ὡμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω σοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως, ἵνα διαπεράνῃς τὸν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, παρασκευαστέον ἐστὶ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶν τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ὡς ὀλίγιστα; σκέψαι εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἥπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἥδε· ἢ αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν, ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας ἑταῖρον εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. Ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγὼ ἕτοιμός εἰμι ἐπαινεῖν, ἄν τι καλῶς λέγῃς; τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖς πάνυ καλῶς εἰρηκέναι.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εὖ λέγειν. φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἑκάστῳ εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, ὅνπερ οἱ παλαιοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. οὐ καὶ σοί;

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e 2 καὶ B T P: καὶ μὴ F γέ μοι F: γε ἐμοὶ B T P **e** 3 ἀπεκρίνω scr. recc.: ἀπεκρίνου B T P F **a** 1 οὕτως B T F: ἴσως P διαπεράνῃς T P F: διαπερανῇ B **a** 4 ἀδικήσομεν Heindorf **a** 7 ἥπερ T P f: ᾗπερ B: καὶ εἴπερ F **a** 8 ἥδε P F: ἥδε B T (τῇδε Buttmann et supra ᾗπερ cum B) δεῖν ἄρχειν P **a** 10 ἑταῖρον F: ἕτερον B T P et in marg. f

or wanting? I mean it this way: is it if he does not want to suffer injustice that he will not suffer injustice, or if he prepares power for not suffering injustice that he will not suffer injustice?

CALL. Plainly, then, this at any rate: if power.

SOC. What, then, of doing injustice? Is it if he does not want to do injustice that this is sufficient—for he will not do injustice—or, for this too, must one prepare some power and craft, since, if he e
does not learn them and exercise himself in them, he will do injustice? Why have you not answered me this very thing, at any rate, Callicles: do you think that Polus and I were rightly compelled to agree in the arguments before, or not, when we agreed that no one does injustice wanting to, but that all who do injustice do injustice unwillingly?[1]

CALL. Let this be so for you, Socrates, so that you may carry the 510
argument through.

SOC. For this too, then, as it seems, one must prepare some power and craft, so that we may not do injustice.

CALL. Certainly.

SOC. What ever, then, is the craft of the preparation for suffering no injustice, or as little as possible? Look into whether you think as I do. For I think it is this: either one must oneself rule in the city, or even be a tyrant, or be a companion of the existing regime.[2]

CALL. Do you see, Socrates, how ready I am to praise, if you say b
anything well? This I think you have said very well.

SOC. Look into this too, then, whether you think I speak well. I think each is a friend to each, as much as possible, the one whom the old and wise speak of: like to like. Do you not think so too?[3]

1. That the agreement is drawn from the argument with Polus that all we do we do for the sake of the good, and that one who does what he thinks best without sense does not do what he wants (466d–468e), is an interpretation; that no one does injustice wanting to is not said there in these words, and follows only with the proof that doing injustice is worse for the one who does it (474c–475e).

2. *Companion*: *hetairon*, F's reading, which Burnet prints; B, T and P have *heteron*, "other", which the later hand in F also writes in the margin.

3. A proverb as old as Homer: "as ever, the god brings like to like" (*Odyssey* 17.218); the *Lysis* quotes the line (214a) and the saying of the wise that like is friend to like (214b), and in the *Symposium* Agathon calls "like always draws near to like" the old saying (195b).

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων ἄγριος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος, εἴ τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ βελτίων εἴη, φοβοῖτο δήπου ἂν αὐτὸν ὁ τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ νοῦ οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο φίλος γενέσθαι; c

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε εἴ τις πολὺ φαυλότερος εἴη, οὐδ' ἂν οὗτος· καταφρονοῖ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ ὁ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὡς πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειεν. 5

ΚΑΛ. Καὶ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Λείπεται δὴ ἐκεῖνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃς ἂν ὁμοήθης ὤν, ταὐτὰ ψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν, ἐθέλῃ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι. οὗτος μέγα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται, τοῦτον οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδικήσει. d οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τις ἐννοήσειεν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων, "Τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδείς με ἀδικοῖ;" 5 αὕτη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτῷ ὁδός ἐστιν, εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ἐθίζειν αὑτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅμοιος ἔσται ἐκείνῳ. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί. 10

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι, ὡς ὁ ὑμέτερος λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπρά- e ξεται.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν; ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἴπερ ὅμοιος ἔσται τῷ ἄρχοντι ὄντι ἀδίκῳ καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ μέγα 5 δυνήσεται; ἀλλ' οἶμαι ἔγωγε, πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὑτωσὶ ἡ

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b 7 *ἄρχων* P **c** 3 *οὗτος* B T P F: *οὕτως* Schanz **d** 1 *τῇ* P F b: om. B T **d** 4 *εἰ ἄρα τις* B T P: *ἆρ' οὖν εἴ τις* F *ταύτῃ* F: *αὐτῇ* B T W: fort. *ἐν αὐτῇ ταύτῃ* Stallbaum **d** 6 *αὕτη* F: *ἡ αὐτὴ* B T P *ὁδός* B T P: *ἡ ὁδός* F **e** 6 *οὑτωσὶ* B T P: *οὕτως* F

CALL. I do.

SOC. Then wherever there is a tyrant ruling, savage and uneducated, if someone in the city were much better than he, the tyrant would be afraid of him, surely, and would never have the power c
to become a friend to him with all his mind?

CALL. It is so.

SOC. Nor, at any rate, if someone were much more paltry, would this one either; for the tyrant would despise him and would never be in earnest toward him as toward a friend.

CALL. These things too are true.

SOC. There remains, then, only that man worth speaking of as a friend to such a one, who, being of the same character, censuring and praising the same things, is willing to be ruled by the ruler and lie under him. This man will have great power in this city; to this d
man no one will do injustice and rejoice.[1] Is that not how it is?

CALL. Yes.

SOC. If, then, one of the young in this city were to consider, "In what way could I have great power and no one do me injustice?", this, as it seems, is the road for him: straight from youth to accustom himself to rejoice and be grieved at the same things as the master, and to prepare so that he will be as like that man as possible. Not so?

CALL. Yes.

SOC. Then this man will have contrived not suffering injustice e
and having great power in the city, as the argument of you people goes.

CALL. Certainly.

SOC. And not doing injustice too, then? Or is it far from it, if he will be like the ruler, who is unjust, and will have great power beside him? But I for my part think wholly the contrary: in this way the

1. *And rejoice*: *chairōn*, which, joined to another verb, means "with impunity" (LSJ).

παρασκευὴ ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οἵῳ τε εἶναι ὡς πλεῖστα ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρξει μοχθηρῷ 511
ὄντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λελωβημένῳ διὰ τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ στρέφεις ἑκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι οὗτος ὁ μιμούμενος 5
τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκεῖνον ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται τὰ ὄντα.

ΣΩ. Οἶδα, ὠγαθὲ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμί, καὶ b
σοῦ ἀκούων καὶ Πώλου ἄρτι πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγου πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐμοῦ ἄκουε, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ μέν, ἂν βούληται, ἀλλὰ πονηρὸς ὢν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ὄντα. 5

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν;

ΣΩ. Οὐ νοῦν γε ἔχοντι, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. ἢ οἴει δεῖν τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον ζῇν, καὶ μελετᾶν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας αἳ ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων σῴζουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἣν σὺ κελεύεις ἐμὲ μελετᾶν c
τὴν ῥητορικὴν τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις διασῴζουσαν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία ὀρθῶς γέ σοι συμβουλεύων.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε; ἦ καὶ ἡ τοῦ νεῖν ἐπιστήμη σεμνή τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι; 5

ΚΑΛ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν σῴζει γε καὶ αὕτη ἐκ θανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν εἴς τι τοιοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν οὗ δεῖ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης. εἰ δ' αὕτη σοι δοκεῖ σμικρὰ εἶναι, ἐγώ σοι μείζω ταύτης ἐρῶ, τὴν κυβερνητικήν, ἣ οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς d
σῴζει ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων

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e 8 *ἀδικοῦντα* B T P: *ἀδικοῦντι* F **a** 4 *ὅπῃ* F: *ὅποι* B T W **b** 2 *ἄρτι* B T P: *ἄρα* F **c** 3 *συμβουλεύων* F (*κελεύων* in marg. f): *συμβουλεύω* B T P **c** 4 *ἦ καὶ ἡ τοῦ* F: *ἡ καὶ ἡ τοῦ* B: *ἡ καὶ τοῦ* T P **c** 8 *τι τοιοῦτον* F: *τοιοῦτον* B T P **d** 1 *μείζω* F: *μείζονα* B T P

preparation will be his for being able to do as much injustice as possible and, doing injustice, not to pay the penalty. Is it not so?

CALL. So it appears.

SOC. Then the greatest bad thing will be his, depraved as he is in 511
his soul and outraged because of the imitation of the master and his power.

CALL. I do not know how you twist the arguments up and down each time, Socrates. Or do you not know that this man who imitates will put to death that man who does not imitate, if he wants, and take away what he has?

SOC. I know, my good friend Callicles, unless I am deaf, at any b
rate, hearing it both from you and from Polus just now many times, and from nearly all the others in the city; but you too, listen to me: that he will put him to death, if he wants, but as a base man putting to death one who is beautiful and good.

CALL. Then is not this, indeed, just the thing to be vexed at?

SOC. Not for one who has sense, at any rate, as the argument signifies. Or do you think a person must prepare himself for this, to live as long a time as possible, and practise these crafts which always keep us safe from dangers, as the one you tell me to practise c
too, rhetoric, which keeps people safe through in the law courts?

CALL. Yes, by Zeus, rightly advising you, at any rate.

SOC. What, most excellent man? Do you think the knowledge of swimming too is something dignified?

CALL. By Zeus, not I.

SOC. And indeed this too keeps human beings safe from death, whenever they fall into something of the sort where there is need of this knowledge. But if you think this is small, I will say to you d
one greater than this, piloting, which keeps safe not only souls but also bodies and money from the utmost

κινδύνων, ὥσπερ ἡ ῥητορική. καὶ αὕτη μὲν προσεσταλμένη ἐστὶν καὶ κοσμία, καὶ οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ διαπραξαμένη τῇ δικανικῇ, ἐὰν μὲν ἐξ Αἰγίνης δεῦρο σώσῃ, οἶμαι δύ' ὀβολοὺς ἐπράξατο, ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου, ἐὰν πάμπολυ, ταύτης τῆς μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας, σώσασα ἃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ παῖδας καὶ χρήματα καὶ γυναῖκας, ἀποβιβάσασ' εἰς τὸν λιμένα δύο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἔχων τὴν τέχνην καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενος ἐκβὰς παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τὴν ναῦν περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι· λογίζεσθαι γὰρ οἶμαι ἐπίσταται ὅτι ἄδηλόν ἐστιν οὕστινάς τε ὠφέληκεν τῶν συμπλεόντων οὐκ ἐάσας καταποντωθῆναι καὶ οὕστινας ἔβλαψεν, εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς βελτίους ἐξεβίβασεν ἢ οἷοι ἐνέβησαν, οὔτε τὰ σώματα οὔτε τὰς ψυχάς. λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μέν τις μεγάλοις καὶ ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασιν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιός ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὠφέληται· εἰ δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώματος τιμιωτέρῳ, τῇ ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνίατα, τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶν καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσει, ἄντε ἐκ θαλάττης ἄντε ἐκ δικαστηρίου ἐάντε ἄλλοθεν ὁποθενοῦν σώσῃ, ἀλλ' οἶδεν ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ζῆν τῷ μοχθηρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· κακῶς γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ζῆν.

Διὰ ταῦτα οὐ νόμος ἐστὶ σεμνύνεσθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην, καίπερ σῴζοντα ἡμᾶς, οὐδέ γε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τὸν μηχανοποιόν, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίοτε δύναται σῴζειν· πόλεις γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε ὅλας σῴζει. μή σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι;

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d 5 διαπραξαμένη F Olympiodorus: διαπραττομένη B T P f **d** 6 δεῦρο B T P: ὧδε F **e** 2 γυναῖκας] γυναῖκα Naber **e** 3 ἀπ[οβιβάσασα] F (sed inclusa in lac. suppl. f): ἀποβιβάσας B T W **a** 1 οἷοι F t: οἳ B T P **a** 5 ὑπ' B T P f: ἀπ' F **a** 7 βιωτὸν ἔσται Hirschig ὀνήσει Deuschle: ὀνήσειεν B T P F **b** 4 θαυμάσιε B T P: θαυμασιώτατε F **b** 6 πόλεις T P F: πόλις B

dangers, as rhetoric does. And this craft is unassuming and orderly, and does not dignify itself, assuming a bearing as if it were contriving something haughty; but having contrived the same things as the law-court craft, if it brings people safe here from Aegina, it has charged, I think, two obols; and if from Egypt or from the Pontus, if a very great deal, for this great benefaction, having kept safe the e
things I was speaking of just now, both a man himself and his children and money and women, and set them ashore in the harbour, it has charged two drachmas;[1] and he himself who has the craft and has contrived these things, having stepped out, walks about beside the sea and his ship with a moderate bearing. For he knows how to reckon, I think, that it is unclear which of his fellow voyagers he has benefited by not letting them be sunk in the sea, and which he has harmed, knowing that he has landed them not at all better 512
than they were when they embarked, either in their bodies or in their souls. He reckons, then, that it is not so that, if someone held fast by great and incurable illnesses in his body was not drowned, this man is wretched because he did not die, and has been benefited not at all by him, while, if someone, then, has many illnesses, and incurable ones, in what is more honourable than the body, the soul, this man must live and he will avail him, whether from the sea or from a law court or from anywhere else whatever he keeps b
him safe; but he knows that it is not better for the depraved person to live; for it is a necessity to live badly.

Because of these things it is not the law for the pilot to dignify himself, though he keeps us safe; nor, at any rate, you marvellous man, for the engine-maker, who has the power at times to keep safe no less than a general, let alone a pilot, or anyone else; for there are times when he keeps whole cities safe.[2] You do not think, do you, that he is on a level with the law-court man?

1. Aegina lies in the Saronic Gulf, a short crossing from the Piraeus; the Pontus is the Black Sea. A drachma was six obols.

2. *Engine-maker*: *mēchanopoios*, a builder of engines of war, for siege and defence.

καίτοι εἰ βούλοιτο λέγειν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἅπερ ὑμεῖς, σεμνύνων τὸ πρᾶγμα, καταχώσειεν ἂν ὑμᾶς τοῖς λόγοις, λέγων c
καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίγνεσθαι μηχανοποιούς, ὡς οὐδὲν τἆλλά ἐστιν· ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ σὺ οὐδὲν ἧττον αὐτοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς ἐκείνου, καὶ ὡς ἐν ὀνείδει ἀποκαλέσαις ἂν μηχανοποιόν, καὶ 5
τῷ υἱεῖ αὐτοῦ οὔτ' ἂν δοῦναι θυγατέρα ἐθέλοις, οὔτ' ἂν αὐτὸς λαβεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου. καίτοι ἐξ ὧν τὰ σαυτοῦ ἐπαινεῖς, τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ μηχανοποιοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον; οἶδ' ὅτι φαίης ἂν βελτίων d
εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων. τὸ δὲ βέλτιον εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετή, τὸ σῴζειν αὑτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ὄντα ὁποῖός τις ἔτυχεν, καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ ψόγος γίγνεται καὶ μηχανοποιοῦ καὶ ἰατροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 5
τεχνῶν ὅσαι τοῦ σῴζειν ἕνεκα πεποίηνται. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ᾖ ἢ τὸ σῴζειν τε καὶ σῴζεσθαι. μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μέν, τὸ ζῆν ὁποσονδὴ χρόνον, τόν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἐατέον ἐστὶν καὶ e
οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξὶν ὅτι τὴν εἱμαρμένην οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σκεπτέον τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιῶναι ὡς ἄριστα βιοίη, ἆρα ἐξομοιῶν 5
αὑτὸν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ ἐν ᾗ ἂν οἰκῇ, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ 513
σὲ ὡς ὁμοιότατον γίγνεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλὴς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει· τοῦθ' ὅρα εἰ σοὶ λυσιτελεῖ καὶ ἐμοί, ὅπως μή, ὦ δαιμόνιε, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασὶ τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαι- 5
ρούσας, τὰς Θετταλίδας· σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἡ αἵρεσις ἡμῖν

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c 6 *οὔτ' ἂν* ante *τῷ* transp. Cobet **c** 7 *αὐτὸς* B T F: *αὐτὸν* P: *αὖ* Schanz: *αὐτὸς τῷ σαυτοῦ* al. **d** 1 *οἶδ'* T P F: *οἱ δ'* B **d** 7 *ᾖ ἢ τὸ* Heindorf: *ᾖ τὸ* B: *ᾖ τὸ* T P F: *τοῦ* Coisl. **d** 8 *μὴ γὰρ*] *ᾖ γὰρ* Schanz *ὁπόσον δὴ* W f Antoninus: *ὁπόσον δὲ* B: *ὁπόσον δεῖ* T P F **e** 1 *γε* B T F: *τε* W **e** 5 *μέλλοι* B T P F: *μέλλει* Antoninus *βιῴη* B T P F **a** 2 *τῷ ἀθηναίων* T P: *τῶν ἀθηναίων* B F **a** 6 *θετταλίδας* B F: *θετταλικὰς* T P

And yet, if he wanted to say, Callicles, the very things you people say, dignifying the matter, he would bury you under with arguments, speaking and summoning you to the need to become engine-makers, on the ground that the other things are nothing; for the argument is sufficient for him. But you despise him none the less, and his craft, and would call him "engine-maker" as a reproach, and would neither be willing to give your daughter to his son nor take his yourself. And yet, from the grounds on which you praise your own, by what just reckoning do you despise the engine-maker and the others I was speaking of just now? I know that you would claim to be better and from better people. But if the better is not what I say, but this very thing is virtue, to keep oneself and what is one's own safe, being whatever sort of person one in fact is, your censure becomes ridiculous, both of the engine-maker and of the doctor and of the other crafts that have been made for the sake of keeping safe. But, you blessed man, see whether the noble and the good are not something other than keeping safe and being kept safe. For perhaps this, living any length of time whatever, the man, at any rate, who is in truth a man must let be, and must not love his life, but, leaving these things to the god and trusting the women that not even one person could escape his destiny, must look into what comes after this: in what way he might live as well as possible this time that he is going to live; whether by making himself like this regime in which he dwells; and now, then, you must become as like as possible to the people of the Athenians, if you are going to be a friend to it and have great power in the city. See whether this profits you and me, so that we may not, you daimonic man, suffer what they say the women who draw down the moon suffer, the Thessalian women: at the cost of what we love most[1]

c d e 513

1. Marcus Aurelius copied 512d6–e5 into his notebook (*Meditations* 7.46); Burnet's apparatus names him Antoninus. *Perhaps*: *mē*, which Burnet keeps; Schanz proposed *ē*, "truly". *Trusting the women*: that no one escapes his destiny is Hector's word to Andromache (*Iliad* 6.488); Socrates gives it to the women. *The Thessalian women*: witches, said to draw down the moon (Aristophanes, *Clouds* 749–752); the collections of proverbs say they paid for it with their eyes and their children (Zenobius 4.1), or their eyes and feet (*Suda* ε 2559).

ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἰ δέ σοι οἴει ὀντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων παραδώσειν τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύτην, ἥτις σε ποιήσει μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇδε ἀνόμοιον ὄντα b τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλεύῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶναι ἀλλ' αὐτοφυῶς ὅμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ καὶ ναὶ 5 μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρός. ὅστις οὖν σε τούτοις ὁμοιότατον ἀπεργάσεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσει, ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν· τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἤθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἀλλο- c τρίῳ ἄχθονται, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, ὦ φίλη κεφαλή. λέγομέν τι πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ σοι 5 πείθομαι.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δήμου γὰρ ἔρως, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνὼν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν πολλάκις [ἴσως καὶ] βέλτιον ταὐτὰ ταῦτα διασκοπώμεθα, πεισθήσῃ. ἀναμνήσθητι δ' οὖν d ὅτι δύ' ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ἕκαστον θεραπεύειν, καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν, τὴν ἑτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ καταχαριζόμενον ἀλλὰ διαμαχόμενον. οὐ ταῦτα ἦν ἃ τότε ὡριζόμεθα; 5

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα, ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν, ἀγεννὴς καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κολακεία τυγχάνει οὖσα· ἦ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, σοὶ οὕτως. e

ΣΩ. Ἡ δέ γε ἑτέρα, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται τοῦτο, εἴτε σῶμα τυγχάνει ὂν εἴτε ψυχή, ὃ θεραπεύομεν;

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b 5 *ἀπεργάζεσθαι* B T P: *ἀπεργάσασθαι* F **b** 8 *πολιτικὸς* om. cod. Meermannianus *αὐτῶν* B T P f: *αὐτῷ* F **c** 3 *λέγομέν* B T P F: *λέγωμέν* al. **c** 4 *οὐκ* B T P F: *σὺ μὲν οὐκ* Aristides **c** 8 *ἴσως καὶ* seclusi (*ἴσως* secl. Schaefer: *πολλάκις ἴσως* secl. Schanz) **d** 1 *ταὐτὰ* om. F **d** 5 *ἃ τότε* B W F t: *ἅ τε* T **e** 1 *ἔστω σοι ταῦτα εἰ βούλει οὕτω* F **e** 3 post *θεραπεύομεν* lacunam indicat Schanz

will be our choice of this power in the city. But if you think that anyone whatever among human beings will hand over to you some such craft as will make you have great power in this city while you b
are unlike its regime, whether toward the better or toward the inferior, as I think, you do not deliberate rightly, Callicles; for you must not be an imitator but like them by your own nature, if you are going to produce anything legitimate toward friendship with the people of the Athenians, and, yes, by Zeus, indeed with the son of Pyrilampes besides.[1] Whoever, then, produces you most like these, he will make you, as you desire to be a politician, a politician and rhetorician; for when the speeches are spoken in their own char- c
acter, each people rejoices, and at an alien one is grieved, unless you say something else, dear head. Are we saying anything to this, Callicles?

CALL. I do not know in what way it is that I think you speak well, Socrates, but I have suffered the suffering of the many: I am not altogether persuaded by you.

SOC. For love of the people, Callicles, being in your soul, stands against me; but if perhaps we look thoroughly into these same d
things better, you will be persuaded.[2] Recollect, at any rate, that we claimed there were two preparations for tending each thing, both body and soul: one keeping company with it with a view to pleasure, the other with a view to the best, not gratifying it to the full but fighting it out. Were these not the things we were defining then?

CALL. Certainly.

SOC. Then the one, the one with a view to pleasure, is ignoble and in fact nothing other than flattery; is it not so?

CALL. Let it be so for you, if you want. e

SOC. And the other, at any rate, so that this may be as good as possible, whether what we tend is in fact a body or a soul?

1. Callicles' two loves (481d): the people (*dēmos*) of the Athenians and Demos son of Pyrilampes. *Love of the people*, in what follows, is *dēmou erōs*.

2. Burnet brackets, on his own judgement, *isōs kai*, "perhaps and", before *beltion*, "better"; Schaefer had bracketed *isōs*, Schanz *pollakis isōs*. Without them *pollakis* has the sense it takes after *ean*, "perhaps" (LSJ s.v.), not "often". Not translated.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστιν τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν, ὡς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιοῦντας; ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ τούτου, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ηὑρίσκομεν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄλλην εὐεργεσίαν οὐδεμίαν προσφέρειν, ἐὰν μὴ καλὴ κἀγαθὴ ἡ διάνοια ᾖ τῶν μελλόντων ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρχήν τινων ἢ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡντινοῦν. φῶμεν οὕτως ἔχειν;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε, εἴ σοι ἥδιον.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, δημοσίᾳ πράξοντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά, ἢ τειχῶν ἢ νεωρίων ἢ ἱερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα οἰκοδομήματα, πότερον ἔδει ἂν ἡμᾶς σκέψασθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐξετάσαι πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα τὴν τέχνην ἢ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, τὴν οἰκοδομικήν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμάθομεν; ἔδει ἂν ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὖ τόδε, εἴ τι πώποτε οἰκοδόμημα ᾠκοδομήκαμεν ἰδίᾳ ἢ τῶν φίλων τινὶ ἢ ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ οἰκοδόμημα καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν· καὶ εἰ μὲν ηὑρίσκομεν σκοπούμενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἐλλογίμους γεγονότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα πολλὰ μὲν καὶ καλὰ μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων ᾠκοδομημένα ἡμῖν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἴδια ἡμῶν ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν, οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων, νοῦν ἐχόντων ἦν ἂν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἔργα· εἰ δὲ μήτε διδάσκαλον εἴχομεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιδεῖξαι οἰκοδομήματά τε ἢ μηδὲν ἢ πολλὰ καὶ μηδενὸς ἄξια, οὕτω

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e 5 *τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς πολίτας* F **e** 6 *θεραπεύειν* secl. Cobet **e** 7 *ἔμπροσθεν* B T P: *πρόσθεν* F **e** 8 *εὑρίσκομεν* B T P: *εὑρήκαμεν* F *ὄφελος* T P F b: *ὄφελος* B **a** 3 *φῶμεν* F (coniecerat Madvig): *θῶμεν* B T P **a** 6 *πράξοντες* F: *πράξαντες* B T P (sed ο supra *α* P rec. b): *τάξαντες* Madvig **b** 1 *τὴν τέχνην ἢ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα* P F et in marg. B T: om. B T **b** 2 *οἰκοδομικήν* T P F (sed *ν* supra δ T): *οἰκονομικήν* B (sed ras. supra *ν*) *παρὰ τοῦ* B P F: *παρά του* T **c** 2 *ἴδια*] *ἰδίᾳ* B T P F: διὰ Voemel: *ἰδίᾳ δι'* (*διὰ* Schanz) Madvig **c** 4 *ἂν ἰέναι* F: *ἀνιέναι* B T P

CALL. Certainly.

SOC. Then must we attempt to tend the city and the citizens thus, making the citizens themselves as good as possible? For without this, indeed, as we were finding in what went before, it is of no service to apply any other benefaction, unless the mind of those 514
who are going to take either much money or rule over some people or any other power whatever is beautiful and good. Shall we claim it is so?

CALL. Certainly, if it is more pleasant for you.

SOC. If, then, Callicles, we were summoning one another, as men who would do some of the political affairs publicly, to building works, to the greatest buildings, of walls or of dockyards or of temples, would we have to look into ourselves and examine, first, b
whether we know the craft, building, or do not know it, and from whom we learned it? Would we have to, or not?[1]

CALL. Certainly.

SOC. Then, second, this again: whether we have ever built any building privately, either for one of our friends or our own, and whether this building is beautiful or shameful; and if, looking into it, we were finding that our teachers had been good and of note, c
and that many beautiful buildings had been built by us with our teachers, and many also our own after we were rid of our teachers, being so disposed, it would be for men who have sense to go to the public works;[2] but if we had the means to display neither a teacher of ours, and either no buildings or many and worth nothing, thus,

1. *Who would do*: *praxontes*, F's reading, which Burnet prints; B, T and P have *praxantes*, "having done"; Madvig proposed *taxantes*.

2. *Our own*: *idia*, the reading Burnet prints; B, T, P and F have *idiāi*, "privately". Voemel proposed *dia*, Madvig *idiāi di'*, Schanz *idiāi dia*.

δὴ ἀνόητον ἦν δήπου ἐπιχειρεῖν τοῖς δημοσίοις ἔργοις καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἀλλήλους ἐπ᾽ αὐτά. φῶμεν ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι ἢ οὔ; d

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα, τά τε ἄλλα κἂν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὡς ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δήπου ἂν ἐγώ τε σὲ καὶ σὺ ἐμέ, Φέρε 5
πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς ἔχει τὸ σῶμα πρὸς ὑγίειαν; ἢ ἤδη τις ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην ἀπηλλάγη νόσου, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; κἂν ἐγὼ οἶμαι περὶ σοῦ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν· καὶ εἰ μὴ ηὑρίσκομεν δι᾽ ἡμᾶς μηδένα βελτίω γεγονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε τῶν ξένων μήτε τῶν e
ἀστῶν, μήτε ἄνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα, πρὸς Διός, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀνοίας ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ὥστε, πρὶν ἰδιωτεύοντας πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθῶσαι καὶ γυμνάσασθαι 5
ἱκανῶς τὴν τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτούς τε δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους παρακαλεῖν; οὐκ ἀνόητόν σοι δοκεῖ ἂν εἶναι οὕτω πράττειν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε. 10

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐπειδὴ σὺ μὲν αὐτὸς 515
ἄρτι ἄρχῃ πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμὲ δὲ παρακαλεῖς καὶ ὀνειδίζεις ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπισκεψόμεθα ἀλλήλους, Φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἤδη τινὰ βελτίω πεποίηκεν τῶν πολιτῶν; ἔστιν ὅστις πρότερον πονηρὸς ὤν, ἄδικός τε 5
καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄφρων, διὰ Καλλικλέα καλός τε κἀγαθὸς γέγονεν, ἢ ξένος ἢ ἀστός, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; λέγε μοι,

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c 7 δὴ] δὲ Basileensis altera *ἦν δήπου* B T P: om. F (sed add. *ἦν* post *ἐπιχειρεῖν*): *ἦν ἄν που* Schanz **c** 8 *φῶμεν* B T P f: *δῶμεν* F **d** 3 *ἐπιχειρήσαντες* B T P F: *ἐπιχειρήσοντες* Heindorf **d** 5 *δὴ ἄν που* F *ἐγώ τε* T² W F: *ἔγωγε* B T **d** 7 *ἤδη* corr. Par. 1812: *εἰ δή* B T P F **d** 9 *ηὑρίσκομεν* B: *εὑρίσκομεν* T P F **e** 9 *οὕτω* B T P: *τοῦτο* F **a** 4 *καλλικλῆς* T W F: *καλλίκλεις* B **a** 6 *καλός* B W F t: *καλλός* T **a** 7 *ἢ ἀστὸς* T W F: om. B

indeed, it would surely be senseless to attempt the public works and to summon one another to them. Shall we claim these things are said rightly or not? d

CALL. Certainly.

SOC. Then so with everything; both the rest, and if, having attempted to do public work, we were summoning one another as sufficient doctors, I would have looked into you, surely, and you into me: Come, by the gods, how does Socrates himself stand in his body as to health? Or has anyone else ever been rid of a disease because of Socrates, either slave or free? And I too, I think, would be looking into other such things about you; and if we were finding no one who had become better in body because of us, neither of the strangers nor of the townsmen, neither man nor woman, by Zeus, Callicles, would it not truly be ridiculous that human beings should come to such a pitch of senselessness that, before doing many things as private persons, in whatever way we happened to, and setting many right, and training themselves sufficiently in the craft, they should attempt, as the saying, indeed, goes, to learn pottery on the jar, and should both attempt to do public work themselves and summon others like them? Do you not think it would be senseless to act so?[1] e

CALL. I do.

SOC. But now, most excellent of men, since you yourself are just 515
now beginning to do the affairs of the city, and you summon me and reproach me that I do not do them, shall we not look into each other: Come, has Callicles ever made any of the citizens better? Is there anyone who, being base before, unjust and licentious and foolish, has become beautiful and good because of Callicles, either stranger or townsman, either slave or free? Say to me,

1. *Pottery on the jar*: a proverb for beginning on the largest and hardest piece; Plato uses it again at *Laches* 187b.

ἐάν τίς σε ταῦτα ἐξετάζῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἐρεῖς; τίνα b
φήσεις βελτίω πεποιηκέναι ἄνθρωπον τῇ συνουσίᾳ τῇ σῇ;
ὀκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, εἴπερ ἔστιν τι ἔργον σὸν ἔτι ἰδιω-
τεύοντος, πρὶν δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν;

ΚΑΛ. Φιλόνικος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. 5

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ φιλονικίᾳ γε ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς βου-
λόμενος εἰδέναι ὅντινά ποτε τρόπον οἴει δεῖν πολιτεύεσθαι
ἐν ἡμῖν. ἢ ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσῃ ἡμῖν ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ
τῆς πόλεως πράγματα ἢ ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται ὦμεν; c
ἢ οὐ πολλάκις ἤδη ὡμολογήκαμεν τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν τὸν
πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα; ὡμολογήκαμεν ἢ οὔ; ἀποκρίνου. ὡμο-
λογήκαμεν· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σοῦ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο
δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα παρασκευάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει, νῦν 5
μοι ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπὲ περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὧν ὀλίγῳ
πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἰ ἔτι σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται γεγο-
νέναι, Περικλῆς καὶ Κίμων καὶ Μιλτιάδης καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς. d

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν
βελτίους ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας ἀντὶ χειρόνων. ἐποίει ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί. 5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε Περικλῆς ἤρχετο λέγειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ,
χείρους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἢ ὅτε τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἴσως δή, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν
ὡμολογημένων, εἴπερ ἀγαθός γ' ἦν ἐκεῖνος πολίτης. 10

ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν δή; e

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἰπὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται
Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναν-
τίον διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω,

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b 2 *ἀνθρώπων* Hirschig **b** 8 ἢ T P et in lac. textus f: *ἡ* B: *ἦ* Heindorf: *εἰ* Schleiermacher **c** 1 *οἱ πολῖται* B T P: *πολῖται* F (*οἱ* om. Hirschig, Schanz) **c** 6 *ὀλίγῳ* B T P: *ὀλίγον* F **c** 7 *ἀγαθοὶ* B T P: *ἀγαθοὶ οἱ* F **d** 4 *ἐποίει* post *χειρόνων* transp. F (om. mox altero *ἐποίει*) **d** 5 *ναί* B T P F: *ἐποίει* Aldina **d** 7 *οἱ* B T P: om. F **d** 9 *δή* P F: *δεῖ* B T *ἀνάγκη* Schanz

if someone examines you on these things, Callicles, what will you say? What person will you claim to have made better by your association? Do you hesitate to answer, if there is any work of yours while you were still a private person, before attempting to do public work? b

CALL. You are a lover of rivalry, Socrates.

SOC. But I do not ask from rivalry, at any rate, but as in truth wanting to know in what way ever you think one must engage in politics among us. Or will you, then, take care of anything else for us, having come to the affairs of the city, than that we citizens may be as good as possible? Or have we not often already agreed that the political man must do this? Have we agreed or not? Answer. We have agreed: I will answer for you. If, then, the good man must prepare this for his own city, now recollect and say to me about those men you were speaking of a little before, whether you still think they have become good citizens, Pericles and Cimon and Miltiades and Themistocles. c d

CALL. I do.

SOC. Then if they were good, it is plain that each of them was making the citizens better in place of inferior. Was he making them so, or not?

CALL. Yes.

SOC. Then, when Pericles began speaking before the people, were the Athenians inferior to what they were when he was speaking his last?

CALL. Perhaps.

SOC. Not perhaps, indeed, most excellent man, but it is a necessity, from what has been agreed, if, at any rate, that man was a good citizen.

CALL. What then, indeed? e

SOC. Nothing; but say this to me besides: whether the Athenians are said to have become better because of Pericles, or wholly the contrary, to have been corrupted by him. For these are the things I, for my part, hear,

Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους ἀργοὺς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον καταστήσαντα.

ΚΑΛ. Τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων ἀκούεις ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τάδε οὐκέτι ἀκούω, ἀλλ᾽ οἶδα σαφῶς καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σύ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ηὐδοκίμει Περικλῆς καὶ οὐδεμίαν αἰσχρὰν δίκην κατεψηφίσαντο αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἡνίκα χείρους ἦσαν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἐγεγόνεσαν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Περικλέους, κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς πονηροῦ ὄντος.

ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν; τούτου ἕνεκα κακὸς ἦν Περικλῆς;

ΣΩ. Ὄνων γοῦν ἂν ἐπιμελητὴς καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν τοιοῦτος ὢν κακὸς ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβὼν μὴ λακτίζοντας ἑαυτὸν μηδὲ κυρίττοντας μηδὲ δάκνοντας ἀπέδειξε ταῦτα ἅπαντα ποιοῦντας δι᾽ ἀγριότητα. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμελητὴς ὁστισοῦν ὁτουοῦν ζῴου, ὃς ἂν παραλαβὼν ἡμερώτερα ἀποδείξῃ ἀγριώτερα ἢ παρέλαβε; δοκεῖ ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε, ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τόδε τοίνυν μοι χάρισαι ἀποκρινάμενος· πότερον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῶν ζῴων ἐστὶν ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὡς ἄρτι ὡμολογοῦμεν, δικαιοτέρους γεγονέναι ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου, εἴπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸς ὢν τὰ πολιτικά;

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e 6 λάλους t f: ἀλάλους B (sed ἀ erasum) T P: καλοὺς F **e** 11 ηὐδοκίμει B: εὐδοκίμει T P F **a** 1 ἐπὶ . . . Περικλέους secl. Cobet **a** 5 ὄνων γοῦν ἂν T P F: ὄνων ἄν γ᾽ οὖν ἂν B (sed prius ἄν erasum): ὄνων γοῦν Aristides **a** 6 εἰ B T P: μὴ F **a** 7 ἑαυτὸν B T: αὐτὸν P F Aristides: αὐτοὺς f **a** 8 ἅπαντας F **b** 2 ἢ P F: ἢ* T: ᾗ B **b** 8 ἐπεμέλετο B T P: ἐπεμελεῖτο F **b** 10 ἄρτι B T P: ἀρτίως F

that Pericles has made the Athenians idle and cowardly and talkative and lovers of silver, having first set them up in drawing pay.[1]

CALL. You hear these things from the men with the broken ears, Socrates.[2]

SOC. But these things I no longer hear, but I know clearly, both I and you, that at first Pericles was of good repute, and the Athenians voted to condemn him to no shameful penalty, while they were inferior; but when they had become beautiful and good at 516
his hands, at the end of Pericles' life, they voted to condemn him for theft, and nearly assessed his penalty at death too, plainly on the ground that he was base.[3]

CALL. What then? Was Pericles bad for this reason?

SOC. A caretaker of asses and horses and oxen, at any rate, being such, would seem to be bad, if, having taken them over not kicking him nor butting nor biting, he had turned them out doing all these
things because of savageness. Or do you not think that any care- b
taker whatever of any animal whatever is bad who, having taken them over tamer, turns them out more savage than he took them over? Do you think so or not?

CALL. Certainly, so that I may gratify you.

SOC. Then gratify me in this too by answering: is the human being too one of the animals, or not?

CALL. How could he not be?

SOC. Then Pericles was taking care of human beings?

CALL. Yes.

SOC. What then? Must they not, as we were agreeing just now, have become more just in place of more unjust at that man's hands, if that man was taking care of them, being good in political affairs? c

1. *Drawing pay*: Pericles first made service in the law courts paid (Aristotle, *Constitution of the Athenians* 27.3–4). *Talkative* (*lalous*) is the reading of the later hands t and f; B (whose *a* has been erased), T and P have *alalous*, "speechless", and F *kalous*, "beautiful".

2. *The men with the broken ears*: the admirers of Sparta, who in imitation of the Spartans got their ears broken and wound boxing-thongs about themselves (*Protagoras* 342b–c).

3. Thucydides (2.65.3–4) says that the Athenians fined Pericles, in 430 BC, and soon afterwards chose him general again.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἵ γε δίκαιοι ἥμεροι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος· σὺ δὲ τί φῄς; οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγριωτέρους γε αὐτοὺς ἀπέφηνεν ἢ οἵους παρέλαβεν, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς αὐτόν, ὃν ἥκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο.

ΚΑΛ. Βούλει σοι ὁμολογήσω;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δοκῶ γε σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω δὴ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ χείρους;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ Περικλῆς ἦν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σύ γε φῄς.

ΣΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐδέ γε σὺ ἐξ ὧν ὡμολόγεις. πάλιν δὲ λέγε μοι περὶ Κίμωνος· οὐκ ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτὸν οὗτοι οὓς ἐθεράπευεν, ἵνα αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς φωνῆς; καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ προσεζημίωσαν; Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν Μαραθῶνι εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν πρύτανιν, ἐνέπεσεν ἄν; καίτοι οὗτοι, εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, ὡς σὺ φῄς, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ταῦτα ἔπασχον. οὔκουν οἵ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν ζευγῶν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ θεραπεύσωσιν τοὺς ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμείνους γένωνται ἡνίοχοι, τότ' ἐκπίπτουσιν· οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτ' οὔτ' ἐν ἡνιοχείᾳ οὔτ' ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ οὐδενί· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι ἦσαν, ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολιτικὰ

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c 7 *αὐτόν* P: *αὐτὸν* B T F: secl. Cobet **d** 5 *ὡμολόγεις* B T P: *ὁμολογεῖς* F **d** 9 *μαραθῶνι* F (scripserat Schanz): *ἐν μαραθῶνι* B T P **e** 4 *ἐκ* B T P F: om. Aristides **e** 5 *ἀμείνους γένωνται* B T P F: *γένωνται ἀμείνους* Aristides

CALL. Certainly.

SOC. Then the just, at any rate, are tame, as Homer said. But you, what do you claim? Not so?[1]

CALL. Yes.

SOC. But indeed he showed them forth more savage, at any rate, than such as he took over, and that against himself, whom he would least have wanted.

CALL. Do you want me to agree with you?

SOC. If you think, at any rate, that I speak the truth.

CALL. Let these things be so, then.

SOC. Then if more savage, both more unjust and inferior?

CALL. Let it be so. d

SOC. Then Pericles was not good in political affairs, from this argument.

CALL. You claim not, at any rate.

SOC. By Zeus, nor do you, from what you were agreeing. But say to me again about Cimon: did not these men whom he was tending ostracize him, so that they might not hear his voice for ten years? And did they not do these same things to Themistocles, and fine him with exile besides? And Miltiades, the one at Marathon, they e voted to throw into the pit, and, if not because of the prytanis, he would have fallen in? And yet these men, if they were good men, as you claim, would never have suffered these things. So it is not the good charioteers, at any rate, who at first do not fall out of their chariots, but then, when they have tended their horses and become superior charioteers themselves, fall out. That is not so either in charioteering or in any other work; or do you think so?[2]

CALL. Not I.

SOC. True, then, as it seems, were the arguments before, that we 517 know no man who has become good in political affairs

1. Homer sets the savage against the just in Odysseus' question, "are they insolent and savage and not just, or kind to strangers?" (*Odyssey* 6.120–121, 9.175–176, 13.201–202); "tame" is Socrates' own word.

2. *Whom he was tending*: the verb of the two kinds of tending (513d); it also means "court". Cimon was ostracized in 461 BC (Plutarch, *Cimon* 17.2); Themistocles was ostracized and later condemned as a traitor, and fled to Persia (Thucydides 1.135–138). Miltiades, the general of Marathon, was tried on a capital charge after the failure at Paros; Herodotus (6.136) says the people spared his life and fined him fifty talents. The pit (*barathron*) was the chasm into which the condemned were thrown; the prytanis, presumably the one presiding that day, is mentioned only here, and Aelius Aristides, answering Plato (*In Defence of the Four*), denies the story.

ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. σὺ δὲ ὡμολόγεις τῶν γε νῦν οὐδένα, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ προείλου τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας· οὗτοι δὲ ἀνεφάνησαν ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς νῦν ὄντες, ὥστε, εἰ οὗτοι ῥήτορες ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐχρῶντο—οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον—οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μή ποτέ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται οἷα τούτων ὅστις βούλει εἴργασται.

ΣΩ. Ὦ δαιμόνιε, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους ὡς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλά μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἷοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐπεθύμει. ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὅθεν ἔμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν τούτων διέφερον ἐκεῖνοι· ὅπερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου. ναῦς δὲ καὶ τείχη καὶ νεώρια καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐγώ σοι ὁμολογῶ δεινοτέρους εἶναι ἐκείνους τούτων ἐκπορίζειν. πρᾶγμα οὖν γελοῖον ποιοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἐν παντὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ ὃν διαλεγόμεθα οὐδὲν παυόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ περιφερόμενοι καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὅτι λέγομεν. ἐγὼ γοῦν σε πολλάκις οἶμαι ὡμολογηκέναι καὶ ἐγνωκέναι ὡς ἄρα διττή αὖτη τις ἡ πραγματεία ἔστιν καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα διακονική ἐστιν, ᾗ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐκπορίζειν, ἐὰν μὲν πεινῇ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν, σιτία, ἐὰν δὲ διψῇ, ποτά, ἐὰν δὲ ῥιγῷ, ἱμάτια, στρώματα, ὑποδήματα, ἄλλ' ὧν ἔρχεται σώματα εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδές σοι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰκόνων λέγω, ἵνα ῥᾷον καταμάθῃς. τούτων γὰρ ποριστικὸν εἶναι ἢ κάπηλον ὄντα ἢ ἔμπορον ἢ δημιουργόν του αὐτῶν

a 4 *εἰ οὗτοι*] *εἰ τοιοῦτοι* Aristides **a** 7 *μή*] *οὐ μὴ* Madvig et in editione Schanz (nunc *μὴ* tuetur v. Rh. Mus. xli. 152): *καὶ οὐ μή* Cobet (et mox *ἐργάσεται*) **a** 8 *ὅστις* F: *ὃς* B T P **c** 5 *ὃν* B T F: *ὧ* P **c** 7 *γοῦν* Ven. 189: *τε οὖν* F: *οὖν* B T P **c** 8 *τις αὕτη* F **d** 4 *ἀλλὰ ὧν* rec. p: *ἄλλων ὧν* B T P F

in this city. And you were agreeing: of those now, at any rate, none, of those before, however, there were; and you chose these men in preference. But these came to light as on a level with those now, so that, if these were orators, they used neither the true rhetoric—for they would not have fallen out—nor the flattering one.[1]

CALL. But, however, it is far from it, at any rate, Socrates, that any one of those now should ever work such works as whichever of these you want has worked. b

SOC. You daimonic man, neither do I censure these men, as servants of a city, at any rate; but I think they have been more serving than those now, at any rate, and more able to procure for the city what it desired. But to redirect its desires and not to permit them, persuading and forcing them toward that from which the citizens would be superior, in this, so to speak, those men did not differ c in anything from these; which alone is the work of a good citizen. But ships and walls and dockyards and many other such things, I too agree with you, those men were more formidable at procuring than these. So we are doing a laughable matter, I and you, in our arguments; for in all the time we have been conversing we do not cease being carried round always to the same point and being ignorant of what we each say. I, at any rate, think you have often agreed and come to know that this occupation is, after all, a twofold one, d both about the body and about the soul; and the one is serving, by which it is possible to procure, if our bodies are hungry, foods, if they are thirsty, drinks, if they are cold, cloaks, bedding, shoes, other things that bodies come to desire. And I am speaking to you through the same likenesses on purpose, so that you may understand more easily. For one who procures these, being a retailer or a merchant or a craftsman of some one of

1. *Fallen out*: the word for being driven out of the city, used just before of the charioteers (516e).

τούτων, σιτοποιὸν ἢ ὀψοποιὸν ἢ ὑφάντην ἢ σκυτοτόμον ἢ e
σκυτοδεψόν, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν ἐστιν ὄντα τοιοῦτον δόξαι καὶ
αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ
μὴ εἰδότι ὅτι ἔστιν τις παρὰ ταύτας ἁπάσας τέχνη γυμνα-
στική τε καὶ ἰατρική, ἣ δὴ τῷ ὄντι γε ἐστὶν σώματος 5
θεραπεία, ἥνπερ καὶ προσήκει τούτων ἄρχειν πασῶν τῶν
τεχνῶν καὶ χρῆσθαι τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι
χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν τῶν σιτίων ἢ ποτῶν ἐστιν εἰς ἀρετὴν
σώματος, τὰς δ' ἄλλας πάσας ταύτας ἀγνοεῖν· διὸ δὴ καὶ 518
ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς τε καὶ διακονικὰς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους
εἶναι περὶ σώματος πραγματείαν, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, τὴν δὲ
γυμναστικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεσποίνας εἶναι
τούτων. ταὐτὰ οὖν ταῦτα ὅτι ἔστιν καὶ περὶ ψυχήν, τοτὲ 5
μέν μοι δοκεῖς μανθάνειν ὅτι λέγω, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ὡς εἰδὼς
ὅτι ἐγὼ λέγω· ἥκεις δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον λέγων ὅτι ἄνθρωποι
καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν πολῖται ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐπειδὰν b
ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶ οἵτινες, δοκεῖς μοι ὁμοιοτάτους προτείνεσθαι
ἀνθρώπους περὶ τὰ πολιτικά, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ περὶ τὰ γυμνα-
στικὰ ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος οἵτινες ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν ἢ εἰσὶν
σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ἔλεγές μοι πάνυ σπουδάζων, Θεαρίων 5
ὁ ἀρτοκόπος καὶ Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὀψοποιίαν συγγεγραφὼς
τὴν Σικελικὴν καὶ Σάραμβος ὁ κάπηλος, ὅτι οὗτοι θαυμάσιοι
γεγόνασιν σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν ἄρτους θαυμαστοὺς
παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὄψον, ὁ δὲ οἶνον. ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἠγα- c
νάκτεις, εἴ σοι ἔλεγον ἐγὼ ὅτι Ἄνθρωπε, ἐπαΐεις οὐδὲν
περὶ γυμναστικῆς· διακόνους μοι λέγεις καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν
παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, οὐκ ἐπαΐοντας καλὸν κἀγαθὸν
οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν, οἵ, ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν, ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ 5

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e 5 ἢ P F: ᾗ B T γε F: om. B T P **e** 7 *τούτων* B W f et γρ. T: *τούτω* F: *τοιούτοις* T ὅτι recc.: ὅτι τὶ F: ὅτι τὸ B T P **a** 1 *ταύτας*] ταῦτα Coraes **a** 3 *περὶ σώματος πραγματείαν*] *περὶ σῶμα πραγματείας* Cobet **a** 5 οὖν B T F: γοῦν P τοτὲ . . . **a** 6 ὅτι] *τότε* . . . ὅτι B T P F: *τότε* . . . ὅτε Madvig **b** 5 ⟨ὅτι⟩ Θεαρίων Cobet (secl. mox **b** 7 ὅτι . . . θεραπευταί) **b** 6 ἀρτοκόπος B T P: ἀρτοποιὸς F **c** 5 οὐδὲν F t: οὐδὲ re vera B T P οὕτω B T P f: om. F

these very things, a food-maker or a cook or a weaver or a shoe- e
maker or a tanner, it is nothing marvellous that, being such, he should seem, both to himself and to the others, to be a tender of the body: to everyone who does not know that there is, besides all these, a craft, gymnastics and medicine, which, indeed, is in reality, at any rate, the tending of the body, and which it is fitting should rule all these crafts and use their works, because of knowing what among foods or drinks is decent and what base for the virtue of the body, while all these others are ignorant of it. Because 518
of this, indeed, these, the other crafts, are of a kind becoming a slave, and serving and servile as regards the occupation with the body, while gymnastics and medicine are, according to what is just, their mistresses. Now that these same things hold about the soul too, at one time I think you understand what I am saying, and you agree as one who knows what I am saying; but a little later you come saying that human beings have become beautiful and good b
citizens in the city; and when I ask who, I think you put forward human beings most like these about political affairs, just as if, when I was asking about gymnastic matters who have become or are good tenders of bodies, you were saying to me, quite in earnest, Thearion the baker and Mithaecus, who wrote up Sicilian cookery, and Sarambus the retailer, that these have become marvellous tenders of bodies, the one preparing marvellous loaves, the second dishes, c
the third wine.[1] Perhaps, then, you would be vexed if I said to you: Man, you are expert in nothing about gymnastics; you are speaking to me of servants and preparers of desires, human beings expert in nothing beautiful and good about them, who, if it so happens, having filled full and

1. Thearion the baker is named by the comic poets Antiphanes and Aristophanes, whom Athenaeus quotes beside this sentence of Plato's (3.112c–e); Mithaecus' book of cookery Athenaeus cites elsewhere, and quotes a recipe from it (7.282a, 7.325f); Sarambus, by the context, sold wine.

παχύναντες τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπαινούμενοι ὑπ' αὐτῶν, προσαπολοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας σάρκας· οἱ δ' αὖ δι' ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς ἑστιῶντας αἰτιάσονται τῶν νόσων d
αἰτίους εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἀποβολῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων σαρκῶν, ἀλλ' οἳ ἂν αὐτοῖς τύχωσι τότε παρόντες καὶ συμβουλεύοντές τι, ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἥκῃ ἡ τότε πλησμονὴ νόσον φέρουσα συχνῷ ὕστερον χρόνῳ, ἅτε ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ γεγονυῖα, τούτους 5
αἰτιάσονται καὶ ψέξουσιν καὶ κακόν τι ποιήσουσιν, ἂν οἷοί τ' ὦσι, τοὺς δὲ προτέρους ἐκείνους καὶ αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν
ἐγκωμιάσουσιν. καὶ σὺ νῦν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὁμοιότατον e
τούτῳ ἐργάζῃ· ἐγκωμιάζεις ἀνθρώπους, οἳ τούτους εἱστιάκασιν εὐωχοῦντες ὧν ἐπεθύμουν. καί φασι μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτούς· ὅτι δὲ οἰδεῖ καὶ ὕπουλός ἐστιν
δι' ἐκείνους τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ 519
σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν πόλιν· ὅταν οὖν ἔλθῃ ἡ καταβολὴ αὖτη τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς
τότε παρόντας αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ 5
καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσιν, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῇ, καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα προσ-
απολλύωσι πρὸς οἷς ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν b
ἀλλ' ἴσως συναιτίων. καίτοι ἔγωγε ἀνόητον πρᾶγμα καὶ νῦν ὁρῶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀκούω τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πέρι. αἰσθάνομαι γάρ, ὅταν ἡ πόλις τινὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν
μεταχειρίζηται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ἀγανακτούντων καὶ σχετλια- 5
ζόντων ὡς δεινὰ πάσχουσι· πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἄρα ἀδίκως ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς ὁ τούτων λόγος. τὸ δὲ ὅλον ψεῦδός ἐστιν· προστάτης γὰρ πόλεως
οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ποτε ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως ἧς c

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c 7 *προσαπολοῦσιν* B: *προσαπόλλουσιν* F: *προσαπολλύουσι(ν)* T W **d** 4 δὴ F: δὲ B T P f **b** 3 *ἀκούω* B T P: *οὐκ ἀκούω* F *πέρι. αἰσθάνομαι* b t: *περιαισθάνομαι* B T P: **** *ὑπεραισθάνομαι* F (*πέρι* in lac. suppl. et *ὑπερ* punctis del. f) **c** 1 *αὐτῆς* B T P: *αὐτῆς ταύτης* F

fattened the bodies of human beings, being praised by them, will make them lose even their ancient flesh besides; and they, again, d
because of lack of routine, will not blame those who are feasting them as being the causes of their diseases and of the shedding of their ancient flesh, but whoever are in fact present with them then and advising them something, when, indeed, the surfeit of that time comes to them bringing disease a lengthy time afterwards, inasmuch as it came about without the wholesome: these they will blame and censure and do some bad thing to, if they are able, while those earlier ones, who are also the causes of the bad things, they e
will make an encomium of. And you now, Callicles, are working what is most like this: you make an encomium of human beings who have feasted these men, regaling them with what they desired. And people claim that they have made the city great; but that it swells and is festering because of those men of old, they do not per- 519
ceive. For without temperance and justice they have filled the city full of harbours and dockyards and walls and tributes and such nonsense. So whenever this attack of the feebleness comes, they will blame the advisers present then, and make an encomium of Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, the causes of the bad things; and they will perhaps lay hold of you, if you do not beware, and of my companion Alcibiades, when they lose the ancient things too besides what they acquired, though you and he are not the causes b
of the bad things but perhaps joint causes.[1] And yet I, for my part, both see a senseless matter happening now and hear of it about the men of old. For I perceive, whenever the city handles one of its political men as doing injustice, that they are vexed and cry out that it is shocking, that they suffer dreadful things: having done the city many good things, they are, after all, perishing unjustly at its hands, as their account goes. But the whole thing is a falsehood; for a man who stands at the head of a city would never, not even c
one, perish unjustly at the hands of the very city of which

1. *Attack*: the word for the fit of an illness, as of a fever (LSJ, citing this place). Alcibiades, the most famous of Socrates' companions, led Athens into the Sicilian expedition of 415 BC (Thucydides 6.15.2); readers have heard in the warning the losses that followed (interpretation).

προστατεῖ. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ὅσοι τε πολιτικοὶ προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ ὅσοι σοφισταί. καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί, τἆλλα σοφοὶ ὄντες, τοῦτο ἄτοπον ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα· φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι πολλάκις κατηγοροῦσιν τῶν μαθητῶν ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς [αὐτούς], τούς τε μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες, εὖ παθόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου τί ἂν ἀλογώτερον εἴη πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενομένους, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, σχόντας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ ᾧ οὐκ ἔχουσιν; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὦ ἑταῖρε; ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν με ἠνάγκασας, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΚΑΛ. Σὺ δ' οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' εἴης λέγειν, εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀποκρίνοιτο;

ΣΩ. Ἔοικά γε· νῦν γοῦν συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων, ἐπειδή μοι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, εἰπὲ πρὸς Φιλίου, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ ὅτι ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸς γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν ἔπειτα πονηρός ἐστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων τῶν φασκόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδενὸς ἀξίων;

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγοις, οἳ φάσκοντες προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν, ὡς πονηροτάτης; οἴει τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἐκείνων; ταὐτόν, ὦ μακάριε, ἐστὶν σοφιστὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παρα-

c 6 *αὐτούς* (sic B) secl. Bekker **d** 1 *καὶ*] *καίτοι* Heindorf **d** 4 *σχόντας* B T: *ἔχοντας* P F *ᾧ* f: *ὃ* B T P: *ἀλλ'* F **d** 5 *τοῦτο* om. F **d** 6 *με* T P F b: *μὲν* B **e** 1 *γοῦν* B F: *γ' οὖν* T: δὲ in marg. t: δ' *οὖν* P **e** 4 *τινὰ* om. F *ὑπ' αὐτῶν* F

he stands at the head. For it looks as if it is the same thing, all who pretend to be politicians and all who are sophists. For the sophists too, though wise in the rest, work this outlandish matter: asserting that they are teachers of virtue, they often accuse their pupils of doing injustice to them, defaulting on their pay and not giving back any other gratitude, though they have had good done d to them by them.[1] And what matter could be more unaccountable than this account, that human beings who have become good and just, who have had injustice taken out of them by their teacher and have come to have justice, should do injustice by that which they do not have? Do you not think this outlandish, my companion? In truth you have compelled me to address the people, Callicles, by not being willing to answer.

CALL. And would you not be able to speak unless someone were answering you?

SOC. I seem able, at any rate; now, at any rate, I am stretching e out lengthy speeches, since you are not willing to answer me. But, my good friend, say, by the god of friendship: do you not think it unaccountable that one who asserts he has made someone good should find fault with him because, having become good at his own hands and being so, he is then base?

CALL. I think so.

SOC. Then do you hear those who assert that they educate human beings for virtue saying such things?

CALL. I do; but what would you say about human beings worth 520 nothing?

SOC. And what would you say about those who, asserting that they stand at the head of the city and take care that it shall be as good as possible, again accuse it, whenever they happen to, as most base? Do you think these differ at all from those? A sophist and an orator are the same thing, you blessed man, or something near and about equal,

1. *Gratitude*: *charis*, rendered "gratification" in the argument about flattery (462c), here the return owed for a benefit, as in "have gratitude" (470c).

πλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον· σὺ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οἴει εἶναι, τὴν ῥητορικήν, τοῦ δὲ καταφρονεῖς. τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιόν ἐστιν σοφιστικὴ ῥητορικῆς ὅσῳπερ νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἰατρικῆς· μόνοις δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ᾤμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι ὃ αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν, ὡς πονηρόν ἐστιν εἰς σφᾶς, ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελήκασιν οὕς φασιν ὠφελεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον. ἄλλην μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθείς, οἷον ταχὺς γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἴσως ἂν ἀποστερήσειε τὴν χάριν, εἰ προοῖτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἅμα μεταδιδοὺς τοῦ τάχους λαμβάνοι τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ βραδυτῆτι οἶμαι ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ἀδικίᾳ· ἦ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἀσφαλὲς ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι δύναιτό τις ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτω;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλὰς συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον οἰκοδομίας πέρι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν.

ΚΑΛ. Ἔοικέ γε.

ΣΩ. Περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὅντιν' ἄν τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ

b 1 *μὲν* B T P: *μέν γε* F **c** 7 *αὐτῷ* om. F **d** 1 *γὰρ δὴ* F: *γὰρ* B T P **d** 5 *ἀλλὰ* F: *ἀλλ' ὃ* B T P **d** 9 *τὰς* B T P: *δὴ τὰς* F **e** 3 *βέλτιστος* F: *βέλτιστον* B T P *διοικοῖ ἢ* T P F b: *διοικοίη* B

as I was saying to Polus; but you, because of ignorance, think b
the one, rhetoric, something altogether beautiful, and despise
the other. But truly sophistry is more beautiful than rhetoric
by as much as legislation is than judging, and gymnastics than
medicine.[1] And I, for my part, even thought that to those who ad-
dress the people and to the sophists alone it is not open to find fault
with this matter which they themselves educate, as being base to-
ward them, or else by this same argument to accuse themselves too
at the same time of having benefited in no way those whom they
claim to benefit. Is that not how it is?

CALL. Certainly. c

SOC. And to give away the benefaction without pay, at any rate,
surely, as is likely, was open to these alone, if they were speak-
ing the truth. For someone to whom good has been done with any
other benefaction, having become swift, for instance, because of a
trainer, might perhaps default on the gratitude, if the trainer gave
it away to him and did not, having made a compact with him for
pay, as nearly as possible at the same time as he gave him a share of
the speed, take the silver; for it is not, indeed, by slowness, I think, d
that human beings do injustice, but by injustice. Is it not so?

CALL. Yes.

SOC. Then if someone takes away this very thing, the injustice,
there is nothing dreadful for him, lest he ever suffer injustice, but
for him alone it is secure to give away this benefaction, if in reality
someone had power to make people good. Not so?

CALL. I claim so.

SOC. Because of these things, then, as it seems, to give the other
advice, taking silver, about building, for instance, or the other
crafts, is nothing shameful.

CALL. It seems so, at any rate. e

SOC. But about this action, at any rate, in what way someone may
be as good as possible and may best manage his own house

1. Socrates to Polus, 465c. In the scheme of 464b–c justice was the counterpart of medicine and the partner of legislation; here judging, the judge's craft, takes its place.

ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι μόνη αὕτη τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ᾽ εὖ ποιεῖν, ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ᾽ εὖ πείσεται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως, διόρισόν μοι· τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἰατρόν, ἢ ὡς διακονήσοντα καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλήσοντα; τἀληθῆ μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· δίκαιος γὰρ εἶ, ὥσπερ ἤρξω παρρησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ἃ νοεῖς λέγων. καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ.

ΚΑΛ. Λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι ὡς διακονήσοντα.

ΣΩ. Κολακεύσοντα ἄρα με, ὦ γενναιότατε, παρακαλεῖς.

ΚΑΛ. Εἴ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὡς εἰ μὴ ταὐτά γε ποιήσεις—

ΣΩ. Μὴ εἴπῃς ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὁ βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι Πονηρός γε ὢν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· μηδ᾽ ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται ἐάν τι ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ αὖ ἐγὼ εἴπω ὅτι Ἀλλ᾽ ἀφελόμενος οὐχ ἕξει ὅτι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ με ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὕτως καὶ λαβὼν ἀδίκως χρήσεται, εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχρῶς, εἰ δὲ αἰσχρῶς, κακῶς.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μηδ᾽ ἂν ἐν τούτων παθεῖν, ὡς οἰκῶν ἐκποδὼν καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθεὶς εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου.

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e 7 *τοῦτο* B T P: *αὐτὸ* F **a** 5 *ὦ* F: om. B T P **a** 6 *πρός με* F **a** 8 *ὡς* om. F **b** 3 *γε* B T P: *τε* F **b** 4 *ὃ* T P F: *ὅτι* B **b** 7 *χρήσεται*] *χρήσηται* Schanz **c** 2 *κακῶς* B T P: *καὶ κακῶς* F **c** 3 *δοκεῖς ὦ σωκράτης* F: *δοκεῖ σώκρατες* B T P: *δοκεῖ Σωκράτης* Schanz

or city, it is held shameful to claim one will not advise, unless someone gives him silver. Is it not so?

CALL. Yes.

SOC. For plainly this is the cause, that this alone of the benefactions makes the one who has had good done to him desire to do good in return, so that it seems a beautiful sign if one who has done good with this benefaction will have good done to him in return; but if not, not. Are these things so?

CALL. It is. 521

SOC. To which tending of the city, then, are you summoning me? Determine it for me: the one of fighting it out with the Athenians so that they may be as good as possible, as a doctor, or as one who will act as their servant and keep company with them for gratification? Say the truth to me, Callicles; for it is just of you, as you began to speak frankly to me, to go on saying what you have in mind. And now say it well and nobly.

CALL. I say, then, that it is as one who will act as servant.

SOC. You are summoning me, then, most noble man, as one who b will flatter.

CALL. If it is more pleasant for you to call yourself a Mysian, at any rate, Socrates; for if you will not do these things, at any rate—[1]

SOC. Do not say what you have often said, that whoever wants will put me to death, so that I, again, may not say too: Being base, at any rate, he will put to death one who is good; nor that he will take away whatever I have, so that I, again, may not say: But having taken it away he will have no use to make of it, but just as he took it away from me unjustly, so too, having taken it, he will use c it unjustly, and if unjustly, shamefully, and if shamefully, badly.

CALL. How you trust, I think, Socrates, that you would suffer not even one of these things, as one who lives out of the way and would not be brought into a law court by some person perhaps very depraved and paltry!

1. *A Mysian*: proverbially the lowest of men ("the last of the Mysians", *Theaetetus* 209b). Callicles lets the word "flatterer" stand and offers a worse: call it what you like (interpretation).

ΣΩ. Ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἴομαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ὁντινοῦν ἂν ὅτι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν. τόδε μέντοι εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσίω εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων, ὃ σὺ λέγεις, πονηρός τίς μ' ἔσται d ὁ εἰσάγων—οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν χρηστὸς μὴ ἀδικοῦντ' ἄνθρωπον εἰσαγάγοι—καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι. βούλει σοι εἴπω δι' ὅτι ταῦτα προσδοκῶ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. 5

ΣΩ. Οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν· ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὓς λέγω ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ παραινεῖς, τὰ κομψὰ e ταῦτα, οὐχ ἕξω ὅτι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. ὁ αὐτὸς δέ μοι ἥκει λόγος ὅνπερ πρὸς Πῶλον ἔλεγον· κρινοῦμαι γὰρ ὡς ἐν παιδίοις ἰατρὸς ἂν κρίνοιτο κατηγοροῦντος ὀψοποιοῦ. σκόπει γάρ, τί ἂν ἀπολογοῖτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος ἐν τούτοις 5 ληφθείς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τις λέγων ὅτι "Ὦ παῖδες, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅδε εἴργασται ἀνὴρ καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν διαφθείρει τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, καὶ ἰσχναίνων καὶ πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, πικρότατα πώματα 522 διδοὺς καὶ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν ἀναγκάζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ηὐώχουν ὑμᾶς·" τί ἂν οἴει ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα ἰατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; ἢ εἰ εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι "Ταῦτα πάντα ἐγὼ ἐποίουν, ὦ 5 παῖδες, ὑγιεινῶς," πόσον τι οἴει ἂν ἀναβοῆσαι τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς; οὐ μέγα;

ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως· οἴεσθαί γε χρή.

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d 1 ὃ B T P F: ὧν scr. recc. **d** 3 εἰσαγάγοι B T P: εἰσάγοι F **d** 8 νῦν B T P: νυνὶ F **e** 5 τούτοις B T P: τοιούτοις F **e** 7 ἀνὴρ] ἀνὴρ Bekker καὶ αὐτούς . . . διαφθείρει secl. Cobet **e** 8 γρ. καὶ ἴσχων καὶ πνίγων Olympiodorus **a** 1 ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ secl. Madvig πώματα Bekker: πόματα B T P F **a** 4 εἰ F (sed punctis del. f): om. B T P **a** 6 πόσον F: ὁπόσον B T P τι οἴει K. Fuhr: ποιεῖ B (sed π puncto notatum et acc. corr.): οἴει T P F **a** 8 οἴεσθαί γε χρή post οὐ μέγα transp. et Socrati tribuit Forman

SOC. Then I am senseless in truth, Callicles, if I do not think that in this city anyone whatever might suffer this, whatever it may happen to be. This, however, I know well, that if I do go into a law court running a risk about any of these things, as you say, it will be some d
base man who brings me in—for no decent man would bring in a person who does no injustice—and it would be nothing outlandish, at any rate, if I were to die. Do you want me to say to you why I expect these things?

CALL. Certainly.

SOC. I think that with few Athenians, so as not to say alone, I attempt the craft that is in truth political and do political affairs, alone of those now; inasmuch, then, as I speak the speeches I speak on each occasion not for gratification but with a view to the best, not with a view to the most pleasant, and as I am not willing to e
do what you exhort me to, *these refined things*, I shall not have anything to say in the law court.[1] And the same argument comes to me as I was speaking to Polus: for I shall be tried as a doctor would be tried among little children, with a cook accusing him. For look into what defence such a person, caught among these, would make, if someone accused him, saying, "Children, this man has worked many bad things on you, even on your very selves, and he corrupts the youngest of you by cutting and burning, and by making you 522
thin and choking you he puts you at a loss, giving you most bitter draughts and compelling you to be hungry and thirsty, not as I regaled you with many pleasant things of every kind." What do you think a doctor cut off in this bad thing would have the means to say? Or if he said the truth, that "I did all these things, children, wholesomely," how much do you think such judges would shout out? Would they not shout greatly?[2]

CALL. Perhaps; one ought to think so, at any rate.

1. *These refined things*: Callicles' words from Euripides (486c), letterspaced by Burnet as a quotation.

2. The doctor and the cook before children: 464d–e.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἴει ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἂν αὐτὸν ἔχεσθαι ὅτι χρὴ εἰπεῖν; b

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτον μέντοι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονὰς ἃς ἐκπεπόρικα ἔξω αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἃς οὗτοι εὐεργεσίας καὶ ὠφελίας νομί- 5
ζουσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ζηλῶ οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται· ἐάν τέ τίς με ἢ νεωτέρους φῇ διαφθείρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Δικαίως πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο, c
ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν· ὥστε ἴσως, ὅτι ἂν τύχω, τοῦτο πείσομαι.

ΚΑΛ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἄνθρω- πος ἐν πόλει οὕτως διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν ἑαυτῷ 5
βοηθεῖν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε ἓν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὡμολόγησας· εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς εἴη αὑτῷ, μήτε περὶ ἀνθρώπους μήτε περὶ θεοὺς ἄδικον μηδὲν μήτε εἰρηκὼς μήτε d
εἰργασμένος. αὕτη γάρ τῆς βοηθείας ἑαυτῷ πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐμέ τις ἐξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὄντα ἐμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βοηθεῖν, αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἐξελεγχόμενος 5
καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου, καὶ εἰ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνῄ- σκοιμι, ἀγανακτοίην ἄν· εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδείᾳ τελευτῴην ἔγωγε, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἴδοις ἄν με φέροντα τὸν θάνατον. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, e
ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἄνανδρός ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβεῖται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφικέσθαι πάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν ἐστιν.

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b 4 *ἡδονὰς ἃς* T P F: *ἡδονὰς* B **b** 8 *κατηγορεῖν* F **c** 7 *ἓν* F (coniecerat Coraes): *ἐν* B T P *ὃ σὺ* B P F t: *ὃς σὺ* T **d** 2 *τῆς βοηθείας* F: *τις βοήθεια* B T P: *ἡ βοήθεια* Cobet **d** 6 *καὶ εἰ διὰ* F b t: *καὶ ἰδίᾳ* B T: *ἰδίᾳ* P **e** 4 *κακῶν* B T P: *κακόν* F

SOC. Then do you think he would be caught in every want of resource about what he ought to say? b

CALL. Certainly.

SOC. Such a suffering, however, I too know I would suffer if I went into a law court. For I shall not have the means to speak to them of pleasures I have procured, which these men hold to be benefactions and benefits, while I envy neither those who procure them nor those for whom they are procured; and if someone claims either that I corrupt the younger by putting them at a loss, or speak evil of the older by speaking bitter speeches either privately or publicly, I shall have the means to say neither the truth, that Justly I say c all these things, and I do this which is yours, indeed, gentlemen judges, nor anything else; so that perhaps, whatever I may happen upon, this I shall suffer.[1]

CALL. Do you think, then, Socrates, that a person in a city stands well, being so disposed and unable to help himself?

SOC. If that one thing, at any rate, were there for him, Callicles, which you often agreed: if he had helped himself by having neither d said nor worked anything unjust concerning either human beings or gods.[2] For this has often been agreed by us to be the strongest of help to oneself. If, then, someone were to refute me as being unable to help myself and another with this help, I would be ashamed, being refuted both among many and among few and alone by one alone, and if I were to die because of this inability, I would be vexed; but if I, for my part, were to come to my end for lack of flattering rhetoric, I know well that you would see me bearing death easily. e For no one is afraid of dying itself, whoever is not wholly without reckoning and unmanly; but of doing injustice he is afraid: for to arrive in Hades with the soul laden with many acts of injustice is the last of all bad things.

1. *This which is yours*: either "what is for your good", or, with the irony of *dē*, "to use this phrase of yours" (interpretation).

2. *That one thing*: *hen*, F's reading, which Coraes had conjectured; B, T and P have *en*, "if that were in him". At 522d6 "and if ... because of" is the reading of F and the later hands of B and T; B and T have *kai idiāi*, "and privately".

εἰ δὲ βούλει, σοὶ ἐγώ, ὡς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον λέξαι.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἐπείπερ γε καὶ τἆλλα ἐπέρανας, καὶ τοῦτο πέρανον.

ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δή, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ Ὅμηρος λέγει, διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν καὶ ὁ Πλούτων, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον. ἦν οὖν νόμος ὅδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς, τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ ὁσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντα οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὴ Τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἰέναι. τούτων δὲ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ ἔτι νεωστὶ τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων, ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δικάζοντες ᾗ μέλλοιεν τελευτᾶν· κακῶς οὖν αἱ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο. ὅ τε οὖν Πλούτων καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἰόντες ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία ὅτι φοιτῷέν σφιν ἄνθρωποι ἑκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεύς· "Ἀλλ' ἐγώ," ἔφη, "παύσω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἱ δίκαι δικάζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι γάρ," ἔφη, "οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται· ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται. πολλοὶ οὖν," ἦ δ' ὅς, "ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες ἠμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους, καί, ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ᾖ, ἔρχονται αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες ὡς δικαίως βεβιώ-

e 6 *λέξαι*] δέξαι F **a** 1 *φασί* B T P F: *φησί* Stobaeus Plutarchus **a** 2 *ἐγὼ οἶμαι* B T: *ἐγῷμαι* P F Stobaeus Eusebius Theodoretus **a** 5 *ὅδε* B T P f: *ὧδε* F **a** 6 *ἔτι* om. P **b** 4 *ἐπὶ κρόνου* T W Stobaeus Plutarchus et in lac. textus f: *ἐπὶ χρόνου* B **b** 6 *τῇ* F Stobaeus Plutarchus: om. B T P **b** 7 *οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ* Plutarchus: *οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ* B T P F Stobaeus **c** 1 *σφιν* T P: *σφὶν* B F: *σφισιν* Stobaeus Plutarchus **c** 4 *ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται* B T F Plutarchus: om. P Stobaeus *οὖν* B T P F Stobaeus: *μὲν οὖν* Plutarchus **c** 7 *μάρτυρες* B T P F Stobaeus: om. Plutarchus

And if you want, I am willing to speak to you an account, that this is so.

CALL. Well, since you have carried the rest through, at any rate, carry this through too.

SOC. Listen, then, as they say, to a very beautiful account, which 523
you will believe a tale, I think, but I an account; for I will speak to you the things I am going to say as being true.[1] For, as Homer says, Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the rule among themselves, when they had taken it over from their father.[2] Now there was this law about human beings in the time of Cronus, and it is always and still now among the gods: that of human beings the one who has gone through his life justly and holily, when he comes to his end, b
goes away to the Islands of the Blessed and dwells in all happiness far from bad things, but the one who has gone through it unjustly and godlessly goes to the prison of requital and penalty, which, indeed, they call Tartarus. Of these, in the time of Cronus and still recently, when Zeus had the rule, the judges were living, of the living, judging on that day on which they were going to come to their end; so the cases were tried badly. So Pluto and the caretakers from the Islands of the Blessed came and said to Zeus that human c
beings were coming to them, in both directions, unworthy. Zeus, then, said: "Well, I," he said, "will stop this happening. For now the cases are judged badly. For those on trial," he said, "are tried clothed; for they are tried alive. Many, then," he said, "who have base souls are dressed in beautiful bodies and lineages and wealth, and, when the trial comes, many witnesses come with them, to bear witness that they have lived justly;

1. *Tale* and *account*: *mythos* and *logos*. "As they say" seems to mark "Listen, then" as the set opening of a story (interpretation); Critias opens the tale of Atlantis with the same words (*Timaeus* 20d).

2. *Iliad* 15.187–193, where Poseidon tells how the three sons of Cronus divided the world by lot: the sea to him, the misty dark to Hades, whom Plato calls Pluto, and the sky to Zeus.

κασιν· οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπό τε τούτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ d
ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δικάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς
αὑτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὦτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλυμ-
μένοι. ταῦτα δὴ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰ
αὑτῶν ἀμφιέσματα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων. πρῶτον μὲν 5
οὖν,'' ἔφη, ''παυστέον ἐστὶν προειδότας αὐτοὺς τὸν θάνατον·
νῦν γὰρ προΐσασι. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προ-
μηθεῖ ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα γυμνοὺς κριτέον e
ἁπάντων τούτων· τεθνεῶτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι. καὶ τὸν
κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν
ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἑκάστου, ἔρημον
πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα 5
ἐκεῖνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ᾖ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν
ταῦτα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς ἐποιησάμην δικαστὰς ὑεῖς
ἐμαυτοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, Μίνω τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν,
ἕνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης, Αἰακόν· οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευ- 524
τήσωσι, δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἧς
φέρετον τὼ ὁδώ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς Τάρ-
ταρον. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Ῥαδάμανθυς κρινεῖ, τοὺς
δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Αἰακός· Μίνῳ δὲ πρεσβεῖα δώσω ἐπιδια- 5
κρίνειν, ἐὰν ἀπορῇτόν τι τὼ ἑτέρω, ἵνα ὡς δικαιοτάτη ἡ κρίσις
ᾖ περὶ τῆς πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.''

Ταῦτ' ἔστιν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὼς πιστεύω
ἀληθῆ εἶναι· καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε τι λογίζομαι b

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d 3 *τὸ* B T P f: om. F **d** 4 *δὴ* B T P F Plutarchus: δὲ Stobaeus *ἐπίπροσθεν* B T P F: *ἔμπροσθεν* Stobaeus: *ἐπιπρόσθησις* Plutarchus **d** 7 *γὰρ* B T P F Stobaeus: *μὲν γὰρ* f Plutarchus *μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ* B T P F Plutarchus: *μὲν δὴ καὶ* Stobaeus **e** 1 *αὐτῶν* B T F Stobaeus: *αὐτόν* P: *αὐτό* Plutarchus **e** 5 *καὶ* om. F *τῆς γῆς* B T P F Stobaeus Plutarchus: *γῆς* Eusebius Theodoretus **e** 6 *δικαία ἡ κρίσις* B T P F Stobaeus: *ἡ κρίσις δικαία* Plutarchus *μὲν οὖν ταῦτα* B T P F: *μὲν οὖν* Stobaeus: *οὖν ταῦτ'* Plutarchus **e** 7 *πρότερος* B T P F Stobaeus: *πρότερον* Plutarchus **a** 2 *τῇ* B T P F Plutarchus: om. Stobaeus **a** 6 *ἀπορῇτόν τι τὼ ἑτέρω* Findeisen e codice Meermanniano: *ἀπόρρητόν τι τὼ ἑτέρω* B P: *ἀπόρρητον τι τῶ ἑτέρω* T F: *ἀπόρρητόν τι ᾖ τῷ ἑτέρῳ* Stobaeus Plutarchus *ἡ κρίσις ᾖ* B T P F: *ᾖ κρίσις* Stobaeus: *κρίσις ᾖ* Plutarchus

so the judges are struck with amazement by these, and at the same time they themselves too judge clothed, with eyes and ears and the whole body put as a veil before their own soul. All these things, indeed, stand in their way, both their own dress and that of those on trial. First, then," he said, "they must be stopped from knowing their death beforehand; for now they know it beforehand. This, then, has indeed already been said to Prometheus, that he is to stop it in them.[1] Next, they must be tried naked of all these things; for they must be tried dead. And the one who tries them must be naked, dead, contemplating with his very soul the very soul of each, the moment each has died, bereft of all his kindred and having left behind on the earth all that adornment, so that the trial may be just. I, then, having come to know these things before you, have made my own sons judges, two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthys, and one from Europe, Aeacus.[2] These, then, when they have come to their end, will judge in the meadow, at the place where three roads meet, from which the two roads lead, the one to the Islands of the Blessed, the other to Tartarus. And those from Asia Rhadamanthys will try, and those from Europe Aeacus; and to Minos I will give the elder's privilege of giving a further decision, if the other two are at a loss over anything, so that the trial about the journey may be as just as possible for human beings."[3]

These are the things, Callicles, which I have heard and am convinced are true; and from these accounts I reckon that something like this

1. Aeschylus' Prometheus says, "Mortals, at any rate, I stopped from seeing their doom beforehand" (*Prometheus Bound* 248).

2. Minos and Rhadamanthys are Zeus' sons by the daughter of Phoenix (*Iliad* 14.321–322), Europa in later writers, a woman of Asia who came from Phoenicia to Crete (Herodotus 4.45); hence, perhaps, "from Asia" (interpretation). Aeacus is his son by Aegina (527a). In the *Apology* (41a) Socrates names Minos, Rhadamanthys, Aeacus and Triptolemus as the true judges in Hades.

3. *At a loss*: *aporēton*, "the two are at a loss", the reading Findeisen found in the Meerman manuscript; B, T, P and F, and Stobaeus and Plutarch, have *aporrhēton*, "if anything is secret".

συμβαίνειν. ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὤν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν
ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτοιν διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ
σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλοιν· ἐπειδὰν δὲ διαλυθῆτον ἄρα ἀπ'
ἀλλήλοιν, οὐ πολὺ ἧττον ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τὴν ἕξιν τὴν 5
αὑτοῦ ἥνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἔζη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τό τε σῶμα τὴν φύσιν
τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ τὰ θεραπεύματα καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἔνδηλα
πάντα. οἷον εἴ τινος μέγα ἦν τὸ σῶμα φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ c
ἀμφότερα ζῶντος, τούτου καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ νεκρὸς
μέγας, καὶ εἰ παχύς, παχὺς καὶ ἀποθανόντος, καὶ τἆλλα
οὕτως· καὶ εἰ αὖ ἐπετήδευε κομᾶν, κομήτης τούτου καὶ ὁ
νεκρός. μαστιγίας αὖ εἴ τις ἦν καὶ ἴχνη εἶχε τῶν πληγῶν 5
οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἢ ἄλλων τραυμάτων
ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεῶτος τὸ σῶμα ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον· ἢ
κατεαγότα εἴ του ἦν μέλη ἢ διεστραμμένα ζῶντος, καὶ
τεθνεῶτος ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔνδηλα. ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, οἷος εἶναι d
παρεσκεύαστο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, ἔνδηλα ταῦτα καὶ τελευτήσαντος
ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπί τινα χρόνον. ταὐτὸν δή μοι δοκεῖ
τοῦτ' ἄρα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἔνδηλα
πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὰν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τά 5
τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν
ἑκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ἐπειδὰν
οὖν ἀφίκωνται παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας
παρὰ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν, ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας e
θεᾶται ἑκάστου τὴν ψυχήν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ
πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου
ὁτουοῦν βασιλέως ἢ δυνάστου κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὂν τῆς
ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ 5
ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας, ἃ ἑκάστη ἡ πρᾶξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο 525
εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλα-

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b 7 *τὴν* om. P **c** 3 *παχύς*, *παχὺς*] *παχύ*, *παχὺς* Hirschig **c** 6 *οὐλὰς* secl. Heindorf **c** 7 *ἢ κατεαγότα* Eusebius: *κατεαγότα* B T P F: *κατεαγότα τε* Par. 2110: *καὶ κατεαγότα* Schanz: *κατεαγότ' αὖ* Forman **d** 1 *ταυτὰ ταῦτα* F: *ταῦτα* B T P **d** 3 *ἢ πάντα* Findeisen: *ἦν πάντα* B T P F **d** 5 *πάντα* B T P: *ταῦτα πάντα* F

results. Death is in fact, I think, nothing other than the separation of two things, the soul and the body, from each other; and when the two have been separated from each other, then, each of them has, not much less, its own condition, the very one it had also when the person was alive: the body its own nature and its tendings and sufferings, all plain to see. For instance, if someone's body c
was large by nature or by nurture or both while he was alive, his corpse too is large when he has died; and if fat, fat also when he has died; and the rest thus; and again, if he made it his pursuit to wear his hair long, his corpse too is long-haired. Again, if anyone was one fit for the whip and had traces of his blows, scars, on his body while alive, either from whips or from other wounds, one can see his body, when he is dead too, having these; or if anyone's limbs were broken or twisted while he was alive, when he is dead d
too these same things are plain to see. In a word, whatever sort he had prepared his body to be while alive, these things are plain to see when he has come to his end too, either all or most of them, for some time. This same thing, then, I think, holds of the soul too, Callicles: all things are plain to see in the soul when it has been stripped naked of the body, both those of its nature and the sufferings which the person has come to have in his soul because of his pursuit of each matter. So when they arrive before the judge, those from Asia before Rhadamanthys, Rhadamanthys halts them e
and beholds the soul of each, not knowing whose it is; but often, having laid hold of the Great King or of any other king or potentate whatever, he has caught sight of nothing healthy in the soul, but has caught sight of it whipped all over and full of scars from perjuries and injustice, which each action of his had stamped upon 525
his soul, and all crooked from falsehood and imposture

ζονείας καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι· καὶ
ὑπὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ὕβρεως καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν
πράξεων ἀσυμμετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχρότητος γέμουσαν τὴν 5
ψυχὴν εἶδεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς
φρουρᾶς, οἶ μέλλει ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατλῆναι τὰ προσήκοντα πάθη.
προσήκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπ' ἄλλου ὀρθῶς b
τιμωρουμένῳ, ἢ βελτίονι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὀνίνασθαι ἢ παρα-
δείγματι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα ἄλλοι ὁρῶντες πάσχοντα
ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ φοβούμενοι βελτίους γίγνωνται. εἰσὶν δὲ οἱ
μὲν ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ 5
ἀνθρώπων οὗτοι οἳ ἂν ἰάσιμα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμάρτωσιν· ὅμως
δὲ δι' ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὠφελία καὶ
ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλ-
λάττεσθαι. οἳ δ' ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τὰ c
τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παρα-
δείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται
οὐδέν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται οἱ τούτους
ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ 5
φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παρα-
δείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Ἅιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ,
τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα.
ὧν ἐγώ φημι ἕνα καὶ Ἀρχέλαον ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει d
Πῶλος, καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις ἂν τοιοῦτος τύραννος ᾖ· οἶμαι δὲ
καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς εἶναι τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐκ
τυράννων καὶ βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων
πραξάντων γεγονότας· οὗτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ 5
ἀνοσιώτατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνουσι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις

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a 3 *τεθράφθαι* B P: *τετράφθαι* T F **a** 4 *ἀκρατίας* B W F t: *ἀκρασίας* T: *ἀκρατείας* Eusebius **a** 6 *εἶδεν* T P F: *ἴδεν* B **b** 2 *παραδείγματι* scr. recc.: *παράδειγμά τι* B T P: *παραδείγματα* F: *παράδειγμα* Eusebius Theodoretus **b** 3 *τοῖς* B T P: om. F Gellius Theodoretus Suidas **b** 4 *ἃ πάσχει* F **c** 1 posterius *τὰ* F Eusebius Theodoretus Suidas: om. B T P **c** 7 *ἐν ᾅδου* B T P: *ἐδίδου* pr. F **d** 3 *τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων* F Eusebius: *τοὺς τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων* B: *τοὺς τῶν παραδειγμάτων* T W: *τούτων* ci. Heindorf

and nothing straight, because of its having been reared without truth; and he has seen the soul laden with disproportion and shamefulness from licence and luxury and insolence and incontinence in its actions; and having seen it, he has sent it away in dishonour straight to the ward, where it is to go and endure the sufferings that are fitting. And it is fitting for everyone who is b
under retribution, who suffers retribution rightly at another's hands, either to become better and be availed, or to become an example to the others, so that others, seeing him suffer what he suffers, may be afraid and become better. Those who are benefited and pay the penalty at the hands of gods and human beings are those who have erred curable errors; but nevertheless the benefit comes to them through pains and agonies, both here and in Hades; for it is not possible to be rid of injustice otherwise. But those who c
have done the last injustices and because of such acts of injustice have become incurable, from these the examples come, and these themselves are no longer availed in anything, inasmuch as they are incurable, but others are availed, who see them suffering, because of their erring, the greatest and most agonizing and most fearful sufferings for all time, simply hung up there in Hades in the prison as examples, spectacles and admonitions for those of the unjust who arrive at any time. Of these I claim Archelaus too d
will be one, if Polus speaks the truth, and any other who is such a tyrant.[1] And most of these examples too, I think, have come from tyrants and kings and potentates and those who have done the affairs of cities; for these, because of their licence, err the greatest and most unholy errors. And to these things

1. Archelaus, king of Macedon, whom Polus held up as happy in his crimes (470d–471d).

καὶ Ὅμηρος· βασιλέας γὰρ καὶ δυνάστας ἐκεῖνος πεποίηκεν
τοὺς ἐν Ἅιδου τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον τιμωρουμένους, Τάνταλον καὶ e
Σίσυφον καὶ Τιτυόν· Θερσίτην δέ, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος πονηρὸς
ἦν ἰδιώτης, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκεν μεγάλαις τιμωρίαις συνεχό-
μενον ὡς ἀνίατον—οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι ἐξῆν αὐτῷ· διὸ καὶ εὐδαιμο-
νέστερος ἦν ἢ οἷς ἐξῆν—ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐκ τῶν 5
δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ γιγνόμενοι ἄνθρωποι· 526
οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγγίγνεσθαι,
καὶ σφόδρα γε ἄξιον ἄγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπὸν γάρ,
ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ πολλοῦ ἐπαίνου ἄξιον ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ
τοῦ ἀδικεῖν γενόμενον δικαίως διαβιῶναι. ὀλίγοι δὲ γίγνονται 5
οἱ τοιοῦτοι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοθι γεγόνασιν, οἶμαι δὲ
καὶ ἔσονται καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως
διαχειρίζειν ἃ ἄν τις ἐπιτρέπῃ· εἷς δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλλόγιμος b
γέγονεν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσι-
μάχου· οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ὦ ἄριστε, κακοὶ γίγνονται τῶν δυνα-
στῶν. ὅπερ οὖν ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὰν ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς ἐκεῖνος
τοιοῦτόν τινα λάβῃ, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδέν, 5
οὔθ' ὅστις οὔθ' ὧντινων, ὅτι δὲ πονηρός τις· καὶ τοῦτο
κατιδὼν ἀπέπεμψεν εἰς Τάρταρον, ἐπισημηνάμενος, ἐάντε
ἰάσιμος ἐάντε ἀνίατος δοκῇ εἶναι· ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος
τὰ προσήκοντα πάσχει. ἐνίοτε δ' ἄλλην εἰσιδὼν ὁσίως c
βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας, ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἢ ἄλλου τινός,
μάλιστα μέν, ἔγωγέ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, φιλοσόφου τὰ
αὑτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ,
ἠγάσθη τε καὶ ἐς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψε. ταὐτὰ δὲ 5
ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Αἰακός—ἑκάτερος τούτων ῥάβδον ἔχων δι-
κάζει—ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν κάθηται, μόνος ἔχων χρυσοῦν
σκῆπτρον, ὥς φησιν Ὀδυσσεὺς ὁ Ὁμήρου ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν— d

χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσιν.

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e 4 *οὐ γὰρ . . .* **e** 5 *ἐξῆν* secl. Morstadt **a** 1 *δυναμένων* B T P F: *αὐτῶν* Aristides **a** 7 posterius *τὴν* F: om. B T W Aristides **b** 1 *ἃ ἄν* B T P F: *ἄν* (i. e. *ἄν*) Aristides **b** 2 *ἀριστείδης* T P F: *ἀριστίδης* B **c** 5 *ἐς* re vera B T P F

Homer too bears witness; for he has made kings and potentates
the ones in Hades suffering retribution for all time, Tantalus and e
Sisyphus and Tityus; but Thersites, and any other private person
who was base, no one has made held fast in great retributions as
incurable—for, I think, he was not allowed to; because of which
he was also happier than those who were allowed—but, Callicles,
from among those who have power are also the human beings who 526
become exceedingly base.[1] Nothing, indeed, prevents good men
from coming to be among these too, and it is exceedingly worth
while, at any rate, to admire those who do. For it is difficult, Calli-
cles, and worth much praise, to live one's life through justly when
one has come into great licence to do injustice. But such men be-
come few; for both here and elsewhere there have been, and I think
there will also be, men beautiful and good in this virtue of adminis- b
tering justly whatever anyone leaves to them; and one has become
very much of note even among the other Greeks, Aristides son of
Lysimachus;[2] but most of the potentates, best of men, become bad.
As I was saying, then, when that Rhadamanthys takes someone
such, he knows nothing else about him, neither who he is nor of
whom, but that he is someone base; and having caught sight of this
he has sent him away to Tartarus, putting a mark on him according
as he seems curable or incurable; and he, having arrived there, suf- c
fers what is fitting. And sometimes, having looked upon another
soul that has lived holily and with truth, a private man's or some-
one else's, most of all, I for my part claim, Callicles, a philosopher's
who has done his own and has not been a busybody in his life, he
has admired it and sent it away to the Islands of the Blessed. And
Aeacus too does these same things—each of these two, holding a
staff, judges—but Minos sits overseeing, alone holding a golden
sceptre, as Homer's Odysseus says he saw him— d

holding a golden sceptre, dealing right to the dead.[3]

1. Tityus, Tantalus and Sisyphus suffer in Odysseus' sight in the underworld (*Odyssey* 11.576–600); Thersites, who reviles the kings, is beaten by Odysseus in *Iliad* 2.211–277.

2. Aristides, called the Just (Plutarch, *Aristides* 6.1); Herodotus (8.79) judges him "the best man in Athens and the most just".

3. *Odyssey* 11.569.

ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπό τε τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχήν· χαίρειν οὖν ἐάσας τὰς τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀσκῶν πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὢν καὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνῄσκω ἀποθνῄσκειν. παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, ὃν ἐγώ φημι ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀγώνων εἶναι, καὶ ὀνειδίζω σοι ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσῃ σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ᾖ καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἣν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἐλθὼν παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν, τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης υἱόν, ἐπειδάν σου ἐπιλαβόμενος ἄγῃ, χασμήσῃ καὶ ἰλιγγιάσεις οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε σὺ ἐκεῖ, καί σε ἴσως τυπτήσει τις καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀτίμως καὶ πάντως προπηλακιεῖ.

Τάχα δ' οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὥσπερ γραὸς καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἂν ἦν θαυμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν τούτων, εἴ πῃ ζητοῦντες εἴχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα εὑρεῖν· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οἵπερ σοφώτατοί ἐστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλήνων, σύ τε καὶ Πῶλος καὶ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς δεῖ ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν ἢ τοῦτον, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖσε φαίνεται συμφέρων. ἀλλ' ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων ἐλεγχομένων μόνος οὗτος ἠρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἐστὶν τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ· ἐὰν δέ τις κατά τι κακὸς γίγνηται, κολαστέος ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν μετὰ τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον διδόναι δίκην· καὶ πᾶσαν κολακείαν καὶ τὴν

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d 3 *τε* F: om. B T P **d** 4 *σκοπῶ* B T P F: *γρ. ἀσκῶ* T **d** 5 *τὴν* T W F Eusebius: om. B P **d** 6 *ἀσκῶν* F Eusebius: *σκοπῶν* B T P **a** 1 *τὸν* B T P: *ἐκεῖνον τὸν* F *ἄγῃ* B T P: *ἐκεῖνος ἄγῃ* F **a** 2 *ἰλιγγιάσεις* T P: *εἰλιγγιάσεις* B F **a** 3 *καὶ* ante *ἐπὶ* et *ἀτίμως* secl. Cobet: *ἐπὶ κόρρης* secl. Heindorf **a** 5 *γραὸς* B T P: *ὑπὸ γραὸς* F Eusebius Theodoretus **a** 9 *νῦν* om. P

I, then, Callicles, have been persuaded by these accounts, and I look into how I shall set forth my soul to the one who tries me as healthy as possible. So, letting pass the honours of the many human beings, bidding them farewell, I shall try, exercising myself in the truth, in reality, being as good as I have power to be, both to live and, when I die, to die. And I summon all other human e
beings too, as far as I have power, and in particular I summon you in return to this life and this contest, which I claim is worth all the contests here; and I reproach you that you will not be able to help yourself when your case comes and the trial I was speaking of just now, but, when you have come before the judge, the son of Aegina, 527
and he lays hold of you and leads you off, you will gape and be dizzy there no less than I here, and perhaps someone will strike you, even on the jaw, in dishonour, and drag you in the mud in every way.[1]

Maybe, though, you think these things are said as a tale, like an old woman's, and you despise them; and it would be nothing marvellous, at any rate, to despise them, if in any way, by searching, we had the means to find better and truer things than these; but as it is, you see that the three of you, who are the wisest of the Greeks now, you and Polus and Gorgias, do not have the means to demon- b
strate that one must live any other life than this one, which appears to be to one's advantage there too. But among so many arguments, while the others are refuted, this argument alone stands unmoved: that one must beware of doing injustice more than of suffering injustice, and that a man must most certainly practise not seeming to be good but being so, both privately and publicly; and if anyone becomes bad in any respect, he must be punished, and this is the second good after being just: becoming so, and being punished, c
paying the penalty; and every flattery, both that

1. Socrates gives back Callicles' own words at 486a–c: led off by someone who had taken hold of him, Socrates "would be dizzy and gape", unable "to help himself", "dishonoured", one whom it is allowed "to strike on the jaw and not pay the penalty".

περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ ὀλίγους καὶ περὶ πολλούς, φευκτέον· καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει. ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἳ ἀφικόμενος εὐδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. καὶ ἔασόν τινά σου καταφρονῆσαι ὡς ἀνοήτου καὶ προπηλακίσαι, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία σύ γε θαρρῶν πατάξαι τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην πληγήν· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσῃ, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι d ᾖς καλὸς κἀγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρετήν. κἄπειτα οὕτω κοινῇ ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἤδη, ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι, ἐπιθησόμεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἢ ὁποῖον ἄν τι ἡμῖν δοκῇ, τότε βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίους ὄντες βουλεύεσθαι ἢ νῦν. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἔχοντάς 5 γε ὡς νῦν φαινόμεθα ἔχειν, ἔπειτα νεανιεύεσθαι ὡς τὶ ὄντας, οἷς οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ δοκεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων—εἰς τοσοῦτον ἥκομεν ἀπαιδευσίας—ὥσπερ e οὖν ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ χρησώμεθα τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὃς ἡμῖν σημαίνει ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἄριστος τοῦ βίου, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντας καὶ ζῆν καὶ τεθνάναι. τούτῳ οὖν ἑπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακα- 5 λῶμεν, μὴ ἐκείνῳ, ᾧ σὺ πιστεύων ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς· ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ὦ Καλλίκλεις.

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c 4 *πάσῃ πράξει* B T P: *πράξει πάσῃ* F **c** 6 *ὁ λόγος* F: *ὁ σὸς λόγος* B T P **c** 8 *τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην* B T P: *ταύτην τὴν ἄτιμον* F **d** 7 *ταὐτὰ* δοκεῖ B T P: δοκεῖ *ταυτὰ* F **e** 2 *χρησώμεθα* B T: *χρησόμεθα* P F **e** 5 *ἑπόμεθα* P *παρακαλοῦμεν* P

about oneself and that about others, both about few and about many, must be fled; and one must make use of rhetoric thus, always for what is just, and of every other action. So be persuaded by me and attend me thither, where, having arrived, you will be happy both living and when you have come to your end, as the argument signifies.[1] And let anyone despise you as senseless and drag you in the mud, if he wants, and yes, by Zeus, you, at any rate, with good courage let him strike you that dishonouring blow; d
for you will suffer nothing dreadful, if in reality you are beautiful and good, exercising yourself in virtue. And then, having exercised ourselves thus in common, then at last, if we decide we ought, we will set our hand to political affairs, or whatever we decide, then we will deliberate, being better at deliberating than now. For it is shameful, being in the state we now appear to be in, at any rate, then to swagger like young men as though we were something, when we never think the same things about the same matters, and
that about the greatest—to such a pitch of lack of education have e
we come—let us, then, use as a leader the argument that has now shown itself, which signifies to us that this way of life is best: to live and to be dead exercising ourselves in justice and the rest of virtue. Let us follow this one, then, and summon the others to it, not that one, trusting which you summon me; for it is worth nothing, Callicles.

1. *The argument*: F's reading; B, T and P have "your argument".

OUTLINE

The divisions follow the dialogue's own joints: the three conversations, with Gorgias, Polus and Callicles, and the stages of the argument within each. References are to Stephanus pages and sections, which stand in the margins of both pages of the text.

I. The arrival, and Gorgias names his craft (447a–449c)

447a–c Callicles: "Of war and battle, Socrates, this is how they say one should take one's share." Socrates and Chaerephon have come "after the feast"; Gorgias' display is over. Socrates wants to learn "what the power of the man's craft is, and what it is that he professes and teaches".

447c–448c Chaerephon is to ask Gorgias "Who he is", as one would ask a shoemaker. Gorgias: "no one has asked me anything new for many years." Polus answers for him, in a jingle: "routine makes our life journey by craft, and lack of routine by chance"; Gorgias' craft is "the most beautiful of the crafts".

448d–449c Socrates: Polus "has practised what is called rhetoric more than conversing". Gorgias: his craft is rhetoric, and he is an orator, "And a good one". He agrees to answer briefly: "no one could say the same things more briefly than I."

II. What rhetoric is about (449c–453a)

449c–450c Rhetoric is about speeches; but so are medicine and gymnastics. Gorgias: the other crafts are "about handiwork", while all the action of rhetoric "is through speeches".

450c–451d Arithmetic, calculation and astronomy also accomplish everything by speech; "of those about what?"

451d–452e "The greatest of human affairs, Socrates, and the best." The drinking-song: health, beauty, wealth; the doctor, the trainer and the money-maker each claim the greatest good. Gorgias: "To be able, I say, to persuade by speeches judges in a law court, and councillors in a council-chamber, and assemblymen in an assembly"; "you will have the doctor as your slave, and the trainer as your slave".

III. What persuasion, and about what (453a–455d)

453a–454b "rhetoric is a craftsman of persuasion"; but arithmetic persuades too. Of what persuasion? "the one in the law courts and in the other crowds, ... and about those things that are just and unjust."

454b–455a "having learned" and "having been convinced": there is a false conviction, but no false knowledge. "two forms of persuasion, the one providing conviction without knowing, the other knowledge"; rhetoric "is a craftsman of persuasion that convinces, not of persuasion that teaches, about the just and the unjust".

455a–d Then the orator does not advise about doctors, ships, walls or generals. "What will we get, Gorgias, if we are with you?"

IV. The power of rhetoric (455d–457c)

455d–456a Gorgias: the dockyards and walls of the Athenians came from the advice of Themistocles and Pericles, "not from the craftsmen".

456a–c "it gathers together, so to speak, all the powers and holds them under itself": Gorgias has persuaded his brother's patients where the doctor could not; before the assembly "the doctor would appear nowhere".

456c–457c Rhetoric must be used justly, as boxing must; if a pupil misuses it, "it is not the one who taught him that one must hate and throw out of the cities".

V. On refutation (457c–458e)

457c–458b Arguments end in quarrels. Socrates is one of those "who would gladly be refuted if I say anything not true, and would gladly refute if anyone says anything not true"; "nothing is so great a bad thing for a person as false opinion about the things our argument is in fact about now."

458b–e Gorgias fears for the company; Chaerephon and Callicles want the talk to go on: "even if you are willing to converse the whole day, you will gratify me, at any rate."

VI. Gorgias refuted (458e–461b)

458e–459c The orator is "more persuasive than the doctor" in a crowd, that is, "among those who do not know"; "the one

who does not know will be more persuasive than the one who knows, among those who do not know".

459c–460a Must the pupil know the just and the unjust beforehand? Gorgias: "if he in fact does not know, he will learn these things too from me."

460a–c "the one who has learned the just things is just too"; so "the rhetorician will never want to do injustice."

460d–461b But Gorgias said that a pupil might use rhetoric unjustly. The things said "did not sing together".

VII. Polus: rhetoric a routine, a part of flattery (461b–466a)

461b–462b Polus: Gorgias was ashamed; "to lead the arguments to such things is great boorishness." Socrates asks him to keep "The long-speech" shut in, and to ask or answer.

462b–463a What craft is rhetoric? "None, I think, Polus"; "A certain routine", "Of the production of a certain gratification and pleasure"; "a part of the same pursuit" as cookery.

463a–e The pursuit is "not masterly, but of a soul good at aiming, and courageous, and formidable by nature at consorting with human beings"; its sum is "flattery", with four parts: cookery, rhetoric, cosmetics, sophistry. Rhetoric is "an image of a part of politics". Polus "is young and keen".

464a–465e Two crafts tend the body, gymnastics and medicine, and two the soul, legislation and justice; flattery "having divided itself into four" slips in under each. "what cosmetics is to gymnastics, sophistry is to legislation, and that what cookery is to medicine, rhetoric is to justice"; rhetoric is "the counterpart of cookery in the soul".

VIII. Polus: the power of orators and tyrants (466a–468e)

466a–c Polus: do not orators, like tyrants, "put to death whomever they want, and take away money and throw out of the cities whomever they think fit?" Socrates: "I think the orators have the least power of those in the city."

466c–467c "they do nothing of what they want, so to speak; they do, however, whatever they think best." Polus: "Shocking things you do say, and prodigious, Socrates."

467c–468e We want not what we do but "that for the sake of which" we do it, the good; one who kills or banishes "thinking it better for himself, while it is in fact worse" does what he thinks fit, not what he wants, and has not great power.

IX. Polus: whom to envy (468e–471d)

468e–469c "As if you, Socrates, would not accept being allowed to do what you think fit in the city". "Speak words of good omen, Polus." "doing injustice is in fact the greatest of bad things"; "I would choose to suffer injustice rather than do injustice."

469c–470c The dagger in the crowded market-place; such power is good only if it is used beneficially, that is, justly.

470c–471d Polus: "even a child" could refute him; Archelaus of Macedonia, who murdered his way to the throne, is happy. Socrates does not know whether even the Great King is happy, "for I do not know how he stands in education and justice."

X. Two kinds of refutation (471d–474b)

471d–472d Socrates: "you are attempting to refute me rhetorically, like those in the law courts"; witnesses can be had for anything, Nicias and his brothers, Aristocrates, the house of Pericles; Socrates wants one witness, "you yourself, being one".

472d–473e The two theses: the one who does injustice is wretched, and "more wretched, however, if he does not pay the penalty". Polus: "Outlandish things indeed, Socrates, you attempt to say." The racked and impaled tyrant: "Again you are frightening me with bogeys, noble Polus".

473e–474b Polus laughs; Socrates on the Council "provided a laugh and did not know how to put it to the vote"; "I know how to put the question to the vote of one".

XI. Doing injustice is worse than suffering it (474b–476a)

474b–d Polus: suffering injustice is worse; asked which is "more shameful", he answers "Doing injustice".

474d–475b The beautiful in bodies, colours, shapes, voices, laws, pursuits and studies is beautiful by pleasure or benefit or both; the shameful "by pain and bad".

475b–e Doing injustice does not exceed in pain, so it exceeds in bad, and is worse. "neither I nor you nor anyone else among human beings would accept doing injustice rather than suffering injustice; for it is in fact worse."

475e–476a "for me you are enough, being one, alone, both agreeing and bearing witness".

XII. Paying the penalty (476a–479e)

476a–d "such as the doer does, such is what the sufferer suffers."
476d–477a The one punished justly suffers just things, beautiful things, good things; he is "benefited".
477a–478b Of money, body and soul, the three basenesses are poverty, disease and injustice; injustice is the most shameful and the worst; money-making rids of poverty, medicine of disease, "and penalty of licentiousness and injustice".
478b–479c Happiest is the one who has no vice in his soul; second, the one rid of it; "Worst, then, lives the one who has it and is not rid of it". Archelaus is like a sick man afraid "of being burned and being cut".
479c–e "not paying the penalty when doing injustice is naturally the greatest and first of all bad things."

XIII. The use of rhetoric (480a–481b)

480a–d One must go willingly to the judge "as to the doctor", and use rhetoric to accuse oneself and one's own, "so that, as the acts of injustice become plain, they may be rid of the greatest bad thing, injustice."
480e–481b Against an enemy, one must contrive "that he not die, most of all never, but be immortal, being base".

XIV. Callicles enters (481b–482c)

481b–c Callicles: "is Socrates in earnest in this, or is he playing?" If he is in earnest, "our life, the life of human beings, would be overturned".
481c–482c Two lovers in love with two: Socrates with Alcibiades and philosophy, Callicles with "the people of the Athenians and the son of Pyrilampes". "stop philosophy, my darling, from saying them"; Socrates would rather be out of tune with the many than "with myself".

XV. Callicles: nature and law (482c–484c)

482c–483a Polus "was muzzled, being ashamed to say what he had in mind"; "for the most part these are contrary to each other, nature and law".
483a–d The laws are laid down by "the feeble human beings and the many"; "nature itself ... sets it forth, that it is just for the superior to have more than the inferior".

483d–484c Xerxes and Darius acted "according to law, at any rate, the law of nature". The lion-cubs charmed with talk of equal shares; "the slave has come to light as our master". Pindar's "Law, the king of all", and Heracles with the cattle of Geryon.

XVI. Callicles: philosophy for lads (484c–486d)

484c–485a Philosophy is "a charming thing ... if one touches it moderately at the right time of life"; too much of it makes a man "unversed" in laws, contracts, pleasures and characters. Euripides: "where he is in fact himself at his own best".

485a–e Lisping and playing become a child; philosophizing a lad; an older man still at it "needs blows".

485e–486d Callicles speaks to Socrates as Zethus to Amphion; led off to prison, "you would be dizzy and gape, not having anything to say"; such a man "one is allowed to strike on the jaw and not pay the penalty". "cease refuting".

XVII. The touchstone (486d–488b)

486d–487b Socrates has found "a godsend": Callicles has "knowledge and goodwill and frankness".

487b–488b Callicles' partners in wisdom; "what sort the man must be, and what he must make his pursuit". "Take it up again for me from the beginning".

XVIII. Who are the stronger? (488b–491d)

488b–489b "is the stronger and the better and the mightier the same or different?" The many are stronger than the one; so their law, equal shares, is just "by nature too".

489b–490a Callicles: "This man here will not stop talking nonsense"; not "a rabble of slaves". Then "the more intelligent".

490a–491a Should the doctor have most food, the weaver the biggest cloak, the shoemaker the most shoes, the farmer the most seed? "How you always say the same things, Socrates!" "Not only so, at any rate, Callicles, but also about the same things."

491a–d "those who are intelligent in the affairs of the city ... and courageous"; "this is the just: that these have more than the others, the rulers than the ruled."

XIX. Ruler of oneself, and the desires (491d–492e)

491d–e "each one himself ruler of himself"? Callicles: "By the temperate you mean the simpletons."

491e–492c "the one who is going to live rightly must let his own desires be as great as possible and not punish them"; "luxury and licentiousness and freedom, if it has aid, this is virtue and happiness".

492d–e "Then those who need nothing are not rightly said to be happy." "For thus, at any rate, the stones and the corpses would be most happy."

XX. The jars and the sieve (492e–494a)

492e–493c Euripides: "who knows if to live is to die". The body a grave; the jar of the desires, perforated; the sieve of the soul of the senseless.

493d–494a The two men with many jars, one whose jars are sound and full, the other whose vessels are "perforated and unsound". Callicles: the one who has filled them lives "like a stone".

XXI. The stone-curlew and the itch (494a–495c)

494a–b "living pleasantly lies in this: in as much as possible flowing in"; "some stone-curlew's life".

494c–e The itch: "one who has the itch and has an urge to scratch"; "the life of catamites".

494e–495c Callicles: "I claim they are the same." Socrates: "observe whether it may be that the good is not this, rejoicing in every way".

XXII. The pleasant is not the good (495c–499b)

495c–497a Knowledge, courage and pleasure are other than each other. One cannot fare well and badly at once, but one in pain can rejoice: "the pleasant comes to be other than the good".

497a–d Callicles balks: "he questions and refutes things small and worth little." Gorgias: "submit to Socrates' refuting you". "you have been initiated into the great before the small".

497d–499b The good are good "by the presence of good things"; the foolish and cowardly rejoice and are in pain as much as the intelligent and courageous; so the bad would be as good as the good, "or even more good".

XXIII. Good and bad pleasures; flattery reviewed (499b–503d)

499b–500a Callicles: "some pleasures are better and others inferior." "you use me like a child". The good is "the end of all actions"; choosing pleasures needs "a master of the craft".

500a–501c "in what way one ought to live"; cookery a routine, medicine a craft; the flatteries of the soul.

501d–502d Pipe-playing, the lyre, the dithyramb (Cinesias and his father Meles) and tragedy aim at pleasure; poetry is "a kind of addressing the people", "a rhetorical addressing of the people".

502d–503d Do the orators speak "with a view to the best"? Callicles: Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades and Pericles.

XXIV. Order in the soul (503d–505c)

503d–504a The craftsman puts his work into "a certain arrangement" until "the whole is put together, a thing arranged and ordered".

504a–d In the body, health and might; in the soul, "the lawful and law, ... and these are justice and temperance".

504d–505c The good orator will apply his speeches so that "justice may come to be in the souls of his citizens"; to shut a base soul out from its desires is to punish it, and "Being punished, then, is better for the soul than licentiousness".

XXV. Socrates answers himself (505c–507c)

505c–506c Callicles: "ask someone else"; "I gave you these answers for Gorgias' sake." A tale must have a head. Epicharmus: "two men were saying before". Gorgias: "you ought to go through the argument in full".

506c–507c Socrates asks and answers: the pleasant is not the good; virtue comes by "arrangement and rightness and craft"; the orderly soul is temperate, and the temperate soul good; the temperate man is just, holy and courageous, "a perfectly good man".

XXVI. The conclusions (507c–509c)

507c–e "the one who does well is blessed and happy"; one must "flee licentiousness as fast as each of us has feet"; the licentious man can be friend to no one, "living a robber's life".

507e–508c "partnership and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justness hold together heaven and earth"; "geomet-

rical equality has great power"; so Polus and Gorgias granted rightly.

508c–509c Callicles' reproach answered: being struck on the jaw unjustly is not the most shameful thing; doing it is. These things are bound "by arguments of iron and adamant"; "I do not know how these things are".

XXVII. The craft for not suffering injustice (509c–511a)

509c–510a "Power or wanting?"; "no one does injustice wanting to".

510a–d To suffer no injustice one must rule, or be "a companion of the existing regime"; "like to like"; the young man who makes himself like the tyrant.

510d–511a "in this way the preparation will be his for being able to do as much injustice as possible", "the greatest bad thing".

XXVIII. Swimming, piloting, the engine-maker (511a–513c)

511a–c Callicles: the imitator will put to death the one who does not imitate. Socrates: "as a base man putting to death one who is beautiful and good."

511c–512b Swimming and piloting keep safe and do not boast; the pilot "has landed them not at all better than they were when they embarked".

512b–d The engine-maker, whose son Callicles would not let marry his daughter; "see whether the noble and the good are not something other than keeping safe and being kept safe."

512d–513c One "must not love his life"; must one become like the people? "at the cost of what we love most"; "love of the people, Callicles, being in your soul, stands against me".

XXIX. Tending the city (513c–515b)

513c–514a Two preparations, one "with a view to pleasure", the other "with a view to the best"; the second is the way to tend the city.

514a–515b As builders and doctors would be examined before public work; "to learn pottery on the jar". "has Callicles ever made any of the citizens better?"

XXX. The great men of Athens (515b–517a)

515b–e Socrates hears that Pericles made the Athenians "idle and cowardly and talkative and lovers of silver".

515e–516d "A caretaker of asses and horses and oxen" who turns his animals out more savage is bad; "the just, at any rate, are tame".

516d–517a Cimon ostracized, Themistocles exiled, Miltiades voted into the pit; good charioteers do not "fall out". They "used neither the true rhetoric ... nor the flattering one".

XXXI. Serving and tending (517a–519d)

517a–c They were "more serving than those now", but did not redirect the city's desires.

517c–518c The serving crafts and their mistresses, gymnastics and medicine; Thearion the baker, Mithaecus, Sarambus. "Man, you are expert in nothing about gymnastics".

518c–519b The feasters praised, the advisers present blamed; "harbours and dockyards and walls and tributes and such nonsense"; a warning for Callicles and Alcibiades.

519b–d No head of a city perishes unjustly at its hands; the sophists who say their pupils cheat them.

XXXII. Sophist and orator (519d–521a)

519d–520b "In truth you have compelled me to address the people"; "A sophist and an orator are the same thing, you blessed man, or something near and about equal".

520b–521a The benefaction of virtue alone could be given without pay; "it is held shameful to claim one will not advise, unless someone gives him silver."

XXXIII. Which tending? (521a–522e)

521a–c "To which tending of the city, then, are you summoning me?" Callicles: "as one who will act as servant", or "call yourself a Mysian".

521c–522c "I attempt the craft that is in truth political"; "I shall be tried as a doctor would be tried among little children, with a cook accusing him." "Children, this man has worked many bad things on you".

522c–e The one help that counts: "having neither said nor worked anything unjust concerning either human beings or gods"; "to

arrive in Hades with the soul laden with many acts of injustice is the last of all bad things."

XXXIV. The judgment of the dead (522e–524a)

522e–523a "Listen, then, as they say, to a very beautiful account, which you will believe a tale, I think, but I an account".

523a–c The law of Cronus' time; the Islands of the Blessed and Tartarus; the living judged the living, and the cases were tried badly.

523c–524a Zeus: "those on trial ... are tried clothed"; men must not know their death beforehand; they must be tried naked and dead by dead judges, Minos, Rhadamanthys and Aeacus, "in the meadow, at the place where three roads meet".

XXXV. The marks of the soul, and retribution (524a–526d)

524a–d Death "the separation of two things, the soul and the body"; the corpse keeps the marks of the body, and the soul those of its life.

524d–525a Rhadamanthys finds the Great King's soul "whipped all over and full of scars from perjuries and injustice".

525a–d The curable are benefited "through pains and agonies"; the incurable become "examples, spectacles and admonitions"; Archelaus among them.

525d–526d Homer's kings in Hades, and Thersites; "Aristides son of Lysimachus"; the philosopher's soul sent to the Islands of the Blessed; Minos "holding a golden sceptre, dealing right to the dead."

XXXVI. The summons (526d–527e)

526d–527a Socrates will set forth his soul "as healthy as possible", and summons Callicles; "you will gape and be dizzy there no less than I here".

527a–c "said as a tale, like an old woman's"; "this argument alone stands unmoved: that one must beware of doing injustice more than of suffering injustice".

527c–e "let him strike you that dishonouring blow"; "to such a pitch of lack of education have we come"; "for it is worth nothing, Callicles."

LATER READINGS OF CALLICLES

Callicles' speech on nature and law has been cited since Aristotle, and read in modern times as the classic statement of the view that justice is a convention by which the weak restrain the strong, and his name has been joined to those of later writers who held something like it. This essay names some of the parallels and readers, each with the work and place where the reading is found. What is Plato's is stated first, so that the readings can be measured against it.

What the text says

Callicles holds that "for the most part these are contrary to each other, nature and law" (482e); that the laws are laid down by "the feeble human beings and the many" for their own advantage (483b); that by nature "it is just for the superior to have more than the inferior" (483d); and that Xerxes and Darius acted according to "the law of nature" (483e). He does not say that might makes right without qualification: under questioning he grants that "the stronger and the better and the mightier" are the same (488d), refuses to count the many or "a rabble of slaves" among the better (489c), and names as the better "those who are intelligent in the affairs of the city" and "courageous" (491b–c). His second claim, that the good life is the largest desires and their filling, and that "luxury and licentiousness and freedom, if it has aid, this is virtue and happiness" (492c), is distinct from the first, and Socrates spends most of the argument with Callicles on it. Callicles is never brought to agree with the conclusion; he withdraws (505c) and is "not altogether persuaded" (513c). Nothing in the text says who he was or where his view came from. Everything beyond this in what follows is the interpreters'.

His contemporaries

The antithesis of nature (*physis*) and law (*nomos*) was common in the later fifth century, and several texts set out views close to Callicles'. They are parallels, not his sources. The sophist Antiphon, in his *On Truth*, holds that the rules of law are agreed on and those of

nature necessary, and that a man will best serve himself by keeping the laws before witnesses and the rules of nature when he is alone (87 B 44 DK, from an Oxyrhynchus papyrus); the note at 483a cites it. In Thucydides, the Athenian envoys at Sparta say that "it has always been established that the weaker is held down by the more powerful" (1.76.2), and the Athenians at Melos say that both the divine and the human, "by a necessity of nature, rule wherever they have power", adding that they neither laid down this law nor were the first to use it (5.105.2). Herodotus quotes Pindar's "law is king of all" of custom, to show that each people holds its own customs best (3.38); Callicles quotes the same lines for the opposite, and the note at 484c gives the fragment.

Plato's own returns

Plato came back to the view more than once, and each time gave it to someone else. In the first book of the *Republic*, Thrasymachus says that "the just is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger" (338c); in the second, Glaucon restates, as the view of many and not his own, that law is a compact made by those too weak to do injustice with impunity, and that every nature pursues "overreaching" as a good, but is forced by law to honour equality (358e–359c). In the *Laws*, the Athenian lists among the claims to rule that "the stronger rule and the weaker be ruled", which is "according to nature, as the Theban Pindar once said" (690b–c), and returns to Pindar's lines "leading, making just the most violent" (714e–715a). These are Plato's speakers, not readers of the *Gorgias*; that Plato is answering in them the position he gave Callicles is an interpretation.

Aristotle

Aristotle names Callicles once, in the *Sophistical Refutations*, as an example of a trick of argument: leading an opponent into paradox by appealing to nature against law and to law against nature, "as Callicles too is written in the *Gorgias* as saying", since the two are held to be contrary (ch. 12, 173a7–18). He takes Callicles, that is, as a figure in Plato's book, and his point is about method, as Callicles' own charge against Socrates was (482e–483a).

Nietzsche, and the comparison with him

The best-known modern parallel is Friedrich Nietzsche. In *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886) he writes that life itself is essentially appropriation, injury and the overpowering of what is alien and weaker (§259), and he distinguishes a master morality of the strong from a slave morality of the weak (§260); in *On the Genealogy of Morals* (1887) the moral judgments of the weak are compared to the lambs' resentment of the birds of prey (I.13). The comparison was set out at length by E. R. Dodds in his commentary on the *Gorgias* (Oxford, 1959), in an appendix titled "Socrates, Callicles, and Nietzsche", where he noted that Nietzsche does not name Callicles in his published works and argued that some of Nietzsche's doctrines were in some measure inspired by the *Gorgias*; whether the likeness is more than one of doctrine is disputed, and it has been a standard topic since. Dodds also held, in the introduction to the same edition, that Callicles was a real Athenian, which others doubt.

Who Callicles was

No source outside the dialogue mentions him. Those who take him for a historical person point to the details Plato gives, his deme (495d), his friends (487c) and his entry into politics (515a), and to Andron son of Androtion, one of the friends, who appears also in the *Protagoras* (315c); those who take him for a figure of Plato's making point to the absence of any other record. The question is not settled, and the essay takes no side. What the text shows is what Socrates says he valued in him: "knowledge and goodwill and frankness" (487a).

LATER READINGS OF THE JUDGMENT MYTH

The account of the judgment of the dead that ends the *Gorgias* stands beside the myths that end the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, and it has been read, retold and allegorized since antiquity. This essay names some of its antecedents and readers, each with the work and place where the reading is found. What is Plato's is stated first.

What the text says

Socrates calls it an account, though Callicles will take it for a tale (523a). Under Cronus and early in Zeus' reign the living judged the living, clothed; Zeus, warned that the wrong souls were arriving at the Islands of the Blessed and at Tartarus, decreed that men should not know their death beforehand and that they should be judged naked, after death, by his dead sons Minos, Rhadamanthys and Aeacus, at the meeting of the roads in the meadow (523a–524a). The soul, stripped of the body, shows its scars; the curable are made better by pain, "for it is not possible to be rid of injustice otherwise", and the incurable, mostly tyrants and kings, are hung up in Hades as examples (525b–d). The philosopher "who has done his own" goes to the Islands of the Blessed (526c). Socrates says that he has "heard" these things and is "convinced" they are true (524a), and draws from them the conclusions he has drawn already, that doing injustice is the worst thing and paying the penalty a cure. The text does not say where Socrates heard the account, whether the incurable suffer forever in a literal sense, or whether the souls return to life. Everything beyond this is the interpreters'.

What lay before it

The pieces were old. In the *Odyssey* Menelaus is promised the Elysian plain, where fair-haired Rhadamanthys is (4.561–569), and Odysseus sees Minos with his golden sceptre giving judgment to the dead (11.568–571), the line Socrates quotes at 526d; he sees Tityus, Tantalus and Sisyphus suffering (11.576–600). Hesiod puts some of the heroes on the Islands of the Blessed beside Ocean (*Works and Days* 167–173). Pindar, in the second *Olympian*, tells of

one who judges beneath the earth the crimes done in this realm of Zeus (2.57–60), and sends those who, living three times on each side, have kept their souls from all injustice along "the road of Zeus" to the tower of Cronus, where the island of the blessed is, under the counsels of Rhadamanthys (2.68–77). The judgment of the naked soul by dead judges, and the separation of curable from incurable, are not found in these, and are commonly taken as Plato's own (interpretation).

Plato's other myths

In the *Apology* Socrates hopes to meet in Hades "the true judges", Minos, Rhadamanthys, Aeacus and Triptolemus (41a). The myth of the *Phaedo* sends the incurable into Tartarus "whence they never come out", and the curable into Tartarus for a time, until those they wronged forgive them (113d–114b). In the myth of Er that ends the *Republic*, Ardiaeus the tyrant and others like him are seized at the mouth of the underworld and flung into Tartarus as incurable (615c–616a), while the other souls choose new lives. Readers have long compared the three: the *Gorgias* says nothing of rebirth, and some have taken that silence as a sign that it is the earliest of them (interpretation).

Later Greek readers

Plutarch, in *On the Delays of Divine Vengeance*, gives a vision of the afterlife in which the incurable, rejected by Justice, are pursued by an Erinys (564f), in which the vices leave "scars and weals" on the soul and colour it (565b–c), and in which the visionary sees his own father rise from a pit "full of brands and scars" (566f). Lucian retells the judgment as comedy in *The Downward Journey*: Rhadamanthys tells the dead that every wicked deed leaves invisible marks on the soul, and the philosopher Cyniscus, standing naked before him, is found almost clean, having washed off his stains by philosophy (24); the tyrant Megapenthes is condemned, at Cyniscus' suggestion, not to drink the water of Lethe, so that he may remember his crimes (28–29). The Neoplatonist Olympiodorus, lecturing on the *Gorgias* at Alexandria in the sixth century, ends his commentary with the myth, asks why philosophers tell myths at all, and reads this one allegorically (*On the Gorgias*, lectures 46–50).

Christian readers

Eusebius of Caesarea quotes most of the myth and the summons that follows (523a–527b) in his *Preparation for the Gospel* (12.6), among the passages in which he holds that Plato agrees with the Hebrew scriptures; Burnet's apparatus cites his readings throughout the myth, and those of Theodoret of Cyrrhus, who also quotes parts of it.

Modern readings

Modern readers have asked chiefly how the myth fits the argument. Julia Annas, in "Plato's Myths of Judgement" (*Phronesis* 27, 1982), compares the myths of the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedo* and the *Republic* and asks what each adds to the argument it ends. David Sedley, in "Myth, punishment and politics in the *Gorgias*" (in C. Partenie, ed., *Plato's Myths*, Cambridge, 2009), connects the myth's account of punishment with the dialogue's politics. Dodds' commentary (1959) discusses its sources and its relation to the other myths. A question that recurs is how a punishment that makes the curable better fits a myth in which some are punished forever, and how either fits the claim that no one does injustice willingly (509e).

The Greek text. The Greek is John Burnet's, from the third volume of his Oxford Classical Text of Plato (Oxford, 1903), which holds the fifth, sixth and seventh of Thrasyllus' tetralogies; the *Gorgias* stands third in the sixth, after the *Euthydemus* and the *Protagoras* and before the *Meno*. The copy reproduced is the one used for the *Charmides* and the *Lysis* of this series: the second impression, "corrected in some places", of January 1909 (*Impressio secunda non nullis in locis correcta*), printed at Oxford by Horace Hart, Printer to the University. Burnet's preface is dated at St Andrews in March 1903. The text is reproduced page for page and line for line: each left-hand page of this edition is one page of Burnet, with his line-ends, his marginal section letters and line numbers, and his apparatus criticus at the foot. In the margin, "St. I p. 447" at the head of the dialogue gives the volume and page of Stephanus' edition at which it begins; where each later page of Stephanus begins, its number stands in place of the letter a; and within each section every fifth line is numbered. Burnet sets these in the outer margin of his page, this edition in the right-hand margin; his running heads, and the printer's signatures at the foot of some pages (17* beneath 447c, PLATO, VOL. III. 18 beneath 457a, 18* beneath 458d, PLATO, VOL. III. 19 beneath 468c, 19* beneath 469d, PLATO, VOL. III. 20 beneath 479b, 20* beneath 480d, PLATO, VOL. III. 21 beneath 490e, 21* beneath 492b, PLATO, VOL. III. 22 beneath 501d, 22* beneath 502e, PLATO, VOL. III. 23 beneath 512b, 23* beneath 513e, PLATO, VOL. III. 24 beneath 523c, and 24* beneath 525a), are not reproduced. The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library's digital transcription of Burnet, and every line was then checked against the photographs of this copy; where the two differ, this edition prints what Burnet printed. Burnet's title, ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ, and beneath it the names of the five speakers, ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ ΠΩΛΟΣ, in two lines, are kept, with their abbreviations at the head of each speech (ΚΑΛ., ΣΩ., ΧΑΙ., ΓΟΡ., ΠΩΛ.); so are his paragraphing, his capitals at the openings of speeches, and his accents, breathings and punctuation. Where he runs a quick exchange into one paragraph, joining each speech to the one before with a dash and no

space (from 449d), the dashes are kept at the end or the head of a line as he sets them; so are the dashes, without speakers' labels, between the questions and answers of the argument Socrates conducts with himself (506c6–507a2, 507a7–b4), and his capitals at the head of each of them. His quotation marks round the words of imagined questioners and answerers are kept (450e, 451a–c, 452a–d, 454d5, 455d2–4), and round Polus' question as Socrates repeats it (466c9–d3) and the words Socrates imagines himself saying to Polus and Polus answering him (469d2–e1, 469e2–6), and so are his capitals at their heads, at the head of the imagined words he does not quote (452a6–7, 452b4, 452c3–6, 454a8, 514d5, 515a4, 518c2, 521b5, 521b7, 522b9), and at the head of his own account as Socrates restates it (Οὔ, 508d6); the digital transcription has a small letter at all these places but 518c2 and 521b5, at the opening of every speech and of the new paragraphs within a speech at 465b1, 476a7, 484c4 (Callicles'), 507c8, 508c4, 512b3, 524a8 and 527a5, at 447d6 (Εἰπέ) and at the heads of the imagined words at 469d2 and 469e2 (Ὦ), and at 448d1, 448d8, 449b6, 463b7, 463e2, 463e6, 466e4, 487a7, 508c3, 509e5, 525d2 and 527a9 it sets Polus' name with a small letter where Burnet has a capital; it gives four forms of ᾄδω a rough breathing and no accent where Burnet has the smooth breathing and the acute (*ᾀδοντες* 451e3, *ᾄσματι* 484b2, *ᾀδων* 502a6, *ᾄσεται* 502b7), though it has *ᾠδόντων* (451e2) and *ᾆσμα* (484b10) right; and at 491b5 it has *σύ*, with an acute, before *τ'*, where Burnet prints *σὺ*. Burnet's quotation marks round the words of Euripides' Zethus that Callicles turns to Socrates (485e6–486a3), and his capital at their head (Ἀμελεῖς), are kept, and so are his quotation marks round the words of Epicharmus that Socrates keeps (505e1–2), which open with a small letter (*πρὸ τοῦ*), and round the question a young man might put to himself (510d5), with a capital at its head (Τίνα), round the words of the cook accusing the doctor before children and the doctor's answer (521e6–522a3, 522a5–6), with capitals at their heads (Ὦ, Ταῦτα), where the digital transcription has small letters, and round Zeus' speech in the myth (523c1–524a7), with a capital at its head (Ἀλλ'), where the transcription has a small letter and closes the quotation at 523e6 to open another; and his dashes within a sentence (451c2–3, 452a6, 454c1, 457b2–3, 459e4–5, 461b4, 461c1–3, 461d1–2, 463a1–2, 463d4, 464c6, 465a1, 465b7–c1, 465d4–5, 469d7, 473d9–e1, 480c1, 480e7, 482d3, 482d5, 484b3–10, 486a4–5, 490a4–5, 492e9, 493b4–5, 494e1, 500d10, 503c7, 503d2, 509d8, 517a5–6, 521d2–3, 525e4–5, 526c6–7, 527e1), the dashes at

which Socrates breaks off his oath (466e6) and Polus and Callicles break off (467b1, 521b3), and the dash that leads into the line of Homer (526d1). He letterspaces the words of the drinking-song at 451e3–5 (*ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν*, *δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι*, *τρίτον δέ*, *τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως*), but not the words of his own sentence around them (*ἐστιν*, *τὸ δὲ*), and these are letterspaced here as he spaces them. He letterspaces in the same way the words of Euripides' *Antiope* that Callicles works into his prose: *λαμπρός*, *ἕκαστος* and *καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται* at 484e4–5, but not *τέ ἐστιν* or *ἐν τούτῳ*; the line *ἥτις … χείρονα* at 486b5; and at 486c4–8 *παῦσαι δὲ ἐλέγχων*, *πραγμάτων δ' εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει*, *ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα ἀφείς* and *ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις*, but not *καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν* or *εἴτε ληρήματα χρὴ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φλυαρίας*; and the words of that line that Socrates gives back to Callicles, *τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα*, at 521e1–2. The first lines he sets as verse, Pindar's at 484b4–5 and 484b7–9 and Euripides' at 484e6–7, he indents, Pindar's more deeply than Euripides', with the prose between the lines of Pindar (484b6) set as a line of its own; the lines of Euripides that Socrates quotes at 492e10–11 he indents as deeply as those at 484e6–7, and the line that leads into them (492e9) he ends short; the line of Homer that Socrates quotes at 526d2 he indents, less deeply; so they are set here. Angle brackets ⟨ ⟩ enclose what the principal manuscripts lack and Burnet supplies: *τί* at 451d5, by Heindorf's addition, *ὃ* at 461c1, from the later hand in F, *ᾗ* at 481a3, by Schanz's addition (a Paris manuscript has it after *ἡρπακώς*), and *τί ἂν* at 492b4, by Woolsey's addition (a recent hand in B adds *τί* in the margin). Square brackets [ ] enclose words that the manuscripts have and Burnet deletes: *γνῶσις* at 451b4, after Bekker, *τούτου πρόσθεν* at 467b4, after Schleiermacher, *τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι* at 470a9, after Thompson, *ταὐτὸ* at 470b11, as Heindorf proposed, *ὧν λέγεις* at 478b3, after Hermann, *ἀδικίαν* at 478e4, which Stobaeus lacks, *ᾗ* at 481c6, which B writes *ἡ* and the Aldine edition omits, *οὗ* at 491e3, after Routh, *ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς* at 497a8, after Thompson, *μᾶλλον* at 498b1, which other manuscripts omit, *οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί* at 498c7, after H. Schmidt, *ἐπὶ* at 500c7, after Findeisen, *γεγονέναι* at 503d2, on his own judgement (*seclusi*, "I have bracketed"), *βλέποντες* at 503e2 and *πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὑτῶν* at 503e3, which Sauppe omitted, *ἴσως καὶ* at 513c8, again on his own judgement (*seclusi*), and *αὐτούς* at 519c6, after Bekker. At 448e6 he removes from the text, without brackets, the *εἴη* that B and T have after *ποία τις* and F after *Γοργίου* (*delevi*, "I have deleted"); and before 465c1 he removes the words that B, T

and P add, *ὅτι ὃ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικήν, τοῦτο ὀψοποιϊκὴ πρὸς ἰατρικήν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε*, which Thompson had bracketed (*ego delevi*), with F and Aristides, who lack them. Apparent misprints are kept as he prints them: *σὐκ* for *οὐκ* at 457a1, a dash after Polus' label at 468c1 (ΠΩΛ.---Μάλιστα), where a space is expected, *θοιμάτιον* without its coronis at 469d7, no dash between Socrates' question and Polus' label at the turn from 478a7 to 478a8, though the exchange runs on in one paragraph and the label is not indented, and in the apparatus a second small f at 458e7 (*πάντων* B T P f: *παντὸς* f), where F seems meant, and the key c7 for *ὡμολογημένων*, which stands in the eighth line of 477c; at 487d7 a colon stands after *σοι* where the sentence ends (*σοι*: *ἔχει*), with the wider space Burnet leaves after a full point, its upper point at the height of a raised point; it is kept as printed, though a full point seems meant; and in the apparatus *Coisl* lacks its point at 482a7, and at 493b4 a comma stands after the page number in *Phaed.* 79, a 4, where Burnet elsewhere gives a place without one (*Legg.* 714 e at 484b7, *Alc. ii.* 146 a 6 at 484e7); in the text *παρασκευαὶ* at 500b1 has the final form of sigma inside the word; and in the apparatus *om* lacks its point at 500e3, and at 500b3 P is named for two different forms, and a small p stands before f, a letter he uses only once more, at 517d4 (*rec. p*), where it seems to name a recent hand in P; and T's *ἑκαστον* at 506e3 lacks its accent; and in the text *γάρ* at 522d2 has an acute, though neither an enclitic nor a stop follows.

Reading the apparatus. The notes at the foot of each Greek page are Burnet's, unaltered; four letters that did not print whole in this copy are given as he set them, the e of *ex* (458b6) and of *ante* (460c2), whose bar is missing, the o of *post* (454e3), whose right side is broken, and the u of *ut* (483e3), whose foot is broken; and so is the closing parenthesis after *Alc. ii.* 146 a 6 at 484e7, of which only the top printed. Entries are keyed by section letter and line number within the section (a 3 is the third line of section a), and an entry without a key belongs to the line of the entry before it. An entry gives a reading and the witnesses that have it; a colon separates it from the alternatives, each followed by its witnesses (once, at 486d4, a semicolon, before the last alternative, as this copy prints it). Where the text's reading is followed by a square bracket], the bracket closes the lemma, and what follows is a proposal or another reading (447b7, 451a3, 452c3). An entry with no colon gives a single proposal or report: a deletion (*secl.*, 447a5), a gap marked (*lacunam indicat*, 449b7), a note on a witness (452d3), a transposition (*transp.*, 454e3), words written beside the text by a

later hand (*adscripsit*, 458d8, 466a8); a supplement is given with the witnesses that lack the words (451d5). Three spaced points stand for words left out of a lemma (451b4); where a lemma runs across lines or sections, the key of its last word is given too (460b8, in the parenthesis; 460c1, 460c3, 466e13), or both lines are named (492e5, 6), though not always (498c7, 502b2, 521e7, 523e6, 524a6, 527c8). κ.τ.λ. (καὶ τὰ λοιπά, "and the rest") stands for the rest of a lemma, and *ita*, "thus", names the witnesses that read the text as printed, against those that add words before it (465c1). A question mark in parentheses after a witness, T (?), marks a report Burnet gives as doubtful (482a5, 483e3). A parallel passage may be cited in parentheses, as *cf. Legg.* 714 e at 484b7 and, for the spelling ἀιδὲς, *cf. Phaed.* 79, a 4 *et passim*, "and in many places", at 493b4, and *l. c.* (*loco citato*), "at the place cited", refers back to a place already named (484e7, to *Alc. ii.* 146 a 6); at 486c4 Burnet quotes a note in the margin of T in its own Greek, ἐν ἄλλῳ πρόσκειται, "in another copy there is added". *Scripsi*, "I have written", marks a reading of Burnet's own (454d8, 456a1, 466b8, 466c9, 469d6, 490b2, 503d1, 504c3), and *seclusi*, "I have bracketed", a deletion of his own (503d2, 513c8); at 511e3 square brackets enclose the letters of F's form that the later hand supplied in a gap (ἀπ[οβιβάσασα] F, *sed inclusa in lac. suppl. f*); at 503d2 he gives the words οὐκ ἔχω ... εἴπω to Socrates and the reply to Callicles with W (*cum W Socrati tribui ... Callicli*), against B and, as it seems, T (*ut videtur*); *libri*, "the books", stands for all the manuscripts (467b11). A scholar's name standing alone after a reading marks that scholar's reading or proposal; *ci.* marks a conjecture; *coniecerat*, "had conjectured", and *scripserat*, "had written", mark a reading a scholar had proposed or printed before the manuscript that has it was known (486a1, 514a3, 522c7; 516d9). Before a reference *v.* is *vide*, "see": at 517a7 Burnet reports that Madvig proposed, and Schanz printed in his edition, οὐ μή, and that Schanz now (*nunc*) defends μή, for which Burnet refers (*v.*) to the *Rheinisches Museum* (xli. 152, of 1886). Forms are given as the manuscripts have them, not brought into line with the text: the unaccented ἀποκρινη of P and F (448a4), τι δε η of T (452c3), δώιη of B and δώηι of P and T (481a3), and περιείηι of B (505d2), with the iota written on the line, τί ἢ τί of B (491d4), the unaccented ουτω of B (491e3), σὺ λέγη of F without its subscript (489c4), F's ἐκει (493e7) and ἐτι (494a7) without an accent, F's κνησθῆ without its subscript (494e1), and F's ἰδῆς (497a8) and συμφῆς (500e1), also without it, and P's ὦ (517c5); the papyrus' letters are given as it has them, unaccented, with a square bracket where it

breaks off and points for what is lost (*πι τω βο*[. . . . ., 508c8; *εκβαλειν*, 508d2). A letter written above another in a manuscript is printed above it, as *π* over the first *τ* of T's *τότὲ* (491b8); a letter in parentheses within a form gives the spelling with and without it, as *βουλεύμασι(ν)* (481e5), *ἐστι(ν)* (483b2), *πάντ(α)* (487a2) and *ἀ(ι)εὶ*, *ἀεὶ* or *αἰεὶ* (493e8); and asterisks, which Burnet nowhere explains, seem to stand for letters lost, one for each, whether erased or left as a gap (476b7, in F; 491e3, in T; 516b2, after T's *ἢ*; 519b3, four in F, a gap in which the later hand supplied *πέρι*); and a vertical stroke inside a form marks where a line ends in the manuscript (*ἢτ|τον* B, 498e4).

The witnesses. Burnet's apparatus for the *Gorgias* rests on B, the Bodleian Plato (MS. E. D. Clarke 39), which he collated again himself, distinguishing its old corrector (B^2) from the recent hands (b); T, the Venetian manuscript (Append. Class. 4, cod. 1), whose readings he took from Schanz's edition (vol. VIII, Leipzig, 1881), with a later hand (t) and a corrector (T^2); W, the Vienna manuscript (54, suppl. phil. gr. 7), most of whose readings he owed to Josef Král, who reported it to him at almost all the more important places (full collations he had from Král only for the *Laches* and the *Meno*); P, the Vatican Palatinus 173, of W's family, which, his preface says, takes W's place in the *Gorgias* wherever W's reading was not certain, collated by Peter S. McIntyre; and F, the second Vienna manuscript (55, suppl. phil. gr. 39), which Král collated in full, of his own accord, with a later hand (f). F, his preface argues, was copied from a defective manuscript written in capitals, as its gaps, filled by the later hand, and its misreadings of capital letters show (he cites 467b and 525c), and it is a new witness to a source independent of the other families; he therefore cites it throughout the *Gorgias*. Other witnesses named are a Vienna manuscript, Vind. 21, the manuscript phil. gr. 21 (Bekker's Υ) that later editors cite as Y, which Burnet's preface, calling it *Venetus Marcianus* 21, describes as akin to W (*codicis W affini*) (452b7, 473e1, 481d4, 482d5, 490c8, 503e3), four Paris manuscripts, Par. 1815 (478c2), Par. 1811 (481a3, 486e5), Par. 2110 (483d1, 486a8, 524c7) and Par. 1812 (486d4), with a corrector of each of the second and the last, *corr. Par. 1811* (509b3) and *corr. Par. 1812* (514d7), a manuscript once in the Meerman collection, *cod. Meermannianus* (513b8), from which Findeisen took the reading Burnet prints at 524a6 (*e codice Meermanniano*), a corrector of a manuscript of the Coislin collection in Paris, *corr. Coisl.* (482a7, 505c3), and a Coislin manuscript, *Coisl.* (502a5, 512d7), a Venice manuscript, the Mar-

cianus 189, which Burnet's list of sigla calls S (Bekker's Σ), cited as *Ven.* 189 (517c7), and a corrector of it, *corr. Ven.* 189 (487a3), the later manuscripts, *scr. recc.* (450a1, 454b9, 456b6, 457b5, 457c1, 458e1, 463a5, 465b4, 480b2, 486d7, 490c3, 493d1, 494a2, 502d2, 509e3, 521d1, 525b2) or *recc.* (469d6, 486a3, 517e7), and others, *al.* (450c7, 454b5, 455b1, 458b5, 466d5, 469a1, 471a4, 496d1, 498b1, 499d6, 506d6, 512c7, 513c3). Among the ancient witnesses are a papyrus from Oxyrhynchus in Egypt, *Oxy.*, which Burnet does not further identify: P. Oxy. III 454, published by Grenfell and Hunt in 1903, of the second century AD, which preserves 507b–508d; he cites it from 507c8 to 508d2 (507c8, 507d3, 507d4, 507e2, 507e4, 507e5, 508b2, 508c7, 508c8, 508d2), at 507e2 noting a gap in it (*in Oxy. lacuna*), at 508b2 that it has ἄθλιοι once (*semel habet*), and at 508c8 that it already has the words Morstadt bracketed (*iam*); the emperor Marcus Aurelius, *Antoninus*, who copies 512d6–e5 into his notebook, the *Meditations* (7.46) (512d8, 512e5); the Neoplatonist Olympiodorus, of Alexandria, whose commentary on the *Gorgias* survives (447a3, 447b9, 448b5, 449c4, 452b1, 453c8, 454b5, 454d8, 455b1, 456a4, 458b5, 458c5, 459c8, 459d1, 461d6, 462e2, 464b8, 464c4, 465a2, 465b3, 467b10, 470a5, 470a12, 471a4, 471d3, 478b3, 482b5, 493a6, 493d4, 511d5, 521e8; at 481c1 he reports that some copies lacked the verb, *nonnulli teste Olympiodoro*, and at 482a6 he knew the reading ἔκβλητος that B's old corrector notes, *quam lectionem novit*; at 491d4 he reads ὁτιὴ and gives the words to Callicles, *Callicli tribuens*; and at 495a5 he notes, with γρ., that both ἀνομολογούμενος and μὴ ὁμολογούμενος are written); the Roman teacher of rhetoric Quintilian, who quotes 460c1–2 as the question that closes the argument with Gorgias (*Institutio oratoria* 2.15.27) (460c1, 460c3); the scholia in B, *schol. B* (447a3, 453c8, 502c5); the Byzantine lexicon called the *Suda*, which Burnet cites as Suidas (447a3, where it quotes the line under ἀλλ' ἤ; 525b3, 525c1); the anthology of Stobaeus (453a4–6, and often from 466d5 to 472e7 and from 476a3 to 479b8, 487a2–3, from 492e7 to 493b6, from 499c6 to 500b4, and from 507c8 to 507e5, and throughout the tale Socrates has heard, from 523a1 to 524a6); the Christian writers Eusebius of Caesarea and Theodoret of Cyrrhus, *Eusebius* and *Theodoretus*, who quote parts of the myth and of the summons that follows it (from 523a2 to 527a5), Eusebius in his *Preparation for the Gospel* (12.6); the *Consolation to Apollonius* that goes under Plutarch's name, which quotes 523a1–524b4 (ch. 36, 120e–121e) and which Burnet cites as *Plutarchus* (from 523a1 to 524a6); the Latin translation of Marsilio Ficino (Florence, 1484–85), which does not render the words Her-

mann bracketed at 478b3 (*non vertit Ficinus*), and whose *idem te mihi consilium dantem*, "giving me the same advice", implies the *ταὐτὰ* that Burnet prints at 487d3, and whose *quos*, "whom", at 489d6 he sets beside Routh's *τίνας*; the Neoplatonist Simplicius, of the sixth century AD, who quotes 469c1–2 in his commentary on Aristotle's *On the Heavens* (469c1); Athenaeus, of about AD 200, who quotes 473e6–474a1 in the *Deipnosophists* (5.217f), among the anachronisms he charges against Plato (474a1); the orator Aelius Aristides, of the second century AD, whose speech *To Plato, in Defence of Rhetoric* (Oration 2 in Behr's numbering, 45 in Dindorf's) quotes Socrates' account of rhetoric and argues against it (463a6–465c3) and gives Pindar's words in the form Burnet prints at 484b7, *δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον*, beside which Burnet cites the *Laws* (714e, *Legg.*), and who is cited again at 502c5 and from 503a2 to 503b4, from his speech *In Defence of the Four* (Oration 3 in Behr's numbering, 46 in Dindorf's), which answers what Socrates says of the four statesmen (the words of 503a2 are quoted in both speeches), and again at 513c4 and from 516a5 to 517a4; the first speech is cited again at 526a1, 526a7 and 526b1, where it quotes Socrates' words on the few who stay just in great power, Aristides son of Lysimachus among them (525e5–526b3); and the *Prolegomena* to his speeches, cited as *Proll. in Aristidem* (463a6) and *Proll. ad Aristidem* (464b8); and the Epicurean Philodemus, of the first century BC, whose writings on rhetoric survive among the papyri of Herculaneum (465a4, 486a8, 486a9, 486b5); the Roman writer Aulus Gellius, of the second century AD, who quotes 484c5–e3 and 485a3–e2, passing over the lines of Euripides, in his *Attic Nights* (10.22) (484d2), and quotes 525b1–4 at 7.14 of the same work (525b3); Clement of Alexandria, of about AD 200, *Clemens* (487a3); and the *Alcibiades II*, *Alc. ii.*, which adapts the lines of Euripides at 484e6–7, with *κράτιστος* for *βέλτιστος* (484e7); the Neoplatonist Iamblichus, of about AD 300, whose *Protrepticus* (ch. 17) quotes Socrates' words from Euripides' lines to the two men's jars (492e8–494a2), and who is cited throughout them, at 499e9, and again from 505a3 to 505b11 and from 506d6 to 507e5, where chapters 18 and 19 of the same work adapt 504a–505b and 506c–508a; the treatise *On the Method of Forcefulness* that goes under the name of the rhetorician Hermogenes of Tarsus, of the second century AD, which quotes Socrates' oath at 489e2 among oaths that show character (ch. 20), with *οὐ* before it, and in Rabe's text with Zeus for Zethus (*οὔ, μὰ τὸν Ζῆν'*); Alexander of Aphrodisias, of about AD 200, who quotes Socrates' answer loosely in his commentary on

Aristotle's *Topics* (491e3; p. 530 Wallies); and the Antiatticist, an anonymous lexicon of Attic usage printed by Bekker in his *Anecdota Graeca* (vol. I, Berlin, 1814), *Antiatticista Bekkeri*, which Burnet thinks perhaps (*fort.*) read κεφαλαιότατον at 494e4. The editors and scholars named are Immanuel Bekker (448e6, 451b4, 486e5, 494e1, 494e3, 496a1, 496c2, 508b2, 519c6, 521e7, 522a1), Carel Gabriel Cobet (447a3, 447b7, 449c5, 451d6, 452b2, 453a5, 453e3, 455c4, 455e1, 457c5, 457d8, 459a2, 459b7, 459b8, 460e1, 461c4, 461d2, 463c8, 465b5, 466e2, 466e10, 467a1, 467b3, 467d5, 469c2, 471d4, 474a5, 474a6, 480a4, 484a1, 484a4, 485b3, 486c4, 490d6, 493c2, 493c3, 494e7, 502b2, 512c6, 513e6, 516a1, 516c7, 517a7, 518a3, 518b5, 521e7, 522d2, 527a3), Rudolf Bernard Hirschig (447a5, 451d6, 452a9, 457d6, 460c1, 460c2, 465d5, 466e13, 475b1, 477d3, 479d5, 480e3, 490c7, 491a4, 493b2, 493b6, 496b2, 500d2, 502b6, 508c8, 509b3, 512a7, 515b2, 515c1, 524c3), Martin Schanz (447b8, 449b7, 454d8, 457c5, 460c1, 461c6, 464d1, 471d4, 481a3, 483e3, 488b7, 492b8, 492c6, 492e5, 494e3, 498c7, 502b3, 503d2, 504d9, 509b7, 510c3, 512c7, 512d8, 513c8, 513e3, 514c2, 514c7, 515c1, 515d9, 516d9, 517a7, 521b7, 521c3, 524c7), Hermann Sauppe (451a3, 457b4, 457d7, 464d1, 487b7, 493b2, 493d2, 495b5, 496b1, 496d6, 498b1, 499d5, 503e2, 503e3, 506d6), Friedrich Ast (451b4, 496d1, 503d1), Ludwig Friedrich Heindorf (451d5, 452b2, 466b8, 467a4, 470b11, 485e1, 486c2, 489c6, 493b2, 495c6, 499d5, 501b6, 503d1, 504c3, 507b6, 508b2, 510a4, 512d7, 514d3, 515b8, 519d1, 524c6, 525d3, 527a3), Johannes Vahlen (452a9), Adamantios Korais, whom Burnet calls Coraes (452b2, 465b4, 485e1, 486a1, 488c3, 506d6, 518a1, 522c7), Theodore Dwight Woolsey, editor of the *Gorgias* (Boston, 1842) (453c8, 492b4), Charles Badham (454d8, 458d8, 490a5, 492e7, 496d1, 497a8, 508d3), Philipp Buttmann (455e3, 494e3, 510a8), Johan Nicolai Madvig (456a7, 457c5, 481c1, 490a7, 493b1, 514a3, 514a6, 514c2, 517a7, 518a5, 522a1), Herbert Richards (456a7, 467b8, 493a4, 509b7), Peter Paul Dobree (456b6, 465d6, 473b12, 477d2, 478e4, 483a8), Walter Headlam (457e4), Julius Deuschle (460b8, 480c1, 497d7, 504d9, 512a7), William Hepworth Thompson, editor of the *Gorgias* (London, 1871) (460c2, 465c1, 470a9, 470a12, 471d4, 487a2, 497a8, 501c6), Janus Cornarius, the sixteenth-century physician who translated Plato into Latin (465a4, 504e8, 504e9), Johann Georg Baiter, one of the editors of the Zurich Plato (466e6, 491a2, 497a1), Friedrich Schleiermacher, Plato's German translator (467b4, 483e2, 493c3, 504e9, 515b8), Samuel Adrianus Naber (467b11, 484a4, 511e2), Karl Friedrich Hermann, editor of the Teubner Plato (478b3, 483c3,

483e4, 488e2, 497a8, 498b1, 502b2), Gottfried Stallbaum (479d5, 486d4, 494b1, 496d1, 510d4), Ludwig Dindorf (481a4), Christian Cron, who revised Deuschle's annotated *Gorgias* (475d2, 485e7), Henri Estienne, whom Burnet calls Stephanus, whose edition of 1578 gives the pages by which Plato is cited (483a8, 485c3, 494c3), the first printed edition, the Aldine (Venice, 1513), *Aldina* (481c6, 515d5), the second edition printed at Basel (1556), *Basileensis altera* (514c7), Philip Willem van Heusde (482b8), Lodewijk Caspar Valckenaer (484a4, 486a1), David Ruhnken (485e7), Hugo Grotius, who had conjectured the reading of F at 486a1 (*coniecerat*), August Nauck, editor of the fragments of the Greek tragedians (485e7), Hermann Bonitz (486a3), Martin Joseph Routh, editor of the *Euthydemus* and the *Gorgias* (Oxford, 1784) (489d6, 491e3, 498c7), and Kratz (454a1) and von Kleist (454a1, 480a4), Schaefer (455e3, 513c8), Blomfield (456b4), Findeisen (456d1, 475d2, 478b3, 500c7, 501a6, 524a6, 524d3), Beck (459b8), H. Schmidt (473d9, 495d5, 498c7), Lamberton (497a8), Morstadt (478c2, 485b2, 493e2, 508c8, 525e4), Liebhold (503d1), K. Fuhr (503d2, 522a6), Voemel (514c2), Forman (522a8, 524c7) and Riemann (483a6), as Burnet names them. At 472b1 Burnet prints F's *πυθίου*, "in the Pythion", the precinct of Pythian Apollo at Athens, against the *πυθοῖ*, "at Pytho" (Delphi), of B, T, W and f, comparing Thucydides 6.54.7, where the same phrase names that precinct, and an inscription in the *Corpus Inscriptionum Atticarum* (*C. I. A.* i. 189); at 473b3 he reports that B in fact gives Ἴσως to Socrates, though it also adds a dicolon (:), the mark of a change of speaker (*sed add. quoque :*), where the common text had continued Polus' speech.

Names and abbreviations. *acc. corr.*, the accent corrected (522a6); *accentum add.*, adds the accent; *accentum super … add.*, adds an accent over; *accentum … posuit*, places the accent; *ad*, at, beside; *ad … add.*, adds at; *add.*, adds; *addubitant*, doubt; *adscripsit*, wrote beside; *al.*, others; *Alc. ii.*, the *Alcibiades II*; *Aldina*, the Aldine edition; *Antoninus*, the emperor Marcus Aurelius; *aliquid*, something; *ante*, before; *ante haec verba*, before these words; *Antiatticista Bekkeri*, the Antiatticist in Bekker's *Anecdota*; *Basileensis altera*, the second Basel edition; *bis*, twice; *cf.*, compare; *Callicli tribuens*, giving (the words) to Callicles; *Callicli tribuit*, gives to Callicles; *C. I. A.*, the *Corpus Inscriptionum Atticarum*; *ci.*, conjectures; *Clemens*, Clement of Alexandria; *cod.* (*codex*), manuscript; *cod. Meermannianus*, the manuscript once in the Meerman collection; *Coisl.*, a Coislin manuscript; *compendio*, by an abbreviation; *coniecerat*, had conjectured; *corr.*, corrected; *corr. Coisl.*, a corrector of a Coislin manuscript; *corr. Par.*, a

corrector of a Paris manuscript; *corr. Ven.*, a corrector of a Venice manuscript; *cum*, with (*et supra ἦπερ cum B*, and in the line above, ἦπερ, with B, 510a8); *cum W Socrati tribui ... Callicli*, with W I have given (the first words) to Socrates ... (and the next) to Callicles; *delevi*, I have deleted; *distinguens*, punctuating; *ead. m.* (eadem manu), by the same hand; *ego delevi*, I have deleted; *e codice Meermanniano*, from the Meerman manuscript (524a6); *erasum*, erased (515e6, 516a5); *errore typothetarum ut videtur*, by a printers' error, as it seems; *ἐν ἄλλῳ πρόσκειται*, in another copy there is added; *et*, and; *et compendio*, and by an abbreviation; *et in marg.*, and in the margin; *et mox*, and soon after; *et passim*, and in many places; *et suprascr.*, and written above; *ex*, (made) from (*κ ex γ*, 491a2); *ex emend.*, by correction; *fecit*, made (it); *fort.*, perhaps; *habet*, *habent*, has, have (the words); *γρ.* (*γράφεται*, "it is written"), marks a variant reading noted by a hand or reported by a commentator (Olympiodorus, 495a5, 521e8; *γρ. ἀσκῶ* T, 526d4); *iam*, already; *i. e.* (*id est*), that is (526b1); *in editione*, in (his) edition (517a7); *in lacuna*, in a gap (505c8, 507e2); *in lacuna textus suppl.*, supplies in a gap of the text; *in lac. suppl.*, supplied in a gap (519b3); *in lac. textus*, in a gap of the text (515b8); *inclusa in lac. suppl.*, the letters enclosed supplied in a gap (511e3); *in marg.*, in the margin; *in ras.*, on an erasure; *intercidisse putavit*, thought (words) had fallen out; *ita*, thus; *κ.τ.λ.* (*καὶ τὰ λοιπά*), and the rest; *l. c.* (*loco citato*), at the place cited; *lacunam indicat*, marks a gap; *lacunam statuit*, posits a gap; *legisse videtur*, seems to have read; *legit*, reads; *Legg.*, the *Laws*; *libri*, the books, all the manuscripts; *manus recentissima*, a very recent hand; *manus saec. xvi non antiquior*, a hand of the sixteenth century, no older; *mox*, soon after; *non correctum*, not corrected; *non legisse videtur*, seems not to have read; *non habet*, does not have; *non laudat*, does not quote; *non legit*, does not read; *non vertit*, does not translate; *nonnulli teste Olympiodoro*, some, on the witness of Olympiodorus; *nunc*, now (517a7); *obelo notavit*, marked with an obelus; *om.*, omits; *om. mox altero*, omitting the second soon after; *Oxy.*, the papyrus from Oxyrhynchus; *Par.*, a Paris manuscript; *Phaed.*, the *Phaedo*; *post*, after; *post hanc vocem*, after this word; *post hanc vocem distinguens*, punctuating after this word; *Polo vulgo continuant*, the common text continues it to Polus; *posterius*, the second (of two); *pr.*, the first hand (pr. T); *prius*, the first (of two); *Proll. in Aristidem*, *Proll. ad Aristidem*, the *Prolegomena* to Aristides; *punctis del.*, deleted with dots; *punctis notavit*, marked with dots; *punctis notatum*, marked with dots; *puncto del.*, deleted with a dot; *puncto notatum*, marked with a dot; *quae in W ita legi-*

tur, which in W reads thus; *quam lectionem novit*, knew this reading; *quos*, whom (Ficino's word); *qui mox*, who soon after reads; *quod ortum est ex interpretatione verborum*, which arose from an explanation of the words; *quoque*, also; *ras.*, an erasure; *re vera*, *revera*, in fact; *rec.*, a recent hand; *recc.*, the later manuscripts; *Rh. Mus.*, the *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* (517a7); *schol.*, scholion; *scr. recc.*, later manuscripts; *scripserat*, had written (516d9); *scripsi*, I have written; *scripsit*, wrote; *sed σ erasum in B*, but σ is erased in B; *secl.*, brackets as spurious; *secl. ci.*, proposes to bracket; *secluserat*, had bracketed; *seclusi*, I have bracketed; *sed*, but; *sed legit*, but reads; *semel habet*, has (the word) once; (*sic*), so (as written); *sic B*, so B has it (519c6); *sic legit*, so reads; *signis transpositionis*, with marks of transposition; *Socrati tribuentes*, giving (the words) to Socrates; *Socrati tribuit*, *Socrati tribuunt*, gives, give to Socrates; *spiritus corr.*, corrects the breathing; *supplet*, supplies; *supra*, above; *supra versum*, above the line; *suprascr.*, written above; *susp.*, suspects (δι᾽ *αὐτοῦ fuisse susp.*, suspects that δι᾽ αὐτοῦ stood there, 504d9); *ter*, three times; *Thuc.*, Thucydides; *transp.*, transposes; *tuetur*, defends (the reading); *ut videtur*, as it seems; *v.*, von, before a name, and *vide*, see, before a reference (517a7); *vel*, or; *Ven.*, a Venice manuscript; *Vind.*, a Vienna manuscript; *vulg.*, the vulgate, the common text of the earlier printed editions. A superscript ^{2} marks an early corrector (B^2, whom Burnet's preface takes to be Arethas or his scribe; T^2); a small letter, a later hand (b, t, f, and p, 500b3, 517d4).

The translation. The English renders the reading Burnet prints, including the words he supplies; the words he brackets are not translated. It renders each key term with one English word throughout, and the series' rulings stand: *rhētorikē* is "rhetoric", *rhētōr* "orator", *technē* "craft", *empeiria* "routine", *logos* "speech" ("argument" where it is the argument of the conversation), *kalos* "beautiful" in every use, *adikein* "do injustice" and *adikeisthai* "suffer injustice", *pistis* "conviction" and *pisteuein* "be convinced", where they are set against learning and knowledge (454c–455a), *epitēdeuma* and *epitēdeusis* "pursuit" (462e–463b), *charis* "gratification", with *charizesthai* "gratify" (462c–d, 465d); in the argument with Polus (466b–470a), "want" (*boulesthai*) and "think fit" (*ha dokei autois*) are kept apart; *elenchos* is "refutation", with *elenchein* "refute"; *dikēn didonai* is "pay the penalty", *dikē* "penalty" and *timōria* "retribution" (472d–e), and *zēmiousthai* "suffer loss" (470a); *eudaimōn* is "happy" and *athlios* "wretched"; in the argument that the one punished suffers what is just (476b–477a), *paschein* is "suffer" throughout, against *poiein*, "do"; *lypē* and the

words of *algos* are both "pain" (475a–480c); *kakia* is "vice", of money and body as well as of soul, and *ponēria* "baseness" (477a–c); *kolazein* is "punish", and *dikē* stays "penalty" where Socrates names it as a craft beside money-making and medicine (478a–b); *pathos* and *pathēma*, of love and of suffering injustice, are "suffering", with *paschein* (481c–483b); *physis* is "nature" and *nomos* "law" (482e–484c); *pleonektein* is "overreach", beside *pleon echein*, "have more" (483c); *kreittōn* "stronger", *beltiōn* "better" and *ischyroteros* "mightier" are kept apart where Socrates asks whether they are one (488b–d), with *hēttōn* "weaker" and *asthenēs* "feeble"; *ameinōn* is "superior" and *cheirōn* "inferior" (483d, 484c, 488b), since "worse" is *kakiōn*, the word of the argument with Polus (483a); *phaulos* is "paltry", and *errōmenos* "robust", since "strong" belongs to *kreittōn*. *Phronimos* is "intelligent" where Callicles makes the better the more intelligent (489e–491c); *sōphrosynē* is "temperance" and *sōphrōn* "temperate", as in the series, against *akolasia* "licentiousness" and *akolastos* "licentious", as at 477d–478b (491d–494a); *andreios* is "courageous" (491b–c, 494d); *epithymia* is "desire" and *hēdonē* "pleasure"; *anoētos* is "senseless", as at 464d (493a–c); *pimplanai* (494a) and *plēroun* (494b–c) are both "fill", with the middle *plērousthai* "fill for oneself", the jars understood (493e, 494a: "having filled them for himself"), and *apopimplanai* "fill up" (492a); *pithanos*, elsewhere "persuasive", is "credulous" in the likeness of the jar, and *sēma* is "grave" (493a). *Eu prattein* is "fare well", with a note on its double sense (495e), and "do well" at 507c, where Socrates passes from the one sense to the other; *aniasthai* is "be distressed", *aniaros* "distressing" and *ania* "distress", as in the series, kept apart from *lypeisthai* "be in pain" (496c–499a, 502a); *aphrōn* is "foolish" and *deilos* "cowardly" (497e–499a); *ischys* is "might" and *astheneia* "feebleness" (496b); *alogos* is "unaccountable" at 496b, a stated sense against "without account" at 465a, which *alogōs* keeps at 501a; *paraplēsiōs* is "about equally", *homoiōs* "likewise" and *hōsautōs* "in the same way" (496b–499e); *symphanai* is "concur", as 472a, against *homologein* "agree" (500e); *poiēsis* and *hē poiētikē* are "poetry" (501e–502c), and *semnos* "dignified" (502b); *dēmēgoria* is "addressing the people", as *dēmēgorein* at 482c (502c–503b); *taxis* is "arrangement" and *kosmos* "order", with *kosmios* "orderly" as at 493c, *kosmiotēs* "orderliness" and *akosmia* "disorder" (503e–508a), with a note; *chrēstos* is "decent", as at 499e, and *mochthēros*, "depraved" of persons (486b, 488c), is "sorry" of a house and a body (504a–505a), with *diakeisthai* "be disposed"; *lysitelein* is "profit", as at 478c, and *oninanai* "avail" (504e); *epitrepein* is "per-

mit" (504c, 505b); *dikaiotēs* is "justness", beside *dikaiosynē* "justice" (508a); *pleonexia* is "overreaching", as *pleonektein* at 483c (508a). *Sōizein* is "keep safe", as at 501a, and "bring safe" with a word of motion (511d); *politeia* is "regime"; *kybernētēs* is "pilot" and *kybernētikē* "piloting", *mēchanopoios* "engine-maker" (511d–512d); *nosēma* is "illness" and *synechesthai* "be held fast", as at 479a (512a); *lōbasthai* is "outrage", as at 473c (511a); *semnynesthai* is "dignify oneself" (511d–512c), and *schēma*, "shape" at 465b and 474d–e, is "bearing", the carriage a man puts on, at 511d–e, with *schēmatizesthai* "assume a bearing", a stated sense; *philonikia* is "rivalry" and *philonikos* "lover of rivalry" (515b); *allotrios* is "alien" and *gnēsios* "legitimate" (513b–c); *epitrepein* is "leave to" where a thing is left in another's charge (512e, 526b), and *pisteuein*, elsewhere "be convinced" (454c–455a, 524a), is "trust" with a person or an argument (512e, 521c, 527e), stated senses. *Epimelētēs* is "caretaker", as *epimeleisthai* is "take care of" (516a–b); *apodeiknynai* with a predicate is "turn out" (516a–b) and *apophainein* "show forth" (516c), against "demonstrate" and "set forth" elsewhere; *proszēmioun* is "fine besides" (516d), of a penalty voted, beside *zēmiousthai* "suffer loss"; *ekpiptein* is "fall out", of the charioteers and of statesmen driven from the city (516e–517a), with a note; *diakonos* is "servant", *diakonikos* "serving" and *diakonein* "act as servant" (517b–521a); *charis* is "gratitude" where it is the return owed for a benefit (519c, 520c), with a note, and stays "gratification" in *pros charin*, "for gratification" (521a, 521d); *eu paschein* is "have good done to one", beside *eu poiein* "do good" and *euergesia* "benefaction" (519d–520e, 522b); *alogos* is "unaccountable", as at 496b, beside *logos* "account" (519d–e); and *dikastikē* is "judging" (520b), with a note. In the myth and the summons after it (523a–527e) *dikastēs* and *dikazein* are "judge", while *krinein* is "try", *krisis* "trial" and *kritēs* "the one who tries", and *dikē*, the case at law, is "case" (523b–c, 526e), beside "penalty" for *dikē* in *dikēn didonai* and in "the prison of requital and penalty" (523b); *mythos* is "tale" (523a, 527a) and *logos* "account" (522e, 523a, 524b, 526d), "argument" where it is the argument that alone stands unmoved (527b–e); *kosmos* is "adornment" at 523e, as in the *Symposium* (197d–e); *theasthai* is "behold" (524e), with the series; *timōreisthai*, passive, is "suffer retribution", with *timōria* (525b–e); *amphiennysthai* is "be dressed" and *amphiesmata* "dress", beside *ampechesthai* "be clothed", as at 490d (523c–d); *sphodra*, elsewhere "vehemently", is "exceedingly" before an adjective (526a); *anti* is "worth" at 526e, a stated sense; *atimōs* is "in dishonour" (525a, 527a) and *atimos* "dishonoured", but "dis-

honouring" of the blow (527c), a stated sense; *akolouthein* is "attend" and *hepesthai* "follow" (527c–e), with the series, and *hēgemōn* "leader" (527e); and *ellogimos* is "of note" (514c, 526b), with the series. Where the rendering of a key term needs a reason, a note gives it, at or near its first appearance. The speakers' quick exchanges are run into one paragraph where Burnet runs them. The notes identify persons, places and quotations, explain what the English cannot carry, and mark interpretation as such.

The English words on which the argument depends, in alphabetical order, with the Greek they render and the places where they occur, by Stephanus page and section. Where a word occurs throughout, the chief places are given. Where a word has a longer entry in the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Glossary says so.

account, λόγος (*logos*), where it is a story told or a statement of how things are, and in "by your account". 457a, 460b, 463b, 463d, 465a, 471a, 472e, 488e, 490a, 499c, 501a, 519b, 519d, 522e, 523a, 524b, 526d. Kept apart from **argument** and **speech**. See Key Words, *Tale and account*.

address the people, δημηγορεῖν (*dēmēgorein*); **addressing the people**, δημηγορία (*dēmēgoria*); **one who addresses the people**, δημηγόρος (*dēmēgoros*). 482c, 482e, 494d, 502c, 502d, 503a, 503b, 519d, 520b.

admonish, νουθετεῖν (*nouthetein*); **admonition**, νουθέτημα (*nouthetēma*). 478e, 488a, 488b, 497b, 525c.

advantage, to one's, συμφέρον (*sympheron*). 483b, 527b. Kept apart from **beneficial** and from "profit", λυσιτελεῖν (*lysitelein*).

agony, ὀδύνη (*odynē*); **agonizing**, ὀδυνηρός (*odynēros*). 525b, 525c. Kept apart from "pain", λύπη, ἀλγηδών (*lypē*, *algēdōn*).

appear, φαίνεσθαι (*phainesthai*); "So it appears", Φαίνεται. Throughout (448d–527d). Kept apart from **seem**.

argument, λόγος (*logos*), the argument of the conversation. Throughout (450e–527e); "this argument alone stands unmoved", 527b. Kept apart from **account** and **speech**.

arrangement, τάξις (*taxis*); **arrange**, **arranged**, συντάττειν, τεταγμένος (*syntattein*, *tetagmenos*); **disarrangement**, ἀταξία (*ataxia*). 455b, 503e, 504a, 504b, 504c, 504d, 506d, 506e. With **order** (note at 504a). See Key Words, *Temperance*.

assert, φάσκειν (*phaskein*). 448b, 471d, 482e, 486a, 499c, 519c, 519e, 520a. Kept apart from **claim**.

attend, ἀκολουθεῖν (*akolouthein*). 527c, as the series; of following an argument, "keep up", 465c. Kept apart from "follow", ἕπεσθαι (*hepesthai*), 527e.

avail, ὀνινάναι (*oninanai*); **be availed**, ὀνίνασθαι (*oninasthai*). 504e, 512a, 525b, 525c.

bad, κακός (*kakos*); **worse**, κακίων (*kakiōn*). Throughout; the argument with Polus, 474c–475e. Kept apart from **base** and from "inferior" (see **superior**).

base, πονηρός (*ponēros*); **baseness**, πονηρία (*ponēria*). 457a, 464e, 470e, 477b, 477c, 477e, 478a, 478d, 481a, 499e, 502b, 505b, 507c, 511b, 515a, 516a, 517e, 519e, 520a, 520b, 521b, 521d, 523c, 525e, 526a, 526b.

beautiful, καλός (*kalos*); **beauty**, κάλλος (*kallos*). Throughout, in every use, of bodies, laws and conduct; the argument with Polus, 474d–475e. The adverb καλῶς (*kalōs*) is **well**, save at 507c, "well and beautifully". See Key Words, *Beautiful, shameful*.

behold, θεᾶσθαι (*theasthai*). 495e, 524e, as the series. Kept apart from "contemplate", θεωρεῖν (*theōrein*), 465d, 474d, 523e.

believe, ἡγεῖσθαι (*hēgeisthai*). 453a, 458a, 461a, 463a, 463c, 471e, 472d, 473a, 474b, 474d, 477b, 485a, 485c, 488a, 489d, 495e, 499b, 501e, 523a. Kept apart from **think** and from "be convinced" (see **conviction**).

beneficial, ὠφέλιμος (*ōphelimos*); **benefit**, ὠφελεῖν, ὠφελία (*ōphelein*, *ōphelia*). 468c, 470a, 474e, 475a, 477a, 478b, 479b, 499d, 502b, 505c, 509d, 511e, 512a, 520b, 522b, 525b. Kept apart from **advantage, to one's**.

better, βελτίων (*beltiōn*); **best**, βέλτιστος (*beltistos*). Throughout; Callicles' "better", 483d–491c. The impersonal κρεῖττον (*kreitton*) is "better" at 482b and 483b. Kept apart from **superior** and **stronger**. See Key Words, *Stronger*.

blessed, μακάριος (*makarios*); **the Islands of the Blessed**, μακάρων νῆσοι (*makarōn nēsoi*). 469c, 471e, 472d, 495b, 507c, 507e, 512d, 520a; 523b, 524a, 526c. Kept apart from **happy**.

caretaker, ἐπιμελητής (*epimelētēs*). 516a, 516b, 523b. See **take care of**.

case, δίκη (*dikē*), a case at law. 523b, 523c, 526e, a stated sense. See **pay the penalty**.

claim, φάναι (*phanai*); "I claim so", Φημί. Throughout (447c–526e); "say" where φάναι introduces quoted or proverbial words. Kept apart from **assert** and from "say", λέγειν, εἰπεῖν (*legein*, *eipein*).

come to one's end, τελευτᾶν (*teleutan*). 503c, 522d, 523b, 524a, 524d, 527c.

conviction, πίστις (*pistis*); **be convinced**, πιστεύειν (*pisteuein*). 454c, 454d, 454e, 455a, 524a; **not be convinced**, ἀπιστεῖν (*apistein*), 469e; **trust**, πιστεύειν, where no contrast with knowledge is drawn, 512e, 521c, 527e. Kept apart from **believe**. See Key

Words, *Persuade*.
courageous, ἀνδρεῖος (*andreios*); **courage**, ἀνδρεία (*andreia*). 463a, 480c, 491b, 491c, 492a, 494d, 495c, 495d, 497e, 498a, 498b, 498c, 498e, 499a, 507b, 507c. "With good courage" is θαρρεῖν (*tharrein*), 527c.
craft, τέχνη (*technē*); **masterly**, **master of the craft**, τεχνικός (*technikos*); **craftlessly**, ἀτέχνως (*atechnōs*). Throughout (447c–521d); masterly, 455b, 463a, 501b; master of the craft, 500a, 504d; craftlessly, 501a (note). See Key Words, *Craft, routine, knack*.
decide, δοκεῖ (*dokei*), impersonal. 447b, 458b, 495c, 497c, 499e, 506a, 527d. Kept apart from **think fit** and **seem**.
desire, ἐπιθυμία, ἐπιθυμεῖν (*epithymia*, *epithymein*). 447b, 474c, 481b, 484d, 491d, 491e, 492a, 492d, 493a, 493b, 494c, 496d, 497c, 503c, 505a, 505b, 507e, 513b, 517b, 517d, 518c, 518e, 520e.
dishonoured, ἄτιμος (*atimos*). 486c, 508c; **in dishonour**, ἀτίμως (*atimōs*), 525a, 527a; **dishonouring**, of the blow, 527d, a stated sense.
display, ἐπιδείκνυσθαι (*epideiknysthai*); **display** (noun), ἐπίδειξις (*epideixis*). 447a, 447b, 447c, 449c, 452b, 458b, 464b, 467c, 514c.
do injustice, ἀδικεῖν (*adikein*); **suffer injustice**, ἀδικεῖσθαι (*adikeisthai*); **injustice**, ἀδικία (*adikia*); **act of injustice**, ἀδίκημα (*adikēma*); **unjust**, ἄδικος (*adikos*). Throughout (454b–527b); the thesis, 469b–c, 473a, 474b–475e, 509c, 527b. Never "do wrong", "be wronged". See Key Words, *Do injustice*.
example, παράδειγμα (*paradeigma*). 525b, 525c, 525d.
fare well, εὖ πράττειν (*eu prattein*); **fare badly**, κακῶς πράττειν (*kakōs prattein*). 495e, 496e, 497a; **do well**, 507c (note).
feeble, ἀσθενής (*asthenēs*); **feebleness**, ἀσθένεια (*astheneia*). 477b, 483b, 488c, 490b, 490c, 496b, 519a. Kept apart from "weaker" (see **stronger**). See Key Words, *Stronger*.
flattery, κολακεία (*kolakeia*); **flatter**, κολακεύειν (*kolakeuein*); **flattering**, κολακικός (*kolakikos*). 463b, 463c, 464c, 464e, 465b, 466a, 467a, 501c, 502c, 502d, 503a, 513d, 517a, 521b, 522d, 527c. See Key Words, *Flattery*.
good, ἀγαθός (*agathos*). Throughout; "the end of all actions", 499e; the good "by the presence of good things", 497e. See Key Words, *Pleasure*.
gratification, χάρις (*charis*); **gratify**, χαρίζεσθαι (*charizesthai*). 458d, 462c, 462d, 465d, 501b, 501c, 501d, 502a, 502b, 502c, 502e, 513d, 516b, 521a, 521d; **gratitude**, χάρις, the return owed for a benefit, 470c, 519c, 520c. The preposition χάριν (*charin*) with

a genitive is "for ... sake" (485a, 502a, 505c). See Key Words, *Flattery*.

happy, εὐδαίμων (*eudaimōn*); **happiness**, εὐδαιμονία (*eudaimonia*); **happily**, εὐδαιμόνως (*eudaimonōs*). 470d–473e, 478c, 478d, 479d, 491e, 492c, 492e, 493d, 494a, 494c, 494d, 494e, 495a, 496b, 497c, 507c, 507d, 508b, 523b, 525e, 527c. Kept apart from **blessed**.

harmful, βλαβερός (*blaberos*); **harm**, βλάβη (*blabē*). 468c, 475d, 477c, 477d, 477e, 499d, 509b, 511e.

have power, δύνασθαι (*dynasthai*); **power**, δύναμις (*dynamis*); **have great power**, μέγα δύνασθαι (*mega dynasthai*). Throughout (447c–526e); the argument with Polus, 466b–470a; "Power or wanting?", 509d. "Able" is δυνατός (*dynatos*) and οἷός τε (*hoios te*). See Key Words, *Power*.

human beings, ἄνθρωποι (*anthrōpoi*). Throughout (448c–526e). The singular is **person**, save where it names the kind, "the human being" (516b).

incurable, ἀνίατος (*aniatos*); **curable**, ἰάσιμος (*iasimos*). 480b, 512a, 525b, 525c, 525e, 526b.

intelligent, φρόνιμος (*phronimos*); **be intelligent**, φρονεῖν (*phronein*). 449e, 450a, 486c, 489e, 490a, 490b, 490d, 490e, 491a, 491b, 491c, 492a, 497e, 498a, 498b, 498c, 498e, 499a.

judge, δικαστής (*dikastēs*); **judge** (verb), δικάζειν (*dikazein*); **judging**, δικαστική (*dikastikē*). 452e, 478a, 480a, 481a, 520b, 522a, 522c, 523b, 523c, 523d, 523e, 524a, 524d, 526c, 526e. κρίνειν (*krinein*) is **judge** where it is deciding between, 452c, 465d, 483d, and **try** at law. See **trial**.

just, δίκαιος (*dikaios*); **justly**, δικαίως (*dikaiōs*); **justice**, δικαιοσύνη (*dikaiosynē*); **justness**, δικαιότης (*dikaiotēs*), 508a. Throughout; justice among the crafts, 464b–465c; Callicles' "just by nature", 483c–484c, 488b. See Key Words, *Do injustice*.

knack, τριβή (*tribē*). 463b, 501a. Kept apart from **routine**. See Key Words, *Craft, routine, knack*.

law, νόμος (*nomos*), of custom and statute alike; **lawful**, νόμιμος (*nomimos*); **lawful things**, νόμιμα (*nomima*); **the law of nature**, νόμος τῆς φύσεως (*nomos tēs physeōs*), 483e. 474e, 482e, 483a, 483b, 483c, 483e, 484a, 484b, 484d, 488d, 488e, 489a, 489b, 489c, 492b, 504d, 512b, 523a. "Law court" is δικαστήριον (*dikastērion*), 452e–522b. See Key Words, *Nature and law*.

legends, μυθολογεῖν (*mythologein*), of telling them. 493a, 493d. See **tale**.

licence, ἐξουσία (*exousia*). 461e, 525a, 525d, 526a.

licentious, ἀκόλαστος (*akolastos*); **licentiousness**, ἀκολασία (*akolasia*). 477d, 477e, 478a, 478b, 492a, 492c, 493b, 493c, 493d, 494a, 504e, 505b, 507a, 507c, 507d, 507e, 508a, 515a. See Key Words, *Temperance*.

look into, σκοπεῖν, σκέπτεσθαι (*skopein*, *skeptesthai*). Throughout (451c–526d); **look thoroughly into**, διασκοπεῖσθαι (*diaskopeisthai*), 461b, 476b, 513d.

mighty, ἰσχυρός (*ischyros*); **mightier**, ἰσχυρότερος (*ischyroteros*); **might**, ἰσχύς (*ischys*). 452b, 457a, 488c, 488d, 489d, 490b, 491c, 496b, 499d, 504b; **exert might**, ἰσχυρίζεσθαι (*ischyrizesthai*), 489c, and "insist", 495b. Kept apart from **stronger** (note at 488d). See Key Words, *Stronger*.

nature, φύσις (*physis*); **by nature**, φύσει (*physei*); **according to nature**, κατὰ φύσιν (*kata physin*). 463a, 465a, 465c, 482e, 483a, 483c, 483e, 484a, 484b, 484c, 485e, 488b, 488c, 488d, 488e, 489b, 490a, 491e, 492a, 492b, 492c, 501a, 524b, 524c, 524d. See Key Words, *Nature and law*.

orator, ῥήτωρ (*rhētōr*); **rhetoric**, ῥητορική (*rhētorikē*); **rhetorician**, ῥητορικός (*rhētorikos*), of a person. Throughout; rhetorician, 455b–461b, 508c, 513b. See Key Words, *Rhetoric*.

order, κόσμος (*kosmos*); **order** (verb), **ordered**, κοσμεῖν (*kosmein*); **orderings**, κόσμησις (*kosmēsis*); **orderly**, κόσμιος (*kosmios*); **orderliness**, κοσμιότης (*kosmiotēs*); **unordered**, ἀκόσμητος (*akosmētos*); **disorder**, ἀκοσμία (*akosmia*). 493c, 493d, 494a, 504a, 504b, 504c, 504d, 506e, 507a, 508a, 511d; **adornment**, of finery, 523e, as in the *Symposium*. See Key Words, *Temperance*.

overreach, πλεονεκτεῖν (*pleonektein*); **overreaching**, πλεονεξία (*pleonexia*); **have more**, πλέον ἔχειν (*pleon echein*). 483c, 483d, 488b, 490a, 490c, 490d, 490e, 491a, 491d, 508a. See Key Words, *Stronger*.

pay the penalty, δίκην διδόναι (*dikēn didonai*); **penalty**, δίκη (*dikē*). 472d–481a, 482b, 486c, 507d, 509b, 510e, 515e, 523b, 525b, 527c; "justice" in Euripides' "counsels of justice", 486a. At 486b and 516a "penalty" renders other words of the courts. See Key Words, *Penalty*.

person, ἄνθρωπος (*anthrōpos*), in the singular. 453e, 458a, 468e, 473b, 477b, 478c, 485a, 485c, 485d, 491e, 495e, 496a, 496c, 500c, 503c, 505a, 507e, 509b, 509c, 511b, 512b, 515b, 521c, 521d, 521e, 522c, 524b, 524d; in address, "my man" (452b) and "Man" (518c). See **human beings**.

persuade, πείθειν (*peithein*); **persuasion**, πειθώ (*peithō*); **persuasive**, πιθανός (*pithanos*); **be persuaded**, πείθεσθαι (*peithesthai*).

452e–459d, 479c, 486a, 486c, 493a, 493c, 493d, 494a, 505d, 513c, 513d, 517b, 526d, 527c. πιθανός is "credulous" at 493a, a stated sense. See Key Words, *Persuade*.

pleasure, ἡδονή (*hēdonē*); **pleasant**, ἡδύς (*hēdys*); **be pleased**, ἥδεσθαι (*hēdesthai*). 458d, 462c–465a, 470c, 474d–475a, 477a, 478b, 484d, 491e–503a, 504c, 504e, 506c, 506d, 507b, 513d, 514a, 521b, 521e, 522a, 522b. ἡδέως (*hēdeōs*) is **pleasantly** of living (494b, 494d) and **gladly** in "would gladly" (448d, 458a, 506b), a stated sense. See Key Words, *Pleasure*.

politics, πολιτική (*politikē*); **politician**, **political**, πολιτικός (*politikos*); **engage in politics**, πολιτεύεσθαι (*politeuesthai*), 500c, 515b. 452e, 463d, 463e, 464b, 473e, 484d, 484e, 513b, 514a, 515c, 516c, 516d, 517a, 518b, 519b, 519c, 521d, 527d. See Key Words, *Tend*.

punish, κολάζειν (*kolazein*). 476a, 476d, 476e, 477a, 478a, 479a, 491e, 492d, 505b, 505c, 507d, 527b, 527c. See Key Words, *Penalty*.

pursuit, ἐπιτήδευμα, ἐπιτήδευσις (*epitēdeuma*, *epitēdeusis*); **make one's pursuit**, ἐπιτηδεύειν (*epitēdeuein*). 462e, 463a, 463b, 474d, 474e, 488a, 501d, 524c, 524d. Against the series' "way of life" (note at 462e).

refute, ἐλέγχειν (*elenchein*); **refutation**, ἔλεγχος (*elenchos*). Throughout (457e–527b); the two kinds of refutation, 471d–476a. See Key Words, *Refute*.

rejoice, χαίρειν (*chairein*). 474d, 478b, 485b, 494b, 494c, 494e, 495b, 496e, 497a, 497e, 498a–499a, 502b, 510d, 513c. With another verb, "with impunity" (510d), a stated sense; ἐᾶν χαίρειν (*ean chairein*) is "let pass, bidding farewell", 458b, 461a, 472c, 474a, 476a, 505d, 506a, 526d.

retribution, τιμωρία (*timōria*); **suffer retribution**, τιμωρεῖσθαι (*timōreisthai*). 472d, 472e, 525b, 525e. See Key Words, *Penalty*.

routine, ἐμπειρία (*empeiria*); **lack of routine**, ἀπειρία (*apeiria*); **versed**, ἔμπειρος (*empeiros*); **unversed**, ἄπειρος (*apeiros*). 448c, 462c, 462d, 463b, 465a, 500b, 500e, 501a, 518d; versed, 448b, 457c, 465d; unversed, 484c, 484d. See Key Words, *Craft, routine, knack*.

seem, δοκεῖν (*dokein*), personal, without a dative. Throughout; δοκεῖ μοι, δοκεῖ σοι with an infinitive are "I think", "you think". Kept apart from **appear**.

serve, ὑπηρετεῖν (*hypēretein*). 492a; **act as servant**, **serving**, **servant**, διακονεῖν, διακονικός, διάκονος (*diakonein*, *diakonikos*, *diakonos*), 517b, 517d, 518a, 518c, 521a.

shameful, *αἰσχρός* (*aischros*). Throughout; the argument with Polus, 474c–475e. See Key Words, *Beautiful, shameful*.

speech, *λόγος* (*logos*), a speech made; **long-speech**, *μακρολογία* (*makrologia*); **brief-speech**, *βραχυλογία* (*brachylogia*). 448d–451d, 452e, 456b, 460e, 461a, 461c, 461d, 465b, 465e, 466a, 466b, 471d, 471e, 481e, 482a, 484d, 486a, 487d, 492b, 492d, 502c, 502e, 504d, 506b, 513c, 519e, 521d, 522b. Kept apart from **account** and **argument**.

stronger, *κρείττων* (*kreittōn*); **weaker**, *ἧττων* (*hēttōn*). 456d, 483d, 484c, 488b, 488c, 488d, 488e, 489c, 489d, 489e, 490a, 490b, 491a, 491c, 522d. Kept apart from **better**, **superior** and "mightier" (see **mighty**). See Key Words, *Stronger*.

suffer, *πάσχειν* (*paschein*); **suffering**, *πάθος*, *πάθημα* (*pathos*, *pathēma*). Throughout; doer and sufferer, 476b–477a; the "suffering" of love, 481c–d; the soul's "sufferings", 524b–d.

sufficient, *ἱκανός* (*hikanos*); **sufficiently**, *ἱκανῶς* (*hikanōs*). 448b, 453a, 461b, 470d, 480a, 484a, 485e, 486d, 487a, 487b, 487d, 487e, 488a, 489a, 491b, 492a, 492b, 493c, 495a, 501b, 505e, 509d, 512c, 514d, 514e. A stated exception to the series' "capable".

superior, *ἀμείνων* (*ameinōn*), of persons; **inferior**, *χείρων* (*cheirōn*). 483d, 484c, 486b, 488b, 489e, 494a, 499b, 500b, 501b, 501c, 502e, 503b, 503d, 506e, 513b, 515d, 515e, 516c, 516e, 517b. Kept apart from **better**. See Key Words, *Stronger*.

take care of, *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι* (*epimeleisthai*). 485e, 515b, 516b, 516c, 520a. Kept apart from **tend** and from "care for", *κήδεσθαι* (*kēdesthai*). See Key Words, *Tend*.

tale, *μῦθος* (*mythos*). 505c, 523a, 527a. See Key Words, *Tale and account*.

temperate, *σώφρων* (*sōphrōn*); **temperance**, *σωφροσύνη* (*sōphrosynē*); **bring to temperance**, *σωφρονίζειν* (*sōphronizein*), 478d. 491d, 491e, 492a, 492b, 492c, 493d, 504d, 504e, 507a, 507b, 507c, 507d, 508a, 508b, 519a. See Key Words, *Temperance*.

tend, *θεραπεύειν* (*therapeuein*); **tending**, *θεραπεία* (*therapeia*); **tender**, *θεραπευτής* (*therapeutēs*). 464b, 464c, 486d, 501a, 501c, 513d, 513e, 516d, 516e, 517e, 518b, 521a, 524b. See Key Words, *Tend*.

think, *οἴεσθαι* (*oiesthai*). Throughout; also *δοκεῖ μοι*, *δοκεῖ σοι* with an infinitive. Kept apart from **believe**.

think fit, *ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς* (*ha dokei autois*), with a dative of the person; **think best**, *ἃ ἂν δόξῃ βέλτιστα εἶναι* (*ha an doxēi beltista einai*). 458e, 462a, 466c, 466d, 467a, 467b, 468d, 468e, 469a,

469c, 469d, 469e, 470a, 479c; think best, 466e, 467b. Kept apart from **want** and **decide**. See Key Words, *Power*.

trial, κρίσις (*krisis*); **try**, κρίνειν (*krinein*), at law; **those on trial**, οἱ κρινόμενοι (*hoi krinomenoi*); **the one who tries**, κριτής (*kritēs*). 521e, 523b, 523c, 523d, 523e, 524a, 526d, 526e, stated senses. **Try**, of attempting, is πειρᾶσθαι (*peirasthai*), and "a trial" at 448a is πεῖρα (*peira*).

tyrant, τύραννος (*tyrannos*); **tyranny**, τυραννίς (*tyrannis*). 466b, 466d, 467a, 468d, 469c, 469d, 473c, 473d, 473e, 479a, 492b, 510a, 510b, 510c, 525d.

want, βούλεσθαι (*boulesthai*). Throughout; the argument with Polus, 466c–468e; "Power or wanting?", 509d. Kept apart from **think fit** and from "be willing", ἐθέλειν (*ethelein*). See Key Words, *Power*.

wretched, ἄθλιος (*athlios*). 469a, 469b, 470d, 470e, 471a, 471b, 471c, 472d, 472e, 473a, 473b, 473d, 473e, 478d, 479b, 479e, 492b, 493b, 494e, 496b, 507c, 508b, 512a.

NOTE ON THIS EDITION

How the volume was made

The Greek was taken from the Perseus Digital Library's digital transcription of Burnet and cut into Burnet's lines by reading every line-end from the photographs of his page, in the impression described in the Editorial Note. Accents, breathings and iota subscripts were read on enlargements of the photograph of each page, and a doubtful mark was settled by setting it beside sure examples of each form. The digital transcription sets in lower case a number of words Burnet capitalizes, at the openings of speeches, of new paragraphs and of quoted words, and Polus' name in twelve places; it closes and reopens the quotation in Zeus' speech where Burnet has no mark (523e6), and gives four forms of ᾄδω the wrong breathing; these and the other differences, listed in the Editorial Note and in the record of the blocks below, were corrected to Burnet's page. The section letters and line numbers in the margin were worked out from the Stephanus divisions rather than copied, and were then compared with Burnet's margin, page by page.

The dialogue was made in twelve blocks (Burnet pages 1–10, 11–20, 21–30, 31–40, 41–50, 51–60, 61–70, 71–80, 81–90, 91–100, 101–110 and 111–117). Each block was checked by four independent reviewers: two, dividing its pages between them, compared the Greek and the apparatus with the page images letter by letter, one compared the English with the Greek clause by clause, and one checked every fact and reference in the notes and in the Editorial Note. Each finding was examined again against the evidence before it was adopted, and not all were adopted. What those checks caught is recorded at the end of this Note.

The volume was then read through again as one text, since a check made block by block cannot see some kinds of error: a word rendered one way in one block and another way in the next, a recapitulation that states a step in other words than the step itself, a rendering settled late that never reached the first pages. The translator read the whole, and four further reviewers read it independently: one for the consistency of terms across the whole book, two for sense, omissions and continuity in its two halves, and one for the

Editorial Note against the scan of Burnet's volume. The Introduction, the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Outline, the two essays on later readings and the Glossary were then written from the finished English, and three more reviewers checked them, claim by claim and citation by citation, together with the corrections made in the final reading.

What the final reading caught

It found about a hundred and ten points in the English and its notes that the block checks had passed, most of them small, and about ten in the Editorial Note. They fall into a few classes.

The largest class was renderings that had drifted from the rule of one English word for one Greek word, most of them in the first blocks, which were translated before the later rulings were made, and several that earlier reviews had marked to be brought into line at the end. Δῆλον ὅτι is "Plainly" at 448c, as at 459b and 467c; πλουτεῖν is "be wealthy" in the drinking-song (451e), as at 467d; φάσκειν is "assert" at 448b; ἔχειν with an infinitive is "have the means to" at 452b and 453a, its first appearances; νόσημα is "illness" at 450a, as at 479a, 480b and 512a, since "disease" is νόσος; ἀσθένεια is "feebleness" at 477b, as at 496b, since "weak" is ἧττων; τοι is left untranslated after γάρ in six places of the later blocks (484c, 488c, 492e, 498e, 505d, 506a), as in the first blocks and in the series; the singular ἄνθρωπος is "person" at 458a and 522c, and the plural ἄνθρωποι "human beings" in nine places of the first, third and fourth blocks, where "people" had stood; φάναι is "claim" in eight places, among them 482c and its recapitulation at 508c; the answer Μάλιστα is "Most of all" (450a, 468c, 477c, 496e), since "most certainly" is παντὸς μᾶλλον (527b); Pericles is "the one who has lately come to his end" at 503c, as τελευτᾶν is rendered in the myth, with the notes at 473e–474a and 503c; κρίνεσθαι is "be tried" in Socrates' picture of his trial (521e), as in the myth, and the note at 464e quotes it so; and the forms of the stock answers (Οὐ δῆτα "No indeed", 455a; Οὐδαμῶς "By no means", 475c; Ἀληθῆ "True", 448a; Τί δὲ δή "What, then?", 452c), of τάχα "maybe" (450c), μέντοι "however" (458b), φάθι "say so" (475e), τάξις "arrangement" at its first appearance (455b), ἐν τῷ δήμῳ "before the people" (451c), ἐπιψηφίζειν "put the question to the vote" (474a), ἀπιστεῖν "not be convinced" (469e) and μέλει "matter" (501b) were brought into line. Λέγειν is no longer "tell", which is κελεύειν (493c, 493d, 518b, 527a), and the noun "law court" is spelt alike throughout.

Some renderings missed the Greek. At 495b the English had reversed Socrates' suspicion that the good is not rejoicing (*μὴ οὐ* with the subjunctive); at 508c, in a recapitulation of Callicles' words at 486b, an added "them" had taken Socrates out of the dangers he cannot bring himself safe out of; at 510d a note now explains that *χαίρων* joined to another verb means "with impunity"; at 494e Socrates' question is deliberative, "shall I ask"; at 500c a relative clause had been made a question; at 522a the expected answer of *οὐ μέγα* had been turned round; at 520e *μὴ φάναι* is to say one will not; at 513a the Thessalian women draw down the moon "at the cost of what we love most"; at 519c a second "pretend" had no Greek behind it; at 493e–494a the man with sound jars fills his jars for himself, where the English had made him fill himself; at 482d the laughter is still part of Polus' report; at 449e the sick are the subject of the clause, not the persons told; and at 492d the others "think through" what they will not say, since "have in mind" is *νοεῖν*. Recalls were made to answer the passages they recall: "concerning either human beings or gods" at 522d, as at 507a–b; "one must make use of rhetoric" at 527c, as at 480d and 508b; "of the orators now, at any rate" at 503b, which 517a recalls; and "for Gorgias' sake" at 505c is kept for the preposition *χάριν*, as "for ... sake" elsewhere. Particles the draft had left out were restored: *γε* at 466d, at 470e, and twice at 473a, where Polus' "Outlandish things indeed" and Socrates' "Yes, and" now show it; *καί* at 461c.

At the page turns, the English of Euripides' "counsels of justice" now stays on page 56, where *δίκης βου-* begins (486a), "of studies" on page 41 (475a), and the article *ἡ*, which ends page 93, has its English there (510e); a dash at 459d that Burnet does not print was removed. Among the notes, the one at 488d had made "mightier" Callicles' word, where it is Socrates'; the one at 501a printed the same transliteration for both accents; the one at 464e quoted 521e inexactly; and the one at 472d used "wronged", which the English never uses. The Stephanus markers of the first five blocks were written in the form of the later blocks, so that the margin shows the bare page number.

In the Editorial Note, the list of the printer's signatures now gives all fifteen, from 17* beneath 447c to 24* beneath 525a, and a fault in the typesetting that had turned their asterisks into italic markers is mended; the list of dashes within a sentence is completed for the first fifty pages, with Socrates' broken oath (466e6) and Polus' broken sentence (467b1); the digital transcription is said to give four forms of *ᾄδω* the wrong breathing, not every form;

the Vienna manuscript is identified as phil. gr. 21, Bekker's Υ, the manuscript Burnet's preface calls *Venetus Marcianus* 21; the article in the *Rheinisches Museum* is no longer ascribed to Schanz; Alexander's quotation is said to be loose, not from memory; the account of *plērousthai* follows the correction at 493e–494a; and two damaged letters in the apparatus are described separately.

What remains undone

The places in their works of several ancient witnesses Burnet cites have not been found or confirmed. Olympiodorus' commentary on the *Gorgias*, in Westerink's edition, could not be read, so the ancient reading of the proverb at 447a, his note on the stone-curlew (494b) and the account of his lectures on the myth in the essay on its later readings are at second hand; Greene's *Scholia Platonica* could not be read either, and the scholia cited in the notes at 494b and 498e–499a are reported, not seen. The work of Theodoret that Burnet cites in the myth is not named; the work and column of Philodemus are not identified beyond "his writings on rhetoric"; *C. I. A.* i. 189 (472b1) and Iamblichus at 499e9 could not be checked. Several scholars whom Burnet names only by surname are left as he names them (Kratz, von Kleist, Schaefer, Blomfield, Beck, Riemann, Lamberton, Liebhold, K. Fuhr, Voemel, Morstadt, Forman), and Findeisen is only probably the editor of the *Gorgias* of 1796; the Coislin manuscript of 482a7 and 505c3 is identified only as probable, and the numbers of Euripides' fragments are taken from published discussions.

Some readings of this copy lie at the limit of what its photographs show: the second f at 458e7, the second point after Socrates' label at 479d3, the breathings that the print has filled at 476a3, 477d2 and 482a7, the colon at 487d7 and the semicolon at 486d4, the two forms given to P at 500b3, and *ἑκαστον* without an accent at 506e3. The second point at 479d3 is taken for an accident of the impression and not printed, and the filled signs at 476a3, 477d2 and 482a7 are read as the forms require, as the record of the blocks below explains; the rest are kept as printed and noted in the Editorial Note. Dodds' edition, or another impression of Burnet's, has not been seen.

Several renderings are stated senses, departures from the series' rulings made for this dialogue: *πίστις* "conviction" and *πιστεύειν* "be convinced" (454c–455a); *ἐπιτήδευμα* "pursuit" and *χάρις* "gratification" (462c–e); *δίκη* "penalty", *τιμωρία* "retribution" and *ἔλεγχος* "refutation" (472d and after); *ἱκανός* "sufficient" in

every place; *κρίνειν* "try" and *δίκη* "case" in the myth (523b–527a); *ἡδέως* "gladly" in "would gladly" (448d, 458a, 506b); and the bare vocative *Ἄνθρωπε*, "Man" (518c).

The apparatus is Burnet's alone. It has not been collated against the manuscripts or the papyri, and readings proposed since his edition are not reported. The translation follows Burnet's text even where later scholars would print something else.

The notes are a reader's aid, not a commentary. They were chosen to explain what the English cannot carry, and they label the more doubtful interpretations as such. Whether Socrates refutes Callicles or only silences him, and how the myth's punishments fit the claim that no one does injustice willingly, are set out in the Introduction as questions, not argued, and the essays on later readings name some readers without attempting a history; a reader who wants the scholarly debate will need a commentary.

The checks described above were made by independent reviewers working from the same page images. The volume has not been read by a specialist outside the project, and a reader who finds an error is asked to report it.

The record of the blocks

The notes that follow were written as each block was finished, and are kept as a record of what its check found.

Block I (Burnet pages 1–10, 447a1–453c8)

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the ten pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter, and every margin letter and number with a full rendering of the page. On pages 1–5 they found nothing to correct. On pages 6–10 they found that the letterspacing of the drinking-song at 451e3–4 does not take in *ἐστιν*, nor *τὸ δὲ* before *δεύτερον*, which are Plato's words and not the song's, and three forms in the apparatus that the draft had read otherwise: the corrector t's *ἠ* at 452c3, with a smooth breathing and no accent, the medial *σ* of the letters *οσ* written above B's reading at 452e7, and Woolsey's *ἤ οὔ* at 453c8, with an acute, not a circumflex. They confirmed the capitals Burnet prints against the digital transcription (*Εἰπέ* 447d6, *Πῶλος* 448d1, 448d8 and 449b6, and the heads of the quoted and imagined words at 450e–452d), the brackets at 451b4 and 451d5, every dash of the run-in exchanges at 449d–450b, the rough breathings of the reflexives *αὑτὰ*, *αὑτοῦ* and *αὑτῷ* at 451c3, 452b3,

452c6, 452d7 and 452e7, and, in the apparatus, the readings the draft had marked as doubtful at 447a3, 448d2, 451a7 and 452c3. A few specks of the scan, among them a grave-shaped mark over *ἀνθρώποις* at 448c4, were examined and are not printed.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause. Eight Stephanus markers stood a word or more late and were moved to the first English word of their section. Several renderings were brought into line with the series: *μετέχειν* is "share in" (448c), not "partake", which is *μεταλαμβάνειν* in the same sentence; *ἀξιοῦν* is "deem" (450c, 453b), "hold" being *νομίζειν*; *ἰσχυρός* is "mighty" (452b), "strong" being *κρείττων*, which the dialogue will set against it; *ποιητής* is "poet" (451e); *πρᾶξις* "action"; *διατρίβειν* "spend time"; *αἴτιος* "cause"; *ἔμπειρος* "versed"; *βραχυλογία* "brief-speech"; *τὸ κεφάλαιον* "the sum"; "tell" is kept for *κελεύειν*, and *καὶ γάρ* is no longer rendered "in fact", which is kept for *τυγχάνειν* with a participle. Three constructions were corrected: the partitive genitive in Polus' set piece (448c), the ellipse of Polus' "if sufficiently for you" (448b), and the infinitive at 452d, which makes Gorgias the craftsman of the good by his own claim. Socrates' dry "Polus appears ... to have prepared himself well, at any rate, for speeches" (448d) had lost its adverb. The italics of the drinking-song now match Burnet's spacing, the English page turn at 450e falls where the Greek turns, and wording that followed W. R. M. Lamb's Loeb more closely than the Greek requires was changed.

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the Editorial Note against the sources and the scan. The note on Herodicus now gives the places from which the other Herodicus is known as a trainer from Selymbria (*Protagoras* 316e, *Republic* 406a); the drinking-song's second wish is to be born beautiful "in form", not "in nature"; the verb of display is the middle, *epideiknysthai*; the note on brevity and length says who says what in the *Phaedrus* and the *Protagoras*; the notes on "beautiful", "craft", "speeches" and "rhetoric" now stand at or near the first appearance of each word. In the Editorial Note, Burnet's debt to Král for W is described as his preface describes it, reports at the more important places and full collations only for the *Laches* and the *Meno*, against Král's full collation of F; Cobet's conjecture at 453a5 and Burnet's capital at 452a6 were added; the abbreviations *accentum add.*, *accentum ... posuit* and *et* were added to the list; and the scholars named in the apparatus are given their first names.

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the ten pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter, and every margin letter and number with a full rendering of the page. In the text they found one apparent misprint the draft had silently corrected, *σὐκ* for *οὐκ* at 457a1, whose first letter has the top stroke of a sigma, and one mark the draft had printed as Burnet's that is a fleck of ink in this copy: the "acute" over the last letter of *ἔχει* at 459e8, a third the size of the acutes on the same line and set over the wrong side of the letter. In the apparatus they corrected two forms the draft had misread: F's *ἐγῶμαι* at 454d6, with a coronis and no iota subscript, and B's *ἠ* at 455b4, with a smooth breathing, not a rough one. They settled three letters in the Latin of the apparatus, the e of *ex* at 458b6 and of *ante* at 460c2 and the o of *post* at 454e3, as letters that did not print whole, measuring them against sure examples of each letter on the same lines, and confirmed as printed the second small f at 458e7, which is named in the Editorial Note. They confirmed the run-in exchanges and their capitals, the labels that end a line at 454c8, 454d3 and 454d8, the quotation marks at 454d5 and 455d2–4, *Ποίας* at 454a8, the breathings of *αὐτῇ* and *αὐτὸν* at 456a8 and 456c3, and B's *ἑξῆς* at 454e7–8, and found two marks, between *ἤκουον* and *ὅτε* at 455e5 and before *καῦσαι* at 456b4, to be specks.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause. Several renderings were brought into line with the series: *πολέμιος* is "foe" (455b, 456e), kept apart from *ἐχθρός* "enemy" in the same speech; *ἀποδεικνύναι* "demonstrate" and *ἔχειν* with an infinitive "have the means to" (454a); *κατανοεῖν* "apprehend" (455b), where the draft had also dropped Socrates' "not even I myself"; *τεχνικώτατος* "most masterly"; *ἔμβραχυ* "at all"; *καθορᾶν* "catch sight of"; *ἐᾶν* "let pass" and *ἐᾶν χαίρειν* "let pass, bidding farewell" (458a–b); *ὑγιεινός* "wholesome"; *χαλεπαίνειν* "be harsh"; *ἀσχολία* "business"; *καὶ μὲν δή* "moreover"; *Τί δέ;* "What?"; *δοκεῖς μοι* "I think"; *δύνασθαι* "have power" wherever the draft had "be able", which is kept for *δυνατός* and *οἷός τε*; *δικαίως* "justly", not "with justice", which belongs to *δικαιοσύνη*. Gorgias' *ἀγωνία* became "competition", since "contest" is the series' word for *ἀγών*. Three constructions were corrected: the reciprocal "teach one another" at 457c, with the long sentence there rebuilt so that the inability is to part company after defining and learning; the nominative at 456c, which makes

the rhetorician the better persuader, not the better candidate; and the dative ἔμοιγε at 458d, which is the object of "you will gratify". The marker at 455c had stood three clauses late. Words that follow W. R. M. Lamb's Loeb more closely than the Greek requires were changed ("before a multitude", "be so busy", "without knowledge of", "on their own account").

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the Editorial Note against the sources and the scan. The note on κᾰ̓τα at 457b5 now says why the manuscripts' κατὰ will not construe; the note at 459d speaks of the first use of *kalos* for conduct only, since *aischros* had already been so used at 457d and 458d; the note on the inference at 460c says what Polus will in fact claim Gorgias granted, the admission of 460a; and the note on "conviction" now says where the *Symposium*'s "trust" stands. In the Editorial Note, Quintilian is said to quote 460c1–2, not to report the argument; the places of 457c5 were added for Cobet, Schanz and Madvig; the scholars are given in one list; and Schaefer and Blomfield are left as Burnet names them, with Kratz, von Kleist, Findeisen and Beck, since their identification could not be made certain.

Block III (Burnet pages 21–30, 461a3–467d6)

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the ten pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter, and every margin letter and number with a full rendering of the page. Every line of this block came from the digital transcription without a correction, and every word was read again on the photographs. In the apparatus at 463a5 they corrected two forms: Burnet's note on B reads "supra ῃ", with an iota subscript under the η, of the same size and place as the one in αἰσχυνθῇς on the line above, and the form of the later manuscripts is αἰσχυνθείς, with an acute, not a grave. They confirmed Burnet's capitals where the transcription has small letters (Πῶλος at 463b7, 463e2, 463e6 and 466e4; Τῇ at the new paragraph of 465b1; Ἦ at 466c9, with his quotation marks round Polus' question), the run-in exchanges at 462d, 464a–b and 467c–d, the angle brackets of ⟨ὃ⟩ at 461c1 and the square brackets of [τούτου πρόσθεν] at 467b4, Οὗτος ἀνήρ at 467b1 with a smooth breathing, Οὐκ οὖν printed as two words at 467b6, and the rough breathings of αὑτῷ and αὑτό at 465d1 and 465d3; and in the apparatus the long note at 466a8, the words removed before 465c1, the two forms *Proll. in Aristidem* (463a6) and

Proll. ad Aristidem (464b8), B's ἓν at 466c7 and F's ἁπάντων at 467d6, both rough, and the small letters of πῶλος in the lemma at 466e4. Dots at 465a7, 466a8, 466c9 and 467c5 are specks, and a word written above the line at 467a1 is a reader's pencil.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause. Ordinary words were brought into line with the series: ἐρωτᾶν is "ask" (462a, 462b, 467c), since "question" is ἀνερωτᾶν; που "I take it" and δήπου "surely"; οἶμαι "I think"; λανθάνειν "escape the notice"; τρόπος "way"; αὖ "again"; καὶ γάρ "actually"; ἀλλὰ μήν "but indeed"; μέντοι "however"; Δῆλον ὅτι "plainly"; ἔχειν with an infinitive "have the means to" (466a); δοκοῦσί σοι with an infinitive "you think" (467c); ὀξύς "keen" (463e). χρήματα, which Polus says the orators take from their victims, is "money", since "wealth" is πλοῦτος two pages later. Particles Burnet prints on the evidence of a few witnesses now show: γε at 466b6 and 467b10, τά at 466d5. The first statement of what the orators do, "whatever they think best" (466e1), now has the same words as the two places that recall it. Four Stephanus markers were moved to the first English word of their section. The geometers' proportion was set in the form of the Greek ("what cosmetics is to gymnastics, sophistry is to legislation"), and other wording that followed W. R. M. Lamb's Loeb more closely than the Greek requires was changed (462a, 464a, 466e, 467c).

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the Editorial Note against the sources and the scan. The quotation of the *Hipparchus* at 461d had dropped "for you"; the note on Anaxagoras now gives his words in Simplicius' order; the note on Burnet's Ἢ οὐχί at 466c9 now gives each manuscript reading; the note on Polus' name no longer calls the jest an old one, and says that Aristotle does not say which Herodicus made it; the note on ᾧ at 465a4 cites 501a for the other construction; the note on the hand in B at 466a cites the explanation in W from which it comes; and the note on *nomizesthai* now follows LSJ. In the Editorial Note, Aelius Aristides' speech *To Plato, in Defence of Rhetoric* was confirmed to quote 463a6–465c3 word for word, with the readings Burnet cites from it; Philodemus' work could not be identified from the sources reachable, and is described only as his writings on rhetoric.

Block IV (Burnet pages 31–40, 467d7–474b7)

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the ten pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by

letter, and every margin letter and number with a full rendering of the page. They found one word the draft had taken from the digital transcription as it stands there and Burnet does not print: *θοἰμάτιον* at 469d7, which in this copy has no coronis, nor any trace of one, and is kept as an apparent misprint, *θοιμάτιον*. They confirmed the other apparent misprint, the dash after Polus' label at 468c1 (ΠΩΛ.---Μάλιστα), as printed type, measured against the dash before the label; the run-in exchanges of 467d–468e and their line-end dashes; the quotation marks and capitals of the two imagined speeches at 469d–e; the brackets at 470a9 and 470b11; and the breathings of *αὐτοῦ* at 469c7 (smooth) and *αὑτοῦ* at 471b4 and 473c3 (rough). In the apparatus they confirmed the forms the draft had marked as doubtful: *ἓν ἐκ* P at 468a5, the smooth breathing under the circumflex of *ὦ* at 469b5, *ἄν* with an acute before the enclitic at 469e4, F's *φῆς* without an iota subscript at 470b9, *δούς* with an acute at 473d9, the dicolon at 473b3, and the smooth breathing of *ἄλλος*, *ἄλλως*, *ἄλλων* and *ἄλλο* on pages 36–40, whose combined sign looks at first like the rough one. A dot after *μάρτυρας* at 472a4, half the size of a raised point, and others at 469a3, 469d6, 470a3, 471d1 and 474a6, are specks; marks under *μάλης* (469d1) and *κάμης* (470c7) and between *τοῦτο* and *λέγω* (469c5) are a reader's pencil.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause. The construction at 469c8 was corrected: Socrates asks Polus to lay hold of him in argument, not of the argument. Ordinary words were brought into line with the series and with the earlier blocks: *ἀπαλλάττειν* "rid" (as 458a), *φάναι* "claim" and *διώκειν* "pursue" in Polus' story, *αὖ* "again", *παλαιός* "old", *παρέχεσθαι* "provide" (since "produce" is *ἀπεργάζεσθαι*), *οὕτω* "thus" (since "way" is *τρόπος*), *ὅρος* "definition", *συγγένεια* "kinship", *ξένος* "stranger", *εἴπερ* "if", *ἀλλά* and *ἐπεί* no longer "why". The aorists of 469b and 473e now show ("has put to death", "has become tyrant"), the reflexive of 471b ("he escaped his own notice"), and the particles Burnet prints from a few witnesses (*γε* at 469b2, 472e4 and 473b6; *καί* at 472c6). *εὐφημεῖν* is "speak words of good omen"; *ζημιοῦσθαι* is "suffer loss", as in the series; *χάριν ἔχειν* is "have gratitude". Wording that followed W. R. M. Lamb's Loeb more closely than the Greek requires was changed (469b, 469d–e, 471c, 473e).

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the Editorial Note against the sources and the scan. A note now says that Burnet's "in the Pythion" (472b1) is F's

reading, against "at Pytho", Delphi, in the other manuscripts, and another that his "When" (470b9) is F's; the note on Aristocrates gives his generalship from Thucydides 8.9.2 and his death after Arginusae; the note on Socrates' thesis gives the places where it is proved (474c–475e, and the second thesis at 476a–479e); the note on the date adds Nicias and Aristocrates, offered as living witnesses, and Athenaeus' charge of anachronism; Euripides' stay with Archelaus is attributed to Aristotle, and the legal phrase about one's property to Demosthenes. In the Editorial Note, Simplicius' quotation of 469c was found in his commentary on Aristotle's *On the Heavens*, and Athenaeus' of 473e–474a at *Deipnosophists* 5.217f; the sentence on the imagined speeches at 469d–e, which are both Socrates', and the sentence on the dicolon at 473b3 were corrected; and four abbreviations were added.

Block V (Burnet pages 41–50, 474b8–481c2)

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the ten pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter, and every margin letter and number with a full rendering of the page; the two margin letters that the black-and-white image turns into solid squares (479b1, 480b1) are b. Every line of this block came from the digital transcription without a correction, and the reviewers found no error in the words. One place needed a new means of building the page: at the turn from 478a7 to 478a8 Burnet prints no dash between Socrates' question and Polus' label, though the exchange runs on in one paragraph and the label is not indented; it is kept as he prints it and listed among the apparent misprints. In the apparatus a reviewer found that Burnet keys *ὡμολογημένων* to c7 at 477c, though the word stands in the eighth line of the section; the key is kept as printed and the slip named in the Editorial Note. The reviewers confirmed the forms the draft had marked as doubtful, measured against sure forms on the same lines: the smooth breathing of F's *αὐτοῖν* (475a6); the rough breathing, under a circumflex and with an iota subscript, of B, T and P's *ᾗ* at 477d2; F's *ὡς* without an accent (477e2); the four asterisks of *τοι***** (476b7); the order B T F P at 477e6; the rough breathings of *αὑτοῦ* and *αὑτὸν* at 480b–d; and the iota written on the line in *δώιη* and *δώηι* (481a3). At 476a3 the sign over the *ὃ* of B, T and P is filled solid in this copy; it is read as rough breathing and grave, as the relative requires. At 479d3 a second point stands after Socrates' label (ΣΩ..), as large as the first and touching it; since two points set as type would stand apart, it is taken for an accident

of the impression and not printed, and is noted here for the final reading. Marks beside 474d8, 475e1 and 475e7 are specks, and the underlining at 475c9, 477b7 and 477d2 is a reader's pencil.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause. A word had been left out at 475d4, "rather" (*μᾶλλον*), and is restored. Renderings were brought into line with the series and the earlier blocks: *ὡσαύτως* "in the same way", *ἐξαρκεῖν* "be enough", *φοβεῖσθαι* "be afraid", *μεταβάλλειν* "change", *πέφυκε* "is naturally", *προσήκειν* "be fitting", *μάλιστα* "most of all", *μένειν* "remain", *συμφωνεῖν* "be in consonance", *ἔχειν* with an infinitive "have the means to", *εἴπερ* "if" (as Blocks I–IV), *οὕτω* "thus" against *ὧδε* "this way", and *ὑπό* "at the hands of". The agreement of 475d is made "with us", by the many and by Polus; Polus' "Outlandish things" (480e) repeats his words at 473a; the participles of 476b, 480b and 481a keep their construction; Burnet's dashes at 480c1 and 480e7 are followed, and no others added. Each English page now ends, as in the earlier blocks, with the article or negative whose Greek ends the Greek page. Wording that followed W. R. M. Lamb's Loeb more closely than the Greek requires was changed (474b, 476b, 479c, 480a, 480c, 481a).

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the Editorial Note against the sources and the scan. Callicles last spoke at 458d, not at 447c; the doctor's cutting and burning is at 521e; Socrates' common rule of friends and enemies is at *Republic* 332a–d. The note on *paschein* no longer claims that "suffer just things" is strange Greek: it is the ordinary phrase for being justly treated, and the English keeps "suffer" so that each step of the argument shows. The note on *hypoulos* no longer gives a derivation that the lexicon doubts; the note on *zēmia* states the legal sense; and a note now says where Burnet's text at 477d2–3 follows F. In the Editorial Note the place of the missing dash, the range of Stobaeus' citations (to 479b8), the full lists of places for *scr. recc.* and *al.*, the date of Ficino's translation (1484–85) and the range of the words for pain were corrected; Christian Cron is named as the reviser of Deuschle's annotated *Gorgias*; and eight abbreviations were added.

Block VI (Burnet pages 51–60, 481c2–488e5)

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the ten pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter, and every margin letter and number with a full rendering of the page; the two margin marks that the black-and-white image

turns into solid squares (487e1, 488d10) are e and 10. The digital transcription needed two corrections in the words: Burnet's capital for Polus' name at 487a7, and ἄ̓σματι at 484b2, with the smooth breathing, where the transcription has a rough one. The block brought the dialogue's first lines set as verse, Pindar's and Euripides', and the first words of a poet letterspaced inside a speaker's prose since the drinking-song; the reviewers measured the spacing word by word (484e4–5, 486b5, 486c4–8) and found it as built, and found that Burnet sets Pindar's lines more deeply than Euripides', so the two indents were made to match his page. In the apparatus three forms were corrected: B's ᾐ at 481c6 has a smooth breathing and no accent, as at 455b4; the two forms of ἄ̓ν in Bekker's entry at 486e5 have an acute before the enclitic; and the mark before αἷ Par. 1812 at 486d4 is a semicolon, the only one in that place in the dialogue, kept as printed. The reviewers confirmed the forms the draft had marked as doubtful: F's ᾗ̓ τις (486b5), smooth with an acute; the rough breathing of ᾐ̓ σὴ (487e6); the smooth breathings under the circumflex of τ᾽ ᾖ, τ᾽ ᾖι and τ᾽ ᾖν (488c1) and of B's ᾖ (488c7); F's ταυτα without an accent (487d3); and the reading of 487e4 as two entries, F's συνεχώρησά with the accent its enclitic σοι requires, then σὺ B T: σοι F: om. P. At 487d7 a colon stands where the sentence ends (σοι:), its upper point the size and height of the raised point at the end of the same line and its lower point on the line, overlapping as in a single sort, with the wider space Burnet leaves after a full point; it is kept as printed and named among the apparent misprints, as is *Coisl* without its point at 482a7. The u of *ut* at 483e3 and the closing parenthesis at 484e7 did not print whole and are given as set. Over F's εἷ at 482a7 the sign is filled solid; it is read as breathing and circumflex, as the form requires. The marks over παρουσίᾳ (487e5) and before F's ταυτα (487d3) are specks, and the word written beside 488a8 and the underlining of βλᾶκα are a reader's.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause. A Stephanus marker stood a word late at 481e1, 485c1 and 486e1 (where the e stands against Callicles' question, not Socrates' answer), and at 484d1, 487b1 and 488d1 the marker now stands, as in Block I, at the copula that English word order brings forward. The page turn at 482e–483a now keeps the English of αἰσχύ-|νηται on the page where the word begins, and so at 484c (κτή-|ματα). Renderings were brought into line with the series: μεταβάλλεσθαι "change" (as Block V), παύεσθαι "cease", against the active "stop", ἀποφαίνειν "set forth", λέγειν "speak

of", not "tell", which is κελεύειν, αὖ "again", σαφῶς "clearly", καλῶς "well", τεκμαίρεσθαι "take as evidence" (the *Symposium*), ἐντυγχάνειν "come upon", since "meet with" is τυγχάνειν, Τί δή; "Why so?" (as 448e, 469a, 470a), ἡλικία "time of life" at 484c7 too, and γράμματα "letters" (the *Phaedrus*); μαγγάνευμα is now "trickery". The aorists of 484a–b, in the conclusion of a general condition, are given as perfects ("has come to light", "has shone forth"); ὡς with the genitive at 484c gives Callicles' own ground, "on the ground that", not "as if"; πρὸς σέ at 482c goes with the suffering, "of having suffered toward you", as in Callicles' "suffer toward" three times in the same speech; ἐνδεεστέρω and αἰσχυντηροτέρω at 487a–b are both comparatives governed by "more than is needed"; τοῖς ... ἑταιροτάτοις at 487d is the dative of those advised; and the relative at 485e4 now goes with Euripides, whom Callicles had named, not with Amphion. Dashes that Burnet does not print were removed at seven places, and his own kept. A note says that the one who laughed at 482d is Polus. Wording that followed W. R. M. Lamb's Loeb more closely than the Greek requires was changed (481c, 481e, 483a, 484a, 485a, 485b, 486e).

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the Editorial Note against the sources and the scan. The lines of the *Antiope* at 484e are fr. 184 in Kannicht's numbering, not 183; Aristotle quotes them with "best", and only the *Alcibiades II*, which works them into its prose, has "strongest"; the note on fr. 188 no longer says what Zethus' lost words were, but that he bids his brother cease playing the fool (P's word here) and exercise himself in a "good music" of another kind, variously restored. Socrates' oath is sworn whole at 461b and 466c and broken off at 466e; the Egyptians' god is commonly taken to be Anubis; the note on [ἢ] names the manuscripts that have it; the note on λόγον says that B and W lack the clause; a note now gives F's περιουσίᾳ at 487e5, against "presence" in B, T and P; and the note on Zethus' rebuke gives διαπρέπεις its sense, "you adorn", and says that *dikē* there is the poet's word for right. In the Editorial Note the extent of Aulus Gellius' quotation was corrected (484c5–e3 and 485a3–e2, passing over the lines of Euripides); the lines at 484b and 484e are called the first that Burnet sets as verse, since the drinking-song of 451e is verse he runs into prose; Riemann is named as Burnet names him, his first name being uncertain; and *Vind.* was added to the abbreviations.

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the ten pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter, and every margin letter and number with a full rendering of the page, and found the text right throughout. The digital transcription needed one correction in the words, σὺ with a grave at 491b5, where it has an acute; the reviewers confirmed it against the sure graves of the same line. The block brings the first word of the manuscripts in square brackets since Block VI (οὔ at 491e3, after Routh), the first words supplied in angle brackets since Block V (τί ἂν at 492b4, by Woolsey's addition), and the second passage of Euripides set as verse; the reviewers measured the indent of 492e10–11 against the lines of the *Antiope* at 484e6–7 and found it the same. They confirmed the breathings the draft had marked as doubtful, among them Burnet's ἁθρόοι (490b2, his own reading), Οὑτοσὶ (489b7), αὑτῶν (491d4, 492a5, 492b1, 492c2) and ἁμόθεν (492d7), rough, and ἀιδὲς (493b4), smooth and without a diaeresis, and the dashes closed up at 490a4–5, 492e9, 493b4–5 and 494e1. In the apparatus eight forms were corrected, each a breathing, accent or subscript the draft had supplied: F's σὺ λέγη at 489c4 has no iota subscript; Heindorf's ἄττα at 489c6 has a smooth breathing, the indefinite; the form of T, W and F at 491d4 is τί ἢ τί, with a grave, not a circumflex, and the mark under its η is a speck, and the note of the recent hand in B begins with the same ἢ; the lemma at 492e7 is ὥς, with its accent, as in the text; F's ἐκει (493e7) and ἐτι (494a7) have no accent; and F's κνησθῆ (494e1) has no subscript. The reviewers confirmed B's ἠ without an accent and its unaccented ουτω (491d4, 491e3), the two asterisks in T's reading at 491e3, F's ἀνθρόοι (490b2), the π printed over the first τ of T's τότὲ (491b8), the key "e 5, 6" (492e5), the parenthesis in ἀ(ι)εὶ (493e8), B, T and P's ἄλλοθέν with two accents (492d7), the subscript in the lemma πληρώσῃ (494b1) and its absence in ἀποκρίνη P F (494e2). The comma in "*Phaed.* 79, a 4" at 493b4 is in this copy and is kept and named among the apparent misprints. The heavier inking about 489c7 is the same fount, and the marks before τὸ at 492e11, over the stop at 494d8 and after ἑκατέρου at 493d7 are specks.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause. In four places the draft had translated a reading Burnet does not print: the dative ῥήματι at 490a5 is now "hunting with an expression", not the vulgate's accusative; μετατίθεσθαι at 493d1 is the infinitive governed by "persuade",

not the later manuscripts' μετατίθεσαι; πληρώσῃ at 494b1 is the active, "he has filled them", not the middle; and F's αὐτοί at 492b6 is now rendered, "should themselves bring in". Words the draft had left out are rendered: καί at 489b4, so that Socrates' "I too, indeed" answers Callicles' "you too" of 483a; ἀεί at 491a1; αὖ at 491c2; δ' at 492e10; the καί of 492e7, "even as you say"; γε at 490e10 and 492e5, ἀλλά at 489e9 and γάρ at 494e9. The marker stood a word early at 492e1 and a word late at 491c1 and 494b1, and the page turn at 489d now keeps "the two" with the page on which τοὺς δύο stands. Renderings were brought into line with the series: ἀνερωτᾶν "question", πάλαι "long", οὕτω "thus", γιγνώσκειν "know", ἄνθρωπος in the singular "person", ὑπηρετεῖν "serve", δύνασθαι "have power", δεῖσθαι "entreat", ἑτοιμάζειν "make ready", φροντίζειν "take thought", ὀνομάζειν "name", σῆμα "grave" (the *Phaedrus*), διά with the accusative "because of", αὖθις "at another time", the future ἐρεῖς "say"; οὐ μή with the subjunctive is "certainly not", and φέρε δή, λέγω is "let me tell". πιθανός, elsewhere "persuasive", is "credulous" in the likeness of the jar, as the context and the lexicon require; κνησιᾶν is "have an urge to scratch", since "want" belongs to βούλεσθαι; and ἐκπλήττειν is "strike with amazement", since an active "struck Polus" would read as a blow. Wording that followed W. R. M. Lamb's Loeb more closely than the Greek requires was changed (489b, 490e, 491a, 491b, 492a, 492d, 493b, 493c).

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the Editorial Note against the sources and the scan. The recent hand in B adds only τί in the margin at 492b4, not τί ἂν; the *Cratylus* gives the play on σῆμα to "some" (400c), not to the followers of Orpheus, and the note now gives Philolaus' fragment as Clement quotes it, citing "the ancient theologians and seers"; the *Republic* gives the water carried in a sieve in Hades to the unholy and unjust (363d), not to the uninitiated, and the *Cratylus* reports the derivation of Hades from ἀιδές as the common view and rejects it (403a, 404b); the renaming of the virtues in the *Republic* is the work of the false and boastful arguments that seize the young man's soul, and begins with temperance called unmanliness (560d–561a); Xenophon's Hippias asks his question "as if mocking"; and the note on the stone-curlew names its sources, the scholia and Olympiodorus. Three notes were added: on the jingle of νόμον, λόγον and ψόγον (492b8), and on Burnet's readings ἀνοήτων (493b1) and ἀνέδην (494e10). In the Editorial Note the Alexander of 491e3 was identified as Alexander of Aphrodisias,

who quotes Socrates' answer in his commentary on Aristotle's *Topics*; Rabe's text of the treatise *On the Method of Forcefulness* is noted as having Zeus for Zethus at 489e2; the asterisks are described as Burnet leaves them, unexplained; the comma at 493b4 is compared with *Legg.* 714 e and *Alc. ii.* 146 a 6; an entry without a key is said to belong to the line, not the section, of the one before it; *ex* was added to the abbreviations; and the sentence on *plēroun* was corrected.

Not changed. ἱκανός stays "sufficient", as in all nineteen places of the dialogue, so that Callicles' "sufficient nature" (484a) and his "sufficient by their own nature" (492b) share one word, though the *Phaedrus* has "capable" for ability; ἁμαρτάνειν stays "err", as at 479a and 488a; διανοεῖσθαι stays "be minded", the series' word (472d); τῇ ἀληθείᾳ is "truly" at 492b4 and "in truth" at 492c3, where the relative needs the noun; and Sauppe's οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλα (493d2) has no note, since it leaves the sense unchanged.

Block VIII (Burnet pages 71–80, 495c3–502b8)

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the ten pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter, and every margin letter and number with a full rendering of the page. The block is made largely of quick exchanges that Burnet runs into one paragraph; the reviewers confirmed each dash and label at the end or head of its line, and the dash within a sentence at 500d10. The text needed two corrections of the digital transcription, ᾄσεται at 502b7, with the smooth breathing Burnet gives every form of ᾄδω, and παρασκευαὶ at 500b1, where he prints the final form of sigma inside the word, kept as an apparent misprint. A third correction in the draft, ἀθρόαις at 501d4, was withdrawn: both reviewers measured the breathing against the sure rough breathing of ἅμα beside it and of Burnet's ἁθρόοι at 490b2, and found it rough, as the transcription has it. They confirmed the breathings the draft had marked as doubtful, among them αὐτὸν (495e2), ἅσμενος (499b6) and the four οἷ of 498e3–4, rough, and ἄττα (496c1), smooth, against ἅττα (497a6); Sauppe's ἦ ἄρα at 499d5, with a circumflex; φῄς with an acute at 498c1 and 498e2 against φῂς with a grave elsewhere; and the four passages in square brackets (497a8, 498b1, 498c7, 500c7). In the apparatus six forms were corrected, each a breathing, accent or subscript the draft had supplied or missed: F's προι οί at 497a7 has an acute and no breathing; F's ἰδῆς (497a8) and συμφῆς (500e1) have no subscript; the third word of B's ἧττον ἧττον ἡτ|τον (498e4) has a rough breathing and no circumflex; and Findeisen's ἄλογός

(501a6) has a second acute, before the enclitic. The reviewers confirmed the vertical stroke in B's form at 498e4, the missing point after *om* at 500e3, and P named twice and a small p at 500b3, all kept as printed. The printer's signature at the foot of scan p. 339 is not reproduced.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause. The commonest correction was the series' ruling that δοκεῖ μοι is "I think": the draft had "seem" in twelve places (498a–502b), where "seem" belongs to ἔοικε. Other words were brought into line with the series: ὡσαύτως "in the same way", against ὁμοίως "likewise" in the same exchanges; εἴπερ "if"; βούλεσθαι "want"; Τί δέ; "What?"; μέντοι "however"; πολέμιος "foe"; ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι "recollect"; Οὐ δῆτα "No indeed"; ἐρῶ "I will say"; συμφάναι "concur" (472a); ἔστι with the infinitive "can one" and ἔχειν with the infinitive "have the means to"; εὑρίσκειν "find"; φάναι "claim"; ἄνθρωπος in the singular "person"; ὡς with the genitive absolute "on the ground that"; χρῆσθαι "use"; δέχεσθαι "accept"; σῴζειν "keep safe"; and τεχνικός "masterly", without the words "in craft" the draft had added. ἅμα is "at the same time" in all its seventeen places, and the perfect ἀπήλλακται is rendered as a perfect. Words the draft had left out are rendered: αὐτός at 495e1, F's καί at 498d3, καί at 498e8, and the ironic δή of "the things of a man, indeed" at 500c; the "only" added at 500b, which followed Lamb, and the "not" added at 498b, are gone. The marker stood a word late at 499b1 and 500d1. Wording that followed W. R. M. Lamb's Loeb more closely than the Greek requires was changed (498a, 498e, 500a, 500b, 501a, 501d, 501e).

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the Editorial Note against the sources and the scan. The note on Stallbaum's λέγω at 496d1 now says that B, T, P and F have καὶ ἐγώ and other manuscripts ἐγώ; the saying of 498e is given as the proverb Socrates calls it in the *Philebus* (60a), which a scholiast traces to Empedocles, not as Empedocles' outright; the note on the Mysteries cites Plutarch's *Demetrius* (26), where the same word, *ou themiton*, is used; the butcher's routine is recalled from 462d–465e; and notes were added on the readings πλήρωσις (496e1), τὰ αὐτά (499c1) and ἀτέχνως (501a4), each of which changes the sense. In the Editorial Note the transcription is said to give every form of ᾄδω a rough breathing (451e3, 484b2, 502a6, 502b7); Hermann's deletion at 502b2 is keyed as Burnet keys it; the Coislin manuscript of 502a5 is no longer identified with the one whose corrector is cited at 482a7; and the ranges in the sentence

on renderings were corrected.

Not changed. ἐπιτήδευσις stays "pursuit", beside διώκειν "pursue" in the next sentence (501d–e), pending Amvion's ruling on the Block III renderings; Baiter's φῂς at 497a1 has no note, since "you claim" and the manuscripts' "you claimed" come to the same.

Block IX (Burnet pages 81–90, 502b9–508e3)

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the ten pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter, and every margin letter and number with a full rendering of the page. The text needed one correction of the digital transcription, Πῶλος at 508c3, where it has a small letter; the reviewers found no error in the text as built. They confirmed the points the draft had marked as doubtful: ῥητορικὴ without the article at 502d2; the closed-up dashes within a sentence at 503c7 and 503d2; the three passages in square brackets (503d2, 503e2, 503e3), with the comma inside the second; the quotation marks round the words of Epicharmus at 505e1–2, with the comma inside them; every dash and capital in Socrates' argument with himself (506c6–507a2, 507a7–b4); the unlabelled new paragraphs at 507c8 and 508c4; Οὔ at 508d6; Heindorf's ἀλλ' ἃ δεῖ at 507b6; and the printer's signature 22* at the foot of scan p. 341. In the apparatus seven forms were corrected, each a breathing, accent or subscript: at 503e3 the breathings of the three forms (αὑτῶν B, αὐτῶν T P F, αὑτοῦ vulg.), which the draft had reversed; at 505b11 the lemma is the article ἡ, not ἣ, as Iamblichus' text confirms; F's ἅτε δὴ (505d6) has a rough breathing; P's οὐ τω (506d6) has no accent; T's δή (506d8) has an acute; T's ἑκαστον (506e3) has no accent, kept as an apparent misprint; and P's τούτω (508b7) has no subscript.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause and against the series' rulings. Most corrections brought words into line with rulings made earlier: Δῆλον δή "Plainly, then", as in Callicles' own words at 502a1; ἄλλο τι ἤ "is it not"; Τί δέ "What of", without the "then" that belongs to Τί δὲ δή; χείρων "inferior", since "worse" is κακίων (503a, 503b, 503d); φράζειν "declare"; ἁρμόττειν "be in harmony"; τεχνικός "master of the craft" of a person, as at 500a; κάμνειν "be ill", against νοσεῖν "be sick"; εἴργειν "shut out"; μέλει "it matters"; γιγνώσκειν "know"; δύνασθαι "have power"; χρή "ought" and δεῖ "must", which the draft had exchanged in seven places; ἀλλὰ μὲν δή "But then" and καὶ μὲν δή "moreover"; περαίνειν "carry through"; αὖ

"again"; ζῷον "animal"; ἀμείνων "superior"; Ἔστι ταῦτα "It is so"; ἀσκεῖν "exercise oneself in"; προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν "pay attention"; λανθάνειν "escape the notice"; διά with the accusative "because of"; οὔ φημι "I claim ... not"; ὁρμᾶν "start"; φάναι "claim"; φάθι "say so". The adverb κάλλιστα is "best", as in the *Phaedrus*. Where the draft's words belonged to other Greek, new ones were found: εἰπεῖν "speak of", since "name" is ὀνομάζειν; ἀποτελεῖν "satisfy", since "fulfil" is ἐπιτελεῖν; ὄφελος "service", since "use" is χρεία; and μοχθηρός, of a house and a body, "sorry", with διακεῖσθαι "be disposed", since "poor" is the word of poverty. Words the draft had left out are rendered: αὐτῷ at 503e4, F's δέ γε at 504d1, the γάρ of γάρ τοι at 505d6, the καί of ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτός at 506b2, and the δή or γε at 502e8, 504a2, 508a8 and 508d4; the "and" added at 505e1 and the "part" added at 503a6 are gone. At 503e4 ἰδεῖν is rendered as the infinitive it is, and at 506b8 ἀκούων as a participle, which moved the marker of 506c by a word. The recapitulation of 480d at 508b now has "make use of rhetoric", as there. Wording that followed W. R. M. Lamb's Loeb more closely than the Greek requires was changed (503a6, 503d1, 503d5, 503e8, 504d5, 506c4, 506d1).

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the Editorial Note against the sources and the scan. The note on the benefactor now gives the phrase as the one used of the Persian king's roll of benefactors (Herodotus 8.85; Thucydides 1.129.3) as well as of the cities' decrees; the Epicharmus note quotes the line in the words of the text and says that Burnet's quotation marks enclose its first half; the note on εὖ πράττειν marks its reading of 507c as an interpretation; the note on Heindorf's ἀλλ' ἃ δεῖ names the later hand in F; the notes on the speakers at 503d, the bracketed words at 503e and the family of κόσμος were made exact; and a cross-reference was corrected to 473e–474a. In the Editorial Note the papyrus is identified as P. Oxy. III 454; Aristides' citations at 502c5 and 503a–b are traced to his speech *In Defence of the Four*, and Iamblichus' at 505a–507e to chapters 18 and 19 of the *Protrepticus*; the transcription's small letters at the new paragraphs of 484c4, 507c8 and 508c4 are named; the Epicharmus quotation is described as opening with a small letter; and *punctis notatum* and *post hanc vocem* were added to the abbreviations, with a sentence on how the papyrus' letters are given.

Not changed. At 505b the English "and not permit it to do other things than those" shares a sequence of words with Lamb's, which the Greek requires; ἀντί at 506b6 is "in return for", with

ἀποδιδόναι, a stated sense beside the series' "in place of".

Block X (Burnet pages 91–100, 508e3–515e4)

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the ten pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter, and every margin letter and number with a full rendering of the page. The text needed one correction of the digital transcription, Πῶλος at 509e5, where it has a small letter; it also has small letters where Burnet capitalizes the quoted question at 510d5 (Τίνα), the unquoted imagined words at 514d5 and 515a4 (Φέρε) and the new paragraph at 512b3 (Διὰ ταῦτα), and these are printed as he prints them. The reviewers found no error in the text as built, and confirmed the points the draft had marked as doubtful, among them the rough breathings of *αὑτῷ* and *αὑτοῦ* (509b8, 509c8), *αὑτὸν* (510d7, 512d3, 513a1) and *αὑτῶν* (513b8); the closed-up dashes at 509d8; the bracket [*ἴσως καὶ*] at 513c8; *ἴδια* at 514c2; and the printer's signatures 23 at the foot of scan p. 355 and 23* at the foot of scan p. 357, whose 3 looks like an 8 at low magnification but is fixed by the run of signatures. In the apparatus two forms were corrected: F's *ἀπ*[*οβιβάσασα*] at 511e3, where the draft had doubled a syllable inside the brackets, and the smooth breathing of T, P and F's *ἢ τὸ* at 512d7, where the draft had the rough. A dot before *καὶ* in the entry at 509e7 was measured and found to be a fleck.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause and against the series' rulings. The largest class of correction was again words that already belong to other Greek in the series: *λύειν* is "undo", as at 480e; *ψέγειν* "censure", as *ψόγος*; *φοβεῖσθαι* "be afraid", since "fear" is *δέδοικα*; *συμβουλεύειν* "advise", since "counsel" belongs to *βουλεύματα*; *διαπράττεσθαι* "contrive", as at 478e–479a; *ἐπιχειρεῖν* "attempt", in seven places, since "undertaking" is *ἐπιχείρημα*; *παρακαλεῖν* "summon", in six places, as at 500c, which 515a recalls word for word; *τῇ ἀληθείᾳ* "truly" and *ὡς ἀληθῶς* "in truth", which the draft had exchanged; *μέντοι* "however"; *οὕτω* "thus" and *ὧδε* "this way"; *πέφυκε* "is naturally"; *διά* with the accusative "because of"; *ἀντί* "in place of"; *ὑποκεῖσθαι* "lie under", as at 465b; *τὸ λεγόμενον* "as the saying goes"; *ἀνάγκη* "it is a necessity"; and *τὰ φίλτατα* "what we love most", since *φίλος* is never "dear" except in "dear head". *σχῆμα*, "shape" at 465b and 474d–e, is "bearing" for the pilot's carriage at 511d–e, a stated sense. At 513c8, with

ἴσως καί bracketed, πολλάκις after ἐάν takes its sense "perhaps", not "often", which the draft had rendered with Lamb. Constructions were made exact: the object of the participle at 509c8 ("By preparing what"), the genitive absolute at 513c1, the plain futures at 510e5, the present unreal ἔδει ἄν at 514a–b, and the place of γε at 512e1. Words the draft had added or left out were put right ("and" at 511c3, "from us" at 509b6, "too" at 513b6, "then" at 514c3; καί at 511e2 and 512d5, δή at 514e6), and nine markers were moved to the first word of their section. Wording that followed W. R. M. Lamb's Loeb more closely than the Greek requires was changed (509b6, 509c8, 510c8, 511c3, 512b3, 513c8, 514d7, 514e3, 514e6, 515b6, 515d9).

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the Editorial Note against the sources and the scan. Marcus Aurelius' copy of the passage begins at 512d6, not d7; the Thessalian witches' price is given from the collections of proverbs (Zenobius 4.1; the *Suda*), since the scholion could not be seen; the note on like to like says what the *Lysis* and the *Symposium* each quote; the note on 509e marks its reading as an interpretation and names the proof it depends on (474c–475e); Schanz's ἦ and his variant at 514c2 are given; and notes were added on F's ἑταῖρον at 510a10 and πράξοντες at 514a6, each of which changes the sense. In the Editorial Note the correctors of the Paris manuscripts are attributed to the second and the last of the four, the dashes are placed at 509d8, and the gloss of *et supra … cum B* says "in the line above".

Not changed. "With all his mind" (ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ νοῦ, 510c1), "held down" (κατέχεσθαι, 508e7) and "train" (γυμνάζεσθαι, 514e5) are kept as stated senses; the shared sequences of words with Lamb that remain are those the Greek requires.

Block XI (Burnet pages 101–110, 515e5–522e4)

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the ten pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter, and every margin letter and number with a full rendering of the page. The digital transcription has small letters where Burnet capitalizes the unquoted imagined words at 521b7 (Ἀλλ') and 522b9 (Δικαίως) and the head of the quoted words at 521e6 (Ὦ) and 522a5 (Ταῦτα); these, and Burnet's letterspacing of τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα at 521e1–2, are printed as he prints them. One correction of the transcription was made in review: γάρ at 522d2, where Burnet sets an acute, measured against the sure grave of γὰρ on the

same page; it is kept as an apparent misprint. The reviewers confirmed the points the draft had marked as doubtful, among them the rough breathings of *αὐτόν* (516c7), *αὐτῷ* (517e3, 522c8), *αὐτοῦ* (520e3) and the bracketed *αὐτούς* (519c6, in the text and in the lemma), the smooth *αὐτῷ* of 522c7, the closed-up dashes at 517a5–6 and 521d2–3, and the margin letter e at 518e1, which the coarser view turns into a solid square. In the apparatus two forms were corrected: the prefix *ὑπερ* at 519b3, which Burnet prints with a rough breathing and no accent, where the draft had the preposition *ὕπερ*; and P's *ὦ* at 517c5, which has no iota subscript. The breathing of B's *ᾗ* at 516b2 and of B and T's *ᾗ* at 517e5, under the circumflex, was settled as rough on pixel maps against sure forms. The review also found that the typesetting turned Burnet's runs of asterisks into italic markers, so that four printed as two at 476b7 and 519b3; asterisks in the apparatus are now set as Burnet sets them, within the x-height, at those places and at 491e3 and 516b2.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause and against the series' rulings. Again the largest class of correction was words that belong to other Greek in the series: *αὖ* is "again", since "in turn" is *ἐν μέρει*; *διά* with the accusative "because of"; *τούτου ἕνεκα* "for this reason", as at 456d–457b; *ἀληθῆ λέγειν* "speak the truth"; *ἀποστερεῖν* "default", as in the *Phaedrus*; *πάγκαλος* "altogether beautiful", as in the *Phaedrus*; *διακονεῖν* "act as servant", since "serve" is *ὑπηρετεῖν*; *φιλάργυρος* "lover of silver", since "money" is *χρήματα*; *νῦν γοῦν* "now, at any rate", since "just now" is *ἄρτι*; *οἱ παλαιοί* "the men of old"; *ἰδίᾳ* and *δημοσίᾳ* "privately" and "publicly"; *ἀπορία* "want of resource", as in the *Symposium*; and personal *δοκεῖν* without a dative "seem", as at 464d and 486c. A doubled negative at 520c–d was corrected (the trainer is safe if he makes the compact and takes the money at once), and so were the past unreal at 516a, the reply *Ἔοικά γε* at 519e ("I seem able, at any rate"), the reference of *Μυσόν* at 521b ("call yourself a Mysian"), and the subject of the genitive absolute at 519b ("you and he"). Particles the draft had left out were restored, among them *γε* at 516c, 517a, 520c and 521b, *δή* and *γε* at 517e5 and *δή* at 520d1 (both from F), *καί* at 518c and 521e, and *ἔγωγε* at 522d. Eight Stephanus markers were moved to the first word of their section, and the English of a divided word was kept on the page where the word begins (520a7–8). Wording that followed Lamb's Loeb more closely than the Greek requires was changed (516e, 519e, 521c, 522b, 522d).

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked

every note and the Editorial Note against the sources and the scan. The note on 520b had made justice the counterpart of legislation in the scheme of 464b–c, where it is the counterpart of medicine and the partner of legislation; the note on Thearion and Mithaecus now gives Athenaeus' places correctly (3.112c–e; 7.282a, 7.325f); Thucydides' report of Pericles' fine and re-election is cited as 2.65.3–4; the Homeric line is cited with its second verse; the note on Miltiades adds that Aelius Aristides, answering Plato, denies the story of the prytanis; the note on *καταβολή* cites LSJ, and the note on Alcibiades Thucydides 6.15.2; the note on the Mysian marks its reading as interpretation; and a note was added on F's *ἓν* at 522c7 and *καὶ εἰ διὰ* at 522d6, which change the sense. In the Editorial Note the Venice manuscript at 517c7 is identified, from Burnet's own list of sigla, as the Marcianus 189 (his S, Bekker's Σ); the places of *scr. recc.* (521d1) and *recc.* (517e7), *coniecerat* (514a3) and *γρ.* (521e8) were added; the sentence on the asterisks now allows for a gap as well as an erasure, as Burnet's words at 519b3 require; and the dash at which Callicles breaks off (521b3) was added.

Not changed. *ζεῦγος* is "chariot" at 516e, the chariot with its team, against the *Phaedrus*' "team"; *θεραπευτής* is "tender", keeping *θεραπεύειν* "tend", against the *Phaedrus*' "worshipper"; *προστάτης* is "a man who stands at the head of", keeping *προστατεῖν* and *προεστάναι*, against the *Phaedrus*' "champion"; and *ὦ παῖδες* is "Children", as the jury of children at 464d, against the *Symposium*'s "boys" for slaves: all stated senses. Whether the Editorial Note's list of dashes within a sentence should name those of Blocks I–V is left to the final reading.

Block XII (Burnet pages 111–117, 522e5–527e7)

The Greek. Two reviewers, dividing the seven pages between them, compared the text and apparatus with the photographs letter by letter, and every margin letter and number with a full rendering of the page; one of them also read the typeset Greek of the whole block against the source. They found no error in the words, accents, breathings or apparatus. The digital transcription has small letters where Burnet capitalizes the head of Zeus' speech at 523c1 (Ἀλλ') and Polus' name at 525d2 and 527a9, and it closes the quotation and opens another at 523e6, where Burnet prints none; Burnet's page is followed in all four places. The reviewers confirmed the new paragraphs at 524a8 and 527a5, which have no speaker's label, and that 526d3 runs on; the closed-up dashes at 525e4–5, 526c6–7, 526d1 and 527e1; the rough breathings of *αὑτῶν*

(523d3, 523d5), *αὐτοῦ* (524b6, 524b7, 526c4) and *ἑαυτὸν* (527c2); and, in the apparatus, the coronis of *ἐγῷμαι* (523a2), F's *ταυτὰ* without one (524d1, 527d7), the smooth *ᾗ* of the four forms at 524a6, *ἐν ᾅδου* (525c7) and *ἄν* (i. e. *ἄν*) (526b1). One correction was made in review: the line before the verse at 526d1, which ends short in Burnet, had been stretched to the full measure and is now set ragged, as before the verse at 484b and 492e. The verse at 526d2 keeps the indent measured on the scan, though in the typeset page it stands a little left of centre.

The English. One reviewer compared the English with the Greek clause by clause and against the series' rulings. Once more the largest class was words that the series had already given to the same Greek: *θεᾶσθαι* "behold", as at 495e; *ἀκολουθεῖν* "attend" and *ἡγεμών* "leader", as in the *Phaedrus*; *κόσμος* "adornment", as in the *Symposium*, where it is finery; *ἐλλόγιμος* "of note", with 514c changed to match; the singular *ἄνθρωπος* "person"; *ἄξιον* with an infinitive "worth while"; *ἀτίμως* "in dishonour"; and *δοκεῖ σοι* with an infinitive "you think", at 527a. The judges' eyes, ears and bodies are now what is put as a veil before the soul (523d), as the middle with its accusative requires; a participle with no Greek behind it was removed at 523b ("the judges were living, of the living"); and particles the draft had left out were restored, among them *δή* at 523b, *καί* at 523d, 525d, 526a and 526c, and *γε* at 526a. Two Stephanus markers were moved to the first word of their section (523c, 526a). The dashes at 526c2–4, where Burnet prints commas, were removed, and Burnet's second dash at 527e1, which the draft had made a full stop, was restored. Wording that followed Lamb's Loeb more closely than the Greek requires was changed (523b, 523e, 527a, 527e), and 522d was brought into line with *τελευτᾶν* "come to one's end".

The notes and the Editorial Note. A fourth reviewer checked every note and the Editorial Note against the sources and the scan. The note on Socrates' answer to Callicles at 527a now recalls 486a–c in the edition's own words: the dizziness and gaping come when Socrates is taken hold of and led off, and the blow on the jaw is one for which no penalty is paid. The *Iliad* does not name the mother of Minos and Rhadamanthys, and the *Apology* names four judges in Hades, Triptolemus among them; the note now says so, and marks as interpretation its account of "from Asia". The note on "Listen, then" marks as interpretation that the words open a story, and cites Critias' opening at *Timaeus* 20d. Three notes had followed published English versions of Aeschylus, Homer and Herodotus

and were translated afresh; Aristides' name "the Just" is now referred to Plutarch, and Findeisen's reading is explained as a verb. In the Editorial Note the range of Eusebius and Theodoret runs to 527a5, and Eusebius' work is named; the citations of Aristides at 526a–b are referred to his speech *To Plato, in Defence of Rhetoric*, which quotes the passage; Plutarch's chapter and Gellius' place are given; Stobaeus' range ends where his last entry does; three more lemmas that run over two lines are listed; and the sentence on the translation's renderings was corrected and completed.

Not changed. *κρίνειν* is "try" in the myth, where the dead are tried, beside *δικάζειν* "judge", though it shares the word with *πειρᾶσθαι* "try" at 526d and was "judge" at 452c and 465d; *δίκη*, the case at law, is "case" (523b–c, 526e); *ἀντί* is "worth" at 526e; and *ἄτιμος* is "dishonouring" of the blow at 527c: all stated senses. Whether Theodoret's work should be named, and the singular *ἄνθρωπος* at 516b and 522c and *τετελευτηκότα* at 503c, are left to the final reading.